The Armed Forces and Police of Independent Rhodesia (1965-1979). Part 2: The Armed Forces

Gonta Semen Nikolaevich Student; Department of Theory of Law and State, History and Philosophy; Sochi State University 354000, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Sochi, ul. Plastunskaya, 94 rudolf.diesel.bmw@gmail.com Other publications by this author

Ivanov Nikolai Aleksandrovich Lecturer, Department of Physical Culture and Sports, Sochi State University 354000, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Sochi, ul. Plastunskaya, 94 ivanovnik45@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The relevance of the research lies in the absence of fundamental works in modern Russian historiography that would objectively and in detail cover the events that took place in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) after the unilateral declaration of independence (1965-1979). This also applies to the armed conflict between the country's white government and black rebels, which took place throughout the existence of unrecognized Rhodesia.

This work is a logical continuation of the study, which is devoted to the study of the functioning of the Rhodesian Police (British South Africa Police) and the Rhodesian Army Forces (Rhodesian Security Forces) during the years of de facto independence, from 1965 to 1979.

In the previous, first part of the study, the history common to Rhodesian police and army formations was considered, which dates back to the time of the founding of the country by Cecil Rhodes, as well as the functioning of the Rhodesian police formations during the years of de facto independence ^[1]. The present, second part of the study highlights the functioning of the Rhodesian Army forces (Air Force and Ground forces) during the years of de facto independence.

The purpose of the study is to review and analyze the activities of the armed forces of Rhodesia during the period of its de facto independence from 1965 to 1979.

This work is an attempt by the authors to study the issue of ensuring public safety and countering rebel formations by the Rhodesian Security Forces (the common name of all law enforcement agencies in the country, including the armed forces).

Materials and methods of research

The methodology is determined directly by the research topic and includes general scientific research methods: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, classification method. Special historical research methods are also used in the work: historical-genetic and narrative methods.

The illustrations and photographs used in the article are taken from Internet resources (www.bsapolice.org , www.rhodesianforces.org , www.therli.com ), which are dedicated to events in Rhodesia and are supported by former residents of Rhodesia and veterans of the events described. All illustrations used in this work are photo quotes and are taken from open sources on the Internet. Also, under each illustration there are links to the original source (if it was possible to reliably establish one).

The bibliographic database of the article consists of relevant works by domestic and, for the most part, foreign authors on the topic of the study, as well as articles and other materials from the Internet (for example, declassified documents of the US CIA ^{[2, 3, 4]}, official UN documents ^{[5, 6, 7, 8]}, etc.), most of which are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

Discussion

In this article, the bibliographic list logically continues the first part of the research on the topic and is more devoted to the army formations of Rhodesia. As it was noted in the first part of the study, the topic of the war in Rhodesia is extremely limited in the modern Russian scientific environment ^{[9, 10]}, since Soviet and Russian historians are Africanists (V. G. Shubin ^{[11, 12, 13, 14]}, A. Y. Urnov ^{[15, 16]}) covered the process of decolonization of Africa and the accompanying military events from the point of view of the black Communist rebels and their people's liberation struggle, without considering the opposite side in detail.

However, in the Western scientific and military environment, which traditionally pay special attention to the study of events in third World countries ^{[17, 18]} since the time of the British War in Malaya against Communist rebels ^[19], a number of studies have been devoted to the war in Rhodesia (1965-1979) and its various aspects. First of all, it is worth noting the works of the American military: Charles Lohman and Robert McPherson ^[20], Timothy Bairstow ^[21], Michael Stewart ^[22] and Max Kohmetcher ^[23] (a detailed analysis of research on the war in Rhodesia, the American and Canadian military is presented in a separate work by the author S. N. Gaunt ^[24]). Also, it is worth highlighting the large-scale works in their volume and content (which, according to the authors, made the greatest contribution to the study and popularization of this topic): Jackie Silliers ^[25], Ken Flower ^[26], Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin ^[27], Jonathan Pitway and Craig Fury ^[28].     

The results of the study

The first part of the study examined the activities of the Rhodesian police forces, which were mainly involved in the internal struggle against the rebels, as well as in operational support of the army, during joint operations. The specifics of the work of the Rhodesian police and army were in many ways close to each other, especially at the late stage of the war with the rebels, when the entire power unit of the country actually turned into one common structure, built like a special forces unit.

In this second part of the study, the main data relating to the Rhodesian army are presented, namely: composition, strength, structure, weapons, etc.

Rhodesian Security Forces 1965-1980

In the section about the Rhodesian Army forces, it is worth starting with the role they played in World War II (WWII). At the time of the outbreak of WWII, Rhodesia was still under British rule, so, as in the case of the First World War, the Rhodesian contingent participated in hostilities on the side of the mother country.   

According to various estimates, about 10,000 white Rhodesians fought in the British Army, who served in various units such as the Desert Reconnaissance Group, the Special Air Service (SAS), the Royal Air Force, etc. It is worth noting here that even Ian Smith himself, the Prime Minister of independent Rhodesia, served as a fighter pilot, and after being wounded, as an instructor in the 237th "Rhodesian Squadron" of the British Air Force. Also, we should also note the fact that Rhodesia has made the greatest contribution of human resources to the assistance of the metropolis (if we count the ratio to the total white population).

Later, the military from Rhodesia took part in another armed conflict – the Malayan War of the countries of the British Commonwealth against communist rebel formations. As part of the British group in Malaya, from 1951 to 1953, the Rhodesian squadron "C" of the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) fought, its number did not exceed 1,000 people, subsequently reducing to about 100 people ^{[29, p. 53]}, and from 1956 to 1958, the "Rhodesian African Riflemen" (RAR), which were manned by white officers and black soldiers.

Figure 1. Rhodesians from detachment "C" of the 22nd SAS Regiment in Malaya, 1953.

Thus, approaching an important event in the history of Rhodesia – the declaration of independence in 1965, the country's army forces consisted mainly of motivated and well-trained white Rhodesians, who were also veterans of the British colonial wars. Also, it is worth noting here that it was thanks to the veteran officers of the Malayan War, who formed the backbone of the leadership of the Rhodesian army (even army commander Peter Walls himself took part in this campaign), that later it was possible to build effective tactics and strategy against black rebels in Rhodesia itself.

The Rhodesian army acquired its complete appearance on January 1, 1964, when the name was officially changed to the "Army of Rhodesia" (Rhodesian Army), further directions of development were determined, and all formations and units of the army came under the command of a new structure. At that moment, it was already clear that the country was nearing its independence and its proclamation was only a matter of time.

The Rhodesian Army after the unilateral declaration of independence (1965-1979).

After Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence on November 11, 1965 ^[30], the Rhodesian army, and with it the rest of the security bloc, remained loyal to their government, even despite the refusal of the UN and the United Kingdom to recognize this step.

The key stage in the formation of the Rhodesian Security Forces can be considered the so-called "Battle of Sinoia", when on April 28, 1966, a group of 7 rebels was destroyed by BSAP and reservists. Although the operation was carried out successfully (all the rebels were destroyed, against the missing losses of the police), but after this incident, the Rhodesian government decided to shift the focus specifically to military forces to fight the rebels, since the police forces were not adapted for the declared guerrilla struggle.

In the period from 1966 to 1969, small partisan detachments made small attempts at infiltration and sabotage, but did not achieve significant success. It is worth noting here that such a "quiet" period for the Rhodesian Security Forces was possible due to the low military training of the rebels at first, as well as the assistance provided by South Africa, sending "its police forces and prison guard detachments to Rhodesia to assist in the "counter-terrorism" war. Such joint forces established effective protection of the border with Zambia and ensured peace until 1969" ^{[20, p. 22]}.

Also, it was at this time that the rebel forces conducted enhanced military training in socialist countries (USSR, PRC). Therefore, this temporary weakness of the rebels was explained by the accumulation of military experience from the instructors of the above-mentioned countries and the adoption of final decisions on the opening of a permanent aid line for the rebels. Thus, the Russian and Soviet historian V. G. Shubin (who was a direct participant in the events at the diplomatic level, approx. the authors) indicates an even earlier date for the beginning of military training of insurgents in the Soviet Union: "cadres of the ZAPU and its military wing  The People's Revolutionary Army of Zimbabwe (ZIPRA) began arriving to study in the USSR in the middle of 1964" ^{[14, p. 16]}. Military training courses for rebels (from the ZANU group) were also opened in China, it should be noted that one of the members of the rebel group that participated in the Battle of Sinoya was trained at the Nanjing Military College, as evidenced by documents found with him ^[31].

But since the early 1970s, the context of the confrontation began to change significantly. The rebels who had received military training in the countries of the socialist camp not only significantly increased their combat effectiveness, but were now provided with all necessary small arms and special weapons, since the Soviet Union provided generous assistance with weapons to all socialist (even formally) "people's liberation movements" to fight Western "colonialism and imperialism." And the most massive type of weapon supplied by the USSR to African countries was the famous Kalashnikov assault rifle ^{[32, p. 73]}.

Mines should be singled out from the special weapons of the rebels here. The Soviet mines that appeared in the hands of the rebels became a serious problem for the Rhodesian Security Forces and ordinary Rhodesians. According to Yu.G. Veremeev, the Rhodesian war is one of the characteristic examples of "mine warfare" among the local conflicts of the XX century. Also, in his work, Yu. G. Veremeev cites the following data: "only from 1972 to 1980, 2,405 cases of vehicle explosions by mines were noted, resulting in the death of 632 white Rhodesians, and another 4,410 were injured" ^{[33, p. 284]}.

Since the mid-1970s, Rhodesia's situation has been deteriorating. "In 1975, an important event took place, which further influenced the course of the entire Rhodesian government's war with the rebels. A year after the Carnation Revolution in the metropolis, Portuguese Mozambique gained independence in 1975.

After that, power in the country was seized by the "pro-communist" Frelimo party, which was oriented towards the Soviet Union and enjoyed its financial and material support. Rhodesia was expected to be declared an enemy of Frelimo, and the ZAPU and ZANU rebel groups, respectively, allies in the fight against racists."^[34]

So Rhodesia received another enemy, who immediately opened his territory to the ZANU rebels. The country found itself almost completely surrounded by hostile forces, which constantly made successful attempts to penetrate deep into and attack civilian and military facilities. As the team of authors of the US Army Special Operations Forces Command, led by Paul Tompkins, notes in their study: "while ZIPRA (ZAPU military wing) operated from bases in Zambia, Angola and Botswana, ZANLA (ZANU military wing) expanded the structure of its training bases south along the border of Rhodesia and Mozambique" (see Figure 2) ^[35].

Figure 2. Map of the activities and bases of the ZAPU and ZANU rebels in 1974-1979 ^[35].

In this situation, the Government of Rhodesia decided to create special areas of operational responsibility, according to which the units of the Rhodesian Security Forces were maximally distributed throughout the country (see figure 3). The territory of Rhodesia was divided into 5 conditional sections – "Hurricane" in the north (including the area with the capital Salisbury), "Thresher" (the eastern highlands on the border with Mozambique), "Riples" (the area of Fort Victoria), "Grapple" (the central part of the country), as well as the "Tangent" area (the western part of the country bordering Botswana).

Figure 3. Areas of operational responsibility of the Rhodesian Security Forces in the country ^[35].

But even such measures could not contain the increase in the number of rebels in the country and the increasing intensity of their activities. So, if in 1976 the number of rebels in Rhodesia was about 1,700 people, then at the time of 1979 their number was already about 30,000 people ^{[35, p. 99]}. As the situation worsened, the country's military leadership, represented by Army Commander General Peter Walls, recognized its inability to control the entire territory of the country and the security of its borders. In fact, there was a compression of the country's territory, which could be controlled by the Rhodesian armed forces. Now the Rhodesian government controlled only the cities and the surrounding area, as well as important logistics and transport routes and hubs of the country. And for movement between settlements controlled by the white government, special guarded convoys of civilian vehicles began to be assembled more and more often (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. The head pickup truck of the convoy guard, the inscription on the car: "Overtaking a convoy forward is prohibited", Carib city district, 1978.

Source: www.bsapolice.org .

Analyzing the actions of the Rhodesian government and army to combat the insurgency, it is also worth noting the border fortifications, which were built even before the recognition of the failure of full control of the country's territory. Among these, we note the so-called "sanitary border cordon" (see Figure 5), which was built in 1974 (and its construction began back in 1972, approx. authors).

Figure 5. Map of the sanitary border cordon in Rhodesia ^[21].

The above-mentioned sanitary cordon was a line about 179 kilometers long. The cordon consisted of "two small hunting fences at a distance of twenty-five meters from each other with mines scattered between them" ^{[21, p. 46]}. But, as US Army Major Timothy Bairstow notes in his dissertation on the analysis of border control, the effectiveness of this structure turned out to be quite low and rebel groups could easily overcome it, even "despite the density of up to 5,500 explosive mines per kilometer of the cordon" ^{[21, p. 47]}. Based on this, later, the cordon sanitaire was considered only as a tool to delay the penetration of the rebels into the interior of the country, and not to prevent it.

Timothy Bairstow calls the shortage of personnel in the Rhodesian army one of the possible reasons for the low efficiency of the sanitary cordon, which did not allow for effective control and maintenance of minefields and barriers. And here we turn to one of the most important and distinctive indicators of the Rhodesian army – its size.

In conclusion of this section, for a better understanding of the situation, it is worth mentioning some data on the size of the Rhodesian army during the period of the country's de facto independence (1965-1979). According to a declassified US CIA document, at the time of the beginning of the confrontation and in the subsequent first stage of the conflict (1965-1972), the number of Rhodesian army forces was about 3,000 people, the air force numbering about 1,080 people and the territorial reserve forces numbering about 7,400 people (the entire reserve was staffed only by white Rhodesians). Also, about 1,000 black Rhodesians served in the African Rifles regiment of the Rhodesian Army ^{[2, p. 28]}. Later, as the conflict escalated, the size of the Rhodesian army increased, at its peak having a staff of about 15,000 people (about 3,400 were regular military personnel, the rest were white reservists) ^{[23, p. 8]}.

And here it is worth mentioning the Rhodesian African Rifles regiment, where most of the black soldiers served. Throughout almost the entire conflict, this unit remained numerically insignificant compared to the white army units. The Rhodesian government sought to solve military problems mainly at the expense of the main white units of the army, which eventually became a mistake, since most black Rhodesians were ready to defend their country with weapons in their hands on the side of the white government. The mass acceptance of black recruits at an early stage could significantly change the balance of power in favor of the Rhodesian army, but such an attempt was made only at the very end of the war, when the strategic time for the formation of a black reserve was already missed.

US Army Major Michael Stewart comes to the same conclusion in his dissertation (devoted to the study of the formation and development of the African regiment during the Rhodesian War), concluding: "the tragic truth about the African Regiment was that throughout the war there was not enough number of its personnel, and the awareness of The fact that more black soldiers and officers were needed came to the Rhodesian government too late, despite early recommendations on this matter from within the unit" ^{[22, p. 138]}.

Next, we will briefly consider the main units of the Rhodesian army during the period of de facto independence and the armed struggle against the rebels (1965-1979).

Rhodesian Light Infantry.

It is worth starting to consider the units of the Rhodesian Army with the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI), since it was one of the most combat-ready and effective units, as well as one of the two army units consisting exclusively of white Rhodesians.

This unit was founded in 1961 as an infantry battalion, but already in 1964 it began to perform the functions of commandos (in other words, special forces). After the declaration of independence of Rhodesia, the regiment consisted of 5 branches:

1.                  Three main combat squads.

2.                  One of the security departments.

3.                  One rear group.

The number of the unit was about 1000 people (at the same time, there were approximately 100-150 people in each commando unit). Also, it is worth noting here that this unit was not only white (see Figure 6), but also included a fairly large part of the mercenaries (according to various estimates from 20% to 30%).

Figure 6. Soldiers of the RLI unit.

Source: https://therli.com/history/fire-force .

The use of mercenary forces was one of the reasons for the phenomenal combat capability of the Rhodesian army throughout almost the entire war, since its own human resource was limited by the demographic balance of forces (not in favor of whites), which worsened every year of the country's independence period ^[36].

The participation of mercenaries in the Rhodesian war on the side of the white government was a widely discussed topic at that time, and studies on this issue are still being published ^[37]. It should be noted that citizens of various states fought as mercenaries in Rhodesia. Mainly from the United Kingdom (most sympathizers of Rhodesia and considered them devoted brothers), South Africa (whose motivation was to maintain the combat potential of their neighbor, to preserve the buffer state taking the brunt of the "people's liberation struggle"), as well as from the United States ^[38], Australia, New Zealand and a number of European countries (which They mostly rode as soldiers of fortune, primarily for monetary rewards, although they were also not deprived of pan-British solidarity).

The recruitment process in Western countries took place mainly through veterans of various wars living there who maintained ties with Rhodesia. Due to UN sanctions, direct recruitment activities and advertising of such work were prohibited, so the information was transmitted mainly orally. All applicants were paid for transportation and accommodation while the selection process was underway (with a positive decision, the fighter was immediately sent to training courses lasting from 1 month to 4.5 months, depending on the unit). The intermediate hub for the arrival of mercenaries in Rhodesia, of course, was South Africa, to which potential mercenaries got through third countries from their point of departure. In more detail, the process of recruiting mercenaries to Rhodesia is described by Robert Brown in an article for the Soldier of Fortune magazine, who visited Rhodesia in the spring of 1974 and personally communicated with foreign mercenaries who fought there ^[39].

In conclusion of this section, it is worth noting here another feature of the unit – its mixed composition, which included white soldiers and officers, white mercenaries from other countries, as well as, since 1973, the most capable white recruits ^[40].

Rhodesian Armoured Corps.

This unit was formed in 1972 to support ground forces in ground operations (such as: patrolling and reconnaissance, convoy escort, transportation, etc.). The need for such a unit was the specifics of the war, which mainly consisted of ambushes and attacks on personnel in rough terrain, as well as the use of a large number of anti-tank mines, which usually caused significant damage to manpower and civilian vehicles that were not protected.

The main vehicles of the unit were old wheeled armored vehicles of the British ("Ferret Mk.2") and South African production ("Eland", see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Armored vehicles "Eland" of the Rhodesian army.

Source: John Wynn Hopkins / Wikimedia Commons.

Also, due to the lack of light armored vehicles for transporting personnel, the Rhodesian armed forces used various homemade vehicles built according to the MRAP type. "MRAP armored vehicles (mine resistance ambush protected; literally, a vehicle that protects against mines and ambush attacks) have become popular in special forces and armed forces of many states in recent decades" ^[42]. However, it is the war in Rhodesia that can be considered the starting point for the development of such special armored vehicles. And if the first models of such cars (see Figure 8) were artisanal and had a rather primitive appearance and weak characteristics, then approximately in the second half of the 1970s such cars began to make significant technical progress (see Figure 9), representing armored vehicles of a higher level.

Figure 8. The mine-protected Hyena car manufactured in South Africa ^[41].

Figure 9. The mine-protected Crocodile car manufactured in South Africa ^[41].

The main production of such machines was concentrated in South Africa, since Rhodesia did not have ample opportunities for its own production. Thus, South Africa's military production received an impetus for development, having, in fact, a testing ground for its samples of military equipment nearby. And the Rhodesian army, in turn, could count on unannounced assistance from a more developed military industry of its neighbor.

In addition to the above-mentioned handicraft vehicles, by the end of the war the unit had its own tanks, which, however, were never used in battle, remaining a weapon of psychological intimidation. 8 out of 10 T-55 tanks were transferred to South Africa for the Rhodesian Army (see Figure 10), after they were confiscated in 1979 from a French cargo ship in the port of Durban.

Figure 10. The T-55 L tank in the Rhodesian Army ^[43].

After the transfer of tanks to Rhodesia, South Africa also sent its instructors there to train crews, after which the Rhodesians created squadron "E" as part of an armored car unit.

The Rhodesian Air Force and the Rhodesian Special Air Service.

The Rhodesian Air Force traces its history back long before the 1965 war with the rebels, but it was in this war that the country's air forces played a significant role in opposing the rebels and ensuring the effective work of other units of the Rhodesian Security Forces. The total strength of the air force unit, according to various estimates, ranged from 1,100 to 1,300 people. It is worth noting here that the Rhodesian Air Force is a unique example of how, in conditions of international isolation and economic blockade, it is possible to maintain the phenomenal combat capability of perhaps the most technically complex and sensitive type of military.

The Rhodesian air Force was mainly armed with fairly old equipment, which, due to sanctions, was very difficult to maintain in good condition, especially during an armed conflict. The Rhodesian Air Force fleet was represented by various types of aircraft: attack fighters (British "Hunter" and "Vampire"), light reconnaissance aircraft (American "Cessna Skymaster" and "Aermacchi AL-60"), training (British "Percival Provost", Figure 11), "military transport" aircraft (American Beechcraft Baron B-55 and Douglas C-47 Skytrain, British Britten-Norman BN-2 Islander), as well as helicopters (French SA316B Alouette (Figure 12) and American Bell 205).

Figure 11. Percival Provost training aircraft ^[44].

Figure 12. The French helicopter "Alouette".

Other models of light-engine aircraft were also used (Figure 13), especially in the Police Flight Unit (PRAW), which worked under the leadership of the Army Air Force and allowed pilots to use personal air assets ^{[1, p. 174]}.

Figure 13. The general purpose aircraft "Beechcraft Bonanza" of the pilot of the Police Flight Unit (PRAW).

Source: www.rhodesianforces.org .

Separately, it is worth mentioning the special air landing service (SAS), which in its structure and organization completely repeated its British counterpart. The SAS was another unit made up entirely of white fighters. His tasks included mainly reconnaissance, as well as the implementation of targeted operations and strikes against rebel forces (Figure 14).

Figure 14. Soldiers of the Rhodesian SAS in preparation for a combat mission.

The SAS fighter training program was the most complex and included the entire range of military training – from skydiving to learning local African languages. Based on this, the SAS was one of the most elite units of the army, and its number did not exceed 200-300 people.

Selous Scouts.

This division was established in 1973 and existed until the collapse of Rhodesia in 1980. As noted by Charles Lohman and Robert McPherson: "every war gives birth to its elite troops, and Rhodesia was no exception" ^{[20, p. 28]}. This statement can be confidently attributed to the Selous Scouts, because, despite the short period of existence, they have demonstrated phenomenal combat effectiveness with limited resources and the most difficult conditions. According to various estimates, for the entire time of its existence, the unit numbered from 1,200 to 1,800 people. The main task of the unit was to conduct so-called "pseudo-terrorist" operations against the enemy, in fact, conducting a guerrilla struggle against the rebels themselves. During such operations, the unit's fighters were completely self-sufficient and could carry out sabotage and sabotage on the territory of neighboring states, where the main rebel forces were concentrated. The Selous Scout Unit was so secret that until the late 1970s, few people knew about it, even in Rhodesia itself. The personnel were racially mixed, and former black rebels were actively recruited into the ranks of the unit, promising them closure of all "sins" before the country. After Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980, the Selous Scout unit was disbanded because it posed a significant danger. Most of the fighters moved to South Africa, where they joined the country's security forces. It should also be noted that some of the black fighters of the unit were killed as revenge for fighting on the side of the white government.

Grey's Scouts.

This unit was a battalion-level mounted infantry formation, which at its peak numbered about 800 personnel (one squadron of about 160 people ^{[20, p. 28]}). The main task of the unit was to conduct reconnaissance activities in remote areas on horseback (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. The insignia of the Grey Scout Unit.

The unit also participated in joint operations with more elite units of the Rhodesian Army, as a support force. The main backbone of the formation was represented by white Rhodesians, since Africans, due to poverty, had a weak culture of handling horses. The exception here were some Africans who had previously worked on ranches and had experience interacting with horses. They were mainly engaged in servicing and assisting in the search for traces of the rebels ^{[45, pp. 309-310]}. Also, the unit used search dogs when conducting reconnaissance operations in the bush.

Rhodesian African Rifles.

The unit of the Rhodesian African Shooters by its very existence refuted the anti-Rhodesian position and outright propaganda cliches that were actively cultivated in the liberal media (mass media) of Western countries, as well as in print publications of the countries of the socialist camp (the Soviet Union is particularly worth noting here ^[46]). The history of this formation began during the First World War, when Rhodesia formed a special native regiment, in which African soldiers and white officers served ^[47]. Later, the African regiment was reorganized in 1940 to participate in World War II. Having taken part in several more conflicts (the Suez crisis and the War in British Malaya), the Rhodesian African Regiment came to the moment of the unilateral declaration of Rhodesian independence.

After the outbreak of the Rhodesian armed conflict with the ZAPU and ZANU rebels, the unit was expanded by newly created formations. The personnel of this unit was mixed and consisted mainly of white and black officers, as well as black volunteer soldiers (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. Soldiers of the regiment of African riflemen on a patrol boat, Lake Kariba, 1976.

Source: Ggwallace1954 / Wikimedia Commons.

By 1977, the number of the Rhodesian African Riflemen regiment was about 2,800 people (4 battalions, each numbering about 700 people) ^{[20, p. 27]}. As noted by Majors of the U.S. Army Charles Lohman and Robert McPherson, black soldiers were naturally adapted to life in the bush and therefore the regiment acted quite effectively and had a good reputation among other units. In approximately the same vein, this unit is described by another US officer, Michael Stewart, in his work devoted to the study of the formation and development of this unit. In particular, Stewart notes that "for soldiers, the regiment was a source of income, stability and family pride, since in many cases the soldier was a hereditary military man. The soldier of this regiment was a respected member of a team rich in traditions and proud of its history. He was not a second-class citizen and was not considered inferior because of his race" ^{[22, p. 17]}.

The main motivation that motivated black volunteers to join the ranks of the unit was the anti-example that the rebels from the ZAPU and ZANU groups showed. Waves of robberies, violence and murders (due to the refusal to help in the war against the state), to which the black population was subjected, by, in fact, gangs, sharply turned away a significant part of the black population of the country. It was "in protest against the atrocities of ZAPU and ZANU, the protection of their property and the existing tribal system, that many black Africans voluntarily fought for white Rhodesia – in the Rhodesian African Regiment and other units of the Rhodesian Security Forces" ^{[22, p. 22]} (see Figure 17).

Figure 17. Black fighters of the Rhodesian Police Auxiliary Forces (Support Unit).

Source: www.bsapolice.org .

Thus, propaganda cliches about the alleged "colonialist regime", which with the help of "white bayonets" kept the black population in fear, had nothing to do with reality.

Conclusion

Thus, at the end of this study, it can be concluded that the armed forces of Rhodesia were a key factor in maintaining the country's white government for almost 15 years, after the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. Faced with sanctions difficulties during a virtually continuous guerrilla war, the Rhodesian army was able to adapt and very effectively counter the external military threat. It should be especially noted that the Rhodesian army was not racist, since a significant part of the black population of the country fought in various units of the Rhodesian Security Forces, and the black fighters themselves were not subjected to any discrimination. It should also be noted that even despite some mistakes of the army and political leadership (for example, the late realization of the importance of African soldiers in the war against the rebels), the Rhodesian army still remained phenomenally effective.

Having not actually lost a single battle, the Rhodesian army was still unable to ensure the continued existence of the country, since the entire Rhodesian war was a "battle against time", the conjuncture of which left no chance for the existence of an independent Rhodesia.