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International relations
Reference:

Education as a Tool of Russia’s Soft Power in ASEAN Countries

Dontsov Anatolii

ORCID: 0000-0001-6062-6783

Postgraduate Student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia

Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6, Moscow, 117198, Russia

asdontsov@bk.ru

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0641.2025.1.73523

EDN:

VHDUQM

Received:

28-02-2025


Published:

02-04-2025


Abstract: The study examines the use of education as an instrument of Russia’s soft power in ASEAN countries and its role in fostering international educational cooperation. It focuses on academic mobility, government quotas, inter-university programs, and scientific exchanges, as well as key factors influencing student inflows from ASEAN countries to Russian universities. Special attention is given to differences in engagement levels across ASEAN states and challenges faced by students in admission and study processes. The study analyzes historical and contemporary aspects of educational diplomacy, its institutional foundations, and its significance for Russia’s academic and scientific ties with ASEAN. It also explores ways to enhance the appeal of Russian higher education, including improving programs, expanding English-language instruction, and strengthening information support for international students. The research employs contextual and quantitative analysis with a comparative approach. Academic mobility is assessed through an indicator measuring the ratio of ASEAN students in Russia to their home country’s population per million residents. The analysis covers data from 2020 to 2024. The study’s novelty lies in the quantitative assessment of Russia’s educational policy in ASEAN using a newly developed academic mobility coefficient. The findings confirm the hypothesis that an increase in ASEAN students in Russia correlates with expanding educational cooperation and stronger academic ties. The largest student inflows are from Laos and Vietnam, reflecting high engagement in Russian initiatives, while mobility remains low in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei, highlighting the need to revise cooperation strategies. The results emphasize the role of academic mobility as a key component of Russia’s educational diplomacy in the region.


Keywords:

soft power, educational diplomacy, academic mobility, Russian education, ASEAN countries, international educational programs, Russia-ASEAN cooperation, Russian foreign policy, Russian universities, student exchanges

This article is automatically translated. You can find original text of the article here.

Introduction

In the context of increasing global tension and growing conflict potential in different parts of the world, the ability of States to strengthen their international positions through the use of education as one of the key tools of soft power is gaining more and more weight. Unlike hard power based on military potential, soft power involves defending national interests through cultural, educational and diplomatic influence [1, pp. 164-167]. This approach is especially relevant in regions with high military and political tension, where the use of armed forces will only lead to escalation, which forces countries to look for alternative instruments of influence. Southeast Asia (Southeast Asia) is one of these regions, as it is located in the epicenter of strategic competition between the United States and China [2, p. 243]. In addition, territorial disputes in the South China Sea also increase conflict in the region [3, p. 2].

In this context, Russia takes a neutral position, striving to maintain a balance between the comprehensive strategic partnership with China and strengthen the strategic partnership with ASEAN [4, p. 189]. At the same time, cooperation in the field of education and science can be considered as the foundation for the formation of a single Eurasian space of peace and prosperity [5, p. 212]. In this regard, education is becoming an important tool for strengthening Russia's international position in the region, acting both as a resource and as one of the mechanisms for implementing soft power.

Within the framework of this study, it is proposed to use the academic mobility indicator as one of the indicators of the intensity of educational cooperation between Russia and the ASEAN countries. This indicator is calculated as the ratio of the number of students from the ASEAN country studying in Russia to the population of this state per 1 million population. This indicator makes it possible to quantify the scale of educational interaction between Russia and each ASEAN country, which is an important component of soft power. Although it does not provide an exhaustive picture of the effectiveness of Russia's entire soft power, its dynamics may indicate changes in the level of academic cooperation between Russia and the states of Southeast Asia. It is important to emphasize that this indicator reflects only students who came to Russia for the purpose of studying, and not the number of citizens of these countries studying in their own educational institutions or in other countries. Higher values of this indicator may indicate a greater intensity of educational contacts and the involvement of the ASEAN country in academic cooperation with Russia. The first chapter will present a methodology for calculating this indicator based on an analysis of statistical data over the past five years.

Thus, the present study aims to assess the extent to which academic mobility as an element of educational cooperation can be considered as an indicator of the development of Russia's educational ties as a tool of soft power in the ASEAN countries, as well as to identify possible relationships between academic mobility and the perception of Russia in the region in the context of modern geopolitical challenges.

Academic mobility as an indicator of the effectiveness of Russia's soft power in ASEAN countries

In the context of growing conflict potential around the world, education acts not only as a tool for promoting national interests through indirect and informal communication channels, but also as a means of forming a positive image of Russia in the international arena. Academic mobility, which includes student exchange, internships for teachers and scientists, as well as participation in international conferences, helps to broaden horizons, share knowledge, build trust and establish long-term international relations [6, p. 200].

The hypothesis of this study is that an increase in the number of international students from ASEAN countries studying in Russia may indicate an increase in the intensity of educational cooperation between Russia and the countries of the region. It is assumed that the expansion of academic mobility contributes to the formation of more stable educational ties, which in the future may have an impact on the development of bilateral relations.

Measuring educational cooperation in international relations is a complex task that requires an integrated approach. Within the framework of this study, it is proposed to analyze the indicator of academic mobility, reflecting the increase in the number of students from ASEAN countries studying in Russia, per 1 million people of the population of their country of origin. Thus, it is the involvement of ASEAN countries in educational cooperation with Russia that is being analyzed, and not in other countries or in their own educational institutions. An analysis of the dynamics of this indicator over the years 2020-2024 will reveal trends in Russia's educational contacts with the countries of Southeast Asia.

The increase in the indicator may indicate an increase in the involvement of ASEAN countries in Russia's educational programs, which, in turn, creates additional opportunities for strengthening humanitarian ties. At the same time, stagnation or decrease in the indicator values may signal the need to adjust approaches and additional measures to expand academic cooperation.

Special attention will be paid to the analysis of factors influencing the dynamics of academic mobility, as well as possible strategic steps aimed at increasing the attractiveness of Russian education for citizens of the ASEAN countries.

1. Russia–Brunei: the limited impact of educational programs as a tool of soft power

Cooperation between Russia and Brunei in the field of science and education is developing within the framework of the strategic partnership between Russia and ASEAN, as evidenced by the results of the meeting of Ministers of Science, Technology and Innovation on February 14, 2023. The final statement confirmed plans to strengthen ties within the framework of student exchanges, scientific research, and development in various fields from space to artificial intelligence in the agro—industry in accordance with the Russia-ASEAN Action Plan on Science, Technology, and Innovation until 2025 [7].

For students from Brunei, as well as for other foreign citizens, various free study programs in Russia are available, including quotas from the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as offers from individual universities offering both preparatory courses and higher education programs [8]. However, despite the wide possibilities, practice shows that the cooperation declared "on paper" does not achieve its goals: according to statistics from the Unified Interdepartmental Information and Statistical System (EMISS) of the Russian Federation, the number of students from Brunei arriving to study in Russia is only 2-7 people per year (Fig. 1) [9].

1. The number of Brunei citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

The graph shown in Fig. 1 demonstrates the low level of academic mobility in educational cooperation between Russia and Brunei. For a more comprehensive assessment, it is worth taking into account the population of Brunei, which was 458.9 thousand people according to the World Bank [10] in 2023. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 18/458949 x 10^6 = 39.22 (per 1 million inhabitants). This indicator indicates a weak level of academic ties between the two countries and the limited interest of Brunei citizens in Russian education.

The low value of the academic mobility index can be explained by several factors: the weak representation of Russian educational programs in Brunei, the dominant focus on other international educational centers, as well as limited cooperation in the humanitarian field.

In order to expand educational cooperation with Brunei, it is advisable to develop a more active information policy on the possibilities of Russian education, increase the awareness of Russian universities in the region and offer targeted educational programs tailored to the needs of Brunei students.

2. Russia–Vietnam: academic mobility as a factor of strategic partnership

Cooperation between Russia and Vietnam in the field of education and science is one of the priorities of the bilateral strategic partnership [11, p. 33]. Russia allocates quotas for Vietnamese students: at least 1,000 places per year*. In the 2022/2023 academic year, more than 2.3 thousand Vietnamese citizens studied in Russia according to the quota [12].

The steady growth in the number of students from Vietnam in Russia testifies to the success of educational cooperation. Over the past 4 years, the number of Vietnamese students coming to study in Russia has increased more than 4 times, reflecting both the demand for education in Russia and Vietnam's deep interest in strengthening bilateral ties (Fig. 2) [9].

2. The number of Vietnamese citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

The graph in Fig. 2 reflects the growing dynamics of academic mobility between Russia and Vietnam. According to the World Bank, the population of Vietnam in 2023 was 100.3 million people [13]. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 12615 / 100352192 x 10^6 = 125.71 (per 1 million citizens). The obtained value indicates a high interest of Vietnamese in studying in Russia, and also shows a significant degree of development of educational ties between the countries.

The popularity of Russian education among Vietnamese students is explained by the historically close humanitarian ties that continue to strengthen in the context of the strategic partnership between Russia and Vietnam. Vietnamese students are attracted by a variety of exchange programs, study quotas, and scholarship support provided by the Russian government. In addition, Russian technical and engineering education remains in demand in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, in order to increase educational cooperation, it is necessary to take into account modern challenges, including competition from Western and Asian universities. Expanding the offer, improving the quality of double degree programs, promoting online education and developing specialized courses that meet the current needs of the Vietnamese labor market can contribute to the growth of academic mobility.

3. Russia–Indonesia: prospects and challenges of cooperation in the field of education

Cooperation between Russia and Indonesia in the field of science and education is developing within the framework of the Russia-ASEAN strategic partnership [14, p. 285]. Russia provides quotas for Indonesian students, and 300 places were allocated in the 2023/2024 academic year, which is almost twice as much as in the previous year. As of 2023, about 500 Indonesian citizens were studying at Russian universities, of which more than 390 were under the quota of the Russian Government [15].

The number of students from Indonesia studying in Russia is steadily growing, which indicates the fruitful development of relations in the field of education [16, p. 209]. Over the past 4 years, the number of Indonesian students has increased 8-fold (Fig. 3) [9].

3. The number of Indonesian citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

The dynamics of academic mobility from Indonesia to Russia is shown in Figure 3. According to the World Bank, the population of Indonesia in 2023 was 281.1 million people [17]. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 1862 / 281190067 x 10^6 = 6.62 (per 1 million inhabitants). This indicator indicates a relatively low involvement of Indonesian students in Russian educational programs from the entire population of Indonesia, despite a significant increase in the number of students in absolute numbers.

The current state of bilateral relations between Moscow and Jakarta is characterized as a desire for strategic partnership [18], however, educational cooperation remains limited. The main obstacles are the lack of awareness of Indonesian applicants about Russian universities, the language barrier, as well as high competition from Western and Asian educational institutions.

In order to increase the number of Indonesian students in Russian universities, it is important to step up the information campaign, expand scholarship programs and offer more educational modules in English, which can increase the attractiveness of studying in Russia.

4. Russia–Cambodia: dynamics of academic mobility and educational cooperation

Educational and scientific cooperation between Russia and Cambodia has a long history dating back to the Soviet Union, when many Cambodians studied in the USSR [19, p. 434]. Currently, the participation of Cambodia and Russia in joint activities of the Russia–ASEAN Network of Research Centers, which maintain contacts between research and educational structures, plays an important role in the development of academic ties [20, p. 81]. In addition, Cambodian students receive grants, scholarships, and quotas to study at Russian universities in various programs, including in the fields of cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology [21].

The number of students from Cambodia studying in Russia is steadily growing, which confirms the growing interest in Russian education and the establishment of educational ties between the two countries. Over the past 4 years, the number of Cambodian students in Russia has increased 20-fold (Fig. 4) [9].

4. The number of Cambodian citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

The graph in Fig. 4 illustrates the dynamics of academic mobility between Russia and Cambodia. According to the World Bank, Cambodia's population in 2023 was 17.4 million people [22]. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 606/17423880 x 10^6 = 34.78 (per 1 million inhabitants). Despite a significant increase in the number of students in absolute terms, the proportion of students studying in Russia from the entire population of Cambodia remains low.

The low academic mobility rate may indicate poor awareness of Cambodian applicants regarding study opportunities in Russia, as well as various obstacles, including the language barrier, low quotas, and relatively modest cooperation between universities in Cambodia and Russia.

5. Russia–Laos: educational ties as a basis for long-term cooperation

Educational ties between Russia and Laos were established during the Soviet period. Soviet education had a significant impact on the human resources potential of Laos, thousands of whose citizens were trained in the USSR, including such statesmen as President Thonglong Sisulit and former Prime Minister Phankham Vipkhavan [23].

Modern cooperation has intensified since the 2010s, including through the signing of key agreements such as the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of Russia and the Ministry of Education and Sports of Laos in 2023. This document outlines measures to develop inter-university cooperation, exchange teaching staff, support scientific research, and create a joint working group to coordinate the implementation of educational programs. The Russian government allocates annual quotas for Lao students; in the 2023/24 academic year, 100 such places were provided. The main areas of study include international relations, economics, information technology and engineering specialties [24].

The number of students from Laos studying in Russia is steadily growing, which may indicate the fruitful development of educational ties. Over the past 4 years, the number of Lao students has increased by more than 40 times (Fig. 5) [9].

5. The number of Lao citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

Figure 5 shows the dynamics of academic mobility from Laos to Russia. According to the World Bank, the population of Laos in 2023 was 7.6 million people [25]. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 1035/7664993 x 10^6 = 135.03 (per 1 million inhabitants). This indicator may indicate stable educational ties between countries.

The historically warm relations between Russia and Laos contribute to the influx of Lao students to Russian universities. The strategic partnership between Moscow and Vientiane plays a special role in deepening humanitarian ties**.

To strengthen educational cooperation, it is important to increase tuition quotas, increase scholarships, offer more grant programs, and actively inform the youth of Laos about Russian education.

6. Russia–Malaysia: unstable trends in academic mobility

Cooperation between Russia and Malaysia in the field of education is developing dynamically, covering academic mobility, joint scientific research and language education [26, pp. 406-407]. An important stage was the signing of more than 30 memoranda of understanding between universities of the two countries in 2023, which contributed to the expansion of academic exchange and joint educational programs [27], as well as the creation of a Working Group on Education, Science and Technology in 2024, which became a platform for discussing promising formats of interaction [28].

Within the framework of this Working Group, special attention is paid not only to educational projects, but also to cooperation in the field of scientific research and development (R&D). Joint initiatives in the field of ICT, aerospace projects, biotechnology and cybersecurity are considered among promising areas. Additional opportunities for deepening scientific and technical cooperation are created by the Russian-Malaysian High Technology Center, established in 2020 with the support of the Russian Trade Mission in Malaysia, as well as the Business Council for Cooperation with Malaysia, which helps attract high-tech companies and universities to joint projects in Southeast Asia [29, pp. 22-24].

However, the dynamics of the number of students from Malaysia studying in Russia is unstable, as shown in the graph (Fig. 6) [9]. Although the number of students has increased from 520 in 2020 to 869 in 2024, the graph shows a significant drop in 2021. This failure may be justified by the limitations associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the jump in the number of students in 2022 was not the beginning of a positive trend, which may indicate the negative impact of global political and economic turbulence on bilateral educational ties.

6. The number of Malaysian citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

According to the World Bank, the population of Malaysia in 2023 was 35.1 million people [30]. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 3278/35126298 x 10^6 = 93.32 (per 1 million inhabitants). This indicator may reflect a relatively low level of educational connections, since the proportion of Malaysian students in Russia from the total population remains small.

Despite the fact that the Minister of Higher Education of Malaysia, Zambri Abdul Kadira, described Russian-Malaysian relations as strategic [31], educational cooperation seems to be underdeveloped.

The sanctions pressure on Russia and its partners complicates the work of the Business Council for Cooperation with Malaysia. In addition, the language barrier and insufficient efforts to inform Malaysians about Russian universities do not contribute to an increase in the flow of students to Russia. To increase academic mobility, it is important to develop English-language programs, increase quotas, and promote Russian education at relevant international exhibitions and forums.

7. Russia–Myanmar: the growth of academic mobility in the context of political instability

Cooperation between Russia and Myanmar in the field of education and science continues to develop, which is confirmed by a number of significant initiatives, including an increase in quotas for the education of Myanmar students in Russian universities, the opening of language and educational centers, as well as the implementation of joint research projects [32, pp. 121-122]. Improving the quality of Russian language teaching in Myanmar, particularly at Yangon and Mandalay Universities of Foreign Languages, plays a special role in building contacts. However, challenges remain related to the need to modernize teaching methods and professional retraining of personnel, which makes it difficult to widely disseminate RCT in the country [33, pp. 249-250].

The number of students from Myanmar studying in Russia increased significantly from 15 in 2020 to a peak of 313 students in 2023, followed by a slight decrease to 276 students in 2024 (Figure 7) [9]. The positive dynamics may indicate a deepening of educational ties and an increased interest in Russian education, although the subsequent decrease in the number of students probably indicates possible challenges or changes in foreign policy or educational trends.

Figure 7. The number of Myanmar citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

According to the World Bank, the population of Myanmar in 2023 was 54.1 million people [34]. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 1000/54133798 x 10^6 = 18.47 (per 1 million inhabitants). Despite a significant increase in the number of students from Myanmar coming to study in Russia, academic mobility remains relatively low, which underscores the need to intensify efforts to promote Russian education in the country.

To increase the influx of students from Myanmar to Russia, it is necessary to develop Russian language teaching programs, including preparatory courses and distance learning formats. It is also important to increase quotas and the number of scholarships, adapt educational programs to the needs of Myanmar students, and establish more active awareness of study opportunities in Russia through cultural centers and partner universities in Myanmar.

8. Russia–Singapore: curtailing educational cooperation in the face of sanctions

Until 2022, Russian-Singaporean cooperation in the field of education and science developed steadily, covering a wide range of initiatives, including academic exchanges, joint scientific research, and cultural and educational projects. However, after the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Singapore joined the anti-Russian sanctions [35, p. 117], which led to the curtailment of most educational programs and projects. Singapore became the only ASEAN country included in the Russian list of unfriendly states, which further complicated the prospects for bilateral cooperation [36].

One of the most significant areas of cooperation was the opportunity for Singapore citizens to receive higher education in Russia free of charge. Before the sanctions were imposed, the Russian government allocated annual quotas for Singaporean students to study at leading Russian universities, allowing them to study various specialties for free, including engineering, medical and humanities. The representative office of Rossotrudnichestvo in Singapore actively promoted the popularization of Russian education by conducting information campaigns and helping applicants apply for training [37]. However, after 2022, the admission of students from Singapore under this program actually stopped, which led to a decrease in the level of educational interaction.

Scientific cooperation between the two countries has also demonstrated positive dynamics until 2022. The National Research Foundation of Singapore annually invited Russian scientists to the Global Symposium of Young Scientists, which provided an opportunity to share experiences and develop joint research projects. In Russia, in turn, Russian-Singaporean business forums were held at the Skolkovo Technopark, where prospects for cooperation in such areas as artificial intelligence and biomedical technologies were discussed [36]. However, after the sanctions were imposed, most of these initiatives were curtailed, and Singapore abandoned the implementation of previously planned projects with Russian universities and research centers [38].

Nevertheless, despite the political differences, independent language centers offering Russian language courses continue to operate in Singapore, such as the Russian Language Center in Singapore, which is a partner of St. Petersburg State University [37]. Russian Russian is also taught as an optional subject at Nanyang Technological University, where the Center for Modern Russian Language operates. Such centers contribute to maintaining limited educational ties, but the scale of these initiatives is significantly lower than the previous level of interaction, and the prospects for restoring full-scale cooperation between the countries remain uncertain.

The number of Singaporean students studying in Russia peaked at 19 in 2022, followed by a decrease to 14 in 2023 and a slight increase to 16 in 2024 (Figure 8) [9].

Figure 8. The number of Singaporean citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

The population of Singapore in 2023 was 5.9 million people [39]. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 71/5917648 x 10^6 = 12.00 (per 1 million inhabitants). The obtained value indicates a weak interest of Singaporean citizens in educational programs in Russia, which is also undermined by the Singaporean authorities through anti-Russian statements and sanctions.

At the moment, the prospects for developing educational ties are limited by Singapore's sanctions. Singapore's unwillingness to build constructive cooperation with Russia in many areas, including education, jeopardizes academic contacts. The Russian side should probably pay more attention to developing short-term language internship programs in Russia, improving the quality of Russian language teaching in Singapore, and disseminating information about studying in Russia until Singapore's political position towards Russia changes.

9. Russia–Thailand: educational cooperation and challenges of soft power

Educational cooperation between Russia and Thailand plays a significant role in strengthening bilateral relations, developing through academic mobility and scientific contacts. Nevertheless, educational cooperation faces a number of limitations, among which the weak institutional framework for teaching the Russian language is key. Currently, it is studied only in three universities in the country — Thammasat, Chulalongkorn and Ramkanheng University, and the annual quota for Thai students in Russia does not exceed 50 places [40, p. 460].

The number of Thai students studying in Russia has grown from 112 in 2020 to a peak of 218 students in 2023, which may indicate an expansion of educational cooperation. However, this was followed by a decrease to 180 people in 2024, which could be caused by a number of factors, including political or economic changes. In turn, the reduction in the number of students in 2021 to 81 people can be explained by coronavirus restrictions (Fig. 9) [9].

9. The number of Thai citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

The population of Thailand in 2023 was 71.7 million people. Calculation of the academic mobility index: 753 / 71702435 x 10^6 = 10.50 (per 1 million inhabitants). The obtained value indicates a low level of educational cooperation between Russia and Thailand.

Despite the fact that Thailand is Russia's oldest partner in Southeast Asia [42], with diplomatic ties dating back 128 years, Thais are not very interested in Russian education. Moscow needs to take significant steps to establish cooperation, popularize education in Russia, increase quotas for Thai citizens to study at Russian universities, expand exchange programs, and study the problems that Thais may face when applying for documents or studying in Russia, which hinder the influx of students from Thailand [43, p. 1226].

10. Russia–Philippines: Limited interest in Russian education

Russian-Philippine cooperation in the field of education is strengthening, academic mobility and scientific ties are being established. Russia supports Filipino students by offering government scholarships and free tuition. About 50 quotas are allocated annually for studying at Russian universities, which helps create conditions for long-term partnership [44].

At the same time, the formation of a sustained interest in studying in Russia among Filipino youth largely depends on the level of accessibility of learning Russian in their homeland. Russian Russian is taught at several universities in the Philippines with the support of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, and in 2021, the Russian Studies Center was opened at New Era University in Manila. The Center plays an important role in spreading information about Russia, offering courses in Russian language, culture, history and international relations, and actively cooperates with leading Russian universities — Moscow State University and MGIMO [45, pp. 168-169].

The number of students from the Philippines studying in Russia has grown from 28 in 2020 to a peak of 161 in 2022, which may indicate an expansion of educational cooperation. However, this was followed by a decrease to 96 people in 2023 and 94 in 2024, which may be caused by a number of factors, including a special military operation in Ukraine, political or economic changes (Fig. 10) [9].

10. The number of Filipino citizens who entered Russia in the 2020-2024s for the purpose of studying.

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of EMISS data.

According to the World Bank, the population of the Philippines in 2023 was 114.8 million people [46]. The calculation of the academic mobility index is 409 / 114891199 x 10^6 = 3.56 (per 1 million inhabitants). Despite the increase in the number of students in absolute numbers compared to 2020, the proportion of students studying in Russia from the entire population of the Philippines remains extremely low, which underscores the need to build educational ties.

The low level of academic mobility is due to the weak representation of Russian universities in the Philippine educational market, the language barrier and the orientation of Filipinos towards English-speaking countries.

To expand cooperation, it is necessary to introduce joint programs with Philippine universities, offer flexible educational formats, and actively promote Russian universities through online platforms and educational exhibitions. It is also advisable to study the problems that Filipinos may face when applying for documents or in the process of studying in Russia, which hinder the influx of students from the Philippines.

Conclusion

The analysis confirmed the importance of academic mobility as one of the indicators of the intensity of educational cooperation between Russia and the ASEAN countries. The dynamics of the influx of students from Southeast Asia to study at Russian universities allows us to assess the degree of involvement of individual states in humanitarian cooperation and interest in Russian education in the context of modern geopolitical challenges.

Based on calculations of academic mobility indicators for each of the ten ASEAN countries in Russia, a general graph was drawn up (Fig. 11), which shows that the greatest intensity of academic ties is observed between Russia and Laos, Russia and Vietnam. These indicators reflect historically established ties, support from government institutions, and a sustained interest in Russian education. In these countries, academic mobility can be considered as a significant factor in strengthening bilateral cooperation.

Fig. 11.The indicator of academic mobility of students from ASEAN countries in Russia.

Source: compiled by the author.

At the same time, academic mobility remains low in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei. This indicates the need to review approaches to educational cooperation, including expanding English-language programs, increasing quotas and scholarships, as well as improving information policy in order to promote Russian universities abroad. In addition, it is important to continue adapting educational models to modern requirements, including the use of digital technologies, which will increase the accessibility and attractiveness of Russian education for students from ASEAN countries [48, p. 190].

At the same time, the average value of the indicator of academic mobility of students from ASEAN countries studying in Russia is 47.92 per 1 million inhabitants. This indicator demonstrates a general trend towards a rather low level of involvement of ASEAN countries in educational cooperation with Russia, although there are individual examples of successful interactions, such as Laos and Vietnam. The data obtained applies only to students who arrived in Russia for the purpose of studying, and does not include students studying in other countries or in their home countries.

It should be noted that the use of academic mobility alone limits the completeness of the assessment. It does not reflect all aspects of educational interaction, such as the quality of training, the level of integration of graduates into the professional environment, or the impact on Russia's image in the region. In addition, this indicator does not take into account the influence of other factors – economic, political and cultural. In this regard, a promising area of further research is the development of more comprehensive indicators combining quantitative and qualitative parameters.

Thus, education continues to be an important component of Russia's soft power in Southeast Asia, which has the potential for further development in order to strengthen the country's position in Southeast Asia. However, effective use of this tool requires a flexible, strategically adjusted policy based on constant analysis of student flow dynamics, adapting strategies based on the data obtained, working to improve conditions for international students and long-term partnership programs between Russian and foreign universities.

*Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on cooperation in the field of higher education [Electronic resource] // Electronic Fund of legal and regulatory documents. – 2024. – June 20. – Access mode: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/1306447790 (date of request: 29.01.2025).

**Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Lao People's Democratic Republic in the Asia-Pacific Region [Electronic resource] // President of Russia. – 2011. – October 13. – Access mode: http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/1056 (date of request: 02/14/2025).

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The subject of the research in the peer-reviewed publication is education, considered by the authors as a tool of Russia's soft power in the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The research methodology is based on the synthesis of information from scientific publications, online sources and reviews on the topic under study. The authors attribute the relevance of the work to the fact that in regions with high military and political tension, the use of armed forces will only lead to escalation, it is necessary to look for alternative instruments of influence, including education and academic mobility, which are becoming an important tool for strengthening Russia's international positions in the ASEAN countries. The scientific novelty of the reviewed study, according to the reviewer, consists in the conclusions that an increase in the number of students contributes to the formation of a positive perception of Russia, promotes the development of bilateral relations at the state and public levels. The publication structurally highlights the following sections: Introduction, Academic mobility as an indicator of the effectiveness of Russia's soft power in the ASEAN countries, Russia–Brunei: limited impact of educational programs as a tool of soft power, Russia–Vietnam: academic mobility as a factor of strategic partnership, Russia–Indonesia: prospects and challenges of cooperation in the field of education, Russia–Cambodia: dynamics of academic mobility and educational cooperation, Russia–Laos: educational ties as the basis for long–term cooperation, Russia-Malaysia: unstable trends in academic mobility, Russia–Myanmar: growth of academic mobility in the context of political instability, Russia–Singapore: curtailment of educational cooperation in the context of sanctions, Russia–Thailand: Educational cooperation and Challenges of soft power, Russia–Philippines: Limited interest in Russian education, Conclusion and Bibliography. The article examines the interaction of Russia with the ASEAN countries using a quantitative assessment of the number of students studying in Russia in relation to the total population of the ASEAN countries. The bibliographic list includes 48 sources – publications of domestic and foreign scientists on the subject of the article in Russian and English, as well as online resources. There are targeted links to sources in the text confirming the existence of an appeal to opponents. Of the shortcomings, it is worth noting the following. Firstly, the author's formulation of the definition of "soft power effectiveness" in the text seems indisputable, since "the ratio of the number of foreign students to the total population of their country of origin" does not reflect the result, not an approximation to the pursued policy goal, but only one of the intermediate characteristics of the implementation of measures to strengthen Russia's international position, The calculated coefficient only allows to quantify to some extent the impact of education as a tool of soft power, but using only one indicator it is impossible to objectively assess the broader context of educational interaction in international relations. In addition, due to the low values of this indicator, it was probably more convenient to perceive information about those who left for training per 1 million people, as shown in Table 1. Secondly, the text uses the abbreviation SE without deciphering it. Thirdly, table 1 does not have a name that should be placed in front of it. Figure 11 and Table 1 duplicate each other – it is better to leave one of the forms of illustration of the results. Fourthly, it would be interesting to see the average value of the coefficient considered in the publication for the studied set of countries. The article reflects the results of the research conducted by the authors, corresponds to the direction of the journal "International Relations", contains elements of scientific novelty and practical significance, may be of interest to readers, but needs to be supplemented and adjusted in accordance with the comments made.