The future of Russian federalism in the context of relations between Russia and partially recognized and unrecognized states of the post-Soviet space

Bdoyan David ORCID: 0000-0002-2810-3808 PhD in History Associate Professor, Department of Regional Management and National Policy, Moscow State Institute of International Relations 76 Prospekt Vernadskogo str., Moscow, 119454, Russia d.g.bdoyan@gmail.com

Suslin Sergei Student, Department of Political Theory, Moscow State Institute of International Relations 76 Prospekt Vernadskogo str., Moscow, 119454, Russia obiliator@gmail.com

Introduction      

Currently, the world is going through a series of political upheavals that are significantly changing the current system of international relations. In conditions of deep political and civilizational contradictions, international institutions and international law cease to function. New centers of power and forms of interaction between States are emerging. A new world order is gradually taking shape. In these conditions, small States with limited resources become especially vulnerable in the post-Soviet space. And unrecognized or partially recognized States are at an even greater disadvantage. In conditions of global instability, they are increasingly seeking not just to form alliances with major actors, but also to reunite with them, thereby trying to protect themselves from external threats.

       The reunification of Russia with Crimea in 2014, as well as the recognition of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and their entry into the Russian Federation together with the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions in 2022 significantly changed both the political map of the world and the perception of Russia in the world. At the same time, the awareness of the population and the leadership of the country of Russia's place in the world and its responsibility for the fate of the post-Soviet space is undergoing a serious change. The increase in the number of subjects of the Russian Federation also leads to changes in federal, regional governance and national policy. In this regard, the purpose of this work is to consider the future of Russian federalism from the point of view of the possible entry of new post-Soviet territories into the country.

       Currently, the Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia are partially recognized in the post–Soviet space, and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic are unrecognized. All these republics have a similar history of gaining independence due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a consequence, the emergence of secession conflicts. At the same time, the processes that take place around these states differ significantly, as do their prospects for joining the Russian Federation. For a deeper analysis and a better understanding, let's look at them separately.

South OssetiaDe facto Georgia ceased to control South Ossetia immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the early 1990s, the Georgian leadership made a number of unsuccessful attempts to abolish the South Ossetian Autonomous Region and establish control over the region ^[1]. The resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 20, 1991 "On the situation in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region and measures to stabilize the situation in the region" stated that "Tskhinval is blocked by illegal armed groups, deprived of electricity and heat. The population of the city and the autonomous region is experiencing an acute shortage of food, basic necessities ..." ^[2]. On September 1, 1991, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia decided to reunite with Russia, and on December 21, 1991, the declaration of independence.

Up until 2008, the situation around the region was relatively calm. However, in August 2008, hostilities began between Georgia and South Ossetia, and Russian armed forces were introduced into the region. On August 26, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia (Nicaragua, Nauru, Syria and Venezuela also recognized the independence of South Ossetia.). The security of the Republic of South Ossetia is guaranteed by the 4th Guards Russian military base. On September 2, 2008, Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia.

For the first time, the issue of South Ossetia's reunification with Russia began to be seriously discussed in early 1992. So, on January 3, 1992, a referendum was held and the question "Do you agree with the decision of the Supreme Council of the Republic of South Ossetia of September 1, 1991 About reunification with Russia?" 99.89% of those who voted responded positively ^[3]. In 2006, the citizens again confirmed their agreement with the course of Tskhinval for full independence from the Georgian administration ^[4]. In 2015, an integration agreement was signed between Russia and South Ossetia, creating a single defense and customs space, unifying the systems of medical insurance and pension formation. And in 2016, the President of South Ossetia Leonid Kharitonovich Tibilov announced the possible holding of a referendum on the entry of the South Ossetian state into Russia in October of the same year. ^[5] However, this referendum was first postponed for one year, and then completely canceled. Despite this, L.H. Tibilov said that the people of South Ossetia want to hold this referendum and sooner or later they will do it anyway.

On March 30, 2022, Alan Tatdaev, Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of South Ossetia, again announced a referendum on the same issue, stating that it would be held in the near future. The President of South Ossetia Anatoly Ilyich Bibilov once again stressed the possibility of uniting South and North Ossetia into a single entity called "Ossetia-Alania", ^[6] which was later supported by the head of North Ossetia Sergey Ivanovich Menyailo ^[7].

On April 8, the initiative group for the referendum was convened. On April 10, the first round of elections for the new president of South Ossetia took place. After winning the second round on May 8, it became Alan Eduardovich Gagloev, who also places great emphasis in his election program on accelerating integration processes with Russia. He said that the referendum can be held only when Moscow fully agrees with this. On May 30, he suspended the draft referendum on the republic's accession to the Russian Federation, citing the need to complete a series of consultation meetings with representatives of Russia on a whole range of issues ^[8]. Commenting on the current situation, the press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Peskov said that the situation was complicated by some incident related to the wording in the preparation of documents ^[9].

The prospects for South Ossetia's entry into the Russian Federation are largely related to Russian-Georgian relations and events in Ukraine. The current leadership of Georgia is pursuing a rather pragmatic policy, refusing to join anti-Russian sanctions, not sending its parliamentarians to Ukraine, refraining from criticizing the leadership of Russia, etc., despite serious pressure from Kiev and Western countries. At the same time, the trade turnover between the two countries and the number of Russian tourists in Georgia are growing every year.  However, in case of successful completion of a special military operation in Ukraine and the emergence of a real threat of Georgia joining NATO and the EU, such a scenario should not be ruled out. Being de facto part of Russia and receiving subsidies from it, South Ossetia is already ready for full and rapid integration with the Russian Federation.

Thus, given the warming of Russian-Georgian relations and the need to concentrate resources on the Ukrainian direction, it is safe to assume that in the near future the most likely scenario is the deep integration of South Ossetia with Russia without reunification. A similar opinion is shared by Sergey Miroslavovich Markedonov, a leading employee of the MGIMO Institute of International Studies. In his article for Forbes magazine, he stated that formally the annexation of the Republic of South Ossetia would cause serious problems in relations with Georgia, without de facto changing the position of the partially recognized republic, taking into account the degree of its involvement in the Russian political space ^[10].

At the same time, according to Article 10 of the current Constitution of South Ossetia of 2001, it is possible to build union supranational relations with other countries and transfer part of the administrative powers of the Republic to potential supranational union bodies ^[11]. In this regard, the creation of a union State will help legally preserve the independence of South Ossetia, eliminate some administrative barriers and avoid additional international tension.

AbkhaziaAs in the case of South Ossetia, tensions between the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and Georgia began to increase in the late 80s. It should be noted that by the early nineties, Abkhazians made up no more than 17 percent of the total population of the autonomy, since during the Soviet period there was a tendency to gradually reduce the Abkhaz and increase the share of Georgian population ^[12].

In addition, the Abkhaz language was excluded from the school curriculum. In response to this, protests of the Abkhaz population broke out in 1957, 1967 and 1978, demanding Abkhazia's secession from the Georgian SSR.

On February 21, 1992, Georgia announced the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978, which was perceived by the Abkhaz leadership as the abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia. The consequence of this was the decision of the Abkhaz leadership to restore the validity of the Abkhazian Constitution of 1925, according to which the Republic of Abkhazia is an independent and sovereign state. This decision was not accepted by the world community, and even more so by Georgia, after which a full-scale war broke out between Georgia and Abkhazia on August 14, 1992. The conflict was resolved only in 1994 with the mediation of the Russian Federation, but in August 2008 the situation escalated again. And on August 26, 2008, Russia recognized the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The leadership of Abkhazia at the official level has never made statements about the desire to join the Russian Federation. At the same time, the republic is almost completely dependent on the Russian Federation both financially and economically, and militarily and politically. For example, for the period from 2010 to 2019. The Russian Federation has transferred approximately 30 billion rubles to Abkhazia, Russian funds account for approximately 60 percent of the Republic's budget, and in 2022 financial assistance to the Russian Federation amounted to 5.7 billion rubles. In 2023, according to the Minister of Finance of Abkhazia Vladimir Delba, Russia will provide Abkhazia with 5.1 billion rubles. 

In 2022, the speaker of the Abkhaz parliament, Valery Kvarchia, commenting on the possible holding of a referendum on South Ossetia's accession to the Russian Federation, said that the decision of the South Ossetian leadership and people is their sovereign right, and there is no question of Abkhazia's entry, since, according to the constitution, Abkhazia is an independent state. "Russia is our strategic partner.... But we have no intentions of joining the Russian Federation in the republic." ^[13].He also stressed the impossibility of launching this process due to the impossibility of changing the constitution of Abkhazia. A similar statement was made by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Abkhazia Sergey Shamba.

Despite the fact that there is no question of reunification with Russia on the agenda of the leadership of Abkhazia, both the Abkhaz and Russian public periodically have a question about the expediency of preserving the independence of the republic in the tense situation around unrecognized and partially recognized states in the post-Soviet space. In addition, most residents of Abkhazia have Russian citizenship, in accordance with the dual citizenship agreement, and in 2020 a "Program for the formation of a common social and economic space between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia based on the harmonization of legislation of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Russian Federation" was adopted.

As in the case of South Ossetia, the prospects for further integration of Abkhazia with Russia are largely related to the results of a special military operation in Ukraine and in the near future, most likely, will wear the form of a union state. Thus, in August 2022, the President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, announced the readiness of the republic to join the expanded version of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, which may arise after the successful completion of a special military operation. "We would be happy to support this idea. This corresponds to our national interests" ^[14]. Thus, on the one hand, the independence of Abkhazia will be preserved de jure, which will satisfy the demands of the Abkhazian political elite and a significant part of the population, and on the other, Abkhazia will be completely protected from military and political threats and will receive some guarantees of financial support for solving socio-economic issues.

TransnistriaThe Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) declared its independence on September 2, 1990 following a referendum.

The referendum itself was the result of the population's discontent with Moldova's policy of infringing on the rights of national minorities. So, in the summer of 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR approved the Moldovan language as the only state language, and in June 1990, the Moldovan Parliament declared the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) illegal, and thus Chisinau withdrew from its composition. In fact, he abandoned the common state with Transnistria – the MSSR was formed in 1940 by unification (according to the directive of the Soviet government) Bessarabia and districts on the left bank of the Dniester, which at that time were part of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) with its capital in Tiraspol. 

Ultimately, the desire of the Moldovan leadership to take control of Transnistria led to an armed conflict, which was frozen thanks to the Russian military presence. Currently, an Operational Group of Russian troops in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (OGRV PRRM) is stationed in Tiraspol, in the form of two separate motorized rifle battalions that perform peacekeeping tasks, alternately replacing each other.

In 2006, a referendum was held, according to the results of which the population of Pridnestrovie once again demonstrated its desire for independence from Moldova and for subsequent free accession to the Russian Federation ^[15]. Despite the fact that the accession project has not yet been implemented, it is impossible to judge the change in the goals of Pridnestrovie.  The republic's officials have repeatedly spoken about the key importance of joining Russia in the future, the flag of the Russian Federation is used in Pridnestrovie on an equal basis with the state language, Russian also has the status of the state language.

Pridnestrovie, unlike partially recognized Abkhazia and Ossetia, is an unrecognized state (The independence of Pridnestrovie was recognized by partially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.) The prospects for entry, in addition to the results of a special military operation, also depend on the political decisions of the Moldovan leadership. If Moldova, under the leadership of Mai Sandu, continues to pursue an anti-Russian policy and strive for integration with Romania, most likely, the issue of Transnistria becoming part of Russia will become more relevant. The possible unification of Romania and Moldova, according to Dmitry Soin, a deputy of the fifth convocation of the Parliament of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, will force Russia to recognize and agree to annex the PMR as soon as possible ^[16]. However, at present, the internal political field of Moldova is unstable, that is, the success of the political party "Shor", which leads street protests against the policy of the country's leadership, is not excluded.

At the same time, in case of successful liberation of Odessa and Mykolaiv regions, Transnistria will have additional geopolitical and military-strategic importance. That is, the PMR will be able to successfully join Russia only if a land corridor is created through which Russian troops can get quick and open access to the territory of the republic. That is why this process directly depends on Russia's success during a special military operation.

In the conditions of military-political tension and the constant threat of open armed clashes, the desire of the leadership and population of Pridnestrovie to join Russia is beyond doubt. Moreover, back in 2006, more than 95 percent of the population voted for it ^[15]. And the Administration of Pridnestrovie has long begun the process of bringing its legislative framework in line with Russian legislation.  Moreover, Transnistria has close economic ties with Russia and receives substantial financial assistance from it. For example, in 2014, the speaker of the Pridnestrovian parliament, Mikhail Burla, said that Russia annually finances the PMR in the amount of $ 1 billion (he included benefits for gas supply here), and the press service of the Pridnestrovian Parliament talks about assistance in the amount of over 1.25 billion rubles and 533 thousand euros in the period from 2008 to 2019. ^{[17]Thus, at present, the main obstacles to the entry of Pridnestrovie into the Russian Federation are the absence of a direct border with Russia and hopes for rationality or a change in the political leadership of Moldova.}

The Nagorno-Karabakh RepublicThe history of Russia's relations with Karabakh is long-standing.

Thus, back in 1805, after the signing of the Treaty of Kyurechkai, Karabakh became a subject of the Russian Empire. Since 1868, this territory belonged to the Elizavetpol province of the Russian Empire. In 1918, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, proclaimed by the Provisional National Council of Muslims of Transcaucasia, declared its rights to the territory of the former Baku and Elizavetpol provinces of the Russian Empire (respectively, its rights to Karabakh). The Armenian population of these regions refused to recognize the Azerbaijani authority over them. On July 22, 1918, the First Congress of Armenians of Karabakh recognized its independence, and a people's government was elected. Azerbaijan's unwillingness to retreat led to the tragedy of March 23-26, 1920, known as the Shusha Massacre. About 30 thousand Armenians were killed, the rest of the population was expelled.

Already in April 1920, the ADR government was overthrown by Soviet forces. In May 1921, the ADR was transformed into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. On July 4, 1921, during a meeting of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), it was decided to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, but the very next day the Kavburo revised the issue in favor of Azerbaijan, based on "the need for national peace between the Muslim and Armenian populations." Thus, Nagorno-Karabakh became an administrative-territorial unit within the AzSSR on the rights of broad autonomy. During the Soviet period, the Armenian SSR repeatedly raised the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, but did not receive Moscow's support.

Like all conflicts in the post-Soviet space, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict escalated in the late Soviet period. In early 1987, the collection of signatures for the annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) to the Armenian SSR began. Already on February 20, 1987, the Council of People's Deputies of the NKAO adopted a decision: "Meeting the wishes of the workers of the NKAO, to ask the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR to show a sense of deep understanding of the aspirations of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and resolve the issue of transferring the NKAO from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR, at the same time to petition the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a positive solution to the issue of transferring the NKAO from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR" ^[18].

In 1988, the Regional Council of Nagorno-Karabakh declared its secession from the Azerbaijan SSR. In turn, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR announced the impossibility of transferring Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Military clashes began, which eventually turned into a protracted conflict. In response to this, the Soviet leadership decided to introduce direct control on the territory of the NKAO. In December 1989, the Armenian SSR and the NKAO announced their unification, but in January 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared these actions unconstitutional.

On December 10, 1991, a referendum on independence was held in Nagorno-Karabakh. Out of 132,328 eligible voters, 108,736 people (82.2%) took part in the vote, 108,615 people (99.89% of the number of voters) voted "for" independence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation became even more complicated. The Independent Republic of Azerbaijan continued to consider Nagorno-Karabakh as its territory, the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were withdrawn from its territory, which caused utter chaos and the beginning of the most violent confrontation from 1991 to 1994.

In May 1994, military defeats forced the leadership of Azerbaijan to accept the offer of the Russian Federation to conclude a truce. On May 5, with the mediation of Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in Bishkek, the Bishkek Protocol on Ceasefire was signed between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Relative peace was in effect until 2020. In September 2020, Azerbaijan, with the help of Turkey, began to conduct large-scale military operations, as a result of which it was able to seize a number of territories, both of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Armenia. On November 9, 2020, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and the Prime Minister of Armenia signed a trilateral cease-fire statement, which also provided for the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh. The trilateral statement also provides for the provision of communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan along the Lachin corridor. However, since December 12, 2022, on the initiative of Azerbaijan, the movement of the only highway connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia has been blocked.

Thus, despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers, outbreaks of violence are still occurring. The probability of resumption of hostilities also remains high. In the autumn of 2022, Vladimir Putin met with the heads of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Sochi to discuss the implementation of all agreements on Karabakh. According to Putin, not everything was agreed upon, but the meeting was useful for resolving the situation as a whole. An important outcome of the meeting is the agreement of the parties to the conflict not to use force or threaten such a prospect ^[19].

In general, the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh also largely depends on the outcome of the special military operation in Ukraine. The more successful the Russian troops are in Ukraine, the more unlikely it will be the resumption of the Karabakh conflict or another attack by Azerbaijan on Armenia. However, the situation here is also complicated by the non-pragmatic policy of the Armenian leadership, which in these difficult conditions is trying to get the support of Western partners in the confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey and at the same time establish good-neighborly relations with them. 

Thus, the inclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) into Russia in the current conditions is not possible. The limiting factors are the strengthening of Turkey's role in Transcaucasia, the deepening of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, the absence of a common border, Russia's desire to concentrate on the Ukrainian direction, etc. At the same time, it should be noted that the NKR population sees in joining Russia a certain salvation from the constant existential threat, and the Armenian leadership does not oppose it, having long ago shifted responsibility for the fate of the NKR population to Russia. In March 2022, the former head of the Askeran region of the NKR, Sasun Barseghyan, called for the organization and holding of a referendum on the Republic's accession to the Russian Federation – "In the hope of avoiding physical destruction, saving what remains of the torn-up Artsakh, I propose ... to organize a nationwide referendum on the accession of Artsakh to the Russian Federation in a short time." ^[20]. If the region joins Russia, the security of the population will be ensured, but it is necessary to understand that such a decision can create a large number of additional difficulties in relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. That is why Russia has never seriously considered this option of resolving the conflict. In this regard, it is necessary to pay attention to the comments of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov on this issue. Back in January 2021, he stated that Russia has no intentions of including Nagorno–Karabakh in its composition - "We have no such thoughts even close. We proceed from the fact that all issues of this region should be resolved between the countries located here, first of all between Armenia and Azerbaijan" ^[21].

Russian historian and public figure Modest Kolerov believes that the question here should rather be not so much about the annexation of Karabakh to Russia, as about the preservation of its protection by Russia – "In Russia itself, the question of the annexation of Karabakh has never really been discussed… Nagorno–Karabakh as a state will not survive without Russia's protection, so the question is not about joining Russia, but about preserving Russia's protection. That's what we have to fight for" ^[22].

ConclusionSumming up, it is safe to assume that the most likely and ready candidates for joining the Russian Federation from the partially recognized and unrecognized republics of the post-Soviet space are South Ossetia and Transnistria.

De facto Abkhazia is also ready for maximum integration with Russia, but here the question rests on the desire of local elites to preserve formal sovereignty. The most unlikely is the inclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic into Russia. In general, the future of Russian federalism is tied to the successful completion of its. Having fulfilled all the set goals and secured new territories, Russia will be ready to accept new subjects into its composition.

The entry of new subjects into the Russian Federation should not entail any major changes in the management system of the remaining subjects. Naturally, Russia's new borders will need to be strengthened, especially given that most of the world community will refuse to accept such geopolitical changes. Most likely, the main changes will be related to the restructuring of state institutions in new subjects, with the transfer of most of the powers to the federal center. This factor, on the one hand, may cause discontent among local elites, who will find it difficult to accept the loss of their former position, however, if integration processes begin, this issue will most likely be resolved in advance.

New potential entities are likely to join the list of subsidized regions, while the amount of funding will be increased in order to successfully complete the integration processes and support the population during this transition period. The aggravation of the national issue is not expected, since the multinational nature of the Russian people and the common history with the population of the state entities in question gives flexibility to potential integration processes, and friction between new potential subjects is extremely unlikely, given their solidarity and cooperation within the framework of the "Union of Unrecognized States".

At the same time, at this stage, the most likely evolutionary scenario is not the inclusion of new subjects into Russia, but unification with them within the framework of the union state. Such a scenario is particularly well suited for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria recognized by Russia in the future. The international community will also be more tolerant of such processes. Plus, having created the basis for an expanded union state, it will be possible to talk about further expansion and acceptance of new members in the person of other post-Soviet states.