Stages of defining national identity in the official Political Discourse of modern Russia

Burda Mikhail Aleksandrovich PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Department of Political Science and Political Management; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 82 Vernadsky Ave., Moscow, 119571, Russia byrdamix@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Chelnokova Angelina Pavlovna Head of the club "Real Politics" 82 Vernadsky Ave., Moscow, 119571, Russia angelinka_chelnokova@mail.ru

Introduction

In the context of the geopolitical confrontation and the digital transformation of sociality, the state is faced with the task of preserving the political "we". As a result, a multi-component Russian society with a heterogeneous multiethnic and multi-religious society requires a built-in system of guidelines, meanings and values that are the basis for the self-identification of Russian society. The formation and further maintenance of the functioning of a "unified socio-cultural and political organism" is one of the strategic goals declared at the present stage by the political leadership of modern Russia. One of the conditions for achieving this goal is the implementation of an approach in which the construction of national and state identity is considered as a process of forming a value foundation that contributes to the greater consolidation of Russian society. National-state identity, as an awareness of belonging to a particular nation and a sense of unity, is a prerequisite for the development of Russia as a sovereign state in the face of social, mental and geopolitical shifts.

According to V.Y. Zorin and A.V. Abramov, the state, being a social institution for organizing people's lives, is focused on meeting public needs and maintaining common interests. The collective "vision" of the mission of the state and its uniqueness is one of the staples that promotes the cohesion of citizens and their representation as a single socio-cultural and political organism ^[6].

However, the Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated December 19, 2012 No. 1666, does not define the concept of "national-state identity", nor does it define criteria for the formation of such an identity, its main narratives, semantic and value characteristics. In this regard, the relevance of the request for research increases not only the process of constructing national and state identity, but also the factors influencing such a process, both externally and internally, determining state participation, as well as identifying features characteristic of each of the stages of the process under consideration, which determines the problematic field of this study.

Some approaches to the study of national-state identity

In order to conceptualize the concept of "national-state identity", it is advisable to refer to some approaches to understanding the terms "nation" and "identity". Of particular interest, taking into account this topic, are the works of E. Gellner, B. Anderson, E. Hobsbawm, V.A. Tishkov, who studied the nation in the tradition of a constructivist approach. V. Tishkov's work "The Nation of Nations: on approaches to understanding Russia" ^[16] contains confirmation of the socially constructed nature of the nation and national-state identity and the idea that nations are the result of the process of co-creation of political actors and society. E. Gellner in the work "Nations and Nationalism" ^[4] and B. Anderson in the work "Imaginary communities. Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism" ^[1] consider the nation as a "product of human beliefs" and an "imaginary community", emphasizing the possibility of constructing a social and political reality.

Within the framework of the instrumentalist approach, the American sociologist S. Olzak notes that the nation is a "situational" phenomenon and is used to mobilize and control the population by the ruling elites ^[21]. R. Brubaker's research ^[3] notes that in instrumentalism, social interest and rational choice are crucial for a nation. The nation in the views of instrumentalists has no cultural roots, but focuses on the nation as a means of fighting for political and economic resources. As F. concludes: According to Barth, a nation is a "form of social organization" where the composition of a group is determined by situational influences and current circumstances ^[19].

It can be argued that within the framework of both constructivist and instrumentalist approaches, the process of nation-building is a controlled process, and it is controlled from above, which is implemented using tools such as propaganda, the formation of a sense of patriotism and solidarity with the state through special government programs in the field of education, upbringing and culture.

In turn, the understanding of "identity" as "recognition of one's essence" was presented by the author of the theory of psychosocial development, E. Erickson, in his work "Identity: Youth and Crisis" ^[18].

D. Marcia contributed to the development of a psychological approach to understanding "identity" by describing in his work "Development and validation of ego identity status" ^[20] the stages of identity formation as a structural and dynamic phenomenon. The interrelation of "personal identities" is defined and analyzed by I. Hoffman ^[5] within the framework of a sociological approach to the study of identity. The author focuses on human behavioral models and the definition of roles that depend on the values of society. The idea of a "generalized other" in the process of self-determination was noted by the American sociologist and psychologist J. R. R. Tolkien. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who argued that identity is a "social product" ^[9].

Taking into account the outlined framework of understanding the terms "nation" and "identity", it is possible to identify some approaches to the consideration of the phenomenon of "national-state identity": psychological, sociological and macropolitical. V. Titov, a Russian researcher of national and state identity, deduces his own definition of the concept, which traces the idea of constructivism about an imaginary community, called "we" by the author, and designates the dominant role of the state.

It is necessary for further research to consider national-state identity as a "socio-communicative phenomenon," where V.A. Achkasov highlights primarily works related to the study of national-state identity. Cooley, J. Meade, and R. Jenkins ^[1].

So, Charles Cooley in his work "The Social Self" talks about the "mirror self" and deduces a formula for building human behavior as a "carrier" of national and state identity: initially, there is an "imagination of one's own appearance", which is interpreted through the reactions of "others", as a result, a "self" is formed, deterministic collective views ^[7]. It is also worth noting the emerging "friend–foe" dichotomy, which demonstrates the "division" of the human worldview in the context of a group definition.

In the works of O. Y. Malinova, attention is also focused on the geopolitical and civilizational features of the construction of national-state identity, which occurs "over borders" ^[8]. Significant are the studies of I.S. Semenenko, which convey the idea of "multiple identities" and "identity struggle", which confirms the "interweaving" of various political interests in the discourse of national identity as a "multi-layered" phenomenon ^[14]. In the issue of the formation of national and state identity, S. Huntington focuses on "nation-civilizations", defining civilization as "a cultural community of the highest rank, the broadest level of cultural identity of people" ^[17].

Noting the wide range of socio-humanitarian studies devoted to national-state identity as a psychological, sociological, and macropolitical phenomenon, it can be argued that Russian national-state identity at the present stage is the result of "top-down projection" due to the influence of a number of factors, among which one can single out the "friend-foe"- "Russia-West" confrontation, multilayered (plurality) identity - "the multinational people of Russia", civilizational features expressed in the promotion of the narrative "Russia - state-civilization", "own self" - history, culture and language.

Stages of transformation of national and state identity

Taking into account the identified approaches, we will consider the process of approving national and state identity within the framework of the proposed four stages, the sequence of which is determined by the presented characteristics of each stage and the fundamental ideological differences identified in this regard.

The first stage (1991-1999) is distinguished from the subsequent ones by a pronounced "critical narrative", where the main line of building a dialogue with the "people" is based on examples of the "unsuccessful experience of the Soviet past." Thus, the main emphasis is on the "national and cultural self-determination of peoples" due to the traumatic past they have experienced, the vector of formation of national and state identity is aimed at resolving external factors: international disagreements, building friendly relations with the republics. As for the "common destiny", the first stage of constructing a national-state identity only indicates the "range of tasks" that will need to be solved in the future for the revival of the "great people", the new Russia, where the main principle will be "unity in diversity." The 1993 Constitution acts at this stage as a consolidating element, the foundation of which is national accord. The 1996 Concept of national policy introduces an element of "duality" in the design process, where, on the one hand, the main task is to form a single ideological space, and on the other hand, to preserve the national and cultural autonomy of ethnic communities.

The second stage (2000-2011), in contrast to the first, returns the people to their "origins" and, at the head of the formation of the national idea, represents "total continuity", which draws parallels between the past and future greatness of the country. The distinctive elements of the second stage include the dichotomy of a "weak" and a "strong" state, which is a value regardless of the territorial entity. The fundamental difference between the second stage and the first is determined by such criteria as "attitude to history", where in the period from 1991 to 1999 history was perceived as a "negative narrative", emphasizing the desire to create a "new Russia", and already the period from 2000 to 2011 – as a period of appeal to the "millennial" experience. Another feature of the construction of national-state identity in this period is the first-time voiced positioning of Russia as a "European nation" and at the same time a "warrior country" that has "suffered" a fair attitude towards it. As V. Surguladze notes, "the era of the emerging post-Western world order gives Russia a chance to "return to itself", gain its own identity, and consciously take a special place in history and the world" ^[15].

Another feature of the second stage is the shift in focus from purely political values to moral values, which indicates a greater actualization of the issue of not so much the external as the internal "world order of the country." The 2005 message to the Federal Assembly confirms the idea of the "civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Eurasian continent" and the vehicle of Westernization for other countries. However, it is worth noting that already in 2007, the narrative of the "Russian world" was voiced for the first time at an official high level, while the details of this concept and its semantic content were not presented by the political elite. The contradictions in the nation–building strategy were introduced by the disparaging phrase about "the ancient Russian fun - the search for a national idea," which sounded in the President's Message to the Federal Assembly in 2007.

At the same time, at the stage from 2000 to 2011, based on the positioning of Russia as a nation, it is possible to consider changes in national-state identity through the prism of a psychological approach to understanding "identity", where identity is represented by a dynamic dimension. The narrative of the "young nation" can be described as a "marker" of the stage of "diffusion" and further "moratorium", when Dmitry Medvedev outlined a focus on finding new political ideas and moving away from honoring the achievements of the past. At the same time, the "Russia as a civilization" framework is beginning to be detailed, based on the support of national traditions and the building of the education system in accordance with the desired development vectors of the country.

Since 2012, the process of constructing national and state identity has been documented for the next 13 years within the framework of the "Strategy of State National Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025". Thus, the third stage (2012-2019) differs from the previous two by highlighting the narrative of the "state-forming Russian people" and focusing on the uniqueness of Russia as a "state-civilization" that harmoniously combines the equality of ethnic communities, the identity of peoples and "Russian unity."

In an article by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir V. Putin, published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta on January 23, 2012, "Russia: the National Question," the state's understanding of a civilization without national minorities was formulated. Russian Russian is a citizen who, regardless of national or religious affiliation, "considers himself a native speaker of the Russian language, history, and culture." This principle is also based on the friend-foe recognition system.

However, the 2012 Strategy notes that the "Russian nation" is represented by a multinational people, which to a certain extent contradicts the "diversity" of nations within the framework of "one Russia" and cannot act as an integrating principle for a multinational society. In this regard, as academician V.A. Tishkov notes, the solution to the question of the dual meaning of the nation is to deduce "two different types of social coalition of people — a community based on the state and a community based on cultural similarity" and positioning Russia as a "nation of nations" ^[16].

Based on this principle, an important starting point for the further implementation of national policy, as a sphere of public administration responsible for the implementation of the process of forming national and state identity, is, as V.Y. Zorin notes, "the provision on a two-pronged goal", which implies "the formation of an all-Russian civil nation and the simultaneous ethnocultural development of all the peoples of the country" ^[6].

As part of the third stage, the leading narrative is the "fight for justice," which highlights Russia's assistance to its compatriots in 2014 and the decisive actions of the "leader" in the fight against terrorism in 2015. In the period 2012-2019, we can trace the use of such instruments of influence on the recipient as appealing to authority, building an image of an "alien" in the form of the so-called "collective West." In this vein, it is worth noting some aspects that may arise in the further implementation of the approach chosen by the state to the construction of national-state identity based on the idea of "we are not them."

As noted by E. According to Pain, "in conditions when the government is unable to offer society the prospect of a positive future, the only way to unite is to mobilize against a common enemy" ^[11]. Mobilization against a common enemy as a manifestation of a "negative" identity cannot become a permanent basis for strengthening the unity of the nation, since if the image of a "negative character" loses its disapproving coloring, then the foundation of such an identity will disappear, which could already be observed in the last years of the USSR, where the image of the "West" as the original ideological enemy he underwent a significant change in the perception of public consciousness to a "model" to which one should strive in everything. In a similar vein, one can observe the "Russia-West" confrontation formulated by the Russian political elite, "traditional - non-traditional values", Russia of the XXI century and Russia of the 90s of the XX century, etc.

In this regard, the point of view of V.I. Pantin and V.V. Lapkin is being updated, who believe that Russia's strained relations with Western countries due to the Crimea and Donbass are factors accelerating the formation of a unified Russian identity ^[12], however, it is worth noting that this option of consolidating society is not "static", and still The problem of "rooting" legitimate instruments for the formation of national and state identity remains relevant. Of course, the so-called "Crimean consensus" during this period was able to consolidate most of the Russian political elite, including those representing various systemic political forces, but on the other hand, it also structured that part of Russian society and political forces of the liberal spectrum, which did not accept this approach and no less consolidated its rejection.

The fourth stage (2020-2024) of the construction of national-state identity is marked by an attempt to legally fix those "positive goals" and "explanations" that were noted above. A distinctive feature of the stage is the shift in focus towards the affirmation and translation of already declared spiritual and moral values. An attempt is being made to move away from identifying oneself through "others" and answer the question "who are we?" without referring to negative images of "strangers." The "semantic foundations" of national and state identity are derived in the form of, at least, fixed traditional spiritual and moral values (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated November 9, 2022 No. 809). The aforementioned decree of the President of the Russian Federation not only names traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, but also formulates destructive ideologies that carry the risks of a destructive impact on Russian citizens. At the same time, traditional Russian spiritual and moral values are becoming not only a political and legal definition, but also one of the directions of state policy.

Russian Russian world Conceptually, in the documents of strategic planning in the field of national security and foreign policy, the concept of the "Russian world" is consolidated, which includes all stages of the formation of modern Russia from Ancient Russia, is a world power and unites all nationalities and religions based on the Russian language, history and culture.

Increasingly, the messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly emphasize the "correctness" of the actions of the Russian people using the leading frame "Russia is the Savior." As V. Surguladze notes, the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine caused the acceleration of the "search" for an ideological and political narrative. It is important that the leading role in this process was played by the presentation of Russia as a "civilization state" with a unique mission to protect traditional values ^[15]. Such recognition, according to Nye J., "breaks any conceptual and associative ties with the Western world" ^[10].

It should also be noted that there is a visualization of national and state identity, which is reflected not only in various cultural events dedicated to Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War (May 9), Russia Day (June 12) and National Unity Day (November 4), but also in the release of relevant content on social networks and video hosting sites., messengers and computer games (Smuta).

Thus, one of the key features of the fourth stage of the formation of national and state identity is the use of numerous means of expression and emotionally colored vocabulary, which allows us to recreate visual images of Russia as a "home", "family", to present the Russian people as an "example for the whole world", which can raise "national consciousness.""emotionally reinforced images.

It can be argued that the fourth stage identified in the framework of this study is a fairly obvious top-to-bottom management process, where it is the state, represented by its institutions, that is the main designer of national and state identity, and society acts as the object of influence. A similar variant of the construction of national-state identity can be observed in China. O.V. Popova and N.V. Grishin, in their study of the instruments of state identity policy in the modern world, referring to expert assessments, cite the point of view of one of the experts, who, using the example of modern China, speaks about the optimality and effectiveness of such an approach in a multinational country, despite despite his certain authoritarianism ^[13].

Such an approach is critically perceived by some part of the Russian political spectrum, representing various liberal movements and political parties of the corresponding kind, as well as by the supporting part of Russian society, which does not allow us to speak about the universality of the chosen approach in the context of the political unity of the state.

Conclusion and conclusions

During the analysis of the stages of changing the representation of national and state identity, it is worth mentioning that a new round in its construction, especially in the political and managerial dimension, will take place in 2025, which is associated with the need to develop and subsequently approve by the President of Russia a new version of the "Strategy of State National Policy of the Russian Federation." The identified characteristic features of each stage allow us to talk about changes in the representation of national and state identity, however, the narrative of "unity in diversity" remains the unchanging core of its construction, the only question is how and on the basis of what external factors or internal attitudes the national diversity represented in Russia is formed into a single structure.

Speaking about the process of forming a state-civil identity in modern Russia, it should be noted that the main factor influencing the actualization of this process, as well as a fundamental change in approaches to its understanding and subsequent construction, is the foreign policy aspect caused by the "Russia-West" confrontation, developing not only in political, but also in value-civilizational planes, which is reflected in the positionsDecree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 809 dated November 9, 2022 "On Approval of the Foundations of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values." The above document made it possible to structure the use of various propaganda tools in order to describe the essential and conceptual part of the "spiritual bonds" of Russian society, which will make it possible to more effectively "shape" the image of Russia in the mass consciousness at the state level, not only with the help of "negative identity" and through the negative characteristics of the collective "alien", but primarily through an expanded to present the unique qualities of the peoples of Russia, in order to develop a sense of patriotism and solidarity with the state. The most obvious field of application of this approach is the sphere of culture, where the state can implement a number of programs for the formation of patriotic content, education, within the framework of special training courses, disciplines, adjustments to existing educational programs, as well as youth education, through various public youth institutes and platforms.

In this regard, it is possible to speak about the confirmation of the relevance at this moment of time of constructivist and instrumentalist approaches to the study of the processes of formation of state-civil identity in modern Russia, as a process formed, guided and regulated primarily by government institutions and institutions of civil society loyal to them, which is conditioned by the need to maintain a high level of loyalty and solidarity with the Russian state. societies even in conditions of economic and political crises.