The Soviet-American Trade Relations in the Interial Period of the Second World War, 1939 - 1941: from "Moral Embargo" to Lend-lease

Simonov Mihail Andreevich independent researcher 125047, Russia, Moscow, Tverskoy district, Miusskaya pl., 6 miha7032@gmail.com

A huge amount of Russian and foreign historiography is devoted to the problem of Soviet-American relations during the Second World War. Most of the authors' attention is drawn to the period of the Great Patriotic War ^{[2, 3, 25, 37, 48]}. However, the initial stage of the Second World War is extremely important for understanding the logic of subsequent events. In 1939-1941, Soviet-American diplomatic and economic relations went through a crisis to the point of a possible rupture, but awareness of the common threat allowed the future allies to overcome the confrontation, establish first trade and then allied relations, which led the world to salvation from the totalitarian regimes of the Axis. The study of this period is especially relevant from the perspective of building a constructive dialogue between the two great powers, which were in a state of hidden confrontation, but managed to maintain diplomatic relations and then join forces in a joint fight against the global threat. It is difficult to disagree with the opinion of one of the leading Russian American historians, V. I. Zhuravleva: "The history of relations between the two countries clearly demonstrates that Russians and Americans have a very rich common past, of which they can rightfully be proud, that periods of confrontation invariably gave way to periods of cooperation" ^[7]. This article is devoted to one of the most important periods in Soviet-American relations from the beginning of World War II to the entry of the USSR and the United States into the war and their transformation into allies in the Anti-Hitler coalition."

The purpose of the article is to identify the role of Soviet-American trade relations in the relations between the two countries in the early period of the Second World War. The present study is based on classical historical and narrative methods. The historical and systematic approach allows us to achieve the main goal of the work - to identify the role of Soviet-American trade relations in the relations between the two countries in 1939 – 1941. The historical and chronological method makes it possible to reveal the dynamism of Soviet-American relations in the early period of World War II, especially since the end of 1940. The historical and comparative method is necessary to compare the foreign policy courses of the future allies as a factor influencing the development of Soviet-American cooperation during the period under review.

The Western historiography of the initial stage of the Second World War went through several stages, each of which had its own peculiarities. In total, three stages can be distinguished, the first of which was the traditionalist approach laid down by W. Churchill ^[61]. In the 1940s and 1950s, most researchers who followed this trend mainly viewed the development of allied relations as a continuous path from distrust to unity. The second, so-called "revisionist" stage (the 1960s and 1970s), was marked by a revision of the optimistic picture of relations between the allies, as its supporters paid more attention to the contradictions in the relations between these powers. Prominent representatives of the revisionist approach are the American historians Ch. Byrd^[58], G. Barnes^[57], V. Chamberlain^[60]. A distinctive feature of this trend was the criticism of the American government on the issue of entry into World War II. Separately, their works considered the role of Lend-lease, which contributed to the formation of the communist "threat" and the Cold War [57: P. 159]. In the last decades of the XX century. Post-revisionism has gained popularity in historiography, aimed at rethinking the foreign policy of the powers at the beginning of the war, taking into account the multidimensional nature of relations in various fields, as well as Moscow's role in the Anti-Hitler Coalition. In general, at the present stage of the development of historiography, the economic aspects of cooperation between the great powers have begun to play an important role in research. Special attention should be paid to studies devoted to the change in the US foreign policy, in particular, the monograph by the American historian R. Dallek ^[62], devoted to the foreign policy activities of President Roosevelt in the context of the economic crisis and the isolationist-minded society of the United States. The author considered this course as the desire of the American leadership to get out of the "Great Depression", while simultaneously participating in the defeat of totalitarian regimes and building a new system of international relations. The monograph by Professor S. Casey of the London School of Economics ^[59] examines the interaction of public opinion and government policy, which the author wittily calls a "quiet crusade." The reaction of public opinion is an extremely important factor in US foreign policy, without which it is impossible to build a complete picture of American foreign policy on the eve of the war, as well as in the issue of Soviet-American cooperation.

Among the key Russian researchers of the modern period, it is necessary to single out M.N. Suprun ^{[48, 49, 50]}, who provides an assessment of the scale of lend-Lease supplies and formulates the concept of economic cooperation under Lend-Lease as a "cementing factor of the Anti-Hitler Coalition." The works of N.V. Butenina ^[1], V.N. and I.V. Krasnov ^[25], N.I. Ryzhkov ^[37] and I.V. Bystrova ^{[2, 3]} are devoted to the study of the problem of American supplies to the USSR. The NKVD documents are widely used in the works of I.V. Bystrova, which made it possible to reveal the dynamism and tension of negotiations between the Allies in the first year of the Great Patriotic War. Unfortunately, a small list of works is devoted to Soviet-American economic relations in the period preceding the USSR's entry into the war, among them an article by A.S. Stepanov on the problems of the Soviet aviation industry in connection with the introduction of the "moral embargo" by the Americans ^[45]. An interesting article by M.L. Galas, in which the author comes to the conclusion that active supplies to the USSR began only after a radical turning point on the Eastern Front: "Supplies to the USSR from the USA began actively only in 1943, when it became clear that the advantage of the Red Army was steadily increasing and the turning point in the Great Patriotic War had come. Lend-Lease orders of the USSR replenished military-strategic products, basic necessities, food, which were insufficiently produced in the country for objective reasons. Lend-lease was not of decisive strategic importance for defeating Hitlerism," in conclusion, the author provides data on the timing of payments to the USSR/Russia under lend-lease (until 2006), the sovereign policy of our country, as well as the dependence of other countries on the United States ^[5]. It is difficult to agree with these provisions. Unfortunately, the author did not provide data on the amount of payments. According to information provided by L.A. Muravyeva, by agreement of the parties, the debt of 2.6 billion dollars in 1972 was reduced to 722 million dollars ^[31]. With a total supply of more than $11 billion, it is quite difficult to call lend-lease a credit dependency, given the inflation over more than half a century. Returning to the volume and range of supplies, according to the data provided by M.N. Suprun ^[49], by April 1943 (only 2 months had passed after the Battle of Stalingrad, and about 3 months remained before the Battle of Kursk), a quarter of the fleet of active aviation units of the Red Army consisted of foreign equipment. This technique could not be delivered simultaneously, a significant part of it was delivered before the "fundamental fracture". In addition to military equipment, the most important part of the supplies were industrial equipment and raw materials, which already accounted for the majority of Soviet applications in 1941. According to the second protocol, in 1942-1943, equipment supplies increased 6–fold compared to the first (Moscow) protocol, and the Soviet leadership considered this part of the supply to be the most important nomenclature. At the height of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet side abandoned 6,000 American tanks in favor of industry and raw materials. According to representatives of the NKVT engineering department, the USSR's lag behind the allies in radio equipment and communications was estimated at a decade, but deliveries under the second protocol allowed the USSR to supply 150 divisions with radio stations and 329 with field telephones ^[49].

Thus, the debate about the role of allied supplies in defeating a common enemy continues in modern historiography. Most of the research is devoted to the later stages of the war. However, much less attention is paid to the study of Soviet-American relations in 1939 – 1941. It is quite problematic to build a full-fledged picture of allied relations without highlighting the issue of overcoming the crisis of relations in the first two years of the war. This article attempts to highlight this stage in the focus of economic relations.

Introduction

In 1939, the United States significantly reduced trade operations with Germany. According to the data provided by the economic department of the Ministry of Trade, in the first 9 months of 1939, American exports to the Reich halved: in 1939 it amounted to 51 million dollars, when in the same period in 1938 - 102 million dollars, imports decreased to 49 million dollars against 67 million dollars. accordingly. The trade turnover between the USA and the USSR was half as large, but it also decreased significantly. American exports to the USSR decreased by 48% in 1939 and amounted to $28.8 million against $55.4 million in 1938, while imports from the Soviet Union increased by 4% ($19.8 million against $19.1 million). respectively). The annual trade turnover between the USSR and the USA in 1939 decreased by 19% compared to 1938 ($56.6 million versus $69.6 million) ^{[32, 33]}.

In August 1939, the Soviet-American trade agreement was extended for a year, granting the Soviet side the right to unlimited trade benefits. However, according to a note by Envoy Umansky and Embassy adviser Gromyko, there had been an imbalance in Soviet-American trade relations for a number of years, imports from the United States exceeded exports by more than $40 million since 1937, and the Soviet side was also faced with the fact that some orders for American equipment were not implemented for reasons of military secrecy ^[36].

The introduction of the "Moral Embargo" in December 1939 did not lead to a reduction in all Soviet-American trade, on the contrary, in the first half of 1940, American exports to the USSR increased more than 2 times (42.1 million dollars versus 20.1 million dollars), imports from the USSR increased slightly. However, the United States has significantly reduced exports of strategically important raw materials (including aluminum necessary for the aviation industry) and machinery ^{[36, 45]}.

The forced rapprochement of the USSR with Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as well as the Friendship and Border Treaty of September 28, 1939, caused some concerns among the American administration, but the United States took a wait-and-see attitude towards the Polish campaign of the Red Army in September 1939, however, the Soviet-Finnish war was a turning point in the current confrontation between the two countries.. In addition, a trade agreement worth 500 million marks was signed between the USSR and Germany on August 19 ^[39].

In November 1939, the U.S. State Department informed the Soviet embassy of the creation of an army and Navy committee to coordinate foreign military orders with the needs of the United States in order to prevent the export of scarce raw materials needed by America. The Secretary of State requested information about Soviet orders placed but not yet completed, as well as planned purchases. The Embassy and Amtorg assessed the direction of American policy quite accurately: "The note, in our opinion, has a dual purpose: firstly, to really protect American resources from squandering in a situation of military excitement, and secondly, to influence entrepreneurs so that the Anglo-French grouping is given priority in terms of deadlines when fulfilling orders.". The head of Amtorg, K.I. Lukashev, and Ambassador K.A. Umansky believed that information should be provided only on completed or ongoing orders in order to avoid price increases. This proposal was approved by the NKID and the NKVT ^{[52, 51]}.

As early as 1939, the Roosevelt administration took a number of steps to help the Allies. Among the measures taken by the United States to support the allies are amendments to the law on Neutrality, which allowed Britain and France to carry out purchases on a "Pay-and-carry" basis. America's rapprochement with the Anglo-French alliance was also noted by the Soviet embassy ^[35].

The US administration's concerns about the re-export of strategically important raw materials to Germany also influenced trade relations between the two countries. They were based on the following facts. On February 11, 1940, a confidential Soviet-German protocol was concluded, according to which the USSR undertook to supply Germany with non-ferrous metals purchased by the Soviet Union in third countries. In total, the USSR pledged to supply 5,900 tons. copper, 535 tons of tin, 1309 tons of rubber, 7.5 tons of nickel (scrap). By January 1941, 2,000 tons had actually been delivered. copper and 240 tons . tin. In January 1941, German representatives twice requested that the missing raw materials be shipped. The Soviet side referred to objective circumstances regarding rubber, but the German side did not receive a response regarding the rest of the raw materials. People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A. Mikoyan recommended fulfilling obligations on metals before March 1941 ^[30].

According to the customs Administration of the NKVD of the USSR, the Soviet-American trade turnover in the first year of World War II changed as follows: the share of Soviet exports to the United States of total Soviet exports decreased from 14% in 1939 to 8% in 1940. The share of imports from the United States increased slightly from 30.8% to 31%, respectively. In 1939, the United States was the leading partner of Soviet foreign trade, but the failure of negotiations between the USSR and Britain and France in August 1939, the Soviet-German rapprochement in August-September 1939, and the deterioration of relations with the United States due to the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war in November 1939 led to the main trading partner By 1940, the USSR had become the Reich. The trade turnover between the USSR and Germany increased several times. In 1939, exports to Germany amounted to 10.1%, imports from the Reich – 5.7%, a year later these figures rose to 52.2% and 29%, respectively. In 1939, the trade turnover between the USSR and the USA amounted to 389.2 million rubles, while Soviet-German trade operations for the year amounted to only 118 million rubles (almost 3 times less), inferior to Soviet-British trade: Soviet-British trade turnover in 1939 amounted to 305.8 million rubles, the share of USSR exports to Great Britain It accounted for 21.9%, and imports - 17.4%. In 1940, the trade turnover between the USSR and the USA amounted to 561.7 million rubles against 1.1556 billion rubles of turnover between the USSR and Germany. Soviet-British trade decreased several times to 25.1 million rubles (exports decreased to 0.02%, and imports to 1.7%). In just a year, Germany became the main trading partner of the USSR, the volume of Soviet-German trade operations, according to Soviet customs, was almost 2 times higher than Soviet-American trade ^[44].

The moral embargo

On December 2, 1939, the F.D. Roosevelt Administration imposed an informal "Moral Embargo" on the USSR, which was of a "recommendatory nature." On December 20, the government banned the transfer of plant plans and production rights, prohibited the transfer of technical information necessary for the production of high-quality aviation gasoline to aggressor countries, manufacturers were informed that the aggressors meant the USSR and Japan ^{[103, 104]}.

Amtorg, referring to data from the US Department of Commerce, cited the following indicators of the USSR's share in American imports and exports. In 1939, Soviet purchases accounted for 1.8% of American exports, in 1940, even with the introduction of the "Moral Embargo", the share of the USSR increased to 2.2%. Imports from the USSR in 1939 amounted to 1.1%, but in 1940 decreased to 0.8% ^[15].

In the first half of 1940, according to the NKVT, Soviet imports from the United States were complicated by the following problems: the introduction of a mandatory 20% advance payment and an irrevocable letter of credit; when the contract was terminated at the request of the American government, 10% remained with the company, while the delivery time increased by 6 months. The NKVT raised the question of the expediency of transferring imports from the United States to Germany, but this step had a number of negative sides: firstly, the limitations of the Soviet-German loan agreement, secondly, the nomenclature of the economic agreement, and thirdly, the workload of German industry. By May 1940 The machine tool import has already transferred the order for 24 machines to Germany, which has led to the following consequences: the order completion time has increased by 2 times compared to the United States; prices have been set higher by 15-30%. According to the NKVT analytical report, the transfer of orders from the United States was only partially feasible, and for some items, such as the aviation industry and oil refining equipment, it was impossible. The situation was aggravated by the situation in the United States: American firms refused to accept new Soviet orders, the Soviet mission of the People's Commissariat of the Fuel Industry in 1939 failed to place orders for oil equipment due to the "Moral Embargo", the internship of Soviet specialists at American enterprises (for example, at Wright enterprises) was limited, Soviet services were refused to transfer already aviation equipment manufactured in the interests of the Techno-Import ^[43]. It was not only the USSR that faced the seizure of already purchased goods in the United States. In the fall of 1940, Sweden lost its fighters. On September 26, 1940, during a meeting with the British Procurement Commission, Morgenthau called Assistant Secretary of State A. Burley to resolve the problems with issuing licenses to the British. Morgenthau reported that at the end of August, a government meeting decided to revoke all Swedish licenses for the export of military materials from the United States, with the exception of cartridges.^[107] This decision was approved by the Deputy Secretary of State and the President. The American administration planned to transfer more than 30 Replica aircraft ordered by Sweden to Canada, but two weeks later these aircraft were in American workshops, ready for loading, but they were never transferred to the allies, as it was not possible to resolve property problems with Swedish representatives. On October 10, the United States passed a law on requisitions, and on October 21, the Secretary of State notified the Swedish ambassador of the requisition of 110 Swedish aircraft for defense purposes ^{[108, 81]}.

In connection with the economic cooperation between the USSR and Germany, some part of the Anglo-French establishment considered the possibility of severing diplomatic relations with the USSR, even declaring war on it. During a farewell dinner, the French ambassador to the USSR, P. Nagyard, told Steinhardt about his views on the role of Soviet-German cooperation.: "Germany gets all the advantages that can currently be obtained from a real military alliance, without the disadvantages that are associated with the fact that its ally is at war." The ambassador, who was in Moscow, repeatedly spoke to the French government for severing relations with the Soviet Union. According to the French ambassador, who was returning to his homeland, Great Britain and France should have declared war on the USSR, which he called nothing less than the "Achilles heel" of Germany, and without weakening which victory in a reasonable time would have been impossible. At the end of March, British Foreign Minister Halifax told American Ambassador Kennedy about the French side's plans to attack Soviet oil fields in Baku. However, at the Supreme Council of the Allies, the British side announced Soviet initiatives to normalize economic relations with Britain. According to the minister, at the end of March 1940, Maisky came to him with Stalin's proposal to consider the possibility of signing trade agreements. The British side agreed to consider options on the condition of guarantees to prevent the import of contraband into Germany. "I think Halifax believes that Russia does not want to be on Germany's side and the likelihood that they will be able to settle something is above zero," the American ambassador concluded" ^{[9, 95]}.

In May 1940, K. Umansky, in a conversation with the American Minister of Agriculture, G. Wallace, reported on the problem of chartering American ships, to which Wallace declared his unwillingness to risk American tonnage in connection with the USSR's suspicion of re-export to Germany: "If the British detain your steamships in the Pacific Ocean, it means they believe that you are carrying, with from their point of view, smuggling is for the Germans; under these conditions, we are not interested in risking our tonnage, which we do not have enough; settle the issue with the British and everything will be fine." The Minister asked about the content and volume of Soviet-German trade. Umansky, in turn, replied that a decrease in trade with the United States would lead to an increase in trade with the Reich. Wallace noted that, in order to help Britain, America promotes the development of Soviet-German trade. The ambassador replied that the minister's words were close to the truth ^[13].

With the start of the French campaign in May 1940, representatives of the French Foreign Ministry conveyed to the American ambassador the opinion of the British representatives that the Allies should have addressed the USSR with the following warning: Germany is seizing Europe so quickly that an attack on the USSR is imminent; it would be in the Soviet interest to reduce supplies to the Reich. ^[88]. The Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry and the Director of Political and Commercial Affairs asked Ambassador Bullitt if the American government could enter into negotiations with the Soviet government on reducing imports from the USSR and the United States to Germany. Bullitt considered the demarche undesirable, but requested consultations from the Secretary of State. In a reply telegram, Hall supported the ambassador's position on the undesirability of such a step. On May 22, French Prime Minister Reynaud sent former Aviation Minister Koh to Moscow in order to convince the Kremlin to reduce imports to Germany. On the same day, the prime minister asked Bullitt if the United States could supply the USSR with the necessary materials if the Soviet side made concessions on the German issue. ^{[89, 102]}.

On May 14, at a conference in the White House, Roosevelt instructed the Secretary of the Navy to requisition a large number of machine tools made for foreign customers. The amount of equipment requisitioned was about $3.5 million. In the future, it was planned to expand the requisitions to $21-22 million. Lathes for the production of ammunition and aircraft industry equipment were mainly subject to seizure. The USSR and Japan mostly fell under this designation. Representatives of the Ministry of the Navy offered to provide funds to companies both to cover foreign payments already made and to compensate for damages resulting from contract violations. Already on May 22, the Soviet side was faced with the requisition of equipment. The $95,267 worth of equipment accepted by the Machine Tool Import on May 20 was prohibited from export at the request of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In the first half of June, the Soviet ship Rodina was detained by American customs in New York Harbor. At the request of the American authorities, 1,286 tons out of 2,700 tons were unloaded from the ship. equipment ^{[65, 70]}.

June 12, 1940 Umansky met with Secretary of State Hall. The Secretary of State was concerned about the USSR's relations with Germany, in his opinion, this rapprochement led to attacks from public opinion on Soviet-American relations. The Soviet ambassador recalled the involvement of Western powers in disrupting collective security in Europe, and also stated discriminatory requisitioning measures against the USSR in the field of mechanical engineering and machine tool construction. Soviet orders were requisitioned in favor of the belligerent Britain and France. In response, Hall noted that a change in the vector of Soviet foreign policy towards the Allies could significantly improve and secure Soviet-American relations ^[54].

On July 2, 1940, according to the law on "accelerating and strengthening the national defense of the United States," the president imposed a ban on the unlicensed export of all types of military and related military materials, including equipment for their production. The ban formally applied to all countries, but there were no reports of a refusal to issue these licenses for the UK. The ban largely affected the import of machine tools to the USSR, which accounted for more than half of Soviet imports from the United States. By July 26, according to the Henderson memorandum, the export of machine tools of all types to the USSR was stopped ^{[70, 66]}.

In early June, the new British ambassador to Moscow, Cripps, informed the American envoy to Bulgaria, Earl, of progress in Soviet-British negotiations. According to Cripps, the USSR's relations with its allies have changed significantly over the past 2 weeks. The ambassador expressed real hope for a "constructive agreement" with the Soviet Union. "Russia has finally realized that the German war machine, in the event of the conquest of France and Great Britain, will not stop until Russia is defeated" ^[99]. On June 19, while watching a recording of Hitler's speech about Germany's "peaceful" proposals and the impossibility of driving a wedge between the Reich and the USSR, Cripps called the speech excellent, capable of attracting supporters even in the British government. Commenting on the role of the USSR, he stated that the Red Army could reach Berlin within 3 weeks, the Red Army's entry into the Baltic States showed how dangerous the Red Army was for Germany ^[96].

After Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were incorporated into the USSR, attempts were made by the Soviet side to transfer Baltic funds stored at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York to the account of the USSR State Bank, but the American government refused to issue licenses for these operations. The American side put the annexation of the Baltic states on a par with the occupation, arguing for similar actions by governments in relation to the accounts of the occupied countries. In a government memorandum handed to Lozovsky, Deputy People's Commissar of the NKID, on August 12, 1940, this step was stipulated as follows: "The attempt to transfer gold belonging to the Banks of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was made at a time when it became obvious that the governments and peoples of these countries were deprived of freedom of action by foreign troops who entered their territories by force. or with threats of force" ^[29]. On September 26, the American ambassador also announced that the Baltic banks owed about $29.5 million to the United States, and the "frozen" gold was collateral, and therefore the government could not allow its transfer to the USSR State Bank ^[10].

Despite the United States' non-recognition of the Baltic Republics joining the USSR, five meetings between Deputy Secretary of State S. Wallace and K. Umansky took place on the initiative of the American side from July 27 to August 15. During the negotiations, the export of equipment worth $7 million was allowed, but Soviet orders worth $3.7 million were banned. The American side expressed its readiness to make a written statement on the fair and friendly consideration of export licenses in the future in relation to the needs of the US defense. Restrictions on the Soviet side's use of American dry and oil tonnage were lifted. The United States expressed its readiness to lift the "moral embargo" on Soviet purchases of cracking equipment, promising to lift the ban on other items in the future ^[42]. According to the American ambassador, in the summer of 1940, the USSR was allowed to export 70% of the purchased equipment ^[10].

In September 1940, Cripps met with Stalin and a number of other high-ranking Soviet officials. The Ambassador informed his American counterpart Steinhardt about the contents of the meeting. Stalin declared the USSR's desire to avoid war, but the Soviet leader acknowledged that the only real threat at that time was the Reich. The Soviet leader also stated that even with the defeat of Great Britain, the USSR prefers to enter the war. However, trade negotiations with representatives of the NKID and NKVT were not so open. Mikoyan only offered to exchange Soviet flax for British rubber. Cripps' desire to reach a common trade agreement was met by the demand of Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky to return the Baltic gold and ships confiscated after the annexation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the USSR ^[90]. The UK could not return them, referring to the fulfillment of an urgent request from the American government. However, in a telegram dated September 25, Hall informed the ambassador that the State Department had not sent such requests to third countries. Perhaps the British ambassador was trying to enlist the support of the Americans in order to settle relations with the USSR ^[85].

In October 1940, during a meeting with Vyshinsky, Cripps put forward British proposals to the USSR: Great Britain pledged not to conclude peace without consulting the USSR, not to conclude any anti-Soviet agreements with third countries; to give certain guarantees of non-aggression against Baku and Batumi; to conclude a trade agreement on the supply of strategically important raw materials for the USSR (rubber, In response to a request from the American ambassador, Cripps assured that Britain would not require the USSR to ban re-exports to Germany in order to exclude suspicions of a rapprochement between the two countries, however, the adoption of the agreement as a whole would exclude the possibility of re-export. In response, the British side expected the following conditions to be met: respect for "genuine" neutrality; if Iran and Turkey entered the war against the Axis, "friendly" neutrality; continued support for China; and the signing of the Anglo-Soviet non-aggression pact at a favorable time. Vyshinsky asked if these proposals would be brought to the attention of the U.S. government (they were brought to the attention of the Deputy Secretary of State on October 18, 1940). On November 2, the first secretary of the British Embassy in the United States, Marris, handed over a memorandum outlining British policy to the Assistant to the European Department of the State Department, Henderson. Marris said that his government has concerns about American imports of oil and refining equipment to the USSR, which, according to the British, could lead to a strengthening of Germany in a continental confrontation with Great Britain in 2-3 years. Henderson had questions about Britain's controversial policy, as the provisions of the memorandum were at odds with the activities of the British ambassador in Moscow ^{[91, 71]}.

By December 16, 1940, the situation with the purchased machines was as follows:

Table No. 1 ^[72]

Export permits for machine tools for the USSR in December 1940

The cost of the 5 requisitioned machines was estimated at $851,354, while the cost of the 51 machines allowed for export was only $1.2 million, and, according to Soviet data, this was only 57% of the cost of the purchased equipment. The Soviet side also wanted to place new orders in the amount of $ 1.2 million, so Ambassador Umansky raised the question of the future US policy towards Soviet purchases. In addition, the problem of maintaining the "Moral Embargo" was raised, but the American side insisted on considering this problem after resolving the issue of machine tools. With regard to foreign policy aspects, the parties agreed on similar interests in the Far East, and both the United States and the USSR intended to continue to support China ^[71]. On December 20, a representative of the Ministry of the Navy, Colonel Maxwell, said that the $400,000 worth of equipment allowed for transfer could not be transferred, as it had already been installed in American factories and could not be dismantled. The colonel stated that he could not give a 100% guarantee for the export of equipment that had already been licensed. Soon, 8 out of 10 machines (totaling 64 thousand dollars) were requisitioned, despite the insignificant amount, this equipment was extremely important, since it was intended for the leading Soviet automobile plant in Gorky ^{[73, 78]}.

By the end of 1940, some of the issues had been resolved. The Soviet side gained access to American freight; Soviet engineers were allowed to visit aircraft factories, and American engineers were able to return to work in the USSR; permission was obtained to sell Soviet gold in the United States. However, the "moral embargo" has not been lifted. Soviet-American relations were also overshadowed by the fact that Baltic ships stationed in America were transported to countries that were not in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, all this happened without the knowledge of the Soviet side, with the approval of representatives of former governments ^[11]. The total licensing of American exports created serious difficulties for Soviet purchases (Table 2).

Table No. 2 ^[40]

Export licenses for the USSR from January 1940 to January 1941

Overcoming the crisis

By the end of January, the USSR had received permission to export $14.9 million, but $6.6 million was refused. By the beginning of 1941, some progress had been made: 2/3 of the Soviet applications had been approved. Finally, on January 21, 1941, the moral embargo against the USSR was lifted ^[109]. However, despite Welles' promises to facilitate the purchase of cracking plants, on February 10, the president established licenses for the export of refining equipment. In many ways, the licenses "replaced" the moral embargo, since almost all raw materials and equipment imported by the USSR were subject to licensing, which, in the opinion of the Soviet side, was a discriminatory measure against the Soviet Union, since at the same time the United States granted Canada a general license that did not require permanent approvals. Representatives of the NKVD expected a decrease in trade turnover between the USSR and the United States in 1941, citing the following arguments: government defense orders loaded American industry to capacity, the United States was infinitely increasing military supplies to England. On January 18, 1941, People's Commissar of the NKVD Mikoyan told the American ambassador that only 42% of the paid machines had arrived in the USSR ^{[40, 92]}.

In a letter to Umansky, Wells characterized the lifting of the embargo as follows: "All articles subject to the moral embargo are now subject to export licensing, so this measure did not weaken export controls to the Soviet Union. Since American industry and raw materials are almost entirely devoted to the implementation of the national defense program, it is unlikely that the lifting of the moral embargo will have any noticeable impact, at least in the near future, on American exports to the Soviet Union" ^[86].

After lengthy negotiations between Umansky and Welles, on March 1, 1941, the Soviet ambassador, on behalf of his government, declared that goods purchased and purchased by the Soviet Union in the United States, including petroleum products and industrial equipment, were intended only for the internal needs of the USSR. In the winter and spring of 1941, Amtorg negotiated with the Presidential Committee on Relations on the construction of three cracking plants in the USSR, but was refused by the Deputy chairman of the committee, Yang, who referred to the prohibition of the Ministry of the Navy. Welles attributed the difficulties to the needs of the Lend-Lease program, as well as concerns that the supplied equipment could indirectly compensate for Soviet exports to Germany ^{[83, 74]}.

In June, the State Department took a rather harsh political and diplomatic position towards the USSR. According to this policy, the United States adhered to the following principles: refusal to negotiate with the Soviet government, relations based only on the principle of "reciprocity", refusal to make concessions. Due to the state of emergency in the United States imposed on May 27, on June 14, 1941, a presidential decree was issued on the immediate freezing of all German and Italian assets in the United States, as well as assets of all invaded or occupied European countries that had not previously been frozen, the decree was also extended to the rest of continental Europe. However, the State Department was supposed to issue licenses to neutral countries, including the USSR, which would allow lifting the freeze. All transactions with Soviet accounts from June 16 to June 19 were carried out using these licenses, which were issued by American banks under the condition of purely commercial use ^[101]. From June 19, these licenses were to be issued to all neutral countries, provided that they were not used in the interests of Germany and Italy. When making transactions in excess of $25,000, it was necessary to notify the bank 24 hours in advance ^[105]. On June 16, these conditions were transmitted to the Soviet Embassy ^{[106, 97]}.

On June 14, Welles briefed the British Ambassador to the United States on the American position towards the USSR. Soon Halifax received an urgent message from London. After the negotiations between Eden and Maisky, the British government became optimistic about the USSR, in connection with which Eden requested, through Ambassador Halifax, the US position on possible American military assistance to Russia in the event of German aggression. Regarding his position on the Baltic countries, Halifax replied that Eden was rather cynical about them: "The Baltic peoples are not peoples who require special respect or attention, and in the current situation of Great Britain, which is focused on achieving the sole goal of defeating Hitler, he can imagine a development in which the British government, seeking to establish close ties with the United Kingdom, He will want to establish military relations with the Soviet Union and take some steps towards recognizing the USSR's claims to the Baltic States and the Baltic peoples," the ambassador said. When asked by Welles if this was a violation of moral principles, Halifax replied that the Baltic countries had been under Russian rule for more than 100 years. This position was not approved by Wallace ^[76].

On June 21, 1941, the European Department of the State Department prepared a memorandum on U.S. policy in the event of war between the USSR and Germany. According to it, assistance was to be provided only after the Soviet Union's appeal, in case of appeal, it was supposed to ease export restrictions, defending the interests of American and British defense; provide assistance directly, without resorting to mediation by third countries; renounce any promises and obligations regarding assistance to the USSR. According to the State Department, the Soviet Union's struggle with Germany did not mean that it was defending, defending, or adhering to the principles of international relations that the United States adhered to. Thus, representatives of the foreign ministry took a rather wait-and-see attitude towards our country, but the mood in the department itself was not uniform, as further events will show ^[79].

The path to Lend-lease

The German attack on the USSR had a fundamental impact on Soviet-American relations. On June 22, Soviet Ambassador Umansky telegraphed to Moscow about pro-Soviet sentiments in the United States: the absolute majority of representatives of American society were on the side of the USSR and only a minority opposed to the administration (a group of Republicans and a small part of Democrats) were "anti-Soviet" ^[16]. According to Gallup polls conducted from June 26 to July 26, 1941, 72% of American respondents supported the USSR ^[98]. On June 23, the Deputy Secretary of State spoke at a press conference. Stating his negative attitude towards communism, he confirmed the desire of the United States to support any force fighting against the Axis bloc: "Any consolidation of forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these forces may arise, will accelerate the final fall of the current German leaders and, consequently, will benefit the security of the United States" ^[87]. On June 24, the Soviet Union, at the request of the State Department, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance of the United States, approved a general license under which the USSR was able to purchase in the United States, and $ 40 million in Soviet accounts were also unfrozen. On the same day, at a press conference, the president confirmed Wallace's words, but declared Britain's priority right to military supplies. According to the president, the purchase of military materials required their coordination with Britain ^{[82, 84]}.

At a meeting with Umansky on June 26, Wallace declared the president's unwillingness to declare neutrality towards the USSR. According to Roosevelt, a ban on American ships visiting Soviet ports in the event of the signing of a proclamation of neutrality would not meet the interests of U.S. defense. The Deputy Secretary of State noted that it is better to leave the difficulties in Soviet-American relations that developed on the eve of the USSR's entry into the war in the past. Wallace recalled the American warnings to the USSR about the aggressive intentions of Germany, given to the Soviet ambassador back in March 1941. At the end of June, the proposal of Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Charles Curtis was approved, according to which the Soviet embassy and the Amtorg were to submit their requests in the form of exhaustive lists through a single organization, and not through disparate American departments, as it happened before. On June 27, Wallace asked Umansky (A. Gromyko was also present at the meeting) that the Soviet representatives should address him directly or to Curtis, who headed the committee he proposed. Following the meeting, the Soviet and American sides agreed that Umansky would provide Wallace with Soviet requests, which were transmitted to the president ^{[68, 75]}.

On June 29, the head of the NKID, Molotov, sent Umansky a list of 9 Soviet requests.: 1) 3 thousand fighters; 2) 3 thousand bombers; 3) equipment for car factories worth $ 30 million; 4) 20 thousand anti-aircraft guns with BC; 5) cracking plants and other equipment for the production of high-octane fuel; 6) 50 thousand toluene; 7) equipment for its production; 8) equipment for a tire factory; 9) equipment for rolling light alloys. Moscow also requested a 5-year loan for the purchase of this item. On June 30, the requests were forwarded to Wallace. Responding to the American recommendation to clarify the list, the ambassador stated that the specification of Soviet orders was entrusted to Amtorg. In addition, the Soviet side requested permission to use Baltic merchant ships blocked in America. Wallace stated that he was ready to consider this issue from a practical point of view in the common interests of the USA and the USSR ^{[53, 17]}.

On July 10, 1941, the president, in an interview with the Soviet ambassador, pledged to ensure supplies on orders from the USSR. Urgent orders had to be delivered to the USSR before October 1, 1941. The president was convinced that the more equipment the Germans would be forced to use in the Russian campaign, the sooner Germany would be defeated. Roosevelt stressed that any supplies should be subject to consultations between the United States and Great Britain. On July 22, Moscow approved Roosevelt's proposal to create an allied supply committee. The Committee of Three was to include representatives of the USA, England and the USSR. Umansky was appointed as a representative of the USSR to the Committee of Three ^{[69, 20]}.

On July 27, the president instructed his special assistant Harry Hopkins to fly from London to Moscow. On July 28, Hopkins will travel to the capital of the USSR via Arkhangelsk. On July 30, the presidential aide met with I. V. Stalin. Hopkins requested urgent and lengthy demands from the USSR to the United States. The head of the Soviet Union requested the first category: 20,000 anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, more than a million rifles. The second category includes high-octane aviation gasoline and aluminum for aircraft construction. "Give us anti–aircraft guns and aluminum, and we can fight for 3-4 years," Stalin concluded. The chairman of the State Defense Committee also confirmed that 200 P-40 fighters have already been delivered to the USSR (140 from England and 60 from the USA). Hopkins assured the Soviet leadership of the president's determination to do everything possible to support the USSR ^[64].

Stalin told Hopkins that the United States would have to enter the war sooner or later, and that America's entry into the conflict would be a key factor in victory. Stalin sent a message to Roosevelt through Hopkins, in which he stated that he would welcome US troops under American command to any part of the Soviet front. Hopkins wrote in the memorandum: "Finally, he asked me to tell the president that although he is confident that the Russian army will be able to withstand the German army, the supply problem will become serious by next spring and that he needs our help."^[64] On August 1, 1941, Hopkins conveyed an extremely important message to the president through the American ambassador, informing him of the reliability of the Soviet front, the high morale of Soviet citizens, and the boundless determination to win. This message became crucial in the issue of ensuring supplies to the USSR ^[93].

August 2, 1941 Wallace notified Umansky of the allocation of unlimited licenses to the USSR for the purchase of defense materials: "The State Department also issues unlimited licenses allowing the export to the Soviet Union of a wide range of goods and materials necessary to strengthen the defense of the Soviet Union in accordance with the principles applied to the supply of similar goods and materials necessary for the same purposes to other countries resisting aggression." He announced the approval by the American government of a proposal to use American tonnage to deliver goods to the USSR ^[55].

On August 6, the British Embassy in Moscow also provided the NKVT with a memorandum of its government's readiness to provide its merchant ships for transporting Soviet goods to the Persian Gulf and to the United States for further shipment of these goods to the USSR. In return, Great Britain requested permission to charter free tonnage of ships bound for the USA, Australia, and Malaya ^[28]. On August 9, People's Commissar of Finance Zverev informed Mikoyan about the allocation of 10 tons of gold to the USSR State Bank for storage in Arkhangelsk in case it was exported abroad. On August 16, Umansky informed Moscow that he had reached an agreement with Morgenthau on the allocation of a short-term interest-free loan of $10 million to secure the shipped Soviet gold (the United States bought 301 troy ounces from the USSR) ^[8]. This amount was credited to the Amtorg account the next day. The issuance of the loan by the Ministry of Finance was forced due to the slowness of the RFK ^[21].

On August 22, the State Department granted Amtrak unlimited licenses to export important goods from the United States to the USSR, such as aviation fuel, ethyl liquid, a number of petroleum products, electrodes, cars, radio components, electric motors, dynamite, and some other explosives. According to the NKID, this was not enough, and the issuance of the first license took place without taking into account the project proposed by the Soviet side. Negotiations on this issue continued ^[20].

There were also bureaucratic problems in the implementation of Soviet purchases. On August 30, a representative of the Air Corps of the eastern district of Frank called the Amtorg office. He said that there were three aviation corps in the United States that certified priority certificates. American firms were required to provide these certificates to the aviation corps before accepting orders, when this was not required from the British procurement Mission, since its name already indicated "government affiliation" ^[41]. Amtorg, on the other hand, was an American organization, so it required a letter of authority from the Soviet Embassy. In a memorandum dated September 9, the Soviet Embassy confirmed the status of Amtorg as a Soviet commercial agency ^[67].

By the end of August 1941, Amtorg was allowed to purchase about $100 million, and negotiations were underway to issue permits for another $70 million. The total value of the Soviet applications amounted to $ 1.5 billion. The RFK was ready to allocate only minor loans worth about $ 50 million. According to Jones, the issue of extending Lend-lease to the USSR would have caused a negative political reaction beneficial to Germany. The head of the RFK suggested that Umansky request small loans secured by Soviet raw materials. The only option, according to the ambassador, was to accept Jones' proposal. The funds received should have been allocated to Amtorg, informing the press that this was just a normal commercial transaction ^[23]. September 12, 1941 Umansky signed a loan and procurement agreement with RFK in the amount of $50 million. "The Defense Supply Corporation agrees to buy from Amtorg, and Amtorg agrees to sell it manganese, chromium ore, asbestos, platinum and other goods and materials that the United States needs or that are usually imported by the United States from the USSR, in the amount of approximately $ 100 million with delivery to US ports. <...> The Defense Corporation, in order to secure these scarce defense goods, advances the amount of $ 50 million to Amtrak in amounts of 5 million each, as needed, to pay for the goods it purchases in the United States" ^[22].

On September 5, Churchill stated in a message to Stalin that it would be better for the Allies if the assistance provided to the Soviet Union were based not on "purchase and sale", but on the platform of partnership on which American lend–Lease aid was based, i.e. without financial calculation ^[56]. In a reply letter dated September 13, Stalin expressed gratitude for the Prime Minister's initiative to provide aluminum, aircraft, and tanks to the USSR free of charge. Stalin suggested considering the possibility of transferring the British expeditionary force in 25-30 divisions to Arkhangelsk or to the south of the USSR, following the example of the French 1940 campaign ^[26]. On September 21, Churchill notified Stalin that of the allied supplies for the USSR, drawn up for 9 months under the first Moscow Protocol (from October 1941 to July 1942), most of the monthly quotas (until June 1942) consisted of British products or materials produced by American industry for Britain (as purchased by Britain at their own expense, and delivered under lend-lease). He stated that Britain's main task was to hold the seas, and noted that the British army could not compare with the continental ones, but assured that Britain would do everything possible for the common cause on the southern borders. The Prime Minister harbored hopes for the United States to enter the war soon, which, in his opinion, would ensure a confident victory over the Axis countries ^[27].

On September 26, Hopkins informed Gromyko that it was impossible to say definitively whether the USSR would be included in the Lend-Lease program. In September 1941, there was a struggle in the House of Representatives on the issue of additional appropriations for the program. The isolationist bloc was opposed to the inclusion of the USSR in the aid program. Stettinius notified the Soviet diplomat of the Administration's intention not to constrain itself in choosing means of assistance, but in September it adhered to the concept of support beyond lend-Lease ^[18]. The Moscow Conference was held on September 29 – October 1, 1941. The American delegation was led by Roosevelt's representative for supplies to England and the USSR, A. Harriman, and the British delegation was led by W. Beaverbrook (Minister of Supply and Industry). According to the first Moscow Protocol of October 1, the Allies pledged to supply the following materials (see the fragment of the protocol in Table No. 3). A list was also signed for Soviet supplies to Great Britain, mainly of raw materials (timber, coal, etc.).

Table No. 3 ^[38].

The first (Moscow) Protocol of October 1, 1941

November 7, 1941 The President sent a congratulatory telegram in honor of the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution to Mikhail Kalinin. Roosevelt announced the inclusion of the USSR in the Lend-Lease supply program ^[100]. However, there were still some problems in the interaction of the allies. For example, American Colonel Faymonovil, the USSR supply commissioner, faced bureaucratic obstacles in the issue of granting Soviet visas to his personnel. Representatives of American production and the army were selected, and their entry into the USSR was coordinated with the embassy in Washington and the authorities in Moscow, but at the end of October, the Soviet embassy refused to issue visas. Faymonovil enlisted the support of Deputy People's Commissar of the NKID Vyshinsky, who promised to settle the issue, but on November 13 he was again refused by the Soviet Embassy, referring to instructions from the center. He protested to the NKVD representative: "Maybe the Soviet experts are the best in the world, but they don't know and can't know American tanks and American planes, because American specialists know them. <...> I know well that broad sections of Americans, and not just the Government, want American weapons to be used as best they can, so that Americans have every right to say that their weapons beat the Germans. And the correct use of American weapons is possible only with the help of American specialists" ^[12].

The order of implementation of Allied supplies from the United States by the end of November – beginning of December 1941 was as follows. Amtorg (or the procurement commission) provided detailed specifications for each product (excluding weapons and ammunition) to the Department of General Spaulding (Burns' assistant), who sent them to the relevant ministers with an indication of the dates and quantity of goods, then the ministries set prices for the goods based on the specifications received and sent them through Spaulding to the procurement commission or Amtorg for signature, the purpose of which was to agree on the prices and purchases of these goods ^[19].

By the time the Lend-Lease program entered into, the USSR's obligations under the orders issued amounted to $44 million, and the total amount of all obligations was $ 133.9 million, most of them were orders for group I (machine tools, equipment and installations) ^[47], which is an order of magnitude less than the British ones. As of October 1, 1941, the amount of British orders placed in the United States amounted to 1.6 billion dollars, of which 237 million were capital investments in American infrastructure, orders for 11 thousand aircraft and 27 thousand engines were placed, the planned orders corresponded to those already placed ^[80].

According to Stettinius, by the end of 1941, only $173 million worth of military materials had been transferred to the Allies under the Lend-Lease program. Most of the military equipment supplied in 1941 was paid for in cash. The military equipment ordered under lend-lease in the first year proved to be significant only in 1943. Most of the $7 billion allocated to the program in March had been spent by December 1941. The total amount of lend-lease contracts by the end of the year was $5.5 billion. Lend-Lease, first of all, helped the American economy to embark on a war footing ^[46].

Conclusion

Thus, during the period 1939 – 1941, Soviet-American relations went through a difficult path. In 1939-1940, the United States gave way to the USSR's main trading partner. The political crises in Eastern Europe, as well as the economic rapprochement of the USSR with Germany, led to a sharp deterioration in relations with the United States. The trade turnover with the United States was unbalanced, Soviet imports exceeded exports to this country several times (in 1939-1940 by 3-4 times), which forced the USSR to export gold. The crisis in trade relations had a negative impact on the oil refining and aviation industries, since, according to representatives of the NKVT, Germany was unable to replace American supplies either in price or in nomenclature, and Soviet exports to Germany caused concern among both the UK and the USA. The introduction of the "moral embargo" in December 1939 led to significant problems in the procurement of strategic raw materials and equipment. Despite the lifting of the "embargo" in January 1941, the NKVT and Amtorg faced serious restrictions, such as total licensing of American exports, as well as a system of priorities introduced by the American government in 1940 - 1941 in order to support Allied defense orders.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, representatives of the State Department took a rather harsh position towards the USSR. It can be assumed that the British Foreign Ministry was more positive towards the future ally than their American counterparts. Despite the foreign policy contradictions, in 1940 the two countries managed to extend the trade agreement, as well as to refrain from severing trade and diplomatic relations. In the winter of 1940 - 1941, the issue of the purchased machines was partially resolved. Amtorg agreed to sell some of the equipment to American companies, and licenses were obtained for most of them, but even when they were obtained, the Soviet side faced requisitions from the American government. Despite the licenses obtained, Mikoyan informed the American ambassador that only 42% of the purchased equipment had been delivered to the USSR by March 1941. From 1940 to 1941, disputes over the property of the Baltic states did not stop. Not a single meeting between Umansky and representatives of the State Department was complete without discussing the problems of the US confiscation of Baltic ships and accounts claimed by the USSR. The balanced position of the two sides made it possible to resolve the issue of the moral embargo and partly machine tools due to the fact that the Baltic issue was moved beyond the scope of pressing topics of negotiations.

In mid-June 1941, Soviet accounts, as well as those of other continental European states, were frozen, but they were unfrozen from the moment the USSR entered the war. Despite the wait-and-see attitude of the European department of the State Department, expressed in a memorandum dated June 21, on June 23, the Deputy Secretary of State issued an appeal for support from the USSR in the war with Germany even before the Soviet Union asked for help. On September 12, Umansky signed an agreement with RFK for a loan of $50 million. On September 29 – October 1, 1941, during the Moscow Conference, the American side, together with Great Britain, signed the first protocol on supplies to the USSR, according to which it pledged to supply military equipment, medicines and raw materials. In September, Churchill proposed considering the possibility of loan-lease supplies to the Soviet Union. On November 2, Roosevelt managed to secure an interest-free loan for the purchase of $1 billion for the USSR, and on November 7, the USSR was included in the lend-Lease program. Soviet orders in the United States reached $ 130 million, which was an order of magnitude less than British purchases, but 60% of Soviet purchases were machine tools, which was extremely important for increasing evacuated production. Lend-lease in 1941 had not yet played a decisive role not only for the USSR, but also for Great Britain. In 1941, under this program with a budget of $ 7 billion, goods worth only $ 173 million were delivered to the Allies, which was a rather insignificant amount compared to British orders placed by October 1941 in the amount of 1.6 billion. Nevertheless, the main result of this period was the overcoming of mutual claims by the Allies and the building of an economic infrastructure already in 1941. The first Dervish convoy arrived at the port of Arkhangelsk on August 31 with aircraft and ammunition for cash payments and Soviet gold, but in a few months the allied PQ convoys with cargoes of the first Moscow Protocol and then Lend-Lease will arrive along this route. In the face of a common threat, the great Powers managed to overcome ideological, political, and economic contradictions, so the experience of the initial period of World War II is seen as the most promising and interesting area for future research.

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