The Nazran Act of Oath of 1810 is the result of forcing the peace of the lowland Ingush

Albogachiev Magomed Mikhailovich ORCID: 0009-0006-3925-1554 an independent researcher. Master's student. Scientific supervisor - Professor of the Department of History of Ingush State University, Head of the Department of History of the Ingush Scientific Research Institute of Humanities named after Ch.E. Akhriev, Candidate of Historical Sciences Dolgieva Marem Belanovna Office 302, 7 Zyazikova Ave., Magas, Republic of Ingushetia, 386001, Russia magomed_albogachiyev77@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Dolgieva Marem Belanovna PhD in History Professor, Department of History, Ingush State University, Leading researcher, Head of the History Department of the Ingush Scientific Research Institute of Humanities named after Ch.E. Akhriev 386001, Russia, Republic of Ingushetia, Magas, I. Zyazikova Ave., 7 dmariam1966@mail.ru

At the very beginning of the 19th century, the tsarist administration on the Terek River faced a serious problem – the fugitive Kabardian prince Almaksid (Almaksud) Mudarov (Kanchokin), who in 1800, along with his subjects, fled to Chechnya. Here the fugitives found shelter with the Chechens above the twilight and in the village of Kala, belonging to the Aldeans ^{[1, p. 51]}. The prince gathered around him a significant party of sympathizing Chechens, Ingush, and others, who, under his leadership, launched raids on the so-called "Russian line" ^{[1, p. 46]}.

In other words, Almaksud Mudarov (Kanchokin) defied the Russian administration and fled to Chechnya not for any political or ideological reasons, but because of a banal quarrel with his brothers.

From the report of Gen.-M. Delpozzo Gen.-from-inf. Bulgakov, dated May 19, 1809 (No. 133), learned that in addition to Almaksud Mudraov, there was another Kabardian owner in Chechnya, Atazhuko Adilgireev, "with all about 160 households" of his subjects, and both owners, along with their subordinates and abreks, were stealing in Kabarda" ^{[2, pp. 841-842]}. Moreover, the raids were carried out mainly on the territory of Kabarda.

Gen. I. P. Delpozzo zealously undertook to solve this problem. In our opinion, it was mainly for this purpose that he was appointed bailiff of Kabarda in 1805 ^{[3, p. 8]}. However, for 5 years, the general could not cope with this problem until the events in the south of the Ingush occurred, which will be discussed below.

The fugitives took refuge with the above-the-shadow Chechens, led by Princes Magomed and Musa Turlov, and the Hermenchukians, led by Foreman Beybulat Teimiev.,

Information about Prince Musa Turlov's devotion to Russia is found in a report by Major Ugonitselov (October 21, 1811) to the governor of the Astrakhan and Caucasian provinces, Lieutenant General Nikolai Fedorovich Rtishchev: "The Chechen owner, Prince Musa Turlov, informed me on the night of the 20th of this month that a large party of non-peaceful Chechens gathered on the Sunzha, he intends to fall into our borders and strives for the villages of Chervlenskaya or Kalinovskaya..." ^{[1, pp. 53-54]}.

Perhaps that is why the mountain Vainakh societies, to put it mildly, disliked their flat counterparts, as noted in the work of I. P. Delpozzo ^{[3, p. 40]}. By the way, the general was a prisoner of the "Hermenchuk Chechens" and understood what he was talking about.

However, as it appears from archival documents, the Turlov princes sometimes took liberties and clashed with other subjects of the Russian state, because of disputes they denounced them, but at the same time remained in citizenship ^{[1, p. 52]}. The brothers took the same liberties with the fugitive Kabardian prince Kanchokin and his uzden, sheltering them at home. In Chechnya, "a significant party of Chechen sympathizers gathered around him, who, under the leadership of the prince, carried out raids on the Russian line" ^{[1, p. 46]}. The "Chechen sympathizers" are the princes Turlov, Teimiev and his Abreks. And the "Russian line" they were attacking was Malaya Kabarda, where Gen was the bailiff. Delpozzo. As a result, the Kabardian princes asked the latter to influence the Chechen princes so that they would satisfy their demands for the return of the fugitive prince and his subjects [1. 48].

It is noteworthy that the Kabardian princes suffered not only with Almakhsut Kanchokin, but also with his ancestor Kurogo Kanchokin, who, having converted to Christianity, fled to the Russians in Mozdok and became known as "Lieutenant Colonel Prince Andrei Kanchokin-Cherkassky" ^{[4, pp. 67-71]}.

However, according to the documents, the fugitive prince himself wanted to repent and return home, and even protect the Vladikavkaz road from the Abreks (i.e., from his associates) if his brothers stopped oppressing him and his subjects. As follows from this document, the prince was an ordinary subject of the Russian Empire, who moved with his subordinate peasants to the same subjects of the same Republic – to the princes of the Turlovs, because his brothers oppressed him. Russian Russians were waiting for the guarantee of another Russian subject, Shamkhal Tarkovsky, in order to return to Russian citizenship ^{[1, pp. 49-50]}.

The mountaineers, who were forced to leave their homes and wander in foreign countries, through the mountains and attacked the "Russian line" were called abreks in the Caucasus. They appeared among already conquered tribes and peoples. These were people who, because of a blood feud or because of problems with the administration, were forced to leave their native lands and wander and seek protection in foreign countries. Prince Kanchokin of Kabardia was one of them.

A situation in which a pro-Russian prince or foreman became an abrek could arise as a result of a quarrel between tsarist subjects over some domestic or official issues. For example, a similar quarrel arose between the Turlov princes and Yesaul Chernov, who was given the authority by the Russian administration to "bring the Chechen people to Russian benefits" ^{[1, pp. 52-53]}. In this case, the intervention of the "superiors" prevented the conflict from developing. And in the case of the conflict between Almakhsud Kanchokin and his brothers, this was not done. As a result, the prince fled to Chechnya and gathered around him many Chechen sympathizers and "raided the Russian line," that is, the possessions of his brothers in Kabarda, perhaps taking revenge on them in this way.

Thus, the patrons of the "Chechen" Abreks, like Prince Kanchokin himself, were Russian subjects and agents of its policy among the highlanders. Moreover, many of them denounced each other to their "superiors."In the report of the overseer of the Naursky quarantine, Yesaul Galyakhovsky 3rd, dated November 20, 1812, addressed to the ruling post of the Caucasian civil governor, Vice Governor P. K. Wrangel, it says:"Foreign residents ... lieutenant Prince Magomet Turlov on the banks of the Terika River, lieutenant Tsutsu Zhanbatyrov in the Chechen villages were informed that mountain residents of Chechens and Aksai people of various kinds had gathered up to ten thousand, intending to enter the Russian borders for theft and robbery..."^{[1, p. 53]}. At the same time, the foreman of the Big Atagi, Lieutenant Tsutsu Dzhanbatyrov, is mentioned in the documents of 1807 as an associate of Beybulat Taimiev and Chulik Saykaev (Kendirgeev). The latter two, like Tsutsu Dzhanbatyrov himself, swore allegiance to Russia in the same year. In the 1920s, Dzhanbatyrov of the 19th century was accused of harboring abortions and arrested by the tsarist command" ^{[1, p. 53]}.

That is, Lieutenant Dzhanbatyrov informed the tsarist administration about the "mountain people" who were preparing an attack on the "Russian line" and at the same time, he sheltered Abrekov. Moreover, he was an associate of the leader of the Abreks, Beybulat Teimiev. How did the so-called "anti-Russianness" and "pro-Russianness" combine in the same person? In fact, there is nothing surprising here. It is as if, for example, today an official, for some reason, would shelter his acquaintance or relative who has problems with Russian law, while denouncing other similar violators.

And B. Teimieva himself, according to the documents, participated with his abreks in the "Russian-Ottoman War" on the side of the tsarist troops: "In early June 1829, Bey Bulat, accompanied by several hundred ... mountain horsemen... arrived in Tiflis… From here, accompanied by Cornet Artamonov, Bey Bulat's detachment headed for Erzurum, where Paskevich's headquarters were located.… Bey Bulat will stay in Erzurum for 2 months – July and August 1829. He and his squad participated in the military operations of the Russian army against the Turkish troops" ^{[5, pp. 2098-2099]}. It is noteworthy that it was his abrams who attacked the Nazran people in 1810.

In the report, the Gen. Delpozzo contrasts Chechens and Karabulaks with Nazranites. At first glance, it looks like an interethnic conflict. However, this does not agree with the fact that the Karabulaks lived in adjacent territories with the Nazran people on Sunzha, Assa and Fortanga. Moreover, to a large extent, the Karabulaks and the Nazran people lived mixed and founded joint settlements on the plane (i.e., they were even fellow villagers). Among the same Nazran people there was a significant percentage of Orstkhoevs, a sub–ethnic group of Vainakhs who made up the bulk of Karabulak society. And in many reports, they are called societies of the same Ingush (or Kist) tribe, they were so closely related.

Evidence of such ethnic proximity is the case described by N. A. Volkonsky, when in the early 19th century the Nazran people refused to attack the Karabulak village of Kazak-Gechu (located near the modern village of Davydenko in Chechnya), citing family ties with its inhabitants ^{[6, pp. 207-209]}.

In this regard, the information from the gr report is noteworthy. Ivelich's 3rd gen. Tormasov, dated June 21, 1810 (No. 294. – Vladikavkaz), that if the Ingush joined with the Karabulaks and Chechens, the latter would double in strength ^{[7, p. 896]}. How could the small-numbered Nazran people double the combined forces of Chechens, Kabardians and Karabulaks, if the number of Chechens alone was several times greater than all the Ingush? Interestingly, Ilevich writes in this report: "the predators will increase more than twice." Who did the Russian officers call "predators"? We find the answer to this question in F. F. Tornau's Memoirs of a Caucasian Officer, where the author writes in a note: "Predators are the official term for mountaineers who broke into our borders..." ^{[8, p. 14]}. That is, we are talking about the Abreks who attacked the "Russian Line". Consequently, Ilevich was referring specifically to the Abreks of Teimiev and Kanchokin, and not about Kabardians, Chechens and Karabulaks in general.

After a quarrel with the Russian administration in 1809 (which will be discussed below), the planar Ingush became insubordinate. And such mountaineers, as we have already written above, were called abreks, or "predators" in the terminology of tsarist officers. In this case, the words that Nazran would have doubled the ranks of Chechens and Karabulaks do not look strange. And as you can see, the Russians were afraid of this and tried to appease the Nazran people in order to bring them back into submission. Therefore, in their reports concerning the Nazran people, we often find such instructions as: "so that these people can be supported and caressed as much as possible" ^{[2, p. 898]}; or, for example: "If the poor Ingush people are not caressed now in their current extreme situation, then they must be lost and turned away from themselves." ^{[2, p. 896]}, etc.

Moreover, there were Ingush among the abreks of Prince Kanchokin and B. Teimiev, as reported in Colonel Akhverdov's report to General Tormasov (dated July 19, 1809, No. 224) ^{[1, pp. 48-49]}. Ingush were also among the 300 Abreks who accompanied Beibulat Teimiev to Tiflis in 1929 ^{[5, pp. 2098-2099]}. For some reason, researchers have not focused on this until now.

From the above data, it can be seen that the "Chechens" who attacked Vladikavkaz were Abreks of different nationalities, including Ingush. And they were called "Chechens", apparently, because Chechens made up the majority of them. Therefore, there is no question of any interethnic hostility between the Karabulaks, Kabardians and Chechens on the one hand and the Nazran people on the other. An additional proof of this is the fact that the rebellious Karabulak village of Arshty, which helped Teimiev's associate Artemir Tsechoev, was stormed and ravaged by Cossack and Chechen detachments ^{[6, pp. 64-69]}.

At the same time, the Russians persistently tried to persuade the fugitive prince to return to Kabarda ^{[1, pp. 48-49]}. Perhaps because they did not dare to take extreme measures, fearing that his murder would cause discontent in Kabarda. From the report of the Gen. General Tormasov can clearly see that the Kabardian princes were in hostile relations with the above-mentioned Chechens, since the latter sheltered their fugitive prince and his subjects, who gathered around them "Chechen sympathizers" and plundered their possessions. Moreover, their arbitrator is Gen personally. Delpozzo ^{[1, p. 48]}.

However, the prince could not be persuaded to return from Chechnya to Little Kabarda. On June 4, 1810, he and his friend Elzheruko Abayev, led by a detachment of Chechens and Karabulaks, consisting of 600 people, made an unsuccessful raid on the fortress of Vladikavkaz ^{[1, pp. 51-52]}. On the way back on June 5, they attacked the Nazran people, as a result of which Prince Kanchokin and his uzden Elzheruko were killed ^{[2, p. 898]}.

In April 1809, one event occurred among the Nazran people, after which, perhaps, the Gen. Delpozzo has come up with a plan to solve the problem with the fugitive prince. After the murder of Ossetian sergeant Major Dudarov by Ingush sergeant Major Shikh-Murza Zeitov, Russian troops raided his ancestral village, as a result of which Shikh-Murza's relatives were killed" ^{[9, pp. 734-735; 10, pp. 664; 11, pp. 10-11]}

Chief Shikh Murze is mentioned in the report of General I.K. Ivelich to General S.A. Bulgakov. It says that in 1807, in order to protect General I.K. Ivelich from the "predatory" peoples surrounding Vladikavkaz, he invited peaceful and reliable Ingush residents to settle near the city — foremen Shikh-Murza Zaitov, Temerko and Zhankhot Malsegov, "each of them with his own village" ^{[7, p. 215]}. As we can see, before these events, the Ingush sergeant was in an allied relationship with the Russian administration.

In fact, there is valuable information in these two messages that sheds light on the events of 1810. Shikh-murza was a "reliable" Ingush foreman who was tasked with preventing attacks by Rebel groups on Vladikavkaz. And judging by the fact that the breakthroughs to the fortress of the latter were practically nullified, the Ingush sergeant-major really effectively coped with it. But after his relatives were "hacked up", Shikh-Murza decided to take revenge on the Russians. However, he understood that he could not cope with the latter alone, as a result of which he moved closer to his enemies, the leaders of the abreks, A. Konchakov and B. Teimiev. This is evidenced by the words of Gen.-M. Delpozzo in the report of the Gen. from information to Bulgakov dated June 13, 1810 (No. 48), which refers to some kind of alliance of the Ingush with Kabardins and Chechens ^{[2, pp. 894-896]}. At the same time, Shikh-murza, who was being persecuted by the Russians, moved with his people from Vladikavkaz to the Nazran Ingush, which was also noted by Gen. Delpozzo in this report says, "They all moved to a place called Nazran, at a distance of 32 miles."

Further, the Ingush, according to this report, accept the terms of the "Union" and massively convert to Islam, building mosques ^{[2, pp. 894-895]}. We also find confirmation of this in the report of Gen.-M. gr. Ivelich Gen. To Tormasov, dated July 28, 1809, (No. 533). Vladikavkaz: "(...) Now they are converting the entire Ingush people to the Busurman faith" ^{[2, p. 891]}

Earlier, there was indeed hostility between the Ingush and Chechens, which began on religious grounds (the Ingush for the most part remained in pagan beliefs until the beginning of the 19th century, while the Chechens had already adopted the Muslim religion). However, the Ingush were not for Russians, Chechens, Kabardians, etc., but for themselves. They, like any other people, had their own political, economic and national interests. They usually joined forces with Chechens when they had common interests, "in the name of a common cause for both sides" ^{[6, pp. 56-57]}. In 1809, unification also took place in the name of a common cause. Therefore, it is not surprising that all the described events among the Nazran people began to occur and develop after April 1809, including the Abreks' attack on the Vladikavkaz fortress.

The Abrek leaders, who were looking for allies, agreed, but perhaps, seeing the critical situation of the Ingush foreman, they set their own conditions for him. Some information about the terms of this agreement is found in the report of Gen.-M. gr. Ivelich Gen. To Tormasov, dated July 28, 1809 (No. 533. Vladikavkaz) ^{[2, p. 892]}. This report says "(...) giving the Mullahs a fifth part." This means hums (or hummus – Arabic. "fifth part") is a deduction from various types of mining in the amount of 1/5 of the amount. Introduced by the Prophet Muhammad (Salallahu IaleikHi in Salaam) as a share of the spoils of war allocated to him; replaced the traditional quarter, which was allocated to the leader ^{[12, p. 283.]}.

U. Laudaev in the 19th century gives the following explanation of this word: "Khams, or hamsi, is an Arabic word and means "five". Chechens pronounce this word "kums". During the Chechen raids on the Gentiles, any booty taken from the enemies was divided into five parts; of these, four parts were provided to the miners, and the fifth was called "kums" and given to the clergy. During Shamil's imamship, kums were given to him. Kooms was punished for hiding it." ^{[13, p. 104]}.

That is, the parties agreed to take joint action against the Russian administration and share the spoils according to Muslim law. And as a result, the attacks on Vladikavkaz began.

The document also says "moreover, 10 measures of wheat, millet and barley from each yard." This refers to the Ushr – a tax or fee of 1/10 in Islamic countries, i.e. a tithe. A tax on agricultural products paid by Muslims from lands that are not subject to kharaj taxation. Theoretically, ushr represents obligatory alms (zakat) from agricultural products ^{[12, pp. 247-248]}. And the "wheat, millet and barley" that the gene is talking about. Ivelic in the report Gen. Tormasovu are agricultural products.

The following definitions of this tax are given in the "A.A. Ali-zade Islamic Encyclopedic Dictionary".: "Ushr is a tithe, a tax of one tenth on agricultural products, which is paid only by Muslims. USR is usually given from the harvest of cereals and fruits. The need to pay ushr is fixed by the Koran, Sunnah and Ijma" ^{[14, p. 731]}.

B. Teimiev did not strive for independence, but fought for autonomous governance for Chechens, Ingush, Kabardians and other Muslim peoples ^{[5, p. 2098]}. However, being a Muslim, it is natural that he built the management of this autonomy on the basis of Muslim laws (by the way, Imam Shamil also asked for this from A. I. Baryatinsky during his captivity). Therefore, having concluded an alliance with the Kabardian prince and the Chechen foreman, Shikh-Murza accepted their terms. This is the arrangement Gen. Delpozzo calls it "a condition for paying taxes to Kabardians and Chechens" ^{[2, pp. 894-896]}.

Ashr should not be confused with haraj (Arabic: خراج) – a state tax in Islamic countries, which is levied on non-believers (kafirs) for the use of land and other property according to Muslim tradition. In this case, this definition is not suitable because:

1. The Ingush occupied the Nazran region 25-30 years before these events, between 1780-1785 ^{[15, p. 213; 16, l. 250; 17, p. 50-51]}

2. The Nazran people were not conquered by Kanchokin and Teimiev. Moreover, until the Ingush foreman Shikh-Murza entered into an alliance with them, the Abreks could not carry out attacks on Vladikavkaz, due to the hostile attitude of the Nazran people towards them.;

3. In the report, Ivelich clearly writes about 1/10 of the measure, which indicates that we are talking about the ushr;

4. By 1809-1810, the Nazran people were already actively converting to the Muslim religion, and the kharaj was taken from the Gentiles who lived on lands conquered by Muslims ^{[14, p. 808]}.

The territories from which the USHR tax is collected must belong to Muslims who voluntarily converted to Islam, or were captured and divided by Muslims as a result of wars, or from lands that were unusable in the past, revived by Muslims ^{[14, p. 808]}. That is, Nazran residents who converted to Islam and lived on their territory paid USD. There is no other reliable evidence that in the first decade of the 19th century, the Ingush paid taxes to Chechens (neither the princes nor their leaders) for living in Nazran. There is no information about this in the traditions of the Ingush themselves.

Apparently, as part of the concluded alliance, the Nazran abreks are moving to Chechnya and, together with the Kabardian and Chechen ones, are beginning to attack Vladikavkaz. An indirect confirmation of this is the fact that it was after Shikh-murza's quarrel with the Russian administration that the first reports appeared about the presence of Ingush among Chechen Abreks ^{[1, pp. 48-49]}. Also, the attacks on the Vladikavkaz fortress began after April 1809.

In our opinion, it is no coincidence that Delpozzo focuses on the fact that the Nazran people "accepted the mullahs, built mosques, and began to practice the Muhammadan law." The fact that much attention is paid to this issue in the Act of 1810 confirms its importance to the tsarist officers, who made great efforts to prevent Islam from spreading among the Nazran people who lived in the strategically important region. Being aware of this desire of the enemy, the Ingush foreman, apparently, on the contrary, actively promoted the conversion of his tribesmen to the Muslim religion. The Russians were very worried about this whole situation, as the Nazran people had been protecting the fortress from the east from the Muslim peoples until now.

They were equally concerned about the alliance of the Nazranites with the leaders of the Abreks, B. Teimiev and A. Kanchokin. As a result, the Vladikavkaz fortress from the east actually became vulnerable.

At that time, Teimiev was actively looking for allies among the Nazran and Karabulaks. He also had a very strained and complicated relationship with the Russians. Therefore, an alliance with an Ingush foreman who had disobeyed the tsarist administration was an additional trump card for him in his confrontation with them. Indeed, Teimiev managed to do something that was considered unthinkable before him: he united the Ingush and Chechen Abreks ^{[6, pp. 53-54]}.

The leader of the Karabulak Abreks at this time may have been Teimiev's associate Dzhantemir Kutsurov ^{[6, p. 58]}. Among the Nazran residents, the leaders of the Abreks, for the most part, were natives of the Meredjoy society (the society of mountain Orstkhoevites), who lived in the foothill and mountainous areas, more remote from the Russian fortresses. Accordingly, they had more opportunities for "liberties and dissent" ^{[6, p. 55]}.

So, having found himself in a state of military confrontation with the tsarist administration, the Ingush foreman "entered into an alliance" with Kanchokin and Teimiev and agreed on joint actions against the tsarist administration. As a result, attacks on Vladikavkaz began in 1809. And everything seemed to be going according to plan. But in one of these attacks, well-known events occurred, which eventually led to the signing of the famous oath act by the Nazran people. What happened between the allies that led to a quarrel between them? There is no direct data on this. But if we analyze all the fragmentary information from different sources and find a cause-and-effect relationship between them, then perhaps we can shed light on these events.

The last attack of the Abreks on the Vladikavkaz fortress was unsuccessful and the Abreks retreated to Nazran. Here they had a quarrel, as a result of which Prince Kanchokin and his bridle were killed.

There are two contradictory messages: One from Gen.-M. Ilevich, and the other from Gen. Delpozzo. V. A. Potto claims that Ivelich "persuaded the nearest villages of the Ingush, because of the possibility of great profit" ^{[9, p. 733]}. Here, the Nazran people are represented by some kind of bloodthirsty robbers, waiting for instructions from the Russians. This, of course, does not agree with the character of the Ingush.

However, later (in a report dated July 13, 1810) Gen. The gene was reporting to Delpozzo. According to Bulgakov, the Ingush let the Chechen party pass to Vladikavkaz, "but when the Chechens, not taking advantage of their prey, returned back to their villages, and after killing the shepherd of their sheep herd, they wanted to drive away the sheep, then a quarrel arose between them and the Chechens, and as a result it came to a well-known battle between them" ^{[2, pp. 894-896; 11, p. 70]}.

This was not the first attack on Vladikavkaz, and there were no serious problems between the Abreks and the local Ingush. On the contrary, according to the report of Mr. I. P. Delpozzo to General S. A.Bulgakov (dated July 13, 1810, No. 48), before these events, the Ingush were in league with the Chechens (Chechens are a provisional name here, since there were not only Chechens among the Abreks) and together with them attacked the fortress and plundered it ^{[2, pp. 894-896]}. That is, the Ingush allowed the Abreks to enter Vladikavkaz, and suddenly one day Ivelich decided to stop it, seducing the Ingush with a thirst for profit and ordering them to "attack the Chechens." Have the Ingush who have been feuding with him so far obeyed his orders with lightning speed? It is unclear why he sat for a year and did not give such an order. And what did the Abreks have so valuable after this unsuccessful raid on Vladikavkaz, which was not present during the successful raids that took place earlier? Why didn't the Ingush rob the Abreks before, when they were acting together with them? Therefore, the message is Gen. Delpozzo looks more plausible, since the Ingush have indeed been missing the "Chechen parties" since Shikh-murza defied the tsarist administration of Vladikavkaz, as mentioned above. Delpozzo had no reason to compose and justify the Ingush. As can be seen from his other reports, he was, to put it mildly, not sympathetic to the Ingush. But Ivelich apparently had reasons to praise himself to his superiors about the allegedly brilliantly conducted operation against the Abreks.

These events took place on June 5, and Delpozzo's report is dated July 13. During this time, the tsarist administration was able to figure out what really happened, as evidenced by Delpozzo's words, which he writes further: "The first circumstance, which happened last June 5, clearly proves the behavior of the Ingush people that they were truly committed to the benefits of the Russian government and had never been, because they missed the Chechen party. to kr. Vladikavkaz region, they did not inform the local chief about her intention to commit robbery here at the time / although Gen. -M. gr. Ivelich 3rd claims that they informed and, at his suggestion, began to fight and became eternally irreconcilable..." ^{[2, pp. 894-896]}.

In general, Chechen Abreks, along with Dagestani and Kabardian colleagues, repeatedly attacked Karabulaks and Nazranites, as the latter professed a mixture of Christian and pagan religion. However, this did not prevent them from forming alliances with them if they saw a benefit in it. For example, L. L. Shteder reports that the Karabulaks were allies of the Chechens, but because of the frequent raids of the latter, they became irreconcilable enemies ^{[15, p. 207]}. Here, Shteder describes a situation very similar to the Nazranites: the parties entered into an alliance, then the Chechens for some reason began to rob the Karabulaks, as a result of which they became "irreconcilable enemies."

Of course, we don't know exactly what led to the conflict between the Abreks and the locals. However, it is known that the conflict arose after the last unsuccessful raid on Vladikavkaz. And logic tells us that these events are somehow connected. Perhaps, on the way back, the Kabardian prince had some kind of dispute with the Ingush abreks or with Shikh-Murza himself during the division of the spoils. Considering that they had not received their share in full, Kanchokin's Abreks attacked the Ingush and tried to take ‘their own" by force. Such a scenario in the context of the gen message. Delpozzo's story that the Abreks robbed the Ingush on the way back looks plausible. And Ivelich just successfully took advantage of this situation and claimed the laurels of such a great success for the Russians.

However, we assume that the tsarist secret services and their agents among the Abreks and Nazran residents worked here. It was hardly a coincidence that Gen, who had been hunting the fugitive prince for many years. Delpozzo was appointed commander of Vladikavkaz after the first, at the head of his abreks, began to attack this fortress.

Anyway, it was this situation that destroyed the Ingush alliance with Teimiev and Prince Kanchokin, which was to the advantage of the tsarist administration. After that, Chechen abreks attacked Ingush villages, and Ingush attacked Chechen and Kabardian villages, etc. ^{[17, p. 71]}.

It is known that in 1770 the Ingush signed an "agreement" on their joining the Republic of Dagestan. In this regard, a reasonable question arises: why did the Russians need to require the Ingush to sign an entry agreement in 1810, where only representatives of 6 teips (Teip – Vainakh territorial and tribal association) are signed, if the Ingush had already signed an entry agreement with all the Kist (Ingush) people forty years earlier? Moreover, representatives of these 6 tapes participated in the signing of this act, among others. We may be able to answer this question if we answer another question: when is there a need to confirm a previously signed legal act? Usually, if there was a violation of it. It follows from this that the representatives of these 6 tapes participated in some kind of anti-Russian cases.

Here we note that, despite the "treaty" of 1770, the Ingush behaved relatively independently of the Russian administration. The Russians eventually brought in these troops and subdued the Nazran people, forcing them to sign the treaty without bringing matters to a direct clash with them. According to the act of 1810, mostly flat Ingushetia came under the control of the tsarist administration, while mountainous Ingush societies were considered "semi-submissive" in the middle of the 19th century. Punitive expeditions were sent against them several times ^{[18, pp. 1-92]}. The self-willed character of the Ingush was noted in his work by the Russian researcher of the XIX century N. F. Grabovsky ^{[19, pp. 14-16]}.

The location occupied by the Nazran Ingush forced the tsarist officers to behave with restraint towards them. The fact is that their villages from the east were adjacent to Vladikavkaz, the most important Russian fortress in the region. Therefore, it was important for the Russians to win over the Nazranites to their side in order to protect Vladikavkaz from attacks by Chechen and Dagestani Abreks, and later from the troops of Imam Shamil. N. F. Grabovsky, noting this important fact, writes: "Shamil, dominating Chechnya and well aware of how strong the strategically suitable area is, occupied by the Ingush, and blocking access from Vladikavkaz to the valley of the Sunzhi River beyond Nazran, tried three times to win over the Ingush and failed each time. A particularly sensitive defeat was inflicted on him, almost exclusively by the Ingush alone, in April 1840..." ^{[19, p. 16]}".

Therefore, in January 1827, Gen. Ermolov, realizing the danger of forcibly forcing the Ingush to accept the Christian faith, wrote to the real Privy Councilor Lansky: "Due to the importance of the place occupied by the Ingush, I could not help but foresee how unpleasant consequences could occur if this people, the most belligerent and courageous of all the mountaineers, were outraged and decided to retire to the mountains." ^{[20, p. 479]}. By saying "unpleasant consequences," the tsarist general apparently meant the possible relocation of the Ingush to mountainous areas, thereby making Vladikavkaz vulnerable and unprotected from the east.

This is the relationship between the tsarist administration and the Nazran people during this period. Each side tolerated the other, not because they longed for companionship, but because of the circumstances.

In our opinion, the signing of the oath in 1810 is the result, not of an uprising, of course, but of the disobedience of the Ingush after the events of 1809, and hostile actions against the tsarist administration in Vladikavkaz, which lasted more than a year. In other words, the "Act of Oath" of 1810 is the surrender of the Ingush side in this confrontation.

Moreover, in this confrontation, the tsarist administration won almost without losses, using the same abreks that the Ingush foreman tried to use against it. This shows that the tsarist secret services were many steps ahead in their confrontation with the highlanders.

According to the report of Gen.-from-inf. Bulgakov's Gen.-from-inf. Tormasov about the intention of the Kumyks, at the invitation of the Chechens, to act against the Ingush (dated 09/3/1810), after the murder of their leaders, the Abreks decided to take revenge on the Ingush and turned to the Dagestani feudal lords for help ^{[2, p. 917]}. When the small Nazran people found out about this, they turned to the military administration of the Vladikavkaz fortress with a request to allocate them "one gun and several gunners with charges" ^{[2, p. 896]}. In other words, the Ingush asked for weapons, not to accept them as subjects.

However, the Tsarist special services, which had started the whole operation to bring the Nazran people into submission, offered them help in return for hosting the Russian garrison. Soon after, an army of representatives of various peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, numbering more than 5,000 people, attacked Nazran again. The tsarist administration, as can be seen from the report of Gen. Bulgakov's Gen.-from-inf. According to Tormasov (dated July 14, 1810, No. 2098), the Nazran residents were given conditions for assistance: recognition of their Russian citizenship ^{[2, p. 898]}. Realizing that they could not resist the Chechen-Dagestan coalition, the Ingush decided to accept the condition.

The cunning policy of the gene. V. A. Potto describes Delpozzo's attitude towards the Nazran people in his work "The Caucasian War": "Knowing that the Chechens would not leave the deed of their fellow countrymen without revenge, Delpozzo, who replaced Ivelich, persuaded the Ingush to temporarily accept the Russian army, and Lieutenant Colonel Firsov, with a detachment of two hundred infantry and one hundred and fifty Cossacks, With three guns, he occupied their main village of Nazran. Firsov really defeated the Chechen party that tried to attack Nazran, and thus made reconciliation between Chechens and Ingush almost impossible. Then the latter, fearing new Chechen invasions, themselves withdrew into Russian citizenship... ^{[9, p. 735]}.

Not only I. P. Delpozzo, but also other generals adhered to this policy. For example, A Gene. Tormasov writes in his report: "I, having received this information, instructed the Gen. from the information of Bulgakov to enter into the position of the Ingush and take advantage of this opportunity to worship this people for eternal citizenship of V.I.V." ^{[2, p. 898]}.

It follows from this that, firstly, the Russians had to trick the Ingush into even accepting Firsov's detachment; secondly, the Ingush agreed to sign the "treaty" after the second attack on Nazran by the anti-Ingush coalition.

Besides, let's not forget that this coalition was led, in fact, by the subjects of RI and, perhaps, the Ingush guessed that all this was controlled by the tsarist administration or the gen himself. Delpozzo. Even those who came to take revenge on the Ingush for the murders of Prince Kanchokin were led by people on Russian pensions, according to Gen.-from-inf. Bulgakov in the report of Gen.-from-inf. Tormasova: "(...) the Chechen party was gathered by many honorable people who have our ranks and receive a most graciously granted pension" ^{[2, p. 898; 17, p. 79]}.

Based on the above data, we fully assume that the coalition forces that attacked Nazran became unwitting participants in Delpozzo's cunningly planned operation to force the submission of Nazran residents. This is logical, because the tsarist general, having moved to Vladikavkaz and replaced Ilevich, tried to solve the problem with the Nazranites and the fugitive Prince Kanchokin. Perhaps, for these purposes, he used his agents among Kabardians, Chechens and Dagestanis.

That is, Delpozzo persuaded Dagestani and Chechen feudal lords and Russian "pensioners" to order their people to attack Nazran. And after the Nazran people were forced to sign the "Act of Oath", he sends them a letter with an "affectionate request" to disband the army ^{[1, p. 52]}.

About this operation, the gene. Delpozzo wrote in 1827 A. P. Ermolov: "In the same place, in the peaks of the Sunzha River, the Ingush settled down from the mountains, a warlike people brought into submission by meek measures used by Major General Delpozzo" ^{[21, p. 20]}. In other words, these actions are a gene. A. P. Ermolov calls Delpozzo's efforts to bring the Nazran people into submission without going into direct military conflict with them, "so as not to completely outrage them." Really "gentle measures" and a brilliantly planned operation.

The Tsarist general tried to quarrel the Nazran people with neighboring large Muslim nations in order to make them dependent on "Russian weapons" against a much outnumbered enemy. All this was done for one purpose: to secure Vladikavkaz from the east from the attacks of the Abreks. Even her subjects quarreled with each other like that, and RI became an arbitrator here.

Thus, we come to the conclusion that in 1810, the tsarist administration, by "gentle measures," as A. P. Ermolov wrote, managed to bring the Nazran Ingush who had disobeyed, into submission, which resulted in the signing of the "Act of Oath" by the latter.