Reforming the wage system in the police: a path to staffing the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia

Madatov Oleg Yakovlevich General adviser, Interregional Public Movement for the Protection of the Rights of Servicemen and Their Families «Conscience of the Law» 350072, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Krasnodar, Moskovskaya str., 61, sq. 32 oleg_madatov@rambler.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

In today's dynamically developing society, where the processes of globalization and urbanization are steadily gaining momentum, the effective functioning of internal affairs bodies, and in particular, the police, is of paramount importance for ensuring the stability and well-being of the state, in the opposite case, it is possible to reduce the responsiveness to offenses, deterioration in the quality of preventive work and, as a result, a direct decrease in the level of security citizens and their property from illegal actions ^[1]. The shortage of personnel in the police, therefore, should be considered not only as a departmental problem, but also as a threat to national security, undermining the foundations of law and order and social stability.

It is necessary to emphasize the direct relationship between understaffing and staff turnover. High staff turnover in the internal affairs bodies is a negative indicator indicating the presence of systemic problems in the organization of the service and the motivation of employees. An analysis of the reasons for the dismissal of police officers, especially in the early stages of service, without seniority, reveals dissatisfaction with conditions of service as a key factor determining staff turnover and, as a result, exacerbating the shortage problem. Among the most significant factors of dissatisfaction, research and practical experience highlight an uncompetitive level of remuneration, inadequate level of responsibility, psycho-emotional stress and risks associated with police service. Insufficient financial motivation, in turn, demotivates potential candidates for service, reduces the attractiveness of the police profession in the eyes of young professionals and contributes to the outflow of qualified personnel from the Interior Ministry system.

Solving the problem of staffing the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, therefore, is a task of not only social but also economic importance. A stable and professional police force is the key to the safety of citizens, a condition for the normal functioning of the economy, attracting investments and sustainable development of society. The problem of understaffing and high staff turnover in the police is compounded by the lack of known and effective ways to increase staffing levels, which makes the search for such solutions an urgent and socially significant scientific task.

The problem of recruitment of government staff and staff turnover has repeatedly attracted the attention of researchers, representatives of the scientific community, practitioners of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the general public, including S. N. Smirnov, who emphasizes the need for a combination of different approaches to staff search and recruitment ^[2], and A. V. Petenko, who focuses on career guidance and graduate support medical universities ^[3]. R. A. Latypov considers it important to take into account the specifics of the work of civil servants and apply a variety of incentives ^[4], and A.D. Kotenev, A. A. Orazaliev, N. N. Kryzhevskaya propose an integrated approach to solving personnel problems in law enforcement agencies ^[5]. Gabriela B. V., M. A. Chobanyan emphasize taking into account the ratio of supply and demand in the labor market and improving selection methods ^[6], and B. K. Collins emphasizes the importance of employee retention and training strategies to solve personnel problems in the public sector ^[7].

A significant amount of research is presented in the scientific literature on various aspects of this issue. In particular, socio-psychological factors affecting the motivation of police officers, professional burnout, satisfaction with conditions of service, the effectiveness of the professional training system, legal and organizational aspects of personnel management in law enforcement agencies are studied. The statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, reflecting the dynamics of staffing and staff turnover, are regularly published in departmental publications and analytical reports, confirming the relevance and severity of the problem under consideration. Journalistic works and materials in the media also highlight the problems of understaffing and staff turnover in the police, supporting them with concrete examples of insufficient funding, high workload for employees, social insecurity and imperfect remuneration system.

However, despite a significant amount of research, an integrated approach to solving the problem of staffing the departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia through a change in the remuneration system, especially under current budget constraints, seems to be insufficiently developed ^[8]. Existing research, as a rule, either focuses on certain aspects of employee motivation, or suggests traditional wage increases that require a significant increase in budget funding, which is not always possible in modern economic realities. Thus, the present study aims to fill this gap in scientific knowledge by developing and justifying an innovative approach to reforming the police remuneration system, which makes it possible to increase its attractiveness and competitiveness without significantly increasing budget allocations, by optimizing and redistributing internal resources.

The main purpose of this study is to develop and scientifically substantiate an effective model for changing the remuneration system for police officers, aimed at significantly increasing the staffing of units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation under current budget constraints.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following key tasks::

1. To conduct a comprehensive analysis of the current staffing of the Russian Interior Ministry units at the federal and regional levels, to identify the main causes of staff turnover, with a special focus on the determinant role of the remuneration factor in this process.

2. To consider the specific features of the special legal status of police officers, to determine its direct impact on the formation and functioning of the remuneration system in the internal affairs bodies, as well as on the motivation of employees to effectively perform their official duties.

3. To investigate the existing theoretical and practical approaches to remuneration in the internal affairs bodies, to carry out a critical analysis of their strengths and weaknesses, taking into account the current challenges and tasks facing the police, and in the context of the problem of understaffing units.

4. To develop and substantiate a conceptual model of a new remuneration system for police officers based on the principles of voluntariness, fairness, incentive effectiveness and economic efficiency, taking into account budget funding constraints and aimed at increasing the attractiveness of police service and solving the problem of shortage.

It is assumed that the proposed model of reforming the wage system will increase its competitiveness and attractiveness, significantly reduce staff turnover and ensure a steady increase in the staffing of departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia without a significant increase in budget allocations. It is expected to increase employee motivation, increase the objectivity and fairness of assessing their contributions, improve the moral and psychological climate in teams, as well as increase the effectiveness of law enforcement in general. The potential risks associated with the implementation of the proposed model will be identified and assessed, and specific recommendations will be developed to minimize them, which will ensure the sustainability and practical feasibility of the reform under current budget constraints.

The object of this study is the system of remuneration for police officers in the Russian Federation in all its diverse elements, mechanisms and interrelations.

The subject of the study is changes in approaches to the remuneration of police officers as a tool for effectively solving the problem of staffing the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, considered in the context of modern socio-economic conditions and the tasks facing the internal affairs bodies.

In this study, a set of general scientific methods was used to ensure the reliability of the results: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, comparison, generalization and a systematic approach that allowed us to consider the wage system as a complex complex. Special legal methods were used: formal legal (analysis of normative acts), comparative legal (comparison of approaches to remuneration and solving the problem of shortage), and the method of interpretation of legal norms. Auxiliary sociological methods (analysis of statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and economic and mathematical methods (modeling of the wage system) were used. The empirical base consists of regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, departmental documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in the open part), scientific research on staff turnover and motivation, as well as analytical materials in the media and the expert community.

The special legal status of a police officer and its impact on the remuneration system

Police service in the Russian Federation is a special type of civil service with a special legal status of employees, which differs from civil servants ^[9]. This status is fixed in Part 3 of Article 10 of Federal Law No. 342-FZ dated November 30, 2011 "On Service in the Internal Affairs Bodies of the Russian Federation ..." and includes expanded rights, duties, increased responsibility, as well as service restrictions and social guarantees that compensate for the difficulties of service ^[10]. The uniqueness of this status directly determines the remuneration system for police officers, which should take into account their responsibility, work intensity, conditions of service and social significance.

Thus, according to A. V. Schmidt, special legal status is understood as a legal position that differs from the general legal status, characterized by specific changes in the rights and duties of the subject. These changes can be expressed both in the granting of additional rights and benefits, and in the establishment of restrictions and additional responsibilities in comparison with the general legal status ^[11].

L. N. Degtereva holds a slightly different point of view: "Special legal status is the status of a person belonging to a certain category of citizens (children, pensioners, military personnel, deputies, etc.). The special legal status is based on the general legal status, however, the legal status of this category may have its own specifics, due to the presence of additional rights and obligations, benefits or restrictions" ^{[12, p. 9]}.

Both definitions are correct, but they reflect different facets of the same phenomenon. A.V. Schmidt gives a more general, theoretical definition of the essence of a special status, and L. N. Degtereva gives a more specific, focused on the subjects of this status. To fully understand the concept, it is advisable to take into account both aspects.

Therefore, it can be concluded that a special legal status is a legal status of a person or category of persons that differs from the general legal status, characterized by a special set of rights, duties, restrictions and benefits due to specific social roles, categories or conditions.

A special legal status gives police officers broad rights (including the use of force, gangs, and entry into premises) to perform duties to protect citizens and law and order ^[13]. The exercise of these rights requires professionalism and is inextricably linked to strict duties (respect for the rule of law, protection of rights, willingness to take risks). Employees bear increased responsibility (disciplinary, administrative, financial, criminal), which emphasizes the importance of their service and requires appropriate financial incentives ^[14].

This status implies significant official restrictions and prohibitions: a ban on entrepreneurship (clause 3.1, Part 1, Article 17 of Federal Law No. 79-FZ of 27.07.2004), participation in strikes and political activities (Part 2, Article 7 of Federal Law No. 3-FZ of 07.02.2011), combination with other paid work (except scientific, teaching, creative) and disclosure of state secrets (clause 7, Part 1, Article 12 of Federal Law No. 342-FZ dated November 30, 2011). These restrictions are aimed at ensuring independence and high standards, but they limit income and require compensation with a decent monetary allowance ^[15]. Social guarantees (pension and housing provision, medical care, insurance, etc. according to Article 52 of Federal Law No. 79-FZ dated 27.07.2004) also serve as compensation, although their effectiveness in practice may be insufficient, affecting motivation ^[16].

The uniqueness of the status (publicity, risk, responsibility, restrictions) ^[17] directly affects motivation and requires a special remuneration system, different from the civil one. It should compensate for the pressures, risks and limitations, stimulate professionalism and promote staff retention.

The current wage system in the Russian Federation tries to take into account status, but does not fully meet modern challenges, especially the problem of shortage. The monetary allowance includes (Article 1 of Federal Law No. 78-FZ of 30.06.2002): salaries (official, by rank), allowances (for length of service, special conditions, class, secrecy) and bonuses.

The main problem of the current police remuneration system is the insufficient competitiveness of salaries in comparison with other areas, especially in large cities and developed regions ^[18]. Often, especially in low-level positions, the salary does not correspond to the responsibilities, workloads and risks of the service. This reduces the attractiveness of the profession and contributes to the outflow of personnel to higher-paying areas.

Thus, the average monthly salary of police officers by region at the end of 2024 is about: Moscow – 100 thousand rubles, St. Petersburg - 90 thousand rubles, Yekaterinburg – 65 thousand rubles. At the same time, the average salary in other fields of activity per month, for example in Moscow, is: mining – 457.2 thousand rubles; financial sector and insurance – 341.1 thousand rubles; information technology (IT) – 249.5 thousand rubles; professional, scientific and technical activities – 194.9 rubles thousand rubles.

These data indicate that police salaries, especially in large cities and developed regions, are inferior to incomes in other areas. This reduces the attractiveness of the service and contributes to the outflow of personnel.

Another disadvantage is the weak relationship between wages and actual results. Awards are often opaque, subjective, and do not motivate effectively ^[19]. The system is also inflexible: it is poorly adapted to changing conditions and does not properly take into account the intensity, processing and additional load due to shortage.

Thus, the current wage system does not solve the shortage problem. Low salaries, opaque bonuses and lack of adequate compensation for overloads demotivate employees, reduce the prestige of the service and hinder the formation of a stable professional staff. There is an obvious need for a fundamental change in approaches to remuneration in order to solve the personnel problem and increase the efficiency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Analysis of the reasons for the shortage of personnel in the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and the role of the wage factor

The problem of understaffing in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, especially in the field, has become systemic (90 thousand in 2022, 152 thousand in 2023, 172 thousand in 2024), which harms the effectiveness of law enforcement and the safety of citizens ^[20]. Statistics confirm the persistent, often worsening shortage of personnel over the past decade, especially in territorial bodies. As of March 2025, 172,000 employees are required in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the main shortage at the end of 2024 falls on the following units: criminal investigation department – 23.9%; drug trafficking control units – 24.7%; pre–trial investigation bodies - 22.7%; shortage in the patrol and guard service – 31.4%, etc.

The greatest shortage was observed in the criminal investigation department (23.9%), drug control units (24.7%), investigation (22.7%) and the police Department (31.4%). Examples by region for 2025: Primorsky Krai and Ivanovo Region – 27%, Magadan (investigation) – 50%, Smolensk (drug control) – 40%, Rostov – 21.2%.

A preliminary analysis of the available data indicates that the most acute shortage problem is observed precisely in the territorial internal affairs bodies at the district and city levels, which directly carry out operational and official activities "on the ground" and in contact with the population ^[21]. The problem is not only in quantity, but also in quality: experienced specialists leave ^[22], and high turnover destabilizes work ^[23].

The shortage itself is unevenly distributed, depending on regional factors (economy, labor market). High rates are often observed both in large cities (competition) and in remote areas (conditions). Nevertheless, the problem is of a nationwide nature and requires a comprehensive solution.

Thus, according to I. B. Maryasis, staff turnover in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is due to a number of reasons, including not only low wages and social benefits, but also poor working conditions (schedule, climate), as well as lack of opportunities for professional development ^[24]

American scientists A. P. Michael and Y. Wawa explain turnover through various theories: care is influenced by unmet needs, lack of motivation and "hygienic" factors, an imbalance of contribution/reward, weak "rootedness" in work and poor relations with management ^[25].

Accordingly, the main causes of staff turnover and understaffing in the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are complex and multifactorial, however, for the purposes of analyzing and developing effective measures of influence, it is advisable to classify them into several groups united by similar characteristics.

The first group of reasons is directly related to the remuneration of police officers and includes the following key factors:

1. Uncompetitive wage levels compared to other areas of activity in the region and in the economy as a whole ^[26]. Insufficient salaries are one of the main factors of staff turnover and understaffing in the police, especially in a competitive labor market. Salaries, especially at the initial stages and lower-level positions, often do not correspond to the responsibilities, intensity, workload and risks of the service. It is also uncompetitive compared to the private sector and other government agencies. A comparison of salaries confirms a significant gap, especially in large cities and economically developed regions, which reduces the attractiveness of the profession and contributes to the outflow of personnel ^[27].

2. Insufficient level of guaranteed part of wages (salaries) ^[28]. The guaranteed part (salaries by position and rank) is often small, and the basic salary consists of variable allowances and bonuses, depending, among other things, on subjective assessments. Low salaries make earnings less stable and predictable, which is especially critical for first-time employees and young families in need of financial stability.

3. The opacity and subjectivity of the bonus and additional payment system ^[29]. The system of bonuses and surcharges in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is often opaque and biased. The criteria for their accrual are not always clearly defined and communicated to employees, which creates conditions for subjectivity and abuse by management. Such an unfair system demotivates staff, undermines trust in superiors, and does not stimulate increased work efficiency.

4. The lack of a direct and obvious link between the results of work and the level of remuneration. In the current wage system, there is often no clear link between the actual performance of an employee and his salary ^[30]. Bonuses are often formal in nature and are distributed evenly, without taking into account individual contributions. The lack of a direct result-pay relationship does not encourage efficiency gains, creates a sense of injustice, and demotivates the most conscientious and proactive employees.

The second group of reasons is related to the organization of the service and the working conditions of police officers and includes the following aspects:

1. Systemic violations of the normal length of official time and unjustified overwork ^[31]. Police service is often associated with irregular schedules and systematic overwork, which is not always adequately compensated. This leads to chronic fatigue, burnout, and employee health problems ^[32]. The shortage worsens the situation, increasing the burden on those who remain and leading to exhaustion. Systematic violations of labor laws on work and rest hours strongly demotivate and contribute to staff turnover, especially among young and family employees.

2. High levels of stress and emotional burnout. Constant exposure to crime, violence, and grief leads to chronic stress and professional burnout. Insufficient psychological support and rehabilitation exacerbate this problem and contribute to staff turnover ^[33].

3. Unfavorable conditions of service (domestic, technical, etc.). In a number of departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, conditions of service are unsatisfactory: poor living conditions (premises, places for rest/food), insufficient technical support (lack of modern equipment, wear of the base), problems with uniforms and equipment ^[34]. These unfavorable conditions reduce the comfort of work, worsen the moral and psychological climate and contribute to staff turnover.

4. Problems with professional growth and career prospects. The lack of clear and transparent career prospects demotivates employees ^[35]. The promotion system is often subjective, does not stimulate professional development and does not attract ambitious specialists, reducing the attractiveness of the service.

5. Insufficient social support and guarantees. Despite the availability of social guarantees, their insufficient effectiveness in practice ^[36] (problems with housing, medical care, pensions) reduces social security, the attractiveness of the service and contributes to staff turnover.

6. Negative public opinion about the police (partially). A negative image of the police (partly generated by the media, social networks, and lack of transparency ^[37]) can reduce the prestige of the service and alienate potential candidates.

The third group of reasons is related to the performance evaluation system of police officers and includes the following aspects:

1. Subjectivism, protectionism, corruption: the labor evaluation system is often subjective and opaque. Decisions about rewards and promotions may depend on the personal preferences of management, protectionism, nepotism, and corruption ^[38]. Such injustice demotivates conscientious employees, undermines trust and promotes staff turnover.

2. There are often no clear, measurable and objective criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of police work ^[39], which makes it difficult to objectively assess the contribution, creates grounds for subjectivity, reduces transparency and fairness of personnel management, demotivating employees.

3. The system of feedback and recognition of achievements is often ineffective. Management does not always pay due attention to the successes of subordinates and does not recognize them in a timely manner ^[40], which reduces motivation, worsens the moral and psychological climate, reduces job satisfaction and contributes to staff turnover.

The wage factor plays a key and dominant role in the problem of the shortage of personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The analysis shows that uncompetitive salary levels are one of the main, perhaps leading, factors in this problem, especially affecting staff turnover among employees who are not eligible for retirement benefits (mostly young people). For them, the financial aspect is most important when deciding whether to stay or leave. A low salary does not provide a decent standard of living, does not compensate for the hardships of service, does not stimulate professional growth and harms the image of the profession.

Empirical data and statistics confirm a direct correlation between the level of wages and turnover/shortage rates in different regions and departments. Low pay reduces motivation, satisfaction, prestige of the profession, and attractiveness to candidates, exacerbating shortages and reducing the overall effectiveness of the Interior Ministry.

The proposed model for changing the remuneration system for police officers

In order to eliminate the identified shortcomings of the current police remuneration system and effectively address the problem of understaffing, this study proposes a conceptually new model of the remuneration system based on the following key principles to ensure its effectiveness, fairness and compliance with modern challenges (table 1).

Table 1 – Basic principles of the proposed model

The proposed model for changing police pay retains the basic structure of pay, but adds new incentive payments for performance and compensation for overwork. Saved:

1. Salary by position ^[41]: the calculation method remains, but is calculated based on a 40-hour week and is determined by the lower salary limit, which guarantees a minimum base salary and frees up funds for new incentive payments.

2. Salary for a special rank ^[42]: remains unchanged, continuing to stimulate growth in rank and take into account experience;

3. Incentive payments and allowances ^[43]: the current payments (for class, secrecy, special conditions, etc.) remain unchanged, continuing to compensate for the specifics of the service and stimulate professionalism.

The key innovation of the proposed system is additional payments to compensate for overwork and stimulate results.:

1. Additional payments for processing:

- the bottom line: payment for hours actually worked in excess of the norm (40 hours/week), issued as an official necessity;

- calculation: hourly rate (based on salary by position) + increasing coefficients for overworking on weekends/holidays, overtime (>2 hours/day) and night time. The coefficients are differentiated by type/intensity;

- financing: due to the unpaid part of the wage fund due to shortage (calculated at the lower salary limit). It does not require any additional information. the budget. Redistributes funds to those who actually work more;

- control: raising more than this fund is prohibited (except in emergency cases). Overwork must be justified (colleague's illness, shortage, shifts, activities) and documented (automation is proposed).

2. Additional payments for the achieved results:

- the essence: payment for achieving specific quantitative/qualitative performance indicators;

- the basis of indicators: Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 1040 of 2013 (statistics: disclosures, protocols, etc.), but with the development of individual systems for each type of unit;

- objectivity: the introduction of an "official participation coefficient" and the assignment of weighting coefficients to indicators depending on their significance;

- financing: due to the difference between the salary fund calculated according to the average salary limit for the state and the fund calculated according to the lower limit. Unused funds from the rework fund can be added;

- Distribution mechanism:

· All weighted results of the division are summed up.;

· the cost of a result unit is calculated (Payout Fund / Sum of weighted results);

· Individual payout = (Cost per unit result) * (Individual weighted employee results).

- examples of indicators: solved/detected crimes, administrative protocols, participation in events, reviewed appeals, etc., specific to the unit.

For the transparency, objectivity and effectiveness of the new remuneration system, automation of accounting for overwork and evaluation of results is necessary. It is proposed to introduce a specialized automated system integrated with the existing systems of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a full cycle of accounting and calculation of surcharges. The main modules of the system:

1. Requests for recycling: an employee submits an application with justification through a mobile application (or Public Services) before the start of recycling;

2. Approval of applications: the immediate supervisor approves/rejects the application in the system; the higher management controls the legality and objectivity;

3. Working time accounting: the system accurately and objectively takes into account the actual working hours and overwork based on applications, timesheets, etc.;

4. Collection and processing of results: automated collection of data on results according to established indicators from departmental systems, minimizing manual input and subjectivity;

5. Calculation of additional payments: the system automatically calculates payments for processing and results according to established algorithms, using data on time, results and weighting factors.;

6. Reports and analytics: generate reports for management on processing, results and payments for monitoring, analysis and decision-making;

The advantage of automation will be increased transparency and objectivity, reduced bureaucracy, accuracy and efficiency of accounting/calculations, increased control, and obtaining analytics for personnel management. The introduction of such a system is a key criterion for the successful implementation of the proposed wage model and solving the shortage problem.

Discussion of the results and evaluation of the potential effectiveness of the proposed model

The proposed model for changing police pay is a comprehensive solution to eliminate the shortcomings of the current system, increase staffing levels and improve the quality of work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its potential advantages:

1. Pay increase for effective employees: by rationally redistributing existing budget funds (from shortage, salary optimization) to stimulate productivity and compensate for overwork, which creates a real financial interest in high results without the need for significant additional budget injections, making the model economically feasible;

2. Reduced staff turnover and increased staffing levels: more attractive and competitive conditions (increased pay for results, compensation for overwork, transparency) should reduce the outflow of personnel (especially young ones) and attract new ones, solving the problem of understaffing and increasing the effectiveness of the police.

3. Increased motivation: the direct "pay-result" relationship and compensation for overwork stimulate conscientiousness, initiative, striving for high performance and professional development.

4. Improving the objectivity and fairness of the assessment: the introduction of an automated system with clear criteria eliminates subjectivity and arbitrariness in evaluating work and calculating payments, increasing employee confidence and creating a sense of fairness.

5. Economic efficiency: the model optimizes the use of available budget funds and reduces costs associated with high staff turnover (recruitment, training) and understaffing, which is important under budget constraints.

6. Improving the moral and psychological climate: A fair, transparent and understandable results-based payment system helps to improve the atmosphere in teams, increase trust and cohesion.

7. Practical feasibility: the model is financially secured through the redistribution of existing resources of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which makes its implementation possible even under budget constraints.

Despite the advantages, the implementation of the proposed police remuneration model carries risks and limitations.:

1. Some conservative employees and managers may resist because of the habit of old methods, distrust or fear of complication. Clarification and involvement are required.

2. It is difficult to create universal and objective performance indicators for all the various departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There is a risk of formalism or ignoring quality. Careful design, testing, and flexibility are required.

3. There is a possibility of falsifying the results to illegally receive payments. Effective control (including automated control), transparency and responsibility for violations are required.

4. The development and implementation of a complex IT system is fraught with technical difficulties (integration, testing, reliability, security). Qualified IT specialists and resources are required.

5. Thorough training and education of all employees and managers is required to work with the new payment system and automated tools.

6. Encouraging overwork and performance can lead to overwork and burnout of the most conscientious employees. Strict control of working hours, psychological support and management attention to load distribution are required.

A set of measures is needed to successfully implement the proposed police remuneration model and minimize risks.

First, large-scale explanatory work. Explaining the goals, objectives, and benefits of the new system to employees and managers at all levels through various channels to overcome resistance and provide support.

Secondly, the participation of personnel. Actively involve employees in the development and discussion of performance indicators and implementation mechanisms to increase the interest and adequacy of the system.

Third, effective control. Creation of a multi-level control system (automated monitoring, departmental, possibly public) to ensure the objectivity of the assessment, the legality of payments and the prevention of abuse ("attribution").

Fourth, the phased implementation. It starts with pilot projects in individual departments to test, identify and eliminate deficiencies before full-scale distribution, minimizing risks.

Fifth, constant monitoring and adjustment. Continuous analysis of the effectiveness of the system in practice and timely adaptation to changing conditions and tasks to ensure its relevance and a sustainable solution to the personnel problem.

The prospects for further research in this area are related to the practical testing and implementation of the proposed model in the pilot units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the subsequent assessment of its real effectiveness based on quantitative and qualitative indicators, as well as further improvement of the performance indicators system and automation mechanisms for accounting and evaluating the activities of police officers. The results of practical testing and further research will make it possible to refine and supplement the proposed model, make it more adapted to the real conditions of the internal affairs bodies and ensure maximum effectiveness in solving the problem of understaffing and improving the quality of law enforcement activities in the Russian Federation.

Conclusion

This study is devoted to the problem of shortage of personnel in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, caused largely by uncompetitive wages, especially for employees without the right to a pension, and offers a conceptually new model for its solution. Based on the principles of fairness, performance incentives, and economic feasibility, the model introduces additional payments for processing (funded by savings from shortages) and for achieving specific results, which requires the introduction of a transparent automated accounting and evaluation system. Despite significant potential benefits (increased pay for effective employees without additional budget, reduced turnover, increased staffing, increased motivation, improved climate), there are risks (resistance, difficulty in developing indicators, abuse, technical difficulties, the need for training, the risk of overload), to minimize which specific measures are proposed (clarification, staff participation, control, step-by-step implementation, monitoring). Practical testing and further improvement of the model, which has significant potential to solve the problem of shortage and improve the quality of law enforcement in the Russian Federation, are the prospects for further research.