The Josephites and the concept of "Moscow-the Third Rome" in Polish historiography and journalism of the XX-XXI centuries.

Eylbart Nataliya Vladimirovna ORCID: 0000-0003-0021-073X Doctor of History Russian State Pedagogical University named after A.I. Herzen Researcher; Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy named after F.M. Dostoevsky (St. Petersburg, Russia). 48 Moika River Embankment, Saint Petersburg, Russia, 191186 ejlbart@mail.ru Other publications by this author

1. Introduction = Introduction

The personality of Joseph Volotsky and the ideological content of the Josephite movement, as well as the historiosophical concept "Moscow – the Third Rome" born in their midst, have received quite a large, albeit analytically uniform reflection in Polish historiography and journalism of the last century. The analytical concepts proposed in these works, in our opinion, have their roots in the 16th century in the texts of the letters of Prince Andrei Kurbsky to Tsar Ivan the Terrible, where he urges the sovereign not to listen to the advice of the "crafty Osiflians." A negative attitude towards the Josephites as proclaimers of the divine nature of grand ducal and royal power, who laid the theological foundation for the expansion of the influence of the autocephalous Russian Orthodox Church on the Kiev metropolis, to the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth remaining under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, is formed in Polish historiography primarily due to the loss of Poland's political independence, and then statehood. Over the past hundred years, there have been three periods of a surge in the interest of Polish researchers in the above-mentioned issue, which, unfortunately, they considered with a minimal degree of research objectivity, with a predominance of an emotional approach and a rather crude political bias. Nevertheless, it seemed necessary to compile a review of Polish literature on this issue, because it is a very vivid example of how, under the influence of stereotypical (even archetypal) thinking, historical analysis becomes propaganda with a series of "anti-civilizations", "anti-countries" and "antiheroes". In fact, the outright Russophobic orientation of the materials we have reviewed is a consequence of the internal political problems that the Polish state itself has experienced and is experiencing, because to some extent the image of "evil, expansionist and slavish Russia" and the image of "freedom-loving Poland, the outpost of European culture" has become a key part of Polish national identity over the past two and a half centuries. In this regard, the Polish public is becoming dependent on the narratives about Russia broadcast by its scientific community. Unfortunately, the Polish intellectual environment turns out to be more hostile towards Russian history and its ideological Orthodox component than the English-speaking one. The latter repeatedly conveyed balanced and objective views on relations between Russia and Poland. A. Toynbee, for example, wrote: "There is a notion in the West that Russia is an aggressor, and if we look at it through our eyes, then all the external signs of this are obvious. We see how in the 18th century, when Poland was divided, Russia absorbed the lion's share of its territory; in the 19th century, it was the oppressor of Poland and Finland and the arch-aggressor in today's post-war world. In the opinion of Russians, everything is exactly the opposite. Russians consider themselves victims of the incessant aggression of the West, and perhaps, in the long term, there is more reason for this view than we would like. An outside observer, if there were such an observer, would say that the victories of the Russians over the Swedes and Poles in the XVIII century were only a counteroffensive and that the seizure of territory during these counteroffensives was less characteristic of Russia's relations with the West than the losses on its part before and after these victories" [Toynbee A., 2011, p. 160]. At the same time, the previously used antithesis of "Friend and Foe," in which Russia was opposed to the West by the East, has been transformed into the antithesis of "Friend and Foe," which has led to a tightening of rhetoric in science, journalism, and politics. As Russian researcher N.V. Sinitsyna famously noted, "The West distorted Philotheus' words ["Moscow is the Third Rome"] in order to cover up the constant attempts of Poles and Swedes to conquer the territories of Ukraine and Belarus" [Sinitsyna N.V., 1998, p. 186]. Unfortunately, we will not find in Polish historiography and journalism (we exclude from the time frame of the study the period when the Republic of Poland was part of the countries of the socialist bloc, since at that time there was practically no discourse on the concept of "Moscow-the Third Rome" or repeated the words of Soviet textbooks) works written in a benevolent tone. where an attempt would be made to look at Russia from the point of view of its interests. It includes a series of texts that are both militant and promote national self-affirmation, as understood by modern Polish politicians.

2. Material, Methods, review = Material, Methods, Revie

For historical and philosophical analysis, we have selected works by Polish authors of both scientific and scientific-journalistic nature (the latter, in our opinion, have a significant impact on the worldview of the Polish public), published both traditionally in print, electronically in online publications, as well as posted on the pages of some bloggers in the form of posts. The texts published on the website of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the University of Warsaw deserve special attention, since its staff specializes in the study of the countries of the former USSR. As noted above, the time frame of our study covers the period from the early 1920s (the restoration of Poland's state independence) to the present (excluding the period of Poland's membership in the socialist bloc). Since these are the years that Polish politics positions as a time of comprehensive national independence, we set ourselves the task of determining the degree of independence of Polish historians and publicists regarding the Josephite movement and their concept of "Moscow-the Third Rome", and to identify the degree of their similarity with traditional unfavorable Western narratives, where Russia from century to century seemed static and unchangeable.. After all, as the same A. Toynbee aptly noted, in Western ideas "both under the crucifixion and under the hammer and sickle, Russia is still "Holy Russia", and Moscow is still "The Third Rome"" [Toynbee A., 2011, p. 174]. In this case, we defined the working hypothesis as the fact that Polish historiography and journalism is in this respect a set of stereotypical narratives that simplify reality and repeat Western mythologies about the history of Russia. As academician A.O. Chubaryan writes, "stereotypes of this kind are very stable, they are passed down from generation to generation and it is very difficult to leave politics and consciousness. Often based on actual individual facts and manifestations, they at the same time become the basis for the formation of a whole system of mythological concepts and ideas" [Chubaryan A.O., 2011, p. 19]. It should be noted that the collected material has been translated into Russian for the first time, and fragments of these translations are presented in this article.

3. Results and Discussion = Results and Discussion

We have divided the Polish studies we have selected on the history of the Josephite movement and the formation of the "Moscow-the Third Rome" ideology (as well as the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in the broadest sense) into three groups according to a chronological principle that has a significant political component within itself.

The first group of studies was created in the 1920s and 1930s. Poland, which has seceded from the Russian Empire, demonstrates a "new independent view" of Russian history, rethinking the ideological attitudes that were once obligatory for them as for former Russian subjects. In this regard, the seven-volume work of the historian, graduate of the Imperial Warsaw University Jan Kuharzewski "From White Tsarism to Red" (Kucharzewski J. Od białego karatu do czerwonego), published in 1923-1935, stands out. Mercilessly criticizing "Moscow Caesaropapism" and the "barbaric alteration of the Byzantine heritage by Moscow "scribes", he gives the following assessment of the influence of the Josephites on Moscow statehood: "From the end of the XV to the middle of the XVI century, the three hierarchs of the Moscow church, Joseph, Daniel and Macarius, gradually carried out work to subordinate the church to the tsarist government. An example was given by the abbot of the Volokolamsk monastery, Joseph Sanin, an enemy of wisdom, a proponent of blind obedience and close ties between the clergy and the state. "Reasoning is the source of all sin," one of Joseph's disciples put it this way. The Josephites demanded severe punishments for sages and apostates, and they were treated by anyone who dared to think instead of blindly repeating the text of books considered sacred. They blunted thought and feeling in the church, replacing them with form, letter, and ritual. They made the church a state institution based on orders and blind subordination. They propagated the principle of pleasing the royal power, claiming that they were giving the caesar what was Caesar's, contrary to the spirit of Christianity, they expanded the scope of the tsarevich and narrowed the scope of the divine more and more. The clergy protects the royal power with religious sanction, it is malleable and useful for all political plans, the tsars, in exchange for this, leave the monasteries their vast estates; they transfer to the clergy custody of enlightenment, that is, rather, the right to stand guard over the universal darkness, entrust the highest church positions to Russians, and not, as before, to the Greeks" [Kucharzewski J., 2000, p. 14].

I. Kukhazhevsky deduced from the ideology of the Josephites, who supported tsarist policy in everything, the "fact" that Russia did not join the Anti-Turkish League with Catholic countries because the political interests of the state had become higher than the interests of Christianity for the Russian Orthodox clergy (while keeping silent, of course, about the numerous and bloody clashes between the Moscow state and the Turkish vassal – The Crimean Khanate). Thus, he paints both this movement and its followers as essentially traitors who "support the crescent moon" despite their religious affiliation, broadcasting an anti-Russian paradigm about "wrong Orthodoxy" that was completely new at that time in the West.

The second group of independent studies appears after almost half a century of interruption in the early 1990s, and this appearance is due to the surge of interest in Russia in the West after the collapse of the USSR. Russian Russian dictionary In this regard, it is worth highlighting the five-volume Russian-Polish-English dictionary of the researcher of the Russian mentality, professor of the University of Lodz, Andrzej de Lazari, "Ideas in Russia" (A. de Lazari. Idee w. Rosji), published from 1999 to 2003 as part of the so-called "Sovietological" studies. Regarding the Josephites, it emphasized that representatives of this trend believed: "Only a strong Church with great wealth can fulfill its divine destiny," and only an authoritarian state could give it strength. He expressed similar views about the "nationalist messianism" of the Russian Orthodox Church and its departure from the "true Orthodox brotherhood" in his book "Will Moscow be the Third Rome? A study on Russian nationalism" ("Czy Moskwa bedzie Trzecim Rzymem ? Studia o nacjonaliźmie rosyjskim») [de Lazari A., 1995]. Thus, the stereotype of an "eternal, unchanging Russia," authoritarian and expansionist under any socio-political system, continued to be broadcast here.

Interest in the issue of the Josephites and in the personality of Joseph Volotsky himself is re-energized in Poland after Patriarch Kirill of Volotsky proclaimed him the heavenly patron saint of Orthodox entrepreneurship and management in 2009. In the same year, 2009, in Gniezno, the religious capital of Poland, an article by researcher Majanna Kuczynska "Saint Dmitry of Rostov and the tradition of monastic piety" (Kuczyńska M. Św. Dymitr Rostowski a tradycja monastycznej pobożności), which notes the "tradition of suppression of free thought" in Russia, allegedly originating from the Josephites. Russian Russian Orthodox clergy, according to the researcher, Peter I and Catherine II faced great opposition to the secularization of church lands precisely because the ideology of the Josephites was too deeply rooted not only in representatives of the Russian Orthodox clergy, but in the Russian people in general [Kuczyńska M., 2009].

The history of the Josephite movement is also reflected in the pages of Polish bloggers during this period, who undoubtedly influence public opinion in the country. One of them, Martina Novak, created a rather biased post in 2011, "The Josephites and the Elders of the Volga Region," where she identified supporters of Nil Sorsky as champions of "personal freedom," contrasting them with the "bloody and cruel" supporters of Volotsky. In particular, she writes about the Josephites as follows: "They were supporters of the concept of a consistent merger and strengthening of the Russian state under the spiritual leadership of the Orthodox Church, theocratic government (theocratic absolutism), the unification of government with the church, the divine origin of the power of the prince / king: "The King himself is like every man, but power is like the Most High God"; subordination the church of secular power, the brutal crackdown on "Jewish heresy"" [Nowak M., 2011]. If we talk about the attitude to the Holy Scriptures, in this blog the Josephites also look unsightly, they are associated with: "Formalism in reading religious literature, slavish attitude to the "Scripture of God", dogmatic perception of rituals (their magical character)." Thus, allegedly from the Josephites comes "disrespect for the individual," according to the author of "inherent in Russian culture," "slavish acceptance of all orders of power."

The third group of studies we are considering chronologically relates to the period from 2014 to the present, it is characterized by the intensification of anti-Russian rhetoric associated with the polarization of the political situation in Europe and the world. This modern discourse does not delve into the origins of the ideological basis of the Russian Orthodox Church and in most cases does not even mention the name of Volotsky and the Josephite movement. It all boils down to "external criticism" of the Russian Orthodox Church as a whole and its political role in the history of Russia at the present stage, calling it either the "Orthodox version of communism" or "soft power". Russian Orthodoxy is considered, by analogy with the 16th century, as an "instrument of the Russian world", an "instrument of imperialism". For example, the Center for Oriental Studies at the University of Warsaw, instead of serious scientific analysis, switched from 2014 to stamping propaganda narratives that generally repeat the stamps of the 1920s and 1930s, but they can be described as more monotonous and primitive. Here we should highlight K. Havrilo's article "The union of the altar and the throne. The Russian Orthodox Church and the government in Russia" [Chawryło K., 2015]. The ideologems of this article are repeated without any correction by the Polish philosopher and publicist, graduate of Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University (a Christian theological educational institution) Lukasz Kobeszko. He examines the problems of interaction between the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church at the present stage in the article "Church soft power. The Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of geopolitics." He calls the modern policy of the Russian state towards the church "the shadow of the Third Rome," emphasizing that "the Russian Church is trying to use the union of the altar and the throne in various directions and put into practice the foundations of the symphony of secular power and the church" [Kobeszko L., 2021].

Unfortunately, Polish researchers who were considered serious experts in the field of Russian history and philology (and who have a degree in Russian philology), who previously tried to show and take into account the Russian point of view in their works, have overly politicized and biased their scientific research. For example, Hannah Kowalska-Stus, a professor at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, states in the article "Russian Orthodox Criticism of Modernism" the following: "Modernism ... is active in the culture of the West and from there influences Russian culture. Since Russian culture is heavily tied to Orthodoxy, which provides a specific genotype of this culture, modernist trends, rooted in its specific depth, produce a completely different effect than it does in the West. The most eloquent example is absolutism, imperialism, or Marxian socialism in the Western and Russian versions. This is just a state-organizing sphere, however, it clearly shows that the ideals of modernity on the basis of Russian culture have acquired a religious character" [Kowalska-Stus H., 2021, p. 267]. In our opinion, this quote indicates that the author believes that Russian Orthodoxy is not a proponent of progress, and therefore modernist European trends acquire archaic retrograde specific features on Russian soil. The latest book by Andrzej Andrusevich, Professor of the University of Rzeszow (who has published many monographs on Russian history) "The Third Rome. From the History of Russian Nationalism" (2019), despite the visible attributes of "scientific", is filled with cliches that are widely known and familiar to both Polish and Western readers in general: "the union of the whip and the cross", "the Russian project: mysticism and politics", etc. [Andrusiewicz A., 2019]. If, on the whole, we turn to Polish research, in one way or another related to this topic, over the past two years, which seemingly have the external attributes of "scientific" and published in journals with academic status, unfortunately we will not find serious discourse there, but only "scientifically based" analytics, more reminiscent of propaganda. An example is article C. Wozniak and A. Chelyuskin's "The Russian Orthodox Church and the imperial policy of the Kremlin" [Wozniak S., Czeluskin A., 2023], which essentially contains the same ideologemes that are present in the works we have already considered.

The pages of Polish news publications in the current period are full of cliches-slogans reminiscent of Western propaganda during the Cold War, probably drawing narratives from the works of the researchers under consideration. Russian Russian Orthodox Church is always at the service of the empire," writes journalist Adam Yavor, developing his idea in the key that "the history of Russian Orthodoxy indicates that it has always strived to achieve Russian supremacy, regardless of whether it was a question of tsars or Russian emperors. The Orthodox Church and the FSB (formerly the KGB) are the only two institutions that survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nothing surprising from here, that the Russian Orthodox Church ... will serve the government that will strive to restore and dominate Russia as an empire" [Jawor A., 2024].

4. Conclusion = Conclusions

Having analyzed the diverse range of Polish works that touch on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Josephite movement, we have to state that all of them, without exception, despite the age-old time spread, convey the same stereotypes and cliches as the overwhelming majority of Western authors in the framework of European discourse about Russia. "As a result, each generation of Europeans and each author, in fact, reinvents or discovers Russia, which is eternal and unchangeable in their eyes" [Tanshina N.P., 2024, p. 12]. From the point of view of the authors of the texts we have analyzed, Russia, as the opposite of Europe, is forever threatening it and pursuing a policy of brutal expansion (while, of course, omitting the details of the severity of European expansion during and after the Great Geographical Discoveries, the polonization of the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories lying east of the ancestral "Piast lands"). Even Christianity itself in its Orthodox version, according to these researchers, does not bring Russia closer to Europe, but makes it even more dangerous for Europeans, since "the altar serves the throne," "stifles freedom of speech," "supports imperial policy." It is noteworthy that even at the present stage, the authors do not differ in ideological diversity, repeating rather primitive narratives in various forms from work to work, going back to the polemic of A.M. Kurbsky with Ivan the Terrible. As the modern British historian of Russian origin A. Lieven aptly notes, there is a "degradation of Western studies ... of Russia within the framework of the general degradation of regional studies in the West" [Lieven A., 2019]. Unfortunately, Polish research is part of this process.