I. Kant: Aesthetics and metaphysics as a science

Kormin Nikolai Aleksandrovich Doctor of Philosophy Leading Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Moscow, Goncharnaya str. 12, p. 1, room 507 n.kormin@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The article examines the aesthetic aspects of the formation of Kantian metaphysics as a "basic science" and the possibility of studying them in the context of the formation of fundamental concepts and statements from the "Critique of Pure Reason" – from the position of how art is possible to the implicit approach to the formation of the world concept of art – this aesthetic equivalent of the world concept of philosophy. Modern approaches to the problem of the correlation of aesthetic and metaphysical knowledge, its controversial interpretations, in which either the aesthetic intuitions of metaphysical discourse or the metaphysical depth of aesthetic knowledge are clearly underestimated, are discussed. Aesthetic aspects of metaphysical thinking are a complex problem, it is solved in different ways by philosophers, aestheticians, artists, scientists, religious thinkers. Aesthetic and metaphysical images are considered by them as operators of connectivity, or as intellectual works, often resisting, but still coexisting with each other. They enter into a complementary dialogue, and the place of these images is a "culturally conditioned person" (H. Belting). Of course, the texts of these works, we agree with Yu. M. Lotman, know more than their authors, but in order to understand the complexity of their meaning, you still need to somehow approach the conceptualization of the creative process as a result of rethinking their relationships and foundations in history and culture.

As a possible transition to such conceptualization, it is proposed to look at the metaphysical path as the right path of science, continuing in aesthetics, and their real interaction within a broader perspective that opens the horizons of interdisciplinary synthesis of aesthetics, cognitive philosophy and cognitive science. Widespread modern views on aesthetics, which previously led to the loss of its metaphysical identity and unity, arose from the narrowly understood spirit of rationalist philosophy. The research disposition is substantiated, according to which the consideration of the world concept of philosophy assumes as a certain aesthetic prerequisite an artistic method of personification, which consists in understanding the peculiarities of the regulatory activity of the philosopher himself as a model, which is the prototype of the legislation of the human mind.

The world concept of philosophy is one of those concepts that occupies every person and excites him, captures our mind, although the fascination with it by different thinkers (mathematician, naturalist, even logician, whose research is aimed at an obviously aesthetic subject – the logical perfection of knowledge) is far from the fascination with the mind of a philosopher, and the characteristic of this distance is given with using both aesthetic and purely practical statements – "virtuoso of reason" and "legislator of reason". Even a logician can be a virtuoso of reason, its master, but for a philosopher such mastery is not enough, because he stands at the origins of philosophy itself, lays its foundations, contributing to the essential goals of the human mind, and in this capacity acts as the ideal of a unique teacher – "there is no such teacher anywhere, and the idea of his legislation is found in every human mind" ^{[26, p. 1051 (In 867)]}. But here the idea of a certain ruler of reason should not arise, because forming an idea of the essential goals of reason, the philosopher sees them in the destiny of man, thereby defining his own philosophy as a moral philosophy.

All this is so. But for the present study, the question is important: do we not have a clear doubt about the presentation of aesthetic structures in the fabric of thinking, which arises before us in the "Critique of Pure Reason". And the question here is not in any particulars - the coloring of this mental fabric, drawing a picture on it (showing the starry sky above us). And yet, in our opinion, it is possible to find some echoes of aesthetic thought in the text of the first "Criticism". And it is not only about the dual use of the term aesthetics in the first part of the transcendental doctrine of principles. 

The fabric of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is made by intertwining two mutually perpendicular systems of thought threads. The first is the thread of orderliness (called beauty), with its secret orientation, about which Vladislav Khodasevich said:

The simple soul is unbearable

The gift of secret hearing is heavy.

This thread is produced by action with its generative orders (it is woven from the structures of understanding the world itself, in which order arises in a specific way: in philosophy this is called the creation of what is necessary). The second is the target thread, which will be directly involved (and in the first "Criticism", which determined the aesthetic meaning of the "Criticism of the ability of judgment") in the formation of that unique work of the mind, which is associated with the creation of the mental interweaving itself, a system of threads-connections. But this creates an aesthetic formula for the potential of these threads.  It is the threads of order and purpose (expediency) that set the internal logic of aesthetic judgment, explicitly or implicitly present in the "Critique of Pure Reason".

Aesthetic propylaea of metaphysics.

It is advisable to start a conversation about Kant's interpretation of the aesthetic aspects of the construction of the world concept of philosophy by analyzing a more general problem - the relationship of philosophy, art and culture as a whole. And this is one of the most difficult and large-scale topics for theoretical reflection, especially since both philosophy and art are the products of a cultural crisis. In modern philosophy, this problem receives the most unexpected, and often multidirectional solutions. Here is just one example. The French philosopher writes that "music, painting and poetry create their own objects, and once these arts reach a certain self-consciousness, they decisively become prisoners of the cultural world" ^{[44, pp. 496-497]}. But what is the meaning of this captivity, are they not voluntary prisoners of each other when culture obeys the charm of art, and vice versa? The principle of such submission or obedience can also be found within various types of art. Thus, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart proceeded from the fact that in the opera "poetry was the obedient daughter of music." But how to combine such different positions and attitudes within the framework of a cultural project?  

In this article we will focus on just one topic: how is it possible to comprehend the incomprehensibility of beauty, how does the self-consciousness of art, which is one of the foundations of humanity in man, and such a matrix form of self-consciousness of culture as philosophy correlate. The problems of such a relationship have long been considered by aesthetics, which synthesized the attitudes of both philosophical and artistic thinking from the point of view of the spiritual essence of culture: art itself "has always been the most sensitive barometer and seismograph of culture" ^{[4, p. 322]}. The thread of the aesthetic tradition is woven from the preceding samples of beauty, one of the forms of conceptualization of such samples is precisely Kant's critical philosophy. We will try to reveal the structure and dynamics of the relationship between art and philosophy, following Kant's principles of interpretation of the entire culture of human abilities, which is divided in transcendentalism into two vast areas – history and philosophy. Therefore, our analysis should acquire a historical and philosophical sound, which fills the entire intellect of culture. At the same time, we will turn mainly to the aesthetic field of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", which sets no less than a culture of synthesis of human reason and feeling; aesthetics, in its Kantian execution, has the ability to read in the soul of culture, to reveal the most complex riddle in the world - anthropological. Such a reading will also be accepted by modern philosophy – thus, establishing a typology of fundamental abilities, P. Riker in his speech at the Library of Congress (December 20, 2004) will see in them the first layer of humanity.

Of course, the philosopher and the artist have different mental attitudes, although, as Marina Tsvetaeva emphasized, answering the question of what art is, the artist himself is the earth that "gives birth to everything", everything that the philosopher seeks to comprehend, for example, in the theory of everything or in the ideas of unity, all–humanity and so on (all these are great ideas, but as for, for example, the all-human, Stepan Trofimovich Verkhovensky has already talked with young people about the all-human renewal). For Kant, the genuine field of art refers to such a region of the practical, which is possible according to the laws of nature (technically practical), but at the same time is associated with its special meaning, considered as obeying the laws of freedom, the grounds of freedom of will or the ability to perform actions to create an object (morally practical). Today, the problem of the ability itself attracts serious attention of researchers. Thus, Ferenc Huoranski seeks to develop a theory of random possibilities based on the difference between abilities and dispositions as real and modal properties of first-order objects with fundamentally different ontological roles ^{[32, p. 7]}. Aesthetic dispositions are used not only to describe mental states, they make sense within the framework of holistic conceptual systems, primarily the conceptualization of morality.

Morally practical as such, from Kant's point of view, is capable of stepping over any given boundary, since it is associated with freedom of arbitrariness. And the aesthetic disposition is also able to reveal itself only under the condition of the existence of arbitrariness. Kant calls his skill, commensurate with the laws of freedom, art, but a specific art, not just commensurate with the laws of freedom, but "making possible a system of freedom similar to the system of nature; truly it would be a divine art if we were able to fully fulfill with its help what reason prescribes to us. And actually implement his idea" ^{[27, p. 53, 55]} in the form of knowledge as a whole. The assumption of such an art would make it possible to realize the systematic nature of cognition, proceeding from contemplation, unfolding through the concept and reaching the idea. Today, scientific research attaches great importance to the analysis of form, for example, the connections of evolutionary theory with the process of formation of forms themselves are revealed, the development of living and inanimate forms, which range from art, art history, neurobiology to architecture, design and biology, is traced, the transformation of modern sciences of epigenesis, self-organization, biological complex systems and extended evolutionary synthesis into the cultural arena. At the same time, a wide range of aesthetic consequences of the influence of these sciences is being clarified [see: 39]. The above fragment from Kant's "Metaphysics of Morals" poses a complex and little-explored problem of the relationship between art and reason (some aspects of this problem were covered at the Franco-Soviet colloquium "Reason and Culture" (1983), as well as in E. Gellner's book "Reason and Culture. The historical role of rationality and rationalism" (2003).

So, only absolute art is able to establish what reason establishes, to realize its very idea. According to Kant, the form of the idea itself has no constitutive application, and is even further from what it is than any category of cognition. In addition, as can be seen from the above fragment from the Metaphysics of Morals, the principle of realization, embodiment, is of fundamental importance, which indicates its special significance for our study of the problems of the world concept of philosophy. Unlike art, philosophy "does not settle down in the order of what is said or written, like a logician in a statement, a poet in a sounding word, or a musician in music. She strives for things to express themselves from the depths of their silence" ^{[43, p. 10-11]}. But how can such a deep expression be realized, and what if we are talking not about things, but about consciousness, about the structure of cognition, about cultural phenomena? Do they belong to the category of that (let us recall the famous aphorism of L. Wittgenstein) about which it is impossible to talk, about which it is necessary to be silent, the analogue of which can be found in Kant's interpretation of humility: if we cannot judge further, it is better to be silent? And what is the depth of epistemological hesychasm? When developing these topics in the aspect we are interested in, it is important to keep in mind that the culture of human abilities has a purely epistemological and aesthetic content associated with the ingenious steps of cognition, including in historical cognition, which also implies aesthetic conditions, as G. Ibsen noted in a letter to J. According to Grigu, "it's amazing how history repeats itself, only changing forms — quite variations on a musical theme." But how does philosophical history repeat itself in these altered reproductions in the epoch of Kant. In the interval between Leibniz and Schopenhauer, "Germany composed a whole host of original thoughts, so they all fall on the same century: but this philosophy, with its braid and web of concepts, with its extensibility, with its despondency, with its secret infinity and mysticism, also adjoins our music, being a kind of baroque in the sphere of philosophy" ^{[45, p. 63]}. But how does this pretentiousness, the quirkiness of philosophical thought of that time manifest itself? And how does it relate to this style in art?  Kant will even borrow the figure of a genius in art and transfer it to a new place – a historical place, endowing it with the ability to comprehend history in stable ideas. In modern Western philosophy, they sometimes try to give a Kantian twist to new areas of research on human cognition and knowledge, in which the emphasis is on the concept of action, for example, as R. Hanna believes, on "cognitive phenomenology, disjunctivistic direct realism, on embodiment and sensory perception as a primitive and protorational ability to know the world" ^{[26, p. 10]}. But it is hardly possible to agree with such an understanding of the content of consciousness reproduced by forms of sensuality (sensation, perception, representation), contrasting them with thinking. Sensuality cannot be abstracted from mental action. The fact that sensuality has its limits does not mean that it is primitive. Without it, it is impossible to write a scenario of the invisible in the visible - a work created as a basis for the formulation of theoretical models and constructions, it is impossible to demonstrate that only experience "brings us joy" (Kant), it is impossible to reveal that moral anthropology contains the doctrine of the creation of moral principles. The very "sensuality can be explained by the subjective [content] of our ideas in general" ^{[27, p. 36]}. And this content is correlated with the cognizable object, its comprehension, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, since sensuality contains the relations of representation to the subject, an aesthetic impulse of these relations arises with its dimension of the expanded matrix of experiencing affective states (pleasure, compassion, etc.).

Generally speaking, aesthetics is constructed as the metaphysics of a work – a phenomenon that coincides with the production of space and time, their endless "ballet", it is worked out in theories, concepts, metaphors, tropes, building its research by identifying the criterion applied to the initial stage of cognition as a form of a priori sensuality, relating not only to pure contemplation. In the aesthetics of some French artists, neutralizing duration and strength, J. Derrida saw the expression of "special metaphysics", this aesthetics is "the daughter (or mother) of their metaphysics" ^{[15, p. 38]}. But a daughter cannot be the mother of herself, so a kind of metaphysical uncertainty, understatement always remains behind aesthetics. And in some studies, aesthetics, in general, appears as a discipline with a controversial metaphysical status. In Kant, it is correlated with the great project of metaphysics, the subject and purpose of which is the supersensible, this project involves the study of the systematically interconnected supersensible in the world (the spiritual nature of the soul) and the supersensible as such, expressed by the idea of God, freedom and immortality (sometimes, instead of immortality, Kant includes the soul in this trinity). It is not given to us to know either the inner principle of these higher ideas, or the consequences arising from their actions. Nevertheless, they constitute the main questions of metaphysics, which presuppose moral answers, albeit limited ones. Thus, the metaphysics of morals does not deal with the nature of freedom – Friedrich Nietzsche based the possibility of thinking freedom on transcendental aesthetics. And "everything that metaphysics deals with besides these issues serves it only as a means to arrive at these ideas and their reality" ^{[26, p. 505 (395)]}. But how important is the search within the boundaries of the European tradition for an answer to the question, is aesthetics only a means to move towards the ideas of these supersensible objects, or does it somehow penetrate into the ideas themselves, looks into an ideal mirror on which the "natural light" of the mind falls? Is it conceivable at some metaphysical stage to move from the sensually perceived to the supersensible, that is, from the aesthetic proper to the beyond? In fact, we ourselves to some extent aesthetically judge these higher objects, "because," as Kant says, "we create these objects for ourselves" ^{[34, p. 427]}. The aesthetic feature of this ideal structure of metaphysics is connected with the fact that such a feature can be drawn with the help of understanding God himself – this, according to Kant, the absolute architect of the whole world, its moral creator and absolute artist. This understanding can be supplemented by the idea of the subject of universal legislation as the creator of the world (world beauty generates faith in a wise creator). Aesthetics has its roots in the metaphysics of freedom, which is most evident in Kant's idea of art as created freedom – this facet of freedom consciousness.

It is more difficult to consider the question of the relationship between aesthetics and the idea of immortality, which is understood by Kant as the eternity and infinity of our existence, its continuation in the afterlife. His other interpretation of immortality is connected with animateness, limited by spirituality. As for the postulate of immortality as a state "in which prosperity or sorrow should fall to a person on the basis of his moral value" ^{[35, p. 251]}, he correlates it with the supersensible and its structure such as the supersensible in us or freedom, through them it proves its objective reality; moreover, this structure it also implies the principle of subjective expediency of nature for our cognitive ability. It is thanks to these aesthetic structures that the idea of immortality is experienced. Creating an image of the supersensible, Kant resorts to aesthetic concepts of perfection and absolute proportion, but even through them he cannot be completely defined. The most perfect categorical imperative, which expresses the moral law in man and "presupposes the highest principle of wisdom, therefore also the ultimate goal of the most perfect will (the highest bliss consistent with morality), contains only conditions under which only he can be given his due. After all, the entity that alone can carry out this proportional distribution is God. And the state in which this fulfillment of the rational world essence can be fulfilled in full accordance only with such an ultimate goal, the assumption of prolongation of life, already inherent in its nature, is immortality" ^{[35, p. 252]}. So, the inner images of metaphysics require an aesthetic rhythm for themselves, its activity is visible in the space of the action of the supersensible, expressed by the idea of God, freedom and immortality.

But such a rhythmic construction is not limited only to aesthetic statements about perfection and proportion, because the very concept of the aesthetic in Kant's interpretation, which makes the necessary critical warnings about its nature, just presupposes a supersensible basis; being the point of synthesis of all our a priori abilities, the very idea of the supersensible is thought by Kant as a justification of taste as a pure reflecting aesthetic ability. judgments, although the sphere of the supersensible implies an absolute world whole, inaccessible to any sense. But if so, how can the aesthetic expanse, its infinite distance, be configured on this basis, which just turn metaphysical sketches into drawings of sensuality?

Kant's conception of sensuality as entering into the fullness of the consequences of primordial essence allows us to answer this question. Justifying the highest ideas of God, freedom and immortality, metaphysics itself becomes the idea of science as a system, for the completion of which it is necessary to begin the construction of an appropriate aesthetic structure, which is characterized by Kant as elegant, made possible by the highest skill. "This building is not extensive, but for the sake of giving it grace, which consists in brevity not at the expense of clarity, it needs a combination of attempts and judgments of various masters" ^{[34, p. 440]}. Aesthetics in its imaginal worlds, with the help of images, metaphors and symbols, makes its own sketch of the understanding of supersensible objects, sustained in the magical-poetic spirit. The question of how to solve the fundamental aesthetic task of moving from ideas to the representation of their reality, to their expedient application, which Kant considers even as the goal of creation, also presents significant difficulties. In understanding the tactics of the pure use of reason itself, it is always important to take into account the possibilities of the faculty of judgment. "In fact, not the idea itself, but only its use can be in relation to all possible experience either transcending it (transcendent), or inherent in it (immanent)" ^{[26, p. 825 (In 671)]}, and delusions caused by all kinds of substitutions and substitutions in this areas that depend not on the mind and reason itself, but on the ability of judgment with its aesthetic possibilities.

Sensuality, reason, the ability of judgment and imagination, reason form a genius whose capabilities are associated with the synthesis of perspicacity and immediacy of feelings. Even the mind is associated with the field of creative abilities, and those angles in which the aesthetic environment of discursivity opens up, connected with the rhythm of the creation of contemplation, the concept and cognition itself, are very unusual: since the mind "contains the ability to grasp (attentio) these representations in order to create contemplation, the ability to highlight the common to many of them (abstraction) in order to to create a concept, and the ability of reflection (refltxio) to create cognition of the subject" ^{[34, p. 154]} or its objective perception. As for the mind, it also aesthetically generates an idea, since it creates its essence. Kant saw in aesthetic inspiration the contemplative perfection of knowledge, emphasizing that their search would be surrounded by a halo of genius even if they could not be learned. The very genius of the cognitive movement is associated with the ultimate creative state, manifested in the highest intellectual spheres of culture: in scientific discovery, in philosophical comprehension of the world and in the creation of a work of art. All these spheres are measured by a more universal category of creativity or creation. It is extremely difficult only to understand them metaphysically.

Kant considers creation itself as a simultaneous and sudden manifestation of the metaphysical principle of unity. "Creation is a kind of unity, i.e. there is no consecutive, successive creation, but all substances are created at once" ^{[23, p. 213]}. On such an intersection and mutual enrichment of comprehension and creation, the whole aesthetics of cognition is built, connected with its liveliness, with the objective unity of self-consciousness. In Russian philosophy, this problem was clearly realized and formulated by Pavel Alexandrovich Florensky. Already in his Notebook (1904-1905), during the analysis of consciousness, he raises the question of "cognition as an act of creation" ^{[56, p. 348]}, while pointing out the variety of hypostases of such creation.

The concept of creation is extremely important in the development of the philosophy of culture. Aesthetics participates in this development with all its categorical and conceptual composition with its outstanding examples of existential-metaphysical penetration into culture. In the Metaphysics of Morals, this participation is described both through the aesthetic concept of perfection and through the aesthetic concept of measure. "Cultivating (cultura) one's natural forces (spiritual, mental and bodily) as a means for every possible purpose is a man's duty to himself. – His own personality (as a being endowed with reason) obliges a person not to leave unused and not to allow his natural inclinations and abilities, which may someday be used by his mind, to rust in uselessness; even if we assume that a person can be satisfied for natural needs and by the innate measure of his abilities, still reason must first, by means of the principles, to indicate to him this satisfaction with a small measure of his abilities, since man, as a being capable of setting goals for himself (making objects his goal), must be obliged to use his powers not only to natural instinct, but to the freedom with which he determines this measure. Consequently, it is not a matter of the benefits that one can have from the culture of one's abilities for all kinds of purposes, because, perhaps (according to Rousseau's principles), the advantage of the benefits will be on the side of the coarseness of natural needs; no, to develop one's abilities (of which one is more and the other less, depending on the difference in their goals) and being pragmatically a person who corresponds to the purpose of his existence is the dictate of moral and practical reason and a person's duty to himself" ^{[28, p. 163, 165]}. Aesthetics is a form of fulfilling this inner duty, which is woven by various threads set in motion by spiritual and spiritual forces (the so-called beauty of the soul), a culture of bodily forces that are aesthetically structured through what can be called aesthetic matter in man; with their help, Kant interprets the indirect duty of man, which consists in "cultivate natural (aesthetic) feelings of compassion and use them as a means to participate from moral principles and corresponding feelings" ^{[28, p. 193]}.

The cultivation of aesthetic feeling takes place in the space of explicit or implicit interaction of various cultural forms. Jose Ortega y Gasset found it in such seemingly incompatible figures, as if standing on almost opposite poles of culture, as Diego Velasquez and Rene Descartes. Pointing out the amazing similarity between them, he wrote that, "like Velasquez, Descartes, in his existential solitude, revolts against all the philosophical principles that guide his age, against any tradition: scholastic or ancient… Both Velasquez and Descartes are making the same revolution, but in different areas. Just as Descartes reduces thinking to rationality, Velasquez reduces painting to visuality. Both turn culture to face reality. Both belong to the outside world and look to the future… We are surrounded by everyday reality. What did painting do to her before? Distorted, exaggerated, extolled, embellished or forged. What should she do with it in the future? Do the opposite: leave it as it is, that is, extract the picture from it. Hence one of the remarkable features of Velasquez's paintings, which his contemporaries defined as "equanimity"" ^{[47, pp. 47-48]}. This kind of interaction of the experience of beauty, art and philosophy is precisely what interests aesthetics – mainly the complementarity of the artistic and rational understanding of the world, figurative schemes, schemes of the regulatory concept and invariants of the artist's perception of the philosopher, a mental sketch of the history of art in the philosopher's view, symbolic matrices of analogies of this perception in world culture. Here, first of all, the question arises about the meaning of aesthetics itself, about the meaning of its image, which is located on the other side of the canvas and directly correlates with clarifying which concept of philosophy aesthetics is – school or world.

If we consider aesthetics as a large discourse responsible for solving the question of how the ability of thinking is possible (and there is always an aesthetic focus in it, since, as E. Kassirer said, "the complete concept of thinking ... restores the harmony of being" ^{[36, p. 372]}), then we cannot help but notice that it initially immersed in the fabric of metaphysical reflection, which is described, for example, in Chinese culture as "creativity" (hu?-yu?n). But why is the beginning itself characterized as creative? Let's try to prescribe this question form a little more definitely. Isn't there a tension between creativity and the beginning, the foundation – a truly metaphysical tension? It is connected with the solution of other questions: why does something exist at all, is it possible to draw the beginning as such. Or is creativity always that after the beginning? Then it should be about the creativity of creativity. If creativity is identical to the beginning, then a number of new questions arise: is there a new metaphysics, what is the metaphysical matter of the beginning, are there aesthetic equivalents of the act of initiation, can it be aesthetically explained (or can it only be explained aesthetically), for example, following the intuition of the binary code of creation or the attitudes of symbolic thinking (but these will already be, for example, Kant has installations of implicit phenomenology). Already here you feel how springy the action of thinking is in its approach to the metaphysics of creativity, what existential tragedies it generates – as Mary of Scotland said, "in my beginning is my end" ("in my beginning is my end"). Comparing the concepts of cause and beginning, Kant saw in the first an intellectual, and in the second a sensual formation. Unlike the cause, "the beginning is only in the world, but not the world" ^{[23, p. 59]}. But in this case, how to interpret the creation itself? When we think in biblical terms, it is a question of what God actually created from: the Apostle John is closer to the aesthetic version – "in the beginning was the Word", but is God given to us the knowledge of this beginning-the Word (the Word is the first structure of the absolute work, as the aesthetic space of metaphysics), which is God himself: the beginning was born by God himself, that is, it was born uncreated, since God was not created by anyone and from nothing.

The ancient Greek philosophy collected in a single range Heraclitus the notion of ("Word"), the idea of a creative mind (the wise considered the "mind ruling the Universe") and the representation of perfection and completeness with their spherical vortex (" " [Diels 1906, 121]) in Parmenides. But according to what pattern does this form of reason (which contains the essence of the object, cognizable by it), which, as Valery would say, is fruitful of ideas, on the other hand, is the idea of the synthesis of the Word and perfection sufficient for its understanding? And is there a perfect truth? And if it exists, then how does it relate to the concepts of absolute and relative truth. Having interpreted the Parmenides curved surface of a perfectly round one in accordance with the concepts of the philosophy of Heraclitus and correlating it with the above arguments about the creative principle, it should be recognized that the beginning and the end are connected by a tense coupling of the impossible: "draw a circle – there is no beginning ... in a circle there is neither beginning nor end" ^{[57, p. 206]}. But for metaphysics, it is not just their connection that is important, but a kind of first connection that does not yet have either a circle or any other object, for this is what Kant introduces as the basis for a synthesis (subjective synthesis of grasping, productive synthesis, transcendental synthesis of imagination a priori, figurative, figurative and intellectual synthesis) of heterogeneous, after the realization of which we can only say that there is that Parmenid vortex motion that arises from the collision of oncoming currents coming from the beginning and from the end, and dragging along and cutting off everything that is "no more" and "no less", and this is the only thing that we can imagine as the ultimate existence, Parmenides' "world-building", in which at least "the thought and what the thought arises about" is fulfilled, and the subjective element bearing it (only minimalism could artistically represent it), which sees with the mind and gives a predicate of perfection to what is, which is a condition of aesthetic predication.

The question of the relationship between the origin and creation of the world in Hinduism is quite complicated, here the relativistic version does not coincide with any of the above versions of the interpretation of their relationship. Sometimes the totality of philosophical texts of India is considered as an absolutely complete, internally-perfected peacemaking.  The problem of the very source of creation has been transferred to the space of the metaphysical foundation of the Highest Reality, it is defined as a tattva – as if the collective unity of the originals themselves, who are in symbiosis with each other, but still dependent on the author of the beginnings - Brahman, on whose chest are located not only the existent, but also the non–existent. Analyzing the doctrinal basis of Hinduism, modern Western researchers consider the theodicy characteristic of it, forming epistemology, ontology, the concept of causality, psychology and teleology of creation within the metaphysical foundation. A. Uskokov, contextualizing the teaching of the Brahma Sutras, shows how this holy scripture "gave rise to widely divergent ontologies and ideas about practice" ^{[57, p. 240]}. There are more than a dozen bases in old Buddhist texts focused on the spiritual work of self-improvement, which can be created on the middle path. Aesthetics has been defined since ancient times by the categories of Buddhist thought that analyzes the nature of sensory phenomena, the idea of a "vital principle", the flicker of life itself, the grounds by virtue of which one can see or not see heavenly images, "bringing pleasure, delightful" ^{[17, p. 218]}. The understanding of the beautiful has a unique range here, which includes both the structures of symbolic thinking and the aesthetic justification of the timbre of the adornment of existence. Of particular importance for aesthetics is the Buddhist metaphysics not only of perfect bliss, but also of the highest perfect mind, the idea of which, according to Kant, is adequate only to the totality of the connection of things in the universe. As A. Y. Syrkin emphasized, "the one who has reached the highest perfection penetrates all sides of the world with his mind full of friendliness" ^{[54, p. 38]}. The spirituality of aesthetic experience is concentrated by the Buddhist consciousness around the impossibility of visualizing Nirvana and the illusory nature of samsara. When we discussed one of the sutras with Valery Pavlovich Androsov, he emphasized that when interpreting it, one should proceed from the conceivability of only consciousness (or only nirvana), everything else is an illusion resulting from the fact that excitement arises in the treasury consciousness, setting everything in motion; the return Path to nirvana is the Path of calm mind (manas), the cessation of any of its manifestations, which will return consciousness to its original, pure state of equanimity, peace. All these ideas find their expression in Buddhist art, which focuses on the image of the Buddha himself as a perfect person in a state of spiritual bliss.

Of particular importance for understanding the origin is the ancient Indian logic of navya-nyaya. Researchers see in it the experience of formalization of intensional logic, even a meaningful system of logical understanding, within which the idea of an organism and an individual is born - an idea that is extremely important for the Kantian logic of aesthetic teleology. As David Benyaminovich Silberman emphasized, the logic of navya-nyai is "truly an organism and an individual. That is, in it, the initial principle, or metaphysics of "relational reification", is threaded through every cell, every element of the structure of the object, expressed in every function of its organization. In modern terms, the navya-nyai model is a cybernetic machine, and she herself is a behavioral organism and therefore spiritual, despite scholastic dryness and operationalism. This is gratifying: navya-nyaya, therefore, is a genuine product of the Indian spirit, embodied in the absolute idea of knowledge,"in the subject of which "all words are already "not the same": "term" is not a term, "category" is not a category, "relation" is not a relation, "operation" is not an operation... Cognition of what is already known in the other is capable of delivering only psychological pleasure, but without apophatic reflection" ^{[8, pp. 155-156]}, which brings us closer to the mystery of the birth of knowledge. Similar to navya-nyaya's logical approach, we find reasoning, as we will see, in Kant's aesthetics, in his analysis of the beautiful, in his artistic intuition. If we talk about it as a whole, then one can, paraphrasing P. A. Florensky, ask the question: does Kant set any other task in his aesthetics than Durer's engraving?

The comparison of the great cultural traditions that determine the essential aspects of the analysis of the metaphysical problem of the correlation of the beginning and creativity is extremely important for understanding Kant's aesthetic style of thinking. The philosopher poses the question of metaphysics as a boundary question, as a question of its boundaries. In modern Russian philosophy, the question is considered in this perspective in the brilliant article by A.V. Smirnov "The Boundaries of Philosophy". The author connects the comprehension of philosophy of philosophy with the answers to the question "what?" (building subjectivity) and the question "what?" (equipping subjectivity with predicates). Kant has another question in the structure of such questioning: "how?" - how is metaphysics possible? But these two types of questioning converge in some way, since they turn to the possibility of metaphysics and philosophy. In A. V. Smirnov, the appeal to such a possibility is expressed in a form that is dramatic enough for aesthetics. "Reasoning about the foundations of anything, a philosopher does not become either a physicist or a biologist, nor – if we continue this line – a priest or a believer, insofar as he speaks about the foundations of these fields of knowledge and spiritual activity precisely as a philosopher (but a philosopher does not talk about the foundations of those specific structures that the author speaks about, but about the ultimate foundations as such, and in this sense he can even be considered as a priest of the limit itself – N. K.). But then, in order to talk about philosophy in the same way, a philosopher must cease to be a philosopher! (one could agree with this if it were explained how one can specifically talk about the limit, about the limit transition. And reasoning about philosophy does not mean that we are looking at the philosopher himself, so it is not clear what kind of subject stops its activity. Even a priest cannot consecrate himself to the priesthood, so the purity of philosophy is that the philosopher cannot stop the sacrament at the limit – after all, it is said: "the agony of Christ lasts forever, and at this time it is impossible to sleep"). He must follow the imperative of zero bias: having nothing ready, distracted from all philosophical tools, he must become a demiurge of philosophy (But what is the meaning of the idea of a demiurge of philosophy? Whoever announced the philosophical system as his own creation, according to Kant, would have to admit that philosophy did not exist before him at all. "... Since, from an objective point of view, only one human mind can exist, then many philosophies cannot exist, i.e. only one true philosophical system based on principles is possible, no matter how diverse and often contradictory philosophizing may be about the same position" ^{[27, p. 23 (207)]}. In the image of such a creation, Kant also thought of his own system of criticism. If someone, Kant continues here, "admitted that there was another (and moreover true) philosophy, then there would be two true philosophies regarding the same subjects, and this contains a contradiction. "Thus, when critical philosophy proclaims itself to be a philosophy before which there was no philosophy at all, then it acts exactly as those who build philosophy according to their own plan have done, will do and should do." But even the project assumes certain models, properties and characteristics. The demiurge of philosophy is not an absolute that can create out of nothing, this relative demiurge-creator must still have something ready and instrumental; besides, if we proceed from the above judgment of Andrei Vadimovich, it is not clear from which side of the border (limit) the philosopher stands as a demiurge and how he carries out the ultimate perception of the construction of this boundary) and observe its occurrence. But then he is not a philosopher (if it is not specified what kind of demiurge he is, and if there is no such clarification, then the question of the boundary itself, of the boundary symbol and image, of the ultimate foundation, hangs), because philosophy has yet to become (it is impossible to draw a boundary in the future, it exists or it does not exist), it does not yet exist (does the border know its negation?): she has an empty subjectivity (but zero or empty subjectivity gives, in the language of mathematics, a result equal to subjectivity: subjectivity = subjectivity; such subjectivity indicates the paradoxicity of the limit, although even selflessness-anatman, as Indologists believe, is realized by a Bodhisattva; another question is where to draw, let's use the name of a Japanese novel, “The Boundary of Emptiness" (“Kara no Ke:kai"), and what is the temptation of creation in this emptiness – N. K.)" ^{[53, p. 17]}. As for the imperative of zero bias, even in quantum mechanics, zero is not always zero, so the question of developing a modern apparatus of mathematical metaphysics is extremely important. In addition, the question here is how to properly keep what Husserl called the boundaries of philosophical research, while making a distinction between the pre-philosophical sphere (reasoning about philosophy, similar to the reasoning of a physicist, says only that the philosopher adheres to a naturalistic attitude) and a specifically philosophical attitude. In Kant we are talking about another demiurge, which is not a philosopher, but a more universal personality – thinking itself, which creates the whole manifested world. According to Smirnov, the creation of philosophy is a paradoxical phenomenon associated with the identification of grounds, but how to consider this paradox if we adhere to the Kantian idea that the term philosophy has always been based on its world concept. And "every concept can be considered as a point that, as an observer's point of view, has its own horizon, i.e. a certain set of things that can be imagined and, as it were, viewed from this point" ^{[26, p. 843 (In 686)]}. Therefore, we can talk about the world point of philosophy, which has its own common horizon, from which, as from the center, all philosophical systems are visible. The philosopher, as a creator, denies his creation. But if a philosopher is not a demiurge, not a creator, then how can he think? That is, philosophy in its aesthetic act can only nourish the hope that it will become itself. But if there is no philosophy, then how can it think of itself as what it is going to become? Apparently, the foundation of the relationship between philosophy and creativity has yet to be thought out. And aesthetics has always sought to comprehend this attitude.  The question is whether it has always risen to the level of philosophical comprehension. The obvious paradox described by Andrey Vadimovich is, in essence, an aesthetic paradox of philosophy. Here it is only important to understand who is the friend of paradoxes here – the philosopher himself or the aesthetic creator. For Pushkin, this is a genius. So we find ourselves in a more extensive territory of art and culture.

The concept of creation is extremely important in the development of the philosophy of culture. Aesthetics participates in this development with all its categorical and conceptual composition with its outstanding examples of existential-metaphysical penetration into culture. In the Metaphysics of Morals, this participation is described both through the aesthetic concept of perfection and through the aesthetic concept of measure. "Cultivating (cultura) one's natural forces (spiritual, mental and bodily) as a means for every possible purpose is a man's duty to himself. – His own personality (as a being endowed with reason) obliges a person not to leave unused and not to allow his natural inclinations and abilities, which may someday be used by his mind, to rust in uselessness; even if we assume that a person can be satisfied for natural needs and by the innate measure of his abilities, still reason must first, by means of the principles, to point out to him this satisfaction with a small measure of his abilities, since man, as a being capable of setting goals for himself (making objects his goal), must be obliged to use his powers not only to natural instinct, but to the freedom with which he determines this measure. Consequently, it is not a matter of the benefits that one can have from the culture of one's abilities for all kinds of purposes, because, perhaps (according to Rousseau's principles), the advantage of the benefits will be on the side of the coarseness of natural needs; no, to develop one's abilities (of which one is more and the other less, depending on the difference in their goals) and being pragmatically a person who corresponds to the purpose of his existence is the dictate of moral and practical reason and a person's duty to himself" ^{[28, p. 163, 165]}. Aesthetics is a form of fulfilling this inner duty, which is woven by various threads set in motion by spiritual and spiritual forces (the so-called beauty of the soul), a culture of bodily forces that are aesthetically structured through what can be called aesthetic matter in man; with their help, Kant interprets the indirect duty of man, which consists in "cultivate natural (aesthetic) feelings of compassion and use them as a means to participate from moral principles and the corresponding feeling" ^{[28, p. 193]}.

The cultivation of aesthetic feeling takes place in the space of explicit or implicit interaction of various cultural forms. Jose Ortega y Gasset found it in such seemingly incompatible figures, as if standing on almost opposite poles of culture, as Diego Velasquez and Rene Descartes. Pointing out the amazing similarity between them, he wrote that, "like Velasquez, Descartes, in his existential solitude, revolts against all the philosophical principles that guide his age, against any tradition: scholastic or ancient… Both Velasquez and Descartes are making the same revolution, but in different areas. Just as Descartes reduces thinking to rationality, Velasquez reduces painting to visuality. Both turn culture to face reality. Both belong to the outside world and look to the future… We are surrounded by everyday reality. What did painting do to her before? Distorted, exaggerated, extolled, embellished or forged. What should she do with it in the future? Do the opposite: leave it as it is, that is, extract the picture from it. Hence one of the remarkable features of Velasquez's paintings, which his contemporaries defined as "equanimity"" ^{[47, pp. 47-48]}. This kind of interaction of the experience of beauty, art and philosophy is precisely what interests aesthetics – mainly the complementarity of the artistic and rational understanding of the world, figurative schemes, schemes of the regulatory concept and invariants of the artist's perception of the philosopher, a mental sketch of the history of art in the philosopher's view, symbolic matrices of analogies of this perception in world culture. Here, first of all, the question arises about the meaning of aesthetics itself, about the meaning of its image, which is located on the other side of the canvas and directly correlates with clarifying which concept of philosophy aesthetics is – school or world.

If we consider aesthetics as a large discourse responsible for solving the question of how the ability of thinking is possible (and there is always an aesthetic focus in it, since, as E. Kassirer said, "the full concept of thinking ... restores the harmony of being" ^{[36, p. 372]}), then we cannot help but notice that it initially immersed in the fabric of metaphysical reflection, which is described, for example, in Chinese culture as "creativity" (hu?-yu?n). But why is the beginning itself characterized as creative? Let's try to prescribe this question form a little more definitely. Isn't there a tension between creativity and the beginning, the foundation – a truly metaphysical tension? It is connected with the solution of other questions: why does something exist at all, is it possible to draw the beginning as such. Or is creativity always that after the beginning? Then it should be about the creativity of creativity. If creativity is identical to the beginning, then a number of new questions arise: is there a new metaphysics, what is the metaphysical matter of the beginning, are there aesthetic equivalents of the act of initiation, can it be aesthetically explained (or can it only be explained aesthetically), for example, following the intuition of the binary code of creation or the attitudes of symbolic thinking (but these will already be, for example, Kant has installations of implicit phenomenology). Already here you feel how springy the action of thinking is in its approach to the metaphysics of creativity, what existential tragedies it generates – as Mary of Scotland said, "in my beginning is my end" ("in my beginning is my end"). Comparing the concepts of cause and beginning, Kant saw in the first an intellectual, and in the second a sensual formation. Unlike the cause, "the beginning is only in the world, but not the world" ^{[23, p. 59]}. But in this case, how to interpret the creation itself? When we think in biblical terms, it is a question of what God actually created from: the Apostle John is closer to the aesthetic version – "in the beginning was the Word", but is God given to us the knowledge of this beginning-the Word (the Word is the first structure of the absolute work, as the aesthetic space of metaphysics), which is God himself: the beginning was born by God himself, that is, it was born uncreated, since God was not created by anyone and from nothing.

The ancient Greek philosophy collected in a single range Heraclitus the notion of ("Word"), the idea of a creative mind (the wise considered the "mind ruling the Universe") and the representation of perfection and completeness with their spherical vortex (" " [Diels 1906, 121]) in Parmenides. But according to what pattern does this form of reason (which contains the essence of the object, cognizable by it), which, as Valery would say, is fruitful of ideas, on the other hand, is the idea of the synthesis of the Word and perfection sufficient for its understanding? And is there a perfect truth? And if it exists, then how does it relate to the concepts of absolute and relative truth. Having interpreted the Parmenides curved surface of a perfectly round one in accordance with the concepts of the philosophy of Heraclitus and correlating it with the above arguments about the creative beginning, it should be recognized that the beginning and the end are connected by a tense coupling of the impossible: "draw a circle – there is no beginning ... in a circle there is neither beginning nor end" ^{[57, p. 206]}. But for metaphysics, it is not just their connection that is important, but a kind of first connection that does not yet have either a circle or any other object, for this is what Kant introduces as the basis for a synthesis (subjective synthesis of grasping, productive synthesis, transcendental synthesis of imagination a priori, figurative, figurative and intellectual synthesis) of heterogeneous, after the realization of which we can only say that there is that Parmenid vortex motion that arises from the collision of oncoming currents coming from the beginning and from the end, and dragging along and cutting off everything that is "no more" and "no less", and this is the only thing that we can imagine as the ultimate existence, Parmenides' "world-building", in which at least "the thought and what the thought arises about" is fulfilled, and the subjective element bearing it (only minimalism could artistically represent it), which sees with the mind and gives a predicate of perfection to what is, which is a condition of aesthetic predication.

The question of the relationship between the origin and creation of the world in Hinduism is quite complicated, here the relativistic version does not coincide with any of the above versions of the interpretation of their relationship. Sometimes the totality of philosophical texts of India is considered as an absolutely complete, internally-perfected peacemaking.  The problem of the very source of creation is transferred to the space of the metaphysical foundation of the Highest Reality, it is defined as a tattva – as if the collective unity of the originals themselves, who are in symbiosis with each other, but still dependent on the author of the beginnings - Brahman, on whose chest are located not only the existent, but also the non–existent. Analyzing the doctrinal basis of Hinduism, modern Western researchers consider the theodicy characteristic of it, forming epistemology, ontology, the concept of causality, psychology and teleology of creation within the metaphysical foundation. A. Uskokov, contextualizing the teaching of the Brahma Sutras, shows how this holy scripture "gave rise to widely divergent ontologies and ideas about practice" ^{[57, p. 240]}. There are more than a dozen bases in old Buddhist texts focused on the spiritual work of self-improvement, which can be created on the middle path. Aesthetics has been defined since ancient times by the categories of Buddhist thought that analyzes the nature of sensory phenomena, the idea of a "vital principle", the flicker of life itself, the grounds by virtue of which one can see or not see heavenly images that "bring pleasure, delightful" ^{[17, p. 218]}. The understanding of the beautiful has a unique range here, which includes both the structures of symbolic thinking and the aesthetic justification of the timbre of the adornment of existence. Of particular importance for aesthetics is the Buddhist metaphysics not only of perfect bliss, but also of the highest perfect mind, the idea of which, according to Kant, is adequate only to the totality of the connection of things in the universe. As A. Y. Syrkin emphasized, "the one who has reached the highest perfection penetrates all sides of the world with his mind full of friendliness" ^{[54, p. 38]}. The spirituality of aesthetic experience is concentrated by the Buddhist consciousness around the impossibility of visualizing Nirvana and the illusory nature of samsara. When we discussed one of the sutras with Valery Pavlovich Androsov, he emphasized that when interpreting it, one should proceed from the conceivability of only consciousness (or only nirvana), everything else is an illusion resulting from the fact that excitement arises in the treasury consciousness, setting everything in motion; the return Path to nirvana is the Path of calm mind (manas), the cessation of any of its manifestations, which will return consciousness to its original, pure state of equanimity, peace. All these ideas find their expression in Buddhist art, which focuses on the image of the Buddha himself as a perfect person in a state of spiritual bliss.

Of particular importance for understanding the origin is the ancient Indian logic of navya-nyaya. Researchers see in it the experience of formalization of intensional logic, even a meaningful system of logical understanding, within which the idea of an organism and an individual is born - an idea that is extremely important for the Kantian logic of aesthetic teleology. As David Benyaminovich Silberman emphasized, the logic of navya-nyai is "truly an organism and an individual. That is, in it, the initial principle, or metaphysics of "relational reification", is threaded through every cell, every element of the structure of the object, expressed in every function of its organization. In modern terms, the navya-nyai model is a cybernetic machine, and she herself is a behavioral organism and therefore spiritual, despite scholastic dryness and operationalism. This is gratifying: navya-nyaya, therefore, is a genuine product of the Indian spirit, embodied in the absolute idea of knowledge,"in the subject of which "all words are already "not the same": "term" is not a term, "category" is not a category, "relation" is not a relation, "operation" is not an operation... Cognition of what is already known in the other is capable of delivering only psychological pleasure, but without apophatic reflection" ^{[8, pp. 155-156]}, which brings us closer to the mystery of the birth of knowledge. Similar to navya-nyaya's logical approach, we find reasoning, as we will see, in Kant's aesthetics, in his analysis of the beautiful, in his artistic intuition. If we talk about it as a whole, then one can, paraphrasing P. A. Florensky, ask the question: does Kant set any other task in his aesthetics than Durer's engraving?

The comparison of the great cultural traditions that determine the essential aspects of the analysis of the metaphysical problem of the correlation of the beginning and creativity is extremely important for understanding Kant's aesthetic style of thinking. The philosopher poses the question of metaphysics as a boundary question, as a question of its boundaries. In modern Russian philosophy, the question is considered in this perspective in the brilliant article by A. V. Smirnov "The Boundaries of Philosophy". The author connects the comprehension of the philosophy of philosophy with the answers to the question "what?" (building subjectivity) and the question "what?" (equipping subjectivity with predicates). Kant has another question in the structure of such questioning: "how?" - how is metaphysics possible? But these two types of questioning converge in some way, since they turn to the possibility of metaphysics and philosophy. In A. V. Smirnov, the appeal to such a possibility is expressed in a form that is dramatic enough for aesthetics. "Reasoning about the foundations of anything, a philosopher does not become either a physicist or a biologist, nor – if we continue this line – a priest or a believer, insofar as he speaks about the foundations of these fields of knowledge and spiritual activity precisely as a philosopher (but a philosopher does not talk about the foundations of those specific structures that the author speaks about, but about the ultimate foundations as such, and in this sense he can even be considered as a priest of the limit itself – N. K.). But then, in order to talk about philosophy in the same way, a philosopher must cease to be a philosopher! (one could agree with this if it were explained how one can specifically talk about the limit, about the limit transition. And reasoning about philosophy does not mean that we are looking at the philosopher himself, so it is not clear what kind of subject stops its activity. Even a priest cannot consecrate himself to the priesthood, so the purity of philosophy is that the philosopher cannot stop the sacrament at the limit – after all, it is said: "the agony of Christ lasts forever, and at this time it is impossible to sleep"). He must follow the imperative of zero bias: having nothing ready, distracted from all philosophical tools, he must become a demiurge of philosophy (But what is the meaning of the idea of a demiurge of philosophy? Whoever announced the philosophical system as his own creation, according to Kant, would have to admit that philosophy did not exist before him at all. "... Since, from an objective point of view, only one human mind can exist, then many philosophies cannot exist, i.e. only one true philosophical system based on principles is possible, no matter how diverse and often contradictory philosophizing may be about the same position" ^{[27, p. 23 (207)]}. In the image of such a creation, Kant also thought of his own system of criticism. If someone, Kant continues here, "admitted that there was another (and moreover true) philosophy, then there would be two true philosophies regarding the same subjects, and this contains a contradiction. "Thus, when critical philosophy proclaims itself to be a philosophy before which there was no philosophy at all, then it acts exactly as those who build philosophy according to their own plan have done, will do and should do." But even the project assumes certain models, properties and characteristics. The demiurge of philosophy is not an absolute that can create out of nothing, this relative demiurge-creator must still have something ready and instrumental; besides, if we proceed from the above judgment of Andrei Vadimovich, it is not clear from which side of the border (limit) the philosopher stands as a demiurge and how he carries out the ultimate perception of the construction of this boundary) and observe its occurrence. But then he is not a philosopher (if it is not specified what kind of demiurge he is, and if there is no such clarification, then the question of the boundary itself, of the boundary symbol and image, of the ultimate foundation, hangs), because philosophy has yet to become (it is impossible to draw a boundary in the future, it exists or it does not exist), it does not yet exist (does the border know its negation?): she has an empty subjectivity (but zero or empty subjectivity gives, in the language of mathematics, a result equal to subjectivity: subjectivity = subjectivity; such subjectivity indicates the paradoxical limit, although even the selflessness-anatman, as Indologists believe, is realized by a Bodhisattva; another question is where to draw, let's use the name of a Japanese novel, “The Boundary of Emptiness" (“Kara no Ke:kai"), and what is the temptation of creation in this emptiness – N. K.)" ^{[53, p. 17]}. As for the imperative of zero bias, even in quantum mechanics, zero is not always zero, so the question of developing a modern apparatus of mathematical metaphysics is extremely important. In addition, the question here is how to properly keep what Husserl called the boundaries of philosophical research, while making a distinction between the pre-philosophical sphere (reasoning about philosophy, similar to the reasoning of a physicist, says only that the philosopher adheres to a naturalistic attitude) and a specifically philosophical attitude. In Kant we are talking about another demiurge, which is not a philosopher, but a more universal personality – thinking itself, which creates the whole manifested world. According to Smirnov, the creation of philosophy is a paradoxical phenomenon associated with the identification of grounds, but how to consider this paradox if we adhere to the Kantian idea that the term philosophy has always been based on its world concept. And "every concept can be considered as a point that, as an observer's point of view, has its own horizon, i.e. a certain set of things that can be imagined and, as it were, viewed from this point" ^{[26, p. 843 (In 686)]}. Therefore, we can talk about the world point of philosophy, which has its own common horizon, from which, as from the center, all philosophical systems are visible. The philosopher, as the creator, denies his creation. But if a philosopher is not a demiurge, not a creator, then how can he think? That is, philosophy in its aesthetic act can only nourish the hope that it will become itself. But if there is no philosophy, then how can it think of itself as what it is going to become? Apparently, the foundation of the relationship between philosophy and creativity has yet to be thought out. And aesthetics has always sought to comprehend this attitude.  The question is whether it has always risen to the level of philosophical comprehension. The obvious paradox described by Andrey Vadimovich is, in essence, an aesthetic paradox of philosophy. Here it is only important to understand who is the friend of paradoxes here – the philosopher himself or the aesthetic creator. For Pushkin, this is a genius. So we find ourselves in a more extensive territory of art and culture.

A.V. Smirnov structures the world culture, highlighting in it a number of large cultures (European, Arab-Muslim, South Asian and Far Eastern). But how significant is it for the metaphysics of culture to refer to the mathematical values of quantities (more – less, etc.) and their measurement? Besides, the criteria for distinguishing them are not quite clear here: neither American nor great Russian, Russian culture coincide with European culture. What about the culture of Israel, which has spiritually fertilized entire regions of world culture for several millennia? Where to include African and Latin American cultures? There are many people, many cultures, many logics, many religions, but there is one person (no one can replace him either at birth or during his lifetime), one mind (if, of course, we abstract from the singularity of artificial intelligence), one world (there is no access to parallel universes yet, if there are any, of coursethat is why it is so important to develop mathematical metaphysics, the metaphysics of genology in its various variants, and to build a modern theory of the unity of scientific knowledge. M. Planck, speaking of the compatibility of scientific theories, emphasized that in their "mutual adaptation lies the germ of their further flourishing and development on the way to higher unity, since the main goal of any science it consists in merging all the theories that have grown in it into a single one" ^{[48, p. 116]}. Theoretical reproduction of the basic points of "one – many" will create a phenomenology of the uniqueness of the cultural perception of the peoples of the world, conceptualize unity in the diversity of cultures themselves, develop sophisticated tools for understanding the cultural spectrum of humanity (which is what Smirnov, Tkachev, Julien and other scientists undertake in their research). But it is no less important to comprehend the nature of the spectrum of world culture itself, and the idea of cultural discourse implicated in it regarding the hazy horizon of harmony, which can never be fully defined. And the very horizon of harmony in this discourse coincides with the horizon of reason. The question of the structure of world philosophy is also extremely complicated. Current Western studies analyze the main attitudes associated with a variety of philosophical ideas, with the largest Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Islamic, African, ancient Greek, modern European philosophical ideas. The authors of these works consider each concept through a universal theme of self-improvement and transformation. Organized around the main themes of knowledge, metaphysics and aesthetics, these studies cover topics from Chinese xin and karma in Buddhist traditions to Okwu in African philosophy, equality in Islamic thought and the good life in Aztec philosophy. This is how an international team of researchers expands philosophical horizons [see: 16]. The approach proposed by A. V. Smirnov allows us to consider large cultures as a variety of plastic realities, each of which has its own pulsating universe of meaning. In this regard, the author analyzes the paradoxes of Tkachev and Julien, which we encounter when describing a foreign cultural tradition. It follows from this analysis that, referring to any cultural tradition, one can only identify and accept its foundations, but it is impossible to substantiate them, which indicates an insurmountable boundary for philosophy. But is there any boundaries for philosophy if it transcends any boundaries? At the beginning of his article, Andrey Vadimovich reflects on universalism and rationalism as distinctive features of philosophy. But then what about the traditional ideas of philosophy as the love of wisdom or with the understanding of philosophy as a method of the soul existing in modern domestic research? In the artistic cultures of the last century, researchers even saw a movement towards individual metaphysics. In addition, the question of paramount importance arises here: what is rationalism, reason itself. We will not find an answer to it in this article by Andrey Vadimovich. In Kant, as we will see, reason will always be where harmony broke out, that is, they converge at the aesthetic point of infinity; in his texts, the question of the creativity of reason, its propensity for creation, its talent, which turn out to be vague in the aesthetic sense, is constantly raised. But then how does the above judgment about the non-philosophical demiurge of philosophy relate? At the beginning of the article, philosophy is contrasted with science, which is rational, but not universal. How to consider such an opposition, if we proceed from Kant's formulation of the question of how metaphysics is possible not only as a natural inclination, but also as a science. In addition, the problem of how to build aesthetics as part of what Andrey Vadimovich calls cognitive philosophy, using the results of, for example, modern cognitive musicology, is of fundamental importance for aesthetics.

In fact, aesthetics, as it were, closes the metaphysical path of the thinker. And the subject of aesthetic knowledge itself can be discussed only if we turn to subjective, reflexive conditions (Kant sometimes considers thinking only as reflection). It is through reflection that external feelings or mediated perceptions (hearing and vision) lead the subject to objective cognition, and reflection itself, combined with conclusions, gives us the concept of reason, which, as A. Ferrarin emphasizes, is "the establishment of order and laws in its sphere of application for the purposes that it sets for itself" ^{[14, p. 283]}. But how can we apply acts of reflection to the aesthetic field if, according to Kant, it contains only the formal side of consciousness, and the "I" of reflection itself, unlike the "I" as a sensual being, does not contain the manifold. Moreover, through reflection, contemplation becomes truth. In addition, "a reflective judgment manifests and releases the depth that remains hidden in another judgment. But another judgment was already a judgment only because of this living depth" [Deleuze, 2001, p. 209], which brings us to the meaning of the "Critique of the faculty of judgment" itself. In this work, the same modified method of thinking is used as in the first "Critique", which the philosopher opposes to the superficiality of the way of thinking of his century and the mature ability of judgment of this time, subjecting them to thorough and thorough criticism, including philosophical classics from Plato to Leibniz, which will be given in the interpretation of the new criticism: it will be the meaning of the most difficult work of the mind, connected with its self-knowledge and the creation of cognitive justice, which justifies the just demands of the mind itself; in it, one can identify the place where the real judgment seat for all disputes of the mind is located, here one can judge the rights of the mind "according to the principles of its first instance." But here the question immediately arises, posed in Chatsky's monologue: "And who are the judges?..". From Kant's point of view, freedom to express one's thoughts "follows from the original rights of the human mind, which recognizes no judge except the universal human mind, in which everyone has a voice; and since everything depends on this mind the improvement that is possible in our condition, then this right is sacred and no one dares to limit it" ^{[26, p. 951 (In 780)]}. Such justice is the criticism of the purest reason with its spirit of thoroughness, which can not only prevail in metaphysics, but also "triumph in other fields of knowledge" ^{[25, p. 15 (XI)]}, including aesthetic discipline, but only one that is able to resist, as Kant said, before the free and by an open test of reason, and will perceive the general principle of everything created by reason, will make its attitude to a certain class of judgments problematic. "In fact, although contemplations may be sensuous, but judgments are entirely related to the understanding (understood in a broad sense), and to judge aesthetically, or sensually, since this should be knowledge of the subject, even in the case there is a contradiction when sensuality intervenes in the matter of the understanding and (by means of vitium subreptionis (error in substitution – Latin)) gives the mind a false direction; rather, objective judgment is always carried out only by the mind and therefore cannot be called aesthetic. That is why all our transcendental aesthetics of the faculty of cognition could, of course, talk about sensual contemplations, but could never talk about aesthetic judgments, since all its judgments must be logical, since it deals only with cognitive judgments that define the object. Consequently, the name, the aesthetic judgment about the object immediately indicates that this representation, however, correlates with the object, but in the judgment it is not the definition of the object that is meant, but the subject and his feelings" ^{[24, pp. 889, 891]}. Consequently, there are two types of judgment – logical and aesthetic, if the first is a form of thinking about an object, then the second also thinks about it, but immediately turns its mental gaze to the subject, to the one looking at this object, that is, here the thought runs a distance from the thinker to the conceivable, and back.

For the aesthete, the specific properties of the metaphysical way of thought are important. Aesthetic judgment is interested in the specified mental "finish", everything that happens in the final part of the mental movement, therefore Kant considers aesthetic judgment as a full-fledged ability that allows building a priori knowledge about aesthetic objects, grasping in them what "the thinking subject takes from himself", the way of his movement into the depths of himself, what we encounter in the experience of art is what is artistically set and executed according to a priori patterns of beauty. At the same time, pure reason itself is also thought of aesthetically, namely, as a "perfect unity" ^{[25, p. 17 (XIII)]}. That is, the aesthetic is not conceived by Kant objectively, in contrast to the logical ability of judgment necessary in the selection of knowledge for their appropriate use, from the logical tact – the metric of "the totality of the determining grounds of judgment contained in the dark depths of the soul" ^{[34, p. 156]}. This is a set of meanings of reflection, which, Kant continues here, "presents the subject from different sides and leads to the correct result, without realizing the acts that occur at the same time in the depths of the soul." This intuitive aesthetic pattern on a logical canvas, created by an unconscious movement in our soul, allows us to relate an object to a concept that has an indirect connection with it through a certain property common to several objects that can only affect our sensuality. The concept of the aesthetic is based on the attitudes of the experimental method in metaphysics, considering it in the perspective of expanding the space of subjectivity. The subject contemplated, say, a color spot in a painting, has its own characteristics that depend on the affinity of our sensuality with this fragment of the picture. That is, this object is so "embedded" in our contemplation that it is perceived as red. But this is only the initial stage of the installation carried out by cognition, followed by another stage – the processing of contemplation into a subjective representation, which relates the "footage" again to the subject, thanks to which we no longer have just the perception of red, but the phenomenon of red. The representation is, as it were, aesthetically neutral, because it "by itself does not create its own object in the sense of [its] being" ^{[26, p. 195 (125)]}, although it defines this object a priori. The mind is connected to such an assembly, which is in harmony with contemplation, complementing this harmony with the aesthetic principle of the play of imagination or reason with its representations, identifying this phenomenon through the synthesis of recognition in the concept, inserting it into a transcendental frame, as a result of which we recognize this phenomenon of color in the image as a transcendental content – this is the epistemological basis relating to to the relevant features of the aesthetic perception of color, in which we have yet to determine whether it is beautiful or not. The methodological premise of the aesthetic judgment about color is the position justified by Kant that the representation, for example, of red can neither be a pure image of sensuality, nor its modification, which Kant's transcendentalism transforms into a thing in itself, nor an idea, nor even a rational concept (notio), it can be thought of only as a single contemplation, which the artistic consciousness generalizes in the act of drawing color, its visualization. The ensemble of abilities that is implicitly present in aesthetic judgment is the result of the work of both perceptual consciousness and reason, and “aesthetic freedom of will” ^{[43, p. 7]}, and imaginative synthesis, as well as imagination, whose unique interpretive ability, as shown by L. Ostarik, plays a special role in the completion of Kant's critical system ^{[46, p. 1376]}.

The aesthetic movement of the figures of thought itself becomes part of the metaphysical program. The system of aesthetic knowledge has the same subjective sources as the metaphysics of consciousness. And those for the knowledge world are not only, as we have already seen, feeling and imagination, but also apperception. "Feeling represents phenomena empirically in perception, the ability of imagination – in association (and reproduction), apperception – in empirical consciousness of the identity of these reproduced representations with the phenomena through which they are given, therefore, in recognition" ^{[25, p. 167 (115)]}. The subject, for example, the artist holds by means of a priori structures in his consciousness a complete identity of himself, in each act of creativity he is by nature identical to all his representations, perceptions, impressions (otherwise they would exist in a separate form), regardless of the way they are given to his consciousness. The act of recognizing or re-perceiving creative ideas presupposes the synthetic unity of all sensory diversity as a manifestation of spontaneity contained in artistic representations and arising in the soul of a composer or writer. But speaking about the artistic contemplation of an object, it should be borne in mind that it, like the creation of new images of it, is devoid of reliance on existing sketches or conventional images of the object itself (drawing, diagram, etc.), that is, it is possible without the presence of the object itself in contemplation, and the ability to have such kind of contemplative representations Kant calls imagination, the spontaneity of which allows us to speak about the type of productive imagination. This typology sets the initial image of the object, the ability to draw images in space, but, from Kant's point of view, productive imagination is still not equivalent to creative imagination. The variety of sensory data is subject to synthesis, and if this synthesis is carried out a priori, then Kant characterizes it as a pure or productive synthesis of the ability of imagination – this aesthetically most significant ability, which is considered in its intention on perception as an appregension, although this ability surpasses even perception in its epistemological power, since it justifies the very possibility of a priori cognition. Hence it is clear why A. Einstein believed that imagination is more important than knowledge. Productive synthesis of imagination allows us to explore the experimental structures of artistic comprehension of the world, analyze the "a priori synthesis of image and feeling" (B. Croce). This synthesis has by its a priori condition the necessary relation to the original unity of apperception, as well as to appregension. "The ability of imagination should reduce all the diverse [available] in contemplation into one image; therefore, before that, it should include impressions in the sphere of its activity, i.e., to implement their appregension" ^{[25, p. 173 (120)]}. All these structures are necessary for the emergence of a new stage, when the unity of apperception, taken in relation to the synthesis of the ability of imagination, appears in the form of reason as the ability to create rules by comparing phenomena, which opens up the possibility of studying, for example, the rules of composition in fine art, and in general the discourse of a work of art, its prerequisite is a synthesis that corresponds to a priori possibility of feelings. If the synthesis of contemplations produced by the imagination is carried out by means of pure concepts of the understanding, then Kant calls it a transcendental synthesis of the faculty of imagination, which differs from the intellectual synthesis produced by the understanding alone. Through the transcendental function of the faculty of imagination, even the affinity of phenomena becomes possible, or their binding, which is carried out by identifying the genesis of the manifold from one root, and in aesthetics, thanks to this, the interaction of art forms.

Aesthetics has specific capabilities to add dimension to the existential-metaphysical register. Sensual contemplation, the general human feeling (sensus communis) correlates with the ideas of nature, and this is a matter of reflexive aesthetic judgments that are going to ascend to the source of art, these judgments themselves arise from a priori principles. In Kant's view, it is in the depths of inner feeling, contemplation of the soul, that an extremely important secret is laid for understanding aesthetics: "... we are not allowed to observe our own soul with the help of any contemplations, except those that are delivered to us by our inner sense, and yet here lies the secret of the origin of our sensuality" ^{[26, p. 437 (334)]}, and, therefore, the origin of all aesthetics and art, which convey emotional states through various expressive instruments. But here it should be noted that not all things are visible from the inside, something visible can become invisible, and vice versa. Sensuality itself grows from the same unknown root as reason, which synthesizes the manifold in an object through concepts that create its outlines, the semiotic field of objective representations. Speaking about the ornamental concept of Johann Sebastian Bach's works, Claude Debussy emphasized that in his music "it is not the nature of the melody that worries, but its outlines, and even more often the parallel movement of several lines, the meeting of which, whether accidental or intentional, causes emotion" ^{[11, p. 22]}.

P. Florensky in "Imaginary Geometry" represented space itself as a double, with its transitions, fractures, inversions, and aesthetic images of such spatial thinking make it possible to understand Kant's metaphysics more deeply, to penetrate into the mystery of transcendental aesthetics. Beyond its limits, aesthetics is constructed in such a way that it proceeds from a special kind of sensuality, sensory cognitive ability associated with the spontaneity of apperception – pure consciousness of genius. The artist's emotional intelligence also presupposes intellectual cognitive ability to form representations, discursive activity that organizes sensory representations: through the activity of the mind, as Kant would say, objects are no longer given, but are thought, thanks to which the connections necessary to build a suite of prerequisites according to concepts are established. In general, "the inner perfection of a person consists in the fact that the use of all his abilities is in his power and he subordinates them to his free will" ^{[34, p. 161]}. In addition, conceptual thinking itself is of no less importance in the unfolding of aesthetic knowledge and the philosophy of art. Concepts are not only the property of logical and theoretical knowledge, they are no less important for the formation of the language of art and art criticism. Thus, describing Andrei Rublev's "Trinity", Paola Volkova emphasized that "Rublev cuts off the Old Testament series and focuses his attention only on the image of the Trinity, but no longer travelers, but three figures. He focuses his attention on the literal religious definition of the Trinity, on the definition of the concept, for the Trinity is unity, indivisibility and non-unity. This is not a plot, these are concepts, and Rublev writes Trinity as a concept: these three angels form this concept" ^{[6, p. 311]}.

The architecture of the relationship between aesthetics and metaphysics.

In aesthetics, metaphysical passion is combined with metaphysics of imaginative thinking. The emotional intelligence of the artist creates images, and Kant structures the very ability to create such an image in the form of an image ability (you can, of course, build images, as mathematicians do, as if producing with your mind what Kant calls the approximate outline of a line corresponding to the concept, but this is only part of the entire image ability). The ability to construct various images will be complemented by the ability to recognize them, which has its own methodology (perceptron). Contemplating diversity, the soul translates it into images, while possessing a purely aesthetic ability to acquire metaphorical intimacy, distinguishing objects according to the feeling of pleasure, which "disposes the spirit to ideas," and they, as it was already clear to Plato, never borrow from the senses. Kant sees Platonic ideas as prototypes of things themselves. The disposition to ideas is combined with a sense of pleasure and displeasure – this deep feeling, which has a priori basis only within the framework of the reflective ability of judgment. Transcendental judgments about these structures, about the inner world of man, based on acts of reflection alone, say that the relationship of sensuality to the object, "without a doubt, is hidden too deeply for us, who even know ourselves only through inner feeling, therefore, as a phenomenon, could use such an imperfect tool our research is for something other than to find again and again only phenomena, the insensitive nature of which we would so passionately like to explore" ^{[26, p. 437 (334)]}, for example, seeks to explore an aesthetic phenomenon as a phenomenon in which the thing in itself shines through. But how can she shine through a sensual fog? Can the science of a priori forms of sensuality answer this question? Aesthetics, in fact, is irreducible to them, because it "multiplies the connection" with both a priori forms of sensuality, and with a priori forms of reason, and with feeling, and with reason. Moreover, the "connection itself, with which everything that should be represented as definite in space or time is necessarily consistent, is given a priori already together and simultaneously with these contemplations (in not in them) as a condition for the synthesis of any appregension. But this synthetic unity can only be the unity of the connection of the manifold, [existing] in this contemplation in general, in the original consciousness according to categories and only in application to our sensory contemplation" ^{[26, p.237 (161)]}.

If we talk about empirical contemplation, for example, of a house, then in the act of turning it into an event of perception, the subject acts as if as an artist capturing the manifold in this contemplation, which is based on the unchanging connection of space and sensory contemplation itself: "I seem to draw the outlines of the house in accordance with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space" ^{[26, p. 239 (162)]}. The mind itself is endowed with a certain talent as the ability to set goals, it creates the integrity of culture, which is hardly worth interpreting, as it manifests itself in Zh. Deleuze, like cunning. Considering Kant's transcendental method, structured by immanent criticism, he notes that "reason is the ability to organize indirect, roundabout means [of achieving goals]; culture is resourcefulness, calculation, a workaround ... Only the cultural goals of reason can be described as absolutely finite" ^{[13, p. 145]}. All these goals, organized into a systemic unity, form a cultural space, which is a prerequisite of the mind itself, which appears as the creator of the ideas of spontaneity, spontaneity, structured in the form of the ability of imagination and reason, making a connection to the manifold in contemplation, and for aesthetics it is extremely important that these spontaneous formations are able to independently begin to act from the internal motives of the subject. "An artist should know how to group the variety of figures so that unity is manifested if his picture is to please" ^{[21, p. 218]}. This indicates that there can be no question of any laws of creativity, the laws of art.

Kant's metaphysics of soul expansion proceeds from the fact that, by creating aesthetic spontaneity, the mind can directly appeal to sensuality. Characterizing the structures of the transition from rational psychology to cosmology, Kant emphasizes that if, under the assumption of the a priori legislation of reason in relation to human existence, its spontaneity was revealed, "then we would notice that in the consciousness of our being a priori contains something with the help of our existence, fully determined only sensually, can nevertheless be it is less defined regarding some inner ability in relation to the intelligible (of course, only conceivable) world" ^{[26, p. 547 (430-431)]}, that is, to that in the subject of feelings that is not itself a phenomenon. The assumption that by means of an inner faculty, which morality and the aesthetic self-consciousness born within it for the first time unfolds, would lead only to a purely intellectual principle of determining human existence and would not at all open up prospects even for psychology, since in fact it would only give a doubling of the predicates given in sensory contemplation. Aesthetics has always existed within the framework of metaphysical anthropology, since a person, "exploring his inner world, not only simply observes, but also easily brings something into self-consciousness, then it is desirable and even necessary to start with phenomena observed in himself, and only after that proceed to the statement of the provisions concerning the nature of man, that is, to the inner experience" ^{[34, p. 160]}. Today, a fundamentally new problem arises – does artificial intelligence have self-consciousness, what are its boundaries and how to recognize them, and finally, if we talk about a person, what are the "boundaries of the spirit" (Husserl), and we don't even know how to approach it yet. Sensuality itself, the whole field of perceptions, should not be represented as something that is outside the mental space. Modern scientific rationality judges sensuality in accordance with the principle of complementarity – the contemplation of feeling and its fulfillment are two non–matching processes.

The metaphysical horizons of aesthetic thought are defined through an intermediary link between the theoretical and practical parts of philosophy, and this connection is equivalent to the transition, firstly, from theory to practice through the underlying aesthetic judgment ability: "that between theory, no matter how complete it may be, and practice, another intermediary link is required that would connect them and it would constitute a transition from one to the other – this is obvious; in fact, an act of judgment should be added to the rational concept containing a rule, thanks to which the practitioner determines whether something fits the rule or not" ^{[31, p.241]}. But the concept of such a transition is especially difficult in theory, which is based on the concept of beauty, the problem of which in modern Western studies is touched upon in a variety of angles: thus, R. Moran finds in the work of Marcel Proust a representative example that allows him to identify some of the features that Kant attributes to the conceptual design of the beautiful, while avoiding paradoxes arising from the concentration of the German philosopher on the conditions of universal consent [see: 44, p. 329]. The idea of an intermediary link between theory and practice is also important in describing the conceptual and normative structure of aesthetic judgment, although it is not always possible to clarify how we realize such an ethos of aesthetic science (what to do, for example, with what Kant calls the rule of the heart, which is also true for the artist's activity: "May the Lord give you according to your heart" (Ps 19:5)), especially since aesthetics are mainly dealt with by theorists who are not artists in practice. In general, the normativity discussed by Kant, as R. Kluis rightly emphasizes, is "a claim of aesthetic judgment to universal significance (or subjective universality)" ^{[20, p. 2]}. Secondly, the transition from theory to practice is also made from the sensual substratum of nature to the supersensible substratum of freedom, but the transition itself (in modern aesthetic studies it is characterized as a "cosmological aesthetic principle" ^{[34, p. 69]}, and the transitional project in Opus postumum is considered as a "post-critical culmination of Kantian philosophy" ^{[25, p. 12]}) is not described by a continuum concept, for it, as Kant will emphasize, time is needed, and therefore rapprochement with a new state, that is, with a creative state or with the anticipation of creativity. And it is quite natural that Victor Hugo will compare time itself with an architect, and people with builders. Sensuality depicts objects as they appear to us, are given in empirical, and not in a priori representations, therefore the transition from it to the supersensible, although related to reason, is not epistemologically significant, it matters only where we find arguments confirming, as Kant emphasizes, how much nature is able to exhibit something analogous to the ideas of reason is not only in morality, which has an empirical region of pleasure as its condition (the question of the pleasure of knowledge is no less important), but also in the field of aesthetics itself.

However, here aesthetic reflection is very changeable. Kant characterizes the process of transcendental research itself by referring to the aesthetic category of the sublime. After all, these studies "include the studies of our mind, which, from the point of view of their importance, we consider much more preferable, and according to their ultimate goal, much more sublime than anything that the mind can learn in the field of phenomena, and are more willing to do anything, even at the risk of falling into error, than to abandon such important studies because of some doubt or neglect and indifference to them" ^{[25, p. 31 (A 3)]}. Aesthetics is also embedded in the structure of transcendental research, in the system of transcendental culture. Culture as such, consisting in the expression of a person's social dignity, arises through the efforts of a private person and involves acts of instruction and training, it is conceived by Kant as a way of cultivating a person's ability to set any goals and is structured primarily in the forms of a culture of skill and a culture of education and instruction, which, combined with a culture of reason, generates a real aesthetic delight accompanying culture morality: the connection itself "should serve as the completion of this instruction, which deeply touches the soul and puts a person on such a height where he can only consider himself with the greatest admiration for his inherent inclinations, and the impression of which is never erased" ^{[28, p. 245 (483)]}. Moreover, as Kant emphasizes here, the culture of reason alone testifies that "in the nature of man there is a love for what (and in the development of which) he has perfected his skill to the degree of science." The modality of culture presupposes a culture of ability, a culture of will, a culture of memory (historical culture), moral and aesthetic culture, science as a culture ennobling humanity, the internal culture of the state. We will be interested here mainly in what role aesthetics plays in this cultivation, because it is thanks to culture that aesthetic spaces become possible, all "created by the culture of art" (Kant). The culture of man is conceived in transcendental philosophy as an aesthetically structured phenomenon, since it is understood as the active perfection of himself performed by him. On the other hand, it is "thanks to art and science that we have reached a high level of culture" ^{[35, p. 23]}. The very reflective faculty of judgment, as it is positioned by reason, the use of which is thought by Kant almost as the goal of creation, is a prerequisite for considering man as the last goal of nature, the ultimate realization of which is what Kant calls human culture. It is a means that allows him to experience pleasure. And the ultimate goal of culture itself is a perfect civil order. Kant introduces the concept of human culture in his main aesthetic work, The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, which appeared at the end of the XVIII century.  "The acquisition by a rational being," Kant writes here, "of the ability to set any goals at all (hence, in his freedom) is culture. Consequently, only culture can be the last goal that we have reason to attribute to nature in relation to the human race" ^{[24, p. 701]}. The conditions for achieving this latter goal are civil society, which gives the greatest scope for the development of human natural inclinations, and the formation of a system of all states that eliminates unfriendly relations between them. The inevitable consequence of the absence of such a system is war, which can plunge an entire country into social chaos, generate human tragedies, and lead to the destruction of cultural monuments. Bearing this in mind, we should still not forget that war contributes to the acquisition of a free horizon for creative phenomena.  "Despite the terrible disasters to which war exposes the human race, despite, perhaps, even greater disasters that constant preparation for war causes in peacetime, war is still another motivating reason (although at the same time the hope for a peaceful state and the happiness of the people is increasingly moving away) to ensure that until to develop all the talents that serve culture to the highest degree" ^{[24, pp. 703, 705]}. Through the significance of culture, nature itself shows an expedient striving for perfection, which can be countered by both what Kant calls the refinement of taste, reaching its idealization, and ambition in science, the frenzy of inclinations to pleasure – all these excesses prevent the liberation of "space for the culture of mankind. The fine arts and sciences, which, through pleasure, which has universal communicability, and through refinement and refinement for society, if they do not make people morally better, then make them more civilized, win a lot from the tyranny of sensual attraction and thereby prepare a person for such an arrangement in which only reason should rule; while misfortunes, with which we are punished partly by nature, partly by the quarrelsome egoism of people, at the same time they strain, increase and harden [our] mental strength in order not to submit to those inclinations, and thus make us feel the hidden fitness for higher goals inherent in us" ^{[24, pp. 705, 707]}.

The attention of modern researchers is increasingly attracted by the question of the metaphysics of culture. Kant's transcendental metaphysics is connected primarily with the culture of reason. Culture itself is an extremely complex phenomenon, it is not only a tool for discovering the pragmatic gift of civilization, but also a manifestation of the greatness of the soul, however, Kant sees in this pragmatism a more dramatic picture associated with the inconsistency of social foundations of life; by this inconsistency he understands the unsociable sociability of people – it is "such a tendency to communicate that at the same time, it is associated with continuous resistance, constantly threatening society with separation" ^{[31, p. 91]}. A person, Kant continues here, is characterized by tendencies not only to communicate, but also to retire, since he "finds in himself the property of unsociability, the desire to conform everything only with his understanding and, consequently, expects resistance from everywhere, because he knows by himself that he is inclined to resist others on his part. This resistance is what awakens all the forces of a person, forces him to overcome the tendency to laziness and, under the influence of ambition, lust for power or greed, create a position for himself among his fellow tribesmen, whom, although he cannot stand, but without whom he also cannot do. This is where the first true steps begin from rudeness to culture, which, in fact, consists in the social value of a person." Since these steps, the philosopher continues, are at the same time the first steps to creative talents, to aesthetic taste, which "brings clarity and order to the completeness of thoughts, it makes ideas stable, capable of causing long-term and universal approval, to be the successors of other [ideas] and constantly develop culture" ^{[24, p. 441]}. Modern researchers strive to give a comprehensive interpretation of Kant's aesthetic ideas [see, for example, 42, p. 21]. The uniqueness of the aesthetic idea is that it encourages "thinking a lot", freely moving within the limits of such reflections, but moving and thinking in such a way that no concept arising in this act can be commensurate with this reflection, nothing from this eidetics helps to clarify the horizon of our thinking. Aesthetic ideation contributes to the transformation of forced social consent into moral legislation. That is why "all culture and all art that adorn humanity, the most beautiful social order are the fruits of unsociability, which, by virtue of its own necessity, must discipline itself and in this way, thanks to the art acquired by necessity, fully develop natural germs" ^{[31, p. 97]}.

True, modern online art strives to ensure that there are no boundaries left for creativity at all. But will it be possible, if we allow such a possibility, to think metaphysically about creativity itself? In addition, do not forget that some aesthetes can, as Kant emphasizes, even arrogantly mock metaphysics, constantly demanding that it participate in some discussions. But the aesthetes themselves "can't get around the questions: where am I from, where is everyone from… With the first judgment made on this matter, they find themselves in the territory of metaphysics. Without any guidance, they will now simply rely here on the beliefs that they may have, although they do not have a map of the field they want to wander through. The criticism of reason brings a torch into this darkness, but it illuminates not the areas unknown to us on the other side of the sensory world, but the darkened space of our own reason" ^{[23, p. 91]}. But aesthetes are sometimes far from aesthetics itself. And the metaphysical nature of aesthetic integrity is connected with the fact that it creates a sculpture of creativity itself – the most incomprehensible thing that we encounter in the world revealed to us, and it participates in the transcendental action of the mind, which draws a portrait of the whole for itself. Thus, comparing music with text, A. Schoenberg emphasized that it has a higher aesthetic and metaphysical rank in a vocal work, here the performer, overcoming his boundaries, reaches superindividual spaces.

In European and Russian culture, aesthetics developed as the final part of the great metaphysical systems, although in this capacity aesthetics is an extremely rare phenomenon, it is good if it happens at least several times in a millennium: Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Solovyov. And it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical breathing, the structures of ultimate thinking, the proto-force of truth with its drop into freedom, the natura naturans of modes and creative images, the metaphysically captured irrational surge (heard in Kant's notes for productive imagination) from great works of art, such elimination would completely make sense of them, would deprive aesthetics of sources confirming its unshakable the rights of justifications. Aesthetics is most often characterized as a part of philosophy, but since, if we follow Kant, there can be no philosophy at all without metaphysics, then aesthetics itself must be comprehended precisely in the structure of metaphysical systems. Moreover, aesthetics itself is constructed as something that relates not just to cultural history, for example, objectivity (one of the last interesting studies on this topic, see: ^[29], but it would be even more interesting to write a cultural history of subjectivity), which has a culture of a kind of secondary objectification, aesthetic judgments should be attributed, rather to complete the structure, let's use the famous definition of the entire culture of the human mind. In this capacity, aesthetics again and again restores itself in judgments that distinguish it from psychology or the theory of art, art studies. T. Adorno generally saw aesthetics as a dwelling and protection of metaphysics. In modern aesthetic and art history literature (the scope of the article does not allow analyzing the so-called aesthetics of metaphysism existing in the West), one can meet with judgments about metaphysical aesthetics, about aesthetics itself as metaphysics, even about metaphysics as philosophical classical aesthetics, with interpretations that sometimes turn aesthetics into almost a whole "set" of metaphysics – the metaphysics of sensuality, the metaphysics of freedom, the metaphysics of the elusive image, the metaphysics of time and even the metaphysics of aesthetics itself. But this is clearly too much. And this overkill is attributed to Kant's aesthetics alone. The German philosopher defines in the Critique of Pure Reason a metaphysical approach to aesthetics (this is an approach from transcendental metaphysics), but it is connected, in our opinion, not with the aforementioned "set", but with the formulation within the framework of the first "Critique" of the question of how art is possible, with the consideration of perfection as an imaginary transcendental predicate. As for the first part of the transcendental doctrine of principles – transcendental aesthetics, here it is important not only a dual, philosophical and psychological understanding of aesthetics and analysis of the philosophy of color in the structure of the visibility of the world, but also that Kant's analysis of the beautiful itself opens with aesthetic analogies of metaphysical experience. After all, as Merab Konstantinovich Mamardashvili subtly noted in his classic work "Kantian Variations", "the aesthetic is laid down in Kant at the very beginning, in the very core of the definition of form. It can even be shown that the so–called concepts of space, time, and other concepts are not concepts, but ideas of the mind, similar to aesthetic ideas. I mean that the very formulation of the definition of space as an idea in one place and the definition of aesthetic ideas in another place of the Kantian text are crystallizations and expressions of the same beating thought" ^{[40, pp.127-128]}. That is why it is so difficult to recreate the picture of Kant's aesthetic thinking as it was compiled at the very beginning of the critical path.

Modern researchers identify metaphysical aspects of aesthetic experience (V.V. Bychkov, N.B. Mankovskaya, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and show how the aesthetic system grows out of intuitive insights of transcendental dimensions of being (V.E. Alexandrov, Yale University). But here's the problem. In modern philosophical works, reference books and encyclopedias, aesthetics, in fact, is deleted from the program of metaphysics (see, for example, ^{[20],[22, p. 416]}). Why is this happening — whether aesthetics has not yet fully revealed its own metaphysical essence, or whether modern researchers are narrowing the circle of metaphysical search? And why is it so important for aesthetics, while remaining within the framework of a philosophical approach, to turn to the metaphysical principle structuring it? The fact is that both aesthetics and metaphysics stem from one common primordial source, which is the Castalian key, the infinitely reflected principle of creativity within itself, or what the late Kant called the "radiant soul" of the creator (Jorge Luis Borges will call such a state "the bright joy of thought"), they make themselves felt in a kind of pervosynthesis or in the initial coordination of their languages, which, as M. Heidegger emphasized, "is prepared for thought and poetry," is prepared for the fusion of the cognitive and aesthetic. And there is a rather tense relationship between them, already A. Saint-Simon contrasted the analyzing, observing mind, on the one hand, and, on the other, the creative mind, the level of the former is weaker compared to what "we know when we create" ("on est tr?s au-dessous du niveau o? l'on trouve quand on cr?e").

As for Heidegger's position, if we keep in mind the aspect we are interested in, it is also not so simple. After all, he, in fact, expresses the modern skeptical position of the complete denial of the aesthetic logos of metaphysics, and the philosopher himself is one of its predecessors. Thus, describing the conceptual apparatus of metaphysics, he notes that in philosophy, along with "metaphysics", there is also "logic", and "ethics", and "aesthetics". But what is this priority of metaphysics? To answer this question, it is necessary to go at least a little deeper into the history of thought – let us remember that history was already the mother of truth for Cervantes. From Kant's point of view, the advantages of metaphysics are related to the systematic analysis carried out by it, which has clearly aesthetic parameters, although even in artistic culture the relationship, for example, between aesthetics and ethics seems difficult. So, in the "Report for the Symposium" by Joseph Brodsky we read:

... Aesthetic flair

the essence is a cast from the instinct of self-preservation

and more reliable than ethics.

The aesthetic parameters are most obvious when we consider the unification of the metaphysical culture of pure reason, the faculty of judgment, comprehending a priori, and the metaphysics of morals. After all, "all the sciences of reason contain metaphysics, which constitutes their spirit. The beauty (Schonheit) of a system [built] from principles" ^{[33, S. 58]}, and how this beauty happens, is what is important for Kant. But what, in fact, is the aesthetic spirit of metaphysics or the metaphysical spirit of aesthetics, what in terms of aesthetics is called beauty, which resides in the center of metaphysics that has happened? Perhaps this is the inner aesthetic workshop through which metaphysical objects must have passed, if we follow the logic of the handwritten sketches to the "Critique of Pure Reason". But how can we develop a concept about it? Most likely, in aesthetics it will be not only a craftsman's workshop, as in the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason, but an artist's workshop, to which, as Gustave Courbet said, "the world comes to be painted in my studio." But how to express this coming of the world not only artistically drawn, but also thought, that is, to express in this case not anthropologically, but transcendentally born aesthetic thought? And it is impossible to do this if we do not want to remain in empirical positions, without turning to metaphysics, under the sign of which we build our understanding of the modality of art, which is burdened with matter and always has some kind of pulsation of reality (whether in its musical sound or in its pictorial performance), which is why this metaphysical form (from Valerie's point of view, it is the philosopher who is the artist of the form) can be as aesthetic, symbolic (understood at the level of protosynthesis) as mathematical, musical, and through this eventfulness in art one develops one's own metaphysical experience of analyzing the infinity of harmonies (K. Rogerson believes that in Kant's aesthetics, the very "expression of ideas is a general solution to the problem of free harmony" ^{[51, p. 20]}), the ultimate vision of reason, the only feasibility of which is freedom, as well as a rational "sense of ideas", the creation of evidence. And M. Mamardashvili was right when he emphasized that "metaphysical experience underlies all thought (as in the basis of aesthetics, ethics, psychology, etc.)" ^{[41, p. 982]}, although the ontological element always prevents moving from it to the reality of art. From this point of view, aesthetics is metaphysics as a transcendental–personal experiment (today there are works describing the process of turning experimental philosophy into aesthetics ^[8]), as a specific empiricism (we can say that aesthetics is not an experimental science, but a science for the experience of art, where even the knowledge of contemplation is not possible in its temporal extension, and since it is "given to us from the Holy Spirit," and the transcendentals of beauty themselves are always actually infinite). It is important for us to emphasize here that in the Heidegger fragment cited above, the metaphysical status of not only aesthetics, but also other philosophical disciplines is underestimated. After all, such an approach implies that aesthetics is, as it were, next to metaphysics, and not inside it, besides, it does not have its privileges, which indicates a certain metaphysical flaw in aesthetics itself. In Heidegger's view, aesthetics was born at a time when philosophy became the business of the school, although in reality aesthetics itself arose much earlier. One might even say that metaphysics was born out of the spirit of aesthetics, so that metaphysical thinking cannot be abstracted from it. The process of such abstraction could be influenced by the fact that the aesthetic approach is inextricably linked with the empirical method of research. But this approach is not limited to this kind of methodology. And there is no strictly defined concept of metaphysics yet, even such classical concepts of it as, say, Leibniz's monad, have far from purely metaphysical content in the history of European thought. Today, in philosophical works, for example, by M. K. Mamardashvili, one can find the concept of individual metaphysics, Valery Alexandrovich Podoroga, who left us prematurely, even introduced the concept of temporal metaphysics, into which he tried to turn fiction.   Being the result of a metaphysical choice, aesthetics can contain only partially empirical premises, always being a structuration of the metaphysical a posteriori — that is why both the metaphysics of aesthetic consciousness and metaphysics in general are so complex and paradoxical, whose ideas can be expressed in various tropes, analogies and metaphors, and although the question of metaphor itself "is not the ultimate for metaphysics" ^{[11, p. 220]}. In fact, a new general type of mind beliefs is emerging in aesthetics.

Aesthetic judgments themselves should be attributed to the final structure, to use the famous Kantian definition, of the entire culture of the human mind. In modern aesthetic and art history literature, one can meet with judgments about metaphysical aesthetics, about aesthetics itself as metaphysics, even about metaphysics as philosophical classical aesthetics, with interpretations that sometimes turn aesthetics into almost a whole "set" of metaphysics. But this is clearly too much. And this overkill is attributed to Kant's aesthetics alone. The German philosopher defines in the Critique of Pure Reason a metaphysical approach to aesthetics, but it is not connected with the aforementioned "set", but with the formulation within the framework of the first "Critique" of the question of how art is possible, with the consideration of perfection as an imaginary transcendental predicate. Modern researchers identify metaphysical aspects of aesthetic experience and show how the aesthetic system grows out of intuitive insights of transcendental dimensions of being. But the problem is that in modern philosophical works, reference books and encyclopedias, aesthetics, in fact, is deleted from the program of metaphysics. Why is this happening — whether aesthetics has not yet fully revealed its own metaphysical essence, or whether modern researchers are narrowing the circle of metaphysical search? And why is it so important for aesthetics, while remaining within the framework of a philosophical approach, to turn to the metaphysical principle structuring it? Heidegger expressed the modern skeptical position of the complete denial of the aesthetic logos of metaphysics, and the philosopher himself is one of its predecessors. From Kant's point of view, the advantages of metaphysics are related to the systematic analysis carried out by it, which has clearly aesthetic parameters, although even in artistic culture the relationship, for example, between aesthetics and ethics seems difficult. But what, in fact, is the aesthetic spirit of metaphysics or the metaphysical spirit of aesthetics, what in terms of aesthetics is called beauty, which resides in the center of metaphysics that has happened? Perhaps this is the inner aesthetic workshop through which metaphysical objects must have passed, if we follow the logic of the handwritten sketches to the "Critique of Pure Reason". The question is, how can we develop a concept about it? Aesthetics is metaphysics as a transcendental personal experiment. One might even say that metaphysics was born out of the spirit of aesthetics, so that metaphysical thinking cannot be abstracted from it. Today, in philosophical works, for example, by M. K. Mamardashvili, one can find the concept of individual metaphysics, Valery Alexandrovich Podoroga, who left us prematurely, even introduced the concept of temporal metaphysics, into which he tried to turn fiction.   Being the result of a metaphysical choice, aesthetics can contain only partially empirical premises, always being a structuration of the metaphysical a posteriori — that is why the metaphysics of aesthetic consciousness and metaphysics in general are so complex and paradoxical, the ideas of which can be expressed in various tropes, analogies and metaphors.

How in general can one think of the relationship between aesthetic, artistic and philosophical attitudes, without reducing it to the fact that the former give the judgments of the latter a certain emotional coloring? From Kant's point of view, this is a rather tense attitude.  In his review of I. Herder's book "Ideas for the Philosophical History of Mankind", Kant seeks to avoid simplistic interpretations of the relationship between them, while emphasizing that he is "least of all going to investigate the question of whether the poetic spirit animating the presentation does not violate the author's philosophy in some cases, whether synonymous expressions are sometimes given out for explanations, and allegories for truths, don't we sometimes get a complete shift of their boundaries and possessions instead of the adjacent transitions from the field of philosophy to the field of poetic language, doesn't the fabric of bold metaphors, poetic images, mythological hints sometimes serve to hide, as under figmas, the body of thought instead of to give him a pleasant shine through a transparent garment" ^{[35, p. 56]}. And it is important to take into account these well-justified concerns about the use of aesthetic language in the fabric of philosophical thinking when developing a broader theme of the relationship between aesthetic, artistic and philosophical, permeating the implicit structures of cultural space; this development has several levels in transcendentalism, demonstrating how the body of thought can aesthetically shine through its transparent robes. If we talk about the phenomena of modern culture, then Adorno found it possible to talk, for example, about the positivism of Stravinsky or Schoenberg. "Schoenberg, whose music was secretly mixed with an element of positivism, which is the essence of his opponent Stravinsky, in order to be able to dispose of the protocol expressiveness of his own music, eradicated every kind of "meaning" in it to the extent that the Austrian composer, inheriting the traditions of Viennese classicism, claimed that he was only interested in coherence invoices" ^{[1, p. 128]}.

The first level of development of the theme of the relationship between the aesthetic, artistic and philosophical is already present in the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason (sketches of 1775-1778), where Kant points to explicit and implicit relationships between metaphysics and aesthetic attitudes. "Although nothing looks less attractive than metaphysics, but after all, the jewelry sparkling on the beauty lay at first in gloomy crypts or at least passed through a poorly lit artisan's workshop" ^{[23, p. 77]}. Consequently, behind the metaphysical constructions there are some, albeit deeply hidden, aesthetic layers of culture. And although in Opus postumum he presents transcendental philosophy itself not as a rhapsody, that is, not as an aesthetic work, but it still has an indirect relation to aesthetics – through the assumption of a creative act of reason: after all, this philosophy "is the idea of the structure of the whole, which reason draws for itself" [Kant, 2000, p. 536]. In fact, the mind appears here as a kind of inner artist of consciousness.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

The system of transcendental idealism, which in one way or another occupies every person (aesthetic thinking occupies everyone who makes a judgment in their field), represents the scientic, methodological side of cognition, expressed in the unity of its diverse disciplines as a kind of dissected whole. In it, the idea is not only the concept of complete unity of concepts about an object, not only the unity achieved by reason and corresponding to nature (in the process of achieving it, reason itself "commands, although it cannot determine the boundaries of this unity" ^{[26, p. 837 (In 681)]}), not only the "projected unity" that it should be considered problematically, an analogue of sensuality schemes is created in it. Using an expression from Robert Musil's novel "A Man without Properties", we can say that here everything is fused into a shimmering meaning: although in the transcendental field "sensuality and reason do not define each other, but each acts according to its own laws; however, they conduct each other (harmony)" ^{[23, p. 131]}. This is not only the interpretation of the scores of thinking, the conductor can be the creator of the scores himself, just as Mozart conducted the premiere opera "The Magic Flute".

Aesthetics should contain a kind of outline of a dismembered whole, which Kant reproduces according to the biological intuition of the original embryo, all parts of which are not yet developed and are hardly visible. And any work of art is always predetermined, motivated by the type of its unity. "With aesthetic perfection, for example, an artist should know how to group a variety of figures so that unity appears if his picture is to please" ^{[21, p. 218]}. The movement towards the intuition of the embryo is carried out by various means, which can be well demonstrated by the example of intuitive (aesthetic) clarity given by Kant, the requirement of which is not as strict as the requirement of discursive clarity, but still quite legitimate. True, these means, which contribute to the comprehension of the expressiveness of the parts that make up this whole, "often delay the understanding of the whole, preventing the reader from quickly viewing the whole, and with their too bright colors obscure and hide the dismemberment or structure of the system, whereas it is the structure of the system that mainly determines judgments about its unity and thoroughness" ^{[25, p. 23 (A XIX)]}. The reason that aesthetic properties distance the understanding of the whole is that, from Kant's point of view, it lies in the intelligible world, while the aesthetic lies only at the intersection of the phenomenal and intelligible worlds. Modern artists sometimes associate the understanding of integrity itself with the knowledge of "figurative logic" ^{[5, p. 374]}, the only problem is how to build it. And such a construction is extremely important for aesthetic science, which is created not only by the structures of understanding sensuality, but also by reason. Aesthetics (like any sciences) should be "explained and defined not according to the description given by its founder, but according to the idea, which, due to the natural unity of the parts composed by him, turns out to be based in the mind itself" ^{[26, p. 1045 (B 862)]} with his desire for systematic cognition, for its connection in accordance with by one principle, to the synthesis of a variety of rational concepts according to the necessary laws through ideas. But is it possible to explain aesthetic science in accordance with an idea that is based in reason? If, as some representatives of Western and Russian culture believe, Plato is the founder of aesthetic science, then, using Kant's terminology, we can say that he, like his followers, wandered around the idea of aesthetics, but could not determine its content and boundaries; therefore, it is so important to collect aesthetic knowledge from historical structures, according to the instructions of the hidden the idea of beauty embedded in us, many related knowledge as a building material, and only after that it becomes possible to see the aesthetic idea in a clearer light and architectonically sketch the outlines of the whole according to the goals of the mind. Therefore, we ask questions not only about human nature, but also about nature in general according to the "idea itself and consider our knowledge insufficient until it is adequate to it" ^{[26, p. 827 (B 673)]}. The question is whether such grounds exist in the mind itself. It can hardly be doubted that the idea of creativity is hidden in the mind, and aesthetic knowledge and cognition are adequate for it. Aesthetic cognition in its two forms: contemplation, which is always single and directly relates to an aesthetic object, for example, to the green color in a painting as a modification of the sense of vision, as a change in our subject, as well as empirical and pure concepts (intuitus vel conceptus), indirectly grasping an aesthetic object through the identification of a feature common to several objects for example, the concept of art for painting, music, architecture, etc. These are concepts involved in the construction of the corresponding forms of judgment, transformed into the actual concept of the synthesis of contemplation. Pure concepts are rooted exclusively in the understanding, and not in the pure image of sensuality. Aesthetic cognition is subjective, and the judgment that can turn it into its own property is always the judgment of the "augmented self" (Igor Severyanin). If we take him only as cognition ex datis, then we can have complete historical knowledge of, say, the aesthetics of Alexander Baumgarten, but he himself knows about aesthetics and judges it as much as all this knowledge was revealed to him – just as knowledge was given in philosophy to Christian von Wolf. But if one of the provisions of the latter is refuted in his systematized compendium of philosophical and scientific knowledge, then "he will not [know] where to get new things from. He formed himself according to someone else's mind, but imitative ability is not the same as creative ability, in other words, cognition did not arise from his mind, and although objectively it was cognition of reason, yet subjectively it is only historical cognition. He well perceived and preserved, i.e. learned, the system, and it is [like making] a plaster cast of a living person" ^{[26, p. 1047 (In 864)]} – this initial principle of all phenomena that "do not obey any law of communication prescribing the ability to establish connections" ^{[26, p. 241 (164)]}. Such a sculptural technique, which subtly notices the meaning of even some modern epistemological constructions, has nothing to do with aesthetics, in which it is just philosophically reflected where to take this new, therefore, in this capacity it will act only if aesthetic knowledge is drawn from universal sources of reason, from which the cognitive ability can draw, only by combining their efforts with creativity. But how is such a connection possible when we mean the image of a philosopher. Merleau-Ponty, creating the image of philosophy as a creation, emphasized that in this capacity it cannot be the last truth. After all, "the point of view of creation, the human Gebilde, and the point of view of the "natural" (Lebenswelt as Nature) are both abstract and insufficient... We are talking about creation, which is called and generated by durch die Lebenwelt as an active and latent historicity that continues creation and is its witness..." ^{[43, p. 249-250]}. But how to fit philosophy as a creation into the architectonics of all human knowledge? Finally, how is it possible to combine the mind as the highest cognitive ability with the creative ability? It is hardly possible to talk about the technique of creative thinking, especially in art with its inscrutable laws and the ineffable depth of spiritual immersion. Let 's recall the lines of Anna Akhmatova:

These poems were with a subtext

Such that you look into the abyss.

And that abyss beckons and pulls,

And you will never find the bottom,

And he won 't get tired of talking forever

Her empty silence.

Gottlob Frege believed that a mathematician cannot create anything by his definition, he can only discover what exists, but isn't discovery the structure of creativity? Yes, the geographer does not create the sea by drawing its boundaries, but he creates something equally important – a map of the seas and oceans, without which we would not even have an idea about them.  On the other hand, is it possible to think of aesthetics as a facet of the idea of a possible science, which is nowhere given in concreto, and philosophy is just such a science? To the latter, as what Kant calls a model of critical evaluation of all attempts at philosophizing, "we try to approach in various ways until a single, heavily overgrown path is opened due to sensuality (aesthetics has always sought to tread it to some extent, but aesthetic efforts were not limited to this only - N. K.) and until a person succeeds, as far as it is allowed to him, to make a hitherto unsuccessful copy equal to the sample" ^{[26, p. 1049 (In 866)]}. Aesthetics and art participate in the creation of such a philosophically executed and equivalent copy of the model with all their categorical apparatus and artistic installations - 2 beautiful, sublime, comic, tragic. They express various aspects of the philosophical vision of reality. Let's take the tragic category as an example. Reflecting on the most important stages of his work, Andrei Tarkovsky emphasized that "earlier in Solaris, the idea was expressed that "a person needs only a person," and this thought was necessary for me. But in “Stalker” the same thought turns inside out: it turns out that dependence on other people, love for them, especially growing into the impossibility of their separate, independent existence from them, is a disadvantage, inability to build their own life without outside participation. The real tragedy is that, it turns out, a person can't give anything to a person!". The tragic allows you to adapt yourself to any meaning, elevating it to the drama of human communication, which is deeply revealed in aesthetics.

The problem of creating a copy equivalent to a philosophical model is how to create an original philosophical system, or at least make a copy obtained in the philosophical school when rewriting the original, equivalent to a model of critical evaluation of all attempts at philosophizing, that is, to exercise the talent of reason on some theoretical models. But this will not be the only sample of it, much more important is a sculpture that conveys what is based in the mind itself and correlated with sensuality. After all, aesthetic perfection is conceived by Kant as perfection precisely according to the laws of sensuality, although aesthetics as such is regulated not by canon, but by normative acts that have the meaning of harmonious institutions. "Aesthetics contains rules of conformity of cognition with the laws of sensuality… It gives us rules, following which delivers the required perfection" ^{[35, p. 270]}. Philosophy and aesthetics give different patterns of mental activity, therefore, aesthetics cannot be reduced to a copy of the philosophical original, or a template made according to a philosophical pattern. The relationship between aesthetics and philosophy is extremely complex, it can be likened to the relationship between the tabernacle and the Heavenly sanctuary, which Moses was once allowed to look at.  Aesthetics cannot, like Moses, invent a philosophical tabernacle, but an aesthetic sanctuary must correspond to a philosophical pattern or tawnite (this Hebrew word means "pattern": model, likeness, drawing), but the problem is how it is possible to achieve such a correspondence: it is possible to create a tabernacle or a philosophical construction provided that there are aesthetic techniques works, techniques of "doing" itself, and such techniques are possessed only by an aesthetic master as a creator, to whom a heavenly pattern is shown from above, that is, in this case, an earthly aesthetic sanctuary can be created if, at least, the aesthetician participates in the act of communication with the philosopher, and even better – if the aesthetics is written by the philosopher himself. As something that has a perfect pattern, aesthetics is inscribed in the structure of transcendental philosophy, so it is quite understandable why this structure is made up of "ideas of speculative, aesthetic and moral//practical reason in one system" ^{[23, p. 563]}, besides, the ideas themselves are aesthetic in nature, since they possess the property of self-creation, the talent of aesthetic skill.

Kant connects the structure of aesthetic knowledge with the possibility of mediation of theoretical and practical philosophy, but the form of mediation itself is not a compositional section of the metaphysical system, although such mediation of the initial premises of the analysis of aesthetic discourse is the result of the substantiation of the faculty of judgment, the principles of which should be affiliated to metaphysics. Moreover, the talent to make judgments is largely determined by aesthetic attitudes, since the ideas about the ability to judge develop the Kantian idea of synthesis (the ancient Greek term means "connection, folding, binding"; from - "joint action, complicity" + "arrangement, placement, distribution, location") cognitive and creative abilities. One of the forms of such synthesis is art, but if we proceed from the logic of the "Critique of Pure Reason", it can be attributed to the number of those concepts, the definition of which causes a lot of difficulties, "since neither from experience nor from reason it is impossible to give a single clear reason that would explain the right to use them" ^{[26, p. 185 (In 117)]}. The idea of synthesis as such is clearly realized by the artists themselves, and its implementation is connected not only with the problem of synthesis of arts. It is no less important for comprehending artistic attitudes, the originality of artistic thinking itself, and its boundaries. Trying to determine the place of art in the space of goodness and truth, Alexander Blok emphasizes in his notebook (July 13, 1902): "Beauty (art) and Goodness imitate Truth, but exhaust only its small elements, which in synthesis (not logical) give a new "something" that is not in Beauty, No Good." But what is the novelty of this something, he does not explain. Or let's give another example. Romain Rolland emphasized that no one knew the art of synthesis in music better than Beethoven.

Cognition, as it is thought in transcendental philosophy, "makes the intuitive a principle through the faculty of judgment" ^{[23, p. 580]}, performing acts of joining and collegiation, they allow you to represent many things in one. In fact, this is the ability to operate with the concepts of the singular, special and universal. The ability of judgment with its schematism is different from the hypothetical application of reason as an idea–based ability to deduce the special from the universal, which is already reliable and given in itself, the talent of the ability of judgment is the talent to find the special for the general (rule), associated with both the insight and originality of thinking and the rigor of the ability to sum up the special and the particulars related to it the laws of nature under the universal, correct concepts, "preventing errors that occur in the dim light in which objects appear" ^{[34, p. 258]}. That is, it is a kind of Diogenes' lantern, so as not to wander in the objective world. Striving for understanding, the faculty of judgment discovers differences in the manifold, even in the identical, notices the smallest similarity, as a result of which the special itself is determined a priori. At the same time, we can conclude to it from the universal on the basis of the universals of the external perception of a thing that is the guiding thread of the special.  In the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, as S. A. Chernov emphasizes, it is just about "the search for an a priori principle for the systemic ordering of the special, about how it is possible that particular empirical laws are connected with each other into one "system of nature", which even in its completely empirical and isolated manifestations reveals amazing expediency, proportionality of our cognitive ability" ^{[23, p. 704]}.

A person sharpens and strengthens the ability to judge or the doctrine of the actual foundations of the mind both in practical classes focused on motives related to sensuality and in theoretical constructions, when, seeing the universal, they determine whether concrete facts correspond to it: G. Ellison, in his analysis of Kantian aesthetics, specifically analyzes the ratio of quid facti and quid juris in the field of taste [H. E. Allison, 2001, p. 65-66]. The substantive basis of the regulation formed in transcendental logic and inherent in the ability of judgment as a feature of the natural mind is a set of objectively significant principles by which one can judge the approbation of a priori concepts in relation to phenomena, which allows for the comparison of normative structures for their similarity or difference. This code serves as a kind of "instruction on the part of the faculty of judgment" with its special natural gift to stage a transcendental narrative in the discursive normative field of experience, opening access to the specific application of the corresponding rational and sensory concepts. This staging creates a tension of the mind, without which it is difficult to discern these normative structures. Therefore, one who is deprived of the natural ability of judgment, "although he is able to see the universal in abstracto, he cannot distinguish whether this case fits him in concreto" ^{[26, p. 251 (173) Transcendental logic, as it were, encodes the correction of errors of the ability of judgment itself in a normative way. Characterizing the ability of judgment as the ability to be connected, Kant, as A.V. Smirnov believes, "considered it invariant and, therefore, does not give a priori laws" [53, p. 27]}. It is unclear only on what basis such a judgment is made. After all, Kant, even in the first introduction to the third "Critique", refers the ability of judgment to the type of ability of a priori cognition, which allows us to describe the structure of bringing the special under the universal. The philosopher hopes that the faculty of judgment will also unfold its own specific a priori principles. Starting from the hypothesis that "the faculty of judgment ... itself contains the principle a priori" ^{[24, p. 97]}, he further refers it to the a priori legislative ability, emphasizing that in one of its varieties the law is predetermined a priori, and the principle of the other is such a specific a priori concept as expediency. Being among the normative constructions of the faculty of judgment, the reflexive view is able to reveal the a priori legislative order, to lay the foundation of art. The experience of aesthetic pleasure itself follows the a priori principle of the faculty of judgment, which is also connected with the concept of the technique of nature and its system. Thinking of it as existing according to empirical laws, the faculty of judgment nevertheless "presupposes it a priori, therefore, by means of a transcendental principle" ^{[24, p. 867]}. Moreover, it is possible to investigate how, in the depths of the aesthetic faculty of judgment, an understanding arises of how the self is possible a priori. "In art, the very possibility for a person to be a rational being is born, therefore, reason is born. That is why Kant speaks of aesthetics as a sphere where, oddly enough, the very a priori nature of reason arises, although for philosophy the possibility of this remains mysterious and only assumed" ^{[19, p. 284]}. Mature judgment ability is a projective and understanding connectivity, a connectivity scheme corresponding to a critical threshold of complexity. Based on it, such rich and widely branched aesthetic knowledge speaks about the analytical region in a special way. Explaining why Kant's idea of the immutability of the ability of judgment is erroneous, A.V. Smirnov emphasizes that "the way of linking "what" and "what" into an integral "what-and-what", the way of positing a thing and the way of positing a judgment (both, and not just the second) are variable, and this variability It is the domain of a priori laws that have already been discovered and that have yet to be found and investigated. We will find that pure knowledge is possible not only as universal, and judgment is possible not only as summing up the special under the universal" ^{[53, p. 27]}. Whether aesthetics should be attributed to pure knowledge is a big question, although it is possible as a result of the invention of the transcendental principle of the expediency of nature in the ability to judge. The prudence of the faculty of judgment, which takes lessons from experience, focuses on the search for universal principles underlying it. But for aesthetics, not only the universal is important, but also the concepts of the singular and the special.

In the above–mentioned triad (singular, special, universal), the concept of the special is the most problematic - how can one think of what, for example, the non-obscurity of the special is in the Hegelian interpretation of the concept (in it, the most important thing for aesthetics, as stated in the first part of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (§ 163), the idea of the concept as "free creative activity, which for its realization does not need material outside of it" (translated from German by B. Stolpner), and in modern philosophical research – how it is possible to transform the universal into the special. What is interesting here, first of all, is how the musical interval itself is structured, coinciding with the ability of judgment. In some part of it, it proceeds from the presence of a common (here the nomotetics inherent in it is predestined a priori) and can bring the special under this given common in advance. In its other part – reflecting from the subjective basis of the faculty of judgment – the faculty of judgment presupposes the ascent from the special to the general and bringing under the law, which has yet to be created. The reflective ability of judgment as such opens up a new type of connections – kinship ties and target connections: the ability to "find in the immeasurable variety of things a sufficient kinship of them according to possible empirical laws" ^{[24, p. 825]}, the aesthetic reflective ability makes a judgment about the beautiful and sublime. By expanding the imagination, this ability, due to the expedient nature of its activity, turns out to be epistemologically attuned, capable of giving proof of ’ . Moreover, in the mode of the ability to perform it, the mind applies cognitive abilities in proportion to their characteristics and is able to conclude, based on their moral principles, about the creator of the world and the ultimate goal of creation. The concept of nature as art, the concept of creativity, the discovery of amazing expediency as a special a priori concept – all of them express the meaning of the reflective ability of judgment in relation to the form of things in nature. In modern philosophy, there are not so many studies devoted to the problems of the relationship between reflexivity and aesthetics. In Russian philosophy, the most interesting works on this topic were carried out by V. A. Lefevre, who believed that his model of fundamental reflexive structures allows explaining why artists and architects prefer the "golden section" or why human perfection is achieved under the condition of a certain defect of knowledge, problematic in its interpretation is only the understanding of "creative activity as aggression towards the whole structure: the elimination of some characters, the introduction of new ones, the construction of an opposing and competing family of research positions" ^{[39, p. 414]}. But such an understanding of creativity smacks of sociologism, at best it can work in the social philosophy of art, if one is created.

Reflection itself has many registers. In Kant's view, she extracts concepts without referring to the subject. Reflection for a philosopher is a "state of mind" in which the subjective prerequisites for the formation of concepts are clarified. For aesthetics, the question of how the cognitive world correlates with such a cognitive ability as sensuality, how to grasp this relationship, is of fundamental importance. The aesthetic is inspired by the universalist projects of the relationship of the higher cognitive abilities "to unity, truth and perfection - through reason, judgment and reason. The latter in a transcendental sense produces all kinds of confusion" ^{[23, p. 118]}, or what Kant calls a mocking appearance. It is equally important to reveal how it is possible to judge a priori, being in the field of transcendental reflection, with the help of aesthetic concepts of harmony (and, as Marina Tsvetaeva noted, it is harmony that implies development) and disharmony, agreement and contradiction, the fundamental aesthetic concept of form. In an effort to reveal what lies "behind the lining" of the architectonic structure of the mind, which determines the coordination of cognitive, practical and aesthetic interests of the mind, Ya. I. Svirsky considers it necessary "to place himself in the middle of Kant's thought, to reveal the virtual platform on which the whole system of his thinking rests. And then it turns out that the cornerstone of the Kantian system – the supposed harmony and agreement between the faculties of the mind – is a very shaky foundation. But instead of criticizing the "pre-established harmony" between abilities, isn't it better to look at what the latter explicitly or implicitly testifies to? Here comes to the fore the fact that the term "harmony" camouflages a fundamental discord between abilities – a discord arising from their differences in nature. The abilities of the mind not only do not adjust to each other, referring to the conditions of consent unacceptable for the mind, but they enter into an irreconcilable struggle, defending – each – its own interests" ^{[13, p. 456]}. And if we follow the attitudes of the third "Critique", then we can say that the musical logic that sets them above distinguishes the tone of the faculty of judgment, which "works" differently with the concepts of the special and the general and assumes the stages of transition from reason to reason, indicating as the goal of the latter's actions a certain unity (distributive unity) and its indefinable boundaries are unity, which has as its condition the idea of the form of cognition as a whole, or what the Russian philosopher V. Solovyov would later call integral knowledge. But this transition is difficult to subtly prescribe. It's like in Russian church singing, which F. I. Chaliapin wrote about.: "There are not enough human words to express how the two poles of joy and sadness are connected in Russian church singing, and where the line is between them, and how one passes into the other, is imperceptible" ^{[60, p. 221]}. Kant nevertheless captures some virtuoso structures of the transition from reason to reason, and at the same time the "special" stage is thought of as being several orders of magnitude lower than the "general" stage.  Here they are complemented by the idea of a natural mind (and this is not only the mind of a scientist, but, in fact, the mind of an artist), the phenomenon of which is comprehended with the help of aesthetic concepts of insight, talent, gift, comic. If there is no sign of the necessary mind, "if the question itself is meaningless and requires useless answers, then in addition to shame for the questioner, it sometimes also has the disadvantage that it encourages an unwary listener to ridiculous answers and creates a funny spectacle: one (in the expression of the ancients) milks a goat, the other holds a sieve under it" ^{[25, pp. 97, 99 (A 58)]}.

But is an aesthetic equivalent of philosophical work possible, which strangely transforms the activity of synthesis as the realization of the ability of imagination – this "blind, though necessary, function of the soul; without this function we would not have any cognition at all, although we rarely realize it" ^{[26, p. 171 (104)]}. The synthesis itself indicates a premonition of the unity of the manifold. The idea of the aesthetic equivalent of philosophical work becomes a cross-cutting theme of Kant's transcendentalism. In fact, there is a whole system of aesthetic equivalences through which the artistically perceived being is determined.

How in general can one think of the relationship between aesthetic, artistic and philosophical attitudes? From Kant's point of view, this is a rather tense attitude. The development of the theme of the relationship between the aesthetic, artistic and philosophical has several levels in transcendentalism, demonstrating how the body of thought can aesthetically shine through its transparent robes. The first level of development of this topic of the relationship between the aesthetic, artistic and philosophical is already present in the materials for the Critique of Pure Reason (sketches of 1775-1778), where Kant points out the explicit and implicit relationships between metaphysics and aesthetic attitudes. And although in Opus postumum he presents transcendental philosophy itself not as a rhapsody, that is, not as an aesthetic work, but it still has an indirect relation to aesthetics – through the assumption of a creative act of reason.  In the transcendental field, sensuality and reason conduct each other, but not only the interpretation of the scores of thinking takes place on this performance platform, the conductor can also be the creator of the scores himself, just as Mozart conducted the premiere opera "The Magic Flute". Merleau-Ponty, creating the image of philosophy as a creation, emphasized that in this capacity it cannot be the last truth. But how to fit philosophy as a creation into the architectonics of all human knowledge? Finally, how is it possible to combine the mind as the highest cognitive ability with the creative ability? It is hardly possible to talk about the technique of creative thinking, especially in art with its inscrutable laws and the ineffable depth of spiritual immersion.

Kant gives the imagination, which receives a tuple of rational parameters, and its free regularity (with respect to which aesthetic taste appears as the ability to judge an object and to contemplate the imagination) not only an aesthetic idea of norm, but also a truly metaphysical meaning. A philosopher, he writes, "may despair of finding an explanation for some knowledge of nature and begin to look for a forced solution in the fruitful sphere of imagination. But this is metaphysics..." ^{[35, p. 48]}. The idea of reproductive and productive imagination occupies a special place in transcendental epistemology, in which imagination is understood as the original power of the soul. Y. M. Borodai, in his book devoted to this topic, connects the very introduction of the concept of productive imagination with Kant's desire to take steps to overcome the contemplative interpretation of cognition. But these steps, as they were made in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, turned out to be so radical that Kant himself later in the second edition began to erase certain traces left from these steps, as a result of which, Borodai emphasizes, "he 'softened' his teaching about the productive capacity of the imagination in the spirit of traditional rationalism, bringing to the fore the concept of "transcendental apperception" - the "I", interpreted as "reason" in general, in terms of Cartesian cogito ergo sum. This gave rise to Kant's followers (in particular, Fichte) to attribute self-activity, "self-affectation" to reason and thereby interpret Kant's philosophy in the spirit of consistent idealism. With Fichte, who idealistically "interpreted" Kant's understanding of "self-affectation," the "struggle" begins against the "annoying inconsistency" of the great teacher - "things in themselves" ("Imagination and the theory of knowledge". II, 2).

The result of this overcoming was the understanding of the imagination as an entity affected by the soul and being a prerequisite for transcendental apperception, in which Kant sees the source of all connection. Another kind of affiction is related to the aesthetic, which "comes from the feeling and from the state of our subject, namely, how we are affected by the object. For through the beauty of knowledge I seek knowledge not of the object, but of the subject" ^{[21, p. 216]}. Imagination has an external feeling as its condition and can give a contemplative image of an object even without its presence – in other words, it is a broad view, which, if analogies are applied, involves "a bold imagination associated with the ability to position with the help of feelings and sensations to its object, which it keeps in a foggy distance all the time" ^{[35, p. 38-39]}. By virtue of its ability to connect the diverse both in sensory contemplation and in knowledge, imagination is able to produce a synthesis in the form of flashes of spontaneity according to the laws (metaphysically understood as a rational ability) – a synthesis of arbitrariness and freedom, and already through it the key aesthetic concept of art is defined as creation through freedom.

A new aspect of the consideration of the representation of the imagination is associated with its interpretation as an education that allows us to approach the concepts of reason or intellectual ideas, but the same representation is also associated with the understanding of an aesthetic idea, even "spirit in aesthetic meaning", which is thought by Kant as an animating principle in the soul. It is noteworthy that in the idea of beauty he sees the representation of the ability of imagination, which allows it to aesthetically infinitely scale the concept of reason, which is such knowledge, in the structure of which empirical synthesis is only a part of it; this concept encourages "many thoughts, and, however, no definite thought, i.e. no concept, can be adequate to it and, consequently, no language is able to fully reach it and make it understandable" ^{[24, p. 425]}. The poet strives to give sensuous outlines even to transcendental beginnings or to that which transcends experience. It is precisely in poetry that the propensity for aesthetic ideas manifests itself to the greatest extent, which allows us to characterize this propensity as a talent of imagination. Aesthetic ideas play an important role in the formation of works of reason, because they serve as a substitute for a logical image, introducing it into the vast field of affinity of phenomena, allowing you to invent a lot of unspeakable. Genius, in fact, is the highest culture, consisting in the ability of imagination and reason, which here uses its rich raw material also indirectly and for cognition, on the one hand, "to find ideas for a given concept and, on the other hand, to select an expression for these ideas, through which the subjective disposition of the soul caused by this as a concomitant the concept can be communicated to others. Such a special talent is, in fact, what is called spirit; after all, in order to express the ineffable in a state of mind with this or that representation and give it universal communication – it doesn't matter whether it is expressed in language, in painting or in plastic – one needs the ability to grasp the fleeting play of the imagination and unite it is in the concept ... that can be communicated to [others] without the enforcement of rules" ^{[24, pp. 433, 435]}. Therefore, genius combines the talent of imagination, talent for art and the highest mediative culture. This peculiar talent to express the ineffable and present it to others is what Kant calls the spirit, the spirit of creation, and the bearer of this spirit – genius is "the originality of the natural talent of the subject serving as a model in the free application of his cognitive abilities," and the free but harmonious play between which, as P. Geiger emphasizes, "is the central concept in the explanation The kant of the experience of beauty" ^{[24, p. 162]}. Generally speaking, the concept of application is extremely important for the theory of human abilities itself. After all, "everything that has a basis in the nature of our abilities should be expedient and consistent with their correct use, if only we can protect ourselves from some misunderstandings and find the right direction for them" ^{[26, p. 823 (In 670-671)]}. The work of genius itself, Kant continues here, is an example "for the succession on the part of another genius, in which it awakens a sense of its own originality and the desire to be free from the compulsion of rules in art in such a way that art itself, thanks to this, receives a new rule and thereby talent manifests itself as exemplary" ^{[24, p. 435, 437]}. Aesthetics, in fact, keeps thinking in the spiritual matrix of the work of genius, seeks to reflect the bursts of unique manifestations of genius, the historical memory of talent, metaphysically portray its model, "to unite various types of fine art with one principle" (Kant). These ideas are also developing in a new aesthetic: for A. Schoenberg, for example, a genius can reflect on himself, although in fact through him nature itself finds a language of self-expression, otherwise absent.  According to Kant, genius as a natural talent "shines like an instantaneous phenomenon that appears at intervals and disappears again, not with the light that can be lit at any time and maintained while it is needed, but as a flickering spark that a happy moment of inspiration knocks out of the productive imagination" ^{[34, p. 385]}. Aesthetics will never cease to feel the approach of genius, its spiritual impulse, in whatever cultural guise they may appear. Therefore, aesthetics can be considered as a theoretical representation of the perfect embodiment of the artist as a model. In this sense, it is the comprehension of artistic reality as belonging to the spiritual destiny of a person with his boundless imagination, talent of reason and culture of reason. If in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment Kant correlates the concept of genius only with a talent for art, and not for science, then later he changes his point of view and poses the problem of genius in science – this, according to him, culture, ennobling humanity. "The talent for invention," he writes in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, "is called a genius. However, this is always called only the master, i.e. the one who knows how to do something, and not the one who only has a lot of information and knowledge; but also not just the master who simply imitates, but the one who creates his creation initially, and finally, if his product it can be considered exemplary" ^{[34, p. 254]}. In science, genius manifests itself in insight and originality, wit, in the grace of reason, "contrasting with the rigor of judgment", in the "generosity of the way of thinking", later Pushkin will supplement these characteristics with a line about the paradoxical thinking of a genius: "And a genius, a friend of paradoxes." Although in culture there is the creativity of those whom Kant refers to the phenomenon of a comprehensive genius who shows his ability in many areas (Leonardo da Vinci). The aesthetic ability of judgment itself makes it possible to create harmony between the imagination and the higher cognitive abilities of the soul, to reveal the divine talent to be human. And it's not just about the culture of reason, Kant builds a whole ensemble of cultural formations – the culture of man, the pinnacle of culture, the culture of spiritual forces, the general and higher culture, connected with an unassuming nature, the culture of skill, the culture of moral feeling, the culture of education, the culture of taste, culture as pleasure, with which aesthetics and art correlate; they are they have a paradoxical status in culture as such, and today the place of art is being fruitfully explored even in the cultural history of ideas [see: 52]. Culture in the philosopher's view is a synthesis of the highest abilities of consciousness, which is carried out by the ultimate semantic structures describing the purpose of the human in humanity.

In order to realize the ideal of perfection, it is necessary to discover new images of ideological originality: to create a gestalt with the help of deep structures of imagination, giving an "aesthetic idea of norm" and revealing a measure of judgment about a person and an aesthetic assessment of him as a representative of the human species, and not just as a carrier of specific unique personality traits, and the idea of reason to determine the purpose of humanity. Since such a gestalt is present only in the ideal world of the one who makes the judgment, then this world with all its symmetries can be aesthetically embodied in its most characteristic features.

Conclusion.

The aesthetic movement of thought takes it back to where it began, it is not the source of logical art, it is, as we read in the academic edition of Kant's works, philosophizing as an "omnipotent development of the human mind" (AA XX, S. 340). At the same time, this is the dimension of the point of the "initial impression", as well as a whole cloud of other initial points, to which, as Kant believes, metaphysics has to return countless times in order to verify its path to perfection, to find the right path of science. Here it is necessary to keep in mind the abilities of the purest mind, for example, not only to find your subject for thinking, but also to create a complete sketch project of metaphysics. These actions of metaphysics alone speak of their aesthetic moments. In the article, we presented a strategy of aesthetic actions that can be implemented in metaphysics. Metaphysics itself is the core of such a matrix form of cultural self-consciousness as philosophy. In its structure, the aesthetic disposition is able to reveal itself only under the condition of the existence of arbitrariness, the mastery of which, being proportionate to the laws of freedom, generates the phenomenon of art. Aesthetics in its strongest version means that it manifests itself primarily in its normative structures, but here the normative becomes singular, something mysterious arises, elusive in the world of the soul, expressing the boundaries of the basic idea of the work of art. It is possible to build an aesthetics of perception, vision of the world with the eye, visualization of action, but how to build an aesthetics that departs from the naturalism of perception, starting from the metaphysical understanding that it is not the eye that sees itself and the mirror, but sees, as Descartes said, answering Gassendi, "the mind, which alone knows both the mirror and the eye and myself." Therefore, the challenge to all modern theoretical claims is how to justify aesthetics based on a singularly knowledgeable mind.

Kant builds aesthetics based on the metaphysical construction of a work of art, the very scene of consciousness. It is important for him to reveal how art thinks in truth, how thought itself is immersed during creation and pure contemplation of the beautiful and sublime. In the final comment, I want to emphasize that the great project of metaphysics, the subject and purpose of which is the supersensible, involves the study of the systematically interconnected supersensible in the world (the beauty of the spiritual nature of the soul) and the supersensible as such, expressed by the idea of God, freedom and immortality, having their own aesthetic meanings. The transmitted aesthetic meaning is incorporated into the text of metaphysics, becomes their common, jointly constituted meaning.

Aesthetic thinking adheres to its metaphysical status, which allows it to escape from the "ridiculous despotism of schools" (Kant), to create a kind of metaphor language, to think in the category of the culture of reason, to carry out substitution, even personification of the concept. In this movement, aesthetics has formed a reflexive consensus for the dissemination of its categories, aesthetic categories point to the metaphor of a place, starting from which one can be at the threshold of philosophy, even practice aesthetics as philosophy as such, bringing the figures of the indirect, symbolic to it. Although aesthetics distances itself from metaphysics, this does not mean that it ceases to participate in metaphysical activity, if we take it from the side of the completion of the entire culture of the human mind, to participate in the transcendental knowledge of the world, in the a priori knowledge of what is and what should be, contributing to the metaphysics of thinking nature being adjusted to the comprehension of the ideal in categories of beauty. It approaches metaphysics, since the latter turns into a demanding criticism that "ensures universal order, harmony and even well–being in the world of science" ^{[26, p. 1065 (In 879)]}, adhering to the main goal - universal bliss. As we can see, the characteristic of the inner value of metaphysics includes the aesthetic concept of harmony (consent), correlates with the conditions of aesthetic benevolence, with artistic descriptions of "the high bliss of living by one's own work" (A. N. Ostrovsky). And although in Opus postumum he presents transcendental philosophy itself far from being an aesthetic work, but it still has an indirect relation to aesthetics – through the assumption of a creative act of the mind, its depiction by some inner artist of consciousness. Metaphysical discourse strives to know its aesthetic field, to define its line, to finish the sketch of an aesthetic page, to check the correctness of its edge. Aesthetic ability is a play of meanings, differences, and imagination that asks the question of what is the same, but not the same. And entering into this game on the field of aesthetic evidence of the oppositely conceivable (for example, the aporetics of harmony ("harmony of bliss in the world" (AA XX, S. 336)) and dissonance, insensitive sensuous, impossible possibility), are we not striving to rewrite the very project of philosophy, the translation of thought, the transition from the school concept of philosophy to the world concept of it. The latter is closely connected with the world concept of art that shines through in Kant's metaphysics and cannot be understood in abstraction from it. Rather, it can be represented as an analogue of the first. The idea of the world concept of art corresponds to the perfect ideal of humanity in the person of man, his destiny, and it seems to project a certain metaphysics, which refers to the observation of that world, which becomes the origin of the coordinates of the primordial, which does not coincide with any outlines of our life, but is an invisible spiritual principle, the starting point of individuation, identity the created work and the recreated "I":  X-L. Borges saw in all works of art the work of a timeless and anonymous author. That is, we are talking about metaphysics not after physics, but after artificial, after art, in such metaphysics, the world concept seems to embody the ideal of the artist, understood as a model that only a genius can become. This is neither a scheme of encroachment of aesthetic discourse on philosophical, nor a metaphorology of philosophy, aesthetics seeks to see its primary concept in the world concept of art. The philosopher intends to resolve the paradox of the inexplicable beginning of the world concept, the artist seeks to create a work of this beginning in its movement, to give rise to artistic light, birth from what has already been created, to recreate the primordial truth, to comprehend how the non–obvious evidence of this beginning was created - but in a specific form, because, as it is said, "aisth-ton can always not to introduce himself, may hide, be absent." For aesthetics, it is important to give an eidetic analysis of one world concept (philosophy) through another world concept – art as the spiritual equivalent of what is most real, to feel the breath, the projective and understanding connectedness of these two worlds. Philosophy itself is aesthetically read as the original harmony that tunes the world orchestra, aesthetic and metaphysical coincide in the register of cognition as the creation of forms, it is not by chance that the poet once said that Dante's creativity can be understood only with the help of quantum theory. The world concept of art, the concept of artistic equivalents of philosophical acts that characterize the work of great artists, determine the noematic side of artistic experience, shows to what extent the prerequisites of a work of art coincide with a priori knowledge of how to deepen the spirituality of feelings, feelings of ideas, how to create an "astronomy passion?e" ("astronomy of feelings" (French)). These concepts tell us how metaphysics works both with the first connections of a priori possible feelings, with the syntheses of conscious life. "Therefore, it is possible to connect only in a work of art: only in it the worlds, while remaining incommensurable, are communicable" ^{[42, p. 750]}. In Russian philosophy (V. Solovyov et al.), the world concept of art appears in fact in the image of theurgy as a super-art. If the image of the philosopher as a model is conceived by Kant as an image of the legislator of the human mind, then the image of genius is as a talent that gives art a rule, as a model of legislative discourse containing a transcendental law of specification. Hence arises the critical necessity of aesthetics itself, the aesthetics of the reflective faculty of judgment.