Between Admiral F. Ushakov and the Sicilian Court: the diplomatic mission of A. Italinsky in Naples (1799)

Ageev Aleksei ORCID: 0009-0001-7382-1411 Postgraduate student; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, city, Moscow, ave. Lomonosovsky, 27 ageevas@my.msu.ru

The history of Russian diplomacy during the war of the Second Anti-French Coalition (1798-1802) has clearly not been studied enough in comparison with the history of the actions of the Russian regular army and navy. Meanwhile, it was the diplomats accredited to foreign courts, guided by instructions from St. Petersburg and their own experience, who had to ensure real interaction between the Russian Empire and its allies, including coordinating actions between foreign governments and the commanders of the Russian armed forces. One of the diplomats responsible for such interaction was Andrei Yakovlevich Italinsky (1743-1827), who since 1785 had served as an adviser to the Embassy of the Russian Empire at the court of the Neapolitan Bourbons (and in the absence of the head of the diplomatic mission, he served as charge d'affaires) ^[14]. A native of the small-town Chernigov nobility, a certified doctor of medicine and a lover of antiquities, A. J. Italinsky became most famous as an experienced diplomat in the subsequent reign, heading the Russian embassies in Constantinople (1802-1806, 1812-1816) and Rome (1817-1827). Meanwhile, his path to the top in his diplomatic career began precisely in the Kingdom of the two Sicilies, and it was the reign of Paul I that marked a time of unprecedented career growth for A. J. Italinsky: shortly after the outbreak of active hostilities in Northern Italy, Italinsky was appointed Commissioner for military Affairs, whose task was to interact with the Sicilian Court and Russian commanders. squadrons and military detachments in the Mediterranean. For nine months, the diplomat acted independently of the envoy to the Sicilian court, V. V. Musin-Pushkin-Bruce (until he took his place in March 1800 in accordance with the rescript of Paul I dated January 23, 1800 ^{[5, l. 1]}), working especially closely with Vice Admiral F. F. Ushakov and his subordinates, ensuring their interaction with the Sicilian Court and acting as an intermediary between Russian officers and the ranks of the Sicilian and Neapolitan administrations. The most striking episode of A. J. Italinsky's "special" mission was his two–month stay with Admiral F. F. Ushakov's squadron in Naples (September-November 1799), which had recently been occupied by royalist troops under the command of Cardinal F. Ruffo.

This article, as well as the history of A. J. Italinsky's appointment as "commissioner for military affairs," the nature of his mission, his perception of the Neapolitan events in June–July 1799, and the specifics of the diplomat's interaction with his leadership, the Russian military, and the royal administration, will be devoted to this episode. The main sources for this article are not only official references. Italinsky's dispatches, as well as materials from his personal archive, including drafts of the diplomat and his correspondence with various persons (documents from the diplomat's personal archive, returned to Russia after his death in Rome, are stored in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) and comprise 13 files from F. 340 "Collection of Documentary Materials from the personal archives of officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (Op. 598. A. Ya. Italinsky), as well as case 465 from F. 70 "Russia's Relations with Naples" (op. 70/2), translated from F. 190 "Embassy in Rome").

1. New appointment of A. J. Italinsky (spring – summer 1799)

At the end of December 1798, the staff of the Russian embassy at the court of the King of the Two Sicilies followed the royal court out of Naples, which was in turmoil and awaiting the French invasion. On December 25, 1798 (January 5, 1799), they arrived in Palermo, the capital of the Sicilian Kingdom, on ships of the Portuguese squadron of Admiral Marquis de Nice ^{[2, l. 4-4.]}. Less than a month later, the Parthenopean Republic was proclaimed in Naples, and soon the city was occupied by the French army of General J. E. Championnet. Thus, the invasion of the royal troops into the territory of the Roman Republic, carried out in November 1798, turned into a complete disaster for the Neapolitan Bourbon dynasty and the loss of one of the two kingdoms under its control.

In one of his letters, A. J. Italinsky, an adviser to the Russian embassy, claimed that he foresaw the collapse of the Neapolitan army and repeatedly warned the royal government against rash actions, back in June 1798, presenting to the court that without help from Paul I, "The Kingdom of Naples would inevitably be enslaved by France" ("It is a pity that for the unimportance of the prophet the prophecy is not respected") ^{[10, l. 114b.]}. It seems that Italinsky's formal position at the embassy mission should not have given him the right to personal interaction with the royal court and cabinet – he was only the second most important person of the Russian mission, deprived of representative functions and subordinate to its head, the young aristocrat Count Vasily To Valentinovich Musin-Pushkin-Bruce (1773-1836). In reality, however, the situation was completely different: A. J. Italinsky, who had been in Southern Italy for more than ten years, enjoyed a special favor from the Neapolitan court and the first Minister of the Kingdom, J. P. Blavatsky. He had extensive experience and actually directed the day-to-day work of the mission, including through his connections and the presence of a network of informants. Thus, Italinsky's subordinate position at the mission did not correspond at all to his real role. Equally, V. V. Musin-Pushkin-Bruce, who had held the post of envoy to the Neapolitan Court only since the spring of 1797, did not have the sufficient experience, connections, or trust of the royal ministry necessary to direct the work of the diplomatic mission (in a letter to A. Ya. Italinsky dated March 11, 1799, the Russian the consul in Messina, A. Manzo, explained Musin-Pushkin's inexperience for leaving the adviser to the embassy in Southern Italy, despite his numerous requests for leave, while describing the envoy as "a young minister, new to his diplomatic career and incapacitated, including due to his poor health (un giovane ministro novizio nella cariera diplomatica, e puoco abbile anche per lo stato cattivo della sua salute)" ^{[10, l. 20]}. In many ways, it was precisely this discrepancy between the real roles of Italinsky and Musin-Pushkin to the positions they formally held that caused the conflict between them, which became especially acute by the beginning of the spring of 1799. In one of his letters, A. J. Italinsky complained about the young envoy, who, as he assured, made his further stay in Palermo "unbearable".: "... Count Vasily Valentinovich, believing that the minister's name alone should place him in the general opinion as highly as he pleases, neglects other means necessary to gain the respect he desires. What is this behavior, such things are contrary to his self-love and vanity, which the Count extremely distinguishes himself by. He does not want to see a direct reason for this, accuses me, and shields every sign of favor shown to me by Their Majesties and the ministry with damage to his honor and violation of his rights.… Until recently, for no reason... he had explanations with me that really made me sick..." ^{[10, l. 112-113]}.

In addition to a letter complaining about Musin-Pushkin to one of his patrons (along with a repeated request for leave), A. J. Italinsky informed Prince Belmonte of his desire to leave Southern Italy, from whom J. J. had learned of this intention. Acton and the royal couple, and it was they who petitioned St. Petersburg to leave the adviser to the embassy at the mission and give him special powers to carry out communication between the royal government and the Russian troops ^{[10, l. 113b.]}: already on March 9, 1799, J. Acton wrote to the Neapolitan envoy in St. Petersburg, Duke Dee Serracapriola ^{[8, l. 5]}, and two months later, on May 20, 1799, Count F. V. Rostopchin, who was first present at the College of Foreign Affairs, handed over the corresponding presentation of the Neapolitan diplomat to Emperor Paul I ^{[8, l. 19]}.

Six days later, on May 26, 1799, the Highest rescript addressed to A. J. Italinsky followed, the text of which explicitly stated that the main reason for granting the embassy adviser new powers was the request of the Sicilian Court ("As a result of the recall of Duke Serra Capriola to Our Ministry, that His Neapolitan Majesty would be pleased to continue your stay at his court, especially in the present troubled circumstances of Italy and in matters related to military actions, for which We also feel that there may be a need for active communication with our commanding troops; We wish to remain with His Majesty the King of Naples...." ^{[12, l. 201]}) It is worth noting at once that this it was not the only case when in St. Petersburg it was decided to divide the powers between the head of the diplomatic mission, who retained representative functions, and one of its employees, who was entrusted with correspondence related to military affairs (according to the same scheme, in the spring of 1799, duties were divided between the ambassador in Vienna, A. K. Razumovsky, and sent to the Austrian The capital was founded by S. A. Kolychev, who was highly trusted in St. Petersburg ^{[1, l. 600]}). Meanwhile, Italinsky's case was still special: much more attention in the imperial rescript was paid to another "special assignment", which was considered more significant in St. Petersburg at that time - it was about the "former Venetian Islands" (the Ionian Islands), where Italinsky was ordered to go at the first opportunity in order to Acting together with Admiral F. F. Ushakov (whose political organizational abilities were questioned in St. Petersburg), to study the situation on the ground and present to the emperor "detailed plans for the establishment of an Aristocratic Republic on those islands" ^{[12, l. 202]} (modeled on the Republic of Ragusa).

Having received a copy of the rescript through the envoy in Constantinople, V. S. Tomaru, on July 10 (20), 1799, A. Ya. Italinsky, who had literally "bombarded" the College of Foreign Affairs with requests for leave during the past year (formally due to his deplorable financial situation and poor health), now could not contain his joy about his a new appointment. In a letter dated July 20 (31), addressed to Count S. R. Vorontsov, Italinsky wrote: "Now that I am extremely pleased with my fate, I cannot but boast of it to Your Excellency, the more that I see in it the effect of your beneficent comments about me to Count Viktor Pavlovich [Kochubey]..." ^{[10, l. 151]} In the following months, A. Ya. Italinsky energetically began to fulfill his new duties related to cooperation on military affairs (it is important to note that he did not assume any "public title", formally remaining an adviser to the embassy until the spring of 1800). At the same time, Andrei Yakovlevich was not particularly enthusiastic about the assignment related to the trip to the Ionian Islands (in one of his later letters addressed to V. S. Tomara (November 1799), Italinsky wrote: "... Maybe after the capture of Malta, I will receive some kind of post that will save me from traveling to the former Venetsky Islands, where everything is in great disorder, where I cannot be useful" ^{[17, p. 628]}). Italinsky's main concerns in the summer and autumn of 1799 were primarily related to the mediation that he had to carry out between the Sicilian Court, British Admiral G. Nelson and Vice Admiral F. F. Ushakov, who left Corfu Island with his squadron on July 24, 1799 in order to go to Messina and enter into direct negotiations with Allied command.

2. Russian diplomacy and the suppression of the Neapolitan Revolution. Arrival of F. F. Ushakov's squadron in Palermo (August 1799)

By the summer of 1799, the situation in the Mediterranean had changed in favor of the anti-French coalition. Russian Russian-Austrian troops under the command of A.V. Suvorov cleared all of Northern Italy from the French, with the exception of the coast of the Gulf of Genoa, the Russian-Turkish squadron of F. F. Ushakov and Kadir Bey gained a foothold in the Ionian Islands and henceforth controlled the entire Adriatic Sea, and the Turkish army, with the support of the British Navy, was able to oust the French army of General Bonaparte from Syria.. In June 1799, the Parthenopean Republic, abandoned by the French, fell: Naples was captured by Royalist troops under the command of Cardinal F. Ruffo with the support of a Russian detachment (about 560 men) from F. F. Ushakov's squadron led by Lieutenant Commander G. G. Belli (formally under the command of the Neapolitan diplomat Antonio Micheru). The capitulation on moderate terms, signed by Cardinal Ruffo with the leaders of the Neapolitan Republicans (June 23), was annulled the very next day by British Admiral G. Nelson, who arrived from Palermo, acting on the direct orders of the Sicilian Court, which demanded the most severe measures against its rebellious subjects (unlike Ruffo and Micheroux, supporters of compromise and more moderate politics in the Neapolitan provinces "cleansed" of Republicans ^{[24, pp. 116-121]}). The spontaneous violence that broke out on the streets of Naples after the entry of Cardinal Ruffo's loosely organized detachments into the city escalated into organized royalist terror, which de facto began with Nelson himself, who arrested the surrendered Republicans (who had previously been promised free passage to France) and ordered the execution of Neapolitan Admiral F. Caracciolo aboard a Sicilian frigate ^{[27, p. 314-327]}. The institutionalization of the royalist terror followed the following month, when, during a brief stay of about a month in the capital of King Ferdinand IV of the Two Sicilies (who, however, never disembarked, using Admiral Nelson's flagship as his "residence"), the State Judicial Commission was established in Naples on July 21, 1799. (Giunta di Stato) ^{[23, p. 277]}, which dealt with the cases of yesterday's figures of the Parthenopean Republic and all those who were suspected of sympathizing with the Jacobins. From July 1799 to September 1800, more than 8000 people were accused of high treason, of which more than 150 were sentenced to death ^{[24, p. 121],[23, p. 255-260]}.

The perception of the events of the Neapolitan Revolution of 1799 by Russian diplomats in Southern Italy is a fairly well–studied plot (mainly based on the relations of V. V. Musin-Pushkin-Bruce) ^{[15, 19]}. The most important work devoted to this topic is G. A. Sibireva's monograph "The Kingdom of Naples and Russia in the last quarter of the XVIII century" (1981), many of the conclusions of which still retain their scientific relevance. Nevertheless, it seems necessary, based on the analysis of archival documents, to correct some of the historian's assessments regarding the attitude of Italinsky and Musin-Pushkin to the punitive policy of the Neapolitan Bourbons in the summer of 1799. Based on official correspondence, G. A. Sibireva contrasted the views of both diplomats, believing that it was Musin-Pushkin's negative attitude towards royalist terror that caused discontent among the Sicilian court and, as a result, contributed to his final recall from Southern Italy, while Italinsky's "rise" was, among other things, due to his chosen "tone a well-intentioned but impartial observer" ^{[19, p. 129]} (one of G. A. Sibireva's arguments was related to the analysis of the language used by Musin-Pushkin: for example, she saw a veiled protest in Musin-Pushkin's description of mass executions in Naples as "a disgrace that occurs there almost daily" ^{[19, p. 123-124however, this argument does not stand up to any criticism: exactly the same word ("disgrace" in the sense of "spectacle") The messenger used in another of his references to the "funny lights" on the feast of St. Peter the Great. Rosalia [3, l. 74]}).

A comparison of the texts of A. Y. Italinsky and V. V. Musin-Pushkin-Bruce's speeches, as well as the sources they used, shows that both diplomats described what happened in Naples in June–July 1799, based on official reports that came to Palermo from the main participants in the suppression of the revolution (including Cardinal Ruffo and Admiral Nelson), and in their descriptions they quite clearly reflected the view of the Sicilian Court on these events. The reports of Italinsky and Musin-Pushkin on the situation in Naples have much in common: a neutral tone towards the June events and actions of Mr. Nelson, the absence of any sympathy for the Neapolitan Republicans, and sharp criticism of Cardinal Ruffo, characteristic of both V. V. Musin-Pushkin ("Their Majesties and the Ministry it has been noticed for some time that the cardinal's actions, in the minds of the rebels, especially those who had excellent wealth in the nobility, represent an obstacle contrary to the rules of impartial justice" ^{[3, l. 4-4ob.]}), and, to an even greater extent, for A. J. Italinsky, who saw in the cardinal a supporter of the "nobility conspiracy" directed against J. Acton ("He promised the Calabrians to give the city [Naples] to plunder, as a place filled with Jacobins, meanwhile he treated the treasonable government as a legitimate Republic and gave every allowance to all the nobles who excelled in treason" ^{[4, l. 12ob.]}). At the same time, it is curious that in later speeches written by A. J. Italinsky already in Naples in the autumn of 1799 (when the cardinal's merits in the destruction of the republic were recognized both in Palermo and in St. Petersburg), the diplomat could soften his tone and omit the most harsh passages addressed to Ruffo and his army (so, from the draft of the relation dated October 26 (November 6), 1799, after the words "Very little is also collected from Calabria to the Treasury..." The following lines were deleted by Italinsky himself: "... In order that Cardinal Rufus removed many duties from the local people, and moreover many places were ravaged by his Army consisting of a rabble greedy for robbery..." ^{[12, l. 275],[4, l. 68]})

It is important to note that in the summer of 1799, some divergence in the views of the two diplomats on Neapolitan policy did become apparent, but it did not concern royalist terror, but rather the assessment of the Sicilian government's plans for the neighboring Roman state. A. J. Italinsky, who drew information from confidential conversations with Queen Maria Carolina and J. In a statement dated August 5 (16), 1799, Acton linked the foreign policy course of the Sicilian Court with the need to counter the threat of Austrian supremacy in Italy, which could be strengthened, among other things, by the Austrians' seizure of Rome and, especially, after the alleged annexation by the Viennese Court of the Ancona province of the Papal State ("The Imperial possessions in Italy became the annexation of the Ancona province would have been adjacent to the Kingdom of Naples... The neighborhood of a power so strong and terrible throughout Italy would have put His Neapolitan Majesty and his successors in an extremely precarious state regarding a calm and secure reign on the throne of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies..." ^{[4, l. 7ob.]}). V. V. Musin-Pushkin, who did not enjoy the confidence of the Sicilian Court, he received information from rumors, as well as from third parties, including cardinals of the Catholic Church, who suspected the Neapolitan Bourbons of seeking territorial seizures to the detriment of the Papal state ("The cardinals who are here consider such an intention unreasonable and moreover think that it means that His Majesty's desire to take possession of some church lands is true..." ^{[3, L. 18]}) However, this difference of opinion, reflected in the official correspondence, could hardly have directly influenced the review of V. V. Musin-Pushkin.

Of course, by the end of the summer of 1799, some actions of the young envoy had already displeased the Sicilian court and influenced the decision to remove him from Southern Italy, but they seemed to belong to the sphere of "private behavior" of Count V. V. Musin-Pushkin. It is interesting that collegiate assessor Nikolai Zagorovsky, who was a clerk at the embassy, played a role in this. He did not know foreign languages, was prone to "painful seizures" and was "useless" for the needs of the mission ^{[3, l. 39-40]} (was he not what A. Ya. Italinsky meant when he wrote on in the margins of the draft with complaints about Musin-Pushkin: "... inflamed by the stupid suggestions of one loafer as. ..." ^{[10, l. 13]}?) Among the official notes of the Duke of Serracapriola, there is a copy of a letter from King Ferdinand IV to his diplomat in St. Petersburg expressing regret over the recall of V. V. Musin-Pushkin from Southern Italy: "I would not like to be the reason for him to lose his position because I wrote to you on August 31, because the fact that what he did was just the mistakes of his youth, supported by the bad advice of Zagorovsky, who is indeed a very bad subject (ce qu'il a fait n'a eté que des etourderies de jeunesse, mal conseillé par Zagorosky, qui est effectiveness un tres mauvais sujét)" ^{[9, l. 82]}. J. R.R. Tolkien was even more concise. Acton, who reported in one of the dispatches to the Duke of Serracapriola (March 23, 1800): "For my part, I cannot but express some regrets about Count Pushkin, whose private behavior may not have deserved the praise that many of his other excellent qualities deserve (qui peut bien par sa conduite privée n'avoir pas merité les eloges qui meritent d'ailleurs plusieurs excellentes qualités qu'il a)" ^{[9, l. 58ob.]}.

***

On July 23 (August 3), 1799, the combined Russian-Turkish squadron under the command of Admiral F. F. Ushakov anchored at the Messina roadstead. The Russian admiral intended to go to Naples to join G. Nelson in order to act together with the British against the Franco-Spanish squadron of Admiral E. E. Bruy ^{[13, pp. 78-79]}. It is immediately necessary to note the breadth and uncertainty of the admiral's powers: The supreme rescript of March 14, 1799 ordered him, first of all, to ensure the safety of Sicily and prevent a possible attempt by the French army on the coast of the Balkan Peninsula, "by worrying the French on the shores of Italy" and "extending navigation to the bays of Morfedon, Taren, to the Strait of Messina, and perhaps to Naples itself" ^{[17, p. 439]}. In an environment where orders from St. Petersburg were devoid of any specifics, planning for the future actions of the Sevastopol Squadron, which depended on the admiral's sole decisions, inevitably required establishing direct contact with the Allied command. The staff of the Russian diplomatic mission in Southern Italy, first of all A. J. Italinsky, who in August 1799 played the role of one of the main informants of the Vice Admiral and, at the same time, the main mediator between Ushakov, the Sicilian Court and Field Marshal A. V. Suvorov, had to help him in this.

In letters sent to Ushakov on August 4 (15) and 6 (17), Italinsky conveyed the wishes of the Sicilian Court to increase the number of ships in the Neapolitan raid (to establish "general peace" in the capital) and sending the "division of battleships" to Ancona (to speed up the surrender of the city), as well as the request of A.V. Suvorov to establish a naval blockade of Genoa and the Tuscan coast ^{[4, l. 23-25]}.In response to letters from Palermo, F. F. Ushakov on August 10 (21) ordered Vice Admiral P. V. Pustoshkin with seven ships to block Genoa, and Captain 1st rank A. A. Sorokin with three frigates to go to Naples, assuming to arrive there soon with the rest of the squadron (Ushakov also hoped that after A small squadron of the Baltic Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral P. K. Kartsev, which arrived in Palermo from England on the same days, will go to Naples for A. A. Sorokin's frigates) ^{[13, pp. 94-95]}.

On August 21 (September 1), 1799, the Russian-Turkish squadron arrived in Palermo. On the same day, F. F. Ushakov met for the first time with A. Ya. Italinsky, who visited the flagship of Admiral "Sv. Pavel" together with V. V. Musin-Pushkin-Bruce ^{[13, p. 106]}.

At a time when the task of resisting the Franco-Spanish squadron (which had returned to Cadiz) had lost its relevance, F. F. Ushakov considered it necessary to work with the British to go to the island of Malta and accelerate the fall of the Valletta fortifications. Having begun to draw up a plan of action, Ushakov asked Italinsky for a detailed plan of Malta (which, according to his information, Nelson had) and, in general, outlined his future strategy in a note to a diplomat written on the morning of August 24 (i.e., at the moment when Nelson had already refused Ushakov the help of the British squadron): "I It is necessary to go there [to Malta] together with the Turkish Squadron, there are inconvenient anchorages there, and they cannot always be under sail. Therefore, we cannot stay there for a long time, and the Turks, having considered the need to stay there for a long time, will not agree, and therefore, upon our arrival, we immediately need to have a strong effect on Malta..." ^{[12, l. 336]}

Lord Nelson, who deeply disliked the Russian admiral and was critical of Paul I's claims to Malta ^{[20, pp. 148-149]}, had a different opinion. On the very first day after Ushakov's arrival in Palermo, he had a conversation with Italinsky, in which, referring to the orders he had received, he announced the need to send all British vessels (including 8 ships stationed in the Naples raid) to Minorca and Gibraltar in order to secure passage to the Mediterranean from the French and Spanish fleets.. At the same time, Nelson expressed the hope that the Russian-Turkish squadron would replace the British ships in the Gulf of Naples, and this idea was fully supported by the First Minister of the Sicilian Kingdom, J. P. Morgan, who was present at the conversation. Acton ^{[4, l. 47b.]} (attention is drawn to the fact that a week before, Nelson, who had just received the order to transfer the British squadron to Minorca and Gibraltar, assured the same Italinsky that "he does not intend to fulfill this [command] before making an experiment regarding capture of the Jack", and even wrote to the commander of the British detachment in Messina, asking for help from the troops ^{[4, l. 32]}). If during Ushakov's first conference with Nelson (August 23), the British admiral limited himself to refusing his Russian ally the help of the British squadron ^{[13, p. 107]}, then the next day (August 24) at two meetings with the participation of British Ambassador W. Hamilton and J. Acton's speech was, in general, about the senselessness of the expedition to Malta and "the impossibility of attacking Maltese fortifications with ships" ^{[4, l. 48ob.]}.

The key episode was a visit to the ship "St. Paul" by King Ferdinand IV of the Two Sicilies (August 25 (September 5), 1799), who, in the presence of A. J. Italinsky, appealed to F. F. Ushakov, persuading him to send a Russian-Turkish squadron to the Naples raid, while the vice admiral's words about the desire, before going to Naples, "to force the "surrender" of the French on the island of Malta, as it seems, was completely ignored by the king (at least, judging by the description of the dialogue made by A. J. Italinsky) ^{[4, l. 48-49]}. In his speech to Paul I, Italinsky wrote that "that evening" Ushakov decided to fulfill the wishes of Ferdinand IV. The note written by Admiral Italinsky the next day (August 26) seemed to indicate Ushakov's remaining doubts (aggravated by financial difficulties and the still unresolved question of to whose account the expenses already made by G. G. Belli and A. A. Sorokin in Southern Italy in the spring and summer of 1799 would be attributed).: one gets the feeling that, in the end, the vice admiral completely trusted the actions of his diplomat and, taking a passive position, obeyed the will of the king of the Two Sicilies, although this decision was not easy for him ("... Notify me of everything, how you will be positioned, and that you spoke yesterday with Acton or with the king, which is the last one left their opinion? Finally, I agree with His Majesty's indispensable wish. I'll see Kadyr Bey and I think we'll go straight to Naples..." ^{[12, l. 68]})

Thus, the decision to march the squadron to the Gulf of Naples was made, and on this trip A. Ya. Italinsky was to accompany Ushakov, as requested by both the admiral himself and the Sicilian Court ^{[4, l. 51b.]}. It seems that such a result of the negotiations was more closely related to the wishes of the Sicilian Court. although, of course, the irreconcilable position of Lord G. Nelson also played a role, deciding to act without any regard for his Russian allies (in the same note to Italinsky dated August 26, Ushakov noted: "... By the time everything was positively over, Nelson, as it is noticeable, had already taken his resolution, the ships of his today's on the night of Otsedov, everyone went to one..." ^{[12, l. 67]})

F. F. Ushakov's departure to Naples was delayed by riots in Palermo caused by the behavior of Turkish sailors who disembarked (August 28). These events, which cost the lives of at least 14 Turkish sailors (another 40 people were missing), provoked a riot on the Ottoman ships, the crew of which demanded the return of the Turkish squadron to the Dardanelles. Only on September 2 (13), 1799, F. F. Ushakov's squadron, which now consisted exclusively of ships flying the St. Andrew's flag, weighed anchor and headed for the Bay of Naples. The instructions received by F. F. Ushakov from the Sicilian king (also through A. J. Italinsky) instructed him not only to "hasten the restoration of peace and decency" in the capital of the kingdom, but also to "launch an enterprise against the French in the Roman region" by dispatching as many people from the Squadron and from the Royal troops as circumstances permit." ^{[4, l. 52ob.]}.

***

For a deeper understanding of the reason why Ferdinand IV's instructions to F. F. Ushakov included a clause on sending Russian amphibious troops to the territory of the Papal State, it is necessary to say a few words about the international context related to the nature of Russian-Neapolitan diplomatic relations.

Starting in February 1799 (when news reached Palermo of the signing of the Treaty of alliance between Russia and the Kingdom of Naples on December 18 (29), 1798), the arrival of the corps of Russian troops promised under the terms of the treaty (nine infantry battalions with artillery and 200 Cossacks ^{[26, p. 164-173]}) was eagerly awaited in Sicily). Since the end of July 1799, thanks to the promising dispatches of the Duke of Serracapriola, the imminent arrival of the Russian auxiliary corps (led by Lieutenant General MV Rebinder) in Palermo was not in any doubt ^{[3, l. 21-22]}. Moreover, the appearance of a strong Russian detachment in the near future seemed certain for A. Ya. Italinsky: in a letter to Ushakov dated August 6 (17), he even assumed that M. V. Rebinder's corps was already besieging Ancona ^{[10, l. 154ob.]}, and the next day he wrote a letter to Lieutenant General Rebinder himself and even I was ready to personally go out to meet his detachment, which was supposed to be already on the march ("On August 7/18, I wrote to Mr. Lieutenant General Rebinder, notifying him of my duty to try to be useful to him on matters that he might have with the local court. I will not fail to go to him when he approaches the borders of Naples..." ^{[4, l. 26ob.]})

The Sicilian court hoped that it would be the Russian corps that would be able to liberate the territory of the Papal State from the French before the arrival of the Austrian army and, first of all, occupy Ancona: the acquisition of this city in Palermo was seen as a way to strengthen the northern border of the Kingdom of Naples, contrasting its territorial expansion with the growing Austrian dominance in Italy (precisely in order to facilitate the organization of the campaign Russian Russian detachment on Ancona on August 5, 1799, the Neapolitan diplomat A. Misheru was sent to the location of the Russian-Austrian army with letters addressed to Suvorov and Rebinder ^{[29, p. 250-251]}). Meanwhile, by the end of August 1799, it became obvious that the arrival of the Rebinder corps was delayed (the Allies soon decided to transfer it to Switzerland, which became known in Sicily only in November 1799), and at the same time news was received from Tuscany about the subordination of the Austrian troops to Piombino (controlled by of the Neapolitan Administration) and part of fr. Elba (August 5, 1799), as well as the movement of the Austrian army to Rome. Thus, the threat of the establishment of Austrian rule in the Papal region became inevitable, and the royal administration had practically no means to counter this (in a statement dated August 19 (30), A. J. Italinsky wrote about the regret of the Sicilian Court, "that until now the corps of Mr. Lieutenant General Rebinder has not arrived in Rome, and that the Austrian teams will have time will take up most of it" ^{[4, l. 45ob.]}). Under these conditions, the dispatch of F. F. Ushakov's squadron to Naples and the prospect of landing a strong amphibious assault from Russian ships presented the leadership of the Sicilian Kingdom with a unique chance to partially compensate for the weakness of its own military forces. Russian Russian squadron was unable to deploy a larger detachment of the Russian regular army, so the Palermo Court decided to use the support of the Russian squadron to realize its regional interests, and A. J. Italinsky provided him with all possible assistance.

3. Italinsky's stay with the Russian squadron in Naples (September – November 1799)

The ships of F. F. Ushakov's squadron arrived at the Naples raid on the evening of September 7 (18), 1799. The city was in a difficult situation: the population remained restless, arrests and violence on the streets of Naples, although they lost their former scope, did not stop (especially with regard to the wealthy residents of the capital, whose houses were often looted by gangs of armed Lazzaroni) And in Monteoliveto, the State Judicial Commission (Giunta di Stato) continued to sit, regularly passing death sentences, which were carried out in the market square (Piazza del Mercato) and in the nearby Castle del Carmine (Castello del Carmine). As the Neapolitan lawyer Carlo di Nicola wrote in his diary, the number of murders in the city increased so much that it was no longer possible to take to the streets of Naples after midnight without risking their lives ^{[30, p. 331]}. An equally eloquent entry was left in his diary by a midshipman from the P. K. Kartsev squadron, E. E. Levenstern (September 10, 1799): "The crush of people running back and forth, frequent murders from around the corner, threats from Lazzaroni: that as soon as the Russians leave Naples, they will re-introduce equality (?). the fear of well–to-do residents that they will be declared Jacobins - all this does not make a pleasant impression. All prisons and fortresses are full of prisoners, the so-called Jacobins" ^{[16, p. 75]}. In this turbulent environment, amid rampant crime, post-revolutionary hysteria and unrelenting royalist terror, the activities of Vice Admiral F. F. Ushakov and A. J. Italinsky, who was with him, were supposed to unfold.

Subsequently, Andrei Yakovlevich described the nature of his mission in relation to the emperor as follows: "The instructions given by His Neapolitan Majesty to Admiral Ushakov when he was sent here from Palermo with a Squadron could not be executed except with the assistance of the local government, which required continuous communication and daily correspondence with him. Due to this circumstance, my stay here was extremely necessary..." ^{[4, l. 64 – 64ob. Having settled in one of the palaces in the Chiaja coastal area in the western part of the city [12, l. 21]}, the diplomat entered into correspondence with the main figures of the Neapolitan administration: the Vicar General of the kingdom, Cardinal F. Ruffo (who, the very next day after the squadron's arrival in Naples, sent Italinsky an exquisite note with an invitation pay him a visit and "dine on disgusting soup (mangiare una cattiva zuppa)" ^{[10, l. 86]}), Director of Finance J. Zurlo, as well as directors of the military department of the Kingdom of Naples Logerot and Torrebruna ^{[12, l. 24-25]}. As a rule, it was through Italinsky that requests, suggestions and messages from Neapolitan officials addressed to F. F. Ushakov were transmitted (on a number of issues, including the deployment of Russian detachments in Naples, sending troops to Rome and organizing courier communication between the admiral and his subordinates in the Papal State). The "feedback" on behalf of Admiral Ushakov also passed through Italinsky (among the materials of the diplomat's personal archive, drafts of reply letters in Italian, compiled on behalf of Ushakov, have been preserved (for example, a draft of F. F. Ushakov's report to King Ferdinand IV of the Two Sicilies dated October 16, 1799 ^{[12, pp. 104-107]}.]), as well as a number of documents (in particular, the painting of the provisions necessary to supply the squadron, dated October 1, 1799 ^{[12, l. 217]}), the contents of which Italinsky, in accordance with the requests of the vice admiral, had to bring to the attention of the Neapolitan administration).

On the very first day after arriving in Naples, F. F. Ushakov met with Cardinal Ruffo, the heads of the military, financial and naval departments, as well as the commanders of the Neapolitan garrison, after which he inspected fortresses, artillery, naval arsenal, shops and units of the regular army for four days. The situation was difficult: as Italinsky testified, "one artillery was found in good condition," and of the 14,000 soldiers of the Neapolitan army, only a little more than 9,000 people were equipped with "decent guns" ^{[4, l. 53-53 ed.]}. In addition to units of the Neapolitan army, at the time of the squadron's arrival, a detachment of Russian paratroopers led by with Lieutenant Commander G. G. Belli, who participated in the capture of Naples in the summer of 1799: Russian infantrymen, numbering about 550 people, occupied the coastal castle of Castel dell'Ovo, and also partially formed the garrison of the fortress of San Elmo towering over the city. Russian Russian artillery guns were stationed in the very center of Naples, on the Largo dello Spirito Santo square (modern Piazza 7 Settembre), where the barracks of Russian soldiers were located, and Lieutenant Commander G. G. Belli himself was quartered in the Palazzo Doria d'angri family palace located on the same square.) ^{[12, l. 35ob.]}.

On the very first day after the squadron's arrival, by order of F. F. Ushakov, a detachment of 818 men (led by Colonel Anton Skipor) was landed on the shore, which was to march on Rome together with the Neapolitans – the landing force was temporarily stationed in Chiaja (Quartiere degli Esteri in Chiaja) and only on September 19 (30), 1799. The city marched to the borders of the Papal state ^{[10, l. 48]}. On October 1, F. F. Ushakov ordered 400 more people to be landed in Chiye to replace the squad of Scipor that had left Naples ^{[10, l. 45, 48]}, however, this number seemed insufficient to Cardinal F. Ruffo: on October 3, the Vicar General sent a note to A. J. Italinsky, asking him to petition the admiral for an additional landing of 200 people, referring to information about the spread of "malicious" Republicans in the vicinity of the "castle of San Eramo" ("Castel S. Eramo", obviously referring to the castle of San Elmo) ^{[10, l. 43]}. Two days later (October 5, 1799), the situation became even more acute: one of those arrested became aware of an alleged plot against the royal administration – this dubious news caused a commotion in the city, followed by the arming of units of the Neapolitan army, and the meetings of the Junta were temporarily suspended ^{[30, p. 336]}. It was assumed that the Republicans would speak on the same day on October 5 (interestingly, according to the interrogation protocol, one of the goals of the conspirators was to capture Russian artillery on Largo dello Spirito Santo, and they suspected "the commander-in-chief of the Muscovites (il Capo generale dei Moscoviti)" of secretly sympathizing with the Republicans ^{[10, l. 187 188]}). A. Ya. Italinsky received the news of the conspiracy with great concern, as evidenced by his handwritten note to F. F. Ushakov ("I am transmitting secret messages received by me at this moment. They warn that the danger is great and requires prompt assistance. I will be with you as soon as my carriage arrives, meanwhile, Your Excellency, order as many people as possible to disembark") ^{[12, l. 114ob.]} On October 8, 1799, in response to a request from the directors of the Neapolitan military Department, F. F. Ushakov, ordered to strengthen the garrisons in Castel Nuovo (Castel Nuovo Russian russians) and Castel del Ovo, sending 50 Russian soldiers from the contingent stationed in Chiaya (under the general command of Tamelovsky) to each fortress ^{[12, pp. 35-36]}, and two days later he ordered a new amphibious landing in order to increase the total number of Russian troops in Chiaye ^{[10, l. 33-33]} (Cardinal F. Ruffo asked A. J. Italinsky about this on October 10 ^{[10, l. 34-34]}). According to a contemporary, in the same days, Russian soldiers were fully entrusted with the protection of the fortress of San Elmo ^{[30, p. 336]}. Finally, another consequence of the false news about the conspiracy was the request of members of the Junta A. J. Italinsky and F. F. Ushakov (transmitted on October 11 by the commander of the Naples garrison, General de Gambs) to send 36 Russian soldiers and 1 officer from the G. G. Belli detachment to guard the Monteoliveto quarter, where the judicial commission meetings were held (as stated in the letter de Gambs, "due to the fact that many state criminals are brought here for interrogation every day (a motive che giornalmente ivi si conducano molti Rei di Stato per'essere esamenati)" ^{[12, l. 158]}). F. F. Ushakov agreed to satisfy the request of the members of the Junta, but ordered Lieutenant Commander Belli to limit himself to sending There are only 12 people in Monteoliveto (including justifying their decision by saying that "the need here is not so great and there is no danger" ^{[12, l. 159]}).

Eventually, in addition to the G. G. Belli landing party (about 550 people) and the Scipor detachment sent to Rome (818 people), more than 600 people "soldiers, sailors and gunners" were landed in Naples from the Russian squadron, mainly stationed in Chiaia and the neighboring quarter of Ferrandina (Quartiere di Ferrandina), as well as who formed the garrisons of the main Neapolitan fortresses. Russian soldiers and officers had to be supplied with bread, meat and wine (at the expense of the Neapolitan treasury), firewood and candles, money, horses, straw for beds (which was especially lacking in the barracks at Largo dello Spirito Santo ^{[12, 35-36]}). In addition, it was necessary to maintain the operation of the hospital for the Russian military, organized in the first days after the arrival of the squadron in the eastern suburb of Naples near the Bridge of St. Magdalene (in the "Royal Granite Factory on the Bridge of St. Magdalene (Real Fabbrica de'granili al Ponte della Maddalena)" ^{[12, l. 29-29]}.] – probably referring to the Palazzo dei Granili, a large building designed by architect F. Fugo (1779), which at the end of the 18th century served the Neapolitan authorities simultaneously as a grain warehouse, an artillery arsenal and a cable factory ^{[25, p. 422-423]}), as well as to settle periodically arising conflict situations. All these organizational issues required constant interaction with the Neapolitan administration, and this task fell entirely on the shoulders of A. J. Italinsky, who was in continuous correspondence with the directors of the military department, Director of Finance Zurlo and the commander of the Neapolitan garrison, General de Gambs.

Speaking about the measures taken by Ushakov and Italinsky to prevent unrest in Naples (and de facto in support of the royalist terror system established in July 1799 - in particular, one should not forget that all Neapolitan fortresses at that time were used by the royal administration as prisons), one cannot but mention their personal attitude towards the repressions that took place in the city. As you know, F. F. Ushakov, from the very first days of his stay in Naples, was an ardent advocate of the speedy return of the royal court to the capital, the cessation of executions and "general forgiveness" (this was discussed, among other things, in a letter written by him to J. According to A. J. Acton on October 7 (18), 1799 ^{[22, pp. 203-204]}, as well as in the admiral's report to the emperor dated December 13, 1799 ^{[13, pp. 223-226]}), it is much more difficult to judge A. Ya. Italinsky's opinion, although it should be noted that in his official reports he is quite he openly described the deplorable situation of the capital of the kingdom and the decadent mood of its inhabitants ("Due to the connection that exists through kinship between the guilty and immaculate houses, the impiety that the former have become worthy of produces sad feelings in others, why this whole part of the inhabitants of the capital is plunged into great despondency" ^{[4, l. 67-67ob.]}). Another interesting episode testifies to the diplomat's direct involvement in the fate of one of the arrested "state criminals": at the request of F. F. Ushakov, A. Ya. Italinsky twice petitioned Cardinal F. Ruffo for the speedy release from custody of Angelo Cordari, a young medical student from St. Mavra Island, captured in June 1799 when royalist troops entered Naples ^{[10, l. 25-26]} (however, the Vicar General of the kingdom did not give any specific answer to these petitions, saying that he had instructed the judicial commission to "resolve [this case] in all fairness (disbrigare in giustizia)" ^{[10, l. 28]}).

***

The most important provision of Ferdinand IV's instructions to Admiral Fyodor Ushakov concerned the organization of a campaign against Rome, but the vice admiral was unable to fully implement this wish due to unauthorized actions by the British and Neapolitan command.

On September 13 (24), 1799, after the landing of Colonel Skipor's detachment, Cardinal F. Ruffo informed A. J. Italinsky and F. F. Ushakov about the truce concluded between Major General Burkhardt, commander of the Neapolitan army near Rome, and the French General Garnier, largely on the initiative of the British Commodore Troubridge, who blocked Civitavecchia occupied by the French from the sea ^{[4, l. 53ob. – 54]}. Ushakov's reaction was unequivocally negative: having received a draft of the future surrender, which guaranteed the French soldiers a return to their homeland with their weapons intact (which in the future could complicate the situation of the Allied army in Northern Italy), the Vice Admiral categorically demanded from Cardinal Ruffo that Burkhardt order Burkhardt to stop any negotiations with the French before the arrival of Colonel Skipor's detachment to Rome and wrote a letter of the same content to Commodore Troubridge. Only after the Vicar General agreed to Ushakov's demands (with assurances conveyed to Italinsky that the negotiations would not succeed anyway due to the "audacity and arrogance (certa impertinenza, ed alteriggia)" of the French ^{[10, l. 51]}), F. F. Ushakov ordered the Scipor detachment to march on Rome (19 (30 September), despite receiving a letter from Trubridge the day before, in which he informed Ruffo that the surrender would be signed on September 17 (28) (Ushakov and Italinsky were confident that after receiving orders from Naples, Burckhardt would refuse to sign this document, and the surrender of Civitavecchia alone without including the fortresses of the Eternal City in the document would not have it makes no sense ^{[4, l. 55]}). Nevertheless, the calculations did not materialize: on the same day (September 19 (30)), after the Russian paratroopers had left Naples, Ruffo conveyed to Italinsky the news that the capitulation of Rome and Civitavecchia had been signed (the text of the surrender itself, drawn up without any participation from the Russian side and suggesting how It was stated in the draft document that the release of French soldiers with the preservation of their weapons was received in Naples on October 4).

It is important to note that on the eve of receiving the news of Burkhardt and Trubridge signing the surrender, A. J. Italinsky, invited by Ruffo to a joint discussion of the articles of the future document, drafted his own version (which eventually remained on paper). A draft of Italinsky's draft (in French) was preserved in his personal archive: according to the first article of the document, the French were supposed to lay down their arms and were recognized as prisoners of war (Italinsky made brief handwritten notes in Russian between the lines of the French text: "If possible, allow, not including in the surrender" (opposite the article on the preservation of all papers for the French commander), "However, what is less points is better," etc.) ^{[10, l. 191-192]}

F. F. Ushakov's reaction to the news of the capitulation of Rome and Civitavecchia is vividly evidenced by the letters he sent these days to A. J. Italinsky. The first of them, written by him in his own hand on September 19 (30) (even before receiving official news from Cardinal Ruffo, but after the first rumors about the capture of Rome appeared in Naples), clearly shows the confusion of the admiral, who literally sent an amphibious detachment to Rome on the morning of the same day: "... Our troops may have gone in vain, and in such bad weather. I don't know how all this will be solved or what to write to Petersburg.… You need to visit the cardinal and inform me about everything. I do not know how to solve such indecent incidents... If Rome is taken, what to do with our troops so that they are not properly sentries of the places taken..." ^{[10, l. 134]}. After the news of the surrender of the Roman fortresses and Civitavecchia was confirmed, Burkhard, Nazelli (interim governor of Rome) and Ruffo demanded that the admiral leave the Russian amphibious detachment in the Neapolitan-occupied city for a while (while the admiral himself intended to transfer the squadron of Skipor to Ancona to help the captain's squadron blockading the fortress). D. Voinovich), F. F. Ushakov's confusion was replaced by anger and irritation. In two letters to A. J. Italinsky dated October 9, he literally urged himself to be patient ("patience patience [sic!] I will observe it until the time comes"), accused Burckhardt of "not having... thoughts" and striving to keep the Russian troops from "useful... executions", while speaking no less negatively about Cardinal Ruffo ("... They explain their troubles without the slightest benefit on our side and immediately boldly call us a garrison. This word is shameless for us, so that the fleet of His Imperial Majesty would form a garrison and only help with the maintenance of guards, this letter was written in the office of Cardinal Rufo and almost the same calm, no justice was given to us in any way, and I am as displeased as with all their actions, with which they do us the slightest honor. they don't give it to anyone" ^{[12, pp. 164-164],[12, pp. 168-169]}).

Ushakov's irritation seems completely understandable if we take into account the fact that it was the maintenance of garrisons that became one of the main tasks of the sailors and soldiers of the Russian navy in the autumn of 1799, both in Rome and in Naples. At the same time, any attempts by the vice admiral to take active action (the capture of Malta, the march of the Skipor detachment to Rome, its transfer to Ancona) were virtually nullified by the British and Neapolitan allies ("We raised and resurrected the dead people," the vice admiral wrote bitterly about the Neapolitans, "They are grateful they take away merit, which can be harder for military people" ^{[12, l. 164]}). Curiously, Ushakov was inclined to see a political background in the actions of the Neapolitan command: from his point of view, Cardinal Ruffo and the Neapolitan cabinet sought to remove the Russian troops as much as possible from the "cause of the liberation of Rome and the Roman region" and thereby gain more influence than the St. Petersburg court on the future election of the Pope ("Political projects In my opinion, they tend to negotiate when the Pope will be installed, so that they have more reason and voice than our court" ^{[12, l. 169]}).

This opinion of F. F. Ushakov, of course, did not correspond to reality. By demanding the abandonment of the Russian detachment in Rome, the Neapolitan administration pursued other goals, which Cardinal Ruffo quite frankly informed A. J. Italinsky in an oral conversation on October 1, 1799: by occupying Rome before the Austrian army approached the city (it was for this reason that the capitulation signed by Burckhardt and Trubridge was approved by the king of the Two Sicilies, despite F.F.'s complaints Ushakov ^{[28, p. 287]}), the Neapolitan command had to hold the Eternal City and not lose it, just as in early August 1799 they lost the Tuscan city of Piombino, which was actually captured by the Austrians, for this a Russian detachment had to remain in Rome, visible proof that the city was It is occupied not by the Neapolitans alone, but by the united forces of the allies ("... Finally, the Russian army is needed in Rome for a while, so that what happened in Piombino, from where the Austrians drove out the Naples garrison, which took the city from the French" ^{[4, l. 56ob.]}), does not follow. In addition, according to Nazelli and Burckhardt, the Russian troops were much better able than the Neapolitan army to help preserve "general peace" in Rome ^{[4, pp. 61-62]}. These circumstances, as well as, paradoxically, the news of the approach of the Austrian army of General Frohlich to Ancona, ultimately contributed to the fact that Anton Skipor's landing force remained in Rome until the beginning of November 1799.

***

On September 28 (October 9), 1799, A. J. Italinsky received the Highest Rescript dated August 4, 1799, which gave his mission a new character: from now on, the diplomat was to play a major role in ensuring the authority of Emperor Paul I over the island of Malta. In the response from September 30 (October 11) Italinsky wrote: "I will use my zealous diligence in carrying out the task that Your Imperial Majesty has most graciously deigned to entrust to me. In addition to correspondence, a personal communication with some of the most honorable Maltese and a verbal explanation of Your Imperial Majesty's generous intentions regarding their welfare can hasten me a lot. Why, as soon as there is no particular need to continue my stay here, I will go to Palermo, and from there to Malta..." ^{[4, l. 58-58]}. Such an assignment does not seem surprising if we take into account the fact that it was the Russian diplomatic mission in the Kingdom of the two Sicilies that was closest to Malta, and the Sicilian king was officially recognized as the supreme sovereign of the island (while the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem formally owned it as a fief).

The new orders received by A. J. Italinsky were bound to force him to leave Naples. However, even before this happened, F. F. Ushakov's position also changed: on October 21 and 22, 1799, the "will and desire" of the King of the Two Sicilies "for the speedy dispatch of troops ... to Malta" were transmitted through the Italian Vice Admiral ^{[12, l. 173-173]}.], and even later he received (also through Italinsky) a letter from G. Nelson (dated October 24), dedicated to the need to jointly organize the capture of Valletta ^{[4, l. 96-98]} (in a letter to Musin-Pushkin dated October 30, Ushakov, now forced to recall the squad of Skipor from Rome and return to the ships part of the "Neapolitan" landing force, could not hide his irritation: "How can an army run back and forth for such a long distance?" ^{[13, p. 177]}). So, the location of the allies had changed, the Russian squadron was preparing for a new campaign, and an important task facing Italinsky was now negotiations with the Neapolitan administration and the Sicilian court on the procurement of sea provisions for the Maltese expedition (it had already been partially prepared in Messina thanks to the activities of the Russian Consul A. Manzo) – the complexity of these negotiations was caused primarily by There is a serious crop failure in Sicily ^{[4, l. 100-101]}. In addition, from the middle of October 1799, Ushakov and Italinsky took all necessary measures to organize a march from Livorno to Naples of three battalions under the command of Major General D. M. Volkonsky (about 2,500 men), intended for the garrison of Malta (at the suggestion of the directors of the Neapolitan military Department, upon arrival in Naples, they also had to be temporarily housed in Chiaia (Piedigrotta) ^{[12, pp. 40-40]}).

A. J. Italinsky left the Naples raid on November 2 (13), 1799 (two days before the arrival of D. M. Volkonsky's battalions) and four days later arrived in Palermo, where he continued negotiations on the supply of the Russian squadron, actively interacting with G. Nelson and J. Acton ^{[4, pp. 102-104]}. The "culmination" of the diplomat's Maltese mission was his 11-day stay in Malta (from December 15 (26), 1799), during which he was able to familiarize himself with the sentiments of the Maltese, as well as engage in direct interaction with the British officer A. Ball, approved by Ferdinand IV as governor of the island ^{[6, l. 1-3],[21, p. 260-262]}.

By the time A. J. Italinsky returned to Palermo (January 2 (13), 1800), the situation had changed dramatically: Admiral F. F. Ushakov, having left the Bay of Naples with the squadron and battalions of D. M. Volkonsky (only three battleships of Captain A. A. Sorokin remained in the Naples raid, and in the city there was a detachment of G. G. Belli), received two of the Highest rescripts from St. Petersburg on October 8 and 23, 1799, ordering him to return to Corfu, and from there to the Black Sea ports (if the first rescript, received by the vice admiral back in Naples, was drafted in streamlined terms, then the second, which reached him already in Messina, he left no doubt about the will of Emperor Paul I ^{[13, pp. 174-175]}). In an effort to keep the secret, Ushakov informed the Sicilian court that he had to go to Corfu to repair ships, and only Musin-Pushkin and Italinsky (whom he met in Messina) revealed the true nature of the orders from St. Petersburg. As V. V. Musin-Pushkin testified in one of his speeches (January 6 (17), 1800), upon his return to Palermo, A. Ya. Italinsky frankly informed J. Acton learned about the contents of F. F. Ushakov's rescripts, and this news was a "great blow" to the Sicilian Court ^{[7, l. 7-8]}. Now, after the withdrawal of a strong Russian squadron from the Central Mediterranean, neither the "Maltese adventure" of Emperor Paul I nor the Sicilian Court's plan to counter Austrian influence based on the military support of the Russian Empire could be implemented. Consequently, the nature of the activities of the Embassy's adviser A. J. Italinsky, who was directly involved in the implementation of both "projects", inevitably had to change.

4. Conclusion

The second half of 1799 was a time of great activity for the diplomatic mission of the Russian Empire in the Kingdom of the two Sicilies compared to the previous period. This objectively peripheral structure, de facto subordinate to the Russian embassies in Constantinople and Vienna, found itself at the center of strategic planning and negotiations between the allies during the war of the Second Coalition.

The main role in this was played by Andrei Yakovlevich Italinsky, adviser to the embassy, an experienced and executive diplomat who directed the work of the mission for more than ten years, was distinguished by great diligence and enjoyed the almost unlimited trust of the Sicilian Court – it was to this trust that he owed his new appointment in May 1799, relying on the support of the first Minister J. In the spring and summer of 1799, A. J. Italinsky was able to improve his position at the mission, effectively removing V. V. Musin–Pushkin-Bruce, a young and inexperienced Russian envoy to the king's court, from the real work of Acton and the Neapolitan royal couple (as well as his patrons, primarily S. R. Vorontsov and V. P. Kochubey). Both Sicilies. At the same time, it was not about a difference of views on Neapolitan politics, but solely about a personal conflict based on the discrepancy between the real position of diplomats and their formally held positions (as well as the dissatisfaction of the Palermo court, which led to the decision to recall V. V. Musin-Pushkin from Southern Italy, was caused more by the "private behavior" of the envoy than by any criticism of the policy of the Neapolitan Bourbons).

Despite the fact that in St. Petersburg, when giving Italinsky new powers, the main importance was attached to the establishment of the republic on the Ionian Islands, in the real situation of the summer and autumn of 1799, the diplomat's main activity was primarily to act as an intermediary between the Sicilian Court, G. Nelson, A. V. Suvorov and F. F. Ushakov. Italinsky was particularly active in this role in late August–November 1799, while serving with Vice Admiral F. F. Ushakov in Palermo and Naples.

On the one hand, it should be noted the indispensability of the diplomat, who was engaged in continuous correspondence with the Sicilian Court and the Neapolitan administration on a number of issues related to both the urgent needs of the squadron and problems of a more private nature (in some cases, he even drafted documents in a foreign language on behalf of the vice admiral, and in October 1799 had to mitigate the anger of Ushakov, dissatisfied with the behavior of his allies). On the other hand, in some situations, A. J. Italinsky, acting as an intermediary, actually acted towards F. F. Ushakov as a "guide" to the will of the Sicilian Court (first of all, at the moment when it was decided to march the squadron to the Naples raid instead of going to Malta).

In the second half of 1799, the Russian squadron definitely played the role of an auxiliary force in relation to the Allies, which was greatly facilitated by the uncertainty of its tasks. Under these conditions, negotiations with the Allied command could have been of crucial importance, but the only real result of these negotiations, held in Palermo at the end of August 1799, was the actual subordination of the actions of F. F. Ushakov's squadron to the regional interests of the Kingdom of the two Sicilies (ensuring the security of Naples, occupying Rome before the Austrian army, fighting the influence of the Viennese Court in Central Italy). In this regard, it is particularly characteristic that from now on the Russian admiral had to be guided in his actions by the instructions of King Ferdinand IV, and the royal request, transmitted to Ushakov through Italinsky in October 1799, proved necessary to begin preparations for the Maltese expedition that never took place.

Russian Russian fleet Although the role of other factors should not be underestimated (the vagueness of the instructions from St. Petersburg, the hostility of the British command, the weakening of the Russian squadron due to the withdrawal of Turkish ships, the condition of Russian ships, etc.), it seems that the current state of affairs was to some extent influenced by the personal disposition of A. J. Italinsky, who at that moment, judging by He sincerely believed in the coincidence of interests. The Kingdom of Naples and the St. Petersburg Court (as he later wrote to Lieutenant General M. M. Borozdin (who arrived in Naples in March 1800), "it seems to me that, in accordance with the wishes of the king, you cannot fail to please the Emperor" ^{[18, pp. 25-26]}). These ideas of Italinsky, along with the relatively weak nature of communication between Southern Italy and St. Petersburg, during 1800 led to a serious discrepancy between the actions of the diplomat, who readily complied with the requests of the Sicilian Court (including the abandonment of A. A. Sorokin's frigates in the Neapolitan raid), and the policy of Emperor Paul I, after the break with The main coalition allies demanded the return of all Russian troops and ships to Russian borders. In early 1801, this almost ended in disaster when the Russian frigates, which had not left Naples (despite unequivocal orders from St. Petersburg), were actually blocked in the Bay of Naples by the British squadron ^{[11, l. 11]}, and only a change in the foreign policy of the Russian Empire in March 1801 prevented further deterioration of the situation.