Russia's Position in the South China Sea Disputes: Evolution and Prospects

Lyu Shii Postgraduate student; Institute of International Relations and World History; N.I. Lobachevsky National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University 23 Gagarin Ave., Nizhny Novgorod, 603022, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod Region 2765327887@qq.com

Starkin Sergey Valerievich Doctor of Politics Associate Professor; Institute of International Relations and World History; N.I. Lobachevsky National Research Nizhny Novgorod State University 23 Gagarin Ave., Nizhny Novgorod, 603022, Russia, Nizhny Novgorod Region starkinserge@mail.ru

Introduction

Against the background of the complex global situation, the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is turning into one of the key economic, geopolitical and military-strategic centers of the modern world. The growing role of the Asia-Pacific region in the system of international relations leads to an increase in attention to the region from the leading world powers, including the United States and Russia, which consider it as a priority area of their foreign policy.

In this context, the South China Sea is of particular importance as a key maritime link connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans and providing economic ties between the countries of the region. Due to its strategic importance for international shipping, the South China Sea is one of the factors of potential instability in the region.

In these circumstances, Russia, being one of the major geopolitical actors, is strategically reorienting international cooperation towards the East against the background of the crisis in relations with Western countries. This process contributes to the strengthening of partnership relations with both China and the countries of Southeast Asia, which increases the importance of Russia's position on the issue of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The research problem of the article is the factors influencing Russia's position on territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The purpose of the study is to identify the factors influencing the evolution of Russia's position on disputes in the South China Sea and to analyze their role in its evolution. To achieve this goal, it is assumed that the following tasks will be solved::

to analyze the official positions of the Soviet Union on the disputes in the South China Sea as the historical basis for the formation of the Russian position; to determine the role of Russia in the modern system of regional relations in the South China Sea; to assess the influence of foreign policy and economic factors on the formation of the Russian position.

The methodological basis of the research consists of historical, political and systemic methods of analysis. Historical, political and systemic analysis make it possible to identify the factors of transformation of Russia's position from the period of the USSR to the modern stage in the context of the changing international situation. The theoretical basis of the research is the neorealist approach in the theory of international relations. Within the framework of this approach, K. Waltz notes that the international system is anarchic in nature, as a result of which states focus on ensuring their own security and strive to maintain a balance of power as the main mechanism for adapting to the external environment ^{[1, p. 117]}. R. Gilpin, in turn, emphasizes the relationship between political and economic factors, pointing out the importance of economic interests in shaping the behavior of states ^[2]. Within the framework of this theoretical approach, the evolution of Russia's position on the disputes in the South China Sea is considered as a result of the interaction of two types of factors: national interests and the international structure. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union, operating in a bipolar system, was focused on ensuring strategic interests through a system of allied relations. In the 1990s, in the context of the transformation of the international system, Russia became a regional power, and its foreign policy was more focused on ensuring a stable external environment. In the 21st century, against the background of increasing trends towards multipolarity and deepening economic globalization, the importance of economic development for Russia has increased. Collectively, these factors contributed to the evolution of Russia's position.

The scientific novelty of the study is that it reveals the mechanism of evolution of Russia's position on disputes in the South China Sea based on an analysis of the interaction of national interests and the international structure. The existing Russian literature mainly examines certain aspects of Russia's position on the disputes in the South China Sea. The works of A. D. Dikarev, A. V. Lukin ^[3], N. V. Feorov ^[4], D. S. Panarina ^[5] focus on the analysis of the modern position of Russia. The research of P. A. Skiruta, I. N. Zolotukhin ^[6], and A.V. Bredikhin ^[7] focuses on certain aspects of evolution, primarily on energy cooperation. At the same time, there is no general explanatory mechanism for the evolution of the Russian position. In contrast to these works, this work offers a holistic explanation of the evolution of Russia's position based on historical dynamics from the Soviet period to the modern stage. It has been established that the key factor in evolution is a change in foreign policy priorities caused by Russia's desire to adapt to the ongoing transformations of the international system. The result is a stable model of Russia's behavior in the region - pragmatic neutrality.

The evolution of Russia's position on disputes in the South China Sea

China, as a key stakeholder, has stepped up the use of military diplomacy tools in South Korea in recent years.‐In the China Sea in order to promote their interests. This provoked a backlash from the Southeast Asian States, which consistently defend their territorial claims in the region. As a result, there is a tendency to escalate the confrontation between China and the countries of Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines and Vietnam.

In this context, the Russian authorities have consistently maintained a neutral position on disputes in the South China Sea for a long time. This balanced approach by Moscow contributes to maintaining regional stability and reducing the overall potential for conflict. However, according to the analysis of documentary sources, the position of the USSR in the Soviet period differed from the position of modern Russia, which allows us to distinguish two main stages.

The Soviet period (before 1991)

In the post-war period, under the conditions of a bipolar international system, the Soviet Union, having the status of a superpower and being in a state of strategic confrontation with the United States, built its foreign policy, including through a system of allied relations, which greatly influenced its approach to regional conflicts and indirectly affected its position on the disputes in the South China Sea. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, the Soviet Union maintained a position of support for China's territorial claims in the disputed waters of the South China Sea ^{[8, p. 47]}.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Government officially declared its sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Archipelago. According to the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, Japan renounced all claims to Taiwan, the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Archipelago. However, the treaty did not provide for the return of these territories to China, which was considered by the PRC as a violation of its legitimate rights. In this regard, during the San Francisco Conference in 1951, the Soviet delegation refused to sign the treaty ^[9].

At the conference on September 5, 1951, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, outlined the position of the Soviet delegation in his speech. He stressed that the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, as well as the Yalta Agreement recognized China's indisputable rights to territories previously alienated from it. The original territories of China include Taiwan Island, the Pescadores, the Paracel Islands and other territories subject to return to the People's Republic of China ^[10]. In this regard, this position also reflected the official view of the Soviet Union of that period, according to which China's sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea was considered universally recognized.

However, at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, against the background of the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations, the USSR's foreign policy in the region underwent significant changes.Moscow's official position on the territorial ownership of islands in the South China Sea has been revised, due to the transformation of the strategic priorities of the Soviet Union in Asia.

Since the late 1950s, ideological differences have been growing between the USSR and China, which has led to a gradual deterioration of bilateral relations and their actual rupture. Among a number of border incidents, the 1969 armed conflict on Damansky Island was of particular importance, which greatly influenced the dynamics of Soviet-Chinese relations. This incident was accompanied by significant losses on both sides and had significant consequences for the international system: it contributed to the split of the world communist movement and created the prerequisites for the subsequent rapprochement between China and the United States. In the early 1970s, there was a tendency to normalize Sino-American relations, which was consolidated in the 1972 Joint Communique. Despite the subsequent easing of tensions, the contradictions between the USSR and the PRC persisted, and mutual perception acquired the character of strategic rivalry. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union was forced to reorient its foreign policy in the region and develop relations with alternative partners.

In the context of the Vietnam War, Soviet-Vietnamese relations experienced a period of intensive development. The Soviet Union, acting as Hanoi's main ally, carried out regular supplies of modern weapons, as well as provided large-scale economic assistance, which contributed to increasing the defense capability of North Vietnam in opposing the military intervention of the United States ^{[11, p. 6]}. The logical continuation of the deepening cooperation was the signing in May 1979 of an agreement on the provision of Cam Ranh Bay to the USSR to create a logistics center for the Soviet Navy ^[12].

Against this background, the evolution of the USSR's position on the issue of territorial demarcation in the South China Sea in favor of Vietnam, accompanied by Moscow's desire to avoid clear recognition of sovereignty over the Spratly Archipelago, caused a negative reaction from Beijing. The Chinese leadership viewed Soviet military and economic assistance to Hanoi as a destabilizing factor limiting China's ability to assert its sovereign rights in the South China Sea ^{[13, p. 90]}.

By the end of the 1980s, with the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union, seeking to reduce external military and political pressure and overcome internal economic difficulties, embarked on reforms. In such circumstances, the USSR's position on the South China Sea issue underwent changes: abandoning unilateral support for Vietnam, the Soviet Union gradually began to adhere to a more neutral line.

The modern period (from the 1990s to the present)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia faced a deep economic crisis and a decline in international influence. Against this background, Russia's foreign policy priorities have undergone a significant transformation. Russia has focused on solving internal problems and settling relations with Western countries, which has led to a decrease in attention to the problems in the South China Sea.

However, the last decade of the 20th century has become a transitional stage. Russia gradually regained its position in the international arena and formed new regional priorities. Since the beginning of the 21st century, in the context of increasing trends towards multipolarity and economic globalization, the foreign policy course of the Russian Federation, driven by the challenges of economic modernization, has demonstrated a clear orientation towards the eastern vector. Moscow has consistently identified China and the ASEAN member countries as priorities for international cooperation, which has led to a review of approaches to resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the development of a neutral and balanced position. In the "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" in 2000, for the first time, priority attention was given to Asia ^[14], which reflected the tendency to intensify cooperation with the countries of the Asian region.

In the 2010s, Russia, like China, was seen as a rising power seeking to weaken American unipolarity and promote a multipolar world. In this context, Vladimir Putin's statement in 2012 on strengthening Russia's role in the Asia-Pacific region became a significant milestone. This statement outlined a strategic course towards a "turn to the East" aimed at expanding Russia's presence in the region ^{[15, p. 83]}.

After the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014 and the introduction of Western sanctions, this course was further accelerated. External pressure from Western countries has intensified the reorientation of Russian policy towards the Asian direction and the search for new forms of cooperation ^{[16, p. 55]}.Thus, the "turn to the East" has become one of the important factors in the transformation of Russia's international positioning.

At the same time, the evolution of the "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" in 2008-2023 reflects the deepening of Russia's interaction with China and the countries of Southeast Asia. Russian-Chinese relations have reached the level of a "comprehensive strategic partnership in a new era," and the Southeast Asian region has become an important market for Russian arms exports.

In these circumstances, Russia, while maintaining partnership relations with both sides of the territorial dispute — China and the involved ASEAN states (Vietnam, the Philippines), acts as one of the factors in maintaining a balance of interests in the South China Sea ^{[17, p. 242]}.

The 2016 arbitration award issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on the claim of the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China became a catalyst for the aggravation of the situation in the South China Sea, as a result of which the trend of internationalization of the dispute became more pronounced. The verdict pointed out the inconsistency of the historical claims of the PRC within the framework of the "nine-point line" with the norms of international law ^{[18, p. 252]}. Beijing rejected the legitimacy of the decision, describing it as contrary to international law and stressing that the Philippines' unilateral initiation of arbitration violates the Sino-Philippine treaties and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

This escalation of the situation in the region has attracted considerable attention from Russia, and representatives of the Russian government and the scientific and expert community have reaffirmed their commitment to a neutral and balanced position.

On the one hand, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stated that Russia does not intend to get involved in territorial disputes and adheres to a neutral position. During the Group of Twenty Summit in Hangzhou (2016), the leaders of the participating states held multilateral consultations on a wide range of issues of economic and trade cooperation. At a press conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined the position of the Russian state regarding the dispute between China and the Philippines, stressing that "Russia does not intend to interfere in disputes over islands in the South China Sea and supports China's position on non-recognition of the Hague Arbitration Court decision" ^[19]. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova also noted that Russia avoids involvement in multilateral territorial disputes in the South China Sea and calls on all parties to resolve differences on a bilateral basis. In 2021, Zakharova, answering questions from the media, reiterated that "the Russian position remains consistent and unchanged. Russia does not participate in conflicts and does not take sides in principle" ^[20]. The totality of these statements confirms Russia's commitment to neutrality in the disputes over the South China Sea.

On the other hand, most Russian researchers are of the opinion that it is necessary to remain neutral regarding the disputes over the South China Sea. Currently, the development of Siberia and the Far East remains an urgent task for Russia ^{[21, p. 21; 22]}, and the preservation of peace, strengthening security, and developing economic ties with China, Vietnam, and other ASEAN countries contribute to solving this strategic task. Grigory Mikhailovich Lokshin, a leading researcher at the Center for Vietnam and ASEAN Studies at the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, notes in his article that Russia, formally distancing itself from the disputes in the South China Sea, seeks to avoid involvement in the conflict between its two strategic partners - China and Vietnam ^{[23, p. 49]}.

After 2022, increased sanctions pressure from Western countries led to a further deepening of Russian-Chinese cooperation. In these circumstances, such rapprochement acts as a structural constraint that prevents Russia from moving away from a neutral position on disputes in the region and at the same time developing more active cooperation with the ASEAN countries. Thus, taking into account the current regional situation and the needs of national development, the position of neutrality can be considered as an appropriate strategy for Russia's foreign policy behavior in the region.

Promising directions of Russia's foreign policy in the South China Sea

The fundamental source of differences between the PRC and the ASEAN member States, in particular Vietnam and the Philippines, in the South China Sea is rooted in different interpretations of the legal status and jurisdiction in this area. At the same time, China and the ASEAN countries act as strategically important partners and key sales markets for Russia in the context of the implementation of the Russian strategy for the development of the Far East and Siberia.

In these circumstances, it is relevant to analyze the promising directions of Russia's foreign policy in relation to disputes in the South China Sea, aimed at maintaining multi-vector interaction with the actors involved and ensuring maximum protection of national interests.

Since Xi Jinping came to power, China has initiated a strategy for the "great rebirth of the Chinese nation", in which ensuring state security has become one of the key priorities aimed at strengthening national power ^{[24, p. 191]}. Against this background, the Chinese Government is demonstrating increasing determination in upholding its sovereignty in the region and protecting national interests.

The report of the 20th CPC Congress (2022) institutionalized the strategic concept of the "Chinese modernization model", and also clearly outlined the goal of accelerating the transformation of the PLA into a world-class armed force ^[25]. During the same period, China not only announced an increase in the defense budget, but also intensified naval exercises and underwater patrol operations in the waters of the South China Sea ^{[26, p. 367]}. The Chinese side has repeatedly stressed the unconditional priority of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, which provoked a sharp reaction from the coastal States of the region. This development had a negative impact on stability in the South China Sea, which prompted many ASEAN countries to purchase weapons ^{[27, p. 16]} and, in turn, increased the risk of military conflict.

China occupies a strategically important place in the current structure of Russia's foreign policy relations, but the importance of the ASEAN member states for the development of the Far East and Siberia should not be underestimated ^{[28, p. 34]}. ASEAN, as a regional association that ranks fifth in the global economy in terms of GDP, has significant economic potential. At the same time, the increasing influence of the organization on the architecture of global governance is becoming systemic.

Among the ASEAN member States, the bilateral relations between Russia and Vietnam demonstrate the highest degree of institutionalization. Vietnam, acting as a traditional strategic partner, occupies an important place in Russia's foreign trade structure, which is reflected in stable trade turnover and diversification of the range of mutual supplies ^{[29, p. 35]}. Oil and gas exploration is one of the strategically important areas of cooperation, in particular, Gazprom and PetroVietnam are developing gas fields in the Gulf of Tonkin ^[22]. Vietnam is also a key market for Russian arms sales and holds a significant share in the structure of Russian military exports.

The increased cooperation between Russia and Vietnam touches on sensitive aspects of the disputes in the South China Sea and objectively increases the degree of Russia's involvement in regional disputes. Russian-Vietnamese energy projects may overlap with waters whose status is disputed by China, and the supply of Russian weapons to states participating in territorial disputes can influence the regional balance of power.

Given the identified strategic and trade-economic realities, Russia's preservation of its existing position and policy of neutrality regarding the South China Sea disputes seems to be the most rational strategy.

From a trade and economic point of view, against the background of sanctions restrictions and strategic pressure from the United States, Russia faces the task of intensifying cooperation with alternative economic partners ^{[30, p. 73]}. According to the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation, China, as Russia's key partner in the framework of the "turn to the East" strategy, has occupied a leading position among its trading partners since the beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022. Over the past five years, the volume of Russian-Chinese trade has consistently exceeded 100 billion US dollars, which indicates the stability and complementarity of the national economies of the two countries.

During the same period, Russian-Vietnamese trade and economic cooperation also showed positive dynamics: after a temporary downturn in 2021, the volume of bilateral trade maintained a steady upward trend. However, in terms of total volume and quantitative indicators, Russian-Vietnamese trade is significantly inferior to Russian-Chinese trade, and this gap remains significant. Thus, under the current circumstances, China remains Russia's key partner in implementing the strategic reorientation.

Graph 1(Data source: China General Administration of Customs)

Graph 2 (Data source: Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation)

At the current stage of the development of international relations, the continued build-up of the US military presence in the Philippines ^[31], due to the geostrategic importance of shipping routes and hydrocarbon resources of the South China Sea, contributes to the transformation of the region into an arena of rivalry between Washington and Beijing for influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With the coming to power of the new Trump administration in early 2025, the United States announced the introduction of increased customs duties on a wide range of trading partners, including China, while increasing the rates of "mutual tariffs" Chinese exports to the American market account for up to 125%. In response, the Chinese side strongly protested and introduced appropriate countermeasures, which intensified the economic confrontation between the two countries and contributed to an increase in tension in the region.

In this regard, against the background of the active development of trade with China and the increasing military and sanctions pressure from the West, led by the United States, China acts as a key partner for Russia and an important factor in balancing this pressure and reducing dependence on Western markets. Although Russian-Chinese relations remain generally stable and are unlikely to face serious difficulties due to the South China Sea issue, Russia's excessive involvement in issues related to the South China Sea, which China considers its sovereign waters, could lead to increased tensions and have a destabilizing effect on bilateral relations..

In such circumstances, in order to preserve strategic cooperation and foreign economic cooperation, it is advisable for Russia to adhere to a restrained line of behavior, avoiding excessive involvement in territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which China considers as a key area of its sovereign interests. Particular caution should be exercised with regard to energy resource exploration projects implemented in cooperation with ASEAN States in this area.

Accordingly, it makes sense for Russia to shift the focus of bilateral cooperation to overland trade and connectivity, in particular by promoting practical cooperation in areas such as energy and infrastructure. At the same time, Russia can maintain de facto neutrality on the South China Sea issue, deepen trade and investment cooperation with China, and strengthen economic complementarity.

Conclusion

In the context of the modern transformation of the international situation and the increasing geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific region, Russia's position in the disputes in the South China Sea is becoming increasingly complex and multidimensional.

The evolution of the Russian position on the South China Sea has gone through a number of stages: during the period of strategic cooperation between the USSR and China, the emphasis was on recognizing and taking into account China's sovereign claims; the subsequent stage associated with the Soviet-Vietnamese strategic partnership was characterized by the support of the Vietnamese side; and since the beginning of the XXI century, Russia has moved to a pragmatic neutral policy, driven by the need balancing cooperation with China and the ASEAN countries.

Based on the analysis, two main groups of factors can be identified that influence the evolution of Russia's position in the disputes in the South China Sea: national interests and international structure. The transformation of the international system indirectly affects the foreign policy status of the USSR and Russia in world politics, as well as the priorities of national interests, leading to a change in approaches to regional conflicts. Under the conditions of the bipolar system, the USSR, having the status of a superpower, sought to strengthen its position through a system of allied relations, which caused its position to vary depending on the nature of interaction with regional partners. After the collapse of the USSR and Russia's transition to the status of a regional power, its foreign policy was focused on ensuring strategic stability and developing multilateral cooperation, which contributed to the formation of a more neutral line. In the 20th century, the strengthening of multipolar trends and economic globalization increased the importance of economic factors, which created the prerequisites for the formation of pragmatic neutrality.

Under the influence of sanctions pressure and the structural reorientation of foreign trade relations, Russian-Chinese economic cooperation is showing steady growth and occupies a leading position in Russia's foreign trade. China is not only a key trade and economic partner, but also an important element in ensuring the sustainability of the Russian economy in the face of external constraints. This contributes to deepening strategic coordination with China and reducing Russia's interest in actively engaging in disputes.

Increased sanctions pressure from Western countries after 2022 significantly accelerated this process, contributing to the further deepening of trade and economic interdependence between Russia and Asian countries. In such circumstances, China retains the status of a key partner of Russia, contributing to maintaining the stability of the Russian economy and its adaptation to sanctions pressure. Accordingly, given the significantly higher level of trade and economic cooperation with China compared to most ASEAN countries, the possibility of further rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing in the disputes in the South China Sea cannot be ruled out. In other words, Russia, at least, will not seek to critically distance itself from the Chinese position. However, given the significant potential of the market for military-technical products in the ASEAN countries, in the short term, Russia is unlikely to significantly reconsider its position of neutrality.

In this regard, the further line of Russia's policy in the South China Sea region can be characterized as a model of pragmatic neutrality, due to a combination of Russia's limited political involvement in regional disputes and the priority of economic cooperation with China, primarily in the field of overland trade in the continental regions of Eurasia. This model is adaptive and is formed under the influence of external sanctions restrictions and the transformation of the international structure, which simultaneously minimizes foreign policy risks and strengthens strategic partnership with China.

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