Development of the New Silk Road Project through the Caspian Region and its Impact on Energy Relations with Russia

Pon'ka Tatyana Ivanovna ORCID: 0000-0003-4944-115X PhD in History Associate Professor; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6, Moscow, 117198, Russia ponka-rudn@mail.ru Chmykhova Elizaveta Aleksandrovna Graduate student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 6 Miklukho-Maklaya Street, Moscow, 101000, Russia tch.eliz4veta@yandex.ru

Netochenko Evgeniya Andreevna Graduate student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 6 Miklukho-Maklaya Street, Moscow, 101000, Russia netochenko@yandex.ru

Introduction

The New Silk Road (NSR) project, initiated by China in 2013, is a large-scale strategy aimed at reviving ancient trade routes in modern geopolitical and economic realities. Officially named One Belt, One Road (OBOR), this project includes two key areas: the Silk Road Economic Belt (overland route) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The Caspian region, which historically played the role of a bridge between East and West, has become one of the key areas for the implementation of the land corridor, which actualizes the analysis of its impact on energy security and cooperation with Russia.

The Great Silk Road, which existed since the second century BC, connected China with Europe through Central Asia, facilitating not only the silk trade, but also the exchange of technology, culture and knowledge. According to the Chinese leadership, the modern NSR is designed not only to recreate this logistics network, but also to transform it into an economic integration tool covering infrastructure, energy and digital technologies.

Three main transport corridors pass through the Caspian region:

1. The Northern route is through Russia (the Trans-Siberian Railway and the BAM), connecting China with Europe.

2. The Central Corridor runs through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran, including railway and pipeline projects.

3. The southern route is through Azerbaijan and Georgia, with access to Turkey and Europe through the ports of the Caspian Sea (for example, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars).

These routes not only reduce the delivery time of goods from Asia to Europe to 10-13 days, but also create an alternative to traditional energy corridors such as the Suez Canal.

The implementation of the NSR in the Caspian region directly affects Russia's interests, especially in the context of competition for the transit of hydrocarbons. By investing in gas pipelines (for example, Turkmenistan-China) and oil terminals in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, China is diversifying its energy supplies, reducing its dependence on Russian routes. At the same time, cooperation between Russia and China within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the SCO demonstrates attempts to synchronize interests, for example, through the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as part of the Arctic branch of the NSR.

Contradictions between China's desire for economic expansion and Russia's desire to maintain influence in Central Asia are becoming a key factor. For example, Chinese investments in the infrastructure of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have already led to an increase in China's trade turnover with the countries of the region, exceeding that of Russia. This creates risks of reformatting traditional alliances and requires Moscow to adopt a flexible strategy that combines competition and partnership.

Materials and research methods

The research is based on an interdisciplinary approach combining methods of historical science, economic analysis and political science, which allows a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of China's energy diplomacy in the Caspian region and its impact on Russia's position. The work is based on a variety of sources, including archival documents, official statistics, international agreements, as well as scientific publications by Russian, Chinese and Western authors. The key materials were agreements on the implementation of infrastructure projects within the framework of the New Silk Road (for example, agreements on the Central Asia–China gas pipeline), reports from the Eurasian Development Bank and the International Energy Agency, statistics from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation and the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, reflecting the dynamics of production, transit and export of hydrocarbons. A significant amount of information was extracted from scientific works such as S.G. Luzyanin's monographs on the transformation of Eurasian energy corridors, R. Cutler's works on Chinese strategy in Central Asia, as well as analytical articles by A.V. Lyamzin and R.S. Mukhametov on Russian-Chinese cooperation. Additional context was provided by media materials - press releases from corporations (CNPC, Gazprom), expert reviews from the Carnegie Moscow Center and specialized publications like The Diplomat, which helped reconstruct the current discussions around the projects.

Methodologically, the study was based on the historical and genetic method, which made it possible to identify the stages of the development of China's energy policy (from the 1990s to the 2020s) and analyze turning points, such as the launch of the GCAC gas pipeline in 2009 or the crisis of supplies through the CAC system. Comparative historical analysis was used to compare the strategies of the Russian Federation and the PRC: for example, when assessing investment priorities (Russian nuclear energy projects vs. Chinese transport corridors). A systematic approach has ensured that the Caspian region is considered as a hub of global energy flows, where the interests of transit states (Kazakhstan), resource powers (Russia) and consumers (China) intersect. Content analysis was used to study the rhetoric of officials, from speeches by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to strategic documents like the "White Paper on Energy of the People's Republic of China," which revealed discrepancies in the narratives of the parties. Statistical methods, including data processing on trade and investment volumes, have made it possible to quantify shifts in China's influence, such as the growth of its share in Kazakh oil production to 16% by 2020.

The limitations of the study are related to the fragmentary nature of archival materials on the early stages of the Russian-Chinese energy dialogue (1990-2000s), as well as contradictory statistics on Turkmen gas and Chinese investments due to the secrecy of some of the data. Nevertheless, the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods ensured the representativeness of the conclusions.

Results and discussions

The historical significance of the Silk Road and its revival in the 21st century. Historically, the Great Silk Road played a huge role as a network of trade routes connecting East and West. For centuries, caravan routes from China through Central Asia have brought silk, spices, porcelain, etc. to the Mediterranean. goods, receiving in return gold, glass, horses and handicrafts from the Mediterranean. These exchanges not only brought prosperity to oasis cities along the way, such as Samarkand, Bukhara and Kashgar, but also stimulated cultural and technological interactions. Thanks to the Silk Road, inventions (for example, paper, gunpowder, silk spinning) and ideas spread, which contributed to the development of civilizations on both sides of the continent.

The legacy of the ancient trading network is still tangible: the regions along the former routes are still characterized by higher economic activity, due to better connectivity and long-standing traditions of exchanges. In many ways, the idea of restoring these ties formed the basis of the modern Chinese initiative "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR), which was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The OBOR (Belt and Road) initiative is seen as the new Silk Road of the 21st century. Its goal is to create an extensive network of land and sea corridors to unite Eurasia. Through investments in transport, energy, and trade, China seeks to link its economy with the countries of Eurasia, Africa, and Europe, revitalizing historic routes.

The Caspian region immediately became the focus of the BRI as a natural corridor between China and Europe ^[2]. The Caspian littoral countries, lying between Central Asia and the Caucasus, actively joined the project in the early years of OBOR, considering it as a chance to modernize infrastructure and trade. Already in November 2013, the railway departments of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia formed a coordinating committee for the development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TMTM). In the following decade, China invested in key projects in the region, laying new communication routes and concluding energy deals – in fact, putting the idea of the new Silk Road into practice.

Chinese projects in the Caspian region (2013-2024). The Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea has become one of the central links of the BRI land "belt". It was developed through the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars Railway (BTK) and the formation of the multimodal Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TMTM). BTK is a railway line with a length of ~846 km connecting Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Officially opened in October 2017 after extensive preparations ^[1], it for the first time directly connected the Caspian coast with the Turkish railway network, providing access to Europe. The BTK route allows cargo to be delivered from East Asia to Istanbul in about 15 days, bypassing the territory of Russia, and significantly speeds up transportation compared to the sea route. The main geopolitical role of this highway is to provide the countries of the region with an alternative route between China and Europe, reducing dependence on traditional routes through competing powers.

The TMTM, known as the Middle Corridor, is also developing in parallel. It is a network of railway, sea and automobile routes connecting China with Europe through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. After the establishment of the relevant committee in 2013, the first pilot container trains from China to Europe passed along this route in 2015-2016 ^[2]. By 2023, the Middle Corridor showed rapid growth: the volume of traffic in the first half of the year increased by 77% ^[3]. Such rapid development is already bringing transit revenues to the countries of the region, creating jobs in ports and logistics centers, and also strengthening the role of Turkey and the Caspian region in Eurasian trade.

Energy agreements (oil and gas pipelines). Simultaneously with its transportation initiatives, China has been strengthening its energy presence in the Caspian region, seeking to ensure long-term supplies of oil and gas. Back in 1997, Beijing agreed with Astana on the construction of an oil pipeline from the Kazakh Caspian Sea to Xinjiang, the first transcontinental pipeline through which oil from Central Asia went directly to China ^[4]. The project was implemented in stages, and by 2006, Kazakh oil had reached Chinese factories. In subsequent years, China actively invested in hydrocarbon production in Kazakhstan; by the mid-2010s, Chinese companies controlled a significant part of oil production there and received an 8.33% share in the Kashagan field ^[5].

In the field of natural gas, the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan played a crucial role. In 2009, the Central Asia–China cross-border pipeline was launched through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, making Turkmenistan one of the key gas suppliers to China: China now buys more than 70% of all Turkmen gas exports ^[6]. Beijing has financed the construction of several branches of this gas pipeline and signed long-term contracts, consolidating its influence in the region's gas sector. Azerbaijan, on the contrary, is still playing a lesser role, focusing energy exports on Turkey and the EU ^[7]. However, the development of the Belt and Road Initiative creates prerequisites for closer cooperation between China and Azerbaijan in the future.

Thus, since 2013, China has revived the concept of the Silk Road, implementing it in projects of the Caspian region. The BTK and TMTM transport corridors connected China, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe, significantly reducing delivery time and logistical risks. Energy projects have provided China with direct access to Caspian oil and gas, increasing its energy security and giving the Caspian Littoral countries new markets ^[8]. As a result, the economic integration of Eurasia has strengthened: the former peripheral countries of the Caspian region have become important transit and raw material links. China has established itself as an influential player by linking regional economies with infrastructural ties. The revival of the Silk Road in a new format has significantly changed the geo-economic landscape of Eurasia, and now no power can ignore the increased role of China in the region.

China's energy diplomacy and Russia's reaction. The development of the New Silk Road project through the Caspian region has become a catalyst for the transformation of China's energy diplomacy and the redefinition of Russia's role in Central Asia. In an effort to ensure energy security and diversify its sources of resources, China has stepped up cooperation with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other Caspian littoral states. This, in turn, provoked a complex reaction from Russia, which historically viewed the region as a zone of its strategic influence.

China's energy diplomacy in the Caspian region is focused on creating infrastructure that allows it to bypass traditional routes controlled by Russia. The Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline (CCAC), built in 2009, is a striking example. This project, which stretched for 7 thousand km through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, not only provided Beijing with access to Turkmen gas, but also undermined Gazprom's monopoly on transporting resources from the region ^[9]. As researcher E.V. Semkina notes, the NCAC has become a symbol of the "strategic breakthrough" of the PRC, which made it possible to reduce dependence on sea routes and strengthen its position in Central Asia ^[10].

The Chinese expansion was accompanied by the active acquisition of assets in the oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan. Back in the 1990s, CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) acquired controlling stakes in key fields such as Aktyubinskneft and Petrokazakhstan ^[12]. By 2020, China's share in Kazakhstan's oil production reached 16%, and by 2023, China imported up to 70% of uranium from Kazakhstan, which strengthened its influence on Astana's energy policy ^[12]. These steps, according to expert Robert Cutler, reflect Beijing's long-term strategy combining economic investments with geopolitical goals ^[10].

Russia, realizing the threat to its influence, tried to maintain control over transit. In 2007, Moscow initiated the Caspian Gas Pipeline project, which was supposed to transport Turkmen and Kazakh gas through its territory ^[11]. However, the explosion on the CAC gas pipeline in 2009 and the subsequent price conflict with Turkmenistan led to a reduction in supplies to the Russian Federation and the reorientation of Ashgabat to China ^[12]. As R.S. Mukhametov and A.V. Lyamzin emphasize, the PRC's foreign energy policy in the Caspian region "does not meet the national interests of the Russian Federation", since it reduces its role as a transit power ^[11].

China's rise in the region has led to a rethinking of Russia's role. If Moscow dominated the Central Asian energy sector in the 1990s due to its Soviet infrastructure heritage, then by the 2020s its position had significantly weakened. For example, the share of Russian companies in Kazakh oil production has decreased, while Chinese investments in the Atasu-Alashankou and Kenkiyak-Kumkol oil pipelines have created alternative routes that exclude Russia from the supply chain ^[12].

Nevertheless, Russia retains leverage through military and political institutions such as the CSTO and nuclear energy projects. For example, the 2017 agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Uzbekistan and Rosatom's participation in the development of Kazakhstan's uranium deposits demonstrate attempts to compensate for losses in the hydrocarbon sector ^[13]. In addition, Russian gas supplies to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2023, organized to compensate for the shortage of resources going to China, emphasize the continuing interdependence ^[12].

Analysts Sergey Luzyanin and Nelly Semenova note that Russia is trying to combine competition with cooperation by promoting the idea of "pairing" the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with the Chinese SREB ^[13]. However, as Semkina points out, this strategy remains largely declarative: Chinese investments are focused on their own transport corridors, while Russian projects such as the Transsib face competition due to lower tariffs from China ^[14].

Conclusions

The energy relations between Russia and China in the Caspian region represent a complex symbiosis of competition and partnership. On the one hand, China, using economic power and infrastructure projects, has significantly limited Moscow's traditional influence. On the other hand, Russia, while maintaining a military and political presence and developing niche areas (nuclear energy, modernization of the fuel and energy complex), remains a significant player.

Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are successfully using multi-vector approach, profiting from the contradictions between the great powers. As Robert Cutler points out, their strategy of "reliability of supply and demand" allows balancing between Russia, China and the West.

However, the growing dependence of the region on Chinese investments creates risks of one-sided orientation. In these circumstances, Russia is forced to look for new formats of interaction, combining energy diplomacy with integration initiatives within the EAEU and SCO. According to Rakhimov and co-authors, the future of the region will be determined by the ability of Moscow and Beijing to find compromises without disturbing the delicate balance of interests. Thus, the Caspian region remains an arena of dynamic interaction, where cooperation and rivalry are intertwined, forming a new geo-economic reality of Eurasia.