Axiological foundations of local civilizations: formation of the concept of freedom in philosophical and religious systems

Grachev Bogdan PhD in Politics Research fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Russia, g. Moscow, ul. Goncharnaya, 12, str.1 BogdanGrachev@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

Today, there are more and more references in the information field to the decline of the unipolar model of the world order, the end of the era of Western hegemony and the impossibility of implementing a universalist socio-cultural model. Simultaneously with the spread of the idea of multipolarity, there is a growing interest in the theoretical problems of understanding local civilizations, one of the widely recognized criteria for which is the specificity of the philosophical and semantic system characteristic of a significant number of people in a particular territory. Deepening the understanding of the nature of local civilizations requires a description of their unique value hierarchies, highlighting what is common and different in them. Research aimed at developing such issues, in addition to the obvious scientific relevance, is also of practical importance. It is values as an ethical imperative that form the basis for both the formation of the domestic political agenda and the search for a common language in the international arena.

Fundamental in the context of this work is the premise that the system of values and meanings historically formed and entrenched in the worldview of the peoples – carriers of civilizational identity, as well as the peculiarities of their semantic setting ^[1] are little subject to change, and modern large socio-cultural communities inherit their characteristic historical tradition.

Within the framework of the article, one of the key values of Western civilization is chosen for comparison – the category of freedom. Its formation and evolution of understanding in ancient (partly medieval), Islamic, Indian and Chinese philosophical and religious traditions are reviewed, since it was in them that the primary, fundamental idea was set, which was corrected over the centuries, but essentially preserved. The question is raised about the place of "freedom" in each of the analyzed value systems. It seems advisable to cover the meanings that have historically been set by thinkers as widely as possible and assess what factors contributed to their formation.

Of course, with such a statement of the question, a cascade of methodological difficulties is inevitably revealed. First of all, there is a problem of fundamental terminological comparability and the possibility of developing a system of comparison criteria. The second problem follows from the first one. This is the problem of temporal correlation and the definition of a set of methods of diachronic or synchronic approaches, taking into account the fact that the former allow us to reflect and try to analytically reduce the importance of contextual factors, and the latter – to focus directly on semantics and highlight the essential characteristics of the target concept and the boundaries of its application. As will be shown in the course of the study, the third most fundamental problem is that the categories of freedom and free will, which have received detailed development in the European tradition, are not the subject of direct philosophical attention in some cultures of the East and are present in religious and philosophical teachings only implicitly. Finally, it is impossible to avoid the issue of linguistic interpretation and differences in the logic of the meaning of the analyzed cultures.

If the latter problem is universal, and its solution is seen in the gradual expansion of the corpus of joint international intercultural research, then within the limited format of the article it seems difficult to give a reasoned answer about the fundamental solvability or insolubility of the remaining difficulties. However, given the heuristic significance of the proposed comparison noted above, an attempt to overcome them seems appropriate and may consist in the synthesis of approaches of dialectical ascent (based on analytical explication) and socio-cultural comparison. The first element of this pair has already been tested in the study of the phenomenon of freedom: "The concept of ascent has a double meaning: as a historical process of progressive development of culture, which becomes a way of reproduction and human development; secondly, as a logical process of constructing an ideal model of free human individuality," notes V. Kozyrkov, Doctor of Sociology ^{[2, p. 103]}. The study of freedom outside the dialectical method is difficult. The definition of the content of the categories "freedom of will", "freedom for", "freedom from" is impossible without the introduction of antinomic categories.

The second element, sociocultural comparison, is a widespread approach in comparative studies in almost all fields of social sciences. This methodological combination opens the way to overcoming these difficulties: attention is paid not so much to the search for similar categories as to the analysis of public ideas about freedom expressed in philosophical and religious-philosophical systems through texts producing the content of authentic civilizational values.

Thus, at the first stage, the content of ideas about freedom in each value system is analyzed. If they are not directly manifested, their reconstruction by analytical explication methods is required. The sufficiently serious elaboration of the topic by both domestic and foreign scientists allows us to rely more on the conclusions already obtained in the course of analytical work, reducing the need to refer to primary sources. At the second stage, an attempt was made to identify common and different ones and extrapolate the conclusions to the modern political and socio-cultural context.

The European tradition

The development of the idea of freedom in ancient philosophical thought is a rather deeply researched topic in Russian science. The evolution of views has been traced, and appropriate classifications have been developed. Serious academic works are devoted to certain aspects: monographs, dissertations. This is due to the fact that the concept of freedom was one of the central concepts of Western philosophy. Already in the early mythological representations of the ancient era, the idea of contrasting human freedom and fate was laid down. A person lives in a "self-sufficient sensory-material cosmos, excluding for himself the presence of any external will capable of controlling him, and therefore obeying his own inner principle" ^{[3, p. 14]}. At the same time, in the Homeric epic it is revealed that in addition to accepting fate as predestination, in addition to the will of the gods, a person has a moral choice through which he has the opportunity to realize inner qualities: responsibility and reasonableness, cowardice and shame, etc. ^[4].

The direct understanding of freedom occurs in connection with another dichotomy: "freedom" – "slavery". "To be free meant to live in one's native land and not be under anyone's domination" ^{[5, p. 701]}, – points out the doctor of Philosophical sciences R.N. Parkhomenko. Slaves were perceived not as individuals, but "as a separate part of the master's body, intended for physical labor. Free people are not suitable for such jobs; they belong to themselves" ^{[6, pp. 19-20]}. The opportunity to have leisure, to engage in seven liberal arts fundamentally distinguishes the activity of a free from a slave, which should indicate the anthropological superiority of the former ^[7].

The Greek polis was an association of free people, where the guarantee of freedom was ensured by the equality of citizens before the law. Here another antithesis of a free person appears – this is a foreigner, a "barbarian", a "non-Greek" ^[5]. The bearers of these "labels" were excluded from the community of free citizens of the policy both purely by virtue of the law and due to a lack of understanding of the cosmic harmony realized in the structure of the policy.

The vision of the polis according to Heraclitus is revealed somewhat differently, who, although he recognized the cosmic order in the polis norms and considered following them reasonable, he nevertheless disputed the primacy of law in the liberation of man, placing at the forefront the harmony of the universal Logos with the inner Logos, in the absence of which a person finds himself in bondage to the corporeal ^[8]. According to Heraclitus, man is endowed with reason, and therefore has a choice whether to follow the dictates of the soul or the universal Logos, and this equalizes people regardless of their social status.

From this premise, which is important for the entire subsequent tradition, stems the path of the sage, which presupposes the rejection of passions and is aimed at the development of reason, a rational understanding of the world and one's place in it. The name of Democritus is associated with the development of the doctrine of atomism, although he did not abandon the role of fate, but among other things, singled out the individual in the polis system, thereby more clearly defining the meaning of the subjective, strengthening the importance of reason in freeing oneself from lower desires in approaching the ideal of the sage through the achievement of which happiness is possible. Thus, simultaneously with the comprehension of freedom of choice, the category of "due" is born, the realization of which Democritus saw in striving for the morally beautiful, and Xenophon – in "doing the best" ^{[5, 40]}.

These ideas are further developed in the philosophy of Socrates, who associated freedom with adherence to moral laws, i.e. the ability to realize subjective intentions regardless of external circumstances. The idea of freedom finds a new refraction in the idea of service: reflection and self-control organize the soul in the same way as national unity and laws organize the polis. Both are good, and the good defines freedom. The one whose thoughts and actions are aimed at achieving the public good is free ^[9]. Thus, the political aspect of freedom is manifested, which allows us to contrast the despotism of the "free" organization of the policy. We find similar intentions in the philosophy of the Cynics. For example, Diogenes of Sinope, known for his ascetic lifestyle, demonstrated the ability to resist both external circumstances and internal sensual urges.

An alternative point of view was proposed by sophists, who contrasted the law created by man and the natural law, which unfolds without external coercion. In their opinion, inner freedom can be achieved outside of social and political institutions, having grounds in the changeable, but corresponding to the deep nature of man, sphere of feelings and opinions.

Plato synthesizes these two ideas in some way ^[9]. According to his views, there are two parts in the human soul: the rational and the strong-willed. The way of life of a person depends on which beginning – lustful or reasonable - he chooses for himself. However, following any of these options makes a person unfree, and only by doubting, hesitating and making a new choice each time, a person approaches freedom. Since Plato admits the arbitrariness of actions, a new dialectical pair "freedom – responsibility" arises. The latter inherits the already described early ancient thought and represents the need to correlate actions with the cosmic order. Human freedom consists in having a natural inner understanding of divine harmony and acting in accordance with it.

Aristotle develops the tradition of linking freedom and virtue, supplementing his reasoning with the introduction of the category "will", by which he understands the special function of the soul, controlled by reason, but capable of self-determination. He identifies involuntary actions that are performed involuntarily (as a result of the action of the elements or power), as well as unconscious ones (if the individual is not sufficiently aware of the consequences). Among arbitrary actions, Aristotle separately distinguishes the category of intentional, committed not just consciously, but precisely as a result of choosing to achieve a goal, taking into account the ways to achieve it. "Freedom thus consists not just in arbitrariness, but in proper arbitrariness aimed at the highest good" ^[10]. The good as a goal is a priori – initially manifested and desired, therefore freedom refers to a greater extent only to the choice of means and ways to achieve this good. This is an opportunity to act according to one's will, which at the same time must be consonant with the Logos. A person is not free if he commits an action or is under any pressure (nature, circumstances), or in case of unconsciousness (if he does not know about the consequences of his decisions) ^{[11, p. 504]}.

In the Hellenistic period, man begins to be perceived not just as a subordinate part of the cosmic order, but as the highest point of its development. The conquest of Hellas forced many philosophers to shift the focus of thinking about freedom from the public to the natural. So Epicurus notes that most actions do not have a controlled causality, but resemble random (and therefore unfree) deviations of the atom. The realization of freedom, however, is seen by him in achieving through reasonable control of the sensory sphere ataraxia – a state of liberation of the soul from external affects and fixation on the inner.

In the philosophy of Stoicism, liberation is again associated with the ideal of the sage and ataraxia, but unlike its predecessors, who thought of it as a harmonious inclusion in the cosmic order, for the Stoics the ideal becomes unattainable, implying the rejection of everything human. Freedom is further individualized, and its achievement begins to be associated with getting rid of suffering. Chrysippus pointed out that it is even possible to resist fate by force of will and reason ^[8].

The change in the socio-political structure led to the emergence of new motives in the philosophy of freedom in the late Stoic philosophy (Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius). For Epictetus, a freed slave and the son of a slave, freedom was the highest value. "You will shackle my leg, but Zeus cannot overcome my free will" ^{[12, p. 34]}, he said. Thus, the ideas about the impossibility of combining slavery and freedom, their fundamental antinomianism, are becoming a thing of the past.

Seneca's imperative was that human freedom lies in the ability to resist the lower impulses of the soul. This is a human privilege, but the person himself is insignificant in front of the world and the state. The departure of a philosopher from the world for any purpose is a weakness, and true freedom of the spirit can manifest itself only in full acceptance of the misfortunes of the world and suffering, in a reasonable choice of his attitude to what is happening.

Neoplatonists have tried to formulate a new paradigm of understanding freedom. Plotinus recognized the possibility of freedom of the soul, but not of the body, since the latter is bound by social and natural laws. He was also interested in the question of the fundamental possibility of such a being in which freedom is a way of existence. Answering it, he noted that since the essence of man does not completely coincide with self-control, then man cannot be considered the master of his being. The soul, according to Plotinus, remains free, thanks to the quality of eternity inherent in it. The person as a whole, having freedom of choice, is at a lower stage of freedom. However, being at this stage, he can improve on the path to the One. Comparing man and animal, Plotinus noted the sinless causal essence of the latter, but man, due to his free will and the ability to commit evil as a result of conscious choice, is subject to sin. In the future, Iamblichus goes even further into the field of theology, shifting the main subject of reasoning from freedom of decisions and actions to liberation from the limitations of nature, i.e. to communion with the divine, knowledge of God, through which the human soul is fully revealed.

In the future, this idea develops in the early Christian understanding, where the ascent of freedom from arbitrariness to creativity is postulated. The Apostle Paul proclaims man's vocation to freedom, which is realized through grace. ^[10]. According to Augustine, a person is free to choose to take on sin or save himself for God – this is how positive freedom is asserted through negation (negative connotation). At the same time, freedom (a positive connotation) was perceived as devotion to Christ and God: "I found that above my changeable thought there is an unchangeable, real and eternal truth" ^{[13, 7:XVII]}. Here we can trace the implicit opposition to the idea of the sage's independence from the outside, which was discussed above. Augustine shares the basic operating ability of man's spiritual nature (voluntas) and freedom of choice (libertum arbitrium) in the act of making a decision.

There is also a significant turn in the theodicy: divine causality takes the place of impersonal cosmic determinism. According to Philo of Alexandria, "only God is free, the one God, as not relying on anything and as a self-fulfilling and self-sufficient higher being" ^{[5, p. 706]}. A free person can be considered someone to whom God has given freedom. The possession of freedom (Origen, Clement of Alexandria) distinguishes people from non-spiritual entities, since it is man who is given the ability to distinguish between good and evil. Good is identical to being, evil is non–existence, therefore, not doing good leads a person into non-existence.

Later, Thomas Aquinas, developing the views of Aristotle, outlined the subordination of the will to reason: a person is independent in the implementation of a reasonably chosen one. Anselm of Canterbury reasoned in the same spirit, for whom reason shows a goal, and the will chooses it. Duns Scotus, on the contrary, asserted the priority of the will (servum arbitrium) over reason (both for God and man), which later found expression in the Renaissance, where freedom was interpreted as an opportunity for comprehensive personal development ^[10].

Occam looked at this question in a different plane, stating that freedom cannot be justified in the arguments of reason, but must be studied as a phenomenon of inner experiences. He also raises the question of man's independence – what can he do before God intervenes. Subsequently, the idea of a non-deterministic will will grow in the philosophy of humanism ^[14].

Arab-Muslim culture

In the East, where there was no place for the democratic structure of the polis, and society was organized on the principle of large empires, the categories of personal freedom, choice, and civil rights did not develop, thinkers focused their main attention on the sphere of human spiritual life, his feelings and relations with the world ^[15]. An attempt to find an analogy for the "free–slave" dichotomy, so characteristic of early ancient thought, cannot be adequately implemented in Arab-Muslim culture. If in Ancient Greece freedom was a necessary condition for choosing a certain type of occupation and inclusion in the political life of the polis, then, as A.V. Smirnov notes, in Islamic thought the status of a "slave" did not take a person beyond the framework of social relations ^[16], and, moreover, did not limit his ability to serve God. To understand this social phenomenon, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the very word "slave" in Arab-Muslim culture carries a fundamentally different connotation and is associated with worship and reverence rather than with restriction of freedom. Being unfree, i.e. passively under someone's authority, is not enough to be a slave. In this logic, any person, first of all, is a slave of God, and independent, active and voluntary worship of God is a necessary condition of existence. Any person living in a territory where Islamic laws are in force has "hukuk" – rights and obligations. The scope of the rights and duties of a slave was many times less than that of a free man, but the principle itself applied to all people. (It is noteworthy that the same was often true with regard to the rights and responsibilities of women, mentally disabled, and sometimes non-Muslims). Therefore, it is not surprising that slaves could occupy influential positions and thus participate in the life of society. ^[17]

In everyday life, a Muslim was faced with prescriptions: a) categorical (wajib, fard – mandatory), b) not categorical (Sunnah), as well as prohibitions: a) categorical (haram, makhzur), b) not categorical (makruh). The largest number of actions of a Muslim belongs to the mabah, which is indifferent to Sharia. Nevertheless, the concept of an autonomous personality is not organic to Muslim society, not because of any prohibitions, but because of the social, collectivist orientation of the individual. A person in Islam, by virtue of prescribed rights and duties (hukuk), is connected "with all members of the cosmo-society from God to the neighbor" ^[18].

Such a social structure correlates with philosophical thought. The concept of freedom in the Islamic tradition is not directly expressed and is not found at all in the Quran ^[19]. However, it is possible to distinguish the categories of choice (ichthyar) and the intention (niyat). The first, unlike the second, has a narrow scope of application – as a preference between "to do" or "not to do". The "intention" is a reasonable goal-setting, which is realized in the free expression of will. In the Islamic ethical system, this bundle is integral and inseparable, which logically unites the "intention" and the actual action. Here there is a discrepancy with the Western view, where the first remains in the ethical plane, and the second goes into the legal one. Nevertheless, some similarities can be found. The "intention" is completely at the mercy of the individual, for whom the highest goal remains the "good". It is hardly possible to reconstruct the hierarchy of benefits, but it can be stated that the maintenance of the Muslim community (Ummah) has always remained one of the highest priorities for a collectivist Muslim society. And although the Ummah is built on grounds different from the principles of the Greek polis, we can talk about some parallels.

The category, through the opposition of which freedom was comprehended in Islam, is "predestination" (qadar). Being one of the six pillars of the creed, "predestination" was originally understood as the omnipotence of God, in the sense that any thing in the world can exist only as a result of the boundless divine will, extending also to the will of man: "You will not wish it unless Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, wills it" ^{[20, 81:29]}. Thus, nothing in the world exists and does not happen without the divine will. The idea of absolute predestination was widespread in the period of early Islam, when the focus of state development was aimed at expanding the territory and strengthening political and military control, and was found, for example, in the teachings of the Jabarites (from "jabar" – "coercion", Saad ibn Darhim and Jahm ibn Safwan) ^[21].

However, with the historical development of the Arab-Muslim civilization, there is a certain shift in emphasis. If in early Islam such characteristics of Allah as "all-powerful" and "all-powerful" (Al-Malik, Al-Qawiy) were in the first place, then the characteristic of "just" (Al-Muqsit, Al-Adl), on which, for example, the Qadarites relied, gradually gained weight. According to their views, if God demands responsibility for actions, then he gives a person the freedom to choose. Otherwise, a situation arises when God judges for the evil deeds of the one to whom he himself predestined these deeds: "Whoever follows the straight path, he acts for his own good. And whoever falls into error acts to his own detriment" ^{[20, 17:15]}.

Striving to fulfill the will of God, a person, heeding the sacred word, should try to lead a righteous life. "Indeed, We have made everything on earth an ornament for it, in order to test people and identify whose deeds will be better" ^{[20, 18:7]}. Thus, heaven and hell are the means of retribution for moral choices in earthly life. Another argument in favor of a person's freedom was God's message of the prophets to convey his word to them. After all, the prophet only transmits the teaching, and the very act of accepting Islam must be voluntary, meaningful and purposeful, that is, an act of free will. "Let's say the truth is from your Lord. Whoever wants to, let him believe, and whoever does not want to, let him not believe" ^{[20, 18:29]}. Thus, a contradiction developed in Muslim theological thought, which remained the subject of discussion for several centuries and contributed to the formation of kalam – the interpretation of religious dogmas based on the principle of reasonableness.

Since about the 9th century, the Mu'tazilite school (Wasil ibn Ata, Amr ibn Ubaid), familiar with ancient philosophy and the content of Christian teaching, began to rely heavily on logical structures in its religious constructions. The doctrine of divine justice, one of the central ones for this school, raised the problem of the correlation between predestination and free will. Thus, Vasil ibn Ata, exploring the foundations of good and evil deeds, argued that a person is placed in external circumstances by God, but human behavior in them depends only on himself. ^{[19, p. 133]}. Such reasoning provoked serious opposition from orthodox Muslim teachers, who accused the Mu'tazilites of making many creators by granting freedom to people, instead of recognizing the Creator of the one. The Mu'tazilites responded to this in the spirit of the concept of "acquiring deeds" (kasb), according to which they solved the problem of justice: the creator of all deeds is Allah, who gives a person a choice, having accepted which, a person begins to answer for him. Subsequently, the tradition set by the "theory of appropriation", which recognizes the limited freedom of human will, became quite widespread, giving rise to three currents: Dirar, Najjar and Shahkham ^[22].

However, orthodox thought has not lost its relevance, having also been developed in subsequent teachings. Abu al-Hassan al-Ashari (founder of Asharism) He claimed that the Almighty gives a person the opportunity and desire to do something and controls both the process and the result of the activity. The logical justification for this statement was based on the classification of actions: 1) the will to act, 2) the act within a person, 3) the act itself. Thus, action becomes possible only when the original divine will is present ^[22].

A fundamentally different interpretation is found in the suffism (Al-Arabi, Jalaj al-Din Rumi, Mahmoud Shabistari, Abd al-Karim Jili). The role of man increases many times due to the possibility of mystical experience and direct interaction with God. The question of the relationship between predestination and freedom is solved through the ethics of confusion (hira – "whirlpool", "confusion"): the opposite statements, external and internal, flowing into each other, are mutually conditioning ^{[23, 44]}. The free will of man, in fact, is nothing compared to the power of God, who manifests himself in the world in the form of circumstances, other stronger people, etc. Based on this, the path of discovering free will in oneself is the path of humility, merging one's own will with the divine through acceptance and self–denial. However, the quality of self-denial must be such that its obligatory attribute must be satisfaction, otherwise self-denial becomes a form of helplessness.

The Indo-Buddhist civilization

Perhaps the most different way freedom is viewed from the European tradition is in Buddhism. Without focusing on the differences between the teachings of Mahayana, Vajrayana and Hinayana (Therayana), we can say that one of the main ideas is that the meaning of human life is to get rid of suffering. The soul strives for liberation (moksha), but a person who is dependent in his actions on desires, attachments and passions only roots himself more and more in suffering, sinking deeper into the "ocean of samsara". Man is bound by the laws of logic and ordinary thinking, concepts and judgments, experience and values, but they are all invented by himself. Ignorance of the path prevents one from getting rid of suffering (avidya is a false consciousness that appears to be true) ^{[24, 41]}.

Overcoming ignorance occurs through following the Noble Eightfold Path. "Whoever has extinguished all passion in himself, who has uprooted all sinful desires, enters on the right path, free from desire, not thirsting for anything here," says the Sutta–Nipata ^{[25, p. 115]}. Among other things, the "right way" presupposes the right view, the right intention, the right way of life – we find the familiar leitmotif of restriction to achieve freedom. This path goes through the practical application of the "Four Noble Truths" in life.

According to one of the most significant directions of Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, awareness of the identity of Atman (individual self) and Brahman (supreme reality or cosmic consciousness) allows you to get out of the cycle of birth and death. Although this may seem deterministic, awareness itself can be seen as a choice made through spiritual insight and understanding, which implies free will in following this path ^[42]. The Advaita school, the Dvaita school, as well as many other branches of Hinduism, have a firm belief in fate and that both the past and the future are known or can be seen, but only by certain saints or mystics, as well as by a higher being (Ishvara).

The soul has the widest choice in the spiritual world, which occurs between countless variations of desires within two types: desires to serve a higher purpose and desires to enjoy in the material world. In the material world, freedom of choice is already limited by the consequences of past activities. But still, a person always has a choice between how to act, godly or sinful.

The issue of free will, which is one of the central issues for European thought, is not typical for the Indian tradition ^[40]. The Buddha avoided certain issues with "noble silence" based on the fact that thinking about them does not help to free a person from suffering. V. G. Lysenko notes: "Free choice interests the Buddha not from the side of his freedom (Buddhism does not pose this problem), but as an opportunity for a conscious attitude to choosing a religious path" ^{[26, p. 103]}. The undevelopment of the category of free will is also connected with the fact that Buddhism is not a theistic religion, i.e. there is no contradiction between the existence of an all-good God and suffering in the world, as a result of which not only the basic premises of the doctrine turn out to be extremely peculiar, but its entire logic unfolds differently.

One of the concepts related to the "freedom – responsibility" dichotomy is karma, which is understood as "a natural law, which in its most general form means the influence of the sum of actions performed by an individual (bodily, verbal, mental) on his entire subsequent life and the nature of future birth (class of existence..., social status, gender, appearance, life expectancy, well-being, health, etc.)" ^[27]. The Bhagavatgita says: "Both brahman and vaishya, both kshatriya and sudra, naturally born gunas determine all their actions" ^{[28, p. 41]}. In addition, the recognition of the karmic law implies a moral assessment of actions (dharma, adharma), and also binds together actions in the past, present and future, thereby legitimizing the presence of suffering in the world as a reward.

Let's make a reservation that, although the category of karma is present in the vast majority of the teachings of Hinduism and Buddhism, its perception differs quite a lot, which is important in the context of ideas about freedom. The Jains, extreme supporters of krivayada (the idea of moral causality), understood karma as a substance that "sticks" to the pure soul (jiva) by its nature, binding it and hindering moksha, and for liberation from karma they offered various forms of asceticism. Buddhists, generally agreeing with the law of moral causation, also identified "non-karmic" factors. Thus, in the Anguttara Nikaya, complete conditioning by past actions is denied - "those who adhere to such views have no desire to do what should be done and avoid what should not be" [cit. according to: 24, p. 114]. The fundamental condition of karmic in the Buddha's teaching is chetana, usually understood as "intention", "motive", "volition". It is chetana that determines a person's responsibility, and unconscious actions are the result of past karma. Also note that casuality is characteristic of the world of samsara, while in nirvana there is liberation from causality. The transition to the stage of bodhichitta, the highest degree of awakening of consciousness, is associated in Buddhism with overcoming the self. A Bodhisattva (enlightened one) is guided by compassion and a desire to help all living beings.

The Akrivayadic currents (ajivika, yadrichcha-vada, ishvara-vada, svabhava-vada), on the contrary, proceeded from a deterministic understanding of the world, believing that everything is conditioned by the inherent nature of things. The Sankhya school teaches that matter (prakriti) has no free will, and spirit (purusha) cannot directly control material processes, so the only free will is to realize that the "I" is immaterial. Ishvara-vada proceeds from the fact that only Ishvara has true freedom. But we are not talking about freedom of will, but about freedom transcendent to all feelings, thoughts, intentions and actions. Ramakrishna Paramahansa compared a man to an animal tied to a post. A person's will is bound by karma and his own nature, but spiritual development, as it were, determines the "length of the rope", that is, inner freedom.

The liberation of the will, feelings and mind is possible through the suppression of desires, and this is a parallel with ancient thought. However, if in the latter liberation was represented as serving the good, for example, by streamlining the life of the polis, then for the Indian worldview liberation consists in getting rid of the subjectivity of one's own self, the illusion of existence, overcoming life as such, interrupting the chain of endless rebirths, ontological disappearance, and achieving nirvana. It is necessary to free oneself "from the illusion of selfhood, because this illusion is connected by a causal relationship with death" ^{[29, p. 109]}. Cognition of emptiness (shunyata) and liberation (moksha) in Mahayana Buddhism are interdependent actions that represent a single whole. These concepts are not just difficult to translate and obscure to the European consciousness, but as I.S. Rodicheva notes, "they do not lend themselves to analysis from the standpoint of formal logic and rational definition, possessing "elusiveness", ambiguity and, one might even say, "transcendence" of meanings and definitions" ^{[30, p. 122]}. And, indeed, in an individualistic culture, it is difficult to imagine the idea of giving up the most valuable thing – your "I".

Chinese Philosophy: Explication

Neither in Confucianism nor in Taoism has the category of freedom received a special philosophical elaboration and requires analytical explication. Nevertheless, a number of similarities with other traditions can be found. Thus, it seems appropriate to note the intersections in the understanding of emptiness in Buddhism and Taoism, although not their identity. The circular motion model ^[30] can be considered as correlated principles: the emptiness of samsara and nirvana in Buddhism and the emptiness of tao, as the interpenetrability of all things. Taoists, like Buddhists, follow the middle path for liberation, but understand it somewhat differently. To comprehend the tao, it is necessary to realize and overcome the duality of yin and yang, which unfold in the opposites and diversity of the world, and when they collapse, they open the "unmanifested" state of emptiness of the tao, the comprehension of which can be understood as liberation. It can be achieved by following the natural course of things. In a state of freedom, a person renounces attachments and restrictions, attitudes and customs of society, laws and rituals, he does not depend on concepts, does not make comparisons, he is not limited by external conditions and does not limit himself, renouncing his "I", his merits and even his name.

One of the steps to connect with the natural order is "non-action" (Wu wei), which is different from inaction as such, but implies a conscious rejection of purposeful activity, since setting a goal forces a person to move towards it, which makes him unfree and, in general, does not correspond to the canons of teaching. On the contrary, achieving perfection in the practice of the principle of non-action also means overcoming the fear of death, making a person completely free. Note that the Wu Wei principle carries two meanings at once: 1) the position of genuine inaction, motivated by a lack of desire to participate in human affairs, and 2) the political technique of governing the people, a way to strengthen control ^[31]. The latter meaning in the logic of Taoism is based on its millenarian content ^[32]: following the Tao by a critical mass of people, peoples and states will fundamentally change the essence of interaction between them, not just eliminating contradictions, but freeing humanity directly from the motives of conflicts by avoiding various kinds of technogeneity and establishing a natural, as close to nature as possible social order.

This idea is close to Chan Buddhism (Chan in China, Thien in Vietnam, Song in Korea, Zen in Japan and the Western perception of the teaching) ^[14]. The difference lies in the way liberation is achieved. In Taoism, the path to freedom lies through non-action. Awareness of this principle, which requires tremendous wisdom and experience, opens up the possibility for a person to act in accordance with desires, and the need for special, deliberate activity disappears. The sage only implicitly influences processes hidden from the eyes of the uninitiated, changing the world without opposing himself to it and without making great efforts. "The path of the perfect Wise is "this is an act without struggle" ^{[33, p. 138]}.

In Chan's teaching, nirvana is not a "different world", it is also present here and now, but it can manifest itself only for those who have changed their own consciousness. Achieving this state does not depend on either political or social conditions. It is a priori in the sense that it always exists before a person comes into the world, but it manifests itself only when consciousness is ready to accept it, and human nature is already perfect enough for this transition ^[34].

In the Lankavatara Sutra, liberation from the suffering of human existence is achieved through "purification of the heart" ^[35]. The first stage on this path is getting rid of vain (illusory) thoughts, the second is comprehending the root causes (yuan qi zi xing), the third is gaining absolute liberation. Absolute liberation is possible only when there is knowledge of a person's realized self-nature, but this realization can only happen as an epiphany. Zen teaches: "To know oneself is to forget oneself. To forget oneself is to become one with all dharmas. To become one with all dharmas means to drop your mind and your body, which are one with the mind and body of others" ^{[36, pp. 7-8]}. This liberation (enlightenment) cannot be conveyed by words or signs, it is beyond the control of an external force, cannot be bestowed from above, is comprehended only directly through personal experience in a state of non-consciousness. That is, it is necessary to let the mind go free, to keep it "in unison with Emptiness, or Suchness, where everything remains in its true form" ^[37]. It requires the utmost effort of will. At the same time, Chan has no purpose in salvation, because pursuing a goal, you lose it. The one who has achieved liberation "possesses" two "self-presences": the "personified Self" and the "dharmic Self". The latter means that a person becomes a derivative of the heart-soul of the person himself.

If liberation is an ontological, existential act for Chan Buddhism and Taoism, then in Confucianism the problem of freedom is largely related to the social one. The reconstruction of the Confucian concept of freedom can be made in terms of "choice" (jie) and, more precisely, "choice of the good" (Jie shang) ^{[38, p. 904]}. For a person to make a good choice, his free will must come from competence. It may seem that having a choice in itself already implies some freedom. But is it possible to talk about the freedom of choice of what a person has no idea about? For example, if you offer a person a choice of fish or meat, but he did not eat either, then as such there is a choice, but in essence the person does not choose, but simply acts at random, not understanding the consequences of the choice.

Making decisions and following choices requires a person's "will". In Confucianism, Ji is interpreted as an independent decision-making force that is absolutely free and has two connotations: as a mental ability with which a person consciously chooses, and as a determination to achieve a goal. These two meanings are not necessarily related, because it is possible to imagine a world in which people are created or programmed a priori to possess a certain goal, never choosing it. In this case, it is impossible to talk about free will ^[39]. Extrapolating the meaning of this example to social reality, it can be stated that a conscious choice or "choice of the good", affecting the life of a person and society, can be made only as a result of comprehension of fundamental laws. In turn, making such a choice is liberating and satisfying.

Confucianism leaves little room for civil liberties (everything is Under heaven). The key consideration in determining the boundaries of individual freedom remains the benefit of humanity, the triumph of "humanity" (ren) in the Middle Kingdom. To achieve it, it is necessary to develop the right habits. Note that initially, the "human nature" (xing) in Confucianism is neither good nor bad, and the behavior of an individual depends on habits, which in turn are determined by the desire to master the "ritual" (li). The concept of freedom grows from its genuine and deep understanding and other important ethical foundations, such as, for example, "love and kindness" (ren), which determine the dynamics and promote harmonious human relationships. The Chinese character literally depicts the relationship between two people, reflecting the idea of "co-humanity".

"Subjugation of the soul through education" ^[15], i.e. full awareness and acceptance of public morality and rules, opens up the opportunity for a person to do whatever he wants. It's a long way: "From the age of 15, he chose the path of study and improvement according to the moral code, from the age of 30 he acted according to the moral code, from the age of 40 he did not doubt his actions, from the age of 50 he realized the deep meaning and authority of the moral code, at the age of 60, only after hearing something, he could already understand, whether it was a moral ritual, at the age of 70 he perfected himself at his own discretion, but without going beyond what was allowed" ^{[15, p. 9]}. Thus, the achievement of freedom is possible only as a result of a long process of self-improvement and education of the soul. Actually, the "liberation" could be called the internalization of the moral code – the rules of life of society. There is no freedom outside these rules, because a person who has not been engaged in self-education does not have competence and self-control, thus turning out to be weaker than his own passions and desires.

Comparison and significance of differences

As we can see, the concept of freedom received the most detailed elaboration in antiquity, where it is one of the central ones in the philosophical works of many thinkers, which, of course, reflects the importance of this category for the Greek polis, later for Rome and Christian Europe. Freedom is considered in a variety of dialectical pairs: "freedom-slavery", "freedom-responsibility", "freedom-destiny", the negative "freedom from" (external conditions) and "freedom for" (achieving the ideal of a sage, approaching God, etc.) are analytically divided. All spiritual and material life a person turns out to be inseparable from freedom.

In non-Western philosophical systems, there is no such significant focus on the category of freedom. Buddhism, where, nevertheless, the concept itself is clearly present in the teaching, interprets freedom in a fundamentally different way: how to get rid of the suffering of earthly life and get out of the cycle of samsara. Liberation within the framework of this philosophy turns out to be identical with the loss of subjectivity (in the sense of awareness of identity with the world or its emptiness), which is unthinkable for the European tradition. Confucianism and Taoism do not at all carry out a special elaboration of the category of freedom, although, as has been shown, its explication is quite possible. This category is not found in the Quran either.

The difficulty of comparing a separate ethical category of various philosophical and religious traditions and cultures lies in the impossibility of reduction. This analytical procedure will almost inevitably lead the researcher to false conclusions. As it has been shown, freedom can be achieved by a highly spiritual person (a sage, an enlightened one) by following certain rules. And although this judgment in itself is correct in almost every one of the analyzed teachings, it would be a mistake to say that it is a common place. In other words, it is true for everyone, but not true for everyone. This conclusion is due to the fact that both the image of the sage, the path (rules), and the very direction of philosophical thought are in different planes.

Thus, the Confucian sage should be the "embodiment" of ritual, a socio–ethical category, the disclosure of which is possible only in society and for society. The Taoist, on the contrary, strives for solitude through awareness of the principle of non-action and the natural conditioning of yin-yang forces. These images of the sage, although opposite in their orientation, remain correlated, because they are based on ideas about the original inequality in the world, which extend, among other things, to social roles. If we turn to the Islamic or Christian tradition, it becomes obvious that the wise man's view is aimed at following the divine commandments, avoiding sin and saving the soul, and cannot be compared with those belonging to the Chinese tradition, since everything is determined by the will of the Creator. The ideal of the enlightened one also turns out to be incongruous in some movements of Hinduism, where the key is the awareness of the illusory nature of the world, accessible only to brahmins. Thus, the ways of gaining freedom in different cultural and civilizational systems are ontologically different.

Here is another example in support of this thesis. Comparing the individual provisions of the above teachings, one could conclude that the individual elements are similar. This is, for example, the motive of the conditional "common good" – the maintenance of the structure of society: the polis in antiquity, the Ummah in Islam, the state in Confucianism, the caste system in Hinduism. He is free, whose thoughts are aimed at achieving the public good, for whom the external law corresponds to the internal code. One can also see a parallel in the views of the sophists, who contrasted social laws and the laws of nature, unfolding without external coercion, and the views of the Taoists. However, such conclusions still seem deceptive. Even a slight inclusion of the researcher in the context allows him to see that the polis is therefore a reflection of the cosmic order, which is a voluntary association of free citizens, while the Ummah exists by the will of Allah, and, unlike democracy or despotism, is not the best or worst form of social organization, but a divine given, and the basis The Confucian state is served by a family (also an organism), where each element performs a natural function.

Differences in the perception of slavery are also significant, and they are probably related to the natural and geographical conditions of the development of society. With a certain degree of assumption, we can say that in Ancient Greece the landscape was conducive to the formation of small towns and small farms, and the limited internal territory and proximity to the sea led to colonization at the same time as a way to prevent overpopulation and a source of economic development. Such a socio-economic structure provided an opportunity for "leisure" for a small number of the indigenous population, due to the exploitation of the replenished mass of slaves, who became the main productive force. This was reflected in the thinkers who separated the "civilized" free man – educated, physically and culturally developed, from the slave – an instrument of production and a barbarian.

Although philosophical thought in the same antiquity went beyond the designated boundary, we can see from history how stable this worldview pattern turned out to be. As you know, colonization was carried out under the banner of the "burden of the white man", implying that there are the best (read – "free", Europeans) and the worst (barbarians, non-Europeans) who must ensure the welfare of the former. Surprisingly, this model has not completely gone into the past, and this is not least due to the ancient understanding of freedom and slavery. Today, the well-being of the "golden billion" (or the countries of the "center" in I. Wallerstein's terminology) is associated with the possession of technologies and financial control over industries around the world, the mechanism of resource allocation, i.e. provided by the intellectual labor of the "free". Developing countries (the "periphery"), being in neocolonial dependence, are doomed to be forever catching up with producers. The liberal project is an ideology implying only one form of social structure and development, which ensures freedom only to a select circle, and provides a moral justification not only for the exploitation of other peoples, but also for the use of violent means of coercion against them. This is achieved through the system of law as the main normative category, the adoption of appropriate laws, the enforcement of which is again ensured by force.

We find a different social structure in the East. The development of agriculture in the river valleys, which involved the construction of complex and large-scale irrigation facilities, required the coordinated work of a large number of people. And although Ancient India and China could not do without a developed system of slavery, the main productive force remained the local free population. Therefore, philosophical thought was aimed not at developing the category of freedom, but at substantiating social stratification – the caste system in Hinduism and the family state in Confucianism. In addition to laws, morality and tradition play a significant role here. However, it would be wrong to identify the two cultures on this basis. Hinduism and later Buddhism emphasize that human freedom is a deliverance from the suffering inherent in this world, and lies beyond the boundaries of reality (in our understanding). In Confucianism and Taoism, freedom lies in the acceptance of the principle of inequality, which is characteristic not only for a society where there are rulers and people, but also for everything that exists: "the sky is above your head, the earth is under your feet; with the sunrise, the moon disappears from the firmament. The sky and the sun are yang, and the earth and the moon are yin" ^{[45, p. 89]}. And although the ethical system as a whole is built from the primacy of virtues and the ruler's benevolence towards the people, the violence necessary from the ruler's point of view is justified by the fact that, firstly, nature is inhumane, and secondly, by the principle of non-ordinariness: what seems evil today is a source of good and vice versa.

Speaking about the implementation of these ideas at the present time, we note two aspects. First, China's modern ideology is based on traditional ideas. Each of the Chinese leaders, starting with Mao Zedong, developed his own ideological program, and today Xi Jinping (fifth generation) at the level of state doctrine ^[46] declares the combination of the principles of outstanding traditional Chinese culture and Marxism. Chinese Marxism is far from the original theory: only those ideas that correspond to the spirit of Chinese civilization have been consolidated. Secondly, the global project proposed by China – the Community of the Common Destiny of Mankind - implies that no nation should prevail in international relations, but the interests of all should be respected in the name of life on Earth, and obviously proceeds from authentic values. And although India has not yet proposed its own project for the future world order, in general we can say that the ideas of Hinduism and Buddhism have not only not lost their influence, but, on the contrary, demonstrate global spread.

The main direction of the social dynamics of the Arab Caliphate at the dawn of its existence was the gathering of tribes and the seizure of territories, that is, unification. The assertion of a rigid monotheistic religion (including the absence of the concept of the Trinity) it perfectly corresponded to the cohesion of society. Everyone was assigned a certain role with a set of rights and responsibilities, but true freedom is inherent only to the Almighty. This understanding contributed to the formation of a rigid hierarchy, the tradition of honoring the elder, and the spread of the ideal of service. These maximally mobilizing ideas were necessary for the successful formation of a large empire and, at the same time, contributed to the rapid spread of Islam. Today, the Muslim world is politically fragmented, but there are also ideas of returning to tradition in the form of projects of a New Caliphate, the Islamic World or the Great Turan. All these examples show that despite the strong influence of the liberal project on life in other countries, in the long term civilizations are able to reproduce their own local values.

Conclusions and a few words about Russia

The choice of the category "freedom" for axiological research was not accidental and was associated not only with the ideological content of the Western liberal project, but also with the disclosure of those destructive, destructive consequences for the individual and society that it carries along with the popularization of the everyday understanding of freedom. The latter, as a rule, hides some ideal way of existence of an atomized individual without any dependencies and restrictions, not only external (law, morality), but also internal (conscience). The approach to this ideal is measured by "how much and for how long I can do what I want" ^{[47, p. 74]}. Freedom becomes the main and only value for the individual.

In practice, such a way of thinking and living inevitably entails the loss of other value orientations, since adherence to any other spiritual and moral scale would mean restriction of freedom. This often results in the loss (or even unformed) of life orientations: through promiscuity, laziness, selfishness, a person comes to disappointment, inner emptiness, loneliness, a sense of the meaninglessness of life ^[48] – the whole gravity of the existentialist "doom to freedom". This is a social trend, which is pointed out, for example, by the famous thinker G.S. Pomerants: "Freedom has gone, as once in Athens, beyond its optimal growth ... (there are) extremes of women's emancipation, loss of kinship contact between man and man, loneliness of the individual in the crowd, loss of the meaning of life, the search for joy in drugs" ^[49].

Fortunately (let's make a value judgment), this understanding of freedom is neither unique, nor classical, nor generally accepted. The analysis of the category of freedom in the most significant religious and philosophical traditions revealed not only discrepancies in usage, but also the fundamental inconsistency of the category under study, which allows us to talk about insurmountable differences in the value and cultural and philosophical foundations of local civilizations. This conclusion is confirmed both on a structural and factual level when considering the traditions of Confucianism, Taoism, various currents of Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, ancient and medieval Christian thought. In each of the presented teachings, the concept of freedom finds a unique place in the general system of values and has a difference in interpretation and use.

The ideological relevance of this conclusion is manifested in the assessment of the processes of globalization. In recent decades, the Western globalist project has been dominant, based on ideas about freedom, rooted in the ancient tradition. This project, expansionist in nature, claims to be universalist in nature, offering its own model of social and value organization as a reference, and assuming, at the same time, the division of the world into developed and developing countries.

Civilizations, being open systems, are able to perceive external experience, and the success of the liberal project is proof of this. However, only those introduced elements that correspond to deep cultural values or have been adapted in accordance with them can gain a foothold. Therefore, what is initially accepted can be rejected by subsequent generations.

The ideas of freedom characteristic of Western thought do not correspond to the values of other cultures; civilizations based on a solid, deeply developed religious and philosophical foundation refuse to accept the imposed liberal order, which also finds practical confirmation in such alternative projects as the Community of the Common Destiny of Mankind, the New Caliphate, the Islamic World, the Great Turan, The Bolivarian Project, Greater Eurasia. Analysis and awareness of the dynamics of these processes can have a beneficial effect on the development of the entire human civilization by improving the quality of intercultural dialogue and including it in addition to directly (verbally) articulate positions of those implicit cultural imperatives that are conditioned by the hierarchy of values of a particular community.

The hierarchy of values in the framework of this study was considered as a cultural and civilizational characteristic of society, defining the key principles of its existence and development. Over long periods of time, some paradoxical nature of this characteristic may manifest itself. On the one hand, society, the people, at each individual historical moment, can choose, change the value hierarchy, introduce new elements into it and remove existing ones. On the other hand, deep orientations that have been reproduced for centuries do not die off and in the long term are restored or recreated at a new stage of socio-cultural development. This principle has repeatedly manifested itself in Russian history. It has also been confirmed in modern times: in the late 1980s and early 1990s, freedom and the liberal Western model of development in all spheres became at the head of the value hierarchy of Soviet and then Russian society. However, the vector was gradually changing, and today, in numerous acute discussions at all levels (the fact of which, in fact, is also an organic characteristic of our civilization), Russian society is once again refocusing on finding its own model of development, determining its place in the world, setting a historical mission.

The opinion is becoming more and more consensual that the basis of such a mission should be sought in the polyphony of Russian civilization, i.e. in its historically proven ability to organize a common integrative and relatively conflict-free space for the numerous peoples and ethnic groups inhabiting it. The demand for overcoming neocolonial dependence and a new model of the world order on the part of non-"golden billion" states is obvious, and the party that Russia has begun to play has every chance of becoming a global leitmotif, in tune with the Chinese Community of the common destiny of mankind, the New Caliphate, the Bolivarian Project, the Great Turan, the liberal Western project and It is quite possible that projects like "United Africa" or "Great India" have not yet fully crystallized.

Taking this vision as a basis, we note that the key "civilizational skill" for humanity remains the ability not only to hear, but also to understand other points of view in all their diversity. Thus, in our opinion, the development of the content of fundamental value categories, manifested in different ways in local civilizations, is one of the most pressing issues of social philosophy today.