Abstract: The article analyzes the psychological basis of fascism. Fascism is interpreted as an ideology not of maximizing power and control, but of absolutization of inequality. The probability of the role of Kant's "categorical imperative" principle in its formation is substantiated. Kant denied the affinity of human consciousness (mind) with the Transcendent. Therefore, the categorical imperative, being the maximalism of self-blind submission to a "duty" arbitrarily set by a person for himself, is a form of self-violence over his mind. Establishing morality for himself, a person inevitably feels his exclusivity, elitism, realizes himself as the creator and owner of morality (and even "God himself"). This attitude is obviously inherent in the fascist personality. At the same time, the lack of reflection and self-criticism leads to self-encapsulation and, consequently, to self-abasement, experiencing oneself as a "Victim". The pseudo-moral experience of being a victim is the hidden core of the fascized personality. The self-pity of the "Victim", without changing its essence, can expand and extend to the collective "I", to "my own". This is how empathy arises, which, spreading to its community: nation, race, and becomes the basis of group egoism. Empathy among adherents of fascism can play a big role, since empathy for "their own" replaces morality as a single moral norm.

Abstract: The subject of the study is the psychological mechanisms that produce a person's character. The classical ideas of character, reflected in its modern definitions and interpretations, are considered. The concepts of "intention" and "attitude" are compared. On this basis, the traditional understanding of character as an expression of the system of human relations to people, objects, etc. is transformed into considering it as an intentional "relief" of the subject. The psychological content of the relationship as a substitute for action (activity) is analyzed. The connection of character with the structure of human activity is substantiated. The idea of the imitation-activity nature of character is put forward. Based on the consideration of the types of intentions and relationships, an attempt is made to develop a basic typology of character. Examples illustrating the imitation-activity nature of character types are given. The advantage of the presented concept of the psychological nature of character is that, unlike existing approaches to character (character as accentuation, social character according to E. Fromm, etc.), it allows you to combine a descriptive approach to character with the possibility of analyzing its internal psychological mechanisms. In addition, since the structure of activity (means, function, etc.) correlates with the fundamental composition of these mechanisms, then our typology of characters is not one of the possible ones, but, as we believe, reflects the basic types of character.