Historical disputes in the dynamics of Japan-Korea relations and the transformation of the security architecture in Northeast Asia amid the competition between the United States and China

Kolesnikova Alexandra Valer'evna ORCID: 0000-0003-1157-8150 Postgraduate student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 10 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Obruchevsky district, Moscow, 117198, Russia alexakolesnikova@mail.ru Other publications by this author

1.Introduction

In the context of the transformation of the modern system of international relations and the increasing fragmentation of the global security architecture, the analysis of regional subsystems within which the interests of the leading world and regional powers are intertwined is of particular importance. In this context, Northeast Asia is one of the most strategically significant regions, where military and political dynamics are determined not only by current security threats, but also by the sustained impact of historical heritage on foreign policy decision-making processes. Historical contradictions in East Asia continue to maintain a high level of politicization and have a direct impact on the nature of interstate cooperation, including in the field of security and military-political cooperation.

This issue is becoming particularly relevant in the context of the accelerating transformation of Japanese security policy and the expansion of Japan's military and political activity outside the national territory. In May 2026, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces conducted a test launch of an anti-ship missile abroad for the first time since the end of World War II as part of joint exercises with the United States, the Philippines and Australia in the northern Philippines, near the South China Sea. This episode was accompanied by sharp criticism from China, which regarded Tokyo's actions as a manifestation of increased regional militarization and an element of the US-centric deterrence system of the PRC. At the same time, the expansion of the Japanese military presence and deepening coordination with US allies have intensified discussions in the Republic of Korea regarding the consequences of Japanese remilitarization for the regional balance of power and the prospects for Japanese-Korean security cooperation. As a result, issues of historical memory and perception of Japanese military activity are once again of direct importance for the functioning of the East Asian security architecture.

The most illustrative example of such a relationship is the relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, which, despite the existence of an objective mutual interest in coordinating security efforts, are characterized by a steady cycle of crises and a limited degree of institutionalization of cooperation. Both countries have significant economic and technological potential, are part of the orbit of the United States' allied obligations and face common threats. At the same time, their bilateral relations remain subject to regular aggravations due to the intensification of the historical and political agenda, including issues of forced labor, the problem of "comfort women", the territorial dispute over the Dokdo Islands./Takeshima, as well as symbolic aspects of memory politics related to interpreting history and visiting Yasukuni Shrine. As research in the field of memory politics and international relations shows, such conflicts have a high degree of stability and are reproduced depending on the domestic political situation and electoral logic ^{[1; 2]}.

Under these conditions, unresolved historical contradictions dating back to the period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea in 1910-1945 continue to play not only a symbolic but also a functional role, affecting the parameters of military-political interaction and limiting the depth of bilateral cooperation. Their influence is manifested in the difficulty of concluding and implementing security agreements, reducing the level of trust between the parties, as well as in the periodic review of agreements already reached. Thus, the historical heritage is transformed into one of the factors hindering the formation of a sustainable regional security architecture.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of historical disputes on the modern military-political interaction between the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as to identify mechanisms for the use of memory policy by external actors in the context of the transformation of the regional security architecture of East Asia. Special attention is paid to the functioning of the General Agreement on the Exchange of Military Information (GSOMIA) as an illustrative example of the clash of security imperatives with the demands of historical justice. At the same time, the role of the United States as a mediator and coordinator of trilateral cooperation, China's strategy of instrumentalizing historical narratives in order to limit the American system of alliances, as well as the impact of Japan's remilitarization processes on the perception of the regional balance of power by East Asian states are being explored. An important place in the study is occupied by the analysis of the reaction of the Republic of Korea and China to the expansion of Japan's military and political activity, including the participation of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in multilateral exercises and the development of offensive military capabilities outside the national territory.

2. The degree of development of the topic

The degree of study of the topic is characterized by the presence of extensive literature devoted to certain aspects of Japanese-Korean relations, including issues of historical memory, strategic culture, and foreign policy behavior of East Asian states. A significant contribution to the development of the theoretical foundations of the study was made by the works of T. W. Berger ^[3], which analyzes the influence of strategic culture on the foreign policy of states, the research of D. Lind ^[4], devoted to the role of apologies and historical responsibility in international politics, as well as the works of A. Dudden ^[5], considering the institutional and discursive aspects of historical disputes in East Asia. South Korean researchers Park Chul-hee ^[6] and Kim Min-seok^[7] made a significant contribution to the analysis of the domestic political mechanisms of memory policy reproduction, focusing on the role of electoral logic and party competition.

In the Russian scientific tradition, the problems of Korean-Japanese relations and historical disputes are considered in the framework of studies of international relations in East Asia, regional security and the politics of memory. A significant contribution to the development of these issues was made by the works of A. N. Panov ^[8], devoted to Japan's foreign policy and its place in the regional security system, A. D. Bogaturov ^[9], analyzing the transformation of the world political system and regional subsystems, as well as V. B. Kashin ^[10], considering the military-political dynamics of East Asia.. A separate area of research is devoted to the politics of memory and its impact on international relations, in particular the work of A. P. Tsygankov ^[11], which addresses issues of identity and foreign policy behavior of states.

At the same time, Russian literature tends to focus either on general issues of regional security or on the bilateral aspects of historical disputes, while their impact on specific institutional mechanisms of military-political interaction remains poorly understood. Consequently, despite a significant amount of both foreign and Russian research, a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between historical disputes and the functioning of modern security architecture in the context of increasing geopolitical competition between great powers remains an insufficiently developed area, which determines the research niche of this work.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in considering the General Agreement on the Exchange of Military Information (GSOMIA) not as an exclusively technical mechanism of interaction, but as an institutional node in which the processes of an unfinished historical settlement between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the strategic competition of the great powers and the transformation of Japanese security policy intersect. The study considers historical disputes as a tool of foreign policy influence that affects the stability of the regional security architecture and the dynamics of interaction between US allies in East Asia. The novelty of the work is also determined by the inclusion in the analysis of modern processes of transformation of Japanese security policy and the reaction of the states of the region to the expansion of Japan's military and political activity in the Indo-Pacific region.

The methodological novelty of the work lies in the combination of tools of historical and political analysis, theory of international relations and approaches to the study of memory politics, which allows us to consider Korean-Japanese relations in a multidimensional analytical framework. The use of the problem-chronological method ensures the identification of stable patterns of reproduction of historical conflicts and their impact on institutional processes in the field of security. At the same time, the application of elements of the neorealist approach and the concept of complex interdependence makes it possible to explain the paradox of the coexistence of an objective need for cooperation and stable barriers to its deepening. The inclusion of the category of "securitization of memory" in the analysis makes it possible to interpret historical narratives as a factor moving from the symbolic plane to the sphere of practical security policy. As a result, the proposed methodological framework integrates previously disparate research approaches and allows for a new interpretation of the impact of historical disputes on the modern regional security architecture.

3. A retrospective of the historical disputes between Korea and Japan and their impact on Japanese-Korean security cooperation

The period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea in 1910-1945 formed a complex of historical and political contradictions that continue to have a systemic impact on bilateral relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan. Despite the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, historical disputes have not been definitively resolved and have maintained a high level of political sensitivity. The Treaty on the Foundations of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, signed on June 22, 1965, became a key element of the post-war restoration of bilateral cooperation and provided the legal basis for economic cooperation, including the provision of Japanese financial assistance to Seoul in the form of grants and loans. However, the agreement did not eliminate fundamental differences in the interpretation of the colonial period. Of particular importance was the legal ambiguity of the wording that the treaties between Japan and Korea concluded before August 22, 1910, are "no longer valid." The South Korean side interprets this provision as recognition of the original illegality of the annexation, while the Japanese position proceeds from the fact that the treaties remained legally binding until the formation of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Such ambivalence created the prerequisites for preserving differences in the historical and legal perception of the colonial past and the subsequent reproduction of conflicts of memory.

One of the most persistent sources of tension remains the territorial dispute over the Dokdo Islands, called Takeshima in Japan. A small archipelago with a total area of about 0.18 square kilometers, located in the Sea of Japan, has been under the de facto control of the Republic of Korea since 1954, but Japan continues to officially declare its territorial claims ^[12]. For Seoul, the Dokdo issue has not only territorial, but also symbolic significance, being perceived as a direct reflection of the historical experience of colonial subjugation. In South Korean political discourse, control of the islands is interpreted as a confirmation of national sovereignty and overcoming the consequences of Japanese domination. According to the Asan Institute for Political Studies, published in 2022, about 87% of citizens of the Republic of Korea consider Dokdo as an essential element of national sovereignty ^[13]. The political significance of this issue is also evident in its direct impact on the security sector. Thus, the visit of the President of the Republic of Korea Lee Myung-bak to the islands in August 2012 provoked a sharp deterioration in bilateral relations and led to the actual failure of the first attempt to sign the General Agreement on the Exchange of Military Information (GSOMIA), canceled less than an hour before the official ceremony ^[14]. This episode demonstrated that territorial and historical contradictions can directly block the development of mechanisms for military-political cooperation.

The problems of school history textbooks continue to play an essential role in the reproduction of historical conflicts. The issue of interpretation of the colonial period occupies a central place in the Korean-Japanese debate on the politics of memory and regularly causes diplomatic crises. The South Korean side systematically accuses Japan of seeking to minimize the scale of colonial repression, forced labor, and cultural assimilation of the Korean population ^[15]. The most acute reactions are caused by the activities of Japanese conservative organizations advocating a revision of the historical narrative. In 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Education approved a textbook prepared by the Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks, which contained revisionist interpretations of the events of the period of Japanese expansion ^[16]. In the Republic of Korea, this decision was perceived as an attempt to institutionally review the results of the colonial period and provoked an official protest from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The South Korean leadership sent a diplomatic note to Tokyo demanding a revision of the textbook's content, which indicated the perception of the neighboring state's educational policy as an element of bilateral relations and a factor of regional security. Such disputes demonstrate that competing historical narratives continue to serve as a tool for political mobilization and the formation of national identity ^[17].

A special place in the structure of historical contradictions is occupied by the problem of Japanese politicians visiting the Yasukuni Shinto shrine. The shrine, which honors the souls of fallen Japanese servicemen, including 14 Class A war criminals according to the classification of the Tokyo Tribunal, is associated in South Korean perception with the symbolic legitimization of Japanese militarism ^[18]. Each visit by high-ranking Japanese politicians to Yasukuni is accompanied by a sharp negative reaction from the Republic of Korea and often leads to the suspension of diplomatic contacts. The most revealing situation was after a visit to the sanctuary by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2013, which caused a sharp deterioration in bilateral dialogue and the actual cancellation of a number of planned summit meetings ^[19]. The South Korean side regarded the actions of the Japanese Prime Minister as a demonstration of the refusal to fully recognize historical responsibility for the crimes of the Second World War. An analysis of diplomatic dynamics shows a steady correlation between the intensification of symbolic memory politics and the deterioration of bilateral relations. Of the seven most serious crises in relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan in the period 2001-2020, most were directly related to issues of historical memory, including visits to Yasukuni, disputes over history textbooks, and statements by Japanese politicians about the colonial period ^[20].

The issue of former "comfort women" remains the most sensitive and politically significant aspect of historical disputes. According to various estimates by researchers, the system of military sexual slavery organized by the Japanese army during World War II involved from 50 to 200 thousand women, a significant part of whom originated from the Korean Peninsula ^[21]. This issue occupies a central place in South Korean memory policy and continues to be seen as a symbol of the incompleteness of the historical settlement. An attempt at an institutional solution to the problem was the agreement of December 28, 2015, in which Japan pledged to allocate 1 billion yen to the victims' support fund, and the parties described the agreements reached as a "final and irreversible" solution to the issue ^[22]. However, the change of political leadership in the Republic of Korea and the coming to power of Moon Jae-in in 2017 led to a revision of the agreement. In 2018, the South Korean government announced the liquidation of the fund established under the 2015 agreements, arguing that there was a lack of public consensus and insufficient consideration of the victims' position. This precedent demonstrated the limitations of exclusively legal mechanisms for resolving historical conflicts in the absence of a consistent interpretation of the past at the level of public perception ^[23].

As for cooperation in the field of security, the impact of historical disputes on it is manifested in the formation of stable patterns of mutual distrust, which significantly limit the possibilities of deepening bilateral military-political cooperation. Historical memory continues to influence not only official rhetoric, but also public opinion, creating internal political constraints for the development of cooperation in the defense sector. According to public opinion research, a significant part of the citizens of the Republic of Korea continue to perceive Japan as a potential source of threat and rival, despite the objective need for security coordination ^[24]. Historical conflicts thus continue to serve as a systemic constraint on the regional security architecture, preventing the formation of sustainable trust mechanisms between the Republic of Korea and Japan.

4. GSOMIA as a mechanism for the pragmatization of historical disputes between Korea and Japan and the limits of cooperation between countries in the field of security

The signing of the General Agreement on the Exchange of Military Information between Japan and the Republic of Korea (GSOMIA) on November 23, 2016 was the first attempt to institutionalize direct bilateral security cooperation between the two countries since the normalization of relations in 1965 ^[25]. The agreement provided for the creation of a legal framework for the rapid exchange of classified information, primarily related to the DPRK's nuclear missile activities, including satellite intelligence, radar surveillance, and monitoring of ballistic missile launches. Prior to the conclusion of GSOMIA, a significant part of the intelligence information was transmitted between Tokyo and Seoul indirectly — through American military and intelligence structures, which significantly reduced the efficiency of interaction and limited the possibilities of coordination in the context of growing instability on the Korean Peninsula ^[26].

The agreement was the result of a temporary convergence of the strategic interests of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States. During 2016, the DPRK conducted two nuclear tests and carried out a record number of missile launches, including tests of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which increased the perception of the threat in the region ^[27]. Against this background, the US presidential administration has stepped up efforts to form a more stable trilateral coordination mechanism between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul. For the American side, GSOMIA was not only a technical information exchange tool, but also an important element in building a regional deterrence system for the DPRK and China. An additional factor was the temporary decrease in tension in relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea after the conclusion of the 2015 agreement on the issue of "comfort women", which at that time was considered by the parties as an opportunity to partially normalize the political dialogue ^[28].

Despite the strategic importance of the agreement, its conclusion was accompanied from the very beginning by serious internal political contradictions, especially in the Republic of Korea. A significant part of South Korean society and opposition political forces perceived GSOMIA as a symbol of excessive rapprochement with the former colonial power without prior resolution of historical conflicts. Additional criticism was caused by the legal mechanism for the adoption of the agreement. Since GSOMIA was framed as an executive agreement, the document did not require ratification by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, which led to a discussion about the lack of democratic legitimacy of this decision ^[29]. The agreement has caused considerable public controversy in the Republic of Korea since its signing. In subsequent years, public opinion polls recorded a high level of critical attitude of South Korean society towards GSOMIA and the idea of deepening military-political cooperation with Japan ^[30]. Thus, already at the stage of institutionalization, GSOMIA faced limitations due to the high politicization of historical memory and the lack of a stable public consensus on the acceptable limits of cooperation with Japan.

The instability of the agreement was particularly pronounced during the crisis of 2019, which demonstrated the dependence of military-political interaction on the dynamics of historical disputes. The reason for the sharp deterioration of relations was the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea in October 2018, which ordered the Japanese companies Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to pay compensation to former Korean workers who were mobilized during the period of colonial rule ^[31]. The Japanese side regarded this decision as a violation of the 1965 agreements, according to which, according to Tokyo's position, all claims related to the colonial period were finally settled. In July 2019, Japan imposed export restrictions on the supply of three types of high-tech materials that are critically important for the South Korean semiconductor industry, including fluorinated polyimide, photoresists, and high-purity hydrogen fluoride ^[32]. The Republic of Korea interpreted these measures as politically motivated economic repression, directly related to judicial decisions on historical issues.

The further escalation of the conflict demonstrated the high degree of interconnectedness of historical, economic, and military-political spheres in Japanese-Korean relations. On August 22, 2019, the Government of the Republic of Korea announced a decision not to renew GSOMIA, arguing this step was a loss of confidence in Japan as a security partner ^[33]. The Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea, Chong Kyung-doo, directly linked the rejection of the agreement with Tokyo's actions in the trade and economic field, emphasizing the impossibility of a full-fledged exchange of intelligence information with a state demonstrating unfriendly behavior towards the South Korean economy. Thus, the crisis around GSOMIA has clearly demonstrated the effect of intersectoral conflict transfer, in which historical disputes turned into an economic confrontation, and then spread to the security sector. Such dynamics have shown the limitations of liberal institutionalism's assumptions about the ability of economic interdependence to automatically reduce the level of political conflict. On the contrary, the Japanese-Korean case shows that in conditions of high politicization of memory, historical issues can prevail over the rational economic and strategic interests of states ^[34].

The agreement was preserved only at the last moment, a few hours before its official termination as a result of intense diplomatic pressure from the United States ^[35]. The Republic of Korea has announced a "temporary suspension" of the decision to withdraw from GSOMIA, while reserving the right to review this decision at any time. Such a compromise format has actually fixed the state of permanent uncertainty around the future agreement. Although GSOMIA continued to operate formally, the level of trust between the parties decreased significantly, and the practical significance of the agreement turned out to be limited. Much of the information about North Korea's missile activity is still transmitted through American coordination channels, which indicates the continued role of the United States as a key mediator in Japanese-Korean security cooperation ^[36].

The structural limitations of GSOMIA are related not only to foreign policy factors, but also to the internal peculiarities of Japan's perception in South Korean society. Historical memory continues to form emotional and political constraints that hinder the full-fledged institutionalization of cooperation. According to a study by the Asan Institute in 2023, more than half of South Korean respondents recognized the need for GSOMIA to exist in the face of growing regional threats, but at the same time, the majority of respondents favored maintaining strict restrictions in relations with Japan ^[37]. Such a distribution of public sentiment reflects the existence of a persistent contradiction between a rational awareness of the need for cooperation and the preservation of a negative perception of Japan as a former colonial power. As a result, GSOMIA turned out to be not a full-fledged mechanism of strategic rapprochement, but rather a forced instrument of limited interaction, the effectiveness of which directly depends on the state of historical and political dialogue between the two states.

5. Historical disputes as a factor of influence of global powers on Japanese-Korean cooperation
5.1. The United States as a mediator of the Japanese-Korean security contradictions

Throughout the post-war period, the United States has been a key external actor, exerting a decisive influence on the dynamics of security relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The American-centric system of bilateral alliances in East Asia formed by Washington after the end of World War II assumed the absence of direct military and political obligations between the US allies and assigned Washington a central coordinating function ^[38]. Unlike the Euro-Atlantic model of collective security based on multilateral institutions, the American strategy in Northeast Asia initially focused on maintaining control over the regional security architecture through a network of separate bilateral alliances. As a result, the military-political interaction between Japan and the Republic of Korea has been developing for a long time mainly indirectly through American mechanisms for coordination and information exchange.

This configuration has led to the structural dependence of Japanese-Korean cooperation on Washington's mediation role. The lack of a full-fledged bilateral military-political alliance between Tokyo and Seoul, as well as a limited level of mutual trust, has led to the United States acting as an external guarantor of the minimal stability of relations between the two allies ^[39]. This dependence is especially pronounced in times of crisis, when it is American diplomacy that becomes the main mechanism for preventing further escalation. Thus, the regional security system in Northeast Asia largely retains an asymmetric character, in which the bilateral relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea are embedded in a broader strategic architecture being formed by the United States.

Washington's strategic interests in the region are determined by two interrelated tasks: curbing the DPRK's nuclear missile program and limiting the growing influence of the PRC ^[40]. In the American political and strategic discourse, coordination between Japan and the Republic of Korea is considered as a necessary condition for the realization of both goals. The strengthening of Pyongyang's missile potential, the development of North Korean nuclear technology, as well as the expansion of China's military presence in the East China and South China Seas have contributed to the gradual shift of the American approach from bilateral management of alliances to a more comprehensive trilateral model of interaction. This course was especially actively promoted by the administration of US President Barack Obama, who considered strengthening cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul as an important element of the strategy of "turning to Asia" ^[41].

The practical manifestation of this approach was the expansion of trilateral cooperation in the military sphere, including joint naval exercises, coordination of missile defense systems, and regular consultations at the level of defense and foreign ministers. The Trilateral Agreement on the Exchange of Intelligence Information (TISA), signed in December 2014, gained significant importance, which allowed for the exchange of data on North Korean missile activity through the mediation of the United States ^[42]. Later, it was this scheme that became the basis for the conclusion of GSOMIA in 2016. Already under the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden, the policy of institutionalizing trilateral cooperation has received additional development. Of particular importance in this context were the agreements reached during the Camp David summit in August 2023 with the participation of President of the Republic of Korea Yun Seok-young and Prime Minister of Japan Fumio Kishida ^[43]. Following the meeting, the parties announced the creation of mechanisms for regular trilateral consultations, expanding the exchange of intelligence information and deepening coordination in the field of missile defense. In fact, the Camp David summit was an attempt to partially institutionalize trilateral cooperation outside the framework of a formal military alliance.

At the same time, American mediation also demonstrates significant structural limitations. Despite the high level of US political and military-strategic influence on both allies, Washington does not have the ability to completely neutralize the impact of historical contradictions on bilateral relations. These limitations were most evident during the GSOMIA crisis in 2019. After the decision of the South Korean government to not extend the agreement, the US State Department publicly expressed "deep disappointment" with this step ^[44]. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell made an emergency visit to Seoul, but initially the South Korean leadership refused to reconsider the decision. It was only as a result of intense diplomatic pressure and the threat of a serious deterioration in relations with Washington that the Republic of Korea agreed to temporarily suspend its withdrawal from GSOMIA. This episode demonstrated that even in the context of asymmetric allied relations, the United States' ability to force allies to cooperate remains limited by internal political processes and public sentiment.

An additional factor of tension is the asymmetry of American relations with the two allies. In American strategy, Japan is traditionally considered as a key military and political partner of the United States in East Asia, which is manifested both in the scale of the American military presence and in the depth of the institutional integration of the two states ^[45]. According to the US Department of Defense, about 54 thousand American troops were stationed in Japan in 2023, while about 28.5 thousand were stationed in the Republic of Korea ^[46]. Such a disparity is often perceived in Seoul as evidence of the higher priority of the Japanese direction for Washington. South Korean political circles and public opinion periodically express concern that the United States avoids publicly criticizing Japan on the most sensitive issues of historical memory, including visits to the Yasukuni shrine and territorial disputes over Dokdo. As a result, the American policy of balancing between the two allies itself becomes an additional source of distrust in the framework of trilateral cooperation.

The mediation role of the United States simultaneously creates a kind of "moral hazard" effect, in which the dependence of the parties on American intervention reduces the incentives for the formation of stable independent mechanisms for resolving contradictions ^[47]. The realization that Washington will have to prevent a complete rupture of relations between the two allies in a critical situation allows both Tokyo and Seoul to take tougher positions on historical issues without risking the final destruction of the security system. This model helps to preserve the chronic instability of Japanese-Korean relations, in which crises are periodically mitigated by external mediation, but the fundamental causes of conflicts remain unresolved. As a result, American mediation simultaneously performs a stabilizing function and preserves the structural incompleteness of the bilateral settlement.

5.2. China's position and the instrumentalization of historical narratives in regional security policy

China occupies a special place in the dynamics of Japanese-Korean relations, consistently using historical issues as an instrument of foreign policy influence and the formation of a regional configuration favorable to Beijing. Unlike the United States, which focuses primarily on institutionalizing military-political cooperation between allies, China's strategy is largely based on using memory politics as a mechanism for diplomatic pressure and limiting the deepening of Japanese-Korean security cooperation. The historical legacy of Japanese imperialism is considered by Beijing not only as an element of the national historical narrative, but also as an important resource for foreign policy mobilization ^[48].

The central place in the Chinese approach is occupied by the concept of the common historical memory of China and Korea as states affected by Japanese expansion in the first half of the 20th century. The Nanjing massacre of 1937, colonial administration on the Korean Peninsula, the problem of forced labor, and the system of "comfort women" form the basis for building a discourse of collective victimization of Japanese militarism ^[49]. This strategy allows Beijing to position itself as Seoul's natural partner in countering Japanese historical revisionism. Chinese official and academic discourse emphasizes that attempts to revise history in Japan pose a threat not only to bilateral relations, but also to the stability of the entire regional security system. Consequently, the policy of memory acquires not only symbolic, but pronounced strategic importance for China.

The practical implementation of this line has been particularly evident in the joint activity of China and the Republic of Korea in international organizations. In 2014 Beijing and Seoul supported the initiative to include documents related to the issue of "comfort women" in the UNESCO Memory of the World Register ^[50]. Despite Japan's active opposition, accompanied by threats to reduce the organization's funding, the initiative received international support. This episode demonstrated China's desire to use multilateral institutions as a platform to increase diplomatic pressure on Tokyo and at the same time strengthen political cooperation with Seoul based on a common historical agenda. At the same time, Beijing actually contributed to the internationalization of historical disputes, taking them beyond the exclusively bilateral conflict between Japan and the Republic of Korea.

A symbolic manifestation of the potential of Sino-Korean rapprochement based on historical memory was the participation of President of the Republic of Korea Park Geun-hye in a military parade in Beijing on September 3, 2015, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and victory over Japan ^[51]. Special attention was paid to this episode in the United States and Japan, where Park Geun-hye's participation in the celebrations was perceived as a potential signal of the possibility of a partial foreign policy drift of the Republic of Korea towards China against the background of ongoing historical conflicts with Tokyo ^[52]. Although the South Korean leadership subsequently continued its policy of maintaining allied relations with Washington, this episode showed that historical issues can become a factor in Seoul's geopolitical maneuvering between the United States, China and Japan.

The economic factor also has a significant impact on the foreign policy calculations of the Republic of Korea. China remains Seoul's largest trading partner, which forms additional mechanisms for influencing South Korean security policy ^[53]. This dependence was particularly evident during the crisis over the deployment of the American THAAD missile defense system in 2016-2017. The Chinese leadership regarded the deployment of the complex as a threat to its own strategic interests and took large-scale measures of economic pressure on the Republic of Korea. One of the most noticeable instruments of influence was the actual restriction of group tourism to South Korea, as a result of which the tourist flow from China decreased by almost 48% during 2017 ^[54]. South Korean companies operating in the Chinese market also suffered significant losses. The situation around the Lotte Group Corporation, which provided the territory for THAAD, became the most significant: a significant part of the company's stores in China were closed under the pretext of violations of fire safety requirements ^[55]. Such actions demonstrated Beijing's willingness to use economic interdependence as a tool to influence Seoul's military and political decisions.

According to the Korea International Trade Association, China accounted for about 22.8% of South Korean exports in 2022, which significantly exceeded similar figures for the United States and Japan ^[56]. As a result, economic interdependence with China is becoming one of the factors limiting Seoul's willingness to deepen its participation in the anti-Chinese elements of the American regional strategy. A difficult strategic balance situation is emerging for the Republic of Korea, in which the need to maintain economic ties with China is combined with the need to maintain a military-political alliance with the United States and limited cooperation with Japan.

A similar ambivalence is evident in the Chinese approach to GSOMIA. Official representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China have repeatedly criticized the agreement, describing it as an element of "cold War thinking" and a tool to strengthen the American system of containment of China in East Asia ^[57]. At the same time, Beijing is objectively interested not so much in the complete destruction of the mechanisms of Japanese-Korean interaction, as in maintaining their limited and unstable nature. A complete break in cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul could lead to a further strengthening of the direct American military presence and a deepening of U.S. bilateral ties with each of the allies individually. In this context, the periodic crises around GSOMIA provide China with an opportunity to simultaneously demonstrate the vulnerability of the American alliance system and strengthen its own influence on the Republic of Korea through economic and diplomatic tools.

The internal policy of memory also plays an important role in the Chinese strategy. The formation of a stable anti-Japanese historical discourse is considered by the leadership of the PRC as a means of consolidating society and strengthening the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China ^[58]. The creation of the National Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre, the establishment of commemorative events dedicated to the victory over Japan, as well as the inclusion of relevant subjects in educational programs form a stable link between historical memory and modern issues of national security. At the same time, such a policy allows Beijing to use historical narratives as a tool of diplomatic pressure on Tokyo in the context of the territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the broader rivalry for leadership in East Asia. As a result, historical memory in Chinese foreign policy is transformed from an element of symbolic politics into a full-fledged instrument of strategic influence on the regional security architecture.

6. Historical disputes and prospects of Japanese-Korean cooperation in the context of the transformation of Japanese security policy

In the context of increasing US-Chinese rivalry and the continued politicization of historical disputes, the transformation of Japanese security policy is of particular importance for Japanese-Korean relations. The expansion of Japan's military and political activity is increasingly perceived by the States of the region not only through the prism of current strategic challenges, but also in the context of the historical memory of Japanese colonialism and militarism. Tokyo's gradual departure from the constraints of the post-war pacifist model, accompanied by the expansion of the country's military capabilities, institutional modernization of the Self-Defense Forces and increased coordination with the United States, actualizes fears in South Korean political and public discourse related to the possible revival of elements of Japanese militarism ^[59]. As a result, historical contradictions continue to have a direct impact on the perception of the transformation of Japanese security policy and create additional constraints for deepening Japanese-Korean cooperation in the field of security.

A key stage of the changes was the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution initiated by the Government of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July 2014, which allowed limited use of the right to collective self-defense ^[60]. Although the pacifist provisions of the Constitution were formally preserved, in fact it was a question of a significant expansion of the permissible scope of the use of Japanese military force. This step was accompanied by the adoption of new security legislation in 2015, which provided a legal basis for the participation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in a wider range of international operations and deepening cooperation with allies ^[61]. In Japanese official discourse, these transformations were explained by the need to adapt to the changed regional security environment, including the development of the DPRK's nuclear missile potential and the growth of China's military might.

An additional impetus for the transformation of the Japanese strategy was recorded in December 2022, when the Japanese government approved a new National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a Defense Capability Development Program ^[62]. The adopted documents consolidated the doctrinal transition to the concept of "counteroffensive capabilities", which presupposes the ability to strike at the military infrastructure of a potential enemy. In practical terms, this resulted in the decision to purchase American Tomahawk cruise missiles of the Block V modification with a range of about 1,600 km, as well as the development of its own hypersonic and high-precision strike systems ^[63]. Thus, for the first time since the end of World War II, Japan began to build a potential that goes beyond exclusively defensive tasks.

At the same time, there is a large-scale increase in Japanese military spending. The Japanese government has set a goal to bring defense spending to about 2% of GDP by 2027, which implies an almost twofold increase compared to the previous decade ^[64]. The implementation of these plans can significantly strengthen Japan's military and political positions in East Asia and turn it into one of the largest military actors in the region. The creation of the Joint Operational Command of the Self-Defense Forces, as well as the active strengthening of the military infrastructure on the Ryukyu Islands, indicate a transition from primarily symbolic modernization to a deep institutional transformation of the Japanese security system ^[65].

For the Republic of Korea, these processes pose a complex strategic dilemma. On the one hand, the growth of Japan's military potential objectively expands the possibilities of trilateral cooperation with the United States in the face of the increasing North Korean nuclear missile threat and growing Chinese influence ^[66]. On the other hand, the deepening of Japanese military activity inevitably faces a negative perception in South Korean society, where the memory of the colonial period continues to be an important element of national identity. According to South Korean opinion polls, support for cooperation with Japan in the field of security is combined with a steady distrust of the strengthening of Japanese military potential due to the continuing influence of historical memory ^[67]. Such assessments indicate the continued close relationship between historical memory and modern perceptions of Japanese security policy.

Seoul is particularly concerned about the prospect of Japan expanding its foreign policy and military activities beyond the immediate defense of its own territory. A significant resonance in South Korean political discourse was caused by Shinzo Abe's statements that "the emergency situation around Taiwan is an emergency situation for Japan" ^[68]. Such formulations were perceived as evidence of Tokyo's willingness to become more actively involved in a potential conflict over Taiwan in coordination with the United States. For the Republic of Korea, this scenario creates additional risks, since deepening cooperation within the framework of GSOMIA and trilateral cooperation could theoretically contribute to Seoul's involvement in crises not directly related to the Korean peninsula. According to international public opinion research, South Korean society demonstrates a high level of concern about the escalation around Taiwan and remains cautious about the prospect of involving the Republic of Korea in the US-Chinese confrontation ^[69]. This creates serious domestic political constraints for expanding military-political coordination with Japan as part of a broader American strategy to contain China.

An additional factor of tension remains the lack of full-fledged institutional mechanisms for consultations between Japan and the Republic of Korea on the transformation of Japanese defense policy. In contrast to the US-Japanese and US-Korean relations, which involve regular meetings of defense ministers, joint committees and stable channels of strategic planning, direct interaction between Tokyo and Seoul remains limited and fragmented ^[70]. Attempts to institutionalize permanent communication mechanisms have repeatedly encountered domestic political resistance in the Republic of Korea, where any form of expanded cooperation with Japan continues to be viewed through the prism of historical memory. As a result, even the presence of common threats does not lead to the formation of a stable system of bilateral strategic cooperation.

A certain potential for reducing the political sensitivity of direct Japanese-Korean interaction is associated with the further development of trilateral cooperation formats with the continued participation of the United States. The agreements reached at Camp David in 2023 created the basis for the gradual institutionalization of such mechanisms ^[71]. However, the sustainability of this model will directly depend on the domestic political dynamics in the Republic of Korea and Japan. The change of the political leadership in Seoul and the possible coming to power of forces oriented towards a tougher line on historical issues can once again lead to an aggravation of bilateral contradictions and a revision of the agreements reached. Thus, the prospects for Japanese-Korean cooperation continue to be determined not only by changes in the regional security environment, but also by unresolved fundamental issues of historical memory.

The practical implementation of the new Japanese security strategy was further confirmed in May 2026, when the Japanese Self-Defense Forces conducted a test launch of an anti-ship missile outside the national territory for the first time since the end of World War II as part of the Balikatan multilateral exercises in the Philippines with the participation of the United States and the Philippines ^[72]. During the exercises, Japanese units used the Type 88 missile system to destroy naval targets in the waters located in the immediate vicinity of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. The symbolic significance of this event significantly went beyond the technical aspect of the exercises. For the first time, the Japanese armed forces demonstrated the ability to deploy and use strike systems within the framework of the regional coalition security infrastructure outside Japan, which became an important indicator of the further transformation of Japanese military policy ^[73].

These steps have caused particular concern in China. Official representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China described the tests as a manifestation of "neo-militarism" and an element of the accelerating arms race in the Asia-Pacific region ^[74]. Chinese state media directly linked Japan's participation in the exercises to the formation of elements of an anti-Chinese deterrence system aimed at limiting China's capabilities in the South China Sea and the Taiwan area. Beijing was further alarmed by the geographical context of the exercises itself: the use of the northern regions of the Philippines and the waters between Taiwan and the South China Sea objectively strengthens the potential of US allies' control over strategically important maritime communications ^[75]. In Chinese expert discourse, these actions are increasingly seen as part of the process of Japan's gradual integration into the American system of "advanced deterrence" of China in the Indo-Pacific region.

The reaction of the Republic of Korea was much more restrained, but these events also caused concern in the South Korean political and expert community. The strengthening of Japan's offensive potential and the expansion of the area of use of the Japanese armed forces outside the national territory have intensified discussions about the risks of a gradual erosion of the post-war restrictions of Japanese military policy ^[76]. Seoul is particularly sensitive about the possibility of Japan's involvement in a potential conflict over Taiwan and the subsequent pressure on the Republic of Korea to coordinate actions within the framework of trilateral cooperation with the United States. For the South Korean side, the problem lies not only in the growth of Japan's military capabilities as such, but also in the lack of full-fledged mechanisms for bilateral consultations on the use of these capabilities in potential crisis scenarios.

In these circumstances, the prospects for GSOMIA and broader Japanese-Korean security cooperation will largely depend on the ability of the parties to develop mechanisms for managing contradictions between the requirements of strategic cooperation and ongoing historical conflicts. The most likely scenario in the medium term is the preservation of the agreement in a limited functional state ^[77]. Despite the interest of the United States in deepening trilateral cooperation, the ongoing disputes over historical memory and the growing concern in the Republic of Korea about Japanese remilitarization will hinder the transformation of GSOMIA into a full-fledged mechanism of military-political integration. At the same time, Washington is likely to continue to serve as an external stabilizer, preventing the final rupture of the agreement during the next crises.

In a broader regional context, these processes indicate a gradual transformation of the balance of power in East Asia. The strengthening of the Japanese military presence and the expansion of Tokyo's participation in multilateral exercises near Taiwan and the South China Sea objectively increase the level of military-political coordination within the American-centered alliance system ^[78]. At the same time, this contributes to further strengthening the Chinese perception of the threat from the United States and its allies, stimulating a retaliatory build-up of Chinese military activity. As a result, a situation of mutual reinforcement of deterrence measures is formed, in which the actions of one side are interpreted by the other as preparation for a potential confrontation. For the Republic of Korea, such dynamics creates additional risks of strategic involvement in the US-China rivalry, especially in the case of deepening coordination between the United States, Japan and the Philippines on the Taiwan issue. Thus, Japanese remilitarization is increasingly beginning to be perceived not as a local transformation of defense policy, but as an element of a larger-scale change in the regional security architecture.

7. Conclusion

The study showed that the historical disputes between the Republic of Korea and Japan continue to have a systemic impact on the formation of the security architecture of Northeast Asia, going far beyond the exclusively bilateral relations. In this case, historical memory acts not only as an element of national identity and internal political discourse, but also as an independent factor of international political dynamics, influencing the stability of allied mechanisms, the depth of military-political coordination and the possibility of institutionalizing regional cooperation. The colonial legacy of Japanese rule over Korea retains a high level of political relevance and continues to be reproduced through territorial disputes, conflicts over the interpretation of history, the problem of forced labor and the issue of "comfort women." Thus, historical contradictions acquire the character of a long-term structural constraint for the development of full-fledged mechanisms of trust between the two states.

An analysis of the functioning of the General Agreement on the Exchange of Military Information has demonstrated that even the presence of objective security threats and a high degree of strategic interdependence does not guarantee the sustainability of institutional cooperation in the context of unresolved historical conflicts. GSOMIA has become an illustrative example of the clash of rational security imperatives with memory politics and public perceptions of justice. Attempts to depoliticize military-political interaction through technical and legal mechanisms turned out to be limited, since crises related to historical issues systematically spread to the economic and military-strategic spheres. The events of 2019 around Japan's export restrictions and the threat of termination of GSOMIA clearly demonstrated the interconnectedness of various levels of conflict and the inability of existing institutions to completely isolate security cooperation from the influence of historical memory.

The study also showed that external actors play an independent and active role in reproducing or containing Japanese-Korean contradictions. The United States considers coordination between Tokyo and Seoul as a necessary element of a regional strategy to contain the DPRK and China, as a result of which American diplomacy serves as a permanent mediator between the two allies. At the same time, the dependence of Japanese-Korean cooperation on external mediation simultaneously reduces the incentives to develop their own sustainable mechanisms for resolving contradictions. China, in turn, uses historical narratives as a tool to limit the American system of alliances and strengthen its own positions in the region, consistently supporting the discourse of the common historical memory of China and Korea as victims of Japanese imperialism. Thus, the memory policy is transformed into an element of broader geopolitical competition between the leading powers in East Asia.

The transformation of Japan's security policy is of particular importance in modern regional dynamics. Japan's departure from the constraints of the post-war pacifist model, increased defense spending and the development of counter-offensive capabilities objectively strengthen the military and political potential of the US-Japanese alliance, but at the same time cause wariness in the Republic of Korea. For Seoul, Japanese remilitarization creates a persistent dilemma between the need for coordination with an important U.S. ally and the persistence of historical concerns about a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. The lack of full-fledged institutional mechanisms for consultations between Tokyo and Seoul on the transformation of Japanese defense policy further strengthens this contradiction and limits the prospects for deepening bilateral cooperation.

The theoretical significance of the study lies in demonstrating the limitations of exclusively rationalistic approaches to the analysis of international relations based on the assumption of the priority of material interests and strategic expediency. The case study shows that historical memory, collective identity, and emotional and political factors can have a direct impact on security decision-making, including issues of military-political cooperation and allied commitments. In this context, the constructivist approach makes it possible to more fully explain the stability of the Japanese-Korean contradictions and their reproduction even in conditions of high economic interdependence and the presence of common external threats. At the same time, the conceptualization of historical disputes as a tool of geopolitical influence proposed in the study expands the understanding of memory politics, taking it beyond the exclusively bilateral interaction and including it in the broader context of regional competition.

The practical significance of the work is related to the identification of structural constraints for the formation of a sustainable security system in Northeast Asia. The results indicate that the persistence of unresolved historical conflicts will further hinder the institutionalization of full-fledged Japanese-Korean security cooperation. In these circumstances, it is particularly important to create mechanisms capable of minimizing the impact of historical disputes on critical areas of interaction, including intelligence sharing, missile defense coordination, and responding to regional crises. At the same time, purely technical measures are not capable of ensuring long-term stabilization of relations without parallel work to form a more stable social and political consensus on the historical past.

The prospects for the further development of Japan-Korea relations will largely depend on a combination of several factors: the dynamics of the US-China rivalry, internal political changes in Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as the further transformation of the regional security architecture. The most likely scenario in the medium term seems to be the preservation of limited and predominantly functional cooperation with the periodic reproduction of political crises related to historical memory. At the same time, further intensification of military and political tensions in East Asia and increased pressure from external threats may gradually stimulate the formation of a more pragmatic model of cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Regardless of the specific development trajectory, the dynamics of Japan-Korea relations will remain key to understanding the future of the regional security system and the nature of political processes in the Indo-Pacific region.

The article is published in the version approved by the reviewers (after receiving a positive review recommending the manuscript for publication) with corrections made by the author (after receiving the editor’s comments, if any).
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