I. Kant: aesthetics and the world concept of philosophy

Kormin Nikolai Aleksandrovich Doctor of Philosophy Leading Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Moscow, Goncharnaya str. 12, p. 1, room 507 n.kormin@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The relevance of the analysis of the world concept of philosophy, introduced in the transcendental metaphysics of Immanuel Kant, is associated with the need for a theoretical understanding of the changes of modern changes in the world order and the formation of new centers of world development. The ideological justification of such a formation largely coincides with the attitudes that developed in the context of the development of the world concept of philosophy by Kant, its subtle aesthetic facet. This facet is connected with the study of the architecture of the relationship between the common and the special, the universal and the unique. The purpose of this article is to consider the key aspects of the movement of Kant's aesthetic thought that help to understand the meaning of the world concept of philosophy or the philosophical concept of the world as a system, as it manifested itself in metaphysics, created in accordance with the critique of pure reason. But the very topic of creating metaphysics poses a purely aesthetic problem of creativity. How the creation of metaphysics is possible is both a purely metaphysical and purely aesthetic question.  And the point here is not in the "understanding of aesthetics, especially in the concept of time" (Kant), not in the necessary elegance of the presentation of thought, not in what the philosopher calls the fashionable manner of genial freethinking characteristic of his time. The question is whether aesthetics is a profiling discipline as an instrument of the culture of reason.

Traditionally, aesthetics is understood as something that goes back to ancient Greek terms meaning "to feel", "perceived by the senses". From Kant's point of view, sensuality is inscribed in the transcendental doctrine of principles, making up its first part, and represents one of the trunks of human cognition, the root of which is unknown to us, although it is so powerful that it contributes to the "successful and fruitful growth of science integral to the human mind, every growing trunk of which is not difficult, of course, to cut down, but whose roots cannot be destroyed" [26 p. 77 (24)]. But if this is so, then is not the aesthetic impression this mysterious, indestructible root of human cognition, which constitutes the condition only under which objects are given to him? But how to get to this aesthetic root?  As for the second, different from sensuality, stem of cognition – the understanding, the aesthetic is problematized in its field, since analytical judgments, without which it is impossible to gain clarity of concepts, have one limitation: these rational concepts are not required in order, as Kant will say, "to get something really new." Therefore, when we touch the second trunk of the tree of knowledge, we cannot say that there are sprouts of creativity on it. So, just one introduction to the "Critique of Pure Reason" opens up a whole range of aesthetic problems for us. The aesthetic fragments present in this work help to deal with the problem of the world concept of philosophy, which is extremely important for understanding transcendental metaphysics, the formation of which Kant presupposes a thorough elaboration of the doctrine of the universal schematism of the ineffable beginning of sensuality, which is transferred to everything that becomes the property of our ability to think. In schematism, Kant sees a metaphysical construct, an aesthetically experienced configuration of thought, thanks to which we can think what is inexpressible, compare the categorical and empirical, establish the boundaries of the application of the first to the second. In fact, on the basis of conceptual structures of schematism, the world concept of philosophy will be built, the justification of such structures is a thought experiment conducted at the stage of preparing the very principle of the world concept of philosophy. For the topic of our research, it is important that in schematism every thought takes on an aesthetic form.

The article analyzes the metaphysically coherent, though not so aesthetically explicit structures of the movement of Kantian thought towards the world concept of philosophy. These structures somehow correlate with the concepts of the sensual and rational, namely, they are the basis of Kant's ideas about transcendental schematism – a kind of propaedeutics of the world concept of philosophy, which gives rise to the ideal of the philosopher as a model. The attributive concept of "aesthetic" or hidden art of the soul is quite applicable to transcendental schematism. The schematism of pure reason reveals the transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment, which refers to architectonics – a kind of aesthetics of the entire system of a priori sciences, a system of criticism in a completely developed form (although initially it had its own scheme as an initial germ), an architectural metaphor for the structure of the mental and cultural space, allowing you to see the idea in a clearer light. The developed faculty of judgment with its schematism fulfills a unique aesthetic mission, which we can judge through the concepts of the appropriate expediency of the form of the whole, the talent of the mind, talent, creative ability of the subject studying the system of philosophy. The transcendental architecture or the scheme of the architectonics of all knowledge flowing from pure reason gives a philosophical projection of the spiritual world as an idea of a possible universal science, mathesis universalis, but even 300 years after Kant, we hardly came close, although we followed various paths, to a universal model of critical objective consideration of all attempts at philosophizing, to ensure that "to make a hitherto failed copy equal to the sample." The ideal of the philosopher as a legislator of the human mind serves as such a model. It was in this ideal that the world concept of philosophy was personified. And the creation of a personification picture is precisely the aesthetic preparation of such a sample – a universal matrix of the world, as if an aesthetically designed bridge between a time in which everything has already been philosophically accomplished (the history of philosophy) and a time in which philosophical models have yet to be accomplished (philosophy in the future history of mankind). 

Schematism as a manifestation of talent judgment ability

The synthesis of cognitive and creative abilities is fully manifested in the development of Kant's doctrine of schematism. The study of schematism seems to the philosopher to be one of the most difficult points of all epistemology. This approach – in its modern register – takes on a new dimension. Correlating schematism with structuralist tools used in literary criticism, J. Derrida emphasizes that it is precisely "thanks to schematism and a more or less recognized reduction to the spatial, we are freer, in terms, to inspect the field deprived of its forces" ^{[16, p. 12]}, freer in the state of the appearance of a seductive form that deprives us of the ability to understand the power from within itself, which is the state in which we can create. Schemes are in a certain sense closer to contours and drawings, which are "better visible when the content, that is, the living energy of meaning, is neutralized. It is like the architecture of a dead or stricken city reduced to its skeleton by some natural or artificial catastrophe. It's not that this city was just uninhabited or abandoned: rather, this city with ghosts of meaning and culture" ^{[15, p. 12]}. Schematic urbanism is, of course, not the urbanism of semantic castings, but in Kant's concept it would be interesting to correlate it with the appearance of meaning, with the invention of a method that, according to some ideas, allowed for the unfolding of a perspective view of objects lining up towards the horizon on some surface.  We will return to the modern interpretations of schematism later.

It is extremely difficult to prescribe the relationship of a schematic image and aesthetic consciousness, here we are faced with confusing ambiguity. Revealing the meaning of the transition from the problematics of synthesis as an action of the faculty of imagination (through which diversity in sensory contemplation is connected, the ideal representation of which is the ideal of beauty) to schematism, Kant throws a new light on the problem of applying categories derived from forms of judgment to the data of experience, and they are just processed into concepts of the synthesis of contemplation. These forms are thought of as existing a priori before any experience, but intending the experimental application of the understanding, whose actions are indefinite without schemes or matrices of sensuality. In a letter to I. G. Tiftrunk dated December 11, 1797, Kant does not dramatize the situation so much. The cornerstone of this problem, as V. V. Vasiliev notes in his comments to the materials of the Critique of Pure Reason, is "in the heterogeneity of the transcendental scheme, i.e. Kant fears that the problem of interaction between sensuality and reason is not solved with the help of schematism, but only transferred to another level" ^{[23, p. 680]}. But does this mean that such transferred schematism is the one that aesthetic ideas will be inspired by? Although he will always treat what beckons us with his peculiar approach.

In another place, Kant warns of the danger that awaits us if we try to immediately move from the possibility of concepts to the possibility of real objects, to confuse the logical predicate with the real. The type of transcendental cognition refers to a mental act in which the pure concepts of the understanding "are not constrained by the conditions of our sensory contemplation, but have an unlimited field, and only the cognition of what we think, [i.e.] the process of determining the object, needs contemplation" ^{[26, p. 243 (166)]}. By means of categories containing the unity of reflection on phenomena, we unite the manifold in transcendental apperception – this primordial unity (different from both logical and subjective concepts of unity). This creates the prerequisites for synthesis as such, the prerequisites for creating the power of connection as such, thereby setting the possibility of objectivity itself (objective unity of self-consciousness), the ability to think of an object in general, extracting from this mental act the material for conclusions. The categorical apparatus itself gives, according to Kant, the intellectual form of all experience, establishing a connection with the concept of synthesis, the concept of connection, which, although not included in the structure of this apparatus, but permeates it through and through. From here already lies a direct path to schematism. "After all, the connected as such cannot be contemplated, on the contrary, in order for the manifold given in contemplation to be connected in one consciousness, i.e., in order to think of an object as something connected, it must be preceded by the concept or consciousness of connection (the function underlying all categories as a synthetic unity of apperception), which is achieved with the help of schematism the ability of judgment, by virtue of which, on the one hand, the connection is consciously connected with the inner sense in accordance with the idea of time, but at the same time, on the other hand, with the diverse content given in contemplation" ^{[35, pp. 576-577]}. The situation is even more heated in the materials for the "Critique of Pure Reason". Imagine that there are two different banks (contemplation and category) of the same river (consciousness), the problem is how to get from one bank to the other, which will require considerable effort. The crossing project involves either the construction of a bridge, or at least the construction of a boat to swim from one shore to the other. The difficulty is that even the material (and if we follow Joseph Brodsky, then we must admit that it must be of aesthetic quality: "Matter is an aesthete..." ("Triton", 1994)) for their construction, it is impossible to take either from the rocks that are on both banks, or from the river itself; you can, of course, block its bed with coastal blocks, but it will no longer be a river of consciousness. Therefore, something different from the river and its banks is necessary, but nevertheless homogeneous with the forms of contemplation, and with categories as conditions for the possibility of experience, with the help of categories we a priori know the objects revealed by our senses according to the laws of their connection, thereby making nature itself possible. Creating such a heterogeneous project that will allow them to be combined into a single whole and generalize the existing knowledge about these areas is a difficult philosophical task, for Kant it is almost a puzzle. Such a project culture makes it possible to integrate sensuality and categoriality, to make up a posteriori a priori into a kind of hypertext of universal individuality and somehow coordinate the relationship between them. Hence, the solution of this philosophical problem is possible in the process of combining sensuality and reason, as well as the designation of some generative action, the result of which is a scheme (from the ancient Greek – "view, figure, sketch, plan, facial expression, even splendor: as we read in Sophocles - (to be surrounded by royal splendor)) – this, according to Kant's definition, is a "sensuous concept of an object", a paradoxical squaring of a circle, but without it, categories would fix things by themselves and, therefore, could not represent the object itself. "This schematism of our reason in relation to phenomena and their pure form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul, the real techniques of which we will hardly ever be able to guess from nature and reveal" ^{[26, p. 259 (180-181)]}. Schematism itself is a kind of intuitive way of representation with its spatio-temporal a prioriism, which is why it is close to the creative region of consciousness in which the aesthetic field of talent is read. Kant finds a scheme in the field of the faculty of judgment, which is able to create a "balloon" of pure ideas, and it is he who will take us from one shore to the other. In the thirty-fourth paragraph of the essay "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that may appear as a science," Kant writes: "... feelings do not give pure rational concepts in concreto, but only a scheme for their application, and the subject corresponding to this scheme is available only in experience (as a product of the understanding from the materials of sensuality)" (trans.. Solovyov). Consequently, the scheme is not just a sensual image, it is comprehended in the mode of a kind of mental composition, in which the image itself finds its objective embodiment in the form of special rules for its creation, components of the form of thought, ways of rethinking the entire structure, as well as aesthetic thinking techniques, its kind of thinking design. The attention of modern Western researchers is attracted by the question: what does it mean to think in images? Presenting a unified theory of different types of images, P. Kozak argues that images provide an authentic and autonomous form of content and knowledge. Unlike the propositional view of thinking based on similarity, it combines the ideas of philosophy of science, image theory, cognitive science and cognitive psychology, while demonstrating "that we can understand what images are only if we really understand the role they play in our thought processes, challenging the prevailing opinion that the usefulness of images is only instrumental and cognitively inferior" ^{[37, p. 248]}. Kant was just trying to identify the role that the image plays in the construction of thought processes. The ability to construct schemes mediating the connection between feeling and reason is thought by Kant as a "transcendental ability of imagination". In contrast to the image, as a product of the empirical ability of productive imagination – this creator of phenomena with their semantics, designed to construct a possible experience (although "whether this or that experience is not just a figment of the imagination – this question should be solved according to special definitions of experience and by correlating with the criteria of any actual experience" ^{[26, p. 373 (279)]}), the scheme is something like a monogram of pure imagination a priori. But such a monogram is not just a way of decorating an image, behind the beauty of a monogram with its forms and expressive details, sometimes confusing outlines of structural schemes are seen, J. Derrida even speaks of an ambiguous concept of form and expression, which refers "to the concept of imagination, this power of mediation, and synthesis between meaning and letter, the common root of the universal and singular – as well as all other similarly disconnected instances – to this dark beginning of structural schemes, the beginning of that friendship between “form and background”, which makes possible the work and access to its unity, that is, to that imagination, which in Kant's opinion was already art in itself, art, which initially does not distinguish between the true and the beautiful: after all, despite all the differences, the "Critique of Pure Reason" and the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" tell us about the same imagination" ^{[15, p. 14-15]}. The very a priori nature of the art of imagination is not only a theoretical construction, poetry also appeals to a specific understanding of a priori:

Perhaps a whisper was already born before the lips,

And in the absence of wood , the sheets were spinning,

And those to whom we dedicate the experience,

Before the experience acquired features.

    (Osip Mandelstam

"And Schubert on the water, and Mozart in the noise of birds..." (1933))

Schematism as a manifestation of the talent of the ability of judgment, as an option of which is the ability to use the concept under which the subject is brought, implies a formal mechanism by which the object itself becomes accessible to contemplation, that is, implies an amazing toolkit of consciousness made in the aesthetic workshop of metaphysics, without which it is impossible to make even a protocol of attribution of the object to the concept. If metaphysics itself is considered in Derrida's categories, namely as an exemplary insurance against the threat of writing (its perfidy is that it both oppresses and enlightens), then the question inevitably arises about the relationship between metaphysics itself and what the philosopher calls the root scheme. Any written texts refer to their own roots, which do not germinate to the depth of the representation space, which "destroys their root essence, although it does not cancel the very need for their rooting function. To talk about this endless interweaving of roots, about their rooting in other roots, about forcing this root rooting, about multiple returns to the same points, about repetitions of old couplings, about entangling and twining each other's roots, to say that the text is only a root system - it means, of course, contradict both the concept of the system and the scheme of the root. This contradiction is not a pure appearance: it acquires a contradictory, or "illogical" meaning only inside a closed configuration - the history of metaphysics, inside a root system that goes far into the depths and does not yet have a name" ^{[14, p. 242]}. But aren't the concepts of the root scheme or the base scheme problematic?

Are they possible in Kantian transcendentalism? After all, the transcendental scheme is not a scheme of the foundation, but a way to identify a synthesis that takes place on a categorical field and occurs in accordance with the rules of unity, and the fact that this synthesis takes place on the basis of concepts does not mean that the scheme as such is a scheme of the foundation itself. And although the schematism of pure reason is embedded in the transcendental doctrine of principles, in the analysis of the fundamentals, but Kant characterizes this principle underlying the transcendental theory as the doctrine of the faculty of judgment, which is its, analytics, canon. It reveals the specific nature of the applied knowledge. That is, this canon contains samples for different cases of applying rational concepts to phenomena. Between the understanding with its categories that guide its activity in experience and reason – these two higher cognitive abilities – there is a certain ratio, as it were, according to their height, or, to use the appropriate terminology, a musical interval, the measure of the "calculus" of which is precisely the whole tone of the faculty of judgment as a special ability, according to which both the deaton of the defining and the semitone of the reflecting judgment abilities were determined. The developed ability of judgment with its schematism fulfills a unique aesthetic mission, which we can judge through the concepts of talent, talent. "The faculty of judgment is a special talent that requires exercise, but which cannot be learned. That is why the faculty of judgment, which is sometimes identified with the faculty of thinking, is a distinctive feature of the so-called natural mind and its absence cannot be filled up by any school, since a school can give a limited mind and, as it were, hammer into it as many rules borrowed from others as it wants, but the ability to use them correctly should be inherent even to a schoolboy, and if there is no such natural gift, then no rules that were prescribed to him for this purpose do not guarantee him from their erroneous application" ^{[25, p. 187, 189 (A 133)]}. To characterize this talent, Kant needs a special aesthetic language of philosophy, he finds it already in Plato, who explicates the aesthetic meaning of his constructions, the semantics of this language is clarified by Kant with the help of the aesthetic category of the sublime (not yet divided into dynamically and mathematically sublime). True, Kant believes that the sublime language that the ancient philosopher used "allows for a calmer and more appropriate presentation of the nature of things" ^{[25, p. 401 (A 314)]}. Schematism is one of the forms of such a narrative.

Kant reproduces the definition of the world concept of philosophy according to a certain model, while posing the problem of the typical embodiment of the idea, the ideal of the philosopher as a model. But how is it possible, to paraphrase Pushkin, of the purest thought "the purest sample"? To expand the reproduction of the definition of the world concept of philosophy, we need to comprehensively think through the structure of the idea. The idea as such gives unity to diverse knowledge, that is, participates in the creation of an epistemological system. But it is precisely to explain the way it is constructed that Kant uses the concept of art. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the term "art" is used only three times. For the first time – when he discusses the problem of schematism as art hidden in the depths of the human soul. The last time is when he talks about architectonics as the art of building a system, that is, the scientic, methodological aspect of cognition. But how do these two types of intellectual art – the art of the soul and the art of systematization - relate? Both types converge in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method." Kant writes here: "An idea needs to be realized in a scheme, i.e. in an essential variety and order determined a priori from the principle of the goal. A scheme drawn not according to an idea, i.e. proceeding not from the main goal of reason, but empirically, i.e. according to randomly presented goals (the set of which cannot be known in advance), gives a technical unity, and a scheme built according to an idea (when reason a priori, and not empirically expects them), creates an architectonic unity. What we call science arises not technically because of the similarity of the diverse or accidental use of cognition in concreto for all kinds of external purposes, but architectonically because of the kinship and origin of one higher and inner goal, which alone makes the whole possible, and the scheme of science must contain the outline (monogramma) and the division of the whole into parts according to the idea, i.e. a priori, that this whole must be distinguished from all other systems precisely and according to principles" ^{[26, pp. 1043, 1045 (in 861-862)]}. The aesthetic consequence of this position is that the differences in the fabric of art are associated with different types of unity creation. And what we call aesthetic science should be connected with that section of intellectual art that should contain the monogram of the whole. No less important here for us is the question of how the realization of an idea as an affective experience is possible, how the sensual embodiment of an idea itself is possible if there is no flesh in the idea itself, as well as about the ideal of sensuality, in which Kant sees a specific creation of imagination (monogram), a kind of sfumato of empyria as an unattainable sample of the sensual contemplation.

Only after the mosaic of the structure of our cognition has been painstakingly assembled, we are able to experience the idea in a clear light and architectonically sketch the whole according to the goals of the mind. The integral formations themselves seem to arise "from a simple cluster of concepts gathered together, at first in a mutilated, but over time in a completely developed form, although they all had their own scheme as an initial germ in the mind that was just unfolding, and therefore not only each of them is dissected according to the idea, but all of them they are united in the system of human cognition as parts of a single whole and allow for the architectonics of all human knowledge, which is not only possible, but even not difficult to create in our time, when so much material has been collected or can be taken from the ruins of old buildings" ^{[26, pp. 1045, 1047 (In 863)]}. Schematism is the germ of holistic semantic formations, through which the teleology of cognition is built.

At the same time, Kant's logic of aesthetic teleology has a pronounced structure of judgment, the predicate of which may contain subjective conditions of cognition, and everyone who makes a reflexive judgment recognizes that, according to Kant, subjective expediency is thought before its action is felt. As for the concept of the organism itself, the philosopher believes that, although the very principle of the original organization is incomprehensible to us, yet we constantly find clear traces of organization: spirituality itself, as I. Herder recognized, can be explained through analogy with natural organization, so that a person becomes a scheme of perfection of this organization. True, in the modern world this scheme becomes problematic, but schematism itself acquires special significance in modern science, for example, in genetics: a diagram of the structure of a double-stranded DNA molecule or a schematic representation of transcription. In modern science, there is no unambiguous understanding of the scheme and schematism. Often the scheme is presented in the form of a linguistic frame or template using instances of this scheme. Schemes are widely used in logical, mathematical and semantic fields (definition of inference rules, description of theories with an infinite number of axioms, setting conditions for the adequacy of definitions of truth). Returning to the anthropological scheme of perfection, to how in the historical process "everyone found a school for perfection" (Kant), it is worth noting P. Valery's point of view on the current state of this school: considering the ideal of a comprehensive man, he emphasized in "Aesthetic infinity" that "the perfect man is dying out." Another pathos is present in Kant's transcendentalism: "one can expect the transition of nature to even more refined actions in order to elevate man with them and elevate him to other, even higher stages of life, and so on to infinity" ^{[35, p. 47]}. Organization presupposes the concept of a goal as a specific form, an expedient and stable ordering of parts in its form, and, for example, prestabilism refers to a system of individual preformation (the so–called inclusion theory), and the question of the organized being itself with its target causality, that is, with "a kind of creative reason" - this active ability, the determining basis of which It is an intention that ultimately boils down to the question of man as the last goal of nature, structured as the bliss and culture of man.

Another monogram is the scheme of sensuality, which relies on synthesis, the scheme of sensory concepts (figures in space), which reproduces the subject in basic terms through semiotic structures, it primarily implicates spatial and temporal definitions in the understanding of what is perceived by us. The concept of schematism is an extremely complex phenomenon that has generated the most contradictory interpretations. We will be interested in it here insofar as it allows us to advance to the explanation of the world concept of philosophy. The schematic connection itself is a scenario of transcendence, it prescribes a sequence of actions according to which the pure concepts of the mind are deployed in the field of sensory thinking. Schematism originates in an area that is difficult enough to reveal the transcendental problematics, related to the comprehension of cognitive abilities with different properties – sensuality, reason (as Kant says, reason can't contemplate anything, and feelings can't think anything) and reason. Each of them has its own schematic sketch. So, as Fr. Nietzsche believed, "rational thinking is an interpretation according to a scheme that we are not able to overthrow" ^{[45, p. 177]}.

But if the conceptual and the sensual are so radically different from each other, then what will allow them to correlate in some way? The answer to this question has not been fully resolved. And in order to solve it, therefore, patterns of application of rational concepts to sensory data different from them must be found. In general, Kant's cognitive space makes real space possible. The rational concepts expressing spatio-temporal definitions seem to keep in touch with the subject of feelings precisely with the help of a scheme that can be considered not as a visual image, but as a form of what M. K. Mamardashvili called visible thoughtfulness, which involves the mind in developing the direction of sensuality, the result of such development is precisely the intermediary objects that they express the art of integrating into a single whole such different cognitive forms as sensuality and reason, the totality of whose knowledge is pulled into a system. Kant's schemes can be likened to the axiom schemes of modern intuitionistic logic, which define the intuitionistic calculus of discursive statements about external objects, with the essential difference that transcendental schemes transcend the framework of any logic. The typology of schematism is the most important way to develop the logic of criticism - from transcendental aesthetics and the transcendental unity of apperception to the transcendental principles of nature. For the topic of this study, the question of aesthetic schematism is of crucial importance, which, however, will not yet stand in the first "Criticism". Aesthetics itself avoids the shortcomings of both the superficiality of sensory cognition and the dryness of abstract constructions, but remains true to the arbitrariness in the action of the imagination, which opens up to us the horizon of perception, giving us access to the image, this fundamental aesthetic concept, which cannot be explained without referring to the phenomenon of schematism. And the question is not only in the structuralist influence, which testifies, according to Zh. Derrida, on the historical and metaphysical threat to foundations. In a certain epoch, "this structuralist passion develops, which turns out to be at the same time something like experimental fervor and multiplying schematism. The Baroque is just one example. Didn't they talk about him about “structural poetics”, “based on rhetoric"? But also about the "exploded structure", "about the enraged poem, the structure of which appears at the moment of the explosion"" ^{[15, p. 13]}. The question is different: in order to see an object and depict it, we need to understand how the image itself is possible. But such an understanding assumes that we know the scheme of the structure of the visual analyzer, the scheme of human visual perception. Reflecting on the subtleties of the structure of the physical image of the world, Max Planck turned to the concept of G. Helmholtz, according to which "our perceptions are never able to deliver us a copy of the external world, at most it is only to give a schematic sketch from it" ^{[48, p. 81]}. As for the image itself, for example, we see it on the TV screen, but this image is possible because scientific thinking has built a block diagram of the TV itself. That is why it is so important for us to turn to the concept of a scheme, that is, to the image of the outlines of an object by means of these refined structures.

The doctrine of schematism opens the transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment, where the concept of the transcendental faculty of imagination develops, the "product" of which is precisely the scheme, without which it is impossible to identify the meaning and range of meanings of either pure concepts of reason or empirical concepts. In general, "in order to demonstrate the reality of our concepts, contemplation is always required" ^{[24, p. 513]}. Both sensory concepts and pure intellectual concepts have their basis in schemas, the former (in the form of spatial outlines) refer to them directly as products of the pure faculty of imagination a priori, normalizing our contemplation in accordance with a certain concept, the latter – a transcendental product of imagination as a categorical synthesis, for which the regulatory principle of unity is necessary, based on which lies the concept in general. In his Critique of Kant's Philosophy, A. Schopenhauer saw in Kant's schematism a means to increase the reliability of the entire system of criticism, although, as he emphasizes in a brief section devoted to the analysis of transcendental aesthetics, Kant's unconscious "way of his actions betrays itself in the most direct way. Namely, since Kant tries to find for each empirical function of the cognitive faculty an a priori function analogous to it, he notices that there is, if not always, then very often, a certain transitional stage between our empirical contemplation and our empirical, which takes place in abstract, non–intuitive concepts of thinking - this is when we from time to time try to return from abstract thinking leads to contemplation; but we are just “trying”, in fact, in order to make sure that our abstract thinking has not gone too far from reliable ground, whether it has not gone too high, or even turned into an empty word–in a word, this is about the same thing that we do in the dark, when we grab the wall that serves us as a guide from time to time. We only make this tentative and fleeting return to the visual world, since with the help of imagination we evoke some contemplation corresponding to the concept that occupies us, which, however, can never be completely adequate to the concept, but serves only as its temporary representative." It is this flashed phantasm, in contrast to the finished image of fantasy, that Kant, according to Schopenhauer, calls a scheme. But due to the fact that the scheme is a product of imagination, it should not be considered as some kind of fantasy, mathematical, geometric concepts that exist not in a dream, but in a thought that performs the activity of conceptualization are not a fantasy.: here thinking depicts something common to certain geometric shapes. For aesthetics, it is important to analyze the relationship of this geometry and art. So, if they focus on "schemes that may seem unnecessarily geometric, it is only because Cornel himself, more than anyone else, was engaged in symmetries." "This geometry is not cultivated for its own sake", "in large plays it is a means subordinate to the goals of the passions" [cit. according to: 15, p. 28]. In contrast to these schemes that are artistically close to symmetries, the geometric scheme in Kant's transcendentalism is understood as a normative act, firstly, the synthesis of the ability of imagination in relation to pure figures in space, and secondly, the definition of contemplation according to some general concept. No less important are the schemes in architecture, made in the form of a drawing, on which the components of a building or structure and the connections or connections between them are shown by conventional graphic designations. In modern design practice, there are several general schematic diagrams, according to which their architectural and planning solutions are implemented.

Jacques Derrida even seeks to outline the scheme of the poet's critical encroachment on philosophical discourse. Such an encroachment is undertaken by Paul Valery, whose attack always has in mind the crisis of the beginning. "Valerie reminds the philosopher that philosophy is being written. And that a philosopher is a philosopher to the extent that he forgets it" ^{[16, p. 331]}. Certain consequences follow from this provision, of which the following is of the greatest interest to us. Fundamental philosophical concepts are presented to Valerie as mere ciphers of the formalization of natural language with all its ambiguous, metaphorical structures, revealing, according to Derrida, the paradoxical law of increasing naturalization processes as graphic formalism expands, although philosophical writing itself is not yet sufficiently formalized, it is still far from its pure model – rigor and unambiguous accuracy. "The great invention," writes Valerie, "which makes laws palpable to the eye and readable to sight, is embedded in cognition, and in a sense it doubles the world of experience with the visible world of curves, surfaces, diagrams, which transfer properties into figures, thanks to which we, following their bends with the eye, experience in the very consciousness of this movement is a feeling of impermanence of a given magnitude. The graph is capable of the continuity that speech is incapable of; in the matter of evidence and accuracy, it wins over it. Undoubtedly, she commands him to exist, gives him meaning, interprets him; but it is no longer her who completes the act of mental mastery. We see how a certain ideography of relations between quantities and qualities written out in the form of figures is gradually being formed, i.e. a language whose grammar is a set of preliminary agreements (scales, grid axes, etc.)" [cit. by: 16, p. 333 (minor changes have been made to the translation)]. But when it comes to graphic formalism, ideography, figures of relations, all these structures largely coincide with the way Kant outlines schematism.   

A scheme of sensory concepts resembling figures in space (and, as Rilke says, wir leben wahrhaft in Figuren – we are truly alive in figures) Kant defines pure imagination as a monogram a priori. Only thanks to the scheme it is possible to justify the most important aesthetic category of the image. The very concept of the image, which is defined by the activity of the soul with all its outbursts, tonalities, modifications, is always associated with a certain scheme. Pointing out the difference between the image and the scheme, Kant emphasizes that if empirical concepts can be designated as the mental assumption of individual contemplations through imaginative structures grasping them (for example, by consistently perceiving five points one after another, consciousness builds an image of the number five), then no perception can give us an idea of the number as such. In this case, we are faced not with a method of cognition through sensations, but with a whole methodology that transcends the knowledge acquired through experience, and adheres to the principle of internal relationships (the principle, as Kant will say, of unity in the definition of sensuality), in this case, of all numbers, and allows for the image of a specific number (five, a hundred, a thousand, etc.) set the proportion as a product of the concept (numbers in general). The a priori concept of quantity is the category that prescribes laws to phenomena or things, and its pure scheme is just "a number - representation combining the successive addition of a unit to a unit (homogeneous)" ^{[24, p. 261 (182)]}. The schemes constructed in thinking can be likened to planimetry, a section of Euclidean geometry that studies figures on a plane. As the deduction of categories has shown, the concepts themselves do not have any meaning "where they themselves, or at least the elements of which they consist, are not given an object" ^{[25, p. 195 (139)]}. And it can be given to categories only in the field where some changes of sensuality occur, in the states of which our soul is exposed to external affiction. It follows from this that thought must be filled with content (capable, as Kant will say, of attaching an object to concepts in contemplation), to make the concepts themselves an instrument of a sensual view of the world when they enter into the biblical structure of what "enlightens the eyes"; the point is to make the concepts themselves sensual, contemplation it must not only see clearly, acquire the ability to see mentally, but also contain a formal condition on which the application of pure concepts of the mind to this or that object depends. This is the pure formal condition of sensuality that Kant calls a scheme, and the work of the mind with these schemes is called schematism. In fact, schematism is a normative methodology that presents the imagination with the opportunity to act constructively, to mentally construct a geometric figure that makes a sensible concept weighty. If the imagination schematizes on the territory subject to the legislative activity of the mind, then the mind itself and the mind, schematizing, philosophize, for example, at the level of the theory of similarity. Different things, interacting with each other, must have something similar, otherwise the very relationship between them becomes problematic. M. Merleau-Ponty reflected on the scale of the bodily scheme as the foundation of space and time, E. Husserl associated such similarity with the phenomenon of the thing itself. Speaking about the outline in the regional idea of a thing, he noted that "any phenomenon of a thing necessarily conceals a layer, which we will call a material scheme, is just a spatial figure filled with "sensual" qualities – apart from any certainty of "substantiality" and "causality"" ^{[9, p. 468]}. The motif of this performance gives a monogram of pure imagination a priori, which can be represented as a kind of sign of Mercury of the transcendental world, God-mediator between the sensual and the intellectual. The basis of their synthesis is the universal form of transcendental aesthetics - time, which sets the scheme, although its real sources are deeply hidden from us. In order not to end up in the eerie emptiness of thoughts without content or in the abyss of meaningless contemplations, transcendentalism introduces the concept of schematism.

Kant attaches the most important importance to the schemes of pure intellectual concepts or categories, through which the mind itself becomes the creator of experience. Each scheme imposes a standard by which the justification of possible contemplations on the field of activity of the mind is set. Pure concepts of the understanding exist outside of any contemplation, "but nevertheless contemplation must be substituted for it if we want to apply it to cognition; and if cognition must be a priori, then we must substitute pure contemplation for it, and moreover in accordance with that synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold [content] of contemplation, which is conceived by means of a category; in other words, the ability of representation must substitute an a priori scheme for a pure rational concept, without which the concept cannot relate to any object, therefore, it cannot serve for any cognition" ^{[34, p. 396]}. Schematism is a kind of converter operating in the field of consciousness, or a synthesizer that generates sound using various forms of synthesis (from subtractive synthesis to synthesis of physical modeling, when a mathematical model of a physical sound source is created) It is important to clarify whether a priori schemes can work in the process of conceptualizing the aesthetic, but this is the subject of special research.

Schemes confront the mind with rules that will intend its activity, requiring compliance with a kind of mental austerity that allows you to direct discursive forms (without allowing any deviations) directly to the canvas of explaining phenomena, to guide like a rut. A similar phenomenon can be found in the aesthetic field. Schematizing, specific categories seem to indicate to the imagination how to discover the possibility of non-objective, but universal aesthetic affects. M. Heidegger generally saw in the schematism of pure concepts of the mind a problematic related to the "innermost essence of ontological knowledge", contributing to laying the foundation for general metaphysics. Such an intermediary in the intellectual domain is extremely important, since we do not have an establishment for depicting shades of judgments about various episodes of knowledge, including mathematical knowledge. The scheme of the categories of quantity (unity, set, completeness) is a number, and the computability of real numbers means the countability of the set. In the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, the ability of imagination to give a scheme of numerical concepts is indicated.  "In Kant's aesthetics, the substantiation of mathematics goes through an indication of countability. The time scheme forms the basis of algebra precisely on the basis of countability – we can take the same subject several times, and this gives the basis for the comprehensibility of mathematics… The concept of a triangle or the concept of a circle, other concepts that are objects, have an uncountable character, they are spread out by one act over a multitude of points, or, if you like, over a multitude of heads. That is, five, conceived by five people, will not be lost" ^{[40, pp. 218-219]}. When we express a theoretical judgment, imagination provides us with a scheme to match the concept of the understanding, as if translating the concept into contemplation and creating the concept in concreto, replacing the concept with a special object. Sensuality and reason are characterized in the first "Critique" as two main trunks of human cognition, on each of which their a priori forms branch out. Sensory diversity gathers in the synthesis of grasping and is embodied through a priori forms into a space-time image, some Kant commentators even discuss the topic of space-time formations as individuals, intelligent bodies in which thought settles. The mind, whose actions are indistinct without sensuality schemes, always finds an empirical application to its concepts, so that from any abstraction it can blind a sensually tangible statue or magnitude, and the abstraction itself would have no meaning if we depicted an object corresponding to it. Therefore, from Kant's point of view, it makes no sense to talk about the object at all. "It is necessary and possible to speak only about an object for some scheme, which Kant calls a scheme of productive imagination, about reality for some scheme" ^{[40, p. 291]}.  Sensuality is precisely intended for the embodiment of reason, as well as for setting limits to it. Even the imagination forgets about the acts of schematization when it fully manifests its freedom, switching from one type of activity to another, connected with the construction of a new configuration of possible contemplations, with the description of the content of perceptions, with the internal mechanism of gestalt, when the imagination seems to be playing, observing this or that figure, form as a possibility of structure. The aesthetic prohibition on becoming the demiurge of an object gives meaning to concepts, although pure rational concepts, according to the laws of their connection, can purely symbolically dictate to objects, "as if a priori prescribe laws to nature and even make it possible" ^{[26, p. 235 (159-160)]}.

But how is the sensuous embodiment, the manifestation of the reality of pure rational concepts possible? To the analysis of their schematism, Kant presupposes the consideration of procedures for correcting the transcendental ability of judgment as the ability to bring under the rules established by reason. This transcendental vision of the faculty of judgment reveals "a sensory condition without which pure rational concepts cannot be applied" ^{[26, p. 253 (175)]}, and the schematism of pure reason depends on this condition. By the very structure of his teaching on the faculty of judgment, Kant seeks to give meaning to the entire categorical construction of transcendentalism and to give it metaphysical depth, first of all with the help of schematism of pure reason, revealing the intuitive prerequisites and sensory origins of the entire field of application of his concepts to phenomena. And for the unfolding in time of the act of such application, schematism is necessary, a kind of art of geometry with its space-time predestination and inevitability. This art opens up to us new facets of the application of reason to the subjects of experience subordinate to it. "With any summing up of an object under any concept, the idea of the object must be homogeneous with the concept, i.e. it is represented in the object being brought under it, since this is the meaning of the expression the object is subordinate to the concept. Thus, the empirical concept of a plate is homogeneous with the purely geometric concept of a circle, since roundness, which is thought of in the concept of a plate, is contemplated in the pure geometric concept" ^{[26, p. 255 (176)]}. Since rational concepts do not occur in contemplation, the question arises as to how the empirical application of categories is possible. Such a possibility arises if we allow a priori contemplation, which intuitively agrees with the pure concept of reason, and such a harmonious combination or synthesis is created by the transcendental ability of imagination. The creative expression of such a combination is precisely the schematism of the faculty of judgment, which fulfills its main task – to comprehend how to apply categories to phenomena, and the solution of this problem is conceivable only in the context of understanding how categories contain the basis of the possibility of any experience. All this contributes to the solution of the main problem of pure reason – how a priori synthetic judgments are possible, and they are possible precisely "through the axioms of contemplation – the anticipations of perception, analogies of experience and the unification of empirical thinking in general, i.e. through schematism of the faculty of judgment, which a priori underlies" ^{[23, p. 510]}. In fact, the ability of judgment includes in schematism a whole methodology of paradoxical creation of a figurative-conceptual system of thinking: we build an image of the object of experience in our perception due to the unity of self-consciousness correlated with the ability to bind. This experience is also carried out in the field of art, especially when constructing compositional or color schemes in painting.

If we are not talking about the schematism of sensory concepts and the faculty of judgment, but about the schematism of pure concepts of the understanding, then these concepts have a condition for their application to sensuality precisely schemes. The diagrams themselves allow us to understand whether the use of categories is not a simple pun. Since diversity in sensuality is brought by transcendental aesthetics under categories, where it is viewed by synthesis, which just gives in a general form a pure concept that a priori refers to objects, and the mind itself makes a measurement through the category of a multitude of objects, and not a specific object (there is no individual object that could be described, for example, category "quantity"). Since these concepts are pure, they have no colors to convey the unique properties of this particular object. And this situation is quite dramatic for an aesthetician, since the most important aesthetic category of the image is being problematized. Nevertheless, there must be some connection between purity and colorfulness, a pure concept and an empirical reality to which these pure concepts are applicable, and this connection will testify not only to the subjective significance of the categories, but also to their objective significance, and they can receive this evidence only from sensuality. Such an intermediary script between them, a tool for normalizing the process of creating such an unusual image, is the transcendental scheme, which has a dual nature. This is the first two-faced Janus of transcendentalism. By the way, in ancient Roman mythology, Janus is the god of time, and it is time that is drawn by schematism itself. The prospect of understanding natural phenomena arises when they fall into the focus of categories and sensory perceptions, and such a focus is precisely the scheme. By the scheme of the concept, Kant understands a generalized structure by which the empirical ability of productive imagination is able to present an image to the concept, to unfold a mental image, it reveals a synthesis explicated by the category in accordance with the prescription of unity on the basis of concepts as such. As will be noted later, the relationship between artistic imagination and ordinary fantasy is not as unambiguous as it may seem at first glance. Speaking about the structures that can be extracted from the representations of art, especially poetry, E. Husserl noted that they are "figments of the imagination, but by the originality of new formations, by the richness of specific features, by the completeness of motivations, they rise high above what our imagination is capable of creating, and moreover, thanks to the fascinating power of the means of artistic incarnations, they, provided they are understood, are translated with special ease into completely clear representations of fantasy" ^{[9, p.212]}.

Sensory concepts are rewritten into the solid form of intellectual statues, as well as into a pure artistic work of the soul, they represent a mental construction, as if a monogram of the pure ability of imagination a priori. We are talking, rather, about the features of "a vague image of various data of experience, rather than a certain picture; like what, according to artists ... hovers in their head as the indescribable outlines of their works or assessments. They can, although not precisely, be called the ideals of sensuality, since they should be an unattainable model of possible empirical contemplations, although they do not give any rules available for explanation and verification" ^{[26, p. 739 (In 598)]}. But is it possible to schematize the aesthetic principle to the field of experience? We can get an answer to this question when we study the exposition of reflective judgments and consider the principle of aesthetic judgment ability. From Kant's point of view, imagination as such has considerable aesthetic power in the field of transcendental interactions, which raises us above the nature in ourselves. Imagination is not just a disturbance of the soul, because it acts in the whole region of the substantiation of schematism: "the ability of imagination, according to the law of association, makes our state of satisfaction physically dependent; but it is precisely on the principle of schematism of the faculty of judgment (therefore, in this respect subordinate to freedom) that it is an instrument of reason and its ideas; however, as such, it is It is also a force [capable of] defending our independence from the influences of nature, considering small what is great for the ability of judgment, and thus seeing the unconditionally great only in its (the subject's) own purpose. This reflection of the aesthetic faculty of judgment, [aimed at] rising to conformity with reason (but without a concept of it), nevertheless represents the subject itself subjectively expedient through an objective discrepancy between the ability of imagination in its greatest expansion and reason (as the ability to [create] ideas)" ^{[24, p. 315, 317]}. Schematism is defined by the activity of the imagination, it is its product. But in the process of such creation, something is simultaneously relied upon that restricts this activity. This refers to certain boundaries of it, drawn by rational concepts.  There is still a debate about the place of schematism in critical transcendentalism. They are led by supporters of different directions both in modern Kantology and in philosophy in general, it is enough to recall, in addition to the material scheme, sensational schemes in phenomenology, which, according to E. Husserl, should be studied according to their noetic-noematic constitution. In the modern Russian philosophy of thematization of schematism, the analysis of methodological and design schemes by G. P. Shchedrovitsky, schematization as a type of practice by F. M. Morozov, schemology by V. M. Rozin, interpretation of schematization in the context of concepts of embodied cognition by S. Y. Borodai are devoted. In modern foreign and domestic concepts of embodied cognition, the embodied concept feels the presence of a naturalistic shade, so the embodied concept is essentially reduced to instrumental structures, to tools, but cognitive embodiment is not objectification. In essence, Kant's embodied concept is a scheme as the proto–language of thought: at the beginning of thought there was a scheme that occupies an approximate intermediate place between thought and reality, facticity (which does not coincide with either one or the other), which the aesthetic occupies between the theoretical and the moral.

As V. M. Rozin emphasizes, "a scheme is not just a narrative (or a graphic construction, for example, a diagram of the Moscow metro), but an element of the depicted structure, that is, a semiotic invention that solves a problem, sets a new reality, causes a new action. The concept of "scheme" explains the transition from the problems (challenges) of time, which become the problems of the individual, to the latter's assumption of a new reality and object that create the conditions for a new activity" ^{[51, p. 100]}. The specified permissions and transitions that make up this expedition according to schematism build a specific logic in it, including the logic of the pictorial experience. But the concept of a scheme is for Kant, as we will see, not just a semiotic invention. The idea of schematism is often addressed by modern Western philosophy, in which it is sometimes correlated with the concepts of frames and scripts. Note here Michael Pendlebury's only recently published monograph "Making Sense of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason". Philosophical Introduction", in which an entire chapter (7.1-7.4) is devoted to the transcendental interpretation of schematism, explaining why intuitions fall under the categories ^[48]. Nevertheless, clarifying the modifications of schematism by metaphysical reflection, elevating its originality to scientific consciousness, is by no means an easy task, which future research has yet to solve.

The most complete analysis of schematism is given in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the second edition it is presented in a collapsed form. In addition to what has already been said above about the concept of a scheme, it should be emphasized that it incorporates the key concepts of transcendentalism, which make it possible to understand how the process of thinking is carried out, how the mechanism of its connection and unity works – the concepts of synthesis and imagination. "Schematism is of fundamental importance for a correct understanding of the greatest achievements of Kant's critical philosophy: the possibility of experience, moral freedom of will, aesthetic and teleological reflection and the systematic unity of reason" ^{[15, p. 516]}. Schematism is a kind of dramatization of thinking, the processing of its text for transcendental embodiment. We perceive the world sensually and grasp it in concept. A gap inevitably forms between these two acts, without eliminating which, it is impossible to create a single fabric of thinking, without which it will experience constant breaks – feeling will reduce the tone of conceptual muscles, and the concept will simplify sensory experience. Therefore, in order to maintain tension in the string of thought, which is the primary source of transcendental vibrations and is used for the instrument of cognition, it is necessary to measure the forces of feeling and concepts transmitted to each other at the point of their attachment, and this measurement is precisely performed by the transcendental scheme. This peculiar structure allows us to understand how the sound of thinking is created as a result of the interaction between its various parts and approaching its going beyond its own limits. After all, the scheme contains a straight, string-like, pictorial composition of thinking, which draws only the outline of objects as a pre-linguistic integrity of ideas about them. It would be a mistake to represent the scheme in the form of a sensory image, it creates, as it were, its preliminary sketch, in which the rules of composition of such an image, corresponding to the rational concept, are already implicated. Kant calls such an effective regulation of sensory embodiment, a discursive applied theory, schematism. "Feelings do not give pure rational concepts in concreto, but only a scheme for their application, and the subject corresponding to this scheme is available only in experience (as a product of the mind from the materials of sensuality)" ^{[33, p. 76]}, as cognition through interconnected perceptions. Since the scheme reproduces not a specific object, but an object in general terms, its art is closer to the art of abstractionists or conceptualists, therefore, it is not able to give an accurate image of the object. The scheme is just a formal rule, and Kant clearly distinguishes it from the image, the image. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute it even to such a type of fine art as graphics, but if we still talk about it as graphics, then only in the sense of the outline of signs, the technique of its execution. And if we talk about graphics, then schematism itself can be represented as a graph of pure concepts. The scheme "is only a pure synthesis expressing the category according to the rule of unity on the basis of concepts in general, and is a transcendental product of the faculty of imagination concerning the definition of inner feeling in general, according to the conditions of its form (time) in relation to all representations, since they must a priori be combined in one concept according to the unity of apperception" ^{[26, p. 199 (142)]}. All concepts are acquired from contemplations, while a priori concepts of the understanding are based on a priori contemplations, but any contemplations are built by time as a pure form of contemplation, and the a priori temporal definitions themselves are nothing but schemes. All objects are felt in time, one after the other. Such objects can be both our inner self and external objects. Since in the pure concepts of the mind this or that object is represented as being in time, they themselves are temporally loaded. Therefore, time is a way of layering categorical paints on a phenomenal drawing. And the diagrams themselves show how easy it is to learn to draw with such unusual colors. As S. Kerner rightly notes, being the rule for creating images, schemes, on the one hand, are connected with concepts, and, on the other hand, they, as creators of images, are connected with perceptions. Some transcendental propositions make it possible to reveal a hidden aesthetic meaning in schematism, although most researchers believe that such an allegorical interpretation speaks only about the problematic nature of the concept of the scheme itself. It is difficult to say whether it will be possible to reveal the nature of schematism, but there is hardly any doubt about its aesthetic subtlety. Starting from the idea of the art of the soul, some of the Western scientists consider it possible to give an "aesthetic interpretation" of schematism [see, for example, 4]. S. Matern even tries to find out "to what extent schematism correlates with the meanings of art" ^{[41, p. 186]}, as they are revealed in the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment". It is possible, of course, to identify the epistemological significance of Kant's aesthetics, even to find out the central role of aesthetics in transcendental philosophy, as F. Hughes does in his book ^[30], but the main thing here is to determine by what structures and on what grounds aesthetics participates in solving the question of the possibility of metaphysics itself, in the construction of a building (tower) metaphysics. Schematism is just one of such structures.

Indeed, metaphysics or pure philosophy, which reveals the possibilities of a priori cognition through the concepts of pure reason, embraces, as Kant says, the fullness of "pure theoretical reason in synthetic use," and if this is so, then how can we raise the question of the relation of metaphysics to aesthetics. Reason itself, whose horizontal structure prescribes categorical diversity to transcendental analysis, is erected in metaphysics on almost an aesthetic pedestal, which raises it to the height of the concept of primordial essence, "pure consciousness and its a priori unity in the act of combining these representations" produced by the mind, whose structures characterize the relation to the object, and, therefore, and to the level of such a condition of all cognition as a representation reflected by another representation, that is, consciousness. V. A. Smirnov seeks to find out how the coherence of the world and the coherence of consciousness, self-consciousness correlate. "What conditions should my consciousness satisfy (what should it be capable of) so that I see the world the way I see it – as a coherence, and not a scattering of unrelated data spots? What does my consciousness do when the body, starting with skin receptors, etc., supplies me – my consciousness – with data? Why does this data not remain "data" when it accurately reflects the world, but is processed so complex and bizarre that at the end I see the usual "picture" of the world, which has nothing to do with the signals received from the world by my body" ^{[53, p. 19]}. The author believes that Plato discovers connectedness, the Platonic idea itself allows us to establish the temporal connectedness of a thing, although Platonism does not find an answer to the question of the connection of idea with matter. Does Kant have such an answer? In things, the philosopher finds a connection of coordination, the parts of each thing are connected into one whole. We represent a thing and can "connect the diversity of these representations in one consciousness" ^{[26, p. 205 (133)]}, and the mind, with its ability a priori to connect the manifold, subordinate to categories, to carry out a coherent experience, plays a certain aesthetic role, since it can even create the connection of the manifold itself, considered as a whole. Due to the creative spontaneity of thinking, the subject calls himself an intelligentsia, "conscious only of his ability to bind, but in relation to the manifold that it must bind, it is subject to a limiting condition called inner feeling and consists in making this connection contemplable only according to temporal relations that are entirely outside the concepts of the mind" ^{[26, p. 233 (158-159)]}. The connection itself, in the philosopher's view, is a form of unity of the synthesis of the manifold in the soul and in the world. That is, this is the ability of binding, thanks to which the synthesis of the sensual and intellectual takes place in schematism. A.V. Smirnov, in his analysis of the European concretization of connectivity, does not touch on the question of schematism, although, according to Kant, it is part of the structure of the transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment. Bypassing this structure, Andrey Vadimovich proceeds to consider an idea that "makes it possible to establish the connectivity of the same thing in time. Fixing being, the idea at the same time fixes the unique individuality of a thing, its own physiognomy, which is not reducible to anything. Each idea is qualitatively original and unique, it is saturated with content and is impossible without content. These are the two inseparable faces of the idea; perfect, extreme abstraction from the concrete content (being) – and deepening into meaningful certainty (the proper face of any given idea). Only thanks to the depth in concrete, juicy content, the idea is able to perform a task that is amazing in its depth: to collect the scattering of content in the basket of "things", taking the multiplicity of contents as a spectrum of changes in one thing" ^{[53, pp. 21-22]}. And for aesthetics, the very principle of weaving a basket of a thing, or creating a thing of a thing, is important. In addition, for the topic of this study, it is essential to understand the transition from schematism to an idea, its deepening into meaningful certainty, since the idea itself and the metaphysical steps following it are the rubrics of this cascade of problematization of the understanding of the world concept of philosophy, including the aesthetic moments of such understanding.

On an aesthetic pedestal, metaphysics rises to the idea of a person who contains metaphysics itself, although, as Kant emphasizes, usually in a rather vague form. One can even say that here metaphysics rises to the concept of the necessary and essential goals of humanity initiated by its project; such metaphysical design is possible provided that the ideal of humanity is realized in its perfection, that is, in what is given by anthroponomy, established by legislative reason (and here it is a special legislation symbolizing the intelligible world, referring to the law, which, according to Kant, humbles and elevates the soul at the same time, penetrating into it by itself; this means the highest perfect law, when the "judgments of the Lord themselves are the truth" (Ps 18, 11)) in the field of beauty. In this way, legislative metaphysics overcomes both the "despotism of empiricism" and the ugliness of unlimited love for imaginary knowledge. The fundamental problem of metaphysics is the problem of unity, unity (and aesthetic unity is this prop of cognition in relation to the ability to judge), and, for example, the "one" itself, which has surprisingly enchanted metaphysics, is the highest metaphysical good. It contains the material for the production of all other possible things, just as marble deposits contain the material for infinitely diverse sculptures, which are all possible only through limitation" ^{[34, p. 430]}. By the way, the mind itself is thought by Kant as a "perfect unity". But what, in fact, does pure reason want to achieve with the assistance of metaphysics, what influence does it have with its help and what value does it have? Or he is doing hard fruitless work here, like Sisyphus. Reason metaphysically holds the principle of completeness in the application of categories. If the interest shown by reason to metaphysics "would not be the deepest, it would be impossible to understand why no one listens to the call to finally stop the eternal dragging of this Sisyphean stone, despite the constantly revealing fruitlessness of efforts in this field" ^{[34, p. 379]}. Despite such a heavy punishment, metaphysics, as a complete integrity, continued and continues to invent the appropriate language, even, as Kant emphasizes, aesthetic expressions introduced into the initial philosophy. A philosopher may sometimes doubt the feasibility of the tasks facing metaphysics. He likens metaphysics to "a boundless sea in which forward movement leaves no trace, and there is no visible goal on its horizon by which one could judge how close we have come to it" ^{[34, p. 378]}. We don't have to go far to get knowledge about the mind, because we find the mind in ourselves. And the whole methodological construction, which is being built up by the epoch-making critique of pure reason, seems to outline the whole of metaphysics, at the same time contributing to its entering "on the right path of science" about the first principles of human knowledge, which it puts in connection with wisdom, crowning at the same time the entire culture of human reason. At the same time, metaphysics turns to the area within which aesthetics will also be grounded – the area of application of metaphysical principles a priori, their limitations, the construction of a system of independent concepts of reason that are not related to the conditions of contemplation. Therefore, it is extremely important to investigate the original grounds for considering the doctrine of beauty in the field of metaphysics. Although Kant raises the question of limiting the sphere of sensuality. There is a metaphysical transition from its cognition to the comprehension of the supersensible, the boundaries of the sensuous expand to this transcendental sphere, which is reduced by metaphysical principles. The supersensible itself is the ultimate goal of metaphysics, the movement towards which is oriented towards understanding "the absolute world whole, inaccessible to any sense" ^{[34, p. 383]}. But this is a specific transition, here each frame of movement is aesthetically panned and scaled in different directions – after all, aesthetics as such is connected with "metaphysics regarding objects, since they are given to our senses, therefore a posteriori" ^{[26, p. 1061 (B 875)]}, by the way, the question of metaphysical a posteriori arises in art, namely, Marcel Proust, but for the first time, as we see, it is put in an implicit form in the "Critique of Pure Reason", and this paradoxical term is sometimes characterized by Kant's empiricism itself. Since aesthetics is not just a field of feelings, but also a field of thought, then Kant's statement is also true for it that "thought itself must ascend to the beginnings of metaphysics, without which no reliability and purity and even no driving force can be expected" ^{[28, p. 17]}, to paraphrase Kant, not only in teaching about virtue, but also in the teaching of beauty. The philosopher even believes that "for those who proclaim themselves a metaphysician, it is an indispensable duty – even in the doctrine of virtue (and, as we believe, in the doctrine of beauty, too – N.K.) to go back to his metaphysical principles and, above all, to study himself in the school of metaphysics" ^{[28, p. 19]}. And it is quite understandable why Kant is trying to create, even if not aesthetic legislation, but at least an aesthetic mechanism symbolizing the meaning of metaphysics in practical terms, that is, moral meaning. "The aesthetics of morals is, although not part of, but still a subjective presentation of the metaphysics of morals, in which the feelings accompanying the coercive force of moral law give to feel the effectiveness of this force (for example, disgust, horror, etc., giving a sensual form of moral antipathy) in order to gain an advantage over a purely sensual urge" ^{[28, p. 81]}.

Aesthetics is introduced by Kant into the system of transcendental philosophy, proceeding from the concept of the faculty of judgment as part of the critique of pure reason, although the beginnings of its activity as a special cognitive ability aimed at the application of concepts cannot be elements of the structural structure of metaphysics, but can only be attached or attached to theoretical and practical philosophy, performing a kind of wave function within metaphysics. This immediately creates some kind of paradoxical situation - aesthetics as a part that is not part of metaphysics, and this situation will determine all further constructions in aesthetics (a concept without a concept, a judgment based not on concepts, etc.). It is possible to solve the problem (in Kant's view, this is a problem so confused by nature itself) will allow an appeal to the foundations of metaphysics itself, to the project of the building of metaphysics itself. If the system of pure philosophy is ever destined to be realized under the general name of metaphysics (and it is possible to develop it in its entirety and in all respects extremely important for the use of reason), then criticism must in advance explore the ground for this building to the depth at which the first foundation of the ability to [give] principles independent of experience lies in order not to settle any part of the building, which would inevitably lead to the collapse of the entire building" ^{[24, pp. 71, 73]}. Of particular importance is such a study for the construction of the building of morality, which is why Kant perceives his criticism as a kind of preparatory work that allows "leveling and strengthening the soil for this majestic building, since reason, albeit with good intentions, but vainly digging in this soil in search of treasures, dug it like a mole, underground passages which threaten the strength of the building itself" ^{[26, p. 485 (376)]}. Such preparatory work reveals a special faculty of judgment, which, like reason, which creates the very connection of the manifold, and reason, belongs to theoretical knowledge, but Kant isolates it from the already accumulated cognitive wealth, since its concepts transcend the cognitive ability itself and serve to curb the ambitions of the mind and direct its activities in accordance with the principle unattainable completeness for him. The transcendental use of the faculty of judgment itself shows how categories "make experience possible and what principles about its possibility they give in application to phenomena" ^{[26, p. 245 (167)]}.   Difficulties in the field of this research are associated with tricky questions that suggest certain answers, they can be found in the process of searching for the distinctive principle of the ability of judgment itself. After all, it does not have a cognitive status, but is significant only as a regulatory concept (D. Heideman rightly emphasizes that in his aesthetics Kant puts forward arguments that help answer the question whether he is a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist [see: 28, p. 24]), referring to the mechanisms of thinking that form subjective rules of activity the very ability of judgment. This difficulty about the principle "occurs mainly in those judgments that are called aesthetic and relate to the beautiful or sublime in nature or in art" ^{[24, p. 73]}.

But the aesthetic abilities themselves are connected with the construction of the building of metaphysics. Indeed, this requires the talent of an architect and the talent of a builder, but not only. It cannot be built without applying a whole array of knowledge. Even the Parthenon, built according to the project of Iktinos by the architect Kallikrates and decorated by Phidias, could not have been built without using knowledge in mathematics, physics, knowledge of perspective and so on. What can we say about the building or tower of metaphysics, erected by the creative power of reason, which, however, neglected the problem of justification in the course of such construction, aesthetic structures laid in the very foundation of metaphysics. After all, "the human mind is so prone to creation that it has already erected a tower many times, and then demolished it again to see if its foundation is strong" ^{[32, p. 70]}. Therefore, a new justification of metaphysics was so necessary, some adequate project for the construction of its system. Transcendental philosophy itself marks the "new birth of metaphysics according to a plan completely unknown until now" ^{[32, p. 71]}, revealing the peculiarity of the principles of cognition that lie beyond experience, building a system of synthetic a priori positions and seeing in the expansion of knowledge the purpose of metaphysics. At the same time, with truly aesthetic pathos, Kant describes the motives for expanding knowledge: "the passion for expanding [knowledge], inspired ... by the proof of the power of reason, recognizes no boundaries" ^{[25, p. 33 (A 4-5)]}, although reason itself needs precisely a priori boundaries.

But for Kant, not only the analogy with the construction of a building or with the building stones of metaphysics is important, but also with a ship, because he is talking about "giving this ship a pilot who, on the basis of the correct principles of navigation, drawn from the knowledge of the globe, equipped with the most detailed nautical chart and compass, could confidently bring the ship to the target" ^{[32, p. 76]}. But the map and the compass are a kind of schemes – these products, as T. B. Dlugach shows, of the era of scientific experiment – mental (construction) and real, hiding the secret of Kantian a priori. No less important for Kant, as we have seen, are other analogies from social practice that do not coincide with the field of construction and navigation.

The very idea of schematism arises in the context of approaches to the problem of substantiating the possibility of cognition, and, consequently, artistic cognition of the world revealed to us as a sensory representation and modification of the soul. These may be schemes of action, as in some literary works, or an almost schematic representation, for example, of the sea in some paintings by Claude Monet. But artistic schematism is a topic of special research. In this case, we are interested in the nature of schematism itself, as it appears in Kant's transcendentalism, and its aesthetic manifestations. To unravel the mystery of schematism, it is necessary to consider some structures of the picture of cognition. The understanding places certain limits on sensuality so that it cannot intend things by themselves, but could refer the sensory representations themselves to a transcendental object (some unknowable something), it is independent of sensuality, but the representation of it is nevertheless sensuous; this object correlates with the unity of apperception in order to take a step forward to the realized by the understanding synthesis of the manifold in sensory contemplation. Without this step, it is impossible to integrate diversity into the concept, and the transcendental object itself can at least be symbolized through a phenomenon. Thus the work of cognition gradually becomes clearer. As for the artistic interpretations of cognition itself, some artists have it both coinciding and not coinciding with the Kantian register. So, in the Seventh Duin Elegy by R.-M. Rilke we read:

We are given to know only in the inner

                                                                   transfiguration.

                                                                    (V. Makushevich lane).

For aesthetics and art, the transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment is of particular importance, which will adjust the pure sensory conditions for showing the form of space and time, without which discursive reasoning cannot be used, even metaphorically used, and the schematism of pure reason is located in the range of such use. Yes, reality is more complicated than a scheme, but it is even more difficult to imagine reality without a scheme. After all, in this case, it would be impossible to give reality to the concepts of reason. Categories are the first abstractionists in the "image" of cognition, because they encompass the pure synthetic unity of the manifold in general, the formal condition of which is time as a condition for linking all representations. On the other hand, this unity arises precisely because time itself is produced in the appregension of contemplation. So, "the scheme of each category contains and makes it possible to represent: the scheme of magnitude is the generation (synthesis) of time itself in a sequential appregension of the object, the scheme of quality is the synthesis of sensation (perception) with the idea of time, i.e. the filling of time, the scheme of relation is the relation of perceptions to each other at any time (i.e. according to the rule of time definitions). Finally, the scheme of modality and its categories contains and makes it possible to represent time itself as a correlate of the definition of an object in the sense of whether it belongs to time and how it belongs to it. That is why schemes are nothing but definitions of time a priori, subject to rules and related (in application to all possible subjects according to the order of categories"to the time series, to the content of time, to the order of time and, finally, to the totality of time" ^{[25, pp. 201, 203 (145)]}. The scheme of substance, the scheme of cause, the scheme of interaction, the scheme of possibility, the scheme of reality and the scheme of necessity will also be connected with these temporal definitions. Of course, there is no aesthetic scheme, otherwise we would have to invent a schematism of the predicates of pure reason, depicting in its entirety its family tree and demonstrating from what root it grows, as well as refer to the predicates of change, change of the unchangeable, its reconstruction, revival, development and creation. But in an aesthetic sense, given the idea of the scheme as an a priori definition of time, it would be most interesting to raise the question whether its relationship with music, which is sometimes seen as the art of time, is possible. In a sense, one can speak of musical schematism as a musical play of sensations, which, in Kant's view, is combined with the play of figures in dance. But this is already some kind of dynamic schematism. It is permissible to compare the schematism of mathematical concepts and what Kant calls the proportion of sound vibrations in music. Finally, it is possible to correlate the basis of music as an expression of transcendent, supersensible ideas with Kant's interpretation of the supersensible itself, for which the contemplation of nature is performed not for the purpose of enjoying the sensuous, but as if for the scheme of the supersensible itself. But the theory of schematism has the greatest aesthetic significance in musicology.

Knowledge itself can be rational or sensuous, and only in connection with each other they can determine the subject, which is impossible to do neither to contemplations without a concept, nor to concepts without contemplation. Although theoretical and empirical ideas about the subject that certain sciences deal with are "generated in the soul completely a priori, nevertheless they would have no meaning if we could not show their meaning every time on phenomena (empirical subjects). That is why it is necessary to make every abstract concept sensuous, i.e. to show the object corresponding to it in contemplation, since without this the concept (as they say) would be meaningless, i.e. devoid of meaning" ^{[26, p. 397 (299)]}. The above applies to all predicates and predicates, since with their help it is impossible to clarify the object of definition, ignoring the conditions of sensuality. True, the claims of sensuality itself are limited by such a borderline concept as noumenon. Reproducing the famous allegory, we can say that, although in Kant's view the categories are not conditioned by sensuality, nevertheless they are reduced to the personification of the sensory world, which was Plato's cave, and their carrier is the mind (which is confronted with what is already thought in the concept, problematizing not only its relation to objects, but also and its significance as a unity of thought in general) can never go beyond sensuality. They are, of course, not prisoners of the cave, because they allow an application that goes beyond the application of all objects of the senses and extends beyond sensory contemplation, but without a relationship to the cave of the senses, it is impossible to understand what, in fact, is meant by the concept. The categories, rather, resemble that sad comrade from Pushkin's "Prisoner" that

he looks out of the window, as if he has planned the same thing with me. He calls me with his look and cry. 

Like this character, categories want to say something about external objects, being dependent on forms of contemplation - space and time. And such dependence is extremely important in aesthetics. "Making Time tangible in oneself is a common task of a painter, composer, and sometimes a writer. A task separate from any size or pace" ^{[12, p. 75]}.

Transcendental aesthetics transfers the variety of sensual contemplations into the realm of pure intellectual concepts. And one of its structures determines all contemplation. We are talking about transcendental temporal definitions, which are related both to categories, since they lay the foundations for the unity of these definitions, and to phenomena, since time is hidden in every representation of the manifold.  "Therefore, the application of categories to phenomena becomes possible by means of a transcendental temporal definition, which, as a scheme of concepts of the understanding, mediates the summation of phenomena under categories" ^{[25, p. 195 (139)]}, warning against substituting the logical possibility of concepts with the transcendental possibility of things. And they relate to the objects of the senses only if they are connected with the general conditions of possible experience. The meaning of the action of thinking itself in Kant's view is to relate this contemplation to the subject. Rational concepts show us thinking with its objective intention in proportion to different modes. But "for use, we still need the function of the faculty of judgment, on the basis of which the object is brought under the concept, therefore, we still need to have at least a formal condition under which something can be given in contemplation. If this condition – the ability of judgment (scheme) is absent, then such a summation cannot take place, since we are not given anything that could be summed up under the concept" ^{[25, p. 323 (A 247-248)]}. So Kant thinks of a plan of mental actions related to schematism. But why is schematism so important for Kant?

If the formal condition is fulfilled under which something can be given in sensory intuition, namely the faculty of judgment, "then the transcendental system develops into a whole teaching about the schematism of pure reason, which a priori "anticipates the form of possible experience in general ... and can never go beyond sensuality, in which only objects can be given to us. The foundations of reason are only the principles of the exposition of phenomena" ^{[25, p. 323 (A 256-247)]}. These are the principles of discursive clarification that produce visual data encrypted in a certain way. And these principles of flaunting what is placed in the museum halls of phenomenological works have always occupied aesthetic minds. But what exactly does such a product of data mean? Can it be attributed to an act of creativity? Martin Heidegger regarded the artist himself as a creative truth. Andrei Tarkovsky even advocated an artistic search for the absolute truth. "An artist," he said, "who is not trying to find the absolute truth, is just a temporary worker, his ideas have a private, but not global significance." Comparing the predicate "true" with the predicate "beautiful", Gottlob Frege noted that the latter has its own gradations, which truth does not have. In addition, the truth does not depend on a subjective judgment about it, which cannot be said about the beautiful. "Regarding the truth, error is possible – in the case of the beautiful, no. Something is beautiful to me precisely because I think it is beautiful. But because I think something is true, it does not become true; and if something is not true in itself, it is not true for me. There is nothing that is beautiful in itself – it is so only for the perceiving being, and in the case of judgments about the beautiful, this being must always be present in thought. However, we make such judgments that, as it seems, claim to be objective... Without feelings and ideas, subjectively beautiful and, therefore, objectively beautiful cannot exist. Thus, many things seem to speak in favor of the fact that a genuine work of art is a complex of representations within us and that a thing of the outside world - a painting, a sculptural monument – is only a means to evoke in us the experience of this genuine work of art. In accordance with this, everyone who experiences aesthetic pleasure has his own work of art, so there is no contradiction between different judgments about the beautiful: de distibus non disputandum" ^{[58, pp. 310-311]}.

The scheme of imagination and the legislative reason.

To answer this question, it is necessary first of all to understand whether the subject-predicate construction of the beautiful and true coincides with the internal logic of schematic thinking, with the doctrine of which the fundamental section of the entire Kantian metaphysics is connected? Charles Pierce even believed that if schematism had been expounded by Kant at the origins of his philosophy, it would have surpassed all his transcendental science. For us, the concept of schematism is important because it is the result of metaphysical work with a sensory impression, it correlates with a priori concreteness, with a paradoxical connection of the unconnected, the method of which allows not just to read, but to create the objectivity grasped by thinking at the moment of its opposition to it in contemplation, that is, with the justification of the normative act of applying categories to phenomena. And in the chapter "On the schematism of pure rational concepts" Kant is just trying to find ways to solve the question: how is it possible to apply categories to phenomena? Hence, here thinking seems to take possession of objectivity, being still burdened with sensuality: it does not contain pure rational concepts, under which, nevertheless, empirical structures must somehow be summed up, which are the result of the synthesis of concepts themselves with pure and empirical intuitions. Before the limitation of the territory of the specified possession, the very mastery of schematization becomes obvious, as if on the eve of the phenomenon of language, the work appearing at this stage "still lacks that form and existence in which the self exists as the self; – it still lacks the expression in itself that it contains some inner meaning, it lacks language, that elements in which there is a filling meaning itself. Therefore, the work, although it has been completely cleansed of the whole animal and bears only a form of self-consciousness, is still a soundless form that needs a ray of the rising sun in order to make a sound that, being generated by light, is only sound, not language, shows only some external self, not internal" ^{[7, p. 354]}.  

When there is a form generated by the light of thinking, it is the language of logic. For Kant, the logic of justifying the rights to own the subject matter into which thinking enters is extremely important, namely transcendental logic – this creative project, which, according to Kant, is created from reason. Transcendental logic in modern research is considered as "denoting the sphere of objective intellectual cognition in general" ^{[4, S. 145]}, in one part of which, namely in transcendental analytics, the concept of a scheme is just introduced. It is, as it were, intended to realize the ultimate goals of metaphysics, as they are conceived in the canon of the faculty of judgment, which constitutes a kind of insurance contract concluded by drawing up certain normative documents using transcendental logic, the normative specification itself opens a direct path to aesthetics (by the way, K. Pollock, with his analysis of Kant's theory of normativity, covers fundamental issues not only theoretical and practical philosophy, but also aesthetics ^{[50, p. 308]}). Thus, errors of judgment are prevented, thanks to which philosophy itself is able to deploy, as Kant emphasizes, all its insight and the art of research. Thanks to this, the peculiarity of philosophy itself is revealed, which consists in the approval of normative acts fixed in categories; by means of the first, it should limit the field of application of the second. That is, here we are talking "about concepts that should relate to their subjects a priori, and therefore their objective significance cannot be proved a posteriori, since such proof does not concern their dignity at all" ^{[26, p. 253 (175)]}.

Therefore, transcendental philosophy should identify distinctive properties, by virtue of which it becomes possible to define criteria that allow evaluating subject data in accordance with these concepts, to create something like a pure scheme for possible experience. Without this, the concepts themselves would be meaningless structures, not categories, at best they could be considered as logical forms. If we weigh what has been said, then the possibility of schematism turns out to be essentially the geometry of connectivity. When there is no representation (repraesentatio) of data or external objects, then the whole categorical grid does not make any sense. Distinguishing between the processes of synthesis occurring in the imagination and the acts of schematization created in it, manifested in the speculative interest of the mind, J. Deleuze noted that "synthesis itself is a given of a certain space and a certain time, through which diversity is associated with the object in general according to categories. But the scheme is a spatio–temporal task, which itself corresponds to the category - everywhere and always: it consists not in an image, but in spatio–temporal relations that embody and implement the conceptual relations proper. The scheme of imagination is a condition under which the legislative reason makes judgments with the help of its concepts – judgments that will serve as principles for any cognition of diversity" ^{[13, p. 163]}. True, it's not only about this embodiment of space-time relations, but also in their coincidence with conceptual structures, in the processing of empirical concepts, which is carried out as a search for relevance to the scheme of imagination, in which Kant saw a deep mystery and implicit aesthetics or hidden art.

However, it is not only about imagination, but also about the property of the ability of judgment to reflect or reason, that is, to compare representations with each other, considering synthesis schemes either within these mental structures, or relative to the cognitive ability itself. In the aesthetic judgment of reflection, subjectivity begins the harmonious play of imagination and reason. But no less important here is the problem of form, which in aesthetics should be approached taking into account transcendental requirements. Thus, if we reflect on the objects of nature, we have all the grounds to admit in them a form that has a transcendental scheme, indicating a kind of cognitive legislator. But not only that. After all, "reflection already has its predestination in the concept of nature in general, i.e. in the understanding, and the faculty of judgment does not need a special principle of reflection, but schematizes reflection a priori and applies these schemes to every empirical synthesis, without which no judgment of experience would be possible. The faculty of judgment acts here in its reflection in the same way as the determining faculty of judgment, and its transcendental schematism simultaneously serves it as a rule under which these empirical contemplations are summed up" ^{[24, p. 869]}, including artistic perceptions and experiences.  Hegel has in mind another form to which the master rises in his work to the bifurcation of his consciousness. "In this unity of the self-conscious spirit with itself, since it is for itself the form and object of its consciousness, therefore, its confusions with the unconscious mode of direct natural design are purified. These monsters, in form, speech and action, dissolve into a spiritual formation, into something external that has gone into itself, into something internal that manifests itself externally in itself and proceeding from itself – into thought, which is a clear existence that gives birth to itself and receives a form formation accordingly. The spirit became an artist" ^{[7, p. 355]}. Having reached absolute knowledge, having passed the path of history and the science of knowledge that is, the spirit becomes almost a poet: "both sides together are history comprehended in the concept, and constitute the memory of the absolute spirit and his Golgotha, the reality, truth and authenticity of his throne, without which he would be lifeless and lonely; only –

                       From the cup of this realm of spirits

                       His infinity foams for him.

If in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit" the spirit itself becomes the artist, then in the "Critique of Pure Reason" the philosophical spirit itself approaches the artistic form, stepping over the step of transcendental schematism of the faculty of judgment. It gives the idea of a norm, which includes empirical contemplation, and, consequently, aesthetic impressions. As for the aesthetic judgments of reflection, they correlate with the principle of the ability of judgment itself.

In contrast to the transcendental schematism of the faculty of judgment, which presupposes an objective relationship of reason and imagination, in aesthetic schematism, in which only definitions of the subject are meant, the same reason and imagination, as well as freedom and regularity lift each other, affecting the mental state of the bearers of these abilities. There are no conceptual relations in aesthetic schematism, but it inclines to the play of cognitive abilities through the principle of expediency of representation, this schematism is associated with the direct representation of the concept, with contemplation brought under the a priori concept.

In the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, the doctrine of schematism, set forth in the first Critique, develops. The aesthetic judgment itself is justified by another judgment – the judgment of formal reflection, which adds benevolence accompanying the process of objectification as essential for each person. In Kant's view, any sensory embodiment, as well as an intuitive way of representation, can be either schematic or symbolic. The question is, how is such an incarnation possible? According to the Orthodox consciousness, the incarnation itself is possible, since the One Who is incarnated is Christ, the Only Begotten with the One from whom He was born before all ages, He was incarnated from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. But when it comes not to religious transcendental relations, but to cognitive relations, schematism assumes not uniformity, but heterogeneity of mental phenomena. Kant clearly distinguishes between symbolic and schematic incarnation: our knowledge of God can be symbolic, but if someone considers the incarnation as "schematic with such properties as reason, will, etc., which prove their objective reality only on beings in the world" ^{[24, p. 517]}, then he falls into anthropomorphism. Both schematic and symbolic hypotyposes or images differ from the designation of concepts by means of accompanying sensory signs. The schemes themselves are necessary in order to prove the reality of pure rational concepts. The concept of a scheme occupies a special place in art, here schematism has techniques that Kant considers as ways of intuitive representation of nature for the supersensible, as an analogue of his scheme. Describing the freedom of imagination itself, he emphasized that the specificity of this ability lies in the fact that its action in some way resembles the definition of beauty, since it schematizes without a concept, too. Considering the freedom of aesthetic imagination, which produces temporal schematization of rational concepts, modern researchers note how difficult it is to build a complete picture of schematism, and even more so to present arguments regarding Kant's theses about the connection of cognitive and aesthetic schematism. In this sense, Kant's construction of schemes without concepts, which is built up in the third "Critique", is very indicative, this construction testifies to the vagueness of Kant's judgments on this topic. Kant turns to it in the process of substantiating the principle of taste as a subjective principle of the faculty of judgment, its implementation presupposes the harmony of the faculty of imagination and the faculty of reason, so that the meaning of the judgment itself can only consist in bringing the first under the condition of the second, thanks to which a transition from contemplation to concepts is possible. Since the freedom of the ability of imagination consists precisely in the fact that the ability of imagination itself "schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste should be based only on the feeling that the ability of imagination in its freedom and the ability of reason with their regularity animate each other" ^{[24, p. 361]}. On this basis, in some modern studies it is argued that in aesthetic judgments freedom is based on the legitimacy of understanding, whereas in Kant it is not about justification, but about the fact that freedom and regularity give impetus to each other. L. Fileri, in conclusion of his article "Schematics without concepts: the relationship of imagination and understanding in Kant's aesthetics," emphasizes that "the fuzzy (non-determining) search for meaning, the legitimate play of imagination and emotional response – all this is based on schematism without concepts, namely on the fuzzy, reflexively and purposefully oriented use of the normative framework of understanding. The results of schematism without concepts, i.e. aesthetic judgments, are similar – though not identical – to the results of cognitive schematism, i.e. cognitive judgments and empirical concepts" (VII).

Needless to say, the vague nature of the activity of the mind, which proceeds outside of schematism, is similar to the ambiguous nature of unity, which stems from reason and determines the discursive synthesis of concepts. But although it is impossible to find a scheme in contemplation in order to build their integral system, it is nevertheless possible to find its equivalent. "They are served by the idea of maximum subdivision and unification of the cognition of the mind into one principle. Indeed, the greatest and absolutely complete can be thought of as definite, because [at the same time] all limiting conditions that give an indefinite variety are eliminated. Consequently, the idea of reason is an analogue of the scheme of sensuality, but with the difference that the application of the concepts of reason to the scheme of reason is (unlike the application of the categories of reason to their sensory schemes) not knowledge of the object itself, but only a rule or principle of systematic unity of the entire use of reason" ^{[26, pp. 849, 851 (In 693)]}. But do such limiting conditions remain if we represent not the most complete, but the artistically completed? Do the boundaries of reason outlined by schematism change the boundaries of the formulation of aesthetic problems?

As for the idea of reason, it "is an analogue of the scheme of sensuality, but with the difference that the application of the concepts of reason to the scheme of reason is (unlike the application of categories to their sensory schemes) not the knowledge of the subject itself, but only a rule or principle of systematic unity of the entire use of reason" ^{[26, p. 851 (In 693)]}. And this requires a special culture that allows us to identify the world capacity of a person, to prescribe all the connections in consciousness quite subtly, to fulfill a spiritual mission entrusted with coping with many descriptions of aesthetic states. The problem here, first of all, is how sensuality and reason relate (and he is not able to feel, which is why there is a certain tension between them), reasonable and aesthetic, rational and artistic cognition or cognitio of the entire sphere of art. With the vividness of cognition itself, Kant correlates the sensory-aesthetic manifestations of consciousness. Moreover, if we consider aesthetics as a metaphysics of perfection, then it should be recognized that it is directly related to the maxims of reason, by which Kant means "all subjective principles taken not from the nature of the object, but from the interest of reason in relation to some possible perfection of cognition of this object" ^{[26, p. 851 (In 694)]}, they seem to shine through what Kant calls the harmony of the mind with itself, arising from the postulate of the subjective unity of the entire cognitive sphere, performed with its help. The widespread understanding of aesthetics as a teaching about external feelings would not even allow us to outline the contours of an emotional relationship. Because

We do not know the outlines of feeling, –

Only the conditioning of it from the outside.

                              (R.-M. Rilke "The Fourth Duin Elegy", per. V. Mikushevich)

But if we proceed only from such conditionality, then we would have to admit that "the term aesthetics itself is intended exclusively for a predicate related to contemplation in cognitive judgments" ^{[24, p. 945]}, and even to identify the conditions under which this predicate is given. In contrast to this terminological definition, Kant's critique of the aesthetic faculty of judgment deals not with cognitive concepts and judgments, but with reflexive predicates (here the predicate of beauty itself is not connected with the concept of an object), which allow us to find the common for a given particular. In fact, we are entering here into the field of explication of the meaning of expressions (in Russian philosophy, V. Solovyov will set before aesthetics the task of clarifying the general meaning of art). And this search itself is somewhat similar to the concept of an individual concept used in modern intensional logic, referring to a specific individual who gathers all individuals designated by the appropriate name, with the creation of tuples of points of their correlation.  With the help of reflexive predicates, the horizon of aesthetic thinking opens, which, in fact, builds the above-mentioned transition, that is, the connection of theoretical and practical philosophy. The reflexive concept of beauty (the judgment of taste about beauty is, according to Kant, the taste of reflection) just like the logical principle of navya-nyaya: a category is not a category, since a judgment about it is analogous to a logical judgment in which a reflective concept is something that appears without a concept, is presented as an object of universal favor (favor for the beautiful is associated with a hidden, indefinite or blurred concept), and, in fact, it is represented symbolically, that is, as if beauty were a property of the object (although in modern literature there are also objectivist theories of beauty [see: 54, p. 12]) and the judgment about it would be logical. Another variant of this framework is the interpretation of reflection on a priori a beautiful object leads to a concept, but we do not know which one. For all that, beauty itself is also thought of as a form of expediency of the object, but neither without a representation (repraesentatio) of the goal, that is, without a reproduced image of it, indicating the generic identity of the object itself, nor without a conscious representation (perceptio), confined only to the subject as a modification of its state. To understand beauty in art, the analysis of the imaginative ability of the soul is of particular importance ("passing through the manifold, my soul is always busy forming its image" ^{[23, p. 145]}), which Kant structures in the form of a number of abilities: images, secondary images, preceding images, supplemented by the ability to distinguish objects as the sense of pleasure develops. For her, the consciousness of the image, the establishment of the unity of the culturally giving consciousness is also important. In the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, the correspondence between the provisions of navya-nyaya logic about apophatic reflection as a condition for the birth of knowledge and aesthetic judgment can be found in the context of considering the faculty of imagination, which is related not to imaginary knowledge, but to the thought as a productive faculty of thinking, the coordinated application of reason. Imagination has the power to create from nature itself, as it were, its new form, processing the first into something superior to it. The ability of imagination, "following in the footsteps of reason, strives to reach the maximum, and to present with a completeness for which there are no examples in nature" ^{[24, p. 427]}.

Kant proceeds from the fact that there are structures similar to phenomena, and the transcendental scheme as a product of the ability of imagination belongs to the intellectual-sensory structure, which is subject to temporary definition. The interpretation of such a scheme is extremely important for understanding the aesthetic processes taking place in both classical and modern art. And such an interpretation requires a rather sophisticated analysis. Reflecting on the Kornel tragedy, Derrida wrote: "We would be quite convinced if beauty, which is value and power, could be subject to rules and schemes. But is it necessary to prove that there is no point in this? After all, if "Sid" is beautiful, it is only due to the fact that it goes beyond schemes and reason. We are not talking about the "Side" itself, that its beauty is in all these loops, spirals and elevations." But, Derrida continues here, referring to Jean Rousset, "The "Movement to the highest point", the most subtle feature of the scheme is nothing but a Cornelian movement… The progress marked by "Sid", who so aspires to the height of "Polyeuct", in which, thanks to the skill belonging either to Cornel or Rousset, this scheme reaches its greatest perfection and the greatest inner complexity" ^{[15, pp. 30-31]}. No less difficult is the interpretation of the transcendental scheme for revealing the aesthetic processes taking place in contemporary art. Pointing to the crisis of intellectuality in modern European fine art, P. Valeri wrote that the era of the art of perspective and plastic anatomy in painting is significantly moving away from us, and this has the consequence that creative possibilities are being washed out of the artistic fabric itself. Namely, the scheme is one of the preparatory stages of the development of the invention and discovery project. Moreover, "the rejection of anatomy and perspective turned out to be simply a rejection of the intellectual component of painting just for the fleeting delight of the eyes." But such a refusal, Valerie continues, was precisely the denial of one of the fundamental structures of schematism. Therefore, modern "European painting has already lost part of its desire for power… And, consequently, a part of their freedom" ^{[5, p. 182]}.

Being a product of the empirical ability of the productive power of imagination, its synthesis, the scheme makes the image itself possible, on the mental easel of the imagination, the scheme seems to draw a concept, but its very drawing is an act of representing the construction of phenomena or our pure sensory concepts of the object – these figures in space, thanks to the creation of which geometry becomes possible. In art, this geometry has a special quality. So, Auguste Rodin was given things "to look into the mysterious geometry of space, which allowed him to realize that the contours of a thing must be located in the direction of several surfaces inclined to each other, otherwise the thing will not really penetrate into space, as if it would not be recognized by him in its cosmic sovereignty" ^{[49, p. 145]}.

Kant considers the sensory world itself as a simple scheme of the intelligible. The teaching about it is directly related to the problem of the synthesis of transcendental knowledge, and aesthetics will take shape precisely in connection with the discussion of the question of what new knowledge (this is in science, and in art it has long been known that it is possible to create something only de novo) can give rise to this synthesis. In the history of philosophy, unlike Aristotle's purely logical solution to the problem of such generation, Kant's solution involves a transition from the analytics of the cloud (as Kant would say, "inevitable on a completely untrodden path") platform for the synthesis of the manifold given in contemplation to the platform of what is processed in knowledge formations. This synthesis is given, which is important for the topic of this study, and in the regulative principles of pure reason, which "contain nothing in themselves but some pure scheme for possible experience; for experience receives unity only from the synthetic unity that the understanding initially and spontaneously communicates to the synthesis of the faculty of imagination in relation to apperception and with which phenomena as the data for possible cognition must already be in connection and agreement a priori" ^{[25, p. 311 (A 237)]}. Aesthetic harmony or coherence, given a priori in unity with schematizing imagination, as well as aesthetic freedom of will, make it possible to understand how the epistemological perspective works for depicting phenomena, presented in the world tradition in the form of various paradoxes, antinomies, tetralemmas, and so on. The above-mentioned platforms of the all-pervading synthetic unity of the manifold, given in contemplation and processed in knowledge formations, as well as the synthesis of appregension as a result of the activity of imagination, which has its own perception intention (the idea of appregension underwent a certain evolution in Kant's thinking in the period between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason) and reducing them into one aesthetic the structure is an image, all of them are combined with the synthesis of reproduction of the manifold.

Ideas about the composition of a phenomenon as an object of consciousness, that is, the inner definitions of the soul in one or another temporal relation (sequence, simultaneity), are connected to the synthesis of the ability of imagination. But the appregension of the manifold in a phenomenon always captures it as a changeable structure, as an event described only with the help of such a mode of time as sequence, and not simultaneity. After all, as Wittgenstein will note in the Logical-Philosophical Treatise, "the simultaneous presence of two colors in the same place of the field of view is impossible, more precisely, logically impossible, since it would violate the logical structure of chromaticity" (6.3751; L. Dobroselsky lane), and such a structure is precisely the mental prerequisite of the aesthetic. Kant's interpretation of the activity of representation and appregension is of crucial importance for the theoretical representation of the ways of aesthetic perception and understanding. Regardless of whether we admire the esthetically standing building in front of us or not, we appretenze it as a phenomenon (the transcendental object of which is unknown), grasping the structures of its contemplation one after another in a sequence of acts of perception. But it is impossible to conclude about the sequence of what is revealed to us in the way of linking the manifold of this house in the act of appregension, the synthesis of which nevertheless gives a certain perceptual string. But since the subjective synthesis of appreception, which is in accordance with the synthesis of apperception, is equivalent to grasping the idea of the house that is happening on the stage of the event, this only speaks of the indistinguishability of the two forms of grasping. "In a phenomenon containing an event (let's call the preceding state of perception A, and the subsequent one B), I also notice that B can only follow A in appregension, and perception A can only precede [perception] B, but not follow it. I see, for example, a boat floating down the river. My perception of its position downstream of the river follows the perception of [its] position upstream, and it is impossible that in the appregension of this phenomenon, the boat was perceived first in the lower and then in the upper part of the current. Hence, here the order of perceptions in appregension is defined, and appregension is connected by it. In the following example, in the case of a house, my perceptions of appregension could begin with appregension from the upper part of the house and end with the base of it, or, conversely, start from below and end at the top; I could also catch in appregension the diverse [content] of empirical contemplation on the right or left. Consequently, there was no definite order in the series of these perceptions that would necessarily decide where I should start in the appregension in order to empirically connect the manifold. In the perception of what is happening, such a rule always changes and makes necessary the order of successive perceptions (with the appregension of this phenomenon)" ^{[25, pp. 257, 259 (A192-193)]}. The appregension of contemplation, in the environment of which the subject produces time itself, appregension through sensation as a perception associated with modifications of subjective states, reproduction, reconnaissance (recognition) and the aesthetic feature of the anticipation of perception (and it, as Kant will say, "always contains something striking") they structure the entire fabric of experience, the definitions of which should be subject to the rules of the universal definition of time with their regulatory significance. In addition, two structures are hidden in the implicit aesthetic register of all empiricism: first, these are analogies that explicate all real connections in experience and allow relativists to know the object, to move from perceptions to the perceived object through a possible perceptual series. Secondly, it is also an aesthetic concept of the game of cognitive abilities and the game of changes, which obeys the nature of things. Thus, it follows from this analogy that there is only the principle of change, and not the absolute aesthetic act of arising out of nothing or creation. It is considered by Kant as a form of origin, which is a consequence of the action of an alien cause. Therefore, creation cannot be admitted as a phenomenon in the phenomenal world, otherwise it would have to go beyond ensuring the unity of empirical dimensions. But if we are not talking about creation as such, not about the cause of the world in the idea as a being experiencing pleasure, but about the phenomenal world, then what is called the soul is in continuous change here, and perhaps the only thing that is stable in its changeable states is the "I", which can It can also be endowed with aesthetic features, since as a form of consciousness, it is characterized by the aesthetic concept of the sublime, namely, the Ego as a transcendental form accompanying our ideas and "capable of elevating them to the degree of knowledge" ^{[25, p.479 (A 382)]}. Thus, the whole aesthetics of the world and its perception, the entire aesthetic borderline of relations between the one and the other opens up for us. For example, vision, which in Kant's view is closest to pure contemplation, gives us an indirect aesthetics of light based on a kind of a priori-a posteriori view of light: after all, "one sees in space through light, not light" ^{[23, p. 565]}. The expressiveness of the world meaning in the aesthetic language of thought generated an incredibly complex field of stresses of the expressiveness of the inexpressible itself, articulation of the inarticulate, measurement of the immeasurable, positing and overcoming the boundaries of the rational and rational: after all, "the world itself, at any given moment, opens to us such an immeasurable field of diversity, order, expediency and beauty, regardless of whether we trace they are in the infinity of space or in its boundless division, so that even with all the knowledge that our weak reason could acquire about them, any speech before such numerous and immeasurably great miracles becomes powerless, all numbers lose their ability to measure and even our thought loses all certainty, so that our judgment about the whole inevitably turns into silent, but all the more eloquent amazement" ^{[26, pp. 799, 801 (In 650)]}. Kant's aesthetic hesychasm anticipates the hesychastic attitudes of Wittgenstein, for whom aesthetics is as transcendental as ethics.  Michael Smith traces a metaphysical thread that allows us to continue thinking about the poetic nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as his preoccupation with ethics and aesthetics as important factors. The appeal to aesthetics, as the author believes, is crucial for the re-evaluation of Wittgenstein's legacy, especially if it is carried out in combination with an innovative analysis of the criticism of Kant's "judgments of taste". The result of such research can be a unique discussion of the limits and possibilities of metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics and the tasks of the philosopher in a more general way ^{[55, p. 10]}.

The synthesis of appregension transcendentally substantiates the possibility of cognition in general.  The aesthetic tangent at the point of such an assembly, at the point of gathering diversity in a single act of cognition, is directed to the ability of imagination, the synthesis of which Kant refers to the transcendental actions of the soul performed according to an a priori model. According to this model, only a productive synthesis of the ability of imagination can be performed, the interpretation of which develops the aesthetic idea of combining cognitive and creative abilities. Imagination is an active ability that manifests itself in acts of a priori synthesis of the manifold, and if this ability is directed at perception and impression, then it performs the function of grasping them, appregension, as if reducing the observed diversity into one image. This orientation makes it possible to transform diversity itself into a whole, all parts of which have the necessary harmony as their transcendental condition, providing an aesthetic entrance into the epistemological world. The Critique of Pure Reason outlines at least three approaches to understanding the aesthetic aspects of epistemological constructions. The first is connected with the question of how it is possible to think of this whole. Kant demonstrates this by analyzing the integrity of a poem, each word in which has its own conditions of understanding: and in general, "words are understandable to us only if something corresponds to them in contemplation" ^{[26, p. 473 (333)]}. Considering thought itself as an accident, immanent to a thinking being, is it worth assuming that it is he who thinks as something complex, in which case "every part of him would contain a part of thought. And only all the parts taken together would contain the thought as a whole. Meanwhile, this is contradictory. For since representations distributed among various entities (for example, individual words of a verse) never constitute a thought as a whole (a whole verse), so far a thought cannot be inherent in something complex as such" ^{[25, p. 445 (A 352); minor changes have been made to the translation]}.

The second approach is connected with the aesthetic concept of perfection or with what Kant calls qualitative completeness. Perfection is associated primarily with theoretical and cognitive attitudes. After all, "in every cognition of an object there is perfection, consisting in the fact that ... multiplicity as a whole is reduced back to the unity of the concept and is fully consistent only with the concept" ^{[26, p. 183 (114)]}. The transcendental concept of reason starts from complete totality in the synthesis of conditions and comes to the absolutely unconditional, to the absolute whole, therefore in theoretical philosophy it remains a problem without resolution. Practical reason can solve this problem, the idea of which can only be given to some extent in concreto. After all, the implementation of the idea "is always limited and insufficient, but these boundaries are indefinable, therefore, its implementation is always under the influence of absolute perfection" ^{[25, p. 417 (A 328)]}. The third approach is connected with the assumption of harmony or coordination of knowledge with each other in their relation to the subject. Each of these aesthetic structures has its own volume of individualization, which can be associated with a cognitive process that has the availability of creative grounds.

As for the harmony of cognition in its relation to the subject, it should be borne in mind that Kant, in fact, develops the idea of this harmony, while inventing a new concept – the concept of the scheme of sensuality, which will establish the relationship of pure concepts of the understanding to objects. Ultimately, this agreement or harmony makes the object itself necessary for consciousness, and in this capacity it acts as a formal harmony of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold, which the soul has a priori in its representations. This is the harmony of their very synthesis with the conditions of time. But the soul itself would not be able to carry out such a synthesis "if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its activity, which subordinates the entire (empirical) synthesis of appregension to transcendental unity and for the first time makes possible its connection according to the rules a priori" a of ^{[25, p. 159 (108). The synthesis of appreception must conform to the a priori conditions to which phenomena are subject, and they belong to the fundamental faculty of cognition - to an all-encompassing apperception having an intellectual character, and are in transcendental kinship. So there is a new harmony of connectivity. It is built, on the one hand, by phenomena undergoing appregension, in which time itself is generated – a fundamental philosophical concept that has not only epistemological, but also universal significance: Andrei Tarkovsky even believed that a new stage in the development of all mankind would begin after solving the problem of time. On the other hand, the unity of apperception participates in the construction of the harmony of the episteme, in the community of which all phenomena in the soul reside as contained in a possible experience. When we build a triangle, then this requires not only the ability of imagination, because the possibility of an object corresponding to it presupposes "something more, namely that such a figure should be thought of exclusively under the conditions on which the objects of experience are based. And indeed, if we associate with the concept of a triangle the idea of the possibility of such a thing, it is precisely because space is a formal condition a priori of external experience and that this formative synthesis, by means of which we construct a triangle in imagination, completely coincides with the synthesis that we carry out in the appregension of the phenomenon in order to obtain hence the empirical concept" [25, p. 295 (A 224)]}.

This formative synthesis precisely sets the function of producing schemes immersed in space-time relations, and these schematic frameworks do not mean the dependence of objects on the mind, but the way the mind is applied to phenomena. The scheme remains "behind the scenes" of the image, since it postulates semantic connections – mobile connections, they create the possibility of transition between structures separated in cognition, ensuring continuity of communication when moving the "signal" from the sphere of action of sensuality to the sphere of action of reason. The schematism of the understanding is directed through the transcendental synthesis of the imaginative faculty to the orbit of the unity of the manifold given in the inner sense, and already from this orbit descends to the unity of apperception, which takes place in the synthesis of this receptivity. In art, of course, this schematism is not connected by direct schemes, it here resembles insignificant strokes, features of vague sensations, even a diagram, as in Francis Bacon, who emphasized that "often involuntary marks seem much more convincing than anything else – then there is a feeling that anything can happen. – Do you feel it when you apply them? – No, after they are made: it seems to me that I drew something like a diagram. Looking at this diagram, you can see how the possibilities of various facts are rooted in it. This is a difficult topic, and I am talking about it incomprehensibly. But suppose: you paint a portrait, at some point you mark the mouth, and suddenly you see through this diagram that the mouth could go through the whole face. And you have a desire, so to speak, to achieve the impression of the Sahara in the portrait, to make it very similar, but at the same time including the distances of the Sahara ..." [cit. according to: 12, p. 106].  

Schematism, as we remember, is the primary source of the transcendental teaching about the faculty of judgment - this special gift of the spirit, which will manifest itself in the entire corpus of Kantian aesthetics. That is why understanding the nature of schematism is so important for the topic of this study. It means a lot here to discuss the possibilities of the art of philosophical research, the critical art of philosophy, aimed at preventing the ability to judge not only about the dangers that stand in the way of thinking, but also from its possible errors, in order to prevent possible false interpretations. The ability of judgment as such, being wise by experience, introduces the general to the particular and it is necessary, for example, in the moral sphere in order to introduce distinguishing relative terms to describe the application of a priori laws, ways of approaching the understanding of a person's volitional effort, because he is "affected by so many inclinations that although he is capable of the idea of practical pure reason, however, it is not so easy for him to make it concreto effective in his way of life" ^{[27, pp. 47, 49]}. An analogue of such an idea's effectiveness is Kant's comparison of a philosopher with a model conceived in an idea.  

The faculty of judgment acquires aristocratic features from transcendental apperception, without which it is impossible even to approach the temple of knowledge. At the same time, it does not coincide with any cognitive ability – neither with sensuality, nor with reason, nor with reason, although it determines the tension force of the "threads" going to each of these abilities, thanks to which the balance and harmonious order of the entire cognitive system is established. The judgment that this indivisible faculty makes may or may not be related to the sphere of rules or laws, but in any case it is the ultimate basis of any explication. As a unique ability with a special talent, it gives a creative tone to the work of cognition. As a result, a transcendental affinity of phenomena is formed, which reason and sensuality can determine only in combination with each other, and it becomes clear how to use the opportunities that open up to categories in the field of experience, to correct them as they are applied to phenomena. In fact, the ability to judge is a kind of immune self-assembling system of cognition.  The schematism of pure reason is responsible for this correction, complementing the action of sensuality schemes, without which it is impossible to think categorically grasped things, since the one who applies categories has only the possibility of sensory contemplation, through which the objects themselves are given to us. "Categories, in addition to the super-pure concept of the understanding, also need definitions of their application to sensuality in general (in schemes), and without these definitions they are not at all concepts by which objects would be known and distinguished from each other. Categories are only ways to think of an object for possible contemplation and to give it meaning according to that function of the mind (in the presence of other required conditions), i.e. to define it: after all, they themselves, therefore, cannot be defined" ^{[25, p. 321 (A 245)]}.

But the scheme is important and in what sense. The principles of pure reason cannot form the basis even of empirical concepts through which the understanding thinks of objects of sensory intuition in accordance with synthesizing and schematizing imagination, because these concepts cannot be resolved on a scheme of sensuality in harmony with them, and, therefore, they cannot hold their subject in concreto. Why is this scheme of sensuality so significant. Let's say you need to create a circle diagram. The circle itself (and the roundness, the wheel) sets the road, the whole path of the experimental passage of knowledge, but in order to build it, you need at least an approximate scheme of the cognitive terrain along which this road of experience will pass. An experiment, in this case connected with the construction of a road or in another case – with the construction of a building, as it were, opens this circle, transforms it into a straight line, but philosophy does the opposite transformation, it again "closes the circle and therefore sees how all knowledge is ordered into a single building in relation to such goals that befits humanity" ^{[21, p. 207]}.

But we do not find the uniformity of the objective representation and concept in the territory of the mind, there is no such roundness in its tools that it could contemplate. Therefore, it is necessary to find among pure intellectual and intuitive representations some intermediate structure of the path from categories to phenomena, the ways of applying the first to the second. The transcendental scheme has just such amazing properties. It is hardly possible to agree with the assessment of transcendental schematism given to him by T. I. Oizerman, who believed that he "turns out to be schematism of no better kind: he is not able to solve the problem of the unity of rational and sensual, theoretical and empirical, general and singular. The main conclusion that Kant draws from this teaching is the inapplicability of categories to "things in themselves". However, Kant is not completely consistent in this case, since such categories as existence, plurality, cause (causing sensations) are applied to "things in themselves" ^{[46, p. 207]}. But the very distinction between rational and sensuous also seems to be a kind of schematization, and the difficulty of solving the problem of the unity of theoretical and empirical on a specific material of scientific knowledge, as V. S. Shvyrev showed in his works, is associated with the so-called theoretical loading of empirical data, but such loading varies by the action of schematism. In our opinion, T. B. Dlugach is more right in assessing Kant's doctrine of schematism, who saw in it "the "mystery and source" of the entire transcendental philosophy of I. Kant" ^{[18, p. 266]}.

In the doctrine of transcendental schematism, the question of the possibility of the concept itself is concretized, and this possibility appears if the concept is given an object, and in the very way it is given, Kant sees a modification of sensuality, the formal conditions of which must contain pure concepts a priori, which allows them to be applied to the subject. To this pure condition of sensuality, without which it is impossible to imagine any object, the act of applying the concept of the understanding is reduced (and once this act is performed, then this form of thinking itself can be shown in concreto), and it is this condition of sensuality that Kant calls "the scheme of this concept of the understanding, and the way in which the understanding handles these schemes, – schematism of pure reason" ^{[26, p. 257, 259 (179)]}. The ability to schematize is determined by the very modality of our thinking, so, Kant emphasizes, we can think of a line only by mentally drawing it, in this sense thinking is a talented draftsman who sits in us. However, everything becomes much more complicated when we are dealing not just with a line, but with a category that is applied to a phenomenon. This is where we need not just a draftsman, but a schematizer, whose work is extremely important when we are trying to understand the entire architectonics of the text of Kant's metaphysics: the logic of moving towards it is connected with the transition from the source of knowledge to its subject, with the subject solvability of concepts, even with the dramaturgy of the application of thought, and its script cannot be written without metaphysics as a true philosophy, in which there are genuine sources that discursively nourish the harmonious application of reason.

The above-mentioned transition, which is accompanied and carried out on the basis of the transcendental unity of apperception, is the narrow transition that is beauty. And this dramaturgy is connected not only with the difference between formal-logical and transcendental-logical rules of such application. In Kant's philosophy, as interpreted by M. K. Mamardashvili, "there should always be an opportunity to fulfill, to realize the concept in the sense of replacing the concept with some object, which at the same time means to resolve the concept on the subject. This is analogous to the relation found in geometry. For example, you take a left-pointing screw, you have the concept of a nut. And you are trying to screw the left-pointing screw into this nut. You will not get congruences if they are directed differently in relation to the right and left, and the concept does not contain a description of what will happen. In this sense, this event – the imposition or non–attachment of the screw and nut - is not fully defined. This is what I called the geometric analogy, which became the driving reason for the unwinding of Kant's thought, which placed all the elements of Kant's thought in those visible places where we observe them in the text" ^{[40, p. 211]}, primarily in texts devoted to the analysis of schematism.  Indeed, on what subject can the pure concept of "limitation" be resolved, because we cannot even contemplate it. It is permissible to interpret in different ways the very way of applying the mind and its concepts. One can, of course, assume that rational concepts are "neither the first principles of our cognition created by ourselves a priori nor borrowed from experience, but that they are subjective, at the same time as our existence, the makings of thinking inherent in us, arranged by our creator so that their application exactly agrees with the laws of nature, which experience follows" ^{[26, p. 245 (167)]}, but this is unacceptable from a transcendental point of view.

After all, our contemplations are subject to the principles of transcendental aesthetics, since they are given to us in the representation (and through the unity of contemplation we are given exactly the object), as well as the conditions of the initially synthetic unity of apperception, from these two starting points the path to schematism begins, when, if we talk about aesthetics, through the application of aesthetic principles to the fabric of artistic However, they themselves seem to be schematized and appear suitable for aesthetic use. These points form a kind of transcendental harmony of consciousness, the harmony of the connection of the unconnected, or the ability that Y. S. Druskin called the vision of non-vision, since the whole variety of ideas of contemplation must be brought to unity, that is, harmoniously arranged according to the laws of classical aesthetics, which interprets harmony as unity in diversity. It is thanks to such education that the question can be solved: how is consciousness possible? After all, these representations "should be able to be connected in one consciousness, since without this connection nothing can be thought or known through them, because in this case these representations would not have a common act of apperception: I think and therefore would not be connected in one self-consciousness" ^{[26, p. 209 (137)]}. Consciousness is possible because the act of connectedness of its structures is performed, which is the condition of all thinking. To understand the scheme, it is important that this unity contributes to the unification of the diversity given in contemplation into the concept of an object, that is, it contributes to the birth of knowledge, and it is to the objective unity of apperception that these knowledge are brought through a structure called judgment, and schematism itself is a condition for the intelligibility of something.

Modern researchers turn to various aspects of Kant's doctrine of schematism, for example, G. Bankhman shows how "the two parts of the Metaphysics of Morals" should be interconnected through the concept of practical schematism" ^{[2, p. 15]}. Thinking, according to Kant, is an attitude that has objective significance. And making a judgment, we assert that "representations are connected in the object, i.e. regardless of the states of the subject, and do not exist together only in perception (no matter how often it is repeated)" ^{[26, p. 215 (142-143)]}. But the judgments themselves are the structures of a logical function, that is, categories with their a priori relevance to all the objects of our senses; to these pure concepts of the understanding, which binds the material for cognition, the manifold in contemplation is subordinated. However, the advancement of the concepts themselves beyond the limits of sensory contemplation does not give us any cognitive advantage, and the intellectual linking of the manifold in these forms of thought only correlates with the unity of apperception. The concepts of the understanding themselves are nothing but "empty concepts about objects, which do not give us a reason to judge even whether these objects are possible or not; they are only forms of thought without objective reality, because we have no intuition at our disposal, to which the synthetic unity of apperception, containing only these concepts, could be applied so that they could identify the subject. Only our sensory and empirical contemplations can give them meaning and significance" ^{[26, p. 223 (148-149)]}. At the same time, the assumption of an object of non-sensory contemplation does not at all mean that some kind of cognitive meaning appears here, since such an assumption is not able to reveal the immanent properties of something that we consider as an object to which we could apply pure concepts of the mind that serve to understand perceptions.

Opening the era of New European aesthetics, the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment" uses the same modified method of thinking as in the first "Critique", which allows building a priori knowledge about aesthetic objects, grasping in them not only what is determined by the subject, but also what is given to him from above: "if you send your spirit, they are created" (Ps 103, 30), and they create themselves. So, only the primordial can create. With what is creative and creating, we meet in the experience of art, in what is artistically set and executed according to a priori patterns of beauty. The concept of the aesthetic is based on the experimental methodology in metaphysics, which considers it in the perspective of expanding the space of creative subjectivity, revealing the specifics of the aesthetic understanding of the world. The subject, for example, the artist holds by means of a priori structures in his consciousness a complete identity of himself, in each act of creativity he is by nature identical to all his ideas, perceptions, impressions (otherwise they would exist in a separate form), regardless of the way they are given to his consciousness. Here the unique place of the aesthetic in the world of consciousness and action is revealed, the ways of its differentiation from various transcendental regions. If we proceed from the attitudes of modern aesthetics, then in general it should be recognized that "by tracing the development of art, it is possible to restore peace" (B. Kriegel). In Kant's interpretation, the act of recognizing or re-perceiving creative ideas presupposes the synthetic unity of all sensory diversity as a manifestation of spontaneity contained in artistic representations and arising in the soul of a composer or writer. Starting from rationalistic and empirical interpretations of aesthetic knowledge, Kant reinterpreted them at the level of discovering paradoxes of non-contemplative contemplation, sensory concepts. But speaking about the artistic contemplation of an object, it should be borne in mind that it, like the creation of new images of it, is devoid of reliance on existing sketches or conventional images of the object itself (drawing, diagram, etc.), that is, it is possible without the presence of the object itself in contemplation, the ability to have such kind of contemplative representations Kant calls imagination, the spontaneity of which allows us to talk about the type of productive imagination. Productive synthesis of imagination, unity of apperception and appregension are necessary for the emergence of a new stage, when the unity of apperception, taken in relation to the synthesis of the ability of imagination, appears in the form of reason as the ability to create rules by comparing phenomena, which opens up the possibility of studying, for example, the rules of composition in fine art, and in general the discourse of a work of art. Aesthetics itself comes from a special kind of sensuality, sensory cognitive ability associated with the spontaneity of apperception – pure consciousness of genius. The emotional intelligence of the artist presupposes an intellectual, cognitive ability to form representations, discursive activity that organizes sensory representations: through the activity of the mind, as Kant would say, objects are no longer given, but are thought, thanks to which the connections necessary to build a suite of prerequisites according to concepts are established. Aesthetic consideration avoids the shortcomings of both the superficiality of sensory cognition and the dryness of abstract constructions, but remains true to the arbitrariness in the action of imagination, which opens up the horizon of perception to us, and in aesthetic terms – giving access to the image, this fundamental aesthetic concept, which cannot be explained without referring to the phenomenon of schematism. To see an object and depict it, we need to understand how the image itself is possible. But such an understanding assumes that we know the scheme of the structure of the visual analyzer, the scheme of human visual perception. We see the image on the TV screen, but it is possible because the block diagram of the TV itself is built. That is why it is so important for us to turn to the concept of a scheme, that is, to depict the outlines of an object through certain structures. According to I. I. Lapshin, with his teaching on schematism, Kant brought logic, psychology and the theory of cognition into close contact with the question of the formation and meaning of general concepts, pointing out the amazing complexity and subtlety of the living process of forming qualitative concepts: he revealed to us the secret art of schematism, which undoubtedly prompted Hegel to develop the dialectical method. It should be added to this that the doctrine of transcendental schematism has set the direction for the study of all critical aesthetics.

Contemplating diversity, the soul translates it into images, while possessing a purely aesthetic ability to perceive the "lumen of discrimination" of objects in accordance with the feeling of pleasure, which disposes the spirit to ideas, and they, as it was already clear to Plato, never borrow from the senses. If we talk about empirical contemplation, for example, of a house, then in the act of turning it into an event of perception, the subject acts as if as an artist capturing the manifold in this contemplation, which is based on the unchanging connection of space and sensory contemplation itself: the artist draws the outlines of an object in accordance with the unity of the manifold in space, creating at the same time, "absolute music" or "absolute architecture", as in Piranesi, the construction of an architectural image in which G. Revzin characterizes as "the discovery of the metaphysical horizon by architectural means." The mind itself is endowed with a certain talent as a goal-setting ability, it creates the integrity of culture. Cultural goals, organized into a systemic unity, form a specific space, which is a prerequisite of the mind itself, which appears as the creator of ideas of spontaneity, spontaneity, structured in the form of the ability of imagination and reason, making a connection to the manifold in contemplation, and for aesthetics it is extremely important that these spontaneous formations are able to independently begin to act from the inner motives of the subject of creative activity. The artist has a unique knowledge of the way to bring together the variety of figures depicted in the picture so that it makes an aesthetic impression. Kant refers the term aesthetics to a predicate construction as a means of expressing contemplation in cognitive judgments and spiritual aspirations, and even to identify the conditions under which this predicate is given. In contrast to this terminological definition, Kant's critique of the aesthetic faculty of judgment deals not with cognitive concepts and judgments, but with reflexive predicates (here the predicate of beauty itself is not connected with the concept of an object), which allow us to find the common for a given particular. To understand beauty in art, the analysis of the imaginative ability of the soul, which Kant structures in the form of a number of abilities, is of particular importance: the ability to image, create secondary images, preceding images, supplemented by the ability to distinguish objects as the sense of pleasure develops. For her, the consciousness of the image, the establishment of the unity of the culturally giving consciousness is also important.

It is empirical contemplation that opens the horizon of the application of the intellectual concept, and the synthetic unity of apperception, which reads the manifold in sensory contemplation, is a prerequisite for the formation of structures of subordination of the contemplated objects to the mind as spontaneity in the activity of its figurative synthesis. The assumption of such transcendental devices, a priori performing a rational connection, just allows us to talk about the objectification of concepts. By giving consciousness inner coherence and integrity, the modern philosopher deciphers objectification itself, revealing the rhythmic features of the style of philosophical thinking, they characterize the order of movement from the initial cognitive steps ("the ability to believe a thing") to the ability to grasp the process of change. "... We must be able to see and think about changing things. Finally, to see and think the coherence of the world and the coherence of self–consciousness is the first step towards our ability to know" (53, pp. 19-20). This objectification is about the initial steps of applying not only concepts, but also terms of the language (and in it, as the author emphasizes here, "we speak coherently, and not with a scattering of signs"), as if sketching thereby a scheme of experience that creates an abstract object, visually depicting the most essential structures of a process or system; in fact, schema is the unfathomable art of visualizing abstraction.

For aesthetics, it is of fundamental importance that the scheme appears in Kant as a universal method of a priori activity of the faculty of judgment, which allows us to represent categories to feelings, giving the latter content, while, as already noted, the scheme itself should be distinguished from the image. If I think of a set of elements of some set, then it will be the image of one of the elements. There is a certain strategic approach behind the scheme, its author is the imagination, which in its freedom "schematizes without a concept" (Kant), handing him his image; with the help of this approach, rather, "represent in one image a multitude (for example, a thousand) according to a certain concept, than this image itself, which in in the latter case [when I think a thousand], I can hardly review and compare with the concept. This idea of the universal way in which the image of the imagination delivers to the concept, I call the scheme [for] this concept" ^{[26, p. 259 (179-180)]}. First of all, reproductive imagination is related to the scheme, which leads to the appearance of empirical objectivity and corresponds to the laws of association, while the transcendental ability of imagination, as a productive, amateur ability, plays a creative role in the field of schematization, since it creates not only a scheme of concepts of nature, but also a scheme of the law itself. It is taken with respect to its inherent freedom as what Kant in his aesthetics calls a master of arbitrary possible contemplations, having the ability to create an outline of an image in space. Here, as the philosopher says, aesthetic taste shows its greatest perfection in the sketches of the imagination. And although we capture an object in our contemplation, the very ability of productive imagination appears to be different from the artistic ability, since it is connected "with a certain form of this object and in so far as it does not have free play (unlike poetry), it is still clear that the object can give this ability exactly the form that contains the synthesis of the manifold, which the faculty of imagination, if it were freely presented to itself, would create in accordance with the regularity of the understanding in general" ^{[24, p. 245]}, which in the case of aesthetic contemplation is tuned to establish order. But the faculty of imagination can act in harmony not only with the faculty of reason, but with the faculty of reason to produce concepts.  This creates a rather difficult situation in which the ability of productive imagination turns out to be – it is both free and natural, and this situation is resolved by Kant by introducing a construction of unconstrained expediency without a goal. In this construction, the peculiarity of the aesthetic judgment of taste is manifested, the vaguely expedient return, as Kant says, of spiritual forces to what we call beautiful. Thus, the ability of imagination, by virtue of its creativity, gives rise to creative fantasies that deeply affect us. When we turn to the analysis of the sublime, here the ability of imagination when contemplating a formless object harmoniously correlates with the ability of the mind to give concepts, while the soul itself is shocked, and the imagination reaches some extreme depths. "What is excessive for the faculty of imagination (to which it is stimulated when grasping contemplation) is, as it were, an abyss in which it itself is afraid of getting lost; but nevertheless, it is not excessive, but natural for the idea of reason about the supersensible to cause such an aspiration of the faculty of imagination, therefore, it in turn is equally attractive, in how repulsive it was for one sensuality. But the judgment itself always remains only aesthetic, since, having no basis for a definite concept of the object, it represents only the subjective play of the very abilities of the soul (the abilities of imagination and reason) – through their contrast – as harmonic" ^{[24, p. 289]}. Here the faculty of imagination seems to dominate the subject, but such dominance nevertheless appears as expedient for the entire destiny of the soul.

In contrast to the intellectual connection carried out by the mind, conscious of the unity of action, the possibility of which is based on apperception, figurative synthesis contains the basis of the possibility arising in the depths of the structural application itself, it can be called a transcendental synthesis of the ability of imagination, which allows you to depict a perceptually absent object. It is an inherent property of sensuality, although it does not completely coincide with it, since its synthesis gives rise to spontaneity, "which is determinative, and not definable, like feelings, therefore, it can a priori determine feeling by its form in accordance with the unity of apperception" ^{[26, pp. 225, 227 (151-152)]}. That is, the imagination is endowed with the ability to determine sensuality a priori, while at the same time synthesizing contemplations in accordance with categories. This form of synthesis presupposes the influence of reason on sensuality and is the first pattern of the application of reason, which underlies all other patterns of its application to objects of contemplation. Since the ability of imagination puts into action spontaneity, free creation, Kant sometimes calls it the productive ability of imagination, which in modern research appears as a universal apparatus, a form of what some authors call "subjective universalism" [see, for example, 7, p. 415]. Productive imagination just works with the subject in fulfillment of the scheme that accompanies the birth of a certain geometry of the mind.  Other authors in their interpretation of the concept of scheme emphasize the moment of crossing epistemologically different forms. Thus, M. Champagne considers "the scheme as a hybrid combining the generality of pure concepts and the peculiarities of sensory intuitions" ^{[6, p. 436]}.

Imagination is related by Kant to the integrity of inner self-contemplation and is thought of as a transcendental ability that synthesizes the manifold in pure contemplation, and is considered by him at the same time as the ability to create schemes. For Kant, it is extremely important to find a formal scheme as a special typology of cognition, which includes data on its construction and environment from the side of border formations, such a scheme differs significantly from the usual scheme. And this formal schematism appears as a hypothesis, in some way clarifying the attitudes of transcendental philosophy, because it "is a set of principles of reason, which culminates in a system a priori (to establish in one scheme as formal in cognition, while the material [content] of cognition fully depicts only forms according to principles)" ^{[23, p. 535]}.

The closeness of schematism to the aesthetic way of thinking is determined by the fact that the scheme itself is a form of intuitive search, and, as we have already seen, it is considered as a product of the ability of imagination, different from the visual image. For aesthetics, it is of fundamental importance that the very theory of the image stems from schematism. Even in art criticism, the so-called aesthetics of feelings is sometimes correlated, as, for example, in the author of the "Experience of the Guide to Composition" by G. K. Koch ^[35], with formal schematization. Schemes are a kind of converters necessary to regulate the frequency of tension in the thought field, so that through them rational concepts come into contact with the subject, so that categories receive objective resolution; schemes of transcendental productive imagination are a kind of image creation technologies, it is in this technological mode that they, on the one hand, work with concepts, and on the other hand, they act as tools for constructing images, while connecting, as Kant emphasizes, with perception. But it's not just that. After all, the acts of giving objective reality to the concept, its sensual embodiment, the acts of understanding categories in the context of the very objectivity of possible experience are similar to the purely aesthetic act of an image (exhibitiones); without schematization of this kind, the researcher cannot even have zero skills, the scientist constantly invents new forms of creating experience, performs sketches of a mental drawing dealing with a limited palette of categoricity in relation to contemplation. The importance of schematic forms has often been pointed out in foreign musicology, for example, in the works of K. Dahlhaus. The disposition of expressive characters in music practiced by F. Liszt, the alternation of heroic, militant, elegiac, pastoral and scherzo "tones" is by no means arbitrary, but is subject to a certain, though not easily comprehended logic: one sequence can be perceived as strictly evidential, the other can look like a potpourri. Without aesthetic rigor in the "change of mood", the scheme of the classical sonata cycle with its allegro, adagio, scherzo and finale would be unthinkable, since the melodic associations identified (not always convincingly) by some analysts are not enough to substantiate the impression of belonging to a single cycle coming from the sequence of parts of a symphony or string quartet" ^{[10, p. 270]}.

Transcendental approbation is a kind of visual art of intellectual action. Of course, in order to show the reality of our concepts, it is necessary to find the necessary harmony with their contemplation, but the "portrait" of intellectual action cannot be drawn by feelings, here we can only talk about the birth of sensuality in some new guise (schematic hypotyposis: ? - sketch, essay, sample, example), and for for this direct image, it is necessary not only to choose the style of summing up to a certain point of view, the style in which the "portrait" of this action will be drawn, but also to perform a contour sketch. And this schematic outline assumes that "the concept that is comprehended by the mind is given an appropriate a priori contemplation" ^{[24, p. 513]}. In fact, schematism is the first manifestation of abstractionism in the art of thinking with its intuitive way of representation, which does not relate to the significative meaning.

Schematism draws time (sequence, simultaneity, constancy) by means of a straight line, and space – by the time of an action performed, for example, in an hour of walking; it has the privilege of a pattern. At the same time, the images themselves are not at all reduced to "designations of concepts by means of accompanying sensory signs that do not contain anything belonging to the contemplation of the object, but only serve for them as a means of reproduction according to the laws of association inherent in the ability of imagination, therefore, subjectively" ^{[24, p. 515]}. The schematism of the faculty of judgment itself is a kind of prelude to the transition from metaphysics to physics (with their different abilities in relation to talent), and, consequently, aesthetics, since the physical itself is considered by Kant as sensual.

Schematism contains both intellectual and sensual, but Kant will find almost the same content at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason in the world concept of philosophy, when the ideal of the philosopher as a model will no longer be schematically, but symbolically presented. Only here it will be woven not from pure, but from symbolic representations so important for aesthetics (an interesting analysis of the problems of the relationship between the schematic and the symbolic in Kant's philosophy is given by van Gorkov ^{[58, p. 15-71]}.

The construction of the scheme is a prerequisite for the development of the world concept of philosophy, since the latter will also synthesize and deploy a new set of concepts similar to those that distinguished the transcendental scheme. In this sense, schematism can be spoken of as a metaphysical propaedeutics of the world concept of philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Developing the idea of the world concept of philosophy, Kant includes the idea of reason in this process. But does schematism correlate with this idea? The task of reason, in Kant's view, is to synthesize the actions of reason in the field of experience, which, without the schemes of sensuality, turn out to be quite ambiguous. But the specification of the conditions for the rational feasibility of a systematic connection of rational concepts would be equally ambiguous if there were no analogue of the scheme of contemplation – after all, there is no direct scheme for the complete connectivity of categorical space. We have already partially touched upon the problem of such an analogue. Here we will approach it from the other side. A distinctive feature of the mind is its ability to create concepts and give principles, that is, to build such knowledge in which conceptual cognition of the particular in general is accomplished. Aesthetics develops as a form of such conceptual thinking, its structures have not only logical, but also real application, which attempts to convey a conceptually designed possible experience of art. And this disposition to grasp patterns of immanent application points not only to aesthetic science, but also to the whole array of knowledge that makes its circle in the mind. But it is never directed directly at experience. His intention is different. This rational intention on the activity of the understanding means that by means of a priori rational concepts, unity is introduced into the very discursive diversity of rules, which Kant sometimes calls the unity of reason, the unity of its principles. That is, this variety is given coherence. The identification of such unity presupposes the performance of a kind of aesthetic act by the mind itself. "The diversity of rules and the unity of principles are indeed required by the mind in order to bring the mind into full agreement with itself ..." ^{[26, p. 469 (362)]}, that is, they are required for purely aesthetic purposes of establishing harmonic oscillations between the mind and the mind. The complete harmony of the mind is complemented by a new form of harmony as a synthetic unity of the manifold in general, which is defined by the rational concept. The condition for linking all diverse representations is time, which a priori encloses them in pure contemplation. At the same time, the transcendental temporal structure approaches both the category and the phenomenon, since this structure is present in a variety of experimental data. "Therefore, the application of categories to phenomena becomes possible by means of a transcendental temporal definition, which, as a scheme of the mind, mediates the summation of phenomena under categories" ^{[26, p. 257 (177)]}. And the search for such a reasoned scheme is a rather difficult scientific task. Is it possible to find an aesthetic scheme that will be a means of transmission in order to bring the phenomena of modern art, for example, under the category of beauty? Is it possible to detect it in the aesthetic ability of judgment, if we expand the meaning of the latter?

L. Wittgenstein interpreted thinking about the meaning of judgment as a projection methodology, from this point of view, aesthetic judgment itself can be considered as a way of creating a mental transmission (through propositional signs) of what is characteristic of sensuality. Aesthetically judging means building a special semiotic proposition in projection to the world. Wittgenstein likens the judgment itself to a musical theme, which cannot be compared with a mixture of sounds, but the musical theme, sound waves, and musical notation – they all unfold according to a common logical pattern, which is similar to the scheme. "There is a general rule by which a musician can play a symphony according to its score and which allows you to hear the symphony by running a needle on a gramophone record and, as in the first case, get the score. Something generates an internal similarity between these phenomena, so different to an outsider's view. And this rule is the law of projection, which projects a symphony into the language of a musical recording. This is the rule of translating her language into the language of gramophone records" (Logical and Philosophical Treatise, 4.0141 (L. Dobroselsky lane)). If we interpret Kant's judgment ability in Wittgenstein's categories, then it should be considered as the ability to create a picture of reality, to create the world with the help of logical scaffolding, which Kant's schemes are. Wittgenstein was faced with the question of how this mapping logic is able to operate with such bizarre icons. This is possible only because there are peculiar aesthetic structures, only because all the icons are "connected to each other in an infinitely elegant network, forming, as it were, a large mirror" (ibid., 5.511). In such a large mirror, the scheme just looks so that its appearance fuels thinking.

The concept of imagination aesthetically introduces the theme of the sample, which is why it is so important as a preparatory stage for presenting the philosopher in this capacity. This idea is connected with a suite of other concepts: idea, ideal (by which the idea is meant not only in concreto, but also in individuo), personification, legislator, the highest teleology of reason. Kant assigns a special place in the ideal structure to the ideal of pure reason, the subject of which is the divine primordial essence, by virtue of which this ideal becomes the theme of transcendental theology.  The ideal of pure reason is considered as a natural idea in the perspective of its relation to concepts, while the idea itself, "being purified, forms a completely a priori defined concept and thus becomes a concept about a single object that is completely determined by an idea alone" ^{[26, p. 743 (In 602)]}. No less important is the transcendental ideal, in which reason finds its application and which underlies the complete definition of everything that exists, of all possible things; and this is a genuine ideal, since here there is a self-determination of the general concept and its comprehension in the image of an individual. For Kant, it is important to determine not only the completeness of the works of the first essence (or the most real being), among the creatures of which is the sensuality of man, but also to point out the representation of the most immaculate ideal of the supreme being. "... This ideal of the most real being, although it is only a representation, is first realized, i.e. transformed into an object, then hypostatized and, finally, due to the natural progress of reason towards the completion of unity, even personified... Indeed, the regulatory unity of experience is based not on the phenomena themselves (not on sensuality only), but on the connection their diverse [content] through the understanding (in apperception); therefore, the unity of the highest reality and the complete definiteness (possibility) of all things seem to be contained in some higher reason, therefore, in a thinking being [intelligentsia]" ^{[26, pp. 753, 755 (In 611)]}. The very regulatory principle of the unity of the world, expressed in an idea, it can be represented only by means of its scheme, an analogue of the schematic representation of some higher thinking being who created this unity according to wise plans. "Therefore, the ideal is for the mind a prototype (Prototypon) of all things that, as imperfect copies (ectypa), borrow material from it for their possibility and, more or less approaching it, are still always infinitely far from being compared with it" ^{[26, pp. 747, 749 (In 606)]}. It is no less interesting to consider the idea of a sample in the context of other similar concepts – the ideal of beauty and schematism. At the same time, Kant points out the futility of aesthetic embodiments of ideals, for example, attempts to depict a sage in a novel, since "natural boundaries that constantly violate perfection in an idea exclude the possibility of any illusion in such attempts and thereby make the good contained in the idea even suspicious and liken it to a simple fiction" ^{[26, p. 739 (In 598)]}. For Kant, the aesthetic is primarily an area associated with the activity of the ability of creative representation and contemplation (intuitus), which is directly related to the subject, with the perception of phenomena, which is possible thanks to a synthesis subordinate to categories. But his theory is not limited to transcendental aesthetics, exploring a priori principles of sensuality. Describing the relation of the logical, moral and aesthetic in Kant's transcendentalism, Ya. I. Svirsky believes that "they indirectly speak of the existence of a certain "underground region" constituted by living sensuality or sensitivity – an area that posits another world, which is by no means transcendent and is not a thing in itself, but for the realization of direct involvement in such a world requires certain efforts, the source of which lies beyond criticism. Such a world has an ontological status.  And let Kantian criticism block access to it, but it breaks through the seams that hold together the system of the abilities of the mind. This is the world of pure becoming, access to which is opened through sensuality, which has entered into an alliance with imagination" ^{[13, pp. 464-465]}. It is only unclear why transcendentalism closes access to being, because becoming itself is thought of by Kant as being and non-being of a certain substance. And the fact that Kant criticizes the ontological proof of the existence of the supreme essence does not mean at all that he does not let being itself into his system, another thing is that the ontological light comes to us through the open windows of experience, which can only show us what exactly, as Kant emphasized, "brings us joy", aesthetic pleasure and without experience, "there would be something other than what I thought" ^{[26, p. 773 (In 628)]}. Kant's interpretation of sensuality and its aesthetic tonality has a rather complex structure, the specifics of which can be clarified if we turn to the subjective mode of representations. "Although the basis of sensual benevolence is subjective, it is subjective in relation to the whole of humanity. For example, music" ^{[21, p. 214]}. In this sense, the aesthetic is understood as universal subjectivity. In transcendental philosophy, it is multimodal, since it can denote both a means of transmitting meaning (Sinn), and the act of comprehending or sensually reproducing a mental representation, and feeling itself as a figure of representation in its relation to the subject. That is why it is so important for us to trace the role that aesthetic representation plays in the formation of the key concepts of Kant's metaphysics related to sensory modality or close to it - the concepts of imagination, genius, schematism and, finally, the world concept of philosophy, in the image of which Kant also introduces a sensual element. It is equally important to trace how metaphysical structures are closed at the level of the theory of art and culture. Analyzing the history and theory of music, K. Dahlhaus emphasized that if in the middle of the XIX century "it seemed that the history of the symphony had come to an end and no renaissance should be expected, then, on the other hand, the aesthetic prestige of the symphony as the most representative genre of instrumental music – the music that since the time of Wackenroder and Tick Gordo it carried its metaphysical dignity, – it was still preserved...List's idea of the symphonic is undoubtedly marked by the desire to abandon the emasculation of the symphony form, but at the same time to save the bearing principles of the symphonic style" ^{[10, pp. 267-268]}.

Schematism is a philosophical dictionary compiled by reason for what, in Kant's words, it leads to in its conclusions from experience and in proportion to what it normatively measures the degree of its empirical application. From Kant's point of view, there is a significant difference between how absolute objectivity and ideal objectivity are presented to the mind. Unlike the first, when the efforts of the mind are aimed at identifying the object, the desire to build its definition, the activity of the mind to realize the ideal object is carried out only in accordance with the scheme. Schematism presupposes mastery of mediation. Schematizing, the mind refers to the object only indirectly as to what really exists, so here schematism works to depict other objects in their systematic unity as indirectly related to the idea itself. If we represent the concept of intelligence in this way, then its objective reality consists in the fact that it has a dimension that meets the requirements of the maximum unity of reason, and this dimension is only a "scheme of the concept of a thing in general, serving only to obtain the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason, when, as it were, we deduce the object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea as from the basis or cause of it… Assuming such an object in an idea, they bring all the rules of the empirical use of reason to a systematic unity and always expand experimental knowledge, never being able to contradict it, then acting according to such ideas is a necessary maxim of reason" ^{[26, pp. 855, 857 (In 698-699)]}. This mode of action presupposes the transcendental deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason.

But because of its ability to schematize the mind, as Derrida will show, it strays from its path (we are distracted here from the analysis of those schemes according to which, according to Rousseau, all errors and delusions are formed), being at the mercy of "errors of the heart". And these mistakes are directly related to aesthetic misconceptions – in the field of musical art, one can become deaf to what constitutes "the very soul of music – namely, melody, not harmony" ^{[14, p. 379]}. This aesthetic scheme crystallized in the thought structures of the "musical geometer" Rameau (who saw the only foundation of art in harmony, from which melody is derived) and Rousseau (from whose point of view harmony is a kind of perversion of music, which was mainly indulged in by the culture of Northern Europe). "Indeed, harmony, which absorbs the energy of music and shackles its ability to imitate, contained in melody, is absent at the time when music was just emerging (in illo tempore), as well as in non-European music (alibi). The question arises: does Rousseau use a scheme already known to us in his criticism of ethnocentrism? After all, he stands at the same time in the position of a kind of symmetrical anti-ethnocentrism, but in fact - deep Western ethnocentrism. In particular, this applies to the thesis of harmony as a proper European evil and proper European science" ^{[14, p. 380]}. Of course, it is possible to contrast the melodic line of harmony as a union of sounds in simultaneity, but it is hardly worth absolutizing such an opposition. The considered interpretation of these means of musical expression is far from Kant's philosophy of music – analyzing the phenomenon of modulation, Kant notes that the form of a combination of harmony and melody serves to express the ineffable richness of thought as an aesthetic idea of a coherent whole.

But let us return to the order of reasoning about the transcendental deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason. This order, if we take the reasoning itself purely psychologically, leads to certain conclusions regarding, for example, the sentient soul and the body: the soul in all its manifestations and perceptions acts according to its inner experience as if it were an unchangeable substance possessing a "personal identity", while its mode, manifested in the body, constantly changing. Approximately the same connection is established at the aesthetic level, for example, between the musical substance (essence) and the performer's body. "Such a direct connection is established between the musical essence of the piece, which is outlined in the score, and the music flowing around the organ, that the organist's body and his instrument turn out to be only the place of its passage" ^{[44, p. 195]}. This concerns the musical idea, but there are ideas that have weight as having reality, as being analogous to real things, and Kant considers such ideas as a scheme of the intentional principle of systematic unity in comprehending the world. "Admitting such ideal entities, we, in fact, do not expand our knowledge beyond the objects of possible experience, but only expand its empirical unity through systematic unity, for which the idea gives us a scheme, which therefore has the force not of a constitutive, but only of a regulatory principle" ^{[26, p. 861 (In 700-701)]}. We are looking for the source of the regulatory principle in order to think more clearly about its universality, which, in turn, brings us closer to understanding approaches to the interpretation of the philosopher's ideal as a model, although here the justification of the regulatory principle itself does not imply an ideal, but an idea: we think of the existence of a being possible only in accordance with the idea. At the same time, this way of thinking has a clearly aesthetic tonality, since the independent mind acting as such a being determines the possibility of the existence of the universe due to the idea of absolute harmony as a complete world unity. "I think to myself only the relation of a certain being, which in itself is completely unknown to me, to the greatest systematic unity of the universe solely in order to make it a scheme of the regulatory principle of the greatest possible empirical use of my mind" ^{[26, p. 865 (In 707)]}. Under this scheme, the relation of a being created by reason to the world is thought of only problematically, with the sole purpose of revealing the dependence on it of the connection between the variety of sensually perceived things. And at the epistemological level, in the image of the natural unity of cognition of all nature, it is the scheme of the regulatory principle, not the constitutive one, that acts as a way of expanding the empirical unity, and such schematization is precisely set by the idea – this analogue of the whole reality. The source of this regulatory principle is unknowable, nevertheless, this principle is introduced by Kant precisely to depict a being (in whose image Kant sees the supreme mind as the cause of the universe) as existing in accordance with a transcendental idea, often aesthetically conceived as the idea of the greatest harmony of the whole world. In Russian philosophy, V. Solovyov's interpretation of the idea itself as a living being will go back to this position. Kant thinks of this being unknown to him as relevant to the unity of the universe in order to "make it a scheme of the regulatory principle of the greatest possible empirical use of my mind" ^{[26, p. 865 (In 707)]}, and this regulatory schematism as a kind of transcendental object allows us to consider the universal coherence of the world as if it absorbed it from the being created reason (ens rationis ratiocinatae) and the conceivable in the concept of an idea. This regulatory schematism is extremely important in epistemological terms, since the mind transfers the idea of unity to the whole experience. In this status, the idea itself schematizes, referring primarily to such an object as thinking nature, its categorical component, which also schematizes, provided it is solvable on sensory contemplation. Reason itself creates from the empirical unity of thought the concept of a substance identical as a person; Kant presents this substance in the image of an independently thinking being, which does not mean that this substance justifies the possibility of psychological properties of the soul. Such a predication does not mean knowledge of the soul, since from these properties it is possible to compose only an idea devoid of concrete guises. Kant characterizes it as a psychological idea, which he considers suitable only as an application of the efforts of the mind to the understanding of mental life. This is where the concept of specific schematism is attached. "Indeed, in this case, the empirical laws of bodily phenomena, which have a completely different character, are not mixed with the explanation of what belongs only to the inner sense; in this case, lightweight hypotheses about the origin, destruction and rebirth of souls, etc., are not allowed; therefore, this subject of inner feeling is considered in a completely pure form, not mixed with foreign properties, and the investigation of reason is also directed to reducing, as far as possible, the grounds for explanation in this subject to a single principle; all this is achieved best and even solely and exclusively through such a scheme, as if this subject were a real being. The psychological idea can mean nothing else but the scheme of the regulatory concept" ^{[26, p. 871 (In 711-712)]}. But the scheme of the regulatory concept is not limited only to a psychological idea. This schematization is also characteristic of other fields of knowledge, other regulatory ideas of pure speculative reason. Among them, it is necessary to single out first of all the concept of the world in general, of the thinking and bodily nature. Cosmological ideas have such a regulatory status. The complete determinism of all cosmological series is expressed by the idea of the higher intelligentsia, the concept of reason about God. But by means of such an expression, the a priori principle of expediency, which is so important for understanding the nature of aesthetic knowledge, according to the universal laws of nature, complementing the principle of unity of nature, emerges before us with more or less distinctness. And a ban on the assumption of such a principle would mean that the topic of ascent from the natural to the supernatural, to the supreme perfect creator, can be closed altogether. If we keep in mind the topic of our research, it would mean that it is impossible to approach a priori aesthetics. Nevertheless, the aesthetic category of perfection is used by Kant precisely as a predicate of expediency. With perfection, as with the other two concepts of unity and truth, Kant correlates the highest cognitive abilities – reason, reason and the ability to judge. The expedient unity itself underlies the application of reason, the idea of this unity should be considered as a law-making idea, which corresponds to the legislating reason (intellectus archetypes). Kant even admits in this idea of the supreme being "some kinds of anthropomorphism useful for the regulatory principle we think of. Indeed, it is always just an idea that does not relate directly to a being different from the world, but to the regulatory principle of the systematic unity of the world, and moreover only through its scheme, namely the highest thinking being [intelligentsia], who created this unity according to wise plans" ^{[26, p. 887 (In 725-726)]}. He thinks of this being unknown to us by analogy with the empirical concept of the intelligentsia, borrowing the concept of perfection from the aesthetic sphere to characterize it. It is one of those concepts with the help of which the justification of this systematic unity is carried out, a method of applying reason is created, which adheres to the idea of perfect intelligentsia as a scheme of a regulatory principle designed to convey a rational attitude to the world in accordance with another principle - the principle of expediency of all nature and aesthetic representation of it.

In the world concept, the concept of the foundation of philosophy and the concept of the philosopher are combined, which appears as a kind of embodied concept mediated by sensory representation, and this is the structure of pure schematism. We are not talking about the cited example of some philosophical system, which can be considered as a proportionate example of philosophizing. This is neither a search nor a way to extract some proportionate samples of it. Rather, we are talking about an ideal theory that is highly relevant for the development of norms of philosophical activity and the direction of philosophical research in a variety of fields. The ideal of the philosopher as an initial model characterizes his activity as a lawmaker of the human mind, possessing expressive possibilities for rethinking the entire body of knowledge regarding the primary goals of the human mind and its purpose. Kant approaches the idea of this ideal primarily through analogous structures, for example, through the territory of substantiation of the regulatory principle, "the necessity of which, it is true, is recognized by us in itself, but we do not recognize the source of this necessity, but we recognize the highest foundation for it only in order to think more clearly about the universality of the principle, – for example, when I think of a certain being as existing, corresponding only to the idea" ^{[26, p. 863 (In 704)]}. The scheme of the world concept of philosophy is not abstract enough to be treated as a real concept, but at the same time it is more speculative compared to the image of a particular philosopher. Approximately the same scheme will be provided in the third "Critique" as the initial interpretation for the personification of the concept of genius, who, according to S. Kierkegaard, knows that he is stronger than the whole world. "Pure philosophy is a product of genius" ^{[23, p. 580]}. Although this is a different type of personification. In a letter to Beloselsky (summer 1792), interpreting his scheme of dianiology, Kant distinguishes among the higher cognitive abilities the ability to invent (de transcendance), followed by "the ability to combine sensuality with a higher ability, that is, to invent something that serves as a rule without the guidance of rules through imagination, i.e. the sphere of genius, which really cannot be to rank it in the sphere of simple reason. The sphere of foresight is a systematic understanding of the connection of reason in a single system of concepts. The sphere of genius is the connection of the first with the immediacy of feelings" ^{[35, p. 552]}. True, the concept itself does not reach a world-class level with such personification, but only perceives the unity grasped in the play of imagination, but here it is for the concept that an idea as such is sought (including an aesthetic idea that will determine its subject area in accordance with the principles of rational activity in relation to the integrity of all experience), an ideal, which also structures the understanding of the philosopher as a model, that is, a typical embodiment of the philosopher.

The concept itself cannot correspond to an aesthetic idea or a representation of the imagination, which encourages us to consider the manifestations of mental unity in various forms and forms, or, as Kant says, to attach to the concept a lot of the ineffable. The depiction of the concept of genius presupposes spirituality in a work of art, the creator of this work is endowed with exemplary talent and is distinguished by originality, which allows him "to be free in art from the compulsion of rules to such an extent that art itself receives a new rule due to this" ^{[24, p. 437 (translation changed)]}. Talent for art – this example of the originality of a natural gift (and nature itself is not a model even for categories) – refers to the concept of a work as a goal, to understanding why the foundations of a work are identical to the a priori peculiarity of feelings. And if "synthesis is carried out inside these bases, then feelings are also possible (which otherwise either jam, or they dissipate)" ^{[42, p. 825]}.

Quite different possibilities open up when, adhering to the canons of refined anthropomorphism, we create an ideal idea of the cause of the world, seeing in it a supreme being with reason, endowed with aesthetic and moral abilities. Moreover, among its attributes we can also find perfection, which has no limits, this is accepted as a necessary metaphysical postulate of transcendent aesthetic perfection, and although the assumption about it is based on relative knowledge about the ordering of the world, nevertheless, the institutions of our mind prescribe everywhere to look for this unattainable perfection, its absolute aesthetics. Scientific aesthetics, aesthetic teleology is only an application to the theory of the universal unity of nature, comprehending which consciousness transcends to the infinite perfection of the creator. So it is possible to approach the a priori aesthetics of perfection. The concept of expedient unity with its aesthetic aspects is also connected to the justification of this unity. At the cultural level, there is a specific teleological certainty that is not reduced to randomness. Shaftbury also noticed that artistic reflection captures a unique originality in every human face, "which distinguishes an individual as intended for special purposes that are absent from others, although deciphering these signs is beyond our abilities. In a picture drawn from nature and expressive, they see the truth, i.e. that it is not taken from imagination. What is this truth? Undoubtedly, in a certain proportion between one of the many parts of the face and all the others, we must express an individual character containing a vaguely imagined goal" ^{[35, pp. 114-115]}. In contrast to this expedient definiteness, unconditional expedient unity is understood as perfection, which is characterized by Kant as a school for the human mind, in which unity itself is comprehended as a law-setting idea, a systematic unity of nature is derived from it, which reason considers as a scheme of a regulatory principle. But this interpretation of schematism is not shared by all researchers. E. Kassirer noted, "as the real function of the concept is not that this variety is abstractly and schematically "displayed" through it, but only that it contains the law of relation, through which only a new and peculiar connection of the variety is created, and here, the form of combining experiences turns out to be the one that turns changeable "impressions" into permanent "objects"" ^{[36, p. 327]}. But after all, the scheme works not only with the concept, and the very creation of new connections only emphasizes the aesthetic significance of Cassirer's analysis.

The world concept of philosophy and the world concept of art

Aesthetic rhetoric in critical transcendentalism does not mean what are called aesthetic expressions introduced into the initial philosophy, since in principle all philosophy, according to Kant, is prosaic. The question of how this birth is possible, how to represent knowledge as creation, is extremely complicated: any knowledge schematizes activity, but after all, human action itself, according to Kant, does not have its creator. Even the recording of the Pentateuch was made "not by the author, but only by an ideal secretary who wrote down what was dictated to him without a single inaccuracy. The Torah is a heavenly book created by the Almighty before the creation of the world. Moreover, it is a project of the world containing "everything"" ^{[55, p. 9]}. But how can knowledge be born in the world created by God? It seems that we can only talk about knowledge creation after creation, creation after creation, when everything, according to the Torah, is absolutely designed. The simultaneity of the act of creation and the act of creation by us of some structures is impossible even to conceive. After all, "a person must have infinite knowledge in order to know something as a creation" ^{[23, p. 132]}. In the world, we can only meet what we can judge after the insight of the immeasurability of creation, what became after creation, became apparent, although our mind requires the unconditional "as a totality of conditions, since it tries to create the object itself" ^{[23, p. 113]}. The creative attempts of the mind are not limitless (for example, it is not capable of "creating any concepts (about objects), but only ordering them and giving them the unity that they can have with their maximum expansion, i.e. in relation to the totality of the series" ^{[26, p. 825 (In 671-672)]}, spontaneity itself they are realized in the form of a free work of creation – after all, assuming a free cause of the world, which is comprehended in the concept of the architect of everything, a person can begin to draw up the very scheme of his action only freely. Kant calls such a free work a system of creation, which encompasses both the creative substance and the created beings. But how to combine freedom with the act of creation itself, how to combine them in the metaphysics of consciousness. All Russian metaphysics originates from the architectural metaphor of the Intercession on the Nerl. Substances are created at the same time, but this is not the case outside of substantial achievements, in the cognitive sphere, where creative effort can manifest itself in a brilliant form: "it is brilliant to find knowledge that cannot be learned at all" ^{[23, p. 150]}. Here it is important to determine how this form correlates with the Kantian concept of school philosophy, that is, the concept of a system of cognition. In this sense, one of the most important is the problem of speculative proof, which is built on some unstable, wavering foundation and "is placed on such a thin edge that even school philosophy is able to keep it on it only insofar as it makes it constantly spin like a top, so that in its own eyes it has no solid foundation, on which it could be built" ^{[26, p. 541 (In 424)]}. School philosophy only allows you to exercise the talent of the mind, illustrating its universal principles, and philosophizing explores their origins, verifying the fundamental positions themselves, revealing the foundations of aesthetic knowledge.

Already in the Critique of Pure Reason, aesthetic judgments related to the problems of the birth of knowledge are associated with an understanding of the ideals of sensuality, the monograms of imagination, an insight into the immeasurability of creation, with aesthetic intentions on the possibilities of human nature, the orientation of civil laws "to what completely constitutes our own creation and the cause of which we ourselves can be..." ^{[26, p. 465 (358)]}. At the same time, the most difficult aesthetic question is raised here about creating a copy equal to the sample (after all, it is extremely difficult even to compare with the sample, since it is only conceivable in an idea). It is also associated with an equally complex, extremely rarely touched upon even in the theory of rationalism, the question of the talent of reason (although, as Kant will later note, inner truthfulness in front of oneself and the presence of firm principles accessible to the human mind, "in their dignity ... surpass the greatest talent" ^{[34, p. 331]}), about the opposition a virtuoso of reason and a lawgiver of reason, about the idea of the original "creative mind, in relation to which we direct all the empirical use of our mind in its greatest breadth, as if the objects themselves arose from this prototype of all reason" ^{[26, p. 859 (In 701)]}. According to Kant, we wisely consult with ourselves, identifying at the same time a criterion according to which we do not conduct a predicative proof, but turn to the principles of probabilistic logic, which expands the activity of an a priori concept to the level of a realized idea. The creative project of transcendentalism is realized in the famous definition of metaphysics as the completion of the entire culture of the human mind. This project also correlates with theological ideas about the ideal meeting of God and the world, expressing the synthetic unity of transcendental philosophy. God is "the ideal of moral and practical reason and everything that can serve as its rule, the prototype (archetypon) and the architect of the world, although only in an infinite approximation" ^{[23, p.549]}. It is important here that the prototype itself, the sample, the prototype actually coincide with the aesthetic eidos (the idea of architecture).

Kant builds a kind of philosophical archaeology, from which one can proceed to the creation of a prototype of the character of a philosophical work, manifestations of philosophical talent. The explanation of such a prototype can be given historically, but it will be theoretical when it will not be reduced to either historical or purely logical unfolding. Kant considers only such an explication to be promising, which carries with it an understanding of the nature of the human mind. Hence, the problem of the correlation of the philosopher's idea, understood as a model and reason, comes to the fore. In this sense, the threads of philosophical traditions, the history of the use of reason in concreto and in abstracto intertwine and take the form of a corresponding pattern, the completed form of the entire range of scientific disciplines, each of which is one of the organs of wisdom. "Every philosophical thinker builds his own building (Werk), so to speak, on the ruins of the previous one, but it never reaches such a state as to become solid in all its parts. Therefore, philosophy cannot be studied for the reason that it does not yet exist. But even if we assume that there really is one, still none of those who, although they studied it, could say about themselves that he is a philosopher, because his knowledge of philosophy would always be only subjective-historical" ^{[35, p. 281]}. Therefore, the paradox of the world concept of philosophy lies in the fact that we have to talk about a sample of what does not yet exist. It is difficult to say whether Kant considered his own method of critical philosophizing to be among the specified sample, which makes it possible to decompose the system of cognitive abilities and determine their boundaries. But wouldn't such a canonization be presumptuous? Philosophy can be presented in different proportions – both as one thing and as much. And how is it really? Since "from an objective point of view, only one human mind can exist, then there cannot be many philosophies, i.e. only one true philosophical system based on principles is possible, no matter how diverse and often contradictory philosophies may be about the same position" ^{[27, p. 23]}. But can this philosophical system of pure reason serve as models for explaining various ways of philosophizing? Or it excludes all the others, and even if this is the case, then the previous discoveries are not eliminated, without which transcendentalism could not have achieved the conceptual unity of philosophy as such. That is, the problem here is whether different philosophical constructions are possible in the historical space, is it not presumptuous to treat the space of the transcendental method, as well as the system built on its basis, as one's own creation, because the very question of creation in this area presupposes an unambiguous answer: before the new methodology, there could not be any there was no philosophy. Indeed, if we admit that this philosophical methodology was preceded by "another (and moreover true) philosophy, then there would be two true philosophies regarding the same subjects, and this contains a contradiction. "Thus, when critical philosophy proclaims itself to be a philosophy before which there was no philosophy at all, then it acts exactly as those who build philosophy according to their own plan have done, will do and should do" [Kant, 2014, p. 25]. In fact, previous philosophical systems have lost the keys to possible experience, which were first found in critical research. To describe the attitude of critical philosophy to imitators who cover up the scarcity of thought, Kant turns to the aesthetic form of the comic. Shaftesbury at one time introduced such a criterion of the truth of the teaching as its ability to withstand ridicule. In this regard, Kant believes that "over time, it should be the turn of the critical philosopher to laugh last and therefore laugh best when he sees that the systems existing only on paper of those who have owned the first word for a long time are collapsing one after another, and all their followers are fleeing – fate is inevitable for them" [Kant, 2014, p. 29]. In fact, we are talking about a kind of aesthetic verification. But it's not just about these comic forms. After all, one can also raise the question: is critical transcendentalism a model for other new systems? Kant believes that it is still problematic to give a positive answer to this question: after all, "it is not possible to name outstanding and stable names from new philosophers, since everything is in motion here" [Kant, 1994-8, p. 288] – everything that one philosopher creates is demolished to the ground by another. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he generally demonstrates almost an example of intellectual humility, arguing that to call himself a philosopher not in the sense of a lawgiver in language, but in the sense of a lawgiver of the human mind and "to pretend to be compared with a model, conceivable only in idea, would be too bold" [Kant, 2006, pp. 1051 (in 866-867)].

When Kant speaks about the world concept of philosophy, he does not mean at all any allegory of philosophy (like the "Allegory of Painting" or the "Allegory of Faith" by Jan Vermeer), a description of the pictorial images of philosophers (the famous "Athenian School" by Raphael) or a description of the iconography of philosophers (statues of philosophers in the Cameron Gallery of Tsarskoye Selo or sculptures ancient philosophers in the Summer Garden of St. Petersburg). Introducing this concept, Kant only explains it with the help of the traditional artistic technique of personification. But does this mean that philosophy is shifting to the attitudes of aesthetic thinking? Not at all. After all, "every philosophy is prosaic; and the proposal to philosophize poetically again from now on can be taken seriously little more than an offer to a merchant that he henceforth write his ledgers not in prose, but in verse" [Kant, 1994n-p1, p. 527]. So why did Kant need this technique?

In modern research, which outlines the basics of the cognitive approach to metaphor, a certain place is given to the connection of the concepts of metaphor and personification. It is considered here in the context of the analysis of ontological metaphors, when the object is interpreted anthropologically, while considerable attention is paid to the exemplification of the personification itself. From the point of view of J. According to Lakoff and M. Johnson, personification is a category covering a wide range of metaphorical sound, all the "stringed" instruments of which have a human attribute as their source. In this range of meanings, "what is happening is comprehended, personifying it, i.e. in terms that we understand based on our own motivations, goals, actions and properties. The humanization of such abstract concepts ... provides an understanding that is self-evident to most people" [Lakoff, 2017, p. 60]. In Kant's thinking, this question is connected not only with anthropological explications, but here the specified range acquires metaphysical significance.

In the "Viennese logic" the concept of philosophy is thought of as adequate to the concept of conceptu cosmico, and such an approach to its concept, in which the content of the conceptualization of the ultimate goals of the human mind is revealed, allows us to consider its idea as "the idea of the most perfect legislation of the human mind", and the philosopher himself as a "lawyer of the human mind" [Kant, 2022, p. 205], even an expert lawyer in the field of such legislation. In order to carry out his activities, such an expert needs to cultivate philosophical mastery and develop a methodology for the liberation of the philosophy of the human spirit itself. But, apparently, this legislation can be expanded to the jurisdiction of the philosophical court, since philosophy itself is a creative endeavor that avoids the imprudence of the creators themselves, and therefore is subject to the court that is mentioned in the quatrain of G. Ibsen:

To create is a harsh judgment,

The trial of oneself.

It is possible to reveal the world concept of philosophy only if we consider it as a culture of the talent of the philosophical thinker himself, as a wise understanding of the connection of cognition and the entire spiritual path of a person not only with the last goals of his mind (in "Logic" philosophy is a science considered "according to the concept of the world – Weltbegriff or in sensu cosmico", this concept is a high concept that speaks of the dignity of philosophy itself – after all, it contains the idea of perfect wisdom and the highest maxim of the application of our reason), but also with the essential goals of all mankind. The humanity of this connection always has a moral dimension, since "having risen to a higher level of morality, humanity sees much further and the judgment about what we are, in comparison with what we should be ... becomes more strict the more steps of morality we have passed throughout the entire period of history known to us" [Kant, 1994n-p1, p. 341]. It is morality that determines the noumenality of a person who has free will, although incomprehensible by nature, and therefore Kant understands philosophy itself as a practical human knowledge that reveals what the philosopher calls the moral law in us in its indestructible greatness. A person hears the voice of this inner law, and his comprehension in the work "On the recently arisen lordly tone in philosophy" is associated with aesthetic methodology, with the personification of the inner law: a method "personifying this law and making the morally commanding mind some kind of Isis hidden under the veil (even if it was not attributed to other properties, except those that can be established by the first (didactic – N. K.) of the methods) is an aesthetic way of representing the same subject; such, however, can be used later, when the principles have already been clarified in the first way, in order to revive these ideas with the help of a sensual, although resorting only to analogies, image, – but here, however, there is always the danger of falling into dreamy visionary, which is the death of all philosophy" [Kant, 1994n-p1, p. 525]. Therefore, if we want, according to the goals of our research, to depict the world concept of philosophy, to be inspired by its model, a model of courage and honesty of thought, then we should apply the aesthetic method of personification, to reveal the power of aesthetic exemplary, which, as R. Mccreel and Ch. Candler, embedded in a reflexive judgment [Makkril, 2006, p.223], remembering how difficult and formidable the practice of applying this method can be. A. Escobedo tries to reveal how the history of will was described using the literary technique of personification, which "turns subjectivity into objectivity" [Escobedo, 2017, p. 14].

The search for a universal criterion of beauty is hopeless, and the mediativeness of the judgment of taste, due to its empirical load, also creates certain problems: the basis of unanimity deeply hidden for people regarding the favor for objects of taste, which can manifest itself in various peoples, is even difficult to attribute to the category of evaluation criteria. This vague understanding of taste preferences nevertheless sets the theme of exemplary or prototype phenomena that speak of aesthetic taste as a personal ability. It is found in those whose taste allows us to discuss this sample, and it "is only an idea that everyone should create in himself and on the basis of which he should judge everything that can be an object of taste or serves as an example of taste, and even about the taste of any person" [Kant, 2001, p. 221]. Aesthetics unites into a whole a certain ideally closed system, correlating it with the ideal, which was already thought of by Plato as the idea of the divine understanding. The ideal indicates the concept of mind and its transcendental application, for which, in the language of phenomenology, the geometry of experiences cannot be constructed. The field of empirical knowledge appears as defined by an absolute totality of conditions, from the height of which the entire wide and general space of the use of reason is viewed, and the consciousness of aesthetic judgment leads to the improvement of discursive intentionality. "To name an idea means to say a lot about the object (as an object of pure reason), but that is why very little about the subject (i.e., about its reality under empirical conditions, since the idea, being the concept of a certain maximum, can never be adequately given in concreto" [Kant, 2006, pp. 493, 495]. In concreto, only the idea of practical reason can be given to some extent, the embodiment of which takes place under the influence of absolute perfection. The space of her indirect expressions also includes an aesthetic idea, in the transmission of which genius in art is revealed. Large areas of aesthetic research open up when a single entity relevant to an idea is personified. Hence it is clear why Kant interprets the sample of taste as the ideal of the beautiful – some amorphous idea of the mind of a relative conceivable apogee, given in a single image as a manifestation of the ability of imagination; the achievement of this ideal is impossible, a person representing the identity of intellectual substance, only strive for its creation in his inner world. The aesthetic ideal, the ideal of art, is embedded in a system of partially intellectualized judgment of taste, and such an ideal, as Kant emphasizes, can only be that which has the ability to set goals, that is, "a person who can determine his own goals by reason or, where he should borrow them from external perception, is still able to combine Therefore, only man can be the ideal of beauty, just as of all objects in the world [only] humanity in his person as an intelligentsia can be the ideal of perfection" [Kant, 2001, p. 225]. If the "Critique of Pure Reason" introduces the idea of the world concept of philosophy as corresponding to the essential goals of the human mind, then the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" undertakes a culturological expansion of this idea and introduces, in fact, as its analogue, the idea of the world concept of art as corresponding to the perfect ideal of humanity in the person of man, but as if personifying this concept of an artist's ideal is understood as a model that only a genius can become. The world concept of art, which characterizes the work of such great artists as Homer, Rublev, Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Goethe, Dostoevsky, determines how majestic art is created in culture. If the image of the philosopher as a model is conceived by Kant as an image of the legislator of the human mind, then the image of genius is as a talent that gives art a rule as a law, a transcendental law of specification.  

In the Critique of Pure Reason, personification connects the world concept of philosophy and the concept of the philosopher's model. The very concept of a sample follows from the interpretation of normativity. "A sample is a special case of a practical rule, since it represents to us the feasibility or impracticability of some action" [Kant, 2019, p. 237], in this case, an action performed by a philosopher, an action of self–knowledge, the idea of which in its scope can be compared "with the idea (of humanity), what a person should be" (Kant). This juxtaposition "deeply touches the soul and puts a person to such a height where he can consider himself no other than with the greatest admiration for his inherent inclinations… Then he will be close to the question: what is it about you that you dare to enter into a struggle with all the forces of nature in you and around you and overcome them when they find themselves in discord with your moral principles? When this question, the solution of which completely exceeds the ability of speculative reason and which nevertheless is itself, is suggested to the heart, then even incomprehensibility with such self-knowledge should give the soul consolation, which only the more vividly defeats it to honor its duty, the more temptations there are" [Kant, 2019, p. 245]. Art also gives such a suggestion to the heart (the whole aesthetic way of thinking), it acts as a Menschenfreund, a friend of the whole human race, that is, as "one who takes aesthetic participation (joy) in the good of all people and can never violate it without inner regret… When we oblige others with our charity, we thereby become obligated ourselves; as if brothers, subjects of a common father who wishes everyone bliss" [Kant, 2019, p. 227]. Such art can be called the world concept of art.

Analyzing the relationship between the concepts of duty, duty and goals, Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals addresses the problem of personification. Here the ideal of virtue is personified, represented in the image of the sage, which gives his ideal image as a person who can only be imagined in thought, but who is identical with the idea of wisdom. "Human morality,– writes Kant, "at its highest stage can still be nothing more than a virtue, even if it were completely pure (completely free from the influence of all alien motives, except the motive of duty), because then it, as an ideal (to which it is necessary to constantly approach), is usually personified poetically under the name of the sage" [Kant, 2019-2, p. 33 (383)]. Thus, the aesthetic motive is quite clearly introduced into the idea of the world concept of wisdom. When we talk about the aesthetics of a concept, in this case about its personification, we believe that it (the concept of the world) connects, entering into a complex game, with its opponents – metaphor, trope, analogy, metonymy. But to what extent can the concept be expressed aesthetically or metaphorically? The whole given metaphorical series implies the existence of its equivalents: feelings, experiences, volitional acts, etc. E. Husserl even considered reflection as a fundamental feature of the sphere of experience, including the experience of meaning, one of the ways of such experience is "intuitive", when "the object implied as such" is clearly recognized, and at the same time specially noted the case is the one when the way of contemplation is primordial, from the source itself, giving" [Husserl, 2015, p. 425], which involves the interweaving of feeling, will and judgment. And if Kant likens the world concept of philosophy to the lawgiver of reason, then Husserl sees the specific nature of reason in positing on the basis of a primordial giving meaning that has its original legal basis, but has nothing to do with logic or psychology. Therefore, the philosophical studies themselves will be those that act as "neutral" in relation to these last two disciplines, and it is possible to "neutralize" the world not only with the help of mathematical operations, but also through any modes of consciousness correlated with the world and with what is in the world, with things themselves, while having a phenomenological the courage to take them as they give themselves and let them in, while fulfilling their honest description. "This connects those studies related to the theory of mind, which relate to the distinction of things, values, practical subjects, and those that study those additions of consciousness, which are constituted for the above-mentioned. So phenomenology really embraces the whole natural world and all those ideal worlds that it exposes to shutdown; it embraces them as a "world sense" - those essential laws that generally connect the objective sense and the noema – and the closed system of noes, specifically – those essential relationships related to the law of reason, the correlate of which it serves as a "real object", which, therefore, for its part, always represents an appropriate index for completely certain systems of teleological unifying formations of consciousness" [Husserl, 2015, p. 451].

If Husserl correlates the world sense with the law of reason, then Kant correlates the world concept of philosophy with the law of reason; reason itself, of course, does not create any concepts, it only orders them and gives them unity; it is occupied only by reason in its expedient application and in its ability to unite the manifold in an object through concepts. The world can be understood as the universe, the cosmos, the state of humanity (eternal peace as a goal), and finally, as an intelligible world. From Kant's point of view, it would be a mistake to consider the world as an intellectual totality or to draw its noumenal boundaries. In the first "Critique", the concept of "world" is associated with the interpretation of the unity of the Universe, described at the level of cosmological concepts that "entangle the mind into an inevitable antinomy" as soon as we begin to raise questions about its beginning or its infinity; in a transcendental sense, this concept implies the completeness of the synthesis of all phenomena, the communication of substances as a prerequisite for coexistence. At the same time, consciousness contains something that allows us to talk about our inner ability regarding the intelligible world, the objects of which cannot be objects of the senses (Phenomenena), they can only be considered as objects of the understanding (Noumena), and the "absolute totality of the connection itself must be thought of in the noumenal world; in the phenomenal, the world whole (as a given), according to space and time, there is an abyss, and such a thing cannot be given to it" [Kant, 2000, p. 267]. In the idea of the world whole, Kant sees only a prototype of actions in the discursive sphere, which is necessary as a regulatory principle, which is a condition for the interdependence of events of the empirical application of reason. In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant even uses the concept of theoretical world studies as an introduction to pragmatic anthropology, which studies the attitudes necessary for a citizen of the world. He approaches this concept based on cultural concepts. This is how the philosopher begins this work. "All the successes in culture, which serve as a school for a person, have their purpose to apply the acquired knowledge and skills to life. But the most important subject in the world to which this knowledge can be applied is man, because he has his own final goal for himself. "Therefore, the knowledge of the generic characteristics of humans as earthly beings gifted with intelligence especially deserves world studies, despite the fact that man is only a part of earthly creatures." Knowledge about the world is one thing, but the idea of the world whole is quite another, and Kant does not attach objective reality to this idea, because this reality is too deeply hidden from us for us to give any grounds for penetrating into it.

In essence, here we are talking about how to give the concept a sensual form. The first approach to the sculptural image itself is carried out by Kant purely mathematically, exploring one of the main problems of transcendental analytics – what are the prerequisites for distinguishing all objects in general into Phaenomena and Noumena, or what are the consequences of primary distinction – and one of them is creation, creativity, creativity of the mind, and it is one of the most difficult philosophical problems. As P. Valery wrote, "the one who did not see how an obscure but real image appears on a blank sheet of paper, saddening in that it forces him to reject all others; who could not see the outlines of a non-existent building in the transparent air; who was not tormented by the dizzying inaccessibility of the goal, anxiety before the choice of means, a premonition of delay or despair the calculation of successive stages, thinking about the future, especially about what there is no need to think about right now, that person – no matter how extensive his knowledge may be – will never comprehend the wealth, energy and intellectual breadth that illuminate the conscious action of construction. The ability of the gods to create came to them as a gift from the human mind (and not vice versa? – N.K.), because this mind, abstract and regularly acting, is able to bring the conceived to such a scale when he himself is no longer able to realize it" [Valery, 2020, pp. 365-366].

But the mind-sculptor himself creates three-dimensional works in the form of concepts, the condition of which is their logical form, at the same time "handing" them the object with which they will relate. Without this condition, concepts cannot be integrated into the structure of objective knowledge, and then they should be viewed only as a play of the ability of imagination or reason with their representations. As an example, Kant takes the concept of mathematics in their purely contemplative sense. One of the a priori principles of cognition, analyzed in transcendental aesthetics, states that such a form of pure contemplation as space has three dimensions. According to Euclid's axiom, only one straight line can be drawn between two points, etc. "Although all these principles and ideas about the subject that this science deals with are generated in the soul completely a priori, nevertheless they would have no meaning if we could not show their meaning every time on phenomena (empirical subjects). That is why it is necessary to make every abstract concept sensuous, i.e. to show the object corresponding to it in contemplation" [Kant, 2006-2, pp. 313-315 (A 239-240)]. And it is all the more important to make the world concept of philosophy itself sensible. But how to do it?

Considering the correlation of Kant's terms praktische Menschenkenntniss and Antropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, V. V. Vasiliev admits that practical human knowledge coincides with Kant's term "transcendental anthropology", which, as it were, summarizes the main theses of the "Critique of Pure Reason", "Critique of Practical Reason" and "Critique of the faculty of Judgment" [Kant, 2000, p. 616], summarizing the provisions concerning the ultimate goal of human existence. In a certain sense, transcendental anthropology also encompasses the world concept of philosophy, which, unlike the school concept of philosophy, characterizes the art of constructing the entire Kantian system, not only in the form it acquired in the first "Critique", but as a kind of strategic construction, that is, in essence, in the form that it will acquire after the creation of the "Critique of Practical Reason" and the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment." In this case, we will be interested in the question: to which concept of philosophy does aesthetics belong – to the school or to the world? If aesthetics is only a school concept of philosophy, then this is one thing. If aesthetics is, as we believe, still the structure of the world concept of philosophy, that is, if it is a heavenly and earthly aesthetics, engaged in the search for the beginning of the beginnings – natural and transcendental, if it is a discipline that is too sensitive to initial conditions, then this is a completely different understanding of it. And it's not that some philosophical constructions can be defined as beautiful. The question is what to understand by the world concept as such, what "knowledge of the world" (Kant) is fixed in it and how to comprehend the aesthetic facet of this knowledge.

Such comprehension faces certain difficulties in the modern intellectual situation, when some researchers, starting from the phenomenon of disagreements in the philosophical world, seek to prove that philosophy is unable to solve the problems facing it, while painting a picture of the epistemological failure of philosophy. So, I. Tozser argues that, "no matter how hard we struggle, we are unable to create substantial philosophical knowledge that goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis of philosophical theories (we are unable to create substantial philosophical knowledge that goes beyond the cost-benefit analysis of philosophical theories" [Tozser, 2023, p 240], but these economic valuation methods have nothing to do with philosophy. Another researcher, S. Gaukroger, gives a detailed narrative about the failures of philosophy, which paradoxically reveal what is most important in philosophy. What is the evidence of this fiasco of philosophy? The author interprets "the historical study of philosophy in the West from the point of view of its most significant failures: attempts to tell about the good life, to establish philosophy as a discipline that can judge other forms of thinking, to present philosophy as a theory of everything and interpret it as a discipline that rationalizes empirical and mathematical sciences" [Gaukroger, 2020, p. 316]. But the negative assessment of a random or unpredictable combination of circumstances belongs to the field of empirical research, which says little about the meaning of philosophy, about its global concept.

The very concept of personification in the Critique of Pure Reason is not found in the above fragment for the first time. Kant will turn to him already in the third chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic when considering the problem of the transcendental ideal. Cognition through the concept of the immaculate ideal of the supreme being assumes an aesthetic crown. After all, the concept of this ideal "completes and crowns all human cognition" [Kant, 2006, p. 823 (In 670)], but although it is impossible to prove or refute the objective reality of such an ideal, it is important for the purely speculative application of reason, which tends to cross the border of possible experience and is deceived by sensuality, experiencing disharmony with one's own ideal principles, generating an irresistible appearance, confuses the mind. This very appearance even has an aesthetic edge. When the correct principles of reason have made an impression on a person, this deception must be eradicated, "because otherwise it corrupts the soul and does not allow good feelings to rise from under the weeds of beautiful visibility" [Kant, 2006, p. 947 (In 776)]. The reason for the appearance of this appearance is both in the peculiar intentionality of the ideas themselves, and in the flaws of the ability of judgment. The intention of transcendental ideas is aimed at pointing out certain goals to the mind, communicating to concepts not only maximum unity, but also maximum expansion. True, in the "Transcendental Dialectic" we are talking about the personification of the concept of the all-real essence, but at the same time the logical structure of the approach to it will be approximately the same as that characteristic of the interpretation of the world concept of philosophy. Both here and there the concepts of an idea, an ideal, an image, a prototype, and so on will be used. All of them lead to one of the most mysterious concepts of transcendentalism – the concept of schematism, but at the same time raise the question of the possibility of a polemic of pure reason. This question is, "how can two people argue about a thing that they nurtured in themselves only as an idea, trying to extract from it something more than an idea, namely the reality of the object itself?" [Kant, 2006, p. 949 (In 778)].

The philosopher is the substance of a metaphysical work. Pure reason provides the idea for a transcendental science of the world in general (cosmologia rationalis), the concept of which constitutes the regulatory idea of purely speculative reason. For Kant, the important question is whether there is a hidden affinity in the field of the passage of knowledge about the soul to the knowledge of the world and further to the primordial essence, and also what is the difference between the idea and the ideal associated with this knowledge (including the ideal of the sage). Philosophy is created on the model of one amazing form. "Just as an idea gives rules, so an ideal serves as a prototype for the complete definition of its copies; and we have no other standard for our actions except the behavior of this divine person in us, with whom we compare ourselves, evaluate ourselves and, thanks to this, correct ourselves, never, however, being able to compare with him. Although it is impossible to admit the objective reality (existence) of these ideals, nevertheless, they cannot be considered chimeras on this basis; they provide the necessary measure for the mind, which needs the concept of what is perfect in its own way in order to evaluate and measure the degree and shortcomings of the imperfect by it" [Kant, 2006, p. 739 (In 597-598)].

Surveying the field of existing and existing philosophical theories, Kant believes that they all fall only under the concept of school philosophy, which describes scientific knowledge as a system that can be characterized by an aesthetically close concept of logical perfection. But this is, in essence, proximity to linear universalism, under the sign of which no concept can be aesthetically expanded, since it is not able to create an object; defining an object, the concept brings it under itself purely formally. But there is also a dimension of universalism that does not coincide with the first one, which gives a more accurate result that allows us to judge the assemblage point of the entire system of perception of the philosopher, fixing an epiphanic event taking place at the level of the deep foundations of philosophy itself, the event of the birth of the philosopher. We are talking about the transcendent ideal of reason, "which should always be based on certain concepts and serve as an example or prototype for following or evaluating" [Kant 2006, p. 739 (In 598)], it defines a thing according to a priori rules, despite the fact that there are no sufficient empirical conditions for this. Kant sometimes likens reason to the legislator, although some fragments of the Critique of Pure Reason allow us to judge reason as a kind of higher power, incomparable with the legislative power: the legislator himself can be destroyed, reason and the science created by him can be likened to the tree of life as a variant of the image of the world tree (is it not to him that the Kantian world concept goes back?) from such a comparison follows the following general property associated with the tasks of constructing a new metaphysics – Kant believes that it does not take much self-denial to abandon the claims of dogmatic metaphysics, "since the indisputable and inevitable contradictions of reason with itself under the dogmatic method have long since deprived the authority of all metaphysics that existed up to now. Much greater steadfastness will be needed so that internal difficulties and external opposition cannot prevent us from contributing – with the help of an interpretation directly opposite to the one that previously developed – to the successful and fruitful growth of science, integral to the human mind, every growing trunk of which is not difficult, of course, to cut down, but the roots of which cannot be destroyed." [Kant, 2006, p.77 (24)]. Kant reveals a certain intentionality of the methodology of practical philosophy, which makes it possible to turn an assessment according to moral laws into a natural occupation and use a certain effort to solve the question of whether we act for the sake of the moral law, and "this exercise itself and the consciousness of the culture of our mind arising from it, which has a judgment only about the practical, should gradually awaken some interest in the law this reason, therefore, leads to morally good deeds. In fact, in the end, we always love that the consideration of which makes us feel that we are expanding the use of our cognitive abilities, which is facilitated mainly by what we find moral correctness in, because reason, with its ability to determine a priori by principles what should happen, can only feel good with this order of things" [Kant, 1994-4, p. 560]. At this level, another concept works, and this is not the concept of the idea of philosophy, for which the whole of philosophy can never be represented in an image, taken as a model of the source of knowledge, as a model of philosophizing, its original, in relation to which all possible experiences of philosophizing serve as examples that are not at all prototypes of a worthy philosopher. In addition, there is always a gap between the idea and its implementation. To paraphrase Kant, we can say that the philosopher does not coincide with the idea of philosophy, although he carries it in his own soul as a prototype of his mental actions.

But how to think of a concept that exposes this maximum as a prototype of the philosopher and which is connected with the idea of the totality of all phenomena (the world)? Apparently, such a conceivable concept does not coincide with the transcendental interpretation of the concept as an explanation of the basic horizon that allows indexing of other a priori synthetic knowledge. Pure concepts are approaching the world concept, although they are not categorized, but have been applied to a priori concepts since ancient times, first of all perfection. In the senses, the world can never be given as an adequate object, in order to think of such an object, a pure concept of reason (or idea) is necessary, going beyond the limits of possible experience. The idea of reason does not coincide here with the aesthetic idea, because when we talk about the first, imagination with its contemplations never reaches this concept. Does this mean that there can be no question of any aesthetic content when we assert that the concept of reason serves for the conceptual cognition of the world? Kant calls "the world [cosmic] concept (conceptus cosmicus), which has always been the basis of the term philosophy, especially when this concept, so to speak, was personified and presented as if in the ideal of the philosopher as a model. In this sense, philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential goals of human reason (teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not a virtuoso of reason, but a legislator of human reason. To call oneself a philosopher in this sense and claim to be compared with a model that is only conceivable in an idea would be too bold" [Kant, 2006, pp. 1051 (in 866-867)]. In the Vienna Logic, Kant also talks about philosophy, which is built in accordance with the world concept. But if we say about a philosopher that he has become equal to a model, then we are actually using an aesthetic technique, which, as Kant emphasized, is characteristic of art (an artist can create, resorting to experience, in accordance with a model of beauty), and not for science, when a scientist acts according to a methodological attitude and in accordance with the foundation. In fact, we are talking about the aesthetic horizon, which is such not only because it appears in relation to taste, but also because aesthetics itself borders on philosophical knowledge, which is concentrated at the point of coincidence with the goals of humanity, with the goals of the human mind. "The ideal," as Charles Baudelaire wrote, "is not at all something indefinite, some disembodied and boring dream hovering on academic plafonds. The ideal is an individual recreated by another individual and, with the help of a brush or a chisel, returned to the dazzling truth of his original harmony" [Baudelaire, 2017, p. 70]. Kant, however, in this case does not mean the individual at all. We meet with such examples, a kind of epiphany events, in aesthetics (a model for achieving harmony) and in art - for example, a sample of ancient art. In aesthetics, "experiments in fine arts always precede, and then rules follow, which, however, serve only to criticize art. It is necessary, therefore, to get acquainted with the samples of beauty in order to thereby gain taste" [Kant, 2022, pp. 219-220] as an effect of the faculty of judgment. The idea of such a sample is also important in the construction of a philosophical history of art.  As Yu wrote . Habermas, "the aesthetic dispute between the "ancient" and "new" arts finds an elegant solution: romance is the "completion" of art, both in the sense of the subjectivist decomposition of art in reflection, and in the sense of the reflexive breakthrough of that form of representation of the Absolute, which is still tied to the symbolic... Art Nouveau is really decadent art but it was thanks to decadence that it moved forward on the path to absolute knowledge, while classical, antique art retained its exemplary character and was nevertheless evenly overcome" [Habermas, p. 368]. In this not indisputable statement, there is still a basic one grasping what, long before its utterance, opened in the Critique of Pure Reason the prospect of aesthetic identification (or coherence) of judgment and creation (here the relations of the concepts of creativity and art are in relation to each other according to a logical principle, meaning the systematic completeness of all aesthetic when we start from the kind that postulates identity (art is also creation, therefore "art = art"), this principle is opposed to the principle of species: art is a kind of creativity defined through an extended predicate (creation through freedom), which requires a variety of its types and the difference between them with a tuple of meanings subspecies: architecture, music, painting, literature, etc., satisfying this predicate). All this is extremely important for considering the transcendental law of specification, which is so essential for aesthetics.

After all, nature itself reveals the specific features characteristic of the ability to judge, defining universal laws as empirical. Specification is one of those principles by which the mind prepares the field of its activity for the mind. The principle of specification refers to the diversity of the homogeneous within certain types and, together with the principle of uniformity and continuity of forms, completes the systematic connection of the entire field of intellectual activity on a high note of the idea. It is applicable to categories expressing the relationship between concepts in their scope, namely generic, specific and subspecific concepts, therefore, "reason, in its expansion, requires that no species in itself be considered as the lowest, because, still being a concept that contains only what is common it is not fully defined, therefore, it cannot be attributed directly to the individual and, therefore, must always contain other concepts, i.e. subspecies" [Kant, 2006, p. 839 (in 683-684)]. This law of specification boils down to a ban on the thoughtless reduction of various entities. Therefore, empirical cognition through a complete logical analysis of the concept "requires a non-stop ongoing specification of our concepts and progress to the remaining ones, from which the species concept, and to an even greater extent the generic concept, are distracted" [Kant, 2006, pp. 839, 841 (In 684)]. In the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, Kant will talk about the specification of a universal concept through the summing up of an infinite variety of things under it, the implementation of their classification; here we will talk about the mastery of the faculty of judgment to find kinship between natural phenomena according to possible empirical laws. Thanks to the aesthetic facet of such mastery, it becomes possible to consider nature itself as art. "Just as such a classification is not ordinary experiential cognition, but has an artificial character, so nature, if it is thought in such a way that it specifies itself according to such a principle, is considered as art" [Kant, 2001, p. 875], the art of the ability of judgment to represent the expediency of nature at the level of the system of empirical cognition in the specification of its forms. To reveal the possibilities of this art, it is necessary to understand what has a greater impact on aesthetics – interest in diversity (according to the principle of specification) or interest in unity (according to the principle of aggregation). An aesthetician who adheres to one or another principle may "imagine that he draws his judgment from the comprehension of an object, but in fact bases it on a greater or lesser commitment to one of these two principles, which are based not on objective grounds, but only on the interest of reason, and that is why it is more correct to call them maxims" [Kant, 2006, p. 851 (In 695)].

Without clarifying the meaning of this fragment about the world concept of philosophy, it is hardly possible to get to the essence of the whole Kantian aesthetics with its a priori principles. You only need to be extremely attentive to almost every term in the given text. First of all, you should pay attention to the term teleologia. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the concepts of purpose, expediency (Zweckm?ssikeit) are often found, but it is for deciphering the structures of personification itself that the concept of teleology is used, which in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment will be expanded (recall the provision about the embryo) when the question arises about the aesthetic propaedeutics of the faculty of judgment. Namely, it is a teleological ability. Further, it is of interest that in the fashionable language of modern philosophical research is sometimes called a pattern. In his depiction of the world concept of philosophy, that is, its representation through the imaginative faculty of contemplation, Kant uses an ancient representation of the meaning of such an artistic device as personification (from Lat. persona "person", facio "I do"), prosopopeia (from the Greek. "person, personality" and "I do"), personification, endowment with human properties of certain structures. In some cultures, the personification of even abstract concepts was practiced, for example, adinkra in African culture.  Depicting the world concept, Kant enters the field of tropology, and, in essence, performs a certain aestheticization of the foundations of philosophical thinking (not to mention the fact that the world concept entails the concept of the beauty of the world, another question is how to reveal this concept), trying to explain the world concept of philosophy with the help of a certain aesthetic procedure, namely symbolic (in Kant's texts, a clear indicator of such symbolism is in this case gleichsam, in other cases als ob) personification (today it is characterized by some researchers as a frozen version of "literal symbols" (E. Escobedo), although this is a rather narrow interpretation), that is, to endow the world concept with human properties, creating its own a kind of allegorical sculptural image of the ideal philosopher, his thinking, making him visible by separating and discarding cutting off excess, removing his mantle. Likening the plastic art of thought, S. Baudelaire emphasized that sculpture itself is "an amazing art that goes back into the darkness of centuries, already in the most remote epochs created works that amaze the mind of a modern educated person! What is a virtue in painting can turn out to be a disadvantage or a vice here, and perfect mastery is all the more necessary for this art because its expressive means, being apparently more capacious – but in fact more primitive and barbaric, give even the most mediocre things an imaginary completeness and, as it were, perfection" [Baudelaire, 2017, p. 275]. But the perfection of the sculptor's skill is only a form of aesthetic perfection that comes "from the state of our subject, namely, how we are affected by the object. For through the beauty of knowledge I seek knowledge not of the object, but of the subject" [Kant, 2022, p. 216]. It is this beauty of knowing the subject that has to do with understanding the philosopher as a model. If in the "Critique of Pure Reason" we are talking about the world concept of philosophy, then in the "Critique of the faculty of judgment" - in essence, about the aesthetic concept of the world ("architecture of the world", the understanding of the aesthetic perception of nature) as the structure of philosophy itself. The aesthetic conceptualization of world perception is part of an integral system of critical metaphysics, and the metaphysician appears in the image of a composer writing the laws of the world, each time adding new notes to his sheet music. The transcendental horizon itself opens up the world, the condition for the possibility of this act is creative subjectivity, which is precisely what represents it in the world concept of philosophy, conceptual Aesthetic rhetoric in critical transcendentalism does not mean what is called aesthetic expressions introduced into the initial philosophy, since, in principle, all philosophy, according to Kant, is prosaic. The question of how this birth is possible, how to represent knowledge as creation, is extremely complicated: any knowledge schematizes activity, but after all, human action itself, according to Kant, does not have its creator. Even the recording of the Pentateuch was made "not by the author, but only by an ideal secretary who wrote down what was dictated to him without a single inaccuracy. The Torah is a heavenly book created by the Almighty before the creation of the world. Moreover, it is a project of the world containing "everything"" [Torah, 2021, p. 9]. But how can knowledge be born in the world created by God? It seems that we can only talk about knowledge creation after creation, creation after creation, when everything, according to the Torah, is absolutely designed. The simultaneity of the act of creation and the act of creation by us of some structures is impossible even to conceive. After all, "a person must have infinite knowledge in order to know something as a creation" [Kant, 2000, p. 132]. In the world, we can only meet what we can judge after the insight of the immeasurability of creation, what became after creation, became apparent, although our mind demands the unconditional "as a totality of conditions, since it tries to create the object itself" [Kant, 2000, p. 113]. The creative attempts of the mind are not limitless (for example, it is not capable of "creating any concepts (about objects), but only ordering them and giving them the unity that they can have with their maximum expansion, i.e. in relation to the totality of series" [Kant, 2006, p. 825 (In 671-672)], the very spontaneity to creation is realized in the form of a free work – after all, assuming a free cause of the world, which is comprehended in the concept of the architect of everything, a person can begin to draw up the very scheme of his action only freely. Kant calls such a free work a system of creation, which encompasses both the creative substance and the created beings. But how to combine freedom with the act of creation itself, how to combine them in the metaphysics of consciousness? All Russian metaphysics originates from the architectural metaphor of the Intercession on the Nerl. Substances are created at the same time, but this is not the case outside of substantial achievements, in the cognitive sphere, where creative effort can manifest itself in a brilliant form: "it is brilliant to find knowledge that cannot be learned at all" [Kant, 2000, p. 150]. Here it is important to determine how this form correlates with the Kantian concept of school philosophy, that is, the concept of a system of cognition. In this sense, one of the most important is the problem of speculative proof, which is built on some unstable, wavering foundation and "is placed on such a thin edge that even school philosophy is able to keep it on it only insofar as it makes it constantly spin like a top, so that it has no solid foundation in its own eyes, on which it could be built" [Kant, 2006, p. 541 (In 424)]. School philosophy only allows you to exercise the talent of the mind, illustrating its universal principles, and philosophizing explores their origins, verifying the fundamental positions themselves, revealing the foundations of aesthetic knowledge.

Already in the Critique of Pure Reason, aesthetic judgments related to the problems of the birth of knowledge are associated with an understanding of the ideals of sensuality, the monograms of imagination, an insight into the immeasurability of creation, with aesthetic intentions on the possibilities of human nature, the orientation of civil laws "to what completely constitutes our own creation and the cause of which we ourselves can be..." [Kant, 2006, p. 465 (358)]. At the same time, the most difficult aesthetic question is raised here about creating a copy equal to the sample (after all, it is extremely difficult even to compare with the sample, since it is only conceivable in an idea). It is also associated with an equally complex, extremely rarely touched upon even in the theory of rationalism, the question of the talent of reason (although, as Kant will later note, inner truthfulness in front of oneself and the presence of firm principles accessible to the human mind, "in their dignity ... surpass the greatest talent" [Kant, 1994-7, p. 331]), on the opposition of the virtuoso of reason and the lawgiver of reason, on the idea of the original "creative reason, in relation to which we direct all the empirical use of our reason in its greatest breadth, as if the objects themselves arose from this prototype of all reason" [Kant, 2006, p. 859 (In 701)]. According to Kant, we wisely consult with ourselves, identifying at the same time a criterion according to which we do not conduct a predicative proof, but turn to the principles of probabilistic logic, which expands the activity of an a priori concept to the level of a realized idea. The creative project of transcendentalism is realized in the famous definition of metaphysics as the completion of the entire culture of the human mind. This project also correlates with theological ideas about the ideal meeting of God and the world, expressing the synthetic unity of transcendental philosophy. God is "the ideal of moral and practical reason and everything that can serve as its rule, the prototype (archetypon) and the architect of the world, although only in an infinite approximation" [Kant, 2000, p.549]. It is important here that the prototype itself, the sample, the prototype actually coincide with the aesthetic eidos (the idea of architecture).

Kant builds a kind of philosophical archaeology, from which one can proceed to the creation of a prototype of a character in a philosophical work, manifestations of philosophical talent. The explanation of such a prototype can be given historically, but it will be theoretical when it will not be reduced to either historical or purely logical unfolding. Kant considers only such an explication to be promising, which carries with it an understanding of the nature of the human mind. Hence, the problem of the correlation of the philosopher's idea, understood as a model and reason, comes to the fore. In this sense, the threads of philosophical traditions, the history of the use of reason in concreto and in abstracto are intertwined and take the form of an appropriate pattern, the completed form of the entire range of scientific disciplines, each of which is one of the organs of wisdom. The paradox of the world concept of philosophy lies in the fact that we have to talk about a sample of what does not yet exist. It is difficult to say whether Kant considered his own method of critical philosophizing to be among the specified sample, which allows to decompose the system of cognitive abilities and determine their boundaries. But wouldn't such a canonization be presumptuous? Philosophy can be presented in different proportions – both as one thing and as much. And how is it really? Can a certain philosophical system of pure reason serve as models for explaining various ways of philosophizing? Or does it exclude all the others, and even if this is the case, does it not thereby erase the previous discoveries, without which transcendentalism would not have been able to achieve the conceptual unity of philosophy as such. That is, the problem here is whether different philosophical constructions are possible in historical space, is it not presumptuous to treat the space of the transcendental method, as well as the system built on its basis, as one's own creation, because the very question of creation in this area presupposes an unambiguous answer: before the new methodology, there could not be any there was no philosophy. Indeed, if we admit that this philosophical methodology was preceded by "another (and moreover true) philosophy, then there would be two true philosophies regarding the same subjects, and this contains a contradiction. "Thus, when critical philosophy proclaims itself to be a philosophy before which there was no philosophy at all, then it acts exactly as those who build philosophy according to their own plan have done, will do and should do" [Kant, 2014, p. 25]. In fact, previous philosophical systems have lost the keys to possible experience, which were first found in critical research. To describe the attitude of critical philosophy to imitators who cover up the scarcity of thought, Kant turns to the aesthetic form of the comic. Shaftesbury at one time introduced such a criterion of the truth of the teaching as its ability to withstand ridicule. In this regard, Kant believes that "over time, it should be the turn of the critical philosopher to laugh last and therefore laugh best when he sees that the systems existing only on paper of those who have owned the first word for a long time are collapsing one after another, and all their followers are fleeing – fate is inevitable for them" [Kant, 2014, p. 29]. In fact, we are talking about a kind of aesthetic verification. But it's not just about these comic forms. After all, one can also raise the question: is critical transcendentalism a model for other new systems? Kant believes that it is still problematic to give a positive answer to this question: after all, "it is not possible to name outstanding and stable names from new philosophers, since everything is in motion here" [Kant, 1994-8, p. 288] – everything that one philosopher creates is demolished to the ground by another. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he generally demonstrates almost an example of intellectual humility, arguing that to call himself a philosopher not in the sense of a lawgiver in language, but in the sense of a lawgiver of the human mind and "to pretend to be compared with a model, conceivable only in idea, would be too bold" [Kant, 2006, pp. 1051 (in 866-867)].

When Kant speaks about the world concept of philosophy, he does not mean at all any allegory of philosophy (like the "Allegory of Painting" or the "Allegory of Faith" by Jan Vermeer), a description of the pictorial images of philosophers (the famous "Athenian School" by Raphael) or a description of the iconography of philosophers (statues of philosophers in the Cameron Gallery of Tsarskoye Selo or sculptures ancient philosophers in the Summer Garden of St. Petersburg). Introducing this concept, Kant only explains it with the help of the traditional artistic technique of personification. But does this mean that philosophy is shifting to the attitudes of aesthetic thinking? Not at all. After all, "every philosophy is prosaic; and the proposal to philosophize poetically again from now on can be taken seriously little more than an offer to a merchant that he henceforth write his ledgers not in prose, but in verse" [Kant, 1994n-p1, p. 527]. So why did Kant need this technique?

In modern research, which outlines the basics of the cognitive approach to metaphor, a certain place is given to the connection of the concepts of metaphor and personification. It is considered here in the context of the analysis of ontological metaphors, when the object is interpreted anthropologically, while considerable attention is paid to the exemplification of the personification itself. From the point of view of J. According to Lakoff and M. Johnson, personification is a category covering a wide range of metaphorical sound, all the "stringed" instruments of which have a human attribute as their source. In this range of meanings, "what is happening is comprehended, personifying it, i.e. in terms that we understand based on our own motivations, goals, actions and properties. The humanization of such abstract concepts ... provides an understanding that is self-evident to most people" [Lakoff, 2017, p. 60]. In Kant's thinking, this question is connected not only with anthropological explications, here the specified range acquires metaphysical significance.

In the "Viennese logic" the concept of philosophy is thought of as adequate to the concept of conceptu cosmico, and such an approach to its concept, in which the content of the conceptualization of the ultimate goals of the human mind is revealed, allows us to consider its idea as "the idea of the most perfect legislation of the human mind", and the philosopher himself as a "lawyer of the human mind" [Kant, 2022, p. 205], even an expert lawyer in the field of such legislation. In order to carry out his activities, such an expert needs to cultivate philosophical mastery and develop a methodology for the liberation of the philosophy of the human spirit itself. But, apparently, this legislation can be expanded to the jurisdiction of the philosophical court, since philosophy itself is a creative endeavor that avoids the imprudence of the creators themselves, and therefore is subject to the court that is mentioned in the quatrain of G. Ibsen:

To create is a harsh judgment,

The trial of oneself.

It is possible to reveal the world concept of philosophy only if we consider it as a culture of the talent of the philosophical thinker himself, as a wise understanding of the connection of cognition and the entire spiritual path of a person not only with the last goals of his mind (in "Logic" philosophy is a science considered "according to the concept of the world – Weltbegriff or in sensu cosmico", this concept is a high concept that speaks of the dignity of philosophy itself – after all, it contains the idea of perfect wisdom and the highest maxim of the application of our reason), but also with the essential goals of all mankind. The humanity of this connection always has a moral dimension, since "having risen to a higher level of morality, humanity sees much further and the judgment about what we are, in comparison with what we should be ... becomes more strict the more steps of morality we have passed throughout the entire period of history known to us" [Kant, 1994n-p1, p. 341]. It is morality that determines the noumenality of a person with free will, although incomprehensible by nature, and therefore Kant understands philosophy itself as a practical human knowledge that reveals what the philosopher calls the moral law in us in its indestructible greatness. A person hears the voice of this inner law, and his comprehension in the work "On the recently emerged lordly tone in Philosophy" is associated with the aesthetic methodology, so important for our article, of personification of the inner law: a method "personifying this law and making the morally commanding mind some kind of Isis hidden under the veil (even if it is not ascribed other properties, except those that can be established by the first (didactic – N. K.) of the methods) there is an aesthetic way of representing the same subject; such, however, can be used later, when the principles have already been clarified in the first way, in order to revive these ideas with the help of the sensual, although resorting only to to analogies, images – but there is always, however, the danger of falling into dreamy visionary, which is the death of all philosophy" [Kant, 1994n-p1, p. 525]. Therefore, if we want, according to the goals of our research, to depict the world concept of philosophy, to be inspired by its model, a model of courage and honesty of thought, then we should apply the aesthetic method of personification, to reveal the power of aesthetic exemplary, which, as R. Mckril and Ch. Candler, embedded in a reflexive judgment [Makkril, 2006, p.223], remembering how difficult and formidable the practice of applying this method can be. A. Escobedo tries to reveal how the history of will was described using the literary technique of personification, which "turns subjectivity into objectivity" [Escobedo, 2017, p. 14].

In the Critique of Pure Reason, personification connects the world concept of philosophy and the concept of the philosopher's model. The very concept of a sample follows from the interpretation of normativity. "A sample is a special case of a practical rule, since it represents to us the feasibility or impracticability of some action" [Kant, 2019, p. 237], in this case, an action performed by a philosopher, an action of self–knowledge, the idea of which in its scope can be compared "with the idea (of humanity), what a person should be" (Kant). This juxtaposition "deeply touches the soul and puts a person to such a height where he can consider himself no other than with the greatest admiration for the innate inclinations inherent in him… Then he will be close to the question: what is it about you that you dare to enter into a struggle with all the forces of nature in you and around you and overcome them when they find themselves in discord with your moral principles? When this question, the solution of which completely exceeds the ability of speculative reason and which nevertheless is itself, is suggested to the heart, then even incomprehensibility with such self-knowledge should give the soul consolation, which only the more vividly defeats it to honor its duty, the more temptations there are" [Kant, 2019, p. 245]. Art also gives such a suggestion to the heart (the whole aesthetic way of thinking), it acts as a Menschenfreund, a friend of the entire human race, that is, as "one who takes aesthetic participation (joy) in the good of all people and can never violate it without inner regret… When we oblige others with our charity, we thereby become obligated ourselves; as if brothers, subjects of a common father who wishes everyone bliss" [Kant, 2019, p. 227].Such art can be called the world concept of art.