The Suez Crisis in the US Foreign Policy Strategy in the Middle East: Risks and Prospects.

Kryzhko Lidiya Anatol'evna PhD in History Senior Lecturer, Department of Archeology and General History, V. I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University 295007, Russia, Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, Academician Vernadsky Ave., 4 lidochka12345@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The Suez crisis of 1956 is one of the most acute conflicts of the Cold War.  The nationalization of the Suez Canal announced by the President of Egypt on July 26, 1956 predetermined the new foreign policy and socio-economic course of G. A. Nasser, a potential leader of the Arab world. His confident actions leveled the regional leadership of Great Britain and France, creating a precedent for the states of the region that remained in political and economic dependence, but at the same time opened it to new actors – the United States and the USSR. In July 1956 The United States faced new geopolitical conditions in the Middle East, within which it was necessary to develop and defend its own position.

Forming a strategy in the context of the growing military conflict in the Middle East, the United States refused to use military forces, unlike the main holders of shares in the Suez Canal – Great Britain and France ^[1]. However, the manifestation of such a diplomatic position collided, on the one hand, with the desire of the Western European allies to regain control of the canal by military means, and on the other – the desire to prevent the possibility of ceding leadership in the region to the Soviet Union.

In domestic and foreign historiography, there remain controversial issues concerning the rationality and foresight of Washington, which did not support the military action of the leading European NATO allies and was forced, in agreement with Moscow, to advocate the cessation of hostilities.Thus, in the works of researchers it is noted that the chosen strategy of deterrence led the United States to confrontation with its allies and put the North Atlantic Alliance itself at risk ^{[2, p.50]}. For the first time after the Second World War, differences in actions between the United States and Great Britain appeared ^{[3, p. 1307]}. At the same time, the Suez crisis is also noted as a unique event in the history of the Cold War, when the two superpowers shared common views on condemning the war and insisted on the withdrawal of the aggressors' troops. At the same time, the researchers emphasize the expediency of the actions of American diplomacy, which was associated with the implementation of the task of strengthening positions in the region ^{[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]}. In the conditions of bipolarity and the growing international activity of the Soviet Union, the United States was inclined to support new national regimes, primarily in Egypt ^{[2, p.51]}. Therefore, despite the fact that a precedent was set in the history of US diplomacy when they found themselves in a "strange company", the US policy in the midst of the Suez crisis is defined as a sure win, sharply different from the adventure that the British and French took ^{[13, p. 133]}. In this regard, it seems necessary, after analyzing in detail the diplomatic activities of the United States during the Suez crisis, to highlight the positions in their foreign policy strategy defined as risks, as well as to show possible prospects for advancing influence in the region in the conditions of the Cold War.

The first reaction of the US administration to the nationalization of the Suez Canal did not outwardly differ from the positions of Great Britain and France. On August 1, 1956, the US Secretary of State in London stated that the control of one nation over the Suez Canal is unacceptable, especially if this nation is Egypt, and, if necessary, it is necessary to undertake a military operation ^{[6, p. 479]}. However, the subsequent actions of the US administration demonstrated a choice in favor of diplomacy.

Tensions in the Middle East coincided with the US presidential election. The election campaign was underway, D. Eisenhower was nominated for a second presidential term, who did not want to allow accusations at party congresses of a policy of pressure on Egypt and the escalation of the Suez crisis ^{[10, p. 89]}. At this stage, Washington has set the immediate task to move London and Paris as far away as possible from the implementation of the military scenario. During consultations with congressional leaders at a meeting at the White House on August 12, 1956, D. Eisenhower agreed that it was impossible to allow "Nasser to get away with all this," but at the same time Britain and France should not have the impression that Washington would support all their initiatives. It was decided to use the pressure of the international community; to explore the possibility of international management of the Suez Canal; to support their allies who decided to use force morally [Ibid., pp. 89-90].

It is worth noting that D. Eisenhower's position was explained not only by electoral considerations, but also by the parallel events in Hungary related to the suppression of the anti-Soviet rebellion.  Against the background of the Hungarian episode, the question of a military invasion of Egypt arose at a particularly inopportune moment, increasing fears about the "cold war" ^{[3, p. 1304]}. Two international crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe coincided chronologically and developed independently of each other, but both of them contributed to the growth of tension in the international situation. At the same time, the United States used the factor of Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggression against Egypt as an obstacle to the successful actions of American diplomacy aimed at "discarding communism" in Hungary ^[14].

D. Eisenhower was committed to the strategy of containment and was concerned about the possibility of cooperation between Egypt and the USSR. Participation in military operations would irrevocably qualify as an open confrontation with G. A. Nasser. But at the same time, the US president was concerned about the overall function of NATO, within which there was a need to simultaneously support US interests and manage the roles of Great Britain and France ^{[2, p. 53]}.

The open disagreement within the North Atlantic Alliance was demonstrated during the discussion of the problems of control and use of the Suez Canal between representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France in London from July 29 to August 2, 1956: the American side objected to military preparations and insisted on convening a conference of channel users with the participation of the USSR [Ibid, p.51-52]. In these circumstances, Washington is involved in peace initiatives with a proposal to convene an international conference within which to promote the project of the Suez Canal Users Association (APSC).

The greatest activity during the implementation of the APSC was shown by its author, US Secretary of State J. F. Dulles. He acted extremely straightforwardly and harshly towards NATO allies, trying to show Egypt and the region as a whole the lack of links between the US administration and British and French colonial policies [Ibid, p. 52]. The project proposed the operation of the canal through customs posts on ships outside the territorial waters of Egypt. It was believed that the revenues from the operation of the canal would still go past the Egyptian treasury with or without the consent of G. A. Nasser ^{[15, p. 6]}. British Foreign Minister S. Lloyd called the US plan "a clever maneuver invented by Dulles in order to delay time and prevent events from breaking out in the midst of the presidential elections in USA" ^{[16, p. 131-132]}. In the UK, the US plan was perceived as a temporary alternative related to the election campaign. The presidential election significantly affected the restraint of US diplomacy in the Suez crisis, but at the same time the US position was supported by more far-sighted priorities.

Trying to influence D. Eisenhower, the French and British sides actively engaged in the search for justification and legal justification for the United States to participate in military action against Egypt.

First of all, British Prime Minister E. Eden and French Prime Minister G. Mollet formulated the problem from the point of view of Western prestige and authority in the region, they were concerned about protecting their colonial interests and access to oil reserves. They tried to present G. Nasser as a modern A. Hitler and, resorting to historical analogies, urged not to appease his demands, which, it was claimed, would lead to great losses in the region ^{[13, p.147]}.

Nationalization was also presented as a threat to the vital interests of the European economy – the unhindered supply of oil to Europe. Assessing the economic consequences for Western powers from the closure of the Suez Canal, Trans-Arab pipelines and pipelines of the Iraqi Oil Company, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that there would be an immediate shortage of about 3.1 million barrels per day, which could be partially provided by rationing and additional production from other sources: "crude oil production should be increased in the United States and Canada by 1.3 million barrels per day, 200,000 barrels per day in the Caribbean and 500,000 barrels per day in the Persian Gulf to maintain current demand in Western Europe"^[17]. At the same time, it should be noted the risks in case of prolongation of the conflict: the United States and the Caribbean countries could ensure an increase in crude oil production during the first 90 days, and an increase in production for a longer period carried the threat of rapid depletion of oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, being apart from the general economic problems of the European continent, the United States could afford a more restrained position.

The harsh actions of Great Britain and France also proceeded from considerations of financial losses: at the time of nationalization, France owned 52% of the shares of the Suez Canal, Great Britain – 44% ^{[11, p. 23]}. And in this respect, the US also received a relatively smaller blow, not being the main holders of shares.  In addition, D. Eisenhower, having soberly assessed the situation, was convinced that the Egyptians could manage the Suez Canal as effectively and efficiently as the British or the French. The United States understood that in conditions when Egypt pays fair compensation for the property seized by it and allows free and open access to the use of the channel, no other state has legal grounds to conduct a military campaign against it ^{[13, p.145-146]}.

The UK insisted that the US should call for the termination of further payments for the use of the channel to Egypt. This, according to E. Eden and S. Lloyd, will force G. A. Nasser to eventually stop transits, which will justify an armed action against Egypt by allied forces. However, J. F. Dulles gave a tough rebuff to pressure on Washington's position, indicating that "the United States has frozen more than fifty million dollars of funds from the Egyptian government, which is more than enough to cover any road tolls that are currently being paid on the channel" ^[18]. The Secretary of State expressed incomprehension as to how the United States can order private companies not to continue paying in the usual manner.

Without giving a direct answer regarding the military action against Egypt, in early August 1956, Secretary of State J. F. Dulles claimed that D. Eisenhower assumed direct participation in hostilities only if the Soviet Union entered this war. That is, in order to guarantee the military support of the United States, the British and the French needed to provoke the Soviet Union to enter the conflict ^{[13, p.155]}. However, the prospect of Soviet intervention influenced D. Eisenhower's decision-making process more than pressure from Western allies.

Initially, for Great Britain and France, the position of the United States was presented as a delay in the decision-making process due to domestic political reasons and the Cold War factor. But the search for legal justifications justifying participation in a military action against Egypt did not give the Western European allies the desired solution from the United States. The course of the conflict development showed that such a policy of the American side had more detailed reasons related to the desire to replace the former leaders of the colonial era in the region.

Great Britain and France saw the elimination of G. A. Nasser as the main goal of the military operation against Egypt. Such an outcome of events was not included in the calculations of the United States: it was believed that actions against the Egyptian president would "add fuel to the fire of Arab nationalism," which could eventually lead to the loss of Western influence in the region for a long time – about the life of one generation, and this is a "much darker scenario than the loss of control over the channel" ^{[6, p. 480]}. D. Eisenhower believed that the issue of the channel is not one in which one should try to undermine the position of G. A. Nasser, he understood that the president of Egypt has a high potential for Arab leadership ^[19]. Bringing its position to G. A. Nasser, the US administration explained that it did not intend to openly condemn the military preparations of Great Britain and France, but did so through confidential channels ^{[9, p. 48]}. The situation on the eve of hostilities required the American leadership to maneuver in the dialogue between Western European allies and Egypt.

Assessing the risks of joining the military action against Egypt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the following possible consequences for the US position in the Middle East: the decline in the prestige of the West and the loss of US bases in the Middle East and North Africa; the uprising against the French in North Africa will receive a new impetus; governments and leaders of the Middle East countries who identified themselves with politics The United States will be seriously weakened; Muslim governments will face a growing desire to expropriate Western investments in oil fields and pipelines; acceleration of Soviet expansion and consolidation of Soviet power throughout the Middle East; the likelihood of Arab military action against Israel will increase significantly; Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact may become so insignificant that the Pact would be seriously weakened ^[17]. At the same time, it is worth considering how important strategic importance was attached in Washington to attempts to form a defensive agreement with the participation of the states of the region aimed at deterring Moscow (the project "Middle Eastern command", the Baghdad Pact – L. K.) ^[20].

The position towards Egypt and its leader was justified. So, on the eve of the triple aggression, after receiving weapons from the USSR and during the military operation, G. A. Nasser continued to demonstrate his reliance on diplomatic support from the United States: "... now it is clear to everyone, our main hope is the United States" ^{[9, p. 50]}.

Having turned away from the military-strategic plans of Great Britain and France, the United States continued to be active participants in the negotiation process with them on possible options for economic pressure on Egypt. Crucial in the discussion of economic measures against Egypt was the expectation that Egypt would refuse passage through the canal without payment. In this regard, the possibility of bypassing United States tankers around the Cape of Good Hope was investigated. But at the same time doubts were rightly expressed: who will suffer more from this – G. A. Nasser or Western Europe? But in any case, "the United States will actually benefit from an increase in demand for American oil. The United Kingdom and Europe had to decide whether they wanted tankers to bypass the cape with appropriate rationing and dollar value of oil" ^[21]. The American side also suggested dumping Egyptian cotton as another way of pressure, to which the UK expressed doubts about the ratio of "damage to Egypt and ourselves" [Ibid].

The US commercial presence in the Middle East became especially noticeable during the Suez crisis. In the decision-making process, the United States Government sought advice from business leaders through a number of committees that it sponsored. Basically, these were the committees of the heads of oil companies. They began to exert a certain influence on foreign policy, including in matters of the Middle East ^{[12, p. 223]}. Throughout the entire period of attempts to resolve the Suez crisis diplomatically, the United States explored existing opportunities to become a beneficiary of economic pressure measures on Egypt or the consequences of the blockade of the Suez Canal.

The APSC project proposed by the American side was also aimed at gaining control over the profit from its use. The United States managed to involve Great Britain and France in its initiative. Thus, during the active discussion of the Suez crisis at the meetings of the UN Security Council from October 5 to October 13, 1956, representatives of France and Great Britain made a proposal that completely repeats the plan of the US Secretary of State ^[22]. It was Egypt's refusal to accept the US-initiated program for the use of the channel that by mid-September was the justification for E. Eden to "take further steps to assert his rights" ^{[23, p. 333-334]}.

Thus, after the completion of all rounds of the diplomatic game on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, the United States continued to show the greatest attention to the implementation of its idea of an international association of channel users, as well as the economic side of the consequences of its temporary closure. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom and France continued to insist on the use of force against Egypt, even if the United States refused to participate in this.

In fact, the US government did not rule out the possibility of using force if all other means did not give effect ^{[8, p. 25]}. Following a conference in London in August 1956, the US administration came to the understanding that the armed scenario of the Suez crisis would be implemented in the near future. Therefore, it was important to identify all possible scenarios. In the event of the inevitability of its military intervention, the United States was preparing to use any forces to successfully complete the action ^[17].

In this regard, concluding about the scope and nature of measures to support Britain and France, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the United States could provide support by publicly supporting military action in Suez and unconditionally committing to intervene militarily if third parties come to Egypt's aid. The American side was ready to provide certain necessary raw materials for the United Kingdom and France for the period of time until the Suez Canal was closed; to increase economic support and financial assistance to Western European countries; to provide them with military materials and equipment to guarantee the successful seizure and retention of the canal territory; to stop economic assistance to Egypt and freeze all additional Egyptian assets that are in the United States; to provide more active support for the Baghdad Pact, including joining it, in order to counter the growth of Arab nationalism [Ibid]. As can be seen, in the list of possible measures to support the allies, the participation of the US armed forces is presented as the least realistic scenario.

G. Kissinger points out that for D. Eisenhower, the Suez crisis was not so threatening as to merit the use of force: being a passionate opponent of war, which only an experienced military man can be, D. Eisenhower believed that "even if there was a danger to global equilibrium in the Near and Middle East in the long term, then <...>America it is strong enough to reflect it at a later stage, and long before the question of survival arises" ^{[6, p. 485]}. At the same time, Mr. Kissinger emphasizes that it was the diplomacy of J. F. Dulles that forced France and Great Britain to risk everything: his maneuvering between the resolute D. Eisenhower and the European allies led to the fact that they did not understand to what extent the US president was a staunch opponent of the use of force. Such diplomatic dexterity left the United States with the opportunity to change its point of view in case of unforeseen circumstances.

At the same time, it should not be excluded that the triple aggression against Egypt was largely provoked by American diplomacy. Thus, J. F. Dulles in London noted: "It should also be recognized that even though the United States may disagree with certain views of Great Britain and France, if these countries eventually become involved, they can count on the moral support of the United States and, perhaps, more than moral support" ^[24]. Thus, the US Secretary of State left an impression for Western European allies about a possible change in Washington's position, depending on how events unfold. These diplomatic maneuvers played a key role in reinforcing the determination of Britain, France and Israel to launch a war against Egypt.

Without taking a direct part in military operations, the United States was interested in the success of the military operation of its allies. In the process of Israel's military-strategic preparation for war, along with Great Britain and France, the United States also played an important role, with whose money Israel armed its army, developed the production and accumulation of military equipment. NATO states supplied Israel with tanks, planes, guns and small arms. The USA was no exception among the countries where hundreds of Israeli officers of all branches of the armed forces were trained ^{[5, p. 169]}. In the context of the intensification of Egyptian-Israeli border clashes, Israel's position on the transit of strategic cargo through the canal has become decisive in the development of the Anglo-French plan for the invasion of Egypt. At the same time, American military-strategic assistance to the Israeli side was designed to strengthen its combat potential, while at the same time giving impetus to the development of the US military-industrial complex.

Outwardly creating the effect of dissociation from its allies, in fact, Washington provided them not only political, but also economic support: during the crisis, it supplied London and Paris with oil and provided the UK with a loan of $ 500 million ^{[8, p. 39]}.

The ambivalence and inconsistency of US policy became apparent with the outbreak of hostilities.  Having played the role of an instigator, at the climax of the crisis, the United States found it more profitable for itself to dissociate itself from its allies [Ibid., pp. 38-39]. Having received a message dated October 30, 1956 about the decision to land British and French troops in the Suez Canal area, President D. Eisenhower commented that the position of the United States "hands off" could well be indicated and expressed the need to publicly declare "that we were not and are not connected in our activities with the French and the British" ^[25]. Regarding concerns about the possibility of Soviet intervention on the side of Egypt, the United States believed that a blockade by the British could be the only and effective way to prevent the Soviet Union from entering this region.

With the outbreak of hostilities on October 30, 1956, the US representative to the UN Security Council introduced a draft resolution condemning Israel's armed actions against Egypt, as well as calling on all UN members to refrain from the use of force or threat of use of force in the area ^[26].

The culmination of the conflict for US diplomacy was a letter from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers N. A. Bulganin to President D. Eisenhower dated November 5, 1956, in which it was proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union join forces within the UN to stop aggression against Egypt: "The United States has a strong navy in the Mediterranean Sea area. The Soviet Union also has a strong navy and powerful aviation. The joint and urgent use of these means by the United States and the Soviet Union in accordance with the UN decision would be a reliable guarantee of the cessation of aggression against the Egyptian people, against the countries of the Arab East" ^[27]. The representative of the Soviet Union reinforced his intentions, referring to the danger of a regional conflict escalating into a third World War if the USSR and the United States do not take a common position on the cessation of hostilities.

N. A. Bulganin's statement was unprecedented and threatened to bring down missiles on the states participating in the aggression against Egypt, and the readiness of Soviet volunteers to leave for Egypt was also expressed ^{[9, p. 49]}. Both the USA and the USSR understood that the probability of this threat was very low and represented rather psychological measures ^{[6, p. 490; 9, p. 49]}, nevertheless, it turned out to be effective.

On November 2, 1956, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all troops beyond the armistice line ^[28]. The United States showed solidarity with the Soviet Union in voting for the text of the resolution condemning the invasion of Egypt. 

Adhering to the stated line on the need for a cessation of hostilities, the United States, nevertheless, was ready for any development of events. So, the head of the main intelligence Directorate of the USSR S. M. Shtemenko reported to the Minister of Defense G. K. Zhukov on November 8, 1956: "The ships of the 6th Fleet of the United States, maneuvering in the area of 100 120 miles south of O. Rhodes, we worked out the tasks of combat training. On the morning of 7.11.56, the ships of the 6th fleet were joined by the second anti-submarine group from the US Atlantic Fleet (a heavy aircraft carrier, six patrol ships and two submarines).  <...> Aircraft carrier "Forrestal"  after participating in the Lantfibex exercise, planned even before the events in Egypt, it was planned to be sent to the US 6th Fleet. According to the KVF radio intelligence, these ships are presumably en route to the Mediterranean Sea. Special weapons are being transferred to some heavy aircraft carriers of the Atlantic Fleet" ^{[29, p. 558]}.

It is worth noting that the culmination of the Suez crisis created real risks for the United States for the loss of authority on the part of Egypt. The USSR played a key role in this regard. Thus, the Soviet side warned Egypt about the sincerity of the US position shown in the Suez crisis: "recent steps by the United States, in particular their support for the British proposal that the UN send international police forces to maintain peace in the Middle East  Until a permanent settlement is reached, they clearly show their desire to introduce their troops into the Suez Canal zone, which, of course, will not ease the situation of Egypt, but will allow the United States to actually participate in the occupation of Egyptian territory" ^{[30, p. 551]}. Such information from the Soviet side came to Egypt regularly, but it could not completely disrupt American-Egyptian relations, since it was presented as nothing more than an attempt to oust a geostrategic enemy.

In the Suez crisis, Great Britain and France took great risks and subsequently suffered great losses. In particular, the British experienced the fall of their cabinet, an acute shortage of oil and the almost complete collapse of their banking system as a result of their military intervention in Suez ^{[13, p. 134]}. D. Eisenhower demonstrated the steadfastness of the decision not to satisfy the request of his allies, which eventually leveled possible domestic political and economic risks for the American side. Moreover, in the post-war turmoil of NATO allies, the United States found itself in a position of competitive advantage in the region compared to Western European countries.

But at the same time, the categorical position of the US president on refusing to participate in the war carried the risk of losing the functionality of NATO.  In a letter to E. Eden, D. Eisenhower made it clear that "unilateral British actions may entail a revision of America's readiness to maintain membership in NATO, which, accordingly, would condemn America's allies to hope for Moscow's mercy" ^{[6, p. 481]}. J. F. Dulles interpreted article 1 of the treaty on the creation of NATO as requiring from all contracting parties to renounce the use of force and resolve all their disputes peacefully. G. Kissinger noted in this regard: "No one has interpreted article 1 of the North Atlantic Pact Treaty so pacifistically before; no one has done this since" [Ibid., p. 491]. Explaining the exclusion of the possibility of involving NATO to resolve the Suez crisis, the American side insisted that the Middle East is the region that is related to the problem of colonialism and therefore does not fall within the boundaries of the North Atlantic Pact [Ibid., p. 484]. As we can see, the American side has allowed itself not to be in solidarity with its NATO allies. Assessing these risks, the United States did not put them above its own interests in the region.

For the British, the Prime Minister's failures were a symbol of their declining role in international relations. However, E. Eden's successor, G. Macmillan, was able to save the "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom, thereby strengthening Anglo-Saxon relations. France, humiliated by the Suez events, after 1956 took a completely different direction in its foreign policy actions, which in 1966 led to its withdrawal from the NATO military structure ^{[2, p.62]}, however, this decision had other reasons.  Relations between NATO allies have partially lost a trusting tone after the Suez crisis. However, these costs for the United States were limited and did not become a precedent for the loss of leadership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

During the Suez crisis, the United States also ran the risk of losing friendly relations with Israel. Despite the help with weapons and training of specialists, tensions between the parties arose after the United States joined the Soviet Union, which insisted on the need for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal zone. In addition to demands to stop American aid, there were calls for the imposition of UN sanctions and the possible exclusion of Israel from its membership. The tension was eased thanks to the assurances of the United States to maintain freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tirana. This was possible by participating in the UN rapid reaction force, which was introduced into the zone of demarcation between Egypt and Israel ^{[31, p. 64]}. It should also be noted that in the conditions of the election campaign, D. Eisenhower's anti-Israeli course did not affect the outcome of the elections, which confirms the minimization of risks for the United States from relations with Israel. After the Suez crisis, Washington was active in the process of restoring US-Israeli ties ^{[4, p. 28]}. Later, the US president expressed regret that he had to take such a tough position on the issue of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egypt. But at the same time, the Suez crisis laid the foundation for establishing mechanisms of interaction between the US authorities and the Jewish community ^{[32, p. 20]}

Thus, the following correlation of risks and prospects for the United States in the Suez crisis stands out. Participation in military operations against Egypt together with Great Britain and France made it possible to quickly achieve the task of managing and controlling the Suez Canal. This could contribute to the consolidation of Western countries, imposed their initiative in the post-war situation in the region. But in this regard, for the United States, the risk of losing a positive dialogue with the Arab leader in the person of Egypt, as well as the threat of potentially provoking a war with the Soviet Union, turned out to prevail. In addition, leadership in the management of the channel and in the region as a whole would also have to be shared with Great Britain and France.

The project of Secretary of State J. F. Dulles of the Suez Canal Users Association with supervisory functions and corresponding US revenues has not received approval from Egypt. The next attempt to impose this initiative on G. A. Nasser was possible in post-war conditions, while it was important not to associate with colonial countries and take into account the diplomatic efforts of the USSR to separate Egypt from the United States.

The presented opportunities to receive economic dividends from the blockade of the canal and sanctions against Egypt were not widely developed, had a temporary effect and contained the risk of depletion of oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere in the event of a long blockade and loss of control over the oil-producing countries of the region and oil delivery routes.

In this regard, it was decided to risk abandoning joint actions with NATO allies and get the prospect of a relatively stable region. The rejection of emotional and harsh actions allowed us to preserve the potential of influencing G. A. Nasser and the regimes sympathetic to him. At the same time, the United States did not want to lose influence on the Israeli side and did not refuse armed and financial assistance to the warring countries, while stimulating the development of its military-industrial complex.

In its foreign policy strategy in the Middle East during the Suez crisis, the US administration acted rationally and in accordance with a thorough assessment of the significance of the prospects and possible risks. Despite the negative impressions of the United States' uncharacteristic joint position with the Soviet Union, the consequences of the Suez crisis for the United States turned out to be the best possible scenario. Emerging from the old colonial system of geopolitics, the region of the Middle East remained in the sphere of Washington's actions, there was no open confrontation with Moscow. The United States proved to be different from the old colonial regimes, freed itself from Western European competitors. D. Eisenhower, having won the elections, began to develop a new doctrine in which the main task was to fight the communist threat. The general negative impression of the temporary divergence of positions was smoothed out by the need to focus on a common enemy – the Soviet Union. After the Suez crisis, the USSR openly took pro-Arab positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the United States left for itself the possibility of balancing, tried to get mediation functions.

At the same time, it is worth noting that after the Suez crisis in the region, the authority of the Egyptian president significantly increased, who was not guided by a sense of gratitude for the position of the United States, but on the contrary, instilled confidence in the success of the fight against the heirs of the colonial regime. After all, it was the United States that had to assume the role of the former strategic positions of Great Britain and France. In the context of the Suez crisis, Washington was able to achieve the opportunities that open up at the time of the conflict. But they did not provide a long-term perspective. Further strategy had to be worked out after the military events and the extension of the powers of the president. The conclusions from the Suez crisis were reflected in the "Eisenhower doctrine", how effective it turned out to be – the subject of a separate study.