From Expansion to Restriction: CIA Reforms under the Presidential Administrations of D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy

Panov Denis Sergeevich ORCID: 0009-0000-7454-5327 Postgraduate student; Institute of Social Sciences; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 82 Vernadsky Ave., Moscow, 119571, Russia denpanov3000@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

After the Second World War, in the context of the brewing confrontation with the USSR, the American political establishment formed a view of the system of international relations expressed in a realistic paradigm. According to her, international politics is a struggle for power, and "the goals of foreign policy should be defined in terms of national interest and supported by an appropriate force" ^{[1, p.440]}. In the face of the threat from communism, intelligence agencies were given broad powers to carry out foreign policy actions that were supposed to counteract the spread of ideology hostile to the United States and ensure their national security. However, the activities of the intelligence agencies began to destabilize the situation around the world and sometimes did not combine with the official course of the president.

The problem of the relationship between the presidential administration and the US intelligence community, due to the expansion of intelligence functions during the Cold War, remains insufficiently systematized in both foreign and domestic studies. In the works of D. Talbot, T. Weiner and S. Kinzer, the biography and activities of A. Dulles as director of the CIA are studied to a greater extent. The analysis of intelligence operations is presented in the studies of P. Gliechses and N.N. Platoshkin, where the focus is on the planning mechanisms of covert operations, systemic errors and the long-term consequences of interference for international relations. The institutional evolution of the intelligence community is considered in the works of Mikhail Dundukov through the prism of the adaptation of intelligence services to the changing geopolitical landscape. At the same time, A.A. Sergunin's research offers a point-by-point analysis of the reforms of the Kennedy era (1961-1963), revealing attempts to democratize control over the CIA.

This study is aimed at forming an idea of the scale and nature of the contradictions in the "President of the United States – special services" system. The paper examines the institutional conflict of competencies, taking into account the views of statesmen of the American political establishment on American foreign policy, and reveals the cause-and-effect relationships of the CIA's limitless activities during the Cold War era.

For successful research, it is necessary to determine the role of intelligence institutions in relation to the views on international relations of the administrations of D. Eisenhower (1890-1969) and J. John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) belongs to the conservative and liberal cycles, respectively. The article analyzes the contradictions between the president and the special services in the field of their functioning in a certain historical period, which subsequently influenced the implementation of reforms in the field under study. The transformation of national security agencies within certain cyclical periods allows us to gain an understanding of the role of these institutions in the framework of US activities on the world stage, which still have a high degree of relevance in connection with the coming to power of D. Trump and the change in the work of the CIA under the new presidential administration.

The conducted scientific work is based on the analysis of written sources. The study analyzes regulatory legal acts, which makes it possible to trace the legal registration and changes in the status of special services in the US government system, as well as identify non-public decision-making mechanisms. Studying the records of the CIA and the OCS (directives, memoranda, etc.) provides an opportunity to critically analyze the structural problems of the intelligence community and examine the positions of supporters and opponents of strengthening the CIA. Attention is also paid to public speeches and press materials of the president - this type of source allows us to compare public rhetoric with closed directives, identify strategies for legitimizing covert operations and correlate them with the views of the presidents on foreign policy issues. The combined study of the above-mentioned sources makes it possible to complete the picture in the field of the foreign policy dimension of the US national security. The CIA Act of 1949, the report, the report of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government of 1955, the materials of the hearings in the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate, etc. are used in the scientific community, but not so often. Declassified documents, in particular, the OKNSH memorandum "On the justification of the US military intervention in Cuba" on March 13, 1962; the memorandum of the Ministry of Defense from the meeting with the President on March 16, 1962, are also used, however, they have not been fully studied, which makes it possible to pay attention to aspects not previously considered.

The scientific article is based on Arthur Schlesinger's concept of political cycles "Cycles of American History". According to her, American history consists of two successive periods. The first type is liberal, which is characterized by social commitment and is accompanied by reformist transformations ^{[2, p. 56]}. Among them, the presidency of J. P. Blavatsky stands out. John F. Kennedy in 1961 ^[3]. The second type is conservative, characterized by restraint of reforms and any changes. This cycle has the same serious impact on the American political system as the first one. The presidency of D. Eisenhower, known for his conservative policies and uncompromising struggle against the USSR, which contributed to the expansion of intelligence powers and their large-scale activities, belongs to this period ^{[2, p. 57]}. These cycles are characterized by certain approaches to foreign policy, and this, in turn, affects the work of national security agencies. In this regard, A. Schlesinger's theory allows us to understand the political conditions in which they acted before and after the change of presidents, as well as how this affected their work.

According to F. For Klinberg, cycles are also highlighted in American foreign policy. Periods of "extraversion", expressed in exerting economic, diplomatic or military pressure on other nations to achieve goals, and "introverted", consisting in focusing on internal affairs ^{[4, pp. 239-273]}. At each stage of involvement in world affairs, politics is formed in accordance with certain values and is linked to internal political cycles ^{[2, p. 73]}. Taking into account F. Bryer's position that foreign policy ceases to be the prerogative exclusively of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs ^{[5, p.29]}. The complex and numerous processes taking place on the world stage require more and more coordinated work of various departments and structures. In this regard, attention should be paid to the functioning of national security agencies, in particular the activities of American intelligence, the main essence of which is to ensure the national interests of the state in the international arena, created during the adoption of the conservative National Security Act of 1947 ^[6].

"The attitude of the state towards international politics is a dynamic quality. It changes along with the change in the power of the state, which can put it at the forefront in international politics, and may deprive it of the opportunity to actively act in the international arena" ^{[7, p. 28]}. Operating in an anarchic environment, a country must rely on its own strength to ensure its security.

As part of the transformation of the system of international relations and the development of conservative views, a whole network of institutions was organized that were directly responsible for the effective functioning of the state and operated from the standpoint of the paradigm of realism. The National Security Act of 1947 restructured the system of the armed forces, foreign policy, and intelligence agencies. It has become a marker for the further development of bodies that make it possible to achieve national interests by any means possible.

In 1946, even before the passage of the National Security Act by Congress, the position of Director of Central Intelligence was established, who was the head of all American intelligence and the head of the CIA. Initially, his functions were more coordinating than managerial. As intelligence developed and new bodies were created, it became necessary to expand its powers. The first attempts at expansion were made under G. Truman, and in subsequent years the powers increased ^{[8, pp. 319-320]}.

Congress, based on the CIA Act of 1949, expanded the powers of the intelligence agency ^[9]. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its head, who combined the position of director of central intelligence, became key figures in the national security structure. The Director was given expanded opportunities to manage covert operations, including increased funding without having to coordinate with bureaucratic procedures ^[6]. This increased the influence of the intelligence structure, and the head of intelligence began to play a key role in ensuring national security.

The period of Dwight Eisenhower's presidency (1953-1961) is closely connected with the continuation of anti-Soviet policies. This historical period was characterized by unrelenting McCarthyism in domestic politics. In foreign policy, the president's course was aimed at implementing the doctrine of "massive retaliation" and pursuing an active bloc policy under the leadership of John Foster Dulles, one of the main "hawks" of the US foreign policy establishment. This period was also characterized by an active phase of covert CIA operations, authorized by Directive No. 10/2 of 1948 under the previous President Harry Truman and confirmed by secret directives of the National Security Council: No. 5412 of March 15, 1954, No. 5412/1 of March 12, 1955 and No. 5412/2 of December 28, 1955 already during D.'s time in power. Eisenhower ^[10]. Historical conditions created favorable conditions for expanding the powers of national security agencies, which were organically integrated into the general trends of American foreign policy during the period of confrontation between the superpowers. The concentration of a large amount of information and the primacy of the information and analytical function made the organization a secret instrument of American foreign policy, which was entrusted with the most important tasks abroad ^{[8, p.133]}.

The term "US intelligence community" appeared in an official document for the first time thanks to the Hoover Commission in 1955. The community includes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, the military, and the Atomic Energy Commission ^[11]. This showed that a group of departments has been formed that are directly related to foreign policy and, therefore, influence it.

Lieutenant General Bedell Smith became Director of Central Intelligence in 1949. He began to improve the activities of the CIA and appointed Allen Dulles, who had extensive experience in this field, Deputy Director for planning. The former resident of the Office of Strategic Services was an active supporter of the creation of an intelligence agency, spoke at congressional hearings and, in fact, laid the conceptual foundation for the CIA. A. Dulles advocated for the organization's broad powers – granting it extensive rights in foreign policy activities in the system of executive bodies of the United States ^{[12, pp. 525-528]}. The Planning Unit was actively engaged in conducting covert operations, which made it possible to use various methods to promote US national interests on the world stage.

Since 1953, Allen Welsh Dulles, the younger brother of the head of the State Department, J. F. Dulles, served as director of the CIA. He became the first civilian in the leadership of such a structure. Even before his appointment as head of intelligence, he had clear ideas about the fight against communism ^[13]. A. Dulles was a pragmatic statesman, raised in accordance with Puritanical morality that "the world is an eternal battlefield between righteousness and evil" ^[14]. His appointment was facilitated by anti-Sovietism, the political weight of his older brother, as well as his high position in the Republican Party and the financial world.

Since the appointment of Allen Dulles as head of the CIA, he already had enough power to embody his view on the position of the United States in the system of international relations. Given that he and his brother were actively involved in foreign policy and were ardent anti-communists, this set a dangerous precedent, since, in fact, a tandem was being created that could have a great influence on the formation of an aggressive foreign policy course. Subsequently, the Doolittle Commission and the committee of presidential advisers on intelligence activities abroad focused on this in their reports ^[15].

Intelligence officer Kermit Roosevelt wrote as proof of the great autonomy of the CIA's activities in the field of foreign policy. This concerned the plans for a coup in Iran and its approval by the head of the State Department, Dean Acheson: "I did not want to raise this issue with him [the Secretary of State]. <...> We saw no point in involving the outgoing administration in something that we thought they might be less enthusiastic about than the Republicans."^[14] To successfully implement their plans, they needed someone with the same conservative views as them, but in the Oval Office. It turned out to be D. Eisenhower.

During this period of history, the activities of the intelligence organization reached an unprecedented scale, many covert operations were carried out, which had a serious impact on the international situation. Following in the wake of the paradigm of realism, which defined interest as strength and power, made it possible to use a wide range of actions to achieve their goals. The CIA actively used illegitimate methods to achieve its goals. This corresponded to the statement of Allen Dulles, who once noted that the director of the CIA should leave moral principles outside his work ^{[16, p.7]}. Thanks to this approach, a large number of different operations were carried out under his leadership, ranging from revolutions and various coups, as in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954) to political assassinations or assassination attempts, for example F. Castro and P. Lumumba ^{[2, p. 572]}.

It is important to note that the costs of intelligence operations were increasing. If in 1952 the CIA spent 82 million dollars a year ^{[17, p.57]} on carrying out its activities, then by 1956 it was 800 million dollars ^[18]. In the same year, the Presidential Committee of Advisers on intelligence activities abroad was established, which commissioned diplomat David Bruce and Prosecutor Robert Lovett to analyze the activities of the CIA in accordance with NSC Directive 10./2. Based on the results of the analysis in 1957, the commission concluded that the initiators did not imagine the consequences to which the broad powers entrusted to the organization would lead. The operations were conducted "independently and uncontrollably" and only a small part of them was approved by the special group 5412 of the National Security Service. The report said that it was necessary to think about the consequences of the activity of the intelligence organization, which were contrary to international law and norms of international relations, which in turn gave rise to distrust of the American state. Based on the reports, D. Eisenhower was asked to review "programs leading to secret interference in the internal affairs of almost any country with which we maintain relations." However, the president did not take any action ^{[2, p. 573]}.

With the election victory of Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy in 1960, American foreign policy changed. According to the theory of Arthur Schlesinger Sr., a new liberal wave was coming in the 60s of the XX century. According to the historian, "the departure from liberalism, which began in 1947 ..., should stop in 1962, perhaps a year or two earlier or later" ^{[19, p. 93]}. The basis of the policy of J. Kennedy made reforms both in domestic and foreign policy. The new liberal course ran counter to the conservative policy followed by America after the aggravation of relations with the USSR. Despite the fact that the young president was an anti-communist, he assumed the normalization of the system of international relations. In particular, he called for dialogue, the formulation and understanding of the problems separating the parties to the conflict, as well as "a new beginning, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just, the weak are safe and peace is preserved" ^[20].

John F. Kennedy, in his 1960 speech, stated that "If by 'liberal' we mean someone who looks forward rather than backward, who welcomes new ideas without harsh reactions, who cares about people's well-being - their health, housing, schools, jobs, civil rights and freedoms - someone who He believes that we can get out of the impasse and suspicions that bind us in our politics abroad. If this is what is meant by "liberal," then I can proudly say that I am a "liberal."^[21] His opponents, who held conservative views on international relations, certainly did not like this approach.

Thus, a situation has developed in which a president with liberal views on international relations finds himself at the head of a state with conservative sentiments in the political establishment. A large number of government officials in high positions in the United States considered communism to be a serious danger. Among such people was Allen Dulles, who had influence on foreign policy activities by the time J. P. Morgan came to power. Kennedy.

The first years of the president were marked by failures in US foreign policy. American intelligence agencies attempted to conduct a covert operation to overthrow Fidel Castro, which was being prepared under the previous president ^{[22, p.3; 2, p.598]}. It resulted in large reputational costs, which put the American government at a disadvantage, since it was not originally intended to disclose US involvement in this conflict ^[23]. The sprawling operation indicated that the CIA had broad powers, since the scale of the operation involved the use of military equipment, in particular aircraft, to carry out bombing.

The events hit John F. Kennedy's image hard. The operation was developed by intelligence with the possibility of using, as one of the options, American power against the Castro regime in Cuba ^{[22, p. 18]}. The success of the operation depended on the destruction of the Cuban Air Force, but from the very beginning everything did not go according to plan. The sabotage arranged by American intelligence failed, as not all aircraft were destroyed and another bombing was required. John F. Kennedy refused it, fearing an explosion of anti-American sentiment due to the exposure by American journalists of the first unsuccessful attempt to destroy enemy aircraft. This created complications both for the landing in Cochinos Bay, which failed ^[24], and for the new presidential administration in the eyes of the world community.

Another important evidence of the activities of the national security agencies was the declassified documents on Operation Northwoods in November 1997, which the Minister of Defense presented on March 13, 1962. This action was planned as part of the "Cuban project" to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro. It involved the downing of a US civil aviation aircraft off the coast of Cuba, terrorist acts by "Cubans" in Miami, Florida and other cities, including Washington, the explosion of an American ship and other events ^[25]. The CIA was also a participating party and had the right to make suggestions on this matter. On March 16, 1962, John F. Kennedy rejected these proposals ^[26].

There was a situation when the work of the US intelligence agencies was contrary to the course of the president. The reforms of J. Kennedy envisioned the use of foreign policy tools such as the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps, which were aimed at promoting democratic principles around the world and providing humanitarian assistance to States in need. The creation and functioning of these organizations definitively separated military aid from humanitarian aid and laid the foundation for US foreign aid as a policy tool ^[27]. This was supposed to contribute to the formation of a positive image of the United States. At the same time, the structures, in particular the CIA, established at the beginning of the Cold War, were formed in such a way as to function covertly in the face of confrontation between superpowers and at the same time ensure the interests of the United States in the international arena, acting within the framework of a military-political strategy.

The broad powers of various agencies within the intelligence community had an impact on John F. Kennedy's political course. The president had to take responsibility for the failure in the Bay of Cochinos ^[28]. Allen Dulles was dismissed. After the presentation of the plan for Operation Northwoods, Lyman Lemnitzer, as chairman of the ROSC, was appointed Supreme Commander of the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe, which in turn indicates a demotion.

The activities of the intelligence community have left their mark on the relationship between the president and a number of institutions. The heads of departments had great political weight. Changing their views on international relations was not only unacceptable to them, but also threatened their authority. This, in turn, hindered the implementation of the planned course. There was a conflict within the executive branch that needed to be resolved.

The circumstances discussed above became the starting point for the implementation of reforms aimed at limiting the large-scale activities of the CIA. During the period when A. Dulles was the head of intelligence, the agency was not limited to collecting and analyzing intelligence data, but also offered ready-made solutions and hid important information from the president. This practice of submitting intelligence information to the country's leadership did not suit the head of state. This was the reason why presidential aides such as A. Schlesinger, T. Sorensen, P. Salinger and M. Bundy, W. Rostow, R. Comer and G. Kissinger launched a struggle for control over foreign policy ^[29].

The subsequent transformations in the system of executive authorities disrupted the system of interaction of the intelligence community. An important component was the changes in the work of the National Security Council. According to researcher Alexander Anatolyevich Sergunin, John F. Kennedy and his administration were not satisfied with the current NSC system, as it was cumbersome and bureaucratic. Both the Planning Council and the Operations Coordination Council were disbanded, and their staff was re-staffed with staff responsible for advancing the presidential line ^[29].

As part of the reforms, the post of military representative was established, the first appointee of which was General M. Taylor. His responsibilities included overseeing the work of the government's intelligence services to ensure they met the current and future needs of the president. In addition, he worked in conjunction with the Advisory Council on Foreign Intelligence, monitoring the implementation of its recommendations ^[30]. The Council, in turn, was headed by J. Thanks to the support of the President, Kilian was able to adopt many recommendations on reorganization. In the period from May to November 1961, 25 meetings of the council were held, which exceeded the number of meetings in the previous five years of its existence ^{[31, p. 458]}.

The authority of the military representative also included the leadership of the special group No. 5412 of the National Security Service, which was in charge of covert operations. This committee was not even known in Congress. It consisted of high-ranking officials from the State Department, the Ministry of Defense, the CIA, and the office of the National Security Council ^[24]. By special decisions of the National Security Council No. 55 and No. 57, the authority to conduct paramilitary operations was transferred to the Pentagon. In addition, the president imposed a requirement that CIA officers working under diplomatic cover inform the ambassadors about their operations and coordinate their steps with them. Such measures provoked resistance in intelligence circles ^[32]. However, the decisive blow to the CIA's positions was Kennedy's order in 1962-1963 on planned budget cuts, which provided for a 20% reduction in expenditures by 1966 ^{[33, p.397]}.

Such changes have seriously complicated the relationship between the president and government officials who held conservative views. Despite the resignation of Allen Dulles, which was accompanied by recognition of his services, between him and J. Kennedy had disagreements. Even after his resignation, the former head of the CIA behaved like a full-fledged intelligence chief, targeting the president who deprived him of his power and brilliant career.

Between A. Dulles and the White House, headed by J. Kennedy's battle unfolded. The ex-director accused the president of failure, and also tried in every possible way to shift the blame to the head of state. A. Dulles even intended to publish a critical article directed against the new government and its political course, but later decided to refrain from publication. The surviving draft, containing harsh statements against Kennedy and his administration, sheds light on the numerous methods by which the CIA leadership during the Dulles period actually tried to draw the inexperienced president into the Cuban adventure ^[34].

In conjunction with other political decisions that J. Kennedy planned to take action, he sought to maintain transparency and transparency in the field of foreign policy. The implementation of reforms in this area was hampered by the great influence of the special services, namely, the different approaches to American activities in the system of international relations. The planned changes could not be implemented to the end, as on November 22, 1963, J. Kennedy was assassinated.

The conducted research demonstrates that the conservative political cycle and broad powers gave the US special services (in particular, the CIA) in the 1950s and 1960s to act as a political actor with a high degree of autonomy. The confrontational course towards the USSR, as well as family ties at the top of power, allowed A. Dulles, as the head of the CIA, to accumulate great power in his hands. The cycle change with the retention of CIA Director A. Dulles, who was a staunch conservative and over the years led the intelligence service to expand the powers of the organization entrusted to him, suggests that the interests and methods of intelligence work were in conflict with the official course of the new presidential administration. The key patterns during the study period are as follows:1. There is a correlation between the political cycles of A. Schlesinger and the degree of powers of the special services; 2. The exponential growth of the intelligence budget and outright anti-Soviet policies led to its isolation; 3. Operational efficiency was achieved at the cost of violations of international law and dysfunctions in the public administration system.

The liberal presidential Administration of J. Kennedy was faced with powerful intelligence, which reached the level of conducting large-scale military incursions into the territory of a sovereign state and attempts to use terrorist actions in the United States. The scientific work of the CIA demonstrates the phenomenon of departmental autonomy, in which the intelligence community, having significant operational powers and closed decision-making, actually implemented an independent policy, often contradicting the strategic guidelines of the current administration. This confirms the thesis about the existence of deep institutional contradictions in the national security system of the United States in the middle of the 20th century.

The reforms carried out by the new administration contributed to the weakening of its influence on American activities in the system of international relations, which caused discontent and resistance from conservative statesmen. This, in turn, demonstrates that the broad autonomy of the security services is a systemic threat to democratic procedures. The alternation of American political cycles implies changes in the activities of national security agencies. However, this did not happen in this case.