Strategic partnership between Russia and China in the naval sphere

Li Valerii N. Postgraduate student, Department of theory and history of international relations, Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, room 302 valeriy_li_ir@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Russia and China have created a new model of relations between countries with different socio-economic systems. It is enshrined in Russian-Chinese official documents, including the 2001 Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. Russian-Chinese relations are the most important factor of peace and stability in Asia and in the world as a whole. An atmosphere of genuine trust and mutual understanding has been established between the two countries, a real strategic partnership that is not directed against any third party and can become a model of interstate relations between two major neighboring powers in the 21st century.

The strategic partnership between Russia and China has a complex character and established historical and international political prerequisites. A significant area of partnership between the two countries is close cooperation in the military-political field, since it requires a high level of trust and proximity of approaches to key issues of international relations. Military-political cooperation between Russia and China is systemic in nature and is developing in three main directions. First, it is the coordination of the policy of the powers on a global scale and in relation to the main aspects of inter-power competition, which is manifested in the creation of anti-Chinese alliances by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, support for the anti-Russian regime in Ukraine, sanctions wars, NATO expansion, etc. Secondly, the process of rapprochement and openness between Russia and China in the field of military technologies and support for strengthening the military potential of the two countries has been launched. Thirdly, the interoperability of the armed forces is improving, which allows the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and China to act according to common standards and exchange best practices.

Cooperation in the naval sphere is an important tool of military-political cooperation. The purpose of the proposed article is to identify the role of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in the naval field for the strategic partnership of the two countries on the world stage. In this article, the author will analyze the dynamics of cooperation between Russia and China in the naval sphere, as well as assess the benefits of cooperation in this area at the strategic and operational levels.

The history of the development of technical cooperation between Russia and China in the naval sphere

From 1950 to 1959, Soviet aid to Communist China played an important role in building the Navy through technology transfer and training. A veteran of the Long-range campaign and a key figure, political Commissar Liu Huaqing studied naval theory and command at the Voroshilov Naval Academy (1954-1958), now renamed Admiral Kuznetsov. The People's Liberation Army of China received its first submarines and soon began its own production in Shanghai. At enterprises and institutes located in Leningrad, Beijing acquired the know-how to produce its first torpedoes. The Soviet Union provided several SAET-50M torpedoes with passive homing before withdrawing support. The naval guns were copies of Russian designs ^[1]. Beijing received many drawings of aircraft, including the Tupolev Tu-16 bomber, which became the Xi'an Hong-6 in both the air Force and the Navy. In 1959, the commander-in-chief of the naval forces of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) paid tribute to Soviet assistance: “... while our industry, our science and our technologies were still relatively backward, the Soviet government, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet people provided us with disinterested support...” ^[2]. However, this alliance was suspended after the debunking of the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin and mutual accusations of the USSR and China for departing from the ideologically correct course in their state and party policies.

The Sino-Soviet split dealt a serious blow to modernization efforts, especially the Chinese Navy. According to the People's Daily, “The USSR suddenly and unilaterally decided to recall all its specialists and terminate 343 contracts... and 257 other scientific and technical cooperation projects. Then they suspended the most important supplies of equipment and spare parts.”^[3] China lost access to Leningrad naval research institutes and was forced to develop its own research centers, specialized machines and tools. Soon, American intelligence reports showed that the production and operational readiness of the shipyards were seriously reduced. But despite everything, including the devastating cultural revolution, China has completed programs for which it received Soviet kits before the breakup of relations: among them the Project 629 strategic test submarine (Golf), launched in 1964, and the P-15 Termite anti-ship missiles (Styx), designed for Chinese versions of the Soviet Komar and Osa type boats (HY-1), and later destroyers and frigates (HY-1j) based on Soviet Kotlin and Riga type projects ^[4].

Relations in this area were resumed only after the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations in 1989. However, the rapprochement between the two countries had prerequisites of a global nature. After the decline of the bipolar system, a unique period in modern world history began, which can be described as an era of relative historical optimism and idealism, which was received with a light hand by Ch. Krauthammer's name is "the moment of unipolarity" ^[5]. The main feature of this era was the perception of the United States as a hegemon and its aggressive foreign policy under the pretext of defending democratic values and fighting authoritarian regimes. Military force played an important role in carrying out this policy.

The Gulf War (1990-1991) demonstrated Iraq's military impotence in the face of superior American technology. The Chinese army, as well as the Iraqi army, was modeled after the Soviet one, so the defeat of Iraq in this war prompted the military and political leadership to begin modernizing its armed forces ^[6]. In an emergency situation, Beijing revised its strategic doctrine, moving from the concept of “winning local wars under normal conditions” to the concept of “winning local wars under high-tech conditions." Liu Huaqing, deputy chairman of the Central Military Council after his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1982-1987), advocated the purchase of foreign weapons as an intermediate step to bridge the technological gap. Accordingly, in 1995, Liu Huaqing began a successful reform of the military industry aimed at creating the industrial capacities necessary for the production of modern weapons without outside help ^[7].

The basis for Russian-Chinese relations in the 21st century was the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China dated July 16, 2001 ^[8]. This agreement marked a new status in Russian-Chinese relations, which have now become a relationship of comprehensive partnership and strategic engagement, entering a new era. This meant that countries coordinate their own foreign policy in global and regional organizations, fight common challenges and threats, and have a common vision of the international system.

In the new international political reality, the resumption of naval relations with Moscow has become mutually beneficial. Through the export of military-technical products to China, Russia supported its military-industrial sector, while the People's Liberation Army of China quickly modernized its armed forces through the purchase of ready-made equipment. After the Taiwan crisis (1996), when the United States deployed two aircraft carriers, Beijing bought from Moscow twelve submarines of Project 877/636 (Kilo) and four destroyers of project 956 ("Modern"). Eight of these submarines were equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of 120 nautical miles, while four destroyers were equipped with 3M-80ME (120 km) and 3M-80MVE (140 km) Mosquito missiles. These weapons serve as a powerful means of counteraction for aviation groups from US Navy aircraft carriers approaching Chinese shores. For air defense, Beijing has acquired two S-300F naval anti-aircraft systems designed for two Chinese Project 051C destroyers stationed in the Yellow Sea. Beijing has acquired 26 Ka-31 helicopters for its naval aviation, including 14 Ka-28 anti-submarine helicopters, 3 Ka-28 search and rescue helicopters and 9 Ka-31 early warning helicopters ^[9].

These imports allowed China to obtain licenses for key military hardware units, reengineer and master key technologies, and manufacture locally most of the main components and systems that the Chinese Navy has been equipped with so far.

If we talk about the adaptation of the Russian naval military-industrial complex to the Chinese military-industrial complex, then it is worth highlighting the most notable examples. In the field of ship-based anti-submarine cruise missiles, Beijing has developed the 290-kilometer Ying Ji-18 (YJ-18) cruise missile, based on the Russian 3M-54K/KE cruise missile of the Kalibr/Club complex, with subsonic marching mode and supersonic final attack phase (Mach 3). The Russian X-31 missile became a model for the Ying Ji-91, an airborne supersonic anti–ship missile carried by fighter-bombers of naval aviation ^[10].

Russia has also provided significant assistance in the development of military hardware for the Chinese Navy. In particular, the Russian company Almaz-Antey, together with the Shanghai Academy of Space Flight Technologies (SAST), developed the Hong Qi-16B (HQ-16B) missile defense system based on the Buk-M1-2 surface-to-air missile. This complex is part of the anti-aircraft armament of frigates of project 054A and destroyers of project 051C ^[11].

With the delivery of Kilo submarines, China acquired more and more advanced Russian torpedoes (homing in the wake of 53-65KE, TEST-71M). Chinese engineers have implemented a homing device from Russian samples into their own Yu-6 torpedo. China also acquired the APR-3E light torpedo, which it adapted for the national anti-submarine missile.

Thus, the resumption of relations with Moscow in the field of armaments helped Beijing to carry out the technological revolution conceived by Liu Huaqing and significantly increase the military and industrial potential of the PRC. Chinese engineers didn't just duplicate imported equipment; they redesigned it to understand how it worked, adapt it to Chinese requirements, and sometimes innovated and improved its performance. As a result, Russian arms sales to China slowed down after 2007, and now the Chinese industry produces most of the systems itself ^[12].

However, in addition to military-technical cooperation in the naval sphere, Russia and China closely cooperated in the military-political field. In particular, the countries actively participated in naval exercises. Since 2005, China and Russia have joined forces to conduct large-scale Sino-Russian exercises “Peace Mission". In 2018, Moscow invited Beijing for the first time to the large-scale Vostok exercises, which were held back in Soviet times and were aimed at checking the readiness of units and formations of the Soviet army for military operations with China (the most likely enemy of the Far Eastern Theater of Operations). Thus, China's invitation to these exercises radically changed their concept and emphasized the importance of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership ^[13].

Naval exercises between the two countries began in April 2012 near Qingdao. Since then, these Chinese-Russian games have been held annually: in July 2013 (off the coast of Vladivostok), in May 2014 (at the mouth of the Yangtze River), in May 2015 (in the Mediterranean Sea), in August 2015 (off the coast of Vladivostok), in September 2016 (off the coast of Zhanjiang), in July–September 2017 (in the Baltic and Okhotsk Seas), as well as in April–May 2018 and 2019 (off the coast of Qingdao) ^[14].

The strategic level of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the naval sphere

The main feature of the strategic level during naval exercises is to demonstrate close cooperation between the two countries, enhance the image of their own military potential and emphasize that this potential does not pose a threat to third countries, but is aimed at strengthening international stability. China and Russia have used naval exercises to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate in important strategic and political areas. Bilateral Sino-Russian naval exercises began in April 2012 near Qingdao, 1 year after 10 Western and 19 Arab countries invaded Libya to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. In September 2013, in accordance with the decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the naval forces of Russia and China took part in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2181 ^[15]. The Chinese frigate Yancheng joined the Danish, Norwegian and Russian ships tasked with delivering these weapons from Syria to an American ship for their final destruction. In May 2015, the navies of the two countries conducted their annual naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, demonstrating an unexpected Chinese-Russian partner ship on the Syrian issue ^[16].

In September 2016 The exercises of the two countries took place in the northern part of the South China Sea near Hainan Island, confirming Russia's solidarity with China after the international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines in July 2016, contrary to China's arguments. Although Russia does not recognize Beijing's claims to the South China Sea, it expresses full solidarity with China's position that the conflict in the South China Sea should not be internationalized.

In November and December 2019, China and Russia raised the political stakes in their cooperation, for the first time holding trilateral naval exercises with South Africa at the Cape of Good Hope and with Iran in the Arabian Sea. The joint exercises with South Africa allowed the two partners to work with the Navy that meets NATO standards. The exercises involving Iran followed an attack on a Saudi oil field and tensions between Tehran, Washington and London over freedom of navigation. The position of Moscow and Beijing clearly showed that China and Russia unanimously oppose Washington's antagonistic policy, which implies a fight against rogue states, and suggests that they can oppose a military attack on Iran, while stating that security in the Persian Gulf is guaranteed ^[17].

It is also worth noting that, strategically, Russia has pledged to help China acquire technology to create advanced ballistic missile launch warning systems, which will allow the creation of a missile defense system. In addition, China has asked Russia for the possibility of deploying submarines in the Arctic ^[18]. Given that China is working on technologies that allow submarines to overcome the thickness of the ice ^[19], it is highly likely that the strategic partnership between China and Russia in the naval sphere will extend to the Arctic, which has strategic consequences in the form of coordinating the efforts of the two countries to contain the United States.

The operational level of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the naval sphere

The main feature of the operational level during naval exercises is the conduct of maneuvers, the use of weapons and the solution of tasks in conditions as close as possible to combat. China participates in more combat-related training and competitions with Russia than with any other country. This feature is not surprising, given that Western countries are reluctant to share their tactical experience with the PLA. Since its inception in 2012, the Sino-Russian joint naval exercises have focused on combat operations and combat support. The bilateral exercises called "Joint Sea" have been conducted by the two countries more than ten times and have become "exemplary" military exercises between China and Russia. During them, a wide range of topics were worked out: the fight against terrorism, escorting naval vessels, search and rescue, air defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine operations, submarine rescue and combat training. In addition, these exercises implied joint command (i.e., the average officer staff participated) and a large number of personnel were involved for a long period of time ^[20].

The exercises, which the parties conducted in April 2012 near Qingdao, included combined air defense, marine corps replenishment, combined anti-submarine defense, combined search and rescue process and rescue of a captured vessel, as well as ground-to-ground and surface-to-air combat firing, as well as anti-submarine defense. It was attended by the hospital ship Ark of Peace, which visited Vladivostok and conducted exercises in Peter the Great Bay in the Sea of Japan.

The 2013 exercises in the Sea of Japan involved 18 vessels from both sides performing similar actions. As part of this plan, four destroyers, two frigates, one integrated replenishment ship, three helicopters and one special operations unit were involved, which became the largest overseas deployment of the Chinese Navy to conduct exercises with the participation of a foreign state.

In 2014, the countries conducted joint verification and identification for use in the air defense identification zone declared by China in the East China Sea, and also practiced combat exercises without a pre-planned scenario, which became the first joint exercise for any PLA service ^[21]. In addition, for the first time, the ships of both fleets operated in joint formations against a common enemy, exchanging tactical data from their combat systems. In 2016, anti-submarine exercises and the landing of 90 Russian and 160 Chinese marines were conducted during exercises in the South China Sea. The naval forces of the two countries once again exchanged tactical data on anti-submarine and air defense. During the exercises in the Baltic, Japanese and Okhotsk Seas in 2017, the main focus was on submarine rescue, air defense and anti-submarine operations.

In 2019, for the first time, the naval forces of the two countries carried out mutual underwater rescue of submarine crews and joint anti-submarine patrols from the air. Two submarines of the Russian-made Kilo project 636 took part in the exercises. The naval forces of the two countries also conducted an operation to rescue the captured vessel at the Qingdao Dagan pier ^[22]. During the 2021 exercises, Zhang Junshe, a former Chinese naval attache in Washington, stressed the level of trust achieved by both sides: “The scenarios and weapons involved in these exercises reflect the high level of strategic mutual trust between China and Russia. The naval forces of the two countries continue to deepen mutual understanding. [As a result] the region has become safe and stable.” The theme of the 2021 exercises was "maintaining the security of strategic sea channels." Zhang Junshe believes that this indicates that the nature of the Chinese and Russian naval exercises is “defensive in nature”, the main purpose of which is to increase the capabilities of the Chinese and Russian navies to jointly respond to threats to maritime security and maintain regional peace and stability ^[23].

China continued to conduct naval exercises after the start of its military operation. So in December 2022, the Joint Sea - 2022 exercises were held in the East China Sea, over the territorial affiliation of part of the water area of which China and Japan are arguing. The exercises included joint missile and artillery firing at air targets, artillery firing at sea targets and joint anti-submarine operations with the practical use of weapons ^[24].

It is a fact that the Sino-Russian naval exercises are much more complex than just "Passing exercise" (maneuvers between passing ships). Their The complexity implies that the two fleets use common tactics and procedures, which in this particular case is facilitated by common sensors, combat systems and data transmission systems. Chinese destroyers and frigates use common or very similar sensors, such as MR 710 three-dimensional radars (Type 382 in Chinese terminology) and MR-331 Mineral-ME over-the-horizon targeting sensors (Type 366 in Chinese terminology) on Russian platforms ^[25]. Taking advantage of the special propagation of waves in the layers of the atmosphere, the latter provides a detection range for anti-ship weapons, which is not available in the Western naval forces. This commonality and tactical secrecy suggest scenarios in which the Sino-Russian navy could deter the naval forces of Western countries with a longer range of their supersonic anti-ship missiles and a missile detection range using the Mineral-ME radar. Common systems also contribute to air defense, both strategic on land and tactical at sea.

Summing up the analysis of the role of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in the naval field for the strategic partnership of the two countries on the world stage, it is worth noting that the history of its development is closely linked to world political trends. After the Second World War and before the beginning of ideological differences, the USSR provided significant assistance in the creation of the Chinese naval forces as a branch of the armed forces. After the resumption of cooperation with China in the new conditions, naval cooperation with China has deepened both in the field of technology transfer and their application in practice.

Naval exercises have been actively conducted since 2012. Since then, they have become more and more complex and include not only working out typical situations for the Navy, but also joint command and staff exercises, which allows the parties to share tactical techniques in modeling and working out scenarios of combat situations. At the same time, the conduct of these exercises is not regulated by any special document that would formalize naval cooperation. Accordingly, it can be argued that this level of cooperation is determined by the boundaries of the strategic partnership.

Moscow and Beijing are developing a common military potential not against a certain third party, but for political and strategic deterrence of negative trends in the international system that may arise due to the unequivocal anti-Russian/anti-Chinese position of the United States. The Sino-Russian military and naval partnership is aimed at demonstrating their own confidence in the face of the United States, for which the development of the Navy has been and remains a competitive advantage. At the moment, this is of great relevance, since the United States is actively using the Navy to demonstrate its disagreement with the ownership of a number of waters of Russia and China in Peter the Great Bay and the South China Sea, respectively. It can be assumed that in the future, the Sino-Russian partnership may be aimed at preventing the intervention of the countries of the "Collective West", which Moscow and Beijing consider destabilizing.