Russian-Chinese relations: achievements, problems and prospects

El'nikova Yuliya Vasil'evna ORCID: 0000-0002-8478-4716 Doctor of Economics Professor of the Department of Regional and Sectoral Policy of the Kursk State Agrarian University named after I.I.Ivanov 70 Karl Marx St., office 357, Kursk, Kursk region, 305021, Russia gniiivm.h@ya.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction.

In a report at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping noted that the international situation in recent years has been characterized by various deficits (peace deficit, development deficit, security deficit, and governance deficit) that have put humanity in front of unprecedented challenges ^[1-3]. Statements about the unstable and dangerous state of the global system are also heard in official speeches by members of the Russian Government ^[4].

The transformational processes of the 2020s contributed to the peak of conflict in the world order ^{[5, 6]}. The aggravation of local conflicts, the slow pace of global economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic, and the beginning of Russia's Special Military Operation in Ukraine became a turning point for the world order in the post-Cold War era ^{[7, 8]}. Antagonism between different groups of countries has intensified in the global political arena, which has become one of the main trends in the development of international relations ^{[9, 10]}.

Many experts note that in addition to all of the above, the growing threat of terrorism and cyber attacks, the difficult food situation, the effects of climate change and various biological threats create a contradiction between globalization and closure within national borders ^{[11, 12]}. At the same time, strategic competition between developed countries has become more intense, and strategic coordination and cooperation have become more difficult.

In the economy, these trends are manifested through deglobalization, sanctions wars, protectionism, and politically motivated unfair competition. The crisis in Ukraine accelerated the restructuring of global supply chains and production chains, which provoked increased volatility in stock and currency markets in most countries, rising prices for consumer goods, minerals and energy resources ^[13].

Over the past few years, Russia and China have fully faced the full range of external challenges. The main challenges for Russia are focused on the European direction: the escalation of the conflict with the West and the subsequent new round of US and EU sanctions. In such circumstances, the international situation is also tense for China: external pressure on politics, economics, science and technology is increasing, which is aggravated by the strategic rivalry between the People's Republic of China (hereinafter – PRC) and the United States. Many Chinese experts point out that the US government is using the Ukrainian crisis to mobilize its allies in the Asia-Pacific region (hereinafter referred to as the APR) and to accelerate the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, as well as to create a multi-level, multidisciplinary and interregional system of security alliances in East Asia through AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). ^{[10, 15-17]}. The struggle between countries for geopolitical dominance and dominance in the Eurasian markets has reached a critical point. Thus, against the background of the slow recovery of global markets after the COVID-19 pandemic, the emergence of new dividing lines undermines the foundations of the global economic system, leads to negative consequences for the international situation, and slows down the progress of humanity as a whole.

Undoubtedly, in such circumstances, it is fundamentally important to build international relations based on dialogue, cooperation, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. The Russian-Chinese relations are an example of such relations. The main characteristic of the foreign policy of both the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the PRC) is the desire to promote a polycentric world order, as well as the promotion of a position of denial of the use of force in international affairs, which underlines their desire for the need for close cooperation in solving global problems. In this regard, it is relevant to consider the dynamics of the development of Russian-Chinese relations in terms of prospects and hidden threats to the national security of the Russian Federation.

The purpose of the study was to study the dynamics of relations between Russia and China after the start of the CDF and to reveal the main prospects and threats of such cooperation, with an emphasis on the main prospects and threats of such cooperation for Russia's national security.

Materials and methods.

The selection and analysis of sources on the research topic by keywords (Russian-Chinese relations, national security of Russia, economic sanctions, the Asia-Pacific region, military-technical cooperation, challenges of the global system, the Ukrainian crisis, energy exports, sanctions restrictions, geopolitical interests) in specialized bibliographic databases (RSCI, Polpred, EBSCO eBook, Academic reference – CNKI, China National Knowledge Infrastructure – CNKI, WanfangData, abstract reviews of INION RAS). The research methodology included methods of source studies (the study of historical sources with an emphasis on their involvement in scientific practice), system analysis (induction, deduction, expert analysis), economic theory (scientific abstraction), political science (a combination of historical and logical analysis), documentation (information analysis), historiography (historical and comparative method), analogy (direct, subjective, and symbolic analogy) and computational linguistics (self-referencing).

Results and discussion.

The events and trends of recent years have had a decisive impact on the development of Russian-Chinese relations in almost all areas. Relations between the Russian Federation and China have not only withstood numerous challenges posed by the Ukrainian crisis, but have significantly strengthened over the past year: Beijing has supported Moscow in its efforts to ensure national security, and Russia has provided diplomatic support to China in resolving the Taiwan crisis (2022) ^{[10, 18]}.

Modern Russian-Chinese relations are officially defined by the parties as "relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation entering a new era" ^[19]. The most important factor in strengthening bilateral relations is the level of interaction between the top officials. Intensive contacts at the highest and highest levels are carried out between the countries: the leaders of the countries have met more than 40 times ^[19].

The most important event in bilateral relations was the visit of the Russian delegation to China (March 20-22, 2023), which not only created a solid foundation for deepening cooperation between the two countries in a number of key areas, but also became a signal to the international community about the inviolability of partnership between the two countries. During the visit of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation to China (May 23-24, 2023), several interdepartmental agreements were signed, the purpose of which is to develop interstate economic cooperation ^[10].

At the same time, it is the economic ties between the Russian Federation and the PRC that have been subjected to the most serious challenges. The sanctions policy of the countries of the "global West" against Russia has provoked a reassessment of the risks of bilateral financial, trade and economic cooperation. In this regard, in 2022, many analysts argued that the development of trade and investment cooperation between Russia and China had stopped due to the fear of imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese businesses. In practice, relations between the Russian Federation and China not only did not remain at the same level, but began to rapidly expand and deepen. Recently, relations between Moscow and Beijing have become more multifaceted and multidimensional.

One of the important areas of cooperation between Russia and China is energy. The Russian Federation is one of the largest fuel exporters to the Chinese market: in 2022, gas supplies from Russia to China via the Power of Siberia gas pipeline reached a record level of 15.5 billion. cubic meters, and by 2025 it is planned to reach the design annual capacity of 38 billion cubic meters. cubic meters. By the end of 2023, gas exports to China via the Power of Siberia-1 gas pipeline amounted to 22.7 billion cubic meters, which is 1.5 times more than in 2022 ^[19]. As part of the development of cooperation in this area, the Russian Federation and China will continue to work on the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline ^[20].

Russia is also a leader among oil suppliers to China: in 2023, the Russian Federation increased oil supplies to China by 24% to 107.024 million tons. In addition, the countries will continue to work on expanding cooperation in the field of nuclear energy: the construction of nuclear power plants (NPP) in China using Russian technologies. The commissioning of new units of the Tianwan NPP is planned for 2026-2027, and the Xudapu NPP for 2027-2028 ^[19]. The Russian Federation and China are also working on a project for a pool-type fast neutron reactor with sodium cooling (CFR-600) and on the development of renewable energy sources.

The development of innovative technologies is also an important area of economic cooperation between the two countries. One of the main projects in this area is the creation of an Innovative Scientific and Technological Center in Russia and China, which will conduct research in the field of information, space, environmental technologies and their energy efficiency, as well as the development of new materials and technologies. In addition, the Russian Federation and China plan to create joint innovation funds and experience exchange programs in the field of innovation: artificial intelligence is one of the promising areas in this field ^{[20, 21]}.

The most important component of bilateral relations is trade and economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and China: by the end of 2023, the trade turnover between China and Russia reached 227.8 billion dollars ^{[19, 21]}. According to the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, the trade turnover between China and Russia in January-March 2024 increased by 5.2% compared to the same period in 2023, amounting to 56.68 billion dollars ^[19]. At the same time, there is an imbalance between imports and exports in the product range. Russian exports are based on mineral products, wood and pulp and paper products, metals and products made from them, foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials, etc. In the structure of Russian imports, the main share of supplies falls on machinery, equipment and vehicles, chemical industry products, textiles and footwear, metals and products made from them, etc.

It should be noted that Russian experts claim that the price of raw materials exported by the Russian Federation no longer reflects the ratio of supply and demand on the world market, but is a tool in geopolitical games. In this regard, discussions are increasingly taking place in scientific circles about artificially lowering the price of Russian raw materials (setting a politically determined price level for hydrocarbons), which in the long run makes such trade beneficial exclusively for China. Domestic experts argue that in order to offset the geo-economic and strategic dependence on China, the Russian Federation needs to diversify its energy exports ^[5].

As for the import of Chinese goods, in 2023 it fully satisfied the basic needs of Russia in consumer goods. In some cases, we can already talk about the complete capture of the Russian market for certain types of Chinese-made products. For example, in 2022, Xiaomi and Realme accounted for 70% of the market in the smartphone segment ^[22]. A similar trend is observed in the automotive market: by the end of 2024, Chinese companies plan to sell 1.2 million passenger cars of four major brands in Russia. At the same time, most experts note unjustified overestimation of prices for cars that are of insufficient quality for operation in the territory of the Russian Federation.

The bilateral balanced trade turnover has become more uneven due to a decrease in the range of semi-finished products and high-value-added goods supplied from Russia to China. For example, in 2023, exports of semi-finished steel products from Russia to China decreased 3.4 times, which in monetary terms means a fourfold decrease in exports to $300 million ^[5].

Consequently, despite the positive trends in cooperation, it can be argued that China is mainly interested in gaining access to cheap natural resources from the Russian Federation, maximizing the use of Russian territory, obtaining the right to use the Northern Sea Route, as well as expanding its presence in the Russian market of goods and services. At the same time, the number of large joint ventures of Russian-Chinese origin is extremely small, and Chinese direct investments in Russia in 2023 amounted to only about $2.35 billion (compared with 4.48 billion in 2019) ^[19]. In this regard, the key task for 2024-2025 for the states is to transfer mutual trade turnover to a higher level by diversifying its structure.

Political cooperation is also deepening.: Moscow and Beijing adhere to a common position on most issues on the international agenda at the venues of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, the Group of Twenty and other international formats. On February 4, 2022, a joint statement by the Russian Federation and the CND noted that the countries adhere to the principles of government, international law, the unacceptability of sanctions pressure and interference in the internal affairs of other states, and the inclusiveness of international security ^{[10, 23]}. Today, there is almost complete consensus between Russia and China on all these issues.

In turn, military and security relations are a motivating factor in the development of strategic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC ^[24]. Despite the positive trends, we can say that there are currently no serious prerequisites for the transformation of Russian-Chinese relations into extreme forms (military alliance or confrontation). On the contrary, cooperation between countries in the field of defense is based on non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting against third countries and is aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the region and around the world ^[25].

At the same time, this cooperation should not be evaluated too positively. Today, Russia practically does not occupy any other significant positions in the Chinese market, except for the export of hydrocarbons. At the same time, Chinese investors have a limited presence in the territory of the Russian Federation. In turn, in practice, oil and gas exports to China are more important to Moscow than to Beijing. This situation in the energy sector highlights the disparity in bilateral economic ties. Limited only to the supply of hydrocarbons, it is impossible to create a solid foundation for cooperation capable of solving all problems in economic relations between the Russian Federation and China in the future ^[26]. There are problems in other areas as well. For example, if the volume of bilateral trade is steadily increasing, then the investment sector is facing difficulties. The share of foreign direct investment from China continues to grow in many countries, while in Russia this indicator has not increased since 2014 ^[27]. Also, during the period from 2009 to 2018, the goals of the Cooperation Program between Northeast China, the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia were not achieved, which led to the development of a new program for the period from 2018 to 2024 ^[28].

The gap between expectations and reality is particularly noticeable in the field of services and high technology. With the exception of the energy sector, the Chinese government does not exercise control over the international activities of private companies, which independently make investment decisions based on the same principles as multinational corporations from other countries. Russia is still a secondary market for them. Even after the launch of the Eastern Opening Strategy in February 2022, ties with China have not yet been able to compensate for Russia's loss of access to Western technologies and capital markets.

Due to the lack of serious economic levers of influence on Pyongyang, Russia's position as a participant in international efforts to resolve the situation on the Korean peninsula has significantly weakened. The situation is not much better now in Russia's policy towards the countries of Southeast Asia, which has traditionally been characterized by neutrality and balance. Although Russia's dialogue with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been developing quite successfully in recent years, many of its members, as the alliance with China strengthens, see Moscow not as an independent political actor in the region, but primarily as an ally of Beijing ^{[29, 30]}.

Let's note the fact that China has tools that could mitigate the impact of sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on Russia. But Beijing is not going to provoke the leaders of its two dominant markets (the United States and the European Union). In turn, the United States is increasing pressure on China and wants to impose sanctions against Chinese companies due to cooperation between Beijing and Moscow. The Chinese government officially called the claims of the American authorities groundless and stressed that China takes a "prudent and responsible position." Meanwhile, Russian business continues to complain about difficulties in settlements with Chinese counterparties ^{[31, 32]}. China also refused to cooperate with Russia on the creation of the CR929 wide-body airliner ^[5]. Thus, the Russian Federation cannot fully rely on China in everything. At the same time, Moscow is not going to abandon cooperation with Beijing and the exchange of technologies with it.

In this regard, Russia is expanding its cooperation with other Asian countries: Vladimir Putin's visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on June 18-19, 2024, as a result of which the heads of the countries signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement; on June 20, 2024, the Russian-Vietnamese negotiations, as a result of which the heads of Russia and Vietnam signed a number of documents on the expansion of cooperation between the two countries.

It is not easy for the Western press to interpret the Asian trip of the Russian President: on the one hand, the meeting between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, and on the other, a visit to Vietnam, which has strategic cooperation agreements with Russia, the United States, China, India and South Korea ^[33]. But they all regard this event as an attack on the West and the building of a new "axis of evil."

At the same time, the real meaning of these visits was addressed precisely to China, which is afraid of Western sanctions in order to help Russia circumvent them. Thus, the DPRK is of particular importance to China in the context of a possible "American arc from Japan to the Philippines." The development of strategic cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang removes North Korea from Beijing's influence. Vietnam can become Russia's "window" to global financial markets for Russia. At the same time, the United States will not sacrifice relations with this country for the sake of anti-Russian policy, since a huge amount of time and effort has been spent to normalize them. This means that what China was forbidden, Vietnam was allowed ^[34]. Thus, the results of Vladimir Putin's Asian visit should force China to adhere to the agreements reached earlier with the Russian Federation.

Conclusion.

The study of the dynamics of relations between Russia and the PRC after the start of the CBR made it possible to reveal the main prospects and threats of such cooperation, with an emphasis on the main prospects and threats of such cooperation for Russia's national security.

In modern geopolitical conditions, relations between Russia and China have been tested for strength, demonstrate a high degree of stability and determine the economic, political and business side not only of the two countries, but also of the Eurasian continent as a whole. Cooperation is implemented according to the model of "relations of great powers of a new type", which meets all modern international realities, the geopolitical interests of the two countries coincide. China enables Russia to pursue a diverse foreign policy, and Moscow supports Beijing in developing mutually beneficial trade, scientific and technical cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region ^[35-37].

The study showed that the countries pursue independent economic policies and actively develop cooperation in various fields. In turn, Beijing is extremely pragmatic towards Russia.: China is trying to take advantage of the favorable market conditions for Russian energy resources – China's share in Russian imports will continue to grow, but there will be no complete replacement. This is due to the fact that Chinese companies and Chinese authorities are afraid of the announcement of secondary sanctions. Given the similarity of the political and economic conditions of both countries, their interdependence will only increase, despite the disparity in economic power.

At the same time, the tilt towards China places certain restrictions on Russia's cooperation with other Asian countries – there is a risk of losing the status of a neutral country that is not involved in any conflicts in the region. In this case, the multi-vector policy is effectively reduced to zero, and the priorities of foreign policy are determined in the context of relations with China.

The results of the study suggest that Russia needs to step out of China's shadow and become an actor in economic and political processes in the Asian region so that key Southeast Asian countries continue to view Russia as a natural counterweight to China.