Soviet Historiography of Egypt 's relations with the USSR in 1967-1977

Abdalla Moataz Mohamed Eldawoudy ORCID: 0000-0002-9008-0395 Postgraduate Student, Department of Oriental Studies, Ural Federal University 620083, Russia, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Yekaterinburg, Lenina str., 51 Mr.Moataz@Mail.Ru Other publications by this author

Soviet Oriental studies occupied an honorable place in the history of science. Its representatives were distinguished by a deep respect for the peoples of the East, their history and culture, a desire to understand the interdependence of Soviet and Arab cultures, as well as sympathy for the aspirations of the Arabs for freedom and progress. Many works, books, articles and scientific dissertations have been written about their history. ^{[1, p.1]}. Egypt, as the largest country in the Middle East, has always occupied an important place in the studies of the USSR's foreign policy. Thus, the history of the development of Soviet-Egyptian relations during the years of this study is a typical example of a relationship that was freed from colonial and semi-colonial dependence. In Soviet historiography, which has dozens of works, many previous scientific studies have analyzed various aspects of the history of cooperation between the USSR and Egypt. In general, relations between the two countries from the mid-1950s to 1970 during the reign of Egyptian President Ga. Nasser were characterized by friendly character and mutual respect ^{[2, pp. 48-49]}.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt have always had a very significant impact on the development of the situation in the Middle East region as a whole. Many Russian studies have focused on the position of the Soviet Union towards Egypt when the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, as well as the study of the factors underlying the Soviet Union's support for Egypt in the Middle East problem. For example, the results of a study conducted by S. S. Pestich in 2019 on the Soviet Union and the problem of the Middle East proved that the coming to power of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev was one of the factors that clearly increased the political activity of the USSR in the Middle East, especially with Egypt during the 1967 war. From the very first hours of the 1967 Six-Day War, the Soviet Union sided with the Arab States. Israel's aggression was condemned by Moscow, and diplomatic relations with the Jewish state were severed ^{[3, p. 274]}. And also in the results of R. D. Daurov's dissertation entitled "The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 in the context of the politics and diplomacy of the Soviet Union" it is emphasized that the reaction of the USSR at that time forced, willingly or unwittingly, to intervene in the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict from June 5, 1967 ^{[4, p. 3]}.

Undoubtedly, the published works of Soviet politicians and diplomats about this period are one of the most important sources in Soviet historiography. In this regard, one of the most prominent politicians and scientists of the Soviet Union, E. M. Primakov, specializing in Middle Eastern affairs, published a work in Moscow entitled "Confidential: The Middle East on stage and behind the scenes." In this work, he clearly stated the position of the Soviet Union on the Six-Day War and Israeli aggression in the Middle East, expressed in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 21, 1967. Here Primakov explained that the leaders of the USSR saw that aggression  Israel is the result of a conspiracy by imperialist powers, especially the United States, against national liberation movements. On the other hand, they believed that the Middle East conflict was the result of the USSR's approach to the problems of international relations, its long struggle for their improvement, the restructuring of the system of relations between states on the principles of peace, mutual and strict respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs ^{[5, p.346]}.

After the cessation of hostilities during the Six-Day War until the death of Egyptian President G. A. Nasser in 1970, the main concern of the Egyptian leadership was the restoration of the armed forces to overcome the consequences of Israeli aggression. In this regard, Russian writers and historians continue to pay attention to the study of Soviet military aid to Egypt. It should be noted that a book entitled "The USSR and Egypt (1952-1978) The View of historians" has recently been published. The group of authors in this work clearly emphasized that in the three years after the end of the Six-Day War in 1967 and before Nasser's death, Soviet influence in Egypt reached an unprecedented level.

Immediately after the end of the war, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N. V. Podgorny arrived in Cairo. He was accompanied by Chief of the General Staff Marshal M. V. Zakharov. As a result of this visit, it was decided to completely reorganize the Egyptian army. 1,500 Soviet military advisers were assigned to all units of the Egyptian army, up to the brigade level, under the overall command of Marshal Zakharov, who remained in Egypt ^{[6, p.110]}. In this regard, the results of a study conducted by S. N. Detkov on Soviet military assistance to Egypt at Moscow Pedagogical State University entitled "Military-political cooperation between the USSR and Egypt" confirmed that the development of military equipment and the use of modern types of weapons surpassed previous wars in the Middle East. Thanks to the naval facilities deployed in Egypt in 1968, the USSR deployed a significant fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and solved part of its strategic goals in the region. When the Egyptian Air Force was unable to repel Israeli air attacks, Nasser was forced to turn to the Soviet Union with a request to create an air defense system.

The period 1967-1973 is characterized by the most intense military-technical cooperation between Egypt and the USSR. Up to 20,000 Soviet military specialists were sent to Egypt, who were called upon to reconstruct the Egyptian army. In the shortest possible time, they managed to train, rearm, and modernize the Egyptian armed forces. The Egyptian air defense system was created almost from scratch, partially controlled by Soviet personnel ^{[7, p. 173]}. Thus, it can be concluded that the issue of arming the Egyptian army has been the subject of interest to Soviet historians and researchers since 1967, and the Six-Day War can be considered a turning point in the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations in the political and military spheres.

When President Nasser died, Mohamed Anwar Sadat came to power in Egypt instead. A new stage in the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations began with him ^{[8, p. 96]}. As for the Soviet historiography of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union during the Sadat era, there are many studies and books examining the conditions of that period. I. O. Madatov's dissertation "Egypt's Policy towards the USSR and the USA in the 70s and 80s" contributed to clarifying many goals of Egyptian policy towards the Soviet Union, as well as the influence of internal and external factors on the formation of the path of Egypt's political leadership ^[9].

In Soviet literature, almost all works devoted to Egypt during the time of Sadat also touch upon the policy of rapprochement with the United States. The book by academician E. M. Primakov "The Story of a Conspiracy" reveals the reasons for the appearance of the United States in the Middle East problem, analyzes the change in Egypt's foreign policy, which led to Sadat's rapprochement with Washington. In this work, Primakov also explained a lot about the reasons for Sadat's termination of the mission of Soviet specialists and advisers from Egypt and their return to their country ^{[10, p. 25]}.

In Soviet historiography about Egypt, many sources mention the crisis of 1972, associated with the completion of the mission of Soviet military advisers from Egypt and their return to their country, as well as the impact of this step on relations between the two countries. One of the researchers proved in the article "Soviet-Egyptian relations under Sadat: from Union to confrontation" that the USSR's military investments in the Egyptian army in 1965-1972 alone amounted to 3,200 million dollars. By the beginning of the 1973 war, the ranks of the Egyptian army had been strengthened by Soviet pontoon parks for crossing water barriers, high-speed boats for the first shock wave of the landing, T-62 tanks, ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles) "Malyutka", missile and anti-aircraft missile complexes "Shilka" and "Kvadrat", etc. ^{[11, p. 29]}.

On the other hand, V. P. Yurchenko pointed out in the book "Egypt: Problems of National Security 1952-2002" that the involvement of the USSR in Egyptian affairs in the early 70s was of a deep and multilateral nature. However, it was military cooperation that caused problems for the Soviet side, constantly complicated Soviet-Egyptian relations, which led to Sadat's decision to terminate the Soviet military mission in Egypt in July 1972. The author concluded that the result of this decision was in favor of the USSR, since it provided the USSR with non-confrontation with the West when the 1973 war began ^{[12, pp. 64-65]}.

The research of many scientists helped to show the scale of Soviet aid to Egypt during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. M. I. Batraev, for example, noted in the article "Development of Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1950-1970" that Moscow provided military and economic assistance to Egypt, as well as organized an air bridge through which weapons and ammunition were delivered to Egypt and Syria, when they decided to start a war against Israel on October 6, 1973 (the Yom Kippur War). Although the USSR did not participate directly in the war, it transferred new military equipment to Egypt and repaired the already damaged one, provided modern air defense systems, and also concentrated a powerful group of warships in the Eastern Mediterranean, whose task was not only to protect the transfer of weapons, but also to create additional pressure on Israel ^{[13, p. 42]}.

When writing Egypt's policy towards the Soviet Union in the seventies, you should refer to the book "Egypt from Nasser to the October War: from the Ambassador's archive." In this book, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt, V. M. Vinogradov, documented how he lived in Egypt in order to provide an accurate and important documentary archive about this period. Regarding Soviet support for Egypt during the Yom Kippur War, the Ambassador noted that Sadat, after long discussions with Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, announced that his country was ready for a ceasefire if Israel adheres to Security Council resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967, which refers to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories ^{[14, pp. 58-59]}.

When the UN Security Council issued a new cease-fire resolution on October 23, 1973, Israeli forces in Sinai ignored it and surrounded one of the Egyptian armies. This forced the USSR to take unilateral steps and announce on October 24 that seven Soviet airborne divisions were on high alert. This was a signal to the United States and Israel that Moscow would not allow Egypt to be defeated, so Israel stopped military operations ^{[13, p. 42]}. We can conclude that the USSR, during Yom Kippur, once again provided the necessary diplomatic cover to Arab countries and supported them with military supplies.

On the other hand, the results of the study presented by I. O. Madatov showed that the USSR, despite the active support of Egypt during the October War, was unable to exert a decisive influence on the post-war course of events in the region in the interests of Arab countries. This was due to a number of circumstances. Firstly, because of Sadat's course, trusting relations with Egypt were lost. Secondly, there were no diplomatic relations with Israel. Thirdly, there were few contacts with representatives of conservative Arab regimes that did not have close relations in the USSR. However, to a decisive extent, the weakening of the USSR's position was associated with the confrontational struggle between the USSR and the United States on a global scale, which determined the roles of both superpowers in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was sidelined when the Sinai agreements between Israel and Egypt were concluded in 1974-1975 after the October war. The position of Israel, as well as the contradictions between the superpowers, did not allow the USSR to get closer to solving the main issue of the Middle East conflict ^{[9, p. 159]}.

As for the collapse of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, many books and studies have indicated that the Egyptian leadership focused its foreign policy on Washington, explaining that the United States "holds" 99% of the cards in the Middle East in its hands. And also the book "Problems of National Security" clearly showed that in the post-war period Egypt turned from a partner and the main pillar of the Soviet Union into a country hostile to the USSR. Sadat burned bridges between Cairo and Moscow in such an insulting form for the Soviet Union that they could not be restored. In 1975, after the signing of the agreement on the separation of troops in Sinai, the anti-Soviet campaign in Egypt sharply intensified ^{[12, p. 75]}.

On March 14, 1976, the deterioration of relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union reached a climax when Sadat announced in his speech to the Egyptian Parliament the unilateral cancellation of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship and Cooperation Agreement and gave the USSR one month to withdraw submarines and warships from the port of Alexandria and the Egyptian naval field. In 1977, Egyptian-Soviet relations became so complicated that Sadat announced the cessation of cotton supplies to the Soviet Union, and all Egyptian students and military personnel in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were recalled. He also announced in October of the same year that he was suspending payments of debts to the Soviet Union for several years. Relations between the two countries were frozen ^{[7, p. 125]}.

So, we can conclude that the volume of research by Orientalists on Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union has shown interest in the issue of Egypt's support in its wars against Israel. The texts clearly show the Soviet Union's support for Egypt in the war against Israel, both politically and militarily. The research also explained the circumstances and factors of some of the crises that occurred in relations between the two countries from different points of view.