Abstract: The Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878 is the largest foreign policy event in the Russian history of the second half of the 19th century, as well as a significant event in the history of international relations. As a result of the war, the political map and the alignment of political forces in the southeastern part of Europe will change, therefore, the most diverse aspects of the war of 1877–1878 require careful research and rethinking. The subject of the study is the system of measures of preparation for military operations of the Russian–Turkish war of 1877–1878 within the local borders of the coast of the North-Western Caucasus. On the eve of the war, this space would include such administrative units of the Russian Empire as Temryuksky District of the Kuban Region and the Black Sea District, located to the south, which included three departments of guardianship: northern – Novorossiysk, average – Tuapse (Velyaminovsky) and southern – Sochi. The methodological basis of the research is based on the principles of historicism and objectivity, general scientific methods of analysis, comparison, generalization, concretization, etc. They made it possible to comprehensively study and systematize the material, identify historical facts, determine cause-and-effect relationships, and formulate conclusions. In the study, the author pays special attention to the placement of mobilized military units in the points of the Kuban Region and the Black Sea District, the organization of drill exercises and fire training exercises, and the appointment of those responsible for certain areas of defense. For the first time in historiography, the author considers the creation of the Anapa cordon line, designed to protect the north-western part of the coast, which ran from Anapa to Taman inclusive. The article provides data on the quantitative composition and combat capabilities of the Russian Black Sea and Turkish fleets, which could play a key role in the confrontation. The author also mentions the minefields installed in Tsemesskaya Bay after the outbreak of hostilities. The study also revealed the weakest area of defense – the Sochi department of the Black Sea District.

Abstract: The object of this research is the military actions on the Caucasus-Asia Minor Theatre of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. The subject is the participation of the steamship “Grand Duke Konstantin” under the command of Stepan Osipovich Makarov in the liberation of Abkhazia from Turkish occupation and aid to the Sochi detachment of Shelkovnikov Boris Martynovich in forced crossing the Gagra Gorge. The goal of this research lies in comprehensive examination of the actions of Makarov and his team during cruising at the east coast of the Black Sea, as well as in determination the role and importance of their participation in the military actions in the beginning of August 1877. The conclusion is made that successful actions of Makarov helped the Sochi detachment to avoid heavy losses in Gagra; and that damages inflicted on the Turkish warship “Asar-i Tevfik” during Makarov’s night attack suspended it from evacuation of the Turks from Sukhumi. The reconstruction of the results of torpedo attack and comparison of the tactical and technical characteristics of ships draw particular interest. The author concludes that the Turkish warship that attacked by Makarov at Gagra, was not “Asar-i Şevket”, as described in the pre-revolutionary, Soviet and modern Russian historiography.