General inspectors of infantry, cavalry, and engineering units in the Russian army and the issue of the boundaries of their powers in the system of high military administration of Russia in the early 20th century

Datsko Nikita Igorevich Lecturer; Department of Humanities; Russian National Research Medical University named after N.I. Pirogov Postgraduate student; Department of History of Russia of the 19th century – early 20th Century; Lomonosov Moscow State University Russia, Moscow, Ramenki district, ter. Lenin Mountains, 1e datsko.nikita@yandex.ru

After a series of reforms in the military administration, which began at the end of the Russian-Japanese War in 1905 and aimed at decentralizing this administration, the importance of the inspector generals of infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineering units increased dramatically. Now, subordinately, they were independent of the Minister of War, overseeing the training of troops by inspecting them. Therefore, the specifics of the duties of the inspector generals required permanent business trips to the troops. Each of the inspector Generals was accountable only to the emperor, and holding such a position made it possible to automatically join the Council of State Defense of the Russian Empire, established in 1905 to coordinate the activities of all higher authorities of the decentralized military department. In fact, they were especially trusted figures of the tsar directly in the army.

The historiography of the topic of inspector general posts in the Russian Imperial army of the twentieth century is rather poor. There are no special works that would consider and analyze the role and functions of the inspector generals of the armed forces in the structure of the supreme military administration. Nevertheless, in the generalizing works there are references and indirect or direct references to this topic. Thus, even in the study of V.V. Kuzin in the middle of the twentieth century, it was about the important role of inspector generals in the work of the Council of State Defense, about the reliance of the chairman of this Council, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich Jr., on them in order to influence the implementation of Russia's military policy during the period under review ^[1]. Other Soviet military historians I.I. Rostunov ^{[2, p. 37]} and L.G. Beskrovny ^{[3, p. 56]} noted in their works that the removal of inspection functions from the jurisdiction of the Minister of War, but with the retention of economic issues on him, disrupted the effectiveness of centralized army management. Among the works of modern researchers, the dissertations of I.A. Bodrichenko, which examines in detail the office of the Inspector General of Infantry at the beginning of the 20th century ^[4], D.V. Pirogov, where the author, in the context of analyzing the reaction of military periodicals to the course of reforms in the Russian army in 1905 - 1914, notes concern in military circles about the discord between the military Minister, Inspector General and Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff ^{[5, p. 95]}. Also in recent decades, a monograph translated into Russian by the American historian B. Mennig has been published, summarizing the experience of the development of the armed forces of the Russian Empire over half a century: from the Milutin reforms to the First World War ^[6]. In it, however, the author touches on the topic of inspector generals in the army at the beginning of the twentieth century only once, when he examines the activities of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr. as an inspector of cavalry ^{[6, p. 216]}.

Despite the importance of the post of Inspector General, which has been actively revived since 1905 (at the time of this year, there was only the post of Inspector General for engineering in the army, which appeared under Nicholas I), until the end of 1907 and the beginning of 1908, there was no seriously elaborated regulatory legal act that would clearly regulate activities and powers. These positions are in a large and complex military management system. Back in 1905, during the first Special Meeting of the State Defense Council, it was declared that inspector generals should be assigned an important role as supervisors of the officer certification process in the field ^{[7, l. 20 mod.]}. At the same time, the exercise of such a function in the absence of clear regulations between inspector generals and other links The military administration had its negative results, which influenced the course of reforms in the army.

For example, in 1907, the Minister of War of that time, General A.F. Rediger, on his own initiative, concerning the development of measures to improve the quality of training of chief and staff officers, decided to improve the combat training of officers in the infantry and cavalry. To do this, he wanted to transform officer schools into staff officer courses "... so that only those who completed these courses could be transferred to staff officers; I (A.F. Rediger - N.D.) intended to give technical information on the specialties to senior officers in special schools attached to the troops" ^{[8, p. 148]}. For infantry, it was supposed to form rifle courses for staff captains in military districts. Officers in this rank, as a rule, usually applied for the positions of company commanders. In addition to more thorough training of future military leaders in various aspects of small arms, these courses sought to fully immerse them in the newly developing machine-gun business. In the cavalry, A.F. Rediger wanted to organize riding and cavalry training courses at the division level, which would include honing such important techniques for a cavalry commander as riding, organizing cavalry reconnaissance, forging, and others. A.F. Rediger took the corresponding schools in Austria-Hungary, a potential opponent of Russia in the expected great European war, as a model. To obtain information about such an experience in training troops, he specifically used the Russian agency in Austria-Hungary and, through a military agent, Count Snapocki, obtained information about these training schools ^{[8, pp. 148-149]}.

How did the Inspectors General of the infantry, General N.P. Zarubaev, and General V.M. Cavalry react to this initiative? Ostrogradsky, called up by their position to take care of the training of their subordinate troops? The Minister of War met their determined resistance and sabotage. It is especially noteworthy in this situation that the reasons for this resistance were that the minister's proposed initiative "was carried out in addition to him (Zarubaev – ND), and Ostrogradsky did not know anything about schools in Austria-Hungary (!) and simply wondered why I needed new schools?" ^{[8, p. 149]}.

Separately, it should be noted that A.F. Rediger and N.P. Zarubaev did not have a good relationship after he joined the higher military directorate as Inspector General of Infantry. Although, as we recall, when considering the regulations of A.F. Rediger on the procedure for officer attestations and appointment to the posts of combatant chiefs, N.P. Zarubaev at the summer meeting in 1906 was an active supporter of the proposals of the Minister of War on the discussed project ^{[8, pp. 67-68]}. Before the Russian-Japanese war, this military commander was little known, but during it he performed well as commander of the 4th Siberian Army Corps. This was the impetus for his career growth. On the recommendation of M.A. Gazenkampf, whose friend N.P. Zarubaev was, the general became an assistant to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr., with whose patronage he was appointed to inspect the infantry. A.F. Rediger recalled that he met him at meetings of the State Defense Council and later wrote that N.P. Zarubaev "he spoke little, but intelligently, and gave the impression of a modest, more taciturn man; although his abilities seemed average to me (A.F. Rediger – N.D.), he had a glorious military past" ^{[8, p. 67]}. When the post of Inspector General of Infantry became vacant in the spring of 1906 as a result of O.F.K. Grippenberg's illness, it was A.F. Rediger, with the urgent advice and efforts of M.A. Gazenkampf, who proposed the candidacy of N.P. Zarubaev for this post. It got to the point that, taking advantage, as minister, of the opportunity to have a personal audience with the emperor, A.F. Rediger asked Nicholas II himself about his appointment. However, the efforts of the Minister of War did not contribute to the establishment of a close working relationship between him and the new appointee: "Zarubaev's relationship with me immediately changed. Considering himself subordinate only to the chairman of the Defense Council, he began to systematically ignore me and, traveling around the country, did not even inform me about his trips or what he saw. He showed great self-conceit and resentment towards the commanders of the troops" ^{[8, p. 68]}.

Such arbitrariness and conflict situations created various problems that hindered the organic work that took place at the top of the military-administrative hierarchy. It is no coincidence that when in the summer of 1907 the question arose about the formation of a commission under the CDF to develop a "Regulation on Inspectors General", the chief of the General Staff, General A.E. Evert, A.F. Rediger, who was not part of it himself, gave a kind of "ministerial order", the essence of which was the need to insist on the introduction of the provision of the obligation to inspectors general "always inform the Minister of War where they are going for inspection" ^{[8, p. 190]}. Thus, A.E. Evert was a party to the commission representing the interests of the Ministry of War.

At the same time, the tsar himself had a need for inspectors-general. It can be traced in the working correspondence of the Minister of War with the august chairman of the CDF on the activities of the Higher Attestation Commission for the CDF dated February 26, 1907, where Nikolai Nikolaevich was the first to be informed that "the Sovereign Emperor ... was pleased ... to deign ..." so that the inspector generals, who are personally accountable to him, were actively involved in the work of the Higher Attestation Commission for the CDF "to inform the commission of data on the official activities of senior commanders" based on the results of their inspections and inspections in the troops ^{[9, l. 17]}. Through the participation of inspector generals in the work of the Higher Attestation Commission located at the CDF, which, as is known, inspector generals were included in on the basis of the "Regulations on the CDF" ^{[10, l. 26-30]}, the tsar could have persons independent of Nikolai Nikolaevich in their official position in the commission (after all, they are accountable only to the emperor, with the right to make a personal report, etc.). Through these inspector generals, Nicholas II thus sought to obtain his own instrument of control over the course of certification activities, bypassing the Minister of War and the chairman of the CDF. All this was done because of the emperor's desire to constantly remain independent of anyone's opinion when making decisions. For the tsar, this was extremely important, since it was he who retained the last and decisive signature, approving the decisions of the Higher Attestation Commission, which dismissed generals deemed incompetent or completely useless in the army.

This "Highest permission" followed as a result of the report of the General Staff to the Emperor dated February 22, which preceded the letter, in which the question was raised about the position of Inspector generals in the certification processes. It stated that "Your Imperial Majesty has already been pleased to deign to review the regulations on inspectors-General of arms in the Council of State Defense, but consideration of this complex issue in its entirety will require a long time" ^{[9, l. 19]}. At this time (the beginning of 1907), as you know, the "Temporary Regulations on officer certifications..." had already been fully implemented. In this regard, it became increasingly difficult for the military bureaucratic machine to leave the issue of the legal status of inspector generals in uncertainty under these conditions.

Therefore, this car was already in motion at the end of March. Let's consider her work on the "Regulations on Inspectors General" in 1907 - early 1908. During the spring of 1907, work was underway on the outline of the initial draft of the "Regulations on Inspectors General." In March, the Minister of War was followed by report No. 262 of the Committee for the Education of Troops, which complained about the lack of control over some "senior combatant commanders" in the matter of "military training" ^{[11, l. 5]}. Also in the report, the Committee believed that "inspector generals should make sure what measures are being applied in the troops ..." by senior commanders to eliminate the shortcomings in military training revealed by the results of the last Japanese war. The report described in detail what shortcomings in the command of formations during field exercises the inspector generals needed to pay attention to and fix them ^{[11, l. 6]}. On April 7, the Minister of War sends a copy of this report with a cover letter to the Chairman of the State Defense Council with a request to once again return to the issue of the powers and functions of inspector generals at the next meeting of the Council ^{[11, l. 7]}. Nikolai Nikolaevich responded by agreeing with the comments of the Committee on the Education of Troops, but, at the same time, He pointed out that the discussion in the CSO of the issue of formalizing the legislative procedure for the terms of reference of inspector generals, their rights and duties is still premature, since his "Highly approved" guidelines for inspector generals when sending them on a business trip to the troops are quite sufficient ^{[11, pp. 7-8]}.

However, at the next meeting of the Higher Attestation Commission of Officers under the Council of State Defense, the question of the necessity of the provision was raised again, all this reached the emperor and the Supreme Will entrusted the development of the text to Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich– Inspector General of Artillery. In turn, the Council of State Defense formed a commission, headed by Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr., appointed General M.A. Gazenkampf, who obeyed him. This commission at the CDF was initially supposed to work out the wording of the "regulation" before it was submitted for discussion directly to the Council. It was also lower in its composition in terms of hierarchy. The commission consisted mainly of assistants to the heads of those departments and authorities who sat in the Council of State Defense itself ^{[11, pp. 9-10]}.

The assembled commission, led by M.A. Gazenkampf, conducted its work for a very long time, until November 2, although it was designed to solve only the technical aspects of the case. Meanwhile, a serious discussion broke out. At the meetings on September 16, 24, 28, 3, 6, 12, 17, 23, 26 On October and November 2, the commission sequentially reviewed article after article of the text of the editorial office of Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich ^{[11, pp. 12-91]}.

Already at the first meetings of the commission in September, a significant part of the military officials showed dissatisfaction with the existing decentralization of military administration. The projected position, however, was essentially intended to deepen this decentralization. Sentiments about the need to take into account the authority of the Minister of War began to be heard more and more actively. They expressed themselves in proposals to subordinate the inspector generals not to the emperor, but to the Minister of War ^{[11, l. 16]}. Each of the supporters of this idea in the commission argued their position in different ways. General N.I. Ivanov pointed out that at present it is difficult for the military department to answer to the same State Duma on budgetary issues, since, in fact, this department already has 4 different heads who are not accountable and subordinate to each other – the Minister of War, the Head of the GUGS, the Chairman of the CDF and the marine The minister. Now there will be 8 of them at all. Therefore, the general began to insist that if inspectors-general were to be allocated, then the Chairman of the CDF should be placed in charge of the entire military department and this should be fixed by law ^{[11, l. 16 mod.]}. This idea, predictably, did not meet with any support, because then responsibility for everything that happens In the military department, it was not the military and naval ministers who were supposed to be responsible, but Nikolai Nikolaevich. In this position, he had to conduct a direct dialogue with the Duma, work closely with the people's deputies, which the Grand Duke could not afford either as a member of the royal family, or as a military man, or as a person who did not want to burden himself with an unnecessary burden of responsibility for the military department, while holding an important influential post there. In the end, the proposal was at odds with the Regulation on the Council of State Defense, which directly fixed the coordinating, rather than the commanding role of the Chairman of the Council. The head of the commission, M.A. Gazenkampf, almost immediately suppressed this idea ^{[11, l. 17]}.

Both General A.P. Vernander ^{[11, l. 18]}, A.P. Protopopov ^{[11, l. 17]}, and A.P. Skugarevsky ^{[11, l. 14]} spoke in favor of subordination to the Minister of War. General A.Z. Myshlaevsky stated that the activities of inspector generals should be controlling, but not commanding. In other words, the Inspector General should not have the functions of a commander ^{[11, l. 14 mod.]}. The issue of recognizing the command functions of inspectors general in their branches of the armed forces was a separate line of discussion in the commission: are inspectors general only observers or persons who have the opportunity to give orders? After a number of meetings, at a meeting of the commission on October 3, it was resolved as follows: supporters of the subordination of the inspector generals to the Minister of War Gazenkampf and Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich managed to persuade them to agree that the inspector generals remain subordinate only to the emperor (and only directly to him), but only the function of supervisors is recognized for them, and also removed from Their management and inspection is the economic part remaining with the Minister of War ^{[11, l. 39-43]}. However, this only confused the areas of authority of the Inspectors General and the Minister. When the question arose of how to manage the activities of officer schools and academies, it turned out that for each type of weapon, each of these educational institutions had two senior commanders – the Inspector General and the Minister of War. At first, the majority of the commission insisted on leaving officer training camps and academies entirely under the control of the Ministry of War ^{[11, pp. 18-19]}. And here the precedent of the first measures to reorganize the military administration in 1905 worked, to which Sergei Mikhailovich began to appeal, saying that since the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff was accountable to the Chief of the General Staff, F.F. Palitsyn, who did not report to the Minister of War, why could inspectors general who were in the same position as him not qualify for transfer to their jurisdiction of the relevant officer schools, etc. ^{[11, l. 20]}? His idea was developed by A.A. Gulevich, the head of the office of the CDF and also a member of the commission, offering a "compromise option" subordination of schools to the head of the Guard and the St. Petersburg Military District, i.e. the same chairman of the CDF Nikolai Nikolaevich Jr. ^{[11, l. 40]}. As can be seen from the analysis of the discussions in the commissions and meetings of this kind, the decisive role in their work and final decisions belongs to their leader. M.A. Gazenkampf again managed to push the idea of Sergei Mikhailovich ^{[11, l. 60]}, which was shown by the final result of the voting of the commission members.

As is known, A.F. Rediger gave special instructions on the duty to notify the Minister of War of his business trips to inspect troops to A.E. Evert, who participated in the work of the commission. A.E. Evert generally sought to defend the departmental interests of the ministry in the commission. He spoke about the importance of observing the principle of unity of command in the army, which can only be achieved with a centralized Ministry of War ^{[11, l. 14 mod. and 15]}, as well as the need to at least oblige inspector generals to seek permission from the minister for their business trips at the beginning ^{[11, l. 26]}. This proposal has raised many objections. General F.V. Dubasov questioned whether this would belittle the inspector generals ^{[11, l. 26 mod.]}, and M.A. Gazenkamapf pointed out the need for special regulation of these actions, as it is "self-evident" ^{[11, l. 27]}.

The commission had completed its work by November 2, 1907, and was now sending its findings to the CDF, where the case was delayed for another two months.

At the end of 1907, the State Defense Council held 4 meetings, where the "Regulations on Inspector Generals" were considered and discussed: November 28, December 3, 5 and December 17. The vote on the fundamental considerations expressed showed a split in the Council, which Nikolai Nikolaevich began to overcome by his own efforts as chairman. The issue of the autonomy of the inspector generals and their subordination to the Minister was put to the vote of the CDF members. Chief of the General Staff, General A.E. Evert, Inspector General of Cavalry V.M. Ostrogradsky, Assistant Minister of War Polivanov, and General N.I. Ivanov spoke in favor of such subordination, explaining this by their unwillingness to strengthen the excessive fragmentation of the department ^{[12, pp. 5-6]}. Nikolai Nikolaevich, followed by M.A. Gaznekampf, Zarubaev, and Rear Admiral L.A. Brusilov opposed it. Grand Dukes Peter Nikolaevich and Sergei Mikhailovich only conditionally spoke "in favor", on the condition that they, as inspector generals, would not be granted "command rights" ^{[12, l. 7 and 7 arr.]}. Coming out of the situation, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich proposed to gradually consider the articles of the regulation in order to find out which of them it can be accepted under the condition of autonomy. It was in this form of work that compromise options on draft laws were usually reached in commissions and meetings.

The first such question was formulated as follows: "Which position in the "hierarchical-military" relation should be considered higher: the commander in the military district or the inspector general, and which of them should have seniority at the reviews in the ranks?" ^{[12, l. 8]} The final result of the vote showed this: 6 members of the CDF considered it necessary not to to raise the inspector generals above the commanders, 5 – for equality, 3 – for the elevation of the Inspector generals ^{[12, l. 9 mod.]}.

Another, no less fundamental issue directly affected the interests and area of responsibility of the Minister of War. He was asked by the chairman of the CDF at the very first meeting as follows: "Is it necessary for inspectors-General to draw up general plans for detours for inspection of troops by inspectors-general for each year in advance, and is a preliminary agreement with the Minister of War necessary for this?" ^{[12, l. 14]}

Interestingly, the head of the GUGS, F.F. Palitsyn, stayed away from almost all the debates that took place in the CDF. Only at the end did he express his "dissenting opinion," which was placed separately at the end of the meeting log and presented to the Emperor. In many ways, his position was aligned with the views of the Minister of War. For example, F.F. Palitsyn noted that, from his point of view, inspectors-general do not teach anyone, they do not improve anything. These are just "honorary confidants of the Monarch." Therefore, the chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff reasoned, they do not need any departments, ranks with them, or, strictly speaking, positions, "because they can only fulfill the provisions and instructions of the emperor" ^{[12, l. 65]}. It was not by chance that F.F. Palitsyn made such remarks. Excessive strengthening of the powers of inspector generals in the districts could create situations where the instructions of such inspectors, who have real command functions in the military, could run counter to the directives sent down the staff hierarchy by his department. F.F. Palitsyn could not help but realize this.

Allowing for the consideration of a situation when inspector generals act not as individuals with special assignments under the monarch, but as full-fledged military management authorities with their own staff, it is no coincidence that F.F. Palitsyn insisted that in this case they must necessarily be subordinate to the Minister of War ^{[12, l. 65 mod.]}.

Having achieved the separation of "his" military administration body from the custody of the Minister of War, it was no longer desirable to allow the emergence of new similar entities capable of claiming managerial powers from the General Staff itself in the future. It is easier to coordinate decisions with one Minister of War than with several subjects of military power.

As a result of the reviews of each of the articles, it turned out that most of them, which gave certain powers, had to be excluded in order not to create a dual power. At the same time, the role of inspector generals was reduced, since they were "doomed to complete inactivity during periods of absence of inspections" ^{[8, p. 192]}. This largely determined the results of the fourth meeting, when all the articles were reviewed and the fundamental question was raised again: should the inspectors-General be subordinated to the Minister or not? Most of the Council unanimously voted in favor of subordination; only the chairman and three or four "obedient members" voted against it. To reconcile the opinions, A.F. Rediger again proposed equating them with the commanders of the troops, and this proposal was accepted ^{[12, pp. 43-45]}. The Minister of War considered the results of the meetings of the CDF on the issue of inspector generals as part of his victory, saying that "a new fragmentation of power in the military department was prevented" ^{[8, p. 192]}.

On December 31, 1907, the Chairman of the CGO "Most Assuredly presented" the journal of the Council on the issue of the Regulations on Inspectors General, and on January 6, 1908, the Emperor approved the majority opinion ^{[12, l. 1 and 1 mod.]}.

Thus, while working on honing the wording of articles, which, at the same time, remained most often unclear in defining the boundaries of the powers of the inspector generals, the commission at the CDF did not eliminate the fundamental controversial problems for the highest military circles of the empire of the dual nature of the posts of inspectors General. On the one hand, they were equivalent in status to district commanders (and not ministers), on the other hand, they were directly subordinate to the emperor (as a minister), their volitional decisions could completely bypass the Minister of War, unlike the initiatives of the same district commanders. They inspected military educational institutions for their types of weapons, but were not responsible for their economic part. The positions being established were endowed with quite large powers, but at the same time, from the point of view of the wording of the articles, they did not actually oblige the persons who held them to the same degree of responsibility that was assigned to the same ministers and other bureaucrats from the top of the official ladder of the Russian Empire.

All this could not possibly suit the Minister of War, as well as a number of other military managers who did not want to give up their positions to the Grand dukes, who continued to strengthen their presence in the army through the posts of inspector generals. Therefore, at the end of the commission's work, the discussion continued at a higher level – in the Council of State Defense. An analysis of the discussions at this level shows that through this "Provision ...", initiated and developed by one of the members of the imperial family (Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich), the royal personages saw their positions in the army strengthen, since half of the posts of inspector general were occupied by the Grand dukes (artillery and engineering units). After all, the emperor's signature thus secured their specific status, in which the inspector generals rose a little higher in the army hierarchy by law, approximately at the levels between the Minister of War (if not on the same level with him) and the district commanders. At the same time, the results of the November and December 1907 meetings of the Council of State Defense showed that the Minister of War managed to minimize the autonomy of the inspector generals in comparison with the original project, consistently defending his official interests ^{[12, pp. 4-8]}.

To summarize, we note that the painstaking work of the offices, commissions, and meetings of the military department, as in previous times, remained the basis for the genesis of army reforms in the bowels of the supreme military administration of the Russian Empire. At the same time, the order that organized the work of these small units was changing, and with it the principles by which the bureaucracy was supposed to work under the changed system. Since the decentralization of the Ministry of War in 1905 and the concentration of all important military policy matters in the Council of State Defense, even more flexibility and resourcefulness were required from various groups of the highest military bureaucracy in interacting with each other. An analysis of the work of the highest military authorities on the "Regulations on Inspector Generals" shows this well.