M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin meetings with the top leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR on December 10–11, 1991 as a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union

Sotnikov Vladislav Evgenievich Postgraduate student, Department of Russian History of the XX-XXI centuries, Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov 1E Leninskie Gory str., Moscow, 119991, Russia ulsim96@mail.ru

The Belovezhskaya Agreement of the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine on December 8, 1991 became a turning point in the history of not only the Soviet Union and the republics of the former USSR, but also in world history. The leaders of the three union republics announced the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the end of the existence of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical reality, but one of the key questions remained unresolved – what is the fate of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union? Will the supreme military leadership of the USSR support the Belovezhskaya Agreement? The fate of not only the political future of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, but also the Union State itself depended on the answers to these questions. The position of the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces was vividly manifested a few days after the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements during meetings with the top military leadership at a meeting at the USSR Ministry of Defense M.S. Gorbachev on December 10, 1991 and B.N. Yeltsin on December 11, 1991.

            In this regard, there is a problem of the reaction of the supreme military leadership of the USSR to the formation of the CIS and the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 8, 1991 by the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, which manifested itself during meetings with the military of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Based on this, it is necessary to assess the situation of the Armed Forces of the USSR and their leadership on the eve of the Belovezhskaya Agreement, to trace and evaluate the level of preparation and speeches of the Presidents of the USSR and the RSFSR at meetings with the military and draw conclusions about the reactions and reasons for different reactions to these meetings from the top leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

            As for historiography, this problem has not been considered often in the scientific literature, although there are many works devoted to the collapse of the USSR. The works of A.S. Barsenkov ^[1], M.F. Polynov ^[2], D.A. Lukashevich ^[3] made a significant contribution to historiography. In addition, the reaction of the supreme military leadership of the USSR to the Belovezhskaya Agreements was also of interest to foreign researchers ^[4]. However, it should be noted that there are no special works devoted to meetings with the military leadership of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin after the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements in December 1991, in which the approaches of the Presidents of the USSR and the RSFSR to these meetings would be considered in detail and conclusions about the consequences of these events based on sources. This study aims to close this gap. The sources were paperwork documents from the Archive of the Presidential Center of B.N. Yeltsin, published documents of the Gorbachev Foundation, periodical materials covering meetings with the top military leadership of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, as well as documents of personal origin, primarily memoirs of political and military leaders of the USSR.

By December 1991, the USSR was in critical condition. In September 1991, the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were recognized as independent by the USSR State Council. All the Union republics declared their sovereignty during 1990-1991, and almost all the republics, with the exception of Russia and Kazakhstan, declared their independence. Under these conditions, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev tried to convince the heads of the Union republics to sign a new Union Treaty with expanded rights of local authorities and a reduced role of the center, referring to the results of the referendum on March 17, 1991, according to which more than 76% of the votes were cast in favor of preserving the Union. However, the heads of the Union republics, first of all the President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin ^{[2, p. 173]}, advocated a confederate form of state–territorial structure, and at the end of November 1991 inclined to the point of view in favor of the Union of Independent Republics. In addition, Ukraine evaded the negotiation process. The Supreme Council of Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991, and on December 1, 1991, independence was approved by 90% of the votes in a referendum, and thus Ukraine refused to agree to an agreement on a confederate Union.

The Armed Forces of the USSR were also in an extremely difficult situation. Embroiled in conflicts in the Union republics, discredited after the speech of the State Emergency Committee in August 1991, humiliated in the media, in a poor economic condition, but nevertheless the Armed Forces of the USSR continued to remain a formidable force that held together the disintegrating state. In August 1991, after the arrest of a member of the GKChP, the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.T. Yazov, E.I. Shaposhnikov was appointed the new minister, who was guided more not by his immediate superior, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev, but by the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin, and there were objective reasons for that. First of all, it was to Boris Yeltsin that he was obliged to be appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR, in addition, it was the RSFSR, to a greater extent, as the largest Union republic, that bore the main burden of military expenditures ^{[5, p. 3]} under circumstances of a decrease in the budget possibilities of the Union Center. However, subordination and formal subordination to the Supreme Commander M.S. Gorbachev outweighed the above factors until December 1991. During the autumn of 1991, Minister of Defense E.I. Shaposhnikov repeatedly submitted notes to the President of the USSR and the USSR State Council on the state of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the need to sign the Union Treaty as soon as possible ^{[6, p. 90]}, however, there were practically no changes for the better.

In addition, the supreme military leadership of the USSR in the autumn of 1991 was engrossed in an internal conflict between Defense Minister E.I. Shaposhnikov and his first deputy, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces V.N. Lobov. In fact, both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin had the opportunity to play on these contradictions and win over the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense. However, E.I. Shaposhnikov turned primarily to the President of the RSFSR, B.N. Yeltsin, for help in support ^{[7, l. 110]}, thereby emphasizing that he was perceived as a decision-maker, and not the President of the USSR. The head of the information and analytical department of the Ministry of Defense, V.N. Baranets, did not rule out that B.N. Yeltsin was informed before leaving for Belarus that it would not work with V.N. Lobov to sign an agreement on the "triple alliance", since he would be able to "rear the army", and "most of the commanders of the troops would follow him military districts and fleets" ^{[8, p. 149]}.

The unexpected resignation of the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR on December 7, 1991, on the eve of the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements, seemed strange even to Mikhail Gorbachev's closest associates. In particular, Assistant to the President of the USSR A.S. Chernyaev, despite his negative attitude personally to V.N. Lobov, expressed surprise at the change itself "at such a moment" ^{[9, p. 288]}. Nevertheless, with the resignation of the Chief of the General Staff V.N. Lobov, the loyalty of the top officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense to the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin was ensured, but this did not mean a complete preponderance of the army's sympathies towards the Russian President, since the military obeyed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and according to the current Constitution of the USSR, the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev.

When signing the Belovezhskaya Agreements on December 8, 1991, Boris Yeltsin contacted first of all E.I. Shaposhnikov. During a 20–minute conversation, the USSR Defense Minister approved the document, as he received assurances of maintaining a unified Armed Forces ^{[6, p. 126]}. Mikhail Gorbachev recalled that the USSR Defense Minister subordinate to him did not inform him about conversations with Boris Yeltsin, and called him himself. Not immediately, but E.I. Shaposhnikov confessed to the call from the President of the RSFSR, but stated that he "knows nothing more" ^{[10, pp. 598-599]}.

According to the press secretary of the President of the USSR A.P. Grachev, after the signing of the Belovezhsky Agreement, Mikhail Gorbachev could not rely on either the party, the KGB, or the Minister of Defense, but only the military and special forces units remained loyal, whose representatives were ready to fulfill "any instruction to preserve a single state" ^{[11, p. 226]}. However, by that time, the special forces were not under the sole control of Mikhail Gorbachev, since, according to Boris Yeltsin, after the events of the GKChP in August 1991, the Alpha group could only be used jointly by mutual signature with Mikhail Gorbachev ^{[7, L. 97]}.

Only the Armed Forces of the USSR remained loyal to Mikhail Gorbachev, who, however, took a wait-and-see position after the publication of the Belovezhskaya Agreements, and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense did not openly express their attitude to these events, although they discussed the situation in a narrow circle, but decided not to make sudden movements and not make statements ^{[5, p. 3]}.

 By coincidence, it was on December 10, 1991, that a meeting of the leadership of the Armed Forces was to be held at the USSR Ministry of Defense. The meeting was traditional, it was held at the end of each year, when the results of the implementation of combat training plans were summed up. It was attended by Deputy Ministers of Defense, commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, commanders of the armed forces, groups, districts, fleets, associations, commanders of formations, and personally conducted by the Minister of Defense of the USSR ^{[12, p. 1]}. The question remains unclear on whose initiative the visit of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Mikhail Gorbachev to this meeting took place. There is information that the President of the USSR was expected at the board in the Ministry of Defense on December 9, but he did not arrive ^{[5, p. 3]}, according to other sources, the initiative came from the Supreme Commander himself ^{[13, p. 1]}. Meanwhile, on December 9, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev held a meeting with the Presidents of Russia and B.N. Yeltsin and N.A. Nazarbayev, and then discussed it at a meeting of the political advisory council under the President of the USSR, but the issue of the Armed Forces and the upcoming participation of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Meeting of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR was not raised ^{[14, pp. 756-757]}. Thus, there was no detailed preparation of the Supreme Commander's speech to the military leadership of the USSR.

On December 10, 1991, the traditional meeting of the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces was opened by Defense Minister E.I. Shaposhnikov, which has already become a distinctive feature, since defense ministers had not previously attended such a meeting. In addition, for the first time, the chairmen of the defense committees, parliamentarians of the sovereign republics and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, participated. For the first time, he attended such an event in the summer of 1985, after large tactical exercises in Belarus ^{[12, p. 1]}, actually at the very beginning of his reign. As P. Felgenhauer noted, the expanded composition of participants was unprecedented and violated the principles of army subordination, since subordinates were not supposed to be present at the "scolding" of superiors, and in total about 500 people were present ^{[13, p. 1]}.

Mikhail Gorbachev tried to use his last chance to attract the military to his side. In his speech, which lasted about 50 minutes, the President of the USSR outlined the situation in the country, described the economic situation in the country as catastrophic due to the delay in resolving the issue of statehood. ^{[15, p. 1]}. However, Mikhail Gorbachev insisted that fundamental reforms in the Union State are an objective necessity, as well as a decisive transformation of the Armed Forces, but recognized that the implementation of reforms is uneven, meets resistance from those who, speculating on the difficulties they are experiencing, are trying to pursue a separatist, destabilizing course. ^{[12, p. 1]}. According to the President of the USSR, disintegration has gained a particularly dangerous character, however, "the Novoogarevsky process provides a good chance to get out of the crisis." Mikhail Gorbachev advocated the preservation of the Union, since this is required by "responsibility to the millennial past and future" ^{[16, p. 2]}. In addition, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief repented that he had previously paid little attention to military problems ^{[17, p. 19]}, admitted his guilt that at one time he decisively did not stop the "attacks on the army", spoke in favor of a unified Armed Forces and called the lack of a political solution to the urgent problems the reason that the package of army laws and not accepted ^{[15, p. 1]}.

However, in general, Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the right to life of the Agreement in Belovezhye and called for "taking all the positive things" from the draft Agreement on the GCC and the statement of the three leaders on December 8, discussing them in the Supreme Councils of the republic and coming to a legal decision through parliamentary means ^{[12, p. 1]}. It was negatively perceived by the military leadership that Gorbachev's monologue did not develop into a dialogue with the military, although there were many questions to the Supreme Commander ^{[16, p. 2]}. Having started his speech at 16:45, the President of the USSR ended it at 17:35 and left the Meeting without listening to the officers and generals ^{[12, p. 1]}. After the Meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev arrived at a meeting of the political advisory council under the President of the USSR. The assistant to the President of the USSR, G.H. Shakhnazarov, who was present, noted that Mikhail Gorbachev was met with hostility at a meeting with the military leadership, and the Minister of Defense of the USSR, E.I. Shaposhnikov, agreed to transfer the joint command to three leaders ^{[18, p. 758]}.

In light of the analysis of information about Gorbachev's speech, the reaction of the military is not surprising. According to the generals who participated in the meeting, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not tell them anything new ^{[17, p. 19]}, he did not bring any proposals, and the actual flight from pressing issues from the military leadership also did not add arguments in support of the President of the USSR. In addition, much depended on the Minister of Defense of the USSR E.I. Shaposhnikov, who could influence the mood of the meeting participants.

At the same time, a meeting was being prepared with the military leadership of the President of the RSFSR, B.N. Yeltsin, outlining his version of the events of December 8, 1991 and arguments in support of it. The Administration of the President of the RSFSR has done a lot of work to prepare for the meeting of Boris Yeltsin with the top military leadership, in contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev. On December 10, the head of the Secretariat of the President of the RSFSR, V.V. Ilyushin, sent to his deputy V.P. Semenchenko an appeal from the officer community of the Red Banner Baltic Border District to the President of the RSFSR, B.N. Yeltsin, with instructions to use it in preparing the meeting ^{[19, L. 105]}.

The Adviser to the President of the RSFSR, Colonel–General D.A. Volkogonov, sent his theses to Boris Yeltsin, which he urged to use in the report at the Meeting.  ^{[19, L. 99]}. In particular, the theses mentioned the possibility of a Military–political Union of sovereign states, members of the Commonwealth, it was emphasized that the location of a particular compound cannot be considered a basis for ownership, and issues of rights to military structures should be resolved only by state agreements of all republics ^{[19, l. 101]}.

In addition, the office of the President of the RSFSR prepared abstracts of Boris Yeltsin's speech at a meeting with the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR. They reported that the Armed Forces should have a two-tier structure. The first level was assigned to strategic forces under the joint command, including strategic nuclear forces, strategic air forces, Navy, air defense and missile defense systems, mobile airborne forces and infantry, and at the second level – the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth states ^{[19, L. 90]}. In Boris Yeltsin's speech, the plight of the military was directly pointed out, and concrete measures were proposed to solve this problem. In particular, providing officers with the opportunity to obtain land and credit for the creation of farms as a matter of priority was indicated as one of such measures ^{[19, l. 93]}.

In addition to the above, a list of questions of interest to the participants of the meeting was compiled, which were supposed to be answered by the President of the RSFSR. First of all, they concerned the control of nuclear weapons, the subordination of the Black Sea Fleet, the fate of Ground Forces located outside the Commonwealth republics, Russia's housing debt, the formation of the budget of the Armed Forces of the new Union, the allocation of land for troops being withdrawn, assistance to troops by local authorities, the secondment of officers in the Armies of sovereign states and the supply of clothing property, equipment and food in conditions of violation of economic ties ^{[19, L. 83]}. It can be noted that all these problems were extremely relevant for the Armed Forces, especially those related to economic issues, to which the army leadership had not received answers from the Supreme Commander for a long time.

Thus, having carried out a lot of preparatory work, taking into account the mistakes of the meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev held the night before on December 10, Boris Yeltsin met with the military leadership of the USSR at 8 a.m. on December 11, 1991. At the same time, based on the documents of the Office of the President of the RSFSR, the meeting was moved from the House of Soviets of the RSFSR, as originally planned, to the Ministry of Defense of the USSR ^{[19, l. 82]}, thereby demonstrating a step towards the military. On the part of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the meeting was prepared by Defense Minister E.I. Shaposhnikov himself, thereby indicating the equal level of Supreme Commander Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin. However, the number of participants was significantly smaller, since the summing up of combat training ended in one day on December 10, and many commanders of formations and associations had already left for their units ^{[20, p. 1]}, and included only the highest level of the leadership of the Armed Forces of 51 people ^{[19, l. 84-88]}.

It was noted that Boris Yeltsin's speech, which took about an hour, was less academic than Gorbachev's speech on the previous day. Starting with an explanation of the creation of the CIS, the President of the RSFSR stated that the Union of Independent States is not directed against anyone or something, it is just a commonwealth that everyone can join, recognizing the possibility of omissions in the treaty, explaining this by lack of time ^{[15, p. 1]}. Boris Yeltsin's words that there can be no question of any division of the Armed Forces, the international community need not worry, and the command of the Armed Forces, as well as control over their individual components, including strategic ones, were and remain unified, were highlighted by the key head of the information department of the USSR Ministry of Defense, General–Lieutenant V. Manilov ^{[21, p. 1]}.

In his speech, Boris Yeltsin spoke about specific problems, in particular, the issue of the withdrawal of troops was raised. The President of the RSFSR condemned the unprepared withdrawal of Soviet troops from Western Europe, said that the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic republics would be, but not a run, but gradually, first it was necessary to solve the primary problems, for example, with housing. B.N. Yeltsin called the approximate deadline for the withdrawal in 5-7 years, adding that it would be a civilized withdrawal, and he expressed bewilderment why the Baltic countries should break down the unified air defense, missile defense, and Air force systems if they have to be created again in a year or two. The President of the RSFSR admitted that independent republics can create their own groups of ground forces, but Russia does not even think about it. Boris Yeltsin promised to "solve" the housing issue and announced that Russia would increase the salaries of officers by 90% from January 1, 1992, not only those who serve on the territory of the republic, and everyone, regardless of geography. Thus, the President of the RSFSR for the first time assumed all expenses for the maintenance of the army and navy of the Armed Forces of the USSR, leaving a comment on the future fate: "and then we'll see" ^{[15, p. 1]}.

In addition, Boris Yeltsin, clearly feeling superior to the President of the disintegrating USSR, publicly humiliated him in front of the military words that "the man who brought you to your knees is unlikely to be able to help you" ^{[17, p. 19]}, and finally "knocked out" Mikhail Gorbachev with a statement that during a meeting in Madrid with the US President, all expenses were paid by the Americans, "they say, begging, already walking around the world" ^{[22, p. 94]}, and this statement was subsequently confirmed by the adviser to the US Secretary of State for Newly independent states in the post-Soviet space, S. Talbott ^{[23, p. 332]}. After completing an hour-long speech, the President of the RSFSR answered questions from officers and generals for another half hour. According to the assessment of the Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District L. Zolotov, the generals had a truly direct and constructive conversation with Boris Yeltsin" ^{[17, p. 19]}, thereby the President of the RSFSR managed to tip the scales in his favor. The military leadership of the USSR heard what they wanted to hear, and the generals, supported from below by officer meetings, received answers to the army's questions about its future ^{[15, p. 1]}.

Having held a meeting with the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR on the morning of December 11, 1991, on the same day, Boris Yeltsin met with representatives of deputy groups of the RSFSR, at which he shared his impressions. First of all, he expressed surprise at the fact that the meeting went well, apparently, he initially expected a rather cool reception. The President of the RSFSR also noted that the military leadership reacted with understanding and generally approved the line of reforming the Armed Forces ^{[7, l. 94]}. In addition, one of the important achievements of attending the Meeting of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Boris Yeltsin, noted the fact that rumors of an impending military coup were dispelled. According to him, there is no reason to fear a coup, the army and the generals are not in such a state ^{[7, l. 105]}.

B.N. Yeltsin used all the above observations in his speech to argue in support of the ratification of the Belovezhskaya Agreements in the Supreme Council of the RSFSR on December 12, 1991. According to him, the leadership of the Armed Forces expressed active support for the position on CIS issues, and the army is on the side of those who "build interstate relations on a new, democratic basis" ^{[24, p. 4]}. The ratification of the Belovezhskaya Agreements by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the recall of Russian deputies from the Union Parliament meant the point of no return in the liquidation of the Soviet Union.

In fact, the winner in the struggle for the support of the army was the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin, and this was due to several factors. Despite the fact that the original "trump cards" were in the hands of Mikhail Gorbachev – the constitutional President of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Commander–in-Chief, to whom the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR directly reports - however, his political incapacity by December 1991 was obvious. Belated confessions and remorse were not supported by concrete proposals for solutions to the problems that had long been expected in the army and navy, especially in the face of the apparent collapse of the state. In addition, one of the reasons for the failure in the struggle for the sympathies of the military leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev was his lack of experience in the election campaign and lack of understanding of ways to win an audience, and the method of promising help and assistance is more effective than requests for salvation ^{[13, p. 1]}. Before the meeting with the military, the President of the RSFSR, Boris Yeltsin, had much less advantageous starting positions than Mikhail Gorbachev, but managed to learn lessons from the speech of the President of the USSR. In addition, Boris Yeltsin's office carried out a lot of preparatory work for the meeting, identified the key problems of the Armed Forces, and found answers to the alleged questions that could satisfy the military. Moreover, the very fact of the conversation and the answers to the questions showed the military leadership that the President of the RSFSR is ready to cooperate and solve problems, unlike the Supreme Commander M.S. Gorbachev.

It is important to emphasize that the military in the speeches of the two Presidents saw similarities in the main thing: the unity of the Armed Forces, their stability and political non-engagement are the most important guarantor of the national security of all states that are part of the USSR, no matter what the content of the agreements and alliances they intend to sign ^{[21, p. 1]}, and, Consequently, there was no big difference between the already established Commonwealth of Independent States of B.N. Yeltsin and the military planned for the Union of Sovereign Republics of M.S. Gorbachev throughout the year. A.S. Barsenkov noted as one of the factors of the calm perception of the Belovezhskaya Agreements by the entire population, and not only by the highest military leadership, the presentation in them of the liquidation of the USSR as a transformation into the new commonwealth in the spirit of the Novoogarevsky negotiations of M.S. Gorbachev ^{[1, p. 349]}.

But an important factor was also the fact that the draft Union Treaty of Mikhail Gorbachev during 1991, for various reasons, was never implemented in reality, and the Belovezhskaya Agreements were signed and received the support of the heads of almost all the Union republics. According to R. Glebov's correct remark, on December 11, 1991, after Boris Yeltsin's meeting with generals, Mikhail Gorbachev ceased to exist as Supreme Commander ^{[17, p. 19]}, which accelerated his resignation from the post of President of the USSR and marked the end of the process of the collapse of the Soviet Union.