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Smirdov, O.I. (2025). Problems of security and defense of the British Commonwealth at the 1937 Imperial Conference: Canada's position. History magazine - researches, 1, 223–232. https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2025.1.73685
Problems of security and defense of the British Commonwealth at the 1937 Imperial Conference: Canada's position
DOI: 10.7256/2454-0609.2025.1.73685EDN: RTVCEXReceived: 13-03-2025Published: 22-03-2025Abstract: The article presents an analysis of the views of the canadian delegation on security and defense issues within the framework of the British Commonwealth of Nations at the 1937 imperial conference. The contradictions between canada's position and Britain's attempts to establish closer cooperation within the Commonwealth to ensure imperial defense in the event of war are revealed. The approaches of other "white" dominions, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, to current international political and military-strategic issues are considered, which allows them to be compared with the canadian point of view. Special attention is paid to the factor of public opinion in Canada, since a significant part of canadian society, especially the french canadian minority, was opposed to the involvement of the dominion in military conflicts abroad, which was taken into account by the canadian establishment when developing a foreign policy line. It is also shown that one of the factors influencing Canada's position was the isolationist policy of the United States, with which the dominion actively developed extensive economic and political ties. During the writing of the article, the author turned to both special historical methods and used the tools of the theory of international relations. The problem of Canada's position at the 1937 imperial conference on the security and defense of the British Commonwealth was practically ignored in Russian historiography, which prompted the author to fill in this gap in the history of, on the one hand, the transformation of the British Empire, on the other – in the prehistory of the Second World War. In this study, we rely on a wide range of diverse sources, represented by canadian, english and american documents of an official and personal nature. We conclude that the evasive position of the canadian establishment was the result of a breakdown in the coordination of the Commonwealth's defense policy and one of the factors contributing to Britain's policy of appeasing aggressors during the crisis of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations during the interwar period. Keywords: Canadian foreign policy, British foreign policy, The British Commonwealth of Nations, The dominions, the policy of appeasement, the interwar period, imperial relations, Anglo-Canadian relations, defense issues, The imperial conferenceThis article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here. The issues of international relations of the interwar period and the background of the origin of the Second World War still cause heated debates both in historical scholarship and in political discourse. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that scientists focus on the politics of great powers, while "medium" and "small" countries remain, if not aside from their attention, then at least they have not been studied in such detail - much less work is devoted to them, both in Western and domestic historiography. The power of the British Empire, which reached its greatest territorial expansion following the First World War, began to steadily weaken. The growth of centrifugal tendencies within the empire was caused by socio-economic problems within the metropolis, the growth of self-awareness in the "white" dominions and British colonies ("white" dominions mean the former migrant colonies of Great Britain with a predominant population from the British Isles, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa). Canada, the oldest dominion of the British Empire, has traditionally advocated reformatting the model of interaction with the metropolis in the direction of acquiring greater independence. An example is Canada's refusal to send expeditionary forces to help Great Britain in Asia Minor during the Chanak crisis of 1922 [1, p. 291]. Despite the acquired economic benefits resulting from the First World War, Canada suffered serious demographic losses in it [2, p. 375]. Moreover, the country was shaken by the events of 1917, when the Canadian government decided to introduce universal military service, which caused protests and conflicts in society, in particular between French Canadians and Anglo-Canadians [3, p. 258]. It is worth noting that for Canadian society, being drawn into the European conflict was a real problem that continued to occupy an important place in public and political life during the interwar period. The purpose of the article is to examine Canada's position on the security issues of the British Commonwealth of Nations at the 1937 Imperial Conference and its impact on British policy. At first glance, it may seem that the members of the Commonwealth were completely loyal and followed in the wake of London's policy due to close economic and political relationships, as well as a common language and culture. However, sources show the opposite - there were disagreements within the Commonwealth on the most important foreign policy issues, which was especially evident at the 1937 Imperial Conference. By its beginning, the Versailles-Washington system of international relations was in a state of crisis. In 1936, Germany remilitarized the Rhineland and carried out rearmament, there was a civil war in Spain, and Italy annexed Ethiopia [4, p. 98]. As the British themselves admitted, "these events have created a sense of uncertainty and anxiety throughout Europe" [5, p. 201]. In these circumstances, Great Britain initiated an imperial conference. It was held from May 14 to June 22, 1937, and was the last imperial conference before the outbreak of World War II. The event was a gathering of the heads of Government of the British Commonwealth of Nations and their delegations and was timed to coincide with the coronation of George VI. It was attended by representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Union of South Africa, India, Southern Rhodesia and Burma. Ireland, which had a difficult relationship with Great Britain, did not participate in the conference [6, p. 250]. Various issues related to interaction within the Commonwealth, whose legal status was fixed by the Statute of Westminster on December 11, 1931, were discussed at this forum [7, p. 294]. One of the main goals of the British Government was to find out the opinion of the dominions on the main foreign policy issues, namely defense and attitudes to the current international situation. At the same time, it was proposed to discuss trade relations and issues related to citizenship and logistics within the empire. Britain's plans were outlined in a quarterly magazine devoted to imperial relations, The Round Table. Discussing the goals of the future conference, the authors insisted on the need to coordinate the foreign policy of Great Britain and the dominions [8, p. 237]. For example, Canadian historian Richard Ovendale believed that London sought to enlist the support of the Commonwealth members on the above-mentioned issues in order to demonstrate to the world the cohesion of the British Empire [9, p. 45]. Even before the start of the Imperial Conference, the British Ministry of War prepared a report, which was then sent to the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa [5, p. 199]. The abstract of the report stated that its purpose was only to review the current international situation and, in essence, the document was just a recommendation, the final decision on key issues related to defense remained with the members of the Commonwealth. However, in our opinion, the very fact of the existence of such plans clearly indicates that the potential assistance of the dominions in the war was important for Great Britain. This report examined various plans for force coordination in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. For example, Commonwealth members were expected to help with the supply of ammunition, provide ports to the Royal Navy, and increase defense spending. It follows from the document that the Ministry of War was counting on sending a military contingent from the Commonwealth countries to the European theater of operations to help the metropolis, with an emphasis on immediate reinforcements that would prove to be most valuable in the event of a war. The report explicitly indicated the main potential opponents - Germany and Japan [5, p. 202]. This report caused a mixed reaction among the conference participants, showing a lack of consensus within the Commonwealth. Australia and New Zealand supported its provisions. Thus, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Joseph Savage, stated that his country "stands for the unification and joint coordination of the Commonwealth defense systems" [9, p. 49]. Australia and New Zealand were interested in the project, as Japan pursued an active policy of expansion in the Pacific region and posed a real threat to their mandated territories (Australia ruled the territories of Papua and New Guinea, and New Zealand - Western Samoa) [10, p.34]. Moreover, during the Imperial Conference, Australian Prime Minister Joseph Lyons put forward and defended the idea of creating a "Pacific Pact" [6, p.287]. This project implied the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the countries of the region (the United States, Great Britain, Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand), but it did not go beyond the discussion. It is significant that British diplomats, who were surprised by such a proposal, believed that "nothing would come of it" [11, p. 103-104]. Unlike Australia and New Zealand, which were sympathetic to the proposals of the United Kingdom, the Canadian side openly opposed the possible scheme of centralization and coordination of defensive measures, which were discussed in the report of the British Ministry of War. Outlining his point of view on security issues and explaining Canada's position, Dominion Defense Minister Ian Mackenzie stated in his report at the Imperial Conference that it was not possible to combine the defense systems of the Commonwealth members due to the disproportionate resources of the powers and the high cost of implementing this project, since contributions had to be made by each country. The Minister of Defense was convinced that autonomy in the military sphere would be more beneficial than its centralization in the hands of Great Britain [12, p. 202]. Explaining Canada's position, Ian Mackenzie appealed to Canadian public opinion, which, for the most part, advocated the protection of the unity of the nation and the national interests of Canada, and did not want to impose additional obligations on the metropolis [12, p. 203]. Thus, the preliminary communique of the Imperial Conference stated that "defense policy was exclusively the responsibility of the parliaments of the British Commonwealth countries, but the security of each of its members could be improved by ... continuing the measures already begun to coordinate defense ..." [9, p. 50]. Canada, represented by its Prime Minister Mackenzie King, was categorically opposed to such formulations, as they could raise questions from the Parliament and public opinion in Canada. The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, James Herzog, supported his Canadian counterpart and together they achieved a revision of the communique. Thus, Britain's attempt to set a common course on defense issues within the framework of the British Commonwealth of Nations was rejected. The final communique of the Imperial Conference on foreign policy, which was presented to the public, was vague and did not contain any direct agreements on a common course of the Commonwealth [13, p. 12]. The main message of the communique is that the Government of each member of the organization acts according to its own considerations. The British delegation at the Imperial Conference, when discussing issues of imperial defense and security, in our opinion, hoped for more definite cooperation on this issue, but came across opposition from Canada. In Canada, as in the United Kingdom, where the traditions of public policy were strong, public opinion played a major role in shaping foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, the French Canadian minority, which made up about 30 percent of the total population, had a negative attitude towards military obligations to the empire [14, p. 224]. No one has forgotten the events of the spring of 1917, when in Quebec city, as a result of protests against conscription, the military opened fire on the crowd (Quebec is the capital of the province of the same name with a predominantly French Canadian population) [15, p. 509]. In particular, thanks to this, the conservative National Union Party won the 1936 elections in Quebec. It was led by French Canadian Maurice Duplessis, who was known for his anti-English and isolationist sentiments. He criticized the dominance of American, British, and Anglo-Canadian industrialists in the country's economy, and especially in Quebec [16, p. 252]. Later, he campaigned against joining the war on the side of Great Britain, opposing the liberal party of Mackenzie King [17, p.72]. However, tendencies towards isolationism were observed not only among French Canadians. In his speech at the Imperial Conference, Mackenzie King referred to the polarization of Canadian public opinion. The Canadian Parliament held debates not only related to the domestic political situation, but also on foreign policy and defense issues [18, p. 2217]. It was important for the Canadian delegation to show the UK how diverse the views of Canadian parliamentarians were, primarily to justify their isolationist position at the conference. The Canadian Prime Minister identified five main trends in public opinion regarding the defense of the Commonwealth. Thus, the imperialists, who were mostly represented by Anglo-Canadians, considered Canada an integral part of the British Empire, obliged to support each of its members in military operations and unswervingly follow the current foreign policy of the United Kingdom. Their slogan was: "When Great Britain is at war, Canada is at war" [12, p. 203]. They were opposed by isolationists who believed that Canada's geographical location and economic interests oblige the country not to participate in the foreign policy of the metropolis in other parts of the world, in particular, in Europe, Africa and the Far East. Canada will not participate in wars arising from such situations. Mackenzie King referred to the third group as the League of Collectivists, who wanted Canada to participate in international organizations for peace. Some representatives believed that Canada should be ready to join military sanctions, while the other half believed that it should refrain from intervening if military actions take place far from Canada's borders. The fourth group included "American collectivists" who advocated closer integration with the states of North and South America, in particular, they called on Canada to become a member of the Pan-American Union, established as an advisory body of American states at the end of the 19th century [19, p. 13]. If Canada joined the ranks of the union's members, it was assumed that the organization would become an analogue of the League of Nations in the Western Hemisphere. It was proposed to participate in the affairs with the countries of Europe and Asia only insofar as they would correspond to the interests of all American countries. The last group was centrists, who believed that membership in the Commonwealth or agreements with any organizations could not oblige Canada to participate in military operations or neutrality. But they conditioned Canada's entry into the military operations waged by Great Britain to prevent a real or imminent threat to freedom and democracy around the world. They acted according to the principle of "Parliament making the last decision" [12, p. 201]. It was precisely the positions of the latter group that Mackenzie King adhered to, who often invoked the above provisions in his speeches at the Imperial Conference. The Canadian Prime Minister took into account the split of public opinion within the country on foreign policy issues and deftly used this to his advantage. But was Mackenzie King really the isolationist he tried to appear at the conference? Many compatriots doubted this. So, in one of the articles of the socio-political magazine "Canadian Forum", published under the title "Debates on foreign policy" in March 1937, parallels are drawn between the events of the recent past, namely the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, the outbreak of the First World War and the present. The author of the article, Canadian Frank Underhill, a professor of history at the University of Toronto, compared the statements of Mackenzie King and French Canadian politician Wilfrid Laurier, and found similarities in their rhetoric: both politicians tried to convince the population that they were pursuing a course of non-interference in military conflicts in which Great Britain was involved [20, p. 149]. However, as the Canadian observer notes, the demonstrated non-interference of Prime Minister Laurier did not prevent him from sending Canadian volunteers to the war in South Africa, and later, at the head of the opposition, he supported sending a military contingent to the battlefields of the First World War. The article regretfully predicts that Mackenzie King could have behaved in the same way under the appropriate circumstances. He left the issue of Canada joining the war open, but nevertheless tended to believe that a major conflict was coming, in which Canada would inevitably be forced to join Great Britain [20, p. 151]. In addition to appealing to Canadian public opinion, Mackenzie King often referred to the position of the United States, which at that time pursued an isolationist course [21, p. 260]. The Canadian Prime Minister emphasized that similar sentiments prevailed in his country and spoke with approval about the cautious policy pursued by the administration of President Roosevelt. In his speech at the Imperial Conference, Mackenzie King emphasized the close ties with his southern neighbor in various spheres, calling the relations between the two countries "unusually close and friendly" [12, p.157]. During the period under review, the development of friendly relations with the United States was of fundamental importance for Canada. According to statistics, since 1930, the United States has actually become Canada's main trading partner in both imports and exports [22, p.484]. In this regard, the Canadian leadership increasingly looked back at the position of the United States, which stood on the position of neutrality. At the same time, the traditional ties with Great Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations were no less important. In this regard, the Canadian establishment prioritized the development of trade, economic and political ties within the framework of this "North Atlantic triangle" [23, p. 315]. Already in the last days of the conference, Mackenzie King wrote in his diary: "Since we have not achieved success in defense policy, it remains for us to support the Empire through peaceful initiatives" [24, p. 362]. First of all, by these "initiatives" he meant economic and trade relations between the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations. After returning to Canada, Mackenzie King delivered an address to the nation in which he stressed that the decisions of the conference were not binding. The delegations at the conference came to the conclusion that the governments of each dominion should determine for themselves the vector of foreign policy and the main tasks of defense [13, p. 13]. His address corresponded to the isolationist sentiments that prevailed in the Canadian parliament and society [25, p. 220]. Convinced that public opinion would not tolerate even a mention of Canada's involvement in European affairs, Mackenzie King tried to avoid splitting the nation, which at that time was not very united. First of all, this concerned the French-speaking population of Quebec, who were categorically opposed to the dominion's participation in the military campaigns of the metropolis [26, p. 80]. It is also worth noting that, in our opinion, the Canadian Prime Minister's skeptical position regarding the coordination of actions of the Commonwealth member states under the leadership of Great Britain was partly due to electoral calculations by Mackenzie King. An analysis of the sources on this topic allows us to state that Canada at the 1937 Imperial Conference followed a course of isolationism, which primarily corresponded to the mood within the country. The Canadian delegation strongly resisted any obligations that could be imposed as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and refused to take a closer part in the imperial defense, as proposed by Great Britain [27, p. 369]. In their speeches, representatives of Canada defended the idea that imperial policy should not impose political or military obligations on the Commonwealth countries. The results of the imperial conference, which showed the heterogeneity of the opinions of its participants, indirectly influenced the foreign policy of the metropolis. The unwillingness of the Commonwealth countries, primarily its most industrially developed member, Canada, to participate in military conflicts on the side of London, was one of the factors contributing to Britain's more restrained policy in central and eastern Europe, which unleashed the hands of totalitarian regimes. In light of this, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement appealed not only to the Canadian leadership, but also to all the "white" dominions, as it seemed to them that this reduced the chances of war on the continent [28, p. 217]. Canadian public opinion and the government feared the prospect of being drawn into a global military conflict as one of the parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. One can agree with the opinion of Canadian historian Richard Ovendale, who believed that the position of the Canadian delegation was one of the factors that convinced Neville Chamberlain of the correctness and justified the policy of appeasing aggressive powers in the context of the crisis of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations [9, p. 63]. References
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