Scientific research institutes and factory laboratories in the system of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry: attempts to establish regular cooperation in 1932-1939 (based on Leningrad materials)

Aleshin Vladimir Sergeevich ORCID: 0009-0005-6761-6023 Postgraduate student; Humanitarian Institute; Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University Head of the Library; Library; GBOU School No. 401 Kolpinsky district of St. Petersburg Research assistant; Higher School of International Relations; Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University 194100, Russia, St. Petersburg, Vyborg district, Lesnoy prospekt, 67, room 2, 171 Den.Tensor@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The turn of the 19th-20th centuries was the period in the history of mankind when systematic interaction between industry and scientists first began; the appearance of full-fledged laboratories in all branches of industry became a completely new milestone in the development of scientific activity in the advanced countries of Europe and North America ^{[1, pp. 21, 29-30]}.

The Soviet Union was no exception to these trends, because the communist leadership and advanced specialists were interested in the synthesis of science and industry. As part of the transformations of the late 1920s and 1930s aimed at industrialization, the branch of science was formed. As S. B. Ulyanova noted, at that time narrowly focused scientific institutes were being created that were engaged in "servicing" industry, i.e. solving specific scientific and production tasks of enterprises ^{[2, p. 395]}.

In the early 1930s, a three-part model was being built: leading head institutes – specialized branch institutes – factory laboratories ^{[2, p. 417]}. The author of this study tried to analyze how the interaction between the links of this model took place: research institutes and factory laboratories subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP, Narkomtyazhprom), one of the key organs of the Soviet state. It seems that the most productive way to study this is by the example of the Leningrad Research Institutes and factories, an important industrial, educational and cultural center of the USSR.

Soviet historiography wrote practically nothing about the factory laboratories of the 1930s, including their relationship with various research institutes [see in detail: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Even in the collective work on the development of technology at the Leningrad Metal Plant, which is one of the best in terms of covering research activities among enterprises, there is practically no information about cooperation with research institutes [see in detail: 14].

Although in recent years, researchers have increasingly studied the phenomenon of factory laboratories in the USSR [see in detail: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], It should be noted that modern historiography does not attempt to understand how factory laboratories and research institutes interacted during the period of accelerated industrialization.

This research is mainly based on materials from archival departments and periodicals. Valuable legislative, clerical, and scientific and technical sources were discovered in the collections of the Central State Archive of Scientific and Technical Documentation of St. Petersburg (TSGANTD SPb) and the Central State Archive of St. Petersburg (TSGA SPb). Articles from the magazines "Factory Laboratory" and "Socialist Reconstruction and Science" also played an important role. The vast majority of these historical sources are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

The People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry was established on January 5, 1932 on the basis of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR, which previously coordinated the development of the entire Soviet industry ^{[19, p. 106]}. The first people's commissar of the department was G. K. Ordzhonikidze, an associate of I. V. Stalin, a well–known Bolshevik, and the last chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR (since November 10, 1930) ^{[20, p. 284]}. G. K. Ordzhonikidze received the most powerful complex of scientific institutions among the People's Commissariats, which, however, underwent a serious reduction: in 1932, 239 research institutes, in 1934 – 149, in 1935 – 99, together with 27 branches ^{[2, pp. 393-394]}. The number of employees of the Research Institute (scientific staff, technicians, engineers, laboratory assistants, workers) by 1935 amounted to 33,380 people ^{[21, p. 17]}. In 1939, there were 59 research institutes with 14 branches, employing 6,000 employees ^{[22, p. 986]}. According to N. I. Bukharin, the organizer of science and an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the reduction of subordinate research institutes occurred due to "dwarfed and unviable units that do not have sufficiently qualified personnel" ^{[23, p. 377]}. Meanwhile, Leningrad was one of the leaders in the number of scientific institutions in the Narkomtyazhprom system: by the middle of the decade under study, there were 19 research institutes operating in the city [see in detail: 21].

The CPSU(b) attached great importance to the development of factory laboratories, which were defined as "headquarters of technical thought" at industrial facilities ^{[24, p. 4]}. The resolution of the XVII party conference, held in 1932, stated: "Rationalization and standardization of production, the most severe savings in the consumption of materials, [...] saving metal and fuel per unit of product, the widespread introduction of electroautogenic welding, the full development of new technological processes, the ruthless fight against losses, ensuring product quality [...] – all These are necessary prerequisites for improving quality indicators and increasing intra-industrial accumulation. These tasks dictate the further development of the process of mastering technology on the basis of ever closer cooperation between research institutions and industry and, in particular, on the basis of resolute strengthening of factory laboratories and their organization in large new buildings" ^{[26, p. 276]}. Further, the authors of the resolution demanded that the Research Institute cooperate more closely with enterprises: "The work of research institutes should in no way be limited to the walls of laboratories, but must necessarily be brought to the setting of work in factories and plants" ^{[26, p. 276]}. Thus, the activities of industrial research institutes and laboratories of enterprises were considered by the party and state authorities in a comprehensive manner, not in isolation from each other.

The factory laboratories were classified in different ways. Firstly, there were central, workshop and express laboratories ^{[23, p. 381]}. The central laboratories were factory-wide and, consequently, the largest. Workshop laboratories served the needs of specific workshops, for example, open-hearth, steel, etc.; often, as N. I. Bukharin argued, workshop laboratories coincided with express laboratories ^{[23, p. 381]}. The latter carried out accelerated physico-chemical analyses of industrial raw materials or finished products ^{[23, p. 381]}. Secondly, the laboratories of enterprises were divided into production, control and research laboratories^{[1] [26, pp. 112-113]}. Production laboratories were a necessary link in all the technological processes of their workshop; control laboratories analyzed the quality of the obtained raw materials, semi-finished products or finished products; finally, research laboratories were engaged in the creation of completely new technologies that would be useful for the plant or industry ^{[26, p. 112]}. Thirdly, the laboratories had their own production profile: metal science and mechanical, metallophysical and chemical, thermal, foundry, welding, etc. ^{[22, p. 814]}. The variety of operating laboratories was determined by the specifics of the Soviet enterprise.

After the establishment of the new People's Commissariat, discussions on the interaction of scientific institutions in the industry and factory laboratories began quite soon. On July 16, 1932, a meeting of representatives of heavy industry associations in the Scientific Research Sector (NIS) of the People's Commissariat of Industry was held. Its participants discussed the "management status" of the factory laboratories and acknowledged that the interaction was often formal ^{[27, p. 78]}.

Moreover, it turned out to be unproductive and often useless for factory personnel. This is reported by the results of a meeting, also held in 1932, of the All-Union Intersectional Bureau of Engineers and Technicians on the issue of technical advice to industry from the Scientific Research Institute.: "In most cases, institutions are not able to bring the results of their work to industry in a form that is accessible and acceptable for production. On the other hand, production workers do not know what institutions are working on, and often do not know how to use their achievements" ^{[28, p. 230]}. As Yu.N. Flakserman, a representative of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, noted in 1926, strong ties between scientific institutions and industry, as a rule, were not observed even in the early years of Soviet power ^{[29, p. 526]}.

To change the situation, the leadership of the NIS Narkomtyazhprom proposed to legislate a number of responsibilities for scientific institutions in relation to enterprise laboratories: management of scientific and technical production control; methodological guidance on research and production experimental work of factory laboratories; coordination of thematic research plans; participation in course training and retraining of laboratory workers ^{[27, p. 78]}.

In 1932, the process of attaching research institutes to plants of a similar profile began. For example, the State Optical Institute (GOI), according to a certificate addressed to the Office of the Commissioner (UU) of the NKTP in Leningrad, "assumed methodological leadership of the factory laboratories of the optical industry and the provision of emergency scientific and technical assistance at enterprises," including "the elimination of breakthroughs and minor production problems" ^{[30, l. 21]}. GOI took over important enterprises of the industry for the USSR: the OGPU State Optical and Mechanical Plant (GOMZ), the Leningrad Optical and Mechanical Plant (LOMZ), the Leningrad Optical Glass Plant (LENZOS), as well as the experimental plant of the Institute ^{[30, L. 21-21ob]}. To directly support the laboratories of the GOI plants, he established a team of instructors (52 people) from the most qualified employees who traveled to the enterprises if necessary ^{[30, l. 21ob]}. There were also instructors who were constantly present at these plants: their purpose was to systematically analyze laboratories and promptly notify them of emerging scientific problems ^{[30, L. 21ob-22]}. By the beginning of 1933, staff instructors of the research institution had visited subordinate industrial facilities 178 times ^{[30, l. 22]}.

The policy of bringing research institutes and factory laboratories closer together gradually benefited the industry. Thus, as part of the work (it included clarifying the reasons for obtaining low-quality cement, standardizing material testing methods, and detailed briefings for employees ^{[31, L. 4]}), the quality of cement produced at the Vorovsky Leningrad Cement Plant improved in the factory laboratories of the All-Union Institute of Cements (VNITS): "In the first quarter In 1932, the plant produced low–quality products, out of 7 samples taken by the Leningrad branch and tested in the latter's laboratory, only one sample met the requirements of the OST [i.e., the industry standard - VA]. In the second quarter, product quality rose [...] During the month of September, the plant's work [...] can be considered satisfactory, apart from some abnormal moments [...]" ^{[32, l. 51]}. The positive contribution from the VNITS, which had a branch not only in Leningrad, but in Kharkov, the Urals, Siberia and beyond ^{[32, l. 7]}, was additionally expressed in the form of financial assistance with specialized equipment and the development of an industry regulation on the tasks, functions and structure of factory laboratories of the cement industry of the USSR ^{[32, l. 6ob-7; see in detail: 33]}.

In accordance with Order No. 331 of the UU NKTP in the Leningrad Region dated 06/17/1933, the largest enterprises of the Leningrad heavy industry were attached to 11 branch research institutes in order to "achieve the greatest completeness and clarity in service" (see Table. 1) ^{[34, l. 79]}. The Leningrad Regional Council of Factory Laboratories supervised the maintenance of a number of factory laboratories ^{[34, L. 80]}. In 1935, according to the data of the fundamental handbook of the Narkomtyazhprom Research Institute, the number of Leningrad curatorial institutes increased to 17 [see details: 21]. Interestingly, some Moscow research institutes and the Central Radio Laboratory, together with the Central Battery Laboratory, provided assistance to enterprises in the city of Lenin [see details: 21].

Table 1. List of Leningrad research institutes-supervisors of factory laboratories of heavy industry as of June 17, 1933

According to Order No. 34 of the Central Research Institute of the People's Commissariat of Industry dated February 7, 1933, the organization of "implementation groups" was outlined in the institutes of the department ^{[35, L. 2]}. According to the "Regulation on implementation groups in research institutes of heavy Industry", the new structural divisions of the Research institute were supposed to introduce the achievements of their organizations into the industry, control the implementation process and help enterprises master the latest technological solutions ^{[35, L. 2]}. In the context of fulfilling these tasks, the implementation groups focused on establishing "proper" links between research institutes and factory laboratories ^{[35, L. 2ob]}. The implementation teams also had to monitor compliance with the obligations assumed by the Research Institute and industry, "under contracts for the study of certain topics", for testing semi-factory installations and pilot construction ^{[35, 2b]}.

The execution of Order No. 34 was difficult. A. A. Armand, Chairman of the Central Council of Factory Laboratories of the NKTP of the USSR and acting head of the Research and Technical Propaganda Sector ^{[36, p. 11]}, wrote in an official letter dated March 2, 1933, to the directors of the Research Institute: "Along with the institutions that have treated the organization of implementation groups with all seriousness and responsibility, there are attempts by some institutions to formally and bureaucratically execute the order [...] to actually evade its implementation and thereby disrupt measures to introduce the institutes' products into industry. For example, groups of employees (from other sectors) are being created who are not relieved of their previous duties; employees of inappropriate qualifications are invited to join the group; there are attempts to include the implementation group in other sectors or departments..." ^{[37, l. 3]}.

Probably, the "formally bureaucratic" attitude of researchers to the order of the NCTP could be caused by the heavy workload on all departments of the Research Institute, lack of personnel or logistical insecurity. Perhaps Yu. N. Flaxerman was right when he wrote in 1926: "Where we have institutes where we have managed to assemble a cadre of qualified workers and dedicated workers, [...] to provide a material opportunity for work, for conducting research and experiments, there is no need to talk about communication. Real life itself, the work itself, established a normal connection" ^{[29, p. 526]}. Without normalization of the situation in the branch research institutes, it was impossible to count on the systematic interaction of the scientific community and factories.

On October 25-26, 1934, the Council of Factory Laboratories of the People's Commissariat of Industry held a special meeting dedicated to summarizing the work on strengthening ties between the Research Institute and factory laboratories ^{[38, p. 154]}. The meeting participants noted the need to help factory laboratories, as they had mostly not received adequate development by the end of the first half of the decade ^{[38, p. 155]}. The following statement is noteworthy: the main reason for the "separation" of the Research institute from the laboratories of industry was called "insufficient management of scientific and technical assistance to production by the heads and, in particular, their chief engineers" ^{[38, p. 155]}. The lack of a clear understanding among researchers of the tasks and form of communication with enterprises and factory laboratories, as well as the general underestimation of factory laboratories in mastering the achievements of research institutes, stimulated additional difficulties ^{[38, p. 155]}.

The result of the 1934 meeting was the recognition of the need "for all institutes conducting work at the enterprise to carry them out with the close and direct participation of factory laboratories and factory design bureaus" ^{[38, p. 155]}. A way to maintain a "concrete link" between industry and industry science was the "periodic dispatch" of qualified representatives of research institutes to enterprises ^{[38, p. 155]}. In turn, the factories were obliged to send their most competent employees on scientific trips in order to improve their own knowledge ^{[38, p. 156]}.

Apparently, since the second half of the 1930s, new structural divisions began to be created in the Research Institute - groups of factory laboratories. For example, in 1935 such a group appeared at the Leningrad All-Union Institute of Refractory and Acid-resistant Materials (VIOK) ^{[39, l. 1]}. Its tasks included: inspection of factory laboratories; implementation of testing and quality control methods; design, manufacture and supply of the most important laboratory equipment (replacement of imports); organization of new laboratories; development of accelerated laboratory control methods; training of personnel for factory laboratories ^{[39, L. 1-2]}. The named VIOK group actively helped dozens of organizations (representatives of the refractory and metallurgical industries, individual trusts, universities, research institutes and others) in various regions of the USSR, although Leningrad enterprises were practically not discussed by it ^{[40, l. 4]}. At the same time, it is known that in the mid-1930s, VIOK provided great assistance to the Izhora Plant in the accelerated creation (in 1.5 months) of laboratories for testing refractory materials: the institute staff carried out transportation, installation and trial launch of the necessary equipment; after that, they organized a two-month training course for factory workers on thermomechanical testing techniques ^{[39, L. 9]}.

In 1936, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Industry decided to transfer a significant part of scientific research to enterprises, since the country's leadership did not consider the work of many research institutes to be effective: "[...] fundamental changes in industry, which in a few years turned our country into an advanced industrial country in the world, had little effect on research institutes. They swelled due to the incessant increase in the number of topics, reached astronomical values with three zeros in terms of the number of employees, and turned into difficult-to-manage "powerful economic complexes" with multi-million dollar budgets" ^{[41, p. 259]}. On January 29, M. L. Rukhimovich, deputy to G. K. Ordzhonikidze, signed an order "On the revision of the network, structure and work of research institutes." As the first paragraph of the document stated, "all work duplicating the work of factory laboratories, together with personnel and equipment, should be transferred to the relevant enterprises of the NKTP in order to strengthen factory laboratories" ^{[42, p. 262]}. Despite the rational message of the order of the People's Commissariat of Industry, its implementation proved impossible. Surveys of the largest enterprises of heavy industry by the party organs and departmental structures of Leningrad showed in 1936 that the vast majority of factory laboratories could not acceptably engage even in quality control of manufactured products; as a rule, there was no need to talk about serious factory science at all [see in detail: 43, p. 223].

Let's ask the question: could research institutes have seriously affected the state of factory laboratories during the years of the existence of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry? I think not, because in one of the leading articles of the journal "Factory Laboratory" it was rightly stated: "[...] the work of the laboratory can only be carried out with the firm support of the factory administration, and laboratory workers should fight like a Bolshevik for the implementation of their proposals" ^{[44, p. 1048]}. Industry research institutes, burdened with financial and logistical problems ^{[45, pp. 583-584]}, research and plans, most likely paid attention to the laboratories of enterprises on a residual basis or on a case-by-case basis. To confirm this position, let us turn to the practical experience of S. I. Vavilov, an outstanding physicist, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences, scientific director of the State Optical Institute.

In December 1937, he spoke at a conference of the GOI and factory laboratories of the Main Directorate No. 9 of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry (NKOP), an organizational structure separated from the NKTP in 1936 ^{[2, p. 396]}. At the industry conference, specialists in the field of optical physics and workers in the optical and mechanical industry discussed issues of optical glass, civil instrumentation and defense of the Soviet Union. The contents of the first two sections were not subject to public disclosure, and the defense section was secret ^{[46, pp. 1-4]}. As part of the plenary report, S. I. Vavilov stated: "For 19 years of its existence, the institute has not severed ties with factory laboratories [...]. However, this connection was accidental, in most cases episodic, and, in any case, imperfect, unsatisfying neither the industry nor the institution itself" ^{[46, l. 6]}. Although GOI participated in the creation of factory laboratories and even organized a bureau (which existed for only a couple of years) for servicing the optical and mechanical industry, these measures, according to S. I. Vavilov, were categorically not enough to establish a full-fledged connection between the Research Institute and the Leningrad plants ^{[46, pp. 6-7]}.

It is very interesting that the academician opposed the "scientific administration" of factory laboratories, since some of them were sufficiently developed for autonomous and equivalent activities at the research institute level, while others needed the full-fledged creation of research institutions from scratch (the latter went beyond the competencies and capabilities of the GOI) ^{[46, L. 7-8]}. S. I. Vavilov believed that such an approach negates the independence of research teams in enterprises ^{[46, l. 9]}.

I must say that some of the measures proposed by S. I. Vavilov and his colleagues at the end of the conference were not too different from the proposals of the National Research and Technical Commission of the USSR in previous years. According to the text of the surviving resolution, the maintenance of links between the GOI and factory laboratories should have been carried out in the following forms: organization of a training system for laboratory staff of enterprises; systematic inspection of the work of factory laboratories by the NCOP, GOI and a specific plant; convening annual conferences and meetings in the GOI to study the results of laboratory surveys and thematic work plans; collaboration of research institutes and factories on certain topics; sending GOI employees to factories to solve various technical issues; and much more ^{[46, l. 215-220]}. It seems that all these initiatives could be realized only in a limited way. It is unlikely that success could have been achieved in the entire industrial sector, since there were no drastic and quick means to change the situation.

The People's Commissariat of Industry ceased to exist in January 1939. Admittedly, the leadership of the People's Commissariat, represented by NIS, has been making systematic efforts since 1932 to combine the initiatives of specialized research institutes and factory laboratories. However, it turned out to be difficult to achieve the desired goal due to the extremely weak development of factory laboratories and insufficient interest, additionally burdened by limited resources and employment, on the part of research institutes. Successful examples of cooperation between institutions of branch science and industry (Leningrad VIOK and VNITS, partly GOI) somewhat improved the state of affairs, but nothing more. Therefore, it is natural that the resolution of the all-Moscow meeting of research engineers – employees of factory laboratories, held in 1939, declared: "It is necessary to establish a system for attaching laboratories to research institutes [...]. In addition, laboratories should establish links not only with industry institutes, but also with all scientific institutions working in a similar field. The practice of joint work of research institutes and factory laboratories should be expanded in every possible way" ^{[47, p. 20]}. The integration of the efforts of research institutes and research departments of enterprises did not go off the agenda: its new stage began in the difficult 1940s for the country.

The article is published in the version approved by the reviewers (after receiving a positive review recommending the manuscript for publication) with corrections made by the author (after receiving the editor’s comments, if any).
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