The role of cooperation between Russia and China in the military sphere for strengthening the strategic partnership of the two countries

Li Valerii N. Postgraduate student, Department of theory and history of international relations, Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10/2, room 302 valeriy_li_ir@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Russia and China have created a new model of relations between countries with different socio-economic systems. Since the end of the cold war, Russian-Chinese relations have progressed from “good neighborliness” in the early 1990s and “constructive partnership” in 1994 to “strategic partnership” in 1996. Then, the strategic partnership began to develop dynamically: in 2001, relations between the PRC and the Russian Federation acquired the status of a “comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2012. – “Comprehensive strategic partnership and coordination,” and in 2016 – “comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual trust, mutual support, shared prosperity and lasting friendship.” A new update took place on June 5, 2019, when the two heads of state Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin declared Sino-Russian relations a “comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era,” which is intended to emphasize the consistent strengthening of Sino-Russian relations, their resilience to external shocks and the willingness of both sides to cooperate to protect against challenges. and threats to the international environment. In practice, this level of political interaction is reflected in the fact that both Powers continue to adhere to the principles of government, international law, the unacceptability of sanctions pressure and interference in the internal affairs of other states, and the inclusiveness of international security. These positions were outlined in the Joint Statement of the Heads of State on February 4, 2022. All these issues became important and sensitive for the whole world in 2022, and today there is a complete consensus between Russia and China on them, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for Washington to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow.

This high modality of Russian-Chinese cooperation is also evident in the military sphere. However, assessing the strategic partnership in Sino-Russian relations after the end of the Cold War seems to be quite an urgent and difficult task at the same time. Since the 2000s, the question of what forms cooperation between two such distinctive countries as China and Russia will take has been widely discussed ^[1]. Numerous contrasting terms have been used to describe these bilateral relations. Sino-Russian relations are called “partnership“ ^[2], limited partnership ^[3], ”strategic partnership“ ^[4] or ”limited defense strategic partnership" ^[5]. In the scientific literature, the term axis is often found: “axis of convenience” ^[6], “axis of necessity” ^[7] or “axis of uncertainty" ^[8]. The term “alliance" is also often used in academic discussions about Sino-Russian relations. Some scientists in their works have directly raised such questions as “is there a Sino-Russian alliance?”9] and “are Sino-Russian relations an alliance?” ^[10].

In addition, many studies have been conducted on various aspects of strategic cooperation between China and Russia ^[11]. At the same time, there is no comprehensive assessment of the strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and China in the military sphere, which would demonstrate the level of military cooperation between China and Russia and its progress over time.

In this context, the purpose of this article is to identify the degree of maturity and development trajectory of strategic cooperation between China and Russia in the military sphere. To achieve this goal, the author will rely on a relativistic approach to interstate cooperation in the military sphere. According to this approach, interstate relations in the military sphere can be divided into three degrees of maturity: low, medium and high. Each degree of maturity corresponds to certain indicators of strategic partnership.

A relativistic approach to the analysis of military cooperation in international relations

G. Snyder emphasizes that the discussion of strategic partnership between states should not be limited to formal alliances established on the basis of international treaties ^[12]. The alliance only adds formality and precision to the existing interaction ^[13]. Strategic partnership is not necessarily fixed by formal agreements, but is determined by various behavioral actions ^[14]. Focusing only on official allied treaties can be wrong. At the same time, over time, the greater institutionalization of associations affects their reliability, credibility in containing challenges, and effectiveness in potential military conflicts ^[15]. An official union is a more developed form of strategic partnership that strengthens previously existing forms of interaction through the introduction of legal and moral obligations and reciprocity ^[16]. Russia and China have not signed a bilateral treaty formally consolidating their military alliance, but their military cooperation is actively developing. Therefore, the strategic partnership between Russia and China should be viewed from the perspective of a relativistic approach to force in international relations. In accordance with this approach, the author will analyze the indicators of military cooperation between the two countries to assess the degree of maturity of their strategic partnership.

Australian scientist A. Korolev identifies three degrees of maturity of strategic partnership in the military sphere: low, medium and high ^[17]. Two indicators are characteristic of a low level of military cooperation: confidence-building measures and defense consultation mechanisms. The average level of cooperation is characterized by military-technical cooperation and regular joint military exercises. The high level of maturity of military relations is determined by the presence of joint command and control, the joint deployment of troops or the use of military facilities of a partner, as well as a common defense policy. The degree of maturity of the strategic partnership in the military sphere increases with the convergence of the national interests of the two countries.

Confidence-building measures are an initial indicator for bilateral military cooperation, as they aim to overcome distrust or resolve contentious issues such as border disputes. The mechanisms of consultations between the defense departments help to strengthen mutual understanding and increase the predictability of the partner's defense policy, which is especially important when joint actions are needed.

The beginning of a moderate stage of strategic cooperation is military-technical cooperation (MTC), which increases the interdependence and compatibility of tactics and military technologies. This can be a crucial factor for the Allies during the war, when joint supplies of equipment and logistical support become key to the effectiveness of partnerships. It is important for the military-technical cooperation to move from providing technical training and assistance in the procurement of weapons to military technology transfer and long-term projects for the joint design and production of weapons and their components. The second sign of the average maturity of a strategic partnership in the military sphere is regular joint military exercises, which demonstrate a high level of compatibility and coordination, as well as ensure the development of joint methods.

The advanced stage of military cooperation is assessed according to three criteria: joint military command, joint deployment of troops or joint use of military facilities, and a common defense policy. The Joint Military Command creates an organizational framework for the implementation of joint military tasks by the combined forces. In such circumstances, the armed forces of each country, while remaining under national control, become available for participation in joint operations and are placed under the command of either one of the parties or a joint command structure.

The joint deployment of troops and the use of military bases address sensitive issues of territorial sovereignty. The presence of foreign military bases allows the country to demonstrate its power and influence the political processes in the host country. The joint use of bases or other military infrastructure occurs when the deployment of a large contingent is accompanied by a significant amount of military equipment.

The highest form of military cooperation is a common defense policy at the operational and strategic levels. This requires the Allies to commit to joint implementation of the most complex military tasks, pooling resources for the purchase of military equipment and commitments to supply combat units for jointly planned missions. This level of cooperation also implies synchronization and coordination of actions in the field of national security of all parties. This cooperation may vary in scope and content, but it always requires significant investments in joint actions and indicates a deep level of military cooperation.

Confidence-building measures and consultation mechanisms in military cooperation between Russia and China

Russia and China have been taking confidence-building measures since the 1990s to resolve important issues in their bilateral relations, such as the settlement of the border dispute and the reduction of military contingents along the 4,300-kilometer border. These sensitive issues needed to be resolved in order for the relationship to progress. In December 1992, the heads of the two countries, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on mutual reduction of armed forces and confidence-building in the military field in the border area, aimed at creating a "common border of trust." In July 1994, they signed the "Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities," which aimed to create a good-neighborly atmosphere on the border. This agreement provided for the regular exchange of information on the movements and activities of the border army units.

On November 10, 1997, at the Beijing summit, Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin signed a new border agreement, which defined the demarcation of the eastern section of the Sino-Russian border, leaving three islands on the border rivers for future negotiations. This diplomatic breakthrough showed that the issue was resolved along almost the entire Sino-Russian border and became a turning point for the adoption of higher confidence-building measures aimed at demilitarization of the border and information exchange ^[18]. In December 1999, agreements were reached on the complete withdrawal of army units 100 km from the border, creating an extensive demilitarized zone. The final settlement of border issues took place in 2004, when the "Agreement on the eastern section of the Sino-Russian border" was signed, which resolved the problem of the islands of Bolshoy Ussuriysky and Bolshoy Ostrov, which put an end to territorial disputes between Russia and China.

After the border issues were resolved, the number and frequency of confidence-building measures in Sino-Russian relations decreased markedly, but at the same time, the measures themselves began to cover a wider range of issues and developed into regular consultations. These consultations have developed into a multi—level contact mechanism that ensures the regular exchange of information between key government departments and organizations, from senior officials to ministries of defense and their units, including regional military districts, border garrisons and military educational institutions.

The first mechanisms of regular consultations were the meetings of the Russian and Chinese defense ministers, which began in 1993, and the annual strategic consultations between the chiefs of General Staff, which began in 1997. These meetings are held annually alternately in Moscow and Beijing, covering a wide range of issues from strategic guidelines and military strategies to military-technical cooperation. They contributed to a stable exchange of information and the achievement of a common understanding of foreign policy guidelines. However, their relatively broad agenda and similar practices of consultations with other countries do not reflect real high-level cooperation.

A new stage of military consultations began in the early 2000s with the creation of more focused mechanisms that China and Russia do not have with most other countries. An important step was the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, which significantly expanded and institutionalized cooperation in the field of military consultations. The SCO has created many platforms for regular interaction between defense ministers and other military officials, forming a mechanism for inter-military consultations within the SCO structure. This mechanism includes annual SCO summits, meetings of heads of ministries and departments, providing additional opportunities for consultations between the defense ministers of the two countries, as well as traditional bilateral military consultations within the SCO.

Additional progress was achieved in October 2004 with the establishment of Russian-Chinese consultations on national security issues aimed at the immediate interests of both countries ^[19]. This mechanism operates at the level of the heads of the Russian Security Council and representatives of the State Council of China and is unique for China, which supports such consultations only with Russia. According to Tang Jiaxuan, a representative of the State Council of China, this mechanism is the first time that China has created an interstate mechanism for consultations on national security issues with another country ^[20]. Since 2009, this dialogue has been held at least four times a year ^[21].

In 2015, the countries initiated the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, a new platform for regional security consultations aimed at creating effective security mechanisms in Northeast Asia ^[22]. This format is characterized by a high frequency of meetings, which varies depending on the urgency of regional issues and can reach meetings every two months, as was the case after the US decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea in 2016.

Thus, since the early 1990s, China and Russia have been launching new or improving existing consultation mechanisms every 3-4 years. Currently, these mechanisms ensure that 20-30 high-level consultations on security issues are held annually. Most of them end with joint statements or declarations reflecting the two countries' common position on international security issues. All of these mechanisms have been in operation since their inception, and none of them have been discontinued.

The role of military-technical cooperation and military exercises in strengthening the strategic partnership between Russia and China

Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China has been actively developing since 1992, when the Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation was signed and the Russian-Chinese Joint Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation was established. This commission has become an official platform for discussing arms sales to China, contributing to the overall normalization and regulation of bilateral military-technical cooperation. By 1996, the parties had agreed to transfer technology for Su-27 jet fighters, which was later used in the development of the Chinese Shenyang J-11b fighter ^[23]. Although these episodes of military-technical cooperation were significant progress, they remained sporadic.

In 2000, the Russian Federation's Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries was established, with extensive control and oversight functions. This measure increased the volume of arms exports and improved quality control, laying the foundation for more advanced forms of military-technical cooperation. By the mid-2000s, technology transfer and the creation of joint ventures accounted for 30% of the total volume of supplies and sales of Russian military equipment to China ^[23]. An important moment was the signing in 2008 of the "Agreement on Intellectual Property in the field of military-technical cooperation," which reduced Russia's concerns about China copying Russian weapons systems and facilitated the export of more advanced weapons and technologies to China.

Since then, the Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation has reached a high level, as the actual transfer of military technology and long-term cooperation projects have become more frequent. According to Rosoboronexport, the largest military-technical cooperation programs between China and Russia are currently related to aircraft engines and anti-aircraft weapons. Moscow Machine-Building Enterprise named after Chernysheva and the Chinese National Corporation for the Import and Export of Aerotechnologies are implementing a joint program to modernize the Russian RD-33 Klimov turbofan engine for a light fighter aircraft, which has become the main engine for the Chinese multipurpose combat aircraft JF-17 Thunder.

In 2015, significant deals totaling 5 billion US dollars were concluded for the sale of Russian Su-35 multipurpose combat aircraft and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. These contracts opened the way to other deals, including the transfer of helicopters, aircraft engines, and submarine technology, indicating a shift in emphasis in Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation: technology transfer is now more focused than finished military products.

Currently, joint technological projects between Russia and China cover new areas and are gaining strategic importance. Cooperation includes the development of new weapons for land, air and sea bases, space technologies and artificial intelligence ^[24]. Now China acts not only as a recipient of equipment and technologies, but also as a partner, offering Russia electronic components, composite materials, technologies for unmanned aerial vehicles and engines for warships ^[25].

Joint military exercises are an important part of military cooperation. Since 2005, when the first "Peace Mission 2005" exercises took place, they have become a regular practice, held every two years. These exercises, including in the SCO format, include strategies and tactics for countering the threats of "color revolutions" and containing political upheavals in Central Asia. For example, after the "Peace Mission-2009" exercises, China for the first time called for abandoning the "strategy of non-alignment" ^[26].

The "Peaceful Mission" series exercises are mainly focused on ground and air operations, while the "Joint Sea" series exercises are aimed at improving the coordination of actions between the navies of Russia and China. The first Joint Sea exercises took place in 2012 in the Yellow Sea and included the practice of escorting, protection from air and underwater attacks, combating piracy, rescue operations and maritime logistics. These exercises are held annually, although the locations may change. In 2015, the Joint Sea exercises were held in the Mediterranean Sea and became the largest in which the Chinese and Russian naval forces participated together with the military forces of other countries. In 2016, the exercises were held in the South China Sea, a claim area shared by China, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia ^[27]. It is important to note that in 2016, the International Court of Justice rejected China's claims to 80% of this maritime territory, so military exercises with Russia have become an important political statement. The exercise program included maneuvers by surface ships, submarines, aircraft, helicopter carriers, and transport vessels ^[28]. Collectively, the Peace Mission and Joint Sea exercises ensure that one or two large-scale joint military exercises between China and Russia take place each year, involving thousands of military personnel and hundreds of pieces of military equipment, as well as aircraft, helicopters and warships.

Since 2016, China and Russia have launched new joint military exercises called "Aerospace Security-2016", which were held at the Central Scientific Research Military Technical Institute of Russia and became the first exercises of Russia and China on air and missile defense. Aerospace Security 2017 was held in Beijing in December 2017. According to information from the Chinese Ministry of Defense, the main purpose of the exercises was to develop joint combat plans for air defense, operations, and mutual fire support ^[29]. The authorities of both countries emphasize that these exercises are not directed against third countries, but are conducted as a consolidated response of China and Russia to the initiative of the US global air defense system, and are also aimed at strengthening military compatibility between China and Russia.

Elements of an advanced stage of military cooperation in the strategic partnership between Russia and China

One of the main problems associated with assessing the level of development of military cooperation is the lack of information. To solve this problem, a more detailed study of the details of joint military operations is proposed. Although there is currently no data on joint military bases or a common defense policy, students and regular Sino-Russian military exercises indicate that there are certain elements of military compatibility and a unified military command.

According to some estimates, there is a moderate degree of compatibility and interaction between the armed forces of China and Russia ^[30]. For example, during the Peace Mission 2005 exercises, a new command code system was introduced to ensure communication and transmission of orders between pilots of both countries. The "Peace Mission 2009" was characterized by improved coordination of the armed forces using a joint defense model. During the "Peace Mission-2010" additional elements of interaction and joint command were demonstrated, including sharing and identical codes for control and operational intervention ^[31].

During the Joint Sea exercises, all operations are coordinated from a single command center. "Joint Sea-2015" was an important step forward, as it included joint command of warships in foreign waters of the Mediterranean Sea. For this purpose, a joint command post was established in the Russian port of Novorossiysk ^[32]. According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense, one of the goals of these exercises was to improve the ability of the navies of both countries to jointly counter threats to maritime security ^[33].

An important event in the strategic cooperation and integration of command systems was the announcement by President Vladimir Putin in October 2019 that Russia was actively helping China to create an early warning system for a missile attack. This represents a significant improvement in China's defense capability, given that only Russia and the United States have such a system. China and Russia have signed several contracts for the development of software for the new system, which will be based on the Russian Tundra satellites and Voronezh modular ground-based radar stations located in China ^[34]. Thus, this system will provide timely warning about the trajectory of potential missiles, their speed and time to reach the target, which is necessary for effective interception.

Summing up the empirical analysis, it is worth noting that since the end of the cold war, China and Russia have established extensive military cooperation, various aspects of which have developed over the past two decades. A multi-level mechanism for interwar consultations has been established, taking into account international circumstances. Extensive exchanges on military-technical cooperation, including technology transfer, have improved the level of compatibility of the armed forces. Since 2005, regular joint military exercises have contributed to the interoperability of the armed forces of both countries. In general, the military cooperation between Russia and China, which is taking place within the framework of a strategic partnership, has begun to move into an advanced stage of maturity.