Two emperors – two eras. A view from Russia on the personality and politics of Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III: a comparative analysis

Kryazheva-Kartseva Elena Valer'evna PhD in History Head of the Department; Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (FGSN); P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6, Moscow, 117198 kartseva_ev@pfur.ru Linkova Elena Valentinovna Doctor of History Professor; Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117279, Russia, Moscow, Konkovo district, Ostrovityanova str., 33, sq. 84 linkova_ev@pfur.ru

Simonova Mariya Aleksandrovna Director of the Educational and Scientific Institute of Comparative Educational Policy; Institute of Educational and Scientific Comparative Educational Policy; P. Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Miklukho-Maklaya str., 6, Moscow, 117198 simonova-ma@rudn.ru

Two historical figures of France, two emperors – Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III – are two epochs whose assessments sometimes differ dramatically. Comparisons of the rule of an uncle and a nephew were undertaken both in France, and similar comparative practices began during the lifetime of Napoleon III, as well as in the public opinion of other European states. And one of the countries where there was a special interest in the personality and politics of the two French figures was Russia. This interest is understandable: the name of Napoleon Bonaparte was associated with one of the key events in Russian history – the Patriotic War of 1812, a significant change in Russia's position on the world stage. Napoleon III was associated with the transformation of the system that was established after 1814-1815 and the Crimean War of 1853-1856. It is important to note that there were common features in the perception of both emperors among Russian thinkers and statesmen, but basically we are talking about a certain opposition, the portrayal of Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III as two antipodes both in terms of personality, influence on the situation in Europe, and the results of rule for France itself.

To identify these common and special elements, it is interesting to turn to the views and assessments of Russian public and political figures of the mid-19th century (in particular, conservatives and liberals), whose journalistic works and correspondence reflect an analysis of the personality and activities of Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III.

The main methods of this research can be called comparative, which makes it possible to conduct a comparative analysis of opinions and assessments, to identify characteristic features in the perception of French leaders by Russian public and government figures.

The source base was a set of epistolary documents of personal origin, in particular correspondence and journalism, which are quite representative from the point of view of conducting historical research.

It seems possible to note that the present problem has not been studied in practice before, i.e. no special studies have been undertaken comparing the policies of the French emperors in Russian public thought in the 19th century. However, there is a very impressive body of work devoted to the study of the perception of the personality of Napoleon Bonaparte in Russia ^{[9, 10]} and significantly less of Napoleon III ^[7,8]. In this regard, it is very interesting to conduct a comparative analysis of existing assessments, which helps to understand the reason for the respectful attitude towards Napoleon Bonaparte in Russia and the almost complete oblivion or criticism of his nephew.

So, Napoleon Bonaparte is a contradictory personality, a despot and a tyrant on the one hand and a great statesman on the other. In Russian public thought, especially among liberals and conservatives, there is a very contradictory image of the first emperor of the French. From admiration to rejection and criticism, this is the main path of the evolution of assessments of Napoleon Bonaparte's activities in Russia. Napoleon's career, the feat on the Arkolsky Bridge, and his rise to power are the milestones of Bonaparte's life, which were often idealized and admired in Russian society, especially among young people. However, the clash with Russia, the march on Moscow and its looting, and ultimately the defeat of the French army forced a different view of Napoleon's genius, which gave rise to both his criticism and the "black legend," but it never lowered the degree of respect for a worthy opponent. It can be noted that such an attitude towards the French emperor was associated with the realization of the greatness of the victory that Russia had won. These ideas were expressed by many Russian thinkers and statesmen of the first half to the middle of the 19th century: N.M. Karamzin, A.S. Shishkov, S.S. Uvarov, F.I. Tyutchev, I.S. Aksakov, and others.

Analyzing the journalistic legacy of Russian thinkers and statesmen, we can conclude that the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte is a multifaceted and complex image. A.S. Pushkin, somewhat romanticizing the circumstances of Napoleon's life and death on St. Helena Island, called him a "great man", an "exile of the universe" ^{[11, p. 65]}. On the other hand, Fyodor Tyutchev, who dedicated a chapter of his unfinished treatise "Russia and the West" and the poem "Napoleon" to the French emperor, noted that two circumstances were the reason for the defeat of such a great personality. The origins of Napoleon Bonaparte's power are connected with the revolution, so "... he crashed into Russia. For it was Russia that was his true opponent - the struggle between us was a struggle between the legitimate Empire and the crowned Revolution" p^{[12, p. 197]}. Napoleon is the "humble and blind servant" ^{[13, p. 648]} of the Revolution, wrote K.N. Leontiev.

The second reason for Napoleon's collapse was the anti-Christian nature of his power. I.S. Aksakov and F.I. Tyutchev believed that the French emperor was a product of the Enlightenment, a man who believed in unlimited personal freedom, was in thrall to passions and exorbitant ambitions, and rejected Christian morality and values. And it was thanks to its strong spiritual principles that Russia was able to defeat Napoleonic France. Tyutchev's image of Napoleon Bonaparte combines the greatness of a historical figure who influenced the development of Europe with the tragedy of the fate of a man who encroached on Russia, with its Orthodox values and fortitude. As I.S. Aksakov noted, "the power of this proud genius was crushed not by the material power of Russia, but by the moral strength of the Russian people, their humility and faith" ^{[14, p. 525]}. According to conservative thinkers, the role and scale of Napoleon Bonaparte's personality were undeniable, but without a Christian content, any political action is doomed to failure, to defeat both ideologically and militarily.

An interesting idea about the importance of the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte for Russia was expressed by A.S. Pushkin in his poem written on the death of the French emperor, who "to the Russian people... He drew a high lot" ^{[11, p. 65]}. The poet and thinker speaks about the growth of national consciousness that resulted from the Patriotic War of 1812, about the spiritual search that characterized the era after the Napoleonic Wars and which contributed to Russia's self-identification, awareness of its place and role on the world stage.

Finally, Russian thinkers of the mid-19th century noted that for France itself, statesmen of the level of Napoleon Bonaparte are a kind of benefit, they contribute "to society...something new, giving society the opportunity for a short time to distinguish characters that had never been seen before." And although such individuals "exhaust the mental reserves of societies to the ground" 1^{[13, p. 254]}, comparing France at the beginning and middle of the 19th century, K.N. Leontiev concludes that "the situation of France would be different now if it were...she could have produced something great like Napoleon..." ^{[13, p. 331]}.

The attitude towards Napoleon III was completely different. While in France there were various assessments of the activities of the French emperor and the first president: from criticism and ridicule (for example, V. Hugo) to approval, in Russia the name of the French ruler mostly evoked negative connotations. Firstly, it was related to the conditions of coming to power. Secondly, with the Eastern question, in which, precisely with the advent of Napoleon III, obvious Russian-French contradictions emerged (on Holy Sites, on the influence on the Ottoman government, on the protection of Christian peoples by Ports, etc.). Thirdly, with the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which became a kind of result of these contradictions, and the revanchist sentiments of the French and their desire to review the results of 1814-1815, breaking the system that was established by the Congress of Vienna.

It is known that the future French emperor repeatedly addressed Nicholas I in the 1830s, as evidenced by the correspondence between A.H. Benkendorf and Louis Napoleon. We are talking about the financial and political support that Louis Napoleon counted on when intending to take the French throne. Since then, the future French ruler has been given a rather insulting and derogatory nickname - "Napoleon", hinting at the lack of political charisma, but the presence of exorbitant ambitions, unsupported by the actions that were characteristic of his uncle, Napoleon Bonaparte, and once admired by his contemporaries.

In 1847, before being elected president of the French Republic, Louis Napoleon made several attempts through the chief of the Russian secret police, Count A.F. Orlov, to enlist the tsar's help in carrying out his plans in France. Louis Napoleon asked Count A.F. Orlov to become his lawyer ^{[1, p. 172]} and in the spring of 1847, while in London as an emigrant, he tried to establish contacts with Nicholas I. But all these attempts were unsuccessful. For Nicholas I, who was very concerned about the threat of the spread of revolution in European countries, even Louis Napoleon's outspoken promise to restore order in France and thereby help restore "calm" in Europe in exchange for financial assistance from Russia (1 million francs a year) did not play a decisive role. Louis Napoleon asked for money, and he emphasized that restoring order in France was "a difficult but not impossible undertaking. But there is not enough money to achieve this great goal" ^{[1, p. 173]}. However, the expected help from Nicholas I was never received, the Russian emperor throughout his reign actually denied the French ruler legitimacy.

The foreign policy contradictions between Russia and France, especially on the Eastern issue, have only exacerbated this rejection. In Russian journalism, Napoleon III was often awarded with very derogatory nicknames, for example, P.A. Vyazemsky, repeatedly called the French emperor "Napoleon" ^{[2, p. 846]}. But, most importantly, he pointed out the political shortsightedness of the latter. P.A. Vyazemsky noted that France's military ambitions (this was written even before the Crimean campaign of 1854-1856) could provoke social upheaval in the West, while "the rebellion ... will not penetrate into Russia." The Russian thinker was convinced that "it is not for us to think about the disastrous consequences of the war, but for them, and especially for the French. The Reds are more terrifying to them than to us, and if, out of stupid self-love and envy of us, they arm themselves for the Turks and, by weakening their armed forces, clear the way for Ledru-Rollin, then we can say to Napoleon: tu l'as voulu, George Dandin (you wanted it yourself, Georges Downden)" ^{[2, p. 814]}. In part, P.A. Vyazemsky was right: The Crimean War clearly did not contribute to the stabilization of the situation both inside France and in the international arena as a whole.

Moreover, Russian thinkers and statesmen saw in the actions of the French emperor Napoleon III a clear revanchism and a desire to avenge his famous uncle. And in this regard, P.A. Vyazemsky predicted that the Russian people would once again have to "clear the French throne of the locusts that had settled on it," and in the "insane bitterness that pushes the nephew (the nephew is good, the son of a bitch) against Russia, there is some kind of omen that if not in glory, then in fall, Providence is preparing him for the fate of his uncle" ^{[2, p. 834]}.

In addition, the policy of Napoleon III, according to Russian statesmen, destabilized the situation in the Middle East. The Crimean War and the subsequent Paris Congress did not contribute at all to solving the Ottoman problem. This aspect was especially evident in the late 1860s and early 1870s. According to the observations of the Russian consul in the Balkans, K.N. Leontiev, the local population closely followed the events taking place in Europe, believing that they could affect the Balkan region as well. Thus, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 caused a great stir among the southern Slavs. The substantial mass of the population, which, as K.N. Leontiev wrote, could not derive material benefits from the war, began to harbor hopes that "... the war would become a pan–European one, ... that the end of ... centuries-old slavery was coming, and asked if it was time to prepare for an uprising?" ^{[3, p. 292]} But after a few weeks, when it became obvious that the war would affect only France and Germany, the mood changed, and it became clear "that the hour for the deliverance of some and the fall of others had not yet struck, but that Russia would use this war to cancel, if not all, then at least some of the articles of the Paris Treaty" ^{[3, c. 292]}.

Of course, Russian figures and thinkers were more concerned about the foreign policy of both Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III due to the fact that it directly affected Russia's position in the international arena. However, the changes that took place in France itself thanks to these rulers did not go unnoticed in Russian society. It is known that both Napoleon Bonaparte and his nephew made attempts (and sometimes very successful and large-scale ones) to rebuild the French system of government, education, etc. These changes contributed to the transformation of European institutions of power, social and economic relations, which was reflected in Russia. It is not surprising that Russian conservatives associated the ideology of the Revolution with the name of Napoleon Bonaparte, the pacifier of which they called the French emperor. Unlike his predecessor, Napoleon III could not cope with revolutionary sentiments and tendencies. K.D. Kavelin, a Russian liberal of the mid-19th century, noted that Napoleon III attempted to pursue a policy of "Caesarism", but it was this policy that eventually led to the fall of the French emperor. K.D. Kavelin noted that the power of Napoleon III was established as a result of the fall of constitutional principles. The thinker drew parallels with Russia and argued that fascination with the ideas of constitutionalism is fraught with serious political upheavals and instability. Constitutional regimes are extremely unstable, and their decline leads to the maturation of Caesarism, an even more authoritarian government than a limited monarchy ^{[4, pp. 38-39]}.

K.D. Kavelin believed that Napoleon III often served as an example to follow in the highest political circles of Russia, the system he created aroused the interest and positive assessment of the Russian Emperor Alexander II, known for his modernization of Russia and ruled during the period that went down in the history of the country as the "era of great reforms". K.D. Kavelin noted that "In our time, Ludwig Napoleon was Caesar, whose administrative methods inexplicably find diligent imitators in our higher administrative spheres" ^{[4, p. 1016]}, however, the thinker called such hobbies inappropriate to the needs of Russia, and predicted the fall of Napoleon III himself even before the Franco-Prussian War.

K.P. Pobedonostsev, the chief prosecutor and the largest statesman and thinker of Russia in the second half of the 19th century, also wrote about the collapse of the Second Empire. In particular, he pointed out that Napoleon III, although he took into account the warnings of conservative figures, in fact pursued a policy that led to the strengthening of democratic and revolutionary principles, as well as to centrifugal tendencies in the regions of France, especially in the eastern part. KP Pobedonostsev, in particular, mentioned Le Pleu, who "did not hide his way of thinking in front of him (Napoleon III – auth.). One day, in the presence of Morny, he said to him: "Your Majesty, you are being deceived, your Empire will bend and bend for two reasons: one is universal suffrage, the other is the theory of nationalities. This theory will lead you to this – that Alsace will become a German region. And the universal right to vote will lead you to the fact that the palace in which you are talking to me at this moment will be destroyed" ^{[5, p. 198]}.

So, the personality and rule of Napoleon III, as well as Napoleon Bonaparte, attracted the attention of Russian liberals and conservatives for a number of reasons. First of all, this was due to the international situation and the fact that France was one of the key players in the international arena even during periods of its weakening. It so happened that Russian society has traditionally been interested in foreign policy issues, sometimes even more explicitly than domestic politics. It can be noted that the conservative thinkers of Russia in the middle of the 19th century largely anticipated the international polemic that became relevant for European countries in a later era. For example, as historian A.V. Fenenko rightly notes, "discussions on foreign policy issues" acquired their significance and became a popular phenomenon in French society "only in the last third of the 19th century. after the defeat of the country in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871" ^{[6, p. 184-185]}. There is some similarity in the assessments given by Russian thinkers and politicians to the foreign policy steps of the two French emperors. It is noted that both rulers contributed to the destabilization of the balance of power on the European continent, their actions led to the aggravation of the Eastern issue, to the complication of Russia's international position. However, the similarity in the perception of the two Napoleons ended there.

Comparing the scale of the uncle's and nephew's personalities, Russian thinkers came to the conclusion about the greatness of the former and the insignificance of the latter. Napoleon Bonaparte managed to cope with the revolution, contributed to the rise of France and the growth of the country's authority on the world stage. And, although later, faced with Russia, the French emperor was defeated, but this fact does not detract from his services to the French. Napoleon Bonaparte was perceived as a strong and worthy opponent. Napoleon III clearly did not possess such qualities in the eyes of Russian conservatives and liberals. His domestic policy did not lead to the pacification of revolutionary tendencies, but, on the contrary, strengthened them, while France's participation in the Crimean campaign of 1853-1856 was perceived as revanchism. Perhaps this fact was also related to the fact that for Russia, the entry of Western countries into the war in 1854 was quite unexpected, and its results led to the formation of a sense of "national insult inflicted on Russia by France and Britain" ^{[15, p. 33]}.

Nevertheless, despite this difference in the perception of the French rulers, through the prism of analyzing the role of the personality of Napoleon Bonaparte and Napoleon III, Russian thinkers attempted to identify the specifics and national identity of Russia, to assess its historical path and place on the world stage. Often, in order to determine the essence of Russian statehood and social structure, the features of historical development and spiritual principles, a technique based on the "Russia-West" dichotomy was used in Russian socio–political thought. It is for this reason that Russian thinkers turned to comparing Russia and France, the spiritual foundations of the two peoples, as well as comparing political figures who were the embodiment of their states, cultures and moral traditions.