The place of the Arab Spring in French foreign policy

Ionov Dmitriy Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0008-8598-0189 Graduate student of the Institute of International Relations and World History, Department of Political Science, National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky 603000, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 dmitriy.ionov@unn.ru Other publications by this author

Kretov Andrey Dmitrievich ORCID: 0009-0001-9076-1465 Postgraduate student; Department of Oriental Languages and Linguoculturology; Lobachevsky National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University 603005, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod region, Nizhny Novgorod, Ulyanova str., 2 krietov2000@mail.ru

Introduction

The Arab Spring has taken many countries by surprise, despite warnings from the United Nations and many observers. France's first reaction to the rapidly developing events in the Middle East turned out to be rash. France has underestimated the attractiveness of democracy in the Arab world. The appointment of Alain Juppe to the Quai d'orsay in March 2011 was probably supposed to lead to more active support for anti-government forces in Arab countries, since France now unequivocally encourages the "democratic aspirations of the Arab peoples." This turnaround was confirmed at the level of the European Union and at the G8 summit in Deauville, chaired by France. France, together with the United Kingdom, initiated the intervention in Libya and played an active role in the Libyan crisis. However, since the end of 2011, Paris has taken a more cautious position for a number of reasons – from the election results favorable to Islamists to the risk of obvious destabilization in some countries of the region. France opposed the entry of a Saudi military unit into Bahrain, supported the reforms promoted by the King of Morocco, and called on the Islamist governments in Tunisia and Egypt to respect the rights of minorities and freedom of expression.

The object of the study is France's foreign policy in the context of the events of the "Arab Spring" and its impact on France's relations with Arab countries. The subject of the study is the assessment of the "Arab Spring" by the French expert community.

The aim of the work is to analyze the key assessments, approaches and interpretations of the French expert community regarding the events of the "Arab Spring" in the Middle East and North Africa region. To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set: 1. To study and systematize the opinions of French experts (political scientists, orientalists, analysts, etc.) regarding the causes, dynamics and consequences of the "Arab Spring"; 2. To identify the main factors and criteria that guided the French expert community in assessing the events of the "Arab Spring"; 3. To identify the points of view of French experts regarding the influence of the "Arab Spring the impact of the Arab Spring on French foreign policy in the region; 4. To analyze the evolution and change in the assessments of the French expert community regarding the events of the "Arab Spring" at various stages; 5. To identify key trends and patterns in the expert assessments of the French community regarding the "Arab Spring".

The scientific novelty of the work is due to the fact that it interprets the events of the "Arab Spring" as a turning point for French foreign policy in the Middle East, leading to a revision of previously established approaches. The examples of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria showed the changes in France's relations with these countries, as well as how internal unrest in these countries affected French diplomatic strategies.

The methodological basis of the article is based on a systematic approach. This approach is based on the analysis of objects as systems and a holistic consideration of a certain set of events.

In the article, we use such methods as event analysis, which makes it possible to study in detail the specific foreign policy actions of the French presidents within a certain time interval, and the method of discourse analysis when studying the assessments of the "Arab Spring" in the French media. In addition, it is important to note the use of the historical comparison method, which provided an opportunity to conduct a comparative analysis of the concepts and practices of the presidents in the field of French Middle East policy during the "Arab Spring".

Quite a lot of scientific and analytical works are devoted to the events of the "Arab Spring". France continues to show neo-colonialist interests in a number of Muslim regions. The causes and facts of the Arab revolutions are discussed in the books and works of Yalloun T. ^[1], Bank A., Richter T., Sunik A. ^[2], Korotaev A. ^[3]. In their work, they study the emergence of revolutions in states, their origin, what role information technology played, whether there is a scenario for Arab uprisings and what are the prospects for the countries of the Arab world. France's reaction to the events of the "Arab Spring" has become the subject of research by I. M. Mokhova, A. I. Funeshima, N. Y. Uzunova. At the same time, these works mainly contain an analysis of the causes and consequences of the "Arab Spring", primarily for the Arab world and the world community as a whole. There are still few works devoted to the impact of the events of the "Arab Spring" on the foreign and domestic policy of France, which once again confirms the relevance of the topic of this study and determines the choice of topic.

France's reaction to the events of the "Arab Spring"

The "Arab Spring" began in Tunisia on December 17, 2010 after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, followed by a series of mass demonstrations and an attempt to suppress them by force. After several weeks of street fighting and the overthrow by the Tunisian armed forces of the regime of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, a transitional government has arrived. Simultaneously with the events in Tunisia, demonstrations broke out in Egypt, Libya, Syria and several other countries in the Middle East. The reasons for the speeches also varied – some were based on the idea of a change of power and the organization of a more just social order, others on outside interference, and others were related to the imbalance of power between the tribes, together they created a number of acute problems for France ^[5].

These problems have caused rapid changes in French foreign policy. First, as noted in the introduction, France's position in the region was based on personal relationships with some Arab dictators, and therefore, when the Tunisian public began to call for democratic reforms, France found itself in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, as a champion of democratic values, France was expected to support, if not openly encourage, the aspirations of the public. But on the other hand, as an alternative, support for such movements would undermine the foundations of France's regional influence. Secondly, it was impossible to predict the scale and results of the protests in the short term. As a result of the "Arab Spring", France found itself in an unusual situation, waiting for political measures, rather than forming them. Thirdly, the unfolding revolutions led to general instability in the region, which further emphasized France's seemingly short-term detachment, since one of the key reasons why Paris supported authoritarian regimes was their stability and predictability ^[6]. Finally, instability in the region could lead to an increase in illegal immigration to the EU, so France sought to avoid such consequences. Ties between Paris and Tunisia, combined with fears of instability, forced France to show restraint in the early days of the demonstrations.

Such an obvious inaction by the French government provoked internal political tensions, which reached a climax when the first foreign policy statement with any content was made in the form of a "call to arms." In early January 2011, Foreign Minister Michel Alliot-Marie proposed that France send its security forces to support the Ben Ali regime. Eventually, amid growing public concern, French policy towards Tunisia changed – France began to actively work to support political transformations in Tunisia, and in February 2011, Prime Minister Francois Fillon presented a new plan aimed at supporting democratic reforms ^[7].

The period of the "Arab Spring" in Egypt coincided with the events unfolding in Tunisia. On January 25, 2011, demonstrations broke out in Cairo's central Tahrir Square. What began as a series of disorderly demonstrations aimed at expressing solidarity with the Tunisian people quickly turned into more organized protests against restrictions on freedom of speech, manipulation of the outcome of national elections and widespread corruption. Hosni Mubarak's government brought in security forces to quell the demonstrations by shutting down communication channels (Internet and mobile networks), mass arrests and the deployment of rival subnational groups loyal to Mubarak. In Egyptian society, the President has come to be seen as an obstacle to modernization and reform.

Despite such measures, or perhaps because of them, the clear alienation of the ruling elite from the Egyptian masses became apparent, which marked the beginning of a period of constant violence and general instability. Mubarak's military support waned and he handed over power to the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces. By that time, the demonstrations were in full swing, and France decided to pursue a more active policy towards Egypt, since that country had long been considered a bulwark of regional stability. In addition, any civil war in Egypt, especially with explicit Islamic overtones, could damage European political and economic interests ^[8].

Stressing the friendly nature of Franco-Egyptian relations, France called for dialogue between all parties in order to maintain stability in the state and initiate democratic reforms. Further, France took the initiative to involve the EU States in developing a common position, which was expressed in a call for an end to violence against civilians and respect for human rights. France has put forward a number of demands, ranging from responsibility for the protection of journalists to the desire for a quick transfer of power in Egypt, that is, in fact, to regime change from within.

On February 11, 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy publicly welcomed the resignation of the Mubarak government and expressed hope that the new Egyptian authorities would establish democracy and the rule of law. This does not mean that France blindly opposed Mubarak, without thinking about who would replace him. France has repeatedly expressed concerns about Egypt's future, even calling for a complete rejection of any religious dictatorships, stressing that "Western democracies have a moral responsibility to help Egypt avoid systems that would be worse than previous dictatorships" ^[9]. In March of the same year, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe visited Cairo, where he personally congratulated Mohammed Morsi and tried to convey France's interests in restoring stability in the region. Juppe stated that "in Egypt, this movement is being carried out in an admirable way." He also promised to increase financial assistance from France, the European Union and the United States, emphasizing the importance of the Mediterranean Union for Egypt. However, it is noteworthy that France rejected the proposal to write off the Egyptian debt ^[10].

France's attitude towards the Egyptian demonstrations was multifaceted and included several features that deserve attention. Firstly, France openly supported the protesters and began to speak out against the regime. Learning from the mistakes in Tunisia, Sarkozy has made great efforts trying to promote France as an unwavering, unapologetic fighter for democracy and inalienable human rights in the region. By doing so, Sarkozy demonstrated the inconsistency of his policy, since in the recent past he proclaimed the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Secondly, Sarkozy began to work closely with his European allies, in particular with Great Britain and Germany. This multilateral cooperation was aimed at strengthening France's position in the region and was not aimed at shaping EU policy as such, rather, it was aimed at legitimizing France's position through approval from Britain and Germany. Thirdly, France continued to fear that the momentum of change would lead to an Islamic revolution. These were well-founded concerns, because although the Muslim Brotherhood initially faded into the background, they were the most disciplined and organized opposition group in the country. In order to prevent the emergence of a theocratic Egyptian state, France has set itself a new, albeit impossible, goal – to support democratic reforms as a means of suppressing Islamist sentiments.

Unlike the short–term revolutionary impulse characteristic of both the Egyptian and Tunisian episodes, the Syrian one is one example where the suppression of demonstrations led to a full-scale civil war.

France, like a number of other countries, has been actively trying to cope with the growing instability in the country. However, the French government either underestimated the demonstrators' ability to overthrow the regime, or overestimated the regime's ability to suppress the revolution. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, France was on good terms with Bashar al–Assad and used its leverage in the country to weaken the influence of Iran, Russia and China. Thus, initially, France's reaction to the outbreak of violence in Syria consisted of restrained criticism and weak condemnations.

The European Union was responding to the bloodshed in Syria with a limited-scale sanctions regime imposed on Syrian officials four months after the conflict began. However, as the death toll increased, European diplomacy changed its tone. On June 20, 2011, the EU Foreign Affairs Council strongly condemned the escalation of violence in Syria. Regretting that the Syrian authorities did not respond to calls for an immediate end to violence and constructive negotiations, the EU called the ongoing violent repression in Syria a threat to internal and regional stability. Stressing that the crisis can only be resolved through a political process, the EU called on the Syrian authorities to immediately start a dialogue and carry out political reforms. As expected, the reaction of the Syrian government was formal and did not affect policy changes, which could not be said about the EU, which, largely thanks to the initiative of France, imposed a second wave of personal sanctions against a wide range of Syrian officials on June 23 ^[11].

In early August, the third wave of European sanctions was adopted. These measures proved ineffective – the Syrian conflict has not been settled. However, if viewed from a more symbolic point of view, they are an important milestone in the EU's foreign policy, since they can be seen as a foreign policy in action. In addition to implementing the EU options, France has also launched several unilateral initiatives. In April 2011, Alain Juppe listed four priority areas for ending the internal conflict in Syria. First, France promised to use all possible diplomatic means to end the unrest. For example, the Syrian ambassador was summoned to the French Foreign Ministry to give explanations and listen to French demands. Secondly, Juppe announced more active cooperation in the UN Security Council in order to get both sides to agree to an immediate ceasefire. Thirdly, France has imposed its own sanctions. Fourth, tactical communication channels have been opened for the Free Syrian Army (FSA). And finally, fifthly, France intended to initiate measures to resolve the crisis within the framework of the Human Rights Council (HRC), having initiated the Council resolution of April 29, in which the blame was placed directly on Assad and his regime ^[12].

France's involvement in the affairs of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria pales in comparison with the active role that France has assumed in Libya. In February 2011, internal pressure on Muammar Gaddafi increased, as members of the Benghazi tribes, having studied the Tunisian experience and sensing an opportunity, advocated for increased control over Libya's economic and political future.

The demonstrations in Benghazi resembled not so much political gatherings as a call to mobilize the country against Gaddafi's rule. The crowd in Benghazi moved west to Misrata and was stopped, frozen in place, and then pushed back until NATO intervened. Indeed, the North Atlantic Alliance's intervention in the Libyan conflict was so strong that some researchers doubt whether the revolution would have survived at least another 24 hours alone.

NATO's actions were largely dictated by the interests of France. France became one of the initiators of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1973, which gave an international mandate to apply "all necessary measures" to protect the civilian population of Libya. The French Air Force was the first to strike the positions of Gaddafi's troops. At the same time, France played a leading role in coordinating the international military operation in Libya under the auspices of NATO. The French armed forces carried out the bulk of the airstrikes and supported the rebels on the ground.

The impact of the Arab Spring on French foreign policy

From the very beginning, the French president ruled out military intervention, which "will remain the exception and cannot be the rule," he told L'Express in May 2011. Given the positions of Russia and China, no significant initiative is possible at the level of the Security Council. A different path was chosen: in consultation with the League of Arab States, France pushed the European Union to impose economic sanctions. While welcoming the formation of the Syrian National Council, initially headed by a Franco-Syrian, the French authorities took care not to recognize it, waiting for it to demonstrate its representativeness and for the opposition to put an end to internal quarrels and disagreements. Actions were carried out to expel opponents and humanitarian gestures were made towards Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan. However, France, like other Western countries, had to admit its impotence before unleashing violence and sliding the country into civil war.

As for other revolutions or movements, the French position was less advanced and more cautious. The Egyptian revolution is being welcomed positively, and the departure of President Mubarak was welcomed. In March 2012, during a visit to Rabat, Alain Juppe welcomed the Moroccan "model" in which the country adopted a new constitution and a new government headed by a Prime minister under the leadership of Makhzen. In Bahrain, after the brutal suppression of Shiite opponents with the military assistance of Saudi Arabia ^[13], the French reaction remained restrained. By this time, the period of active support had passed, and France was not going to act as a destabilizing force for the current regimes.

This caution, noticeable since the beginning of 2012, was confirmed by President Francois Hollande in his first foreign policy speech, delivered shortly after his election before the conference of ambassadors on August 27, 2012. The success of the demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt did not set an example for other Middle Eastern states – countries such as Libya and Syria, with the help of European countries, found themselves in a state of protracted civil wars with no early prospects of ending them. European countries find themselves in a situation where their security is threatened by hostile regimes, resurgent terrorism and an increased risk of migration ^[14]. However, the democratic process in Tunisia, as in Egypt, is slow. In both countries, reactionary governments are in power, which, even if they rule in a coalition, are gradually taking control of the main political and administrative levers. It is worth noting that the rise to power of Islamist movements is not a surprise. During the period of instability, they were the only organized political force opposing the regimes that could repel the opposition. In addition, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the mentality remains predominantly conservative with a strong attachment to Islam.

This was precisely the policy that France pursued prudently and with some success, and which is being carried out today. Nevertheless, it is clear that this policy of support, especially economic, is the only possible one, even if the current governments do not have a good image in French public opinion. Caution is also necessary because the French government is trying to prevent countries that are still stable and with which France has good relations from falling into uncontrolled turbulence. This explains their caution regarding the situation in Algeria, Morocco ^[15], Jordan or Lebanon. In fact, the French authorities support the current regimes and heads of state, encouraging them to carry out reforms.

The evolution of French public opinion, which has moved from open sympathy to explicit concern about the establishment of radical Islamist regimes in some Arab countries, is also an element that the authorities must take into account. This concern is combined with domestic political problems, even tragic events such as the Merah case, which are causing an increasingly clear hostility to Islam. The IFOP survey shows that 43% of respondents consider Islam a threat, while 60% believe that Islam has too much influence and fame, and 68% believe that Muslims refuse to integrate into French society. However, in France, Islamophobia is rapidly turning into Arabophobia. This alarming development is an additional argument in favor of caution.

Another call for vigilance on the part of the French authorities is related to the need to avoid any confrontation with the countries of the Persian Gulf, especially with Saudi Arabia, which can only be concerned about events in the Arab world (with the exception of Qatar, which is playing its game). Considering that, except in Yemen ^[16], there was no real "Arab Spring" in the countries located on the Arabian Peninsula, there is a potential threat, in particular for Saudi Arabia ^[17], where the prerequisites for a protest movement have formed. Thus, France is trying to avoid the need to make a big distinction between the unrestrained promotion of democracy and the need to maintain good relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf.

This significant shift was already confirmed by his successor at the end of Sarkozy's presidency. In his speech to the ambassadors, President Hollande mentioned the "Arab Spring" very briefly and without much lyricism. Recalling what is at stake, he, first of all, calls on "political formations claiming the status of Islam" to commit themselves to "guarantee freedoms, in particular the freedoms of women, to protect minorities, their cultural or religious values." And he added that "those countries that are working on the transition should demonstrate this, and we should encourage movement without distrust, but with vigilance." Further, speaking about the Mediterranean countries, the President adds that "France will never fail to recall respect for the opposition, freedom of the press, the rights of minorities, the opportunity to participate in public life, whatever its political or religious views, are such essential principles for France."

Ultimately, these passages sound more like warnings to governments emerging from revolutions than as incitement to promote democracy in the Arab world. Referring to the situation in the Sahel and the problems it poses for French security, the President directly raises the question of how the French intervention in Libya was carried out.

As for the speech at the UN on September 27, it essentially talks about the crisis in the Sahel, which may seem to be one of the vicious consequences of the Libyan revolution. This wariness was confirmed during Francois Hollande's official trip to Algeria in December 2012, which, moreover, was successful at the bilateral level – the French president refrained from any references to the "Arab Spring" and any significant calls for reforms. On the contrary, he seemed to condone, reluctantly, the regime and its political immobility.

The only obvious exception to this line of great caution is Syria, with regard to which the President holds a special position. This position can be understood as a double concern for ending the clashes and preventing Syria from completely plunging into chaos ^[18]. In addition, these clashes are beginning to affect neighboring Lebanon, to which France has always had a special affection and whose sovereignty and even existence it wants to protect.

By bringing this initiative to the fore, France intends to act more broadly as an actor of importance in the Arab world in general and in the Middle East in particular, continuing the tradition started by General de Gaulle and continued by his successors. However, the persistence of disagreements within the coalition, the uncertainty of the American government and the rebuff from Russia mean that this initiative has not yet given an opportunity to influence the course of events.

In addition to sympathizing with the democratic aspirations expressed by the Syrian opposition, there is a desire to overthrow the regime of Iran's strategic ally, while avoiding the complete destabilization of this region, in particular Lebanon. More generally, there is concern about countering the harmful effects of the Arab Spring, in particular the emergence of terrorist groups in a political vacuum, as well as expanding their activities in nearby areas, especially in the Sahel.

In fact, the so-called "Arab Spring" is behind profound changes in this traditionally unstable region. Far from being completed, they are changing the geopolitical situation in the Arab world, especially in the Middle East. The word has been released, but the conquest of power by democratic forces is far from over, the game between the Arab countries themselves is radically changing. Non-Arab regional powers such as Turkey, Israel or Iran intend to control these events in their interests. External forces (Russia, the United States and European countries) continue to exert their influence there. New actors (China and other BRICS countries) They clearly demonstrate their desire to be present and interested parties in the "Big Game" unfolding there ^[19].

However, apart from the "Arab Spring", two main problems remain, largely hidden for two years. The first is the Palestinian issue. The lack of prospects for real peace talks and the increasingly problematic nature of the so–called two-State solution create an explosive situation in the heart of the Middle East - as evidenced by the ongoing armed conflict between Israel and Hamas. The second is the nuclear dispute with Iran, which could not be resolved through negotiations. In this case, the military option, which is still on the table, but is no longer a likely outcome, will have devastating consequences for the region, which is already in a zone of severe turbulence. Thus, these facts testify in favor of redefining French policy towards the Arab world, with which France has historically had difficult relations.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring has entered modern history as an important turning point in French foreign policy in the Middle East. For decades, France has insured its position in the region by supporting authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes in the Maghreb and Mashriq countries.

The events of the "Arab Spring" had a significant impact on the world stage, expanding their influence beyond the Arab region, leading to drastic changes in the political landscape of the Middle East. These events provoked waves of protests and revolutions that affected many countries and prompted civil societies to demand democratization, economic reforms and higher living standards. However, the consequences of the "Arab Spring" were ambiguous: in some States there were successful transitions to more democratic forms of government, while in others protracted conflicts arose that led to the destabilization of the entire region.

Having its own interests in the region, France, in turn, was forced to reconsider its approaches to foreign policy, adapting its support and interaction strategies to new political realities. This has created many challenges, from humanitarian crises to security issues, which, in turn, has had an impact on global economic, social and political processes.

Considering itself a model of a just state, France initially perceived the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia as a threat, fearing both the strengthening of Islamic parties and a sharp increase in immigration to Europe, and took a wait-and-see attitude. During the Libyan crisis, caution was discarded, because in this conflict France saw an opportunity to confirm its positions, demonstrate a new division of responsibilities between NATO and the EU led by itself, as well as enhance the image of France and Europe in the eyes of American partners ^[20]. It is worth saying that France's foreign policy in the region has been selective since 2010 – paying significant attention to the events unfolding in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, the French Foreign Ministry turns a blind eye to other episodes of political violence, such as the Shiite rebellion in Bahrain or a mixture of tribal and religious conflicts in Yemen, limiting itself to expressing concern. Finally, France's intervention in Libya has led to a number of contradictions. First, France supported the rebels in their quest to bring about a change in the Gaddafi regime ^[21]. This was contrary to UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which obliged the international community to use all means necessary to urge both sides to observe the ceasefire during the "Arab Spring", which was never undertaken. The intervention of NATO countries in Libya was regarded as a violation of the sovereignty of the state, as stated by officials of Russia, Belarus, China and several other countries. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that members of the international community, primarily the countries of the Western world, chose the path of supporting one of the sides in the civil war – probably the side that represented the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people, but this still led to an increase in the number of civilian casualties. Many other issues, such as the circumstances of Gaddafi's death, the oil deal with France, and the infiltration of extremists from Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations into many rebel groups, overshadowed the original causes and results of the Libyan campaign. It would not be an exaggeration to assume that democracy and human rights, despite the fact that they occupy a central place in France's stated foreign policy goals, were rather instrumental and played a secondary role in the decision-making process in France ^[22].