Bosnia and Herzegovina – shared past, different fates

Kojovic Sara Postgraduate Student; Department of Theory and History of International Relations; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia Assistant; Department of Foreign Languages; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 117198, Russia, Moscow, Miklukho-Maklaya str., 10 k2 sara.kojovic96@gmail.com Other publications by this author

After the Allied victory in World War II, Yugoslavia was formed as a Federation of six Republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Each of the Republics had its own branch of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the ruling elite, as well as contradictions that were resolved at the federal level. The Yugoslav model of government, as well as the "golden mean" between a planned and liberal economy, were relatively successful, and the country experienced a period of strong economic growth and relative political stability until the 1980s under the firm rule of President-for-life Josip Broz Titus. After his death in 1980, the weakened federal government system was unable to cope with the growing economic and political causes. The breakup of Yugoslavia resulted from a series of political unrest and conflicts in the early 1990s. After the death of Josip Broz and the collapse of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia in the 1980s, there was a period of political crisis and escalation of unresolved conflicts, which escalated into interethnic armed conflicts in 1991 and led to the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. Military conflicts were minor in Slovenia in mid-1991, and in Croatia (1991-1995) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) they escalated into civil wars with tens of thousands of deaths. In this article, we will focus on describing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which suffered the most from the breakup of Yugoslavia.

The country's first major national parties won the first elections to the SR of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990. The parliamentary majority consisted of deputies from the Democratic Action Party (Serb. SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (serb. SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (Serb. HDZ). Despite periodic skirmishes, mutual accusations of agitation methods, and fears of forming a political alliance between Bosniaks and Croats against the Serbs, the national parties established an unspoken alliance. Although they differed programmatically and politically, the main reason that connected them and created an idyll of harmony and tolerance was anti-communism, i.e. a common desire to eliminate the former socialist government in the country. The parties divided power along ethnic lines, so that Aliya Izetbegovic, a Muslim, was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Momcilo Krajisnik, a Serb, was elected Chairman of the Assembly, and Jure Pelivan, a Croat, was elected Prime Minister. The power-sharing agreement was in effect during the election race, during the election victory, and during the division of functions that effectively ended it. In Bosnia, the official government began to look for an authentic form of Bosnian identity, which was not to become either Serbian or Croatian. Muslim intellectuals found roots for their people in the common Islamic world, moving them away from their Slavic roots. Muslims, as a nation, have a role to decide the fate of BiH on their own, without the obligation to respect the position of the other two peoples, especially ignoring the position of the Serbs. Few people asked ordinary Muslims about all this, who did not even understand what their representatives in power were doing, Filipovich M notes in his memoirs ^{[1, P. 43]}.

Over time, a certain "idea of Greater Bosnia" developed, which was unknowingly supported by some Serbs who called themselves "cosmopolitans" and guardians of "brotherhood and unity" as the most important achievements of the communist "class" revolution. The project of "independence of Bosnia", which was called "Yugoslavia in a small way" in the organization of the Communists, and at the expense of the Muslim people, at some point became clear to the Serbs, the communists ^{[2, p. 46]}. When the majority understood the background and realized this political game, many refused to participate in the process of creating the idea of Greater Bosnia, but by then it was too late. The process had already gone so far that it was impossible to stop it without consequences. Unlike the majority of Serbs, who realized their mistake in time and whom the regime later dealt with in various scandals, a small number of Serbs continued to follow the path of error.

This situation in BiH was a breeding ground for all three negative nationalisms. Muslim, because he saw a chance to put an end to the process started by the Communists. Croatian and Serbian, because their peoples were discriminated against on various grounds. The essence by which the tri-national country of BiH could be recognized has changed. It is time to settle accounts with the opponents ^{[2, p. 47]}. One ideology, once powerful and at least seemingly effective, has given way to a strong nationalism, euphoric, and sometimes introverted and completely uninterested in the search for a common life in multinational and multi-religious Yugoslavia.

At that time, two Western republics took the initiative to break up Yugoslavia: Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia under the slogan of economic protection of its development, and Croatia under the pretext of realizing Croatia's dream of creating its own statehood, which has been dreamed of for hundreds of years.

All these events were watched from a special angle and with restraint by the people of BiH, directly or indirectly supporting one side or the other. However, it was believed that this was just another theatrical play that had been watched many times in the past and which, as a rule, was almost always played by people from the main centers: Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. Most BiH politicians had no intention or desire to start a war in this area. They were determined to resolve the growing crisis in BiH by political means, but it was not enough. However, not everyone in BiH, as well as outside of it, wanted this. The war was imported under the pretext of helping dying compatriots, but in reality its goal was to create general chaos with a large number of participants. Due to the traditional anticipation of what Belgrade and Zagreb will say and what Ljubljana will do, Bosnia and Herzegovina was late with all the moves. While the nationalist hordes, decorated with previously familiar Ustasha symbols and symbols, euphorically played war games in Croatia, and while the Slovenes were arming their territory, all political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were sitting in ambush, Krajisnik notes ^{[3, P. 52]}.

There was a belief that Yugoslavia could never be divided and destroyed as long as Bosnia and Herzegovina existed, but also that Bosnia and Herzegovina could not survive if Yugoslavia collapsed. It should be borne in mind here that each of the three peoples viewed Bosnia and Herzegovina from their own national point of view. Muslims, the most numerous people, considered it their state. They considered Bosnia to be their own, because they, Muslims, unlike Serbs and Croats, do not have a spare homeland. At least because of geography, because Turkey, unlike Serbia and Croatia, does not border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. For Serbs, Bosnia is a Serbian country, and Herzegovina is the birthplace of Saint Sava. Before the war, the Serbs owned 64% of the country's territory, and the Serbs were the most numerous in history, and only thirty years ago. Migration to Vojvodina after the First and Second World Wars, pressure and political processes permanently expelled a large number of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina ^{[4, p. 59]}.

The Croats referred not only to the close relations between them and Muslims since the time of the so-called Independent State of Croatia (Serb. NDH), but also on the agreements of natural allies in the struggle against the imaginary hegemony of "Greater Serbia". The eight-hundred-year-old presence of Franciscans with a Croatian interpretation of history gave them the right to see Croatia with a border along the Drina River ^{[5, p. 64]}. The positions of all three nations were uncompromising, but Muslim extremists were still in the lead in their exclusivity. While the Serbs and Croats recognized that all three peoples have equal rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosniaks, demanding the preservation of the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wanted to preserve it only for themselves. In a state of intertwining interests, mentoring suggestions and requests, the activities of a political organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina began. The view that the national organization of citizens in BiH contradicts the Constitution of BiH has been adapted for counter-propaganda, according to which the national organization is just another contribution to the democratic transformation in the central Yugoslav Republic and that there is no threat of national conflicts. At that time, the Serbs were not aware of all the agreements between Muslim politicians and the relevant political forces from Croatia. At that time, their union in Serbian opinion existed only in assumptions. The memoirs published after the war fully revealed everything that happened and what the scant intelligence information brought. This was best described by Professor Mukhamed Filipovich in his memoirs ^[1]. Filipovich M. together with Abdich F. Izetbegovich was also the founder of the Democratic Alliance Party, however, he left the party in 1990 because he did not accept Izetbegovich's radical Islamist course.

The assumption that the Serbs would not be organized at the national level has almost come true. The struggle of the Serbs to organize their Serbian National Party at the same time as the formation of the national parties of two other nations was accompanied by inconstancy on the issue of the concept, name and choice of leadership of the future party. Long before that, the Croatian Democratic Union (srb. HDZ BiH) was formed, which euphorically expressed all the ferocity of the offended people, pointing the finger at the Serbs as the only culprits.

The KHOS (Croatian Armed Forces), who wore black uniforms with Ustasha symbols, were the only official military formation in those areas of BiH where Croats were the majority. The PDA Muslim Party has mobilized almost 100% of all Muslims. Before that, the illegal activities of the Young Muslims and Muslim Brotherhood organizations became public. Their political leaders, some of whom were repeatedly punished for propagandizing hatred against non-Muslims, as well as for destroying brotherhood and unity, the main achievements of socialism, put themselves at the head of the future only relevant party of the Muslim people ^{[6, P. 34]}.

The Serbian people watched in amazement at the angry members of the PDA, who completely imitated the supporters of the CDU, whose main goal was to create their own national and unitary state. However, they believed that communism stood in the way of achieving this goal and saw the Serbs as communists. The political organization of Muslims and Croats sent alarming signals to Serbia that nothing good awaits them in the future, and in a short period of time this led to the creation of the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic. The political goal of the SDP was to advocate the preservation of Yugoslavia and the preservation of the equal position of the Serbian people with the other two peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a common state. Since its formation, attempts have been made to portray the Serbian Democratic Party as one of the most dangerous or most nationalist parties in the political arena of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This method of demonizing the SDP was initially focused on propaganda in the media, but later it became known that the planning of crimes was hidden behind this propaganda. This culminated when demonization escalated into a fictional plan to create a "Greater Serbia." In order for these claims against the Serbs to be successfully presented, the fact that the SDP as a party was formed last was hushed up ^{[7, P. 28]}. The Muslim-Croat coalition has abused the desire of the Serbian people to live in one state and preserve Yugoslavia as an internationally recognized state, and has been unacceptably labeled as the "Greater Serbia" project. It is important to say that while the other two nations were secretly arming themselves by forming paramilitary groups (Zenge, the Patriotic League, the Croatian Armed Forces, the Green Berets...), the Serbs trusted the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). However, this support disappeared overnight when JNA moved to Serbia and Montenegro instead of staying in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The atmosphere of the pre-war period was created, similar to the eve of the Second World War, where tension was felt at every step. Such a political fever has engulfed the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The contemporaries of the Second World War just shook their heads, they could not share the bad feeling with the young, because the young looked at life quite differently from them. They expected everything from the first multiparty elections. They were waiting for freedom, for the fall of communism. They expected prosperity and did not see the misfortunes that accompanied it all. At the first stage of the multiparty system, people classified by nationality did not look at each other as enemies. Their main enemy was communism. They believed that uniting the hitherto disenfranchised Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the struggle against communism was the primary task of all national parties in the future. The SDP, CDU and SDA had a unified approach to the new multiparty era. Under their banners with slogans of national reconciliation, the former Communists managed to turn parties into national movements.: The SDP stands for the Serbian people, the CDU for the Croatian people, and the SDA for the Muslim people.

After the first multiparty elections in 1990, inter-party negotiations began. A way to share power in partnership has been found. It was not a coalition. It was about the traditional Bosnian specifics of the eternal and only possible three-headed, three-national and three-confessional Bosnia and Herzegovina. This specificity was the universal Bosnian key that "opened" all doors. It is generally believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a house built on three pillars. Without one, any pillar, it will collapse. However, intolerance towards the Communists, who suffered a complete defeat in these elections, also contributed to the establishment of a division of power between the three national parties. The Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in late October and early November 1990. The SDA received the post of chairman of the Presidency of BiH, the SDP - the post of Chairman of Parliament, and the CDU - the post of Prime Minister of BiH. The Serbian side advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia and for Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of it, while the Muslim-Croat coalition fought for the breakup of Yugoslavia so that Bosnia and Herzegovina would become an independent state.

In November 1990, the first constituent session of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was held. The Parliament had 240 deputies and was divided into two parts: the Citizens' Council and the Municipal Council. The most numerous were the deputies from the Muslim people, there were 100 of them. There were 50 Croat deputies. The rest were Serb deputies, although some of them called themselves Yugoslavs ^{[7, p. 44]}. After analyzing the national composition of the deputies, the Parliamentary Commission concluded that more than a third of the Serbs were in Parliament, which meant that in the future no important constitutional decision could be taken without the consent of the Serbian representatives. The struggle for supremacy began. The norms were not applied. Business etiquette was not respected, and they tried to make all decisions directly, contrary to the constitutional procedure. The CDU, which gathered a few percent more Croats than the SDA and the SDP, pursued a simple goal. This goal was clear to both the Serbs and the international community, but the question is whether it was clear to the Muslim leadership. If this was clear to them, then they had a wrong assessment that they would be able to use the Croats to achieve their goal, namely the separation of BiH from Yugoslavia. At the first stage of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Croats and Muslims had common interests and a common enemy. After this first stage, in which Yugoslavia would be divided into six independent states, the Croats planned to annex their ethnic parts of BiH to Croatia. They were tasked with moving the war from Croatia to Bosnia and joining Croatia's "allies" in the fight against the Serbs. Such a plan was openly implemented by the Croatian Democratic Union in the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina with hatred and strong emotions ^{[6, P. 82]}.

The Serbs, like the constitution itself, stood in the way of Muslims achieving their goals. Together with the Croats, they decided to violate the provisions of the constitution. The Serbs should have been, as quoted by M. Filipovich in his memoirs, Aliya Izetbegovich, "driven across the Drina" ^{[1, p. 101]}.

In 1991, Muslim politics was a policy of expectation and "maturation." They counted on time and the slow identification of appropriate international forces to support the separation of BiH. Only fear, insecurity, and insufficient military readiness kept the Muslim representatives from acting more quickly. They used this year to organize the Patriotic League, a paramilitary group organized by former JNA and Green Beret officers, as well as a Muslim military unit. These were illegal terrorist organizations whose main task was to act as a military force and forcibly separate BiH from Yugoslavia. In addition to the military organization and armament, a real media and lobbying war was waged against Yugoslavia abroad. The demonization of the Serbs was the main task of various well-paid agencies and public figures with great international influence.

The heated parliamentary debate was triggered by the parliamentary session scheduled for February 27, 1991, when the Declaration on State Sovereignty and Indivisibility of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced ^[8]. This proposed Declaration, which was not subsequently adopted, only "added fuel to the fire" and for the first time began to threaten the hope for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The deputies of the Assembly primarily blamed the past, communism, the rule of "Greater Serbia", crimes of the Ustasha, Muslim politics, crimes of the Second World War, and so on. Someone always had others to blame, and everyone interpreted the story in their own way. Specifically, during this session, the leader of the Muslim National Party, Aliya Izetbegovic, delivered a threatening message, which is often used as an example to expose the military intentions of this national group in BiH. He addressed the deputies with the words: "For the sake of a sovereign Bosnia, I would sacrifice peace, and for the sake of peace in Bosnia, I would not sacrifice a sovereign Bosnia..."^[9]. The non-adoption of this declaration at the end of this session in the Assembly of BiH is considered as a historic decision that greatly influenced the further development of the tense situation in BiH.

During 1991, the mass arming of the Muslim population began. At that time, the saying "sell a cow to buy a rifle" was well known among the people, which meant that people tried to get weapons in various ways and show how important they were. Stories about individual arms purchases were quickly replaced by stories about entire armed groups. The whole of Bosnia became militarized overnight. In addition to paramilitary forces, the Interior Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a respectable military force in the hands of "Muslim domination." Their belligerence was evidenced by the daily recruitment of reserve police and the almost public distribution of weapons to citizens. Their actions synchronized with the militant rhetoric of the Croatian Muslim deputies in the Assembly of BiH. Aliya Izetbegovic and Harisa Silajcic's trips to Libya, Turkey and other Islamic countries fit symptomatically into the general atmosphere of general distrust ^{[1, pp. 132-139]}.

For the Serbian leadership, the Yugoslav People's Army, due to the traditional positive attitude of the Serbian people towards the army, was the only legitimate military force that could protect them. And that's why they invited the Serbs to respond to the mobilization. It later became clear that the decisive role in the first year of the war was played by mobilization, Stanishich notes ^{[4, p. 88]}. The Serbian side welcomed the war with a militarily organized army commanded by trained officers, while the other two sides had armed gangs that lacked discipline and military experience. Although the Serbs responded to the mobilization, at the same time, the recommendation of the Muslim and Croatian leadership was that their compatriots should not go to military service. Such a move was illogical and unproductive for Muslims and Croats. However, it seemed counterintuitive, but it actually had a purpose. Their leaders wanted to overthrow YUN, which they tried to do by silencing calls for mobilization. They did this because, in their opinion, they had enough illegally acquired weapons, and therefore they did not need YUN's weapons. The JNA command staff assured the Muslim side that they would remain neutral in the conflict in Bosnia, which was their intention. The JNA did not take sides in 1991, until the CDU and the SDA declared the JNA a Serbian, undesirable and hostile military force.

In the second half of 1991, there were no rules in the political life of BiH. Meetings of the leaders of the three ruling parties became less frequent. Under the circumstances, the internationalization of the BiH problem became more and more obvious. Muslims and Croats have never been ready to make any decision other than to meet their maximalist goals. For them, the negotiations were a simple farce and a demonstration of their coalition power, which they used to annoy and humiliate the other side, not shying away from the fact that this dangerous political game could turn into a tragedy with unpredictable consequences ^{[7, p. 91]}.

In the autumn of 1991, the initiative was again put forward to adopt a Declaration on the Sovereignty and Indivisibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslim-Croatian coalition wanted to use the Assembly of BiH to impose a Declaration in order to create the illusion that the citizens of BiH were in favor of its secession. The intention to impose the Declaration against the will of the Serbian deputies and contrary to the Constitution was aimed at presenting a democratic decision by the parliamentary majority ^{[5, p. 143]}.

At the same time, a Serbian regional union of municipalities followed. The municipalities of BiH, such as Bijeljina, Trebine, Prijedor, Doboj and others, where the Serbs had local self-government, opposed the existing centralized way of organizing the republic. The Serbian regionalization initiative had an economic basis for implementation, but objectively from the very beginning it was a political response to the blatant threats of forces ignoring the will of the whole people. The process of regionalization intensified, and regions were formed overnight. They were originally called "regions", but were quickly renamed "Serbian autonomous regions" following the example of regionalization in Croatia. At that time, SAO Herzegovina, SAO Semberia and Majevica, SAO Posavina, AP Krajina, SAO Romania and SAO Birac were created. The internal "partition" of Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of and took place in parallel with the process of separation of BiH from Yugoslavia.

The session of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began on October 10, 1991 and was interrupted and continued several times, ended on October 15 and went down in history as a fateful event for Bosnia and Herzegovina and its three peoples. This event determined the fate of BiH, because on that day a fire of war broke out, which in less than six months flared up and in the next few years claimed and maimed thousands of lives, destroyed thousands of homes, forced hundreds of thousands of people to leave their homes, sowed hatred between nations for a long time, and maybe forever.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as its inhabitants said, there were three souls in one body. There were three nations, so similar, but different. Respect for differences has maintained the balance of the world for centuries. Judaism, Islam, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy have respected each other and existed autonomously for centuries. Neither side, no matter how numerically superior, has ever succeeded or wanted to impose its will on the other side in peacetime. Bosnia and Herzegovina's resilience was based on agreement and consensus. Respect for historical and traditional values preserved peace in Bosnia, and all the parties to the agreement, and above all the three leaders of the national parties, knew this.

Speaking in their speeches about the Constitution of BiH, the deputies of the SDA, and above all Aliya Izetbegovic, did not mention that the Communists adopted the 60th amendment to the Constitution of BiH on July 31, 1990 at a joint meeting of all chambers, shortly before the elections, with the intention of preventing the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. They ignored paragraph 2 of article 1, which has not changed, and according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina is still part of Yugoslavia, and that two-thirds of the votes of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are required to change the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus separate it from Yugoslavia ^{[4, p. 41]}. In order to implement their plan, the Muslim-Croatian side needed to amend the Constitution and gain the support of this parliamentary decision by at least two thirds of the deputies. Radovan Karadzic addressed the deputies with the following words: "Your commitment to the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a commitment to the separation of BiH from Yugoslavia. This could ignite a civil war in which the citizens, peoples and cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina will disappear. Who has so much courage? Who can bear such a great responsibility to seize BiH by force?" ^[10]. At this point, we should recall the words of the one who is responsible for the dissolution of the Assembly of BiH and the formation of the Assembly of the Serbian People of BiH, who recently said "for which he is ready to sacrifice the world of BiH," which will be demonstrated in the coming days at the extensions of this Assembly session.

After heated debates on October 10, 12, 14 and at the end of October 15, 1991, due to the inability to establish dialogue and reach a compromise, the Chairman of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Momcilo Krajisnik, closed the session and decided to refer the issue to the Council for further resolution, and all Serbian deputies then left the assembly hall. After that, the Muslim-Croatian coalition continued to implement its already prepared plan at an illegal meeting. Mariofil Ljubic, Vice President, continued the meeting without any permission from President Momcilo Krajisnik. Continuing the session was illegal. The Rules of Procedure and the Constitution of BiH were grossly violated.

The SDP informed its Muslim-Croatian partners that the Serbian deputies had only "frozen" their work in the Assembly until the unconstitutional decisions were overturned. However, the Muslim-Croat coalition has not shown the slightest desire to meet the demands of the Serbs. As a result of the events and in response to the unconstitutional decisions taken and the unwillingness of the Muslim-Croatian partners to resolve the crisis and protect Serbian interests in BiH in a constitutional manner, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH was established on October 24, 1991. The Serbian Assembly was supposed to replace the unformed Council for Achieving Equality of Peoples and Nationalities of BiH. It was assumed that this would be a temporary body that would stop working at the moment when the Serbian partners returned to the path of observing the Constitution of BiH. The very name, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, clearly shows that the Assembly was supposed to articulate the interests of the Serbian people, and not the interests of one territorial part of BiH.

In this way, the Muslim-Croatian side led its peoples towards the independence of BiH and its separation from Yugoslavia. According to the justification that this is the will of the majority of the citizens of BiH, and with complete disregard for the organized resistance of the Serbian people, preparations continued for a referendum on independence. At the same time, the Serbian side was working on the implementation of the plebiscite of the Serbian people.

The majority of citizens in BiH and in political life in general still believed that there would be no war in BiH. Reports outside BiH, especially from Croatia, said there was little time left before the war spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The hope was for the European Community. This hope was not unfounded, since the European Community could and should have prevented the conflict. Instead of satisfactorily solving the problem, taking into account the specifics of Yugoslavia, it decided to ignore these specifics. Europe's position was clear. The problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be solved in BiH, not in Europe. Europe will not impose a solution, but will only provide assistance to the parties. According to almost all parties, the internationalization of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only possible solution. While Muslims initially accepted internationalization with reservations, the Serbs were genuinely happy about it.

A group of Serbian deputies decided to attend the session of the BiH Assembly again, and at the session held on December 4, 1991, an initiative for negotiations between the three national communities was presented. It was clear to everyone that new realities had been created after the plebiscite, and since the paths of the warring parties were opposite and the demands incompatible, dialogue between the relevant participants in resolving the crisis was, in fact, the only way out.

At the session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, held on December 21, 1991, a conditional decision was made to proclaim the Serbian Republic of BiH by the Serbian New Year, i.e. on January 14, 1992. If Muslims and Croats remain consistent in their demand for BiH independence, the future republic should become a federal unit within Yugoslavia. The decision to form the Serbian Republic of BiH was a response to the European Community, which adopted on December 17, 1991. The Declaration on Yugoslavia, which was a contest of candidate republics for recognition. Namely, the EU Foreign Ministers called on all republics, i.e. those who wish to do so, to adopt the Declaration on Yugoslavia and accept the conditions of the European Community for recognition ^[11]. The Declaration states that the EU recognizes the independence of all the Yugoslav republics that can fulfill their five demands. At the session of the BiH Assembly on December 20, 1991 The Representative Office and the Government of BiH re-elected the Serbian representatives and, against their will, adopted the EU Declaration. The public was informed through a statement that the decision was made by a majority vote, without saying that all representatives of the Serbian people in the representation of BiH and in the Government voted against this decision. Not a single part of the Bosnian public mentioned violating the Constitution or ignoring the National Council for Equality.

However, other preliminary negotiations have already begun. The parties expressed their views on the settlement of the crisis in BiH. For Muslims and Croats, the connection with Yugoslavia was completely unacceptable. They saw BiH as an independent state without the Yugoslav People's Army and with the Blue Helmets (United Nations army) to maintain peace. The Serbian side strongly opposed the presence of UN forces on the territory of BiH, considering it an occupation. The position of the Serbs was that BiH was part of Yugoslavia, and as a compromise, an alternative solution was proposed - a confederate BiH with three national entities, which would have a significant degree of independence. The negotiations resulted in Muslim-Croatian blackmail with a demand to make a decision on secession, Krajisnik notes ^{[2, p. 66]}.

The situation of the Serbian people at that time was very unfavorable. The Muslim actions against the JNA have raised suspicions that the JNA may withdraw troops from Bosnia. Serbia and Montenegro were preparing to form the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the European Community marked January 15, 1992 as "D-Day" to recognize the former republics of the SFRY as independent states, Muslims and Croats hastily organized and armed themselves militarily, and the partners were preparing to hold a referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina instead of negotiations. In early 1992, chaos began in BiH, followed by social unrest, fear and insecurity. Accordingly, at the session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH, held on January 9, 1992, the Declaration on the Proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was unanimously adopted ^[12]. However, this decision had to be conditional in order to give another chance to interethnic harmony. The condition was the cancellation of the unconstitutional decisions of the Muslim-Croatian coalition.

The last session of the BiH Assembly was held on January 26, 1992. After an almost three-month break, the Serbian deputies again agreed to participate in this meeting, hoping for a possible dialogue. The Muslim Party of the SDA wanted a decision to hold a referendum on the independence of BiH at this session. But since they did not want to agree to the two conditions set by the Serbian side in this case, the same scenario occurred as on October 15, 1991. The Serbs had two proposals: to hold a referendum after the transformation and constitutional restructuring of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to hold a referendum within the planned time frame (15 days), i.e. so that the decision on independence would be implemented after the agreed reorganization of BiH. Due to the impossibility of reaching an agreement between the conflicting parties, this meeting was suspended and its continuation was scheduled for the next day. As expected, after the Serbian deputies left the hall, there was an illegal continuation of the session, which was chaired without permission by Mariofil Ljubic, Vice-President of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then Croats and Muslims voted for the decision to hold a referendum on independence. The next day, none of the representatives of the Croatian Muslim coalition showed up for the legally scheduled continuation of the session, and therefore the Assembly did not continue its work.

Many events took place between January 26, when the last session of the BiH Assembly was held, and April 6, when the Serbian-Croatian-Muslim war began. First of all, Muslims and Croats conducted secret diplomacy with the aim of "cross-recognition" of BiH. Although the arbitration commission was well aware of all the features of BiH, it simply did not comply with them. The members of this commission were aware of the opposition of one composite (Serbian) people. They were aware of the provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the existence of the National Council for Equality. They understood the procedure according to which the Muslim-Croatian coalition was obliged to separate BiH from Yugoslavia. The constitutional amendment had to be done, at least formally, as it was done in Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992. All these listed factors were simply ignored and a decision was made to recognize the referendum, which was attended and voted on only by Muslims and Croats. The recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina on March 1, 1992, before the conclusion of negotiations, marked the beginning of a civil war, the subsequent events of which showed us and still show the split of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the intolerance of the three peoples, hatred and the desire for revenge. Unfortunately, the three Bosnian nations, once united and united, today do not live in peace, they live in disharmony and constant fear of a renewed conflict that ordinary people will neither be able to cause nor control. It wasn't like it was then, in the nineties of the last century.