Abstract: The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of attempts at ontological development of the problem of Nothingness, presented in philosophical systems Leibniz and Heidegger. The article shows that despite the fundamentally different premises and strategies of thinking, as well as the obvious opposition of styles of philosophizing - the clarity and validity of Leibniz's argumentation against the fluidity and hermeneutic "questioning" of Heidegger - in the course of philosophical searches for the ultimate foundations of Being, one can discover non-surface points of intersection in their reflections on the nature and status of negativity. The author examines in detail the methodological strategies of "thinking through" Nothingness and reveals similar intuitions in understanding the conceptual content and philosophical status of the category of Nothingness.
The novelty of the study lies in identifying specific points of intersection between Leibniz and Heidegger in the philosophical discourse on the nature of negativity. It is particularly emphasized that despite the difference in styles of philosophizing and considering Nothingness, we are dealing with the “non-present presence of Nothingness”, where the latter appears not as a negation or “deprivation”, but is filled with positive content. The similarity of the philosophizing of Leibniz and Heidegger was also manifested in their search for new terms in an attempt to reform the language of traditional metaphysics. It is shown that historical and philosophical schematism with its “-isms” and “-ologies” is not always productive, since it simplifies and obscures some aspects that are not obvious and important for understanding the ideas of a particular philosopher. By penetrating the history of metaphysics with various methods in search of an answer to the question “Does the non-existent exist?”, they thereby support and develop the historical tradition of metaphysics as “philosophia perennis,” treating it as an eternal present.

Abstract: The subject of the study is the institution of the ancient Indian dispute, the theoretical understanding of which has become part of the doctrines of all religious and philosophical schools. The “Shraman period” (5th century BC) is considered in detail, during which there was a sharp controversy between religious and philosophical schools, during which effective methods of conducting disputes “crystallized” and developed argumentative normativity.
It is shown that the pluralism and diversity of ontological models that existed in the spiritual culture of that time were reflected in the logical and epistemological doctrine - pramana-vada. Thus, in the first (pre-logical) period, epistemological and logical questions were raised within the framework of anvikshika, “the science of conducting public disputes,” and the widespread culture of philosophical disputes and their actual practice were completely determined by the original cultural context.
The argumentative canon of the Nyaya school is analyzed, the categories of the Indian and Western European traditions are compared, illustrating the discussion, in particular, of the Aristotelian syllogistic and the Nyayak five-term syllogism, the doctrine of the dispute between the ancient Chinese school of the late Mohists and ancient Chrya. The productive methodological ideas of the polemical strategy of conducting philosophical disputes in late Buddhism are revealed, the role of the dual unity of proof and refutation, as well as examples, questions and tricks, as topoi of the ancient Indian culture of dispute is shown.

Abstract: The subject of the study is the ideological heritage of ancient Chinese thinkers, one way or another related to the theoretical understanding of the practice of public debate. The process of institutionalization of the dispute in Ancient China is considered in detail, it is substantiated that its prerequisite was the existence of a specific argumentative discourse in the form of the so-called "beliefs" - teachings, edifying speeches of advisers to their rulers. Arguments against the occurring identification of "beliefs" with real public disputes that were widespread during the Zhangguo period - the "Rivalry of a Hundred Schools" are considered. It is shown that a number of ideas developed during this period will subsequently acquire a normative status and become the hallmark of the Chinese dispute. During the consideration of various types of disputes, techniques specific to the Chinese type of argumentation were identified: the method of associations, references to precedents, the use of the last word; the role of examples as the basis of inductive reasoning is shown. Based on the consideration of the Confucian concept of "correction of names" and the Mohist doctrine of the correct use of language, it is shown that the socio-political context and practical considerations played a decisive role in the theoretical understanding of the art of argumentation. The productive methodological ideas of the ancient Chinese "Dispute Program" are revealed. The role of analogy and examples as topoi of the ancient Indian dispute is shown. The theory of reasoning and the theory of dispute of the late Mohists are analyzed, the conclusion is substantiated that the principles of justification and persuasion, as well as the rules for conducting a dispute contained in them, are applied logic, the normativity of which allows us to consider it as the first theory of argumentation.