Military and political cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cuba in the first quarter of the 21st century

Sizenov Pavel Igorevich Postgraduate student, Department of Modern and Contemporary History, Moscow State University 127591, Russia, Moscow, ul. 800th Anniversary of Moscow, 11 K. 6 sizenovp@mail.ru Other publications by this author

Currently, in the context of the formation of a new world order in the scientific and analytical environment, issues of military-political cooperation between states are becoming increasingly relevant. Given that the Russian Federation is at the forefront of current geopolitical changes, it is especially interesting for researchers to study the UPU with strategic partners who can support Russia in its endeavors. One of these partners is the Republic of Cuba, which already had extremely close military and political contacts with Russia, only with Soviet Russia.

However, before proceeding directly to the problem of the development of military-political interaction between Russia and Cuba in the period under study in the first quarter of the 21st century, several clarifications should be given regarding the methodology and definitions of the study. The research is based on the principles of historicism, scientific objectivity and consistency. In this regard, let us first explain that military-political cooperation in work means a type of activity in international relations that combines elements of military-technical and political cooperation, in which friendly states (or partner states) jointly solve defense and geopolitical tasks. At the same time, since the components of the UPU are extremely multifaceted, it is necessary to clarify that military-political cooperation should include the entire range of both formal and informal cooperative interstate relations focused on ensuring security ^{[1, p. 81]}. The economic aspects of cooperation in the work will be considered indirectly, but without mentioning them it is impossible to determine the real level of cooperation between the countries, since financial issues remain significant in any interstate interaction. In connection with the above, the source base of the study will be quite broad, including bilateral treaties on state security and military cooperation; agreements in strategically important areas: energy and resources, digital technologies, space, heavy industry, etc.; memoranda declaring the close and friendly nature of relations. The study also uses interviews and statements by government officials of the two countries, as well as news information on the interaction between Russia and Cuba^[1]. Separately, we note that to indicate the importance of bilateral relations, the Concepts of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy adopted since the beginning of the 21st century (from 2000, 2008, 2013, 2016, 2023) are considered. To demonstrate solidarity between countries in the international arena, voting on resolutions of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) is studied: resolution 68/262, resolution ES-11/1, resolutions on "The need to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba." At the same time, the position of the United States and the American bill of 2000 "prohibiting the restructuring or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation until the President confirms to Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has terminated all its obligations" is significant for understanding the conditions in which the UPU of Russia and Cuba found themselves at the beginning of the century. operations, withdrew all personnel and permanently closed the intelligence facility in Lourdes, Cuba" (also known as the Law "on Russian-American Trust Cooperation"). To analyze them, the article will use qualitative methods of political science, which make it possible to identify hidden cause-and-effect relationships between events and interpretations of concluded agreements and normative legal acts. In turn, general scientific and historical research methods are necessary in the article for its structuring, logical and chronological clarity of the text.

Regarding the historiography of the work, we note the following: in Russian literature, the authors, as a rule, did not focus specifically on the military-political aspects of state cooperation, considering Russian-Cuban relations in their entirety. Researchers of the interaction between the USSR and the Republic of Cuba focused on similar issues, which was nevertheless studied in more detail in connection with the special attitude of Soviet Latin Americans to the first socialist state in the region. To a greater extent, the materials focused on issues of a political and economic nature of Soviet-Russian-Cuban relations. Among the significant authors in whose publications the topic was actively raised, we note V.A. Borodaeva ^{[2, 3]}, E.A. Larina ^{[4, 5]} and N.S. Leonova ^{[2, 6]}, considerable attention was also paid to it in the works under the auspices of the Kalashnikov Institute of Latin America of the Russian Academy of Sciences., by L.B. Nikolaeva and V.M.Davydov ^{[7, 8, 9, 10]}.

Foreign authors, among whom it is worth noting M. Bain's comprehensive research on cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cuba, focused more on the analysis of political and economic contacts between the states ^{[11, 12, 13]}. At the same time, other experts, including R. Gott and P. Gleichese, assessed Russian-Cuban relations within the framework of a general study of the history of Cuba and the approaches of the country's leadership to international relations, thus shifting the research vector from the topic of interest to us ^{[14, 15]}. Among the latest works, the monograph "Cuba in the Multipolar World Order" should be noted, highlighting the Republic's relations with world centers of power and Cuba's desire for self-determination in the current geopolitical conditions^[16]. In turn, while the authors focused on Russia's military-political cooperation with Latin American states in general, like S. Mason, Russian-Cuban cooperation was most often covered superficially, as part of the study of general trends in Russia's interaction with Latin American states ^[17].

Thus, during the analysis of the historiography of the problem, individual works on the subject of the Russian-Cuban military conflict itself were not identified at the present stage, which indicates the need to focus on this aspect of interaction and the novelty of research in studying this area of cooperation.

By the beginning of the 21st century, Russian-Cuban relations were going through difficult times. In fact, they represented an inertial bilateral interaction based on what was still working within the framework of the Soviet-Cuban treaties. In the 1990s, Cuba, which was the main partner of the Soviet Union in Latin America, lost its importance to the Russian Federation, which literally curtailed economic and military-political cooperation with the republic. Thus, over the last decade of the 20th century, the foreign trade turnover between Russia and Cuba decreased tenfold: in 1990 it reached $9 billion ^{[2, p. 418]} and decreased to 385 million (!) in 2000 ^{[4, p. 179]}, which, of course, had severe consequences for the "island of Freedom". However, the contacts between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cuba have not completely stopped. Russia maintained in Cuba the most important military-strategic facility, the radio–electronic center in Lourdes, for which an agreement was concluded in 1992 "On the presence of the Russian radio-electronic center in the territory of the Republic of Cuba." According to the document, the base was leased to the Russian Federation until November 2000, initially for $90 million in 1992, but by the end of the lease the amount had increased to $200 million ^[18]. As a payment, Russia supplied Cuba with weapons, petroleum products and timber, and the Republic also had access to information related to its national security. Until 2001, Russia used the center in Lourdes, which supplied the special services and the government of the Russian Federation with a huge amount of intelligence data. R. Castro stated in 1993 that about 75% of all Russian intelligence information was obtained through this REC (although it is believed that the Cuban politician overestimated this figure, wanting to emphasize the military-political importance of Cuba, as partner of Russia). Even at the end of the 20th century, the Lourdes center remained one of the most effective intelligence facilities of the successor of the USSR, and the power of the equipment made it possible to intercept data in most of the United States ^[19]. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia used the base primarily for industrial and economic espionage (given the reduced priority of political and military-technical intelligence).

However, the continued effectiveness of the center did not save it from closure: on October 17, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to withdraw the military contingent from bases in Cam Ranh (Socialist Republic of Vietnam) and Lourdes, and in 2002, the Russian Federation terminated the lease of the EC in Cuba. Moreover, the Russian side did not consider it necessary to promptly notify the Cuban partner of the actions being taken ^[7]. The decision came as a surprise to the Cuban side and even to the Russian military personnel of the REC ^{[6, p. 169]}.

Despite official statements by the authorities about the alleged benefits of closing the center ^[17] (high cost of maintenance, technology development, the emergence of analogues in intelligence activities, etc.)^[2], according to a number of researchers, the decision to close the Lourdes base was made under direct pressure from the United States ^[11]. In those years, the American authorities were particularly insistent on closing this base, but in Havana they refused to do so. In July 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives approved bill S.2748 "Russian-American Trust Management and Cooperation" (S. 2748 (106th): Russian American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000), prohibiting the cancellation of Russian debts until the station is liquidated, which was one of the decisive arguments in favor of its closure. At the same time, by closing the base, Russia not only lost an important military intelligence facility in the immediate vicinity of the territory of the United States of America, which provided a significant amount of strategic information about a potential enemy, but also received an image blow that reduced its geopolitical weight in the Western Hemisphere ^{[12, p. 152-154]} and complicated the capabilities of the militarypolitical cooperation between Russia and the countries of the region. At that moment, Russia was not ready to defend its military and political interests in Cuba ^{[5, p. 150]}. Thus, immediately at the beginning of the 21st century, Russian-Cuban relations reached a low point in their development.

This circumstance actually marked a new stage in Russian-Cuban military-political cooperation, since the work of the center was the last remaining military-strategic joint project of the two states since Soviet times. Paradoxically, Russia began to revive relations with its former socialist partners, including Cuba, around the same time it decided to close the bases – at the beginning of the presidency of Vladimir Putin, who visited North Korea, Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam in his early years in power. The President made a trip to the Island of Freedom in December 2000. At that time, hopes were voiced for the restoration of an intensive partnership, which was also recorded in a joint statement "following the official talks between President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba F.Castro" ^[20]. However, the main purpose of the trip was to demonstrate the sovereignty of Russian foreign policy to the West. It is noteworthy that at that moment the head of the Russian state visited the base in Lourdes, highly appreciating its work ^{[6, p. 169]}.

However, for the first few years after the liquidation of the base in Lourdes, no active actions were taken by the countries, given that the closure of the REC by the Russian Federation was an unfriendly step towards the Republic of Cuba. The situation was also complicated by the fact that at that time the Russian Federation considered relations with Cuba primarily in the economic sphere ^{[12, Chapter 2]}, and the Latin American state, which was just emerging from the extremely difficult 1990s, could not offer real financial preferences.

The path to a real revival of cooperation between the states began in the middle of the "noughties". This happened after a new cooling of relations between Russia and the United States, and in 2004, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid an official visit to Cuba. The new cooperation initially focused primarily on "civilian" and dual-use technologies. In the second half of the noughties, IL-96-300 and Tu-204 passenger aircraft were delivered to the island (AN-158 will also be delivered later, and the total number of Russian airliners in Cuba will grow to 14) ^{[21, p. 122]}. Political contacts also became more frequent: in December 2006, Russian Prime Minister Fradkov visited Cuba, and in 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev visited the island. During the visit, he discussed Russian-Cuban relations in the fields of economy, security, regional and military-technical cooperation with Castro, as well as informally met with the leader of the Cuban revolution – F. Castro, which in turn speaks about the significance of the trip. Thanks to these meetings, cooperation in mechanical engineering was resumed. Russia issued new loans to Cuba (Cuba's debt to the USSR was then estimated by the Russian side at $35.2 billion) for the purchase of KAMAZ and Lada vehicles, and old debts were also settled ^{[8, Chapter 6]}. Realizing Cuba's low solvency, loans and concluded contracts for the supply of equipment and spare parts had political goals. Given the change in Russia's foreign policy (around the same time, on February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin delivered his famous "Munich Speech"), it became necessary to regain lost positions outside the post-Soviet space. At the same time, Cuba "returned" to the pages of Russian documents in a positive connotation^[3]: the Foreign Policy Concept of July 12, 2008 indicated that the Russian Federation would "increase political and economic cooperation" with the republic.

Thanks to the resumption of cooperation based on the full coincidence of national geopolitical interests, and "from the old memory of brotherly friendship," Russia has received support from Cuba in the international arena. In 2008, the Republic supported the Russian Federation in the conflict in South Ossetia, however, it has not yet recognized the independence of Ossetia and Abkhazia. The importance of the relationship was determined by the signing in Moscow, during the first post-Soviet visit of Cuban President Raul Castro to Russia, of the Memorandum "On the Principles of Strategic Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cuba" on January 30, 2009. The document defined the vector of interaction for the next 10 years. According to the Memorandum, comprehensive cooperation was supposed to be launched, however, in reality, the document laid the foundation for joint work in only a few strategically important areas – in the energy sector, in "peaceful space" and international relations. Despite the need, for example, to update Cuba's military-industrial complex, the issue of military-technical cooperation was voiced in the document only at the end. At the same time, documents were also signed on granting a loan to Liberty Island and on gratuitous food aid, as well as about 30 more documents on cooperation ^[3]. Later, Raul Castro visited Russia several times, emphasizing the status of a strategic partner in every possible way (2012, 2015). In this regard, in general, it is worth noting the personal contribution of the younger of the Castro brothers, who was initially an ardent supporter of Cuba's cooperation with the USSR, and then made significant diplomatic efforts to restore cooperation (not only military-political), but with the Russian Federation. The rapid resumption of strategic relations was also consolidated in the updated Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation dated February 12, 2013, which stated that Russian-Cuban cooperation would be focused on "expanding political cooperation, promoting trade, economic, investment, innovation, cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint search for answers to new challenges and threats, and consolidation of Russian companies in the dynamically developing sectors of industry, energy, communications and transport."

In 2014, Cuba also adopted a pro-Russian position on the issue of Crimea, voting against UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 and effectively recognizing the peninsula as part of the Russian Federation. At the same time, shortly before Vladimir Putin's visit to Havana in July 2014, our country wrote off 90% of the Soviet debt to the Republic – 31.7 billion dollars (out of 35.2 billion), the remaining 3.5 billion Cuba had to repay by 2024. This write-off was the largest in the history of Russia. In general, this was a logical step in the development of cooperation, especially since there was virtually no chance of full repayment of the debt by the Cuban side. In exchange, Russian oil companies received privileges to develop the island's offshore coast, as well as energy projects ^[22]. At the same time, in 2014, an agreement was signed between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Cuba on cooperation in the field of international information security. It is aimed at maintaining stability in States, countering hostile propaganda, and exchanging information related to international, regional, and local security issues (including intelligence data). The document can be considered as the first real step towards the possible restoration of Russian participation in the work of the radioelectronic center in Cuba (or its equivalent), since it actually involves more intensive intelligence cooperation, albeit aimed at solving international and global problems, rather than solely realizing the geopolitical interests of the two countries.

On December 9, 2016, the countries took the next step in the development of military-political cooperation by signing the program of technological cooperation in the field of defense until 2020. It announced Russia's participation in the modernization of the Cuban Armed Forces and the development of strategically important infrastructure on the island. In the same year, for the first time in the Russian era, military equipment was officially delivered to the island, as part of an openly concluded contract – 2 Mi-17-1 helicopters. At the same time, the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation confirmed that small quantities of weapons and military equipment were supplied to Cuba as part of assistance to a strategic partner, i.e. virtually free of charge^[4].

Here, since the first official purchase of military equipment took place only in the second half of the 2010s, it is necessary to stop separately and give some characterization of the Revolutionary Army of Cuba and the military-industrial sector of the Republic. So, on the one hand, for 2024, the number of Cuban Armed Forces, according to the annual bulletin of the International Institute for Strategic Studies "The Military Balance", is 49 thousand people, and taking into account the gendarmerie and paramilitary formations, it reaches 75 thousand, which surpasses many armies of Central and Caribbean America ^{[23, p. 427]}. Moreover, according to the international ranking of military power of states, compiled annually by the Global Firepower analytical center, the Cuban armed forces occupy the 67th position among 145 countries represented in the list, also entering the top ten most powerful Latin American countries, according to military researchers. Thus, statistically, a picture emerges of a sufficiently combat-ready army suitable for solving various tasks to ensure the security of the country. However, on the other hand, over the past quarter of a century, the Cuban armed forces have rather degraded in their material and technical equipment and are, for the most part, poorly prepared to conduct real combat operations in modern warfare. Weapons and military equipment, despite some upgrades by Cuban designers, such as the BTR-100PB, are significantly outdated, and given that the country, whose main opponent is the United States, requires primarily air defense systems, communications, electronic warfare and modern aviation equipment, weapons and military equipment do not actually meet the needs of the state ^[24]. The current situation is explained by the fact that the Cuban Revolutionary Army, due to objective economic circumstances, has not updated its weapons since the collapse of the USSR, which predetermined its moral and technological obsolescence. Most of the technical and military equipment was and still is Soviet-made [23 p. 427-429]. The country was significantly dependent on the supply of spare parts for industrial equipment and the military-technical park to keep it in working order, since there is practically no national defense industry in Cuba, apart from individual enterprises engaged in the modernization of outdated equipment and the maintenance of what has been functioning since Soviet times. At the same time, the Republic does not have the finances to upgrade weapons and military equipment, and in this case it can rely primarily on loans from potential military partners. This, in turn, determines for Cuba the importance of military-political cooperation with Russia, which, after the annexation of Crimea, increasingly began to consider issues of technical and economic assistance for the sake of geopolitical preferences.

Returning directly to the development of military-political cooperation, after the departure of Raul Castro from the post of head of state^[5] – he remained the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba until April 2021, when he transferred powers to the current President of the republic, Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez^[6] – relations between the countries have not undergone drastic changes. On the contrary, Miguel Diaz-Canel, who became Chairman of the State Council of Cuba on April 19, 2018, and was elected president in 2019 under the new socialist Constitution, demonstrated to Russia that it is Cuba's main ally among the world powers. On November 2, 2018, he paid an official visit to Moscow, this trip was the first foreign visit of the new head of the Republic. In anticipation of the trip, contracts were signed for the construction of a GLONASS station in Cuba, and, as part of joint space activities, for the installation of a satellite information reception system in Cuba ^{[9, p. 119]}.

After the young generation of revolutionaries came to power in Cuba (since 2018), the political contacts of the states became more frequent: before the start of their work, delegations from various Cuban departments came to Russia several times a year. In particular, cooperation turned out to be intensive in 2019, when Cuban delegations visited Russia 6 times, and the Russian side made 4 return visits. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev visited Cuba at that time. Also in 2019, the Cuban military took part in the V International Army Games "Army 2019".

After the start of the special military operation in Ukraine on 02/24/2022, the importance of any military and political allies has increased significantly for the Russian Federation. Cooperation with the Republic of Cuba was also no exception. The frequency of mutual visits from delegations of different levels remained the same, and in the international arena, the Republic of Cuba continued to remain in solidarity with Russia on global issues, never once supporting UN resolutions condemning the Russian Federation^[7]. In turn, the Russian Federation cannot but support the UNGA resolutions on "The need to end the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba."

Thus, in November 2022, the 19th meeting of the Intergovernmental Russian-Cuban Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was held in Moscow, during which joint projects were agreed upon up to 2030. The documents affect the development of relations in strategically important areas of the economy and industry, and also apply to dual-use goods. In addition, in 2023 and 2024, ships of the Russian Navy entered Cuban ports. At the same time, the visit of 2024, when the frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov and the Kazan submarine entered the port of Havana, was used by the Russian Federation, among other things, to "demonstrate the strength" and capabilities of its Navy, which, without sanctions or admission from the United States, conducted a "friendly visit" to the strategic partner states of the Russian Federation – Venezuela. And Cuba. In turn, on the Cuban side, the visit showed the importance of the relationship between the partners, since the frigate in the port of the capital was visited by President of the country M. Diaz-Canel, who later wrote on his social media that he welcomed "friends from Russia."

Currently, Cuba is also actively involved in working with international organizations, in which Russia plays a leading role. In particular, in 2020, Cuba became the first Latin American country to receive observer status in the EAEU, and in 2024 it became a "BRICS partner country." This circumstance is especially important in the context of the Russian Federation's reorientation towards the countries of the Global South and its focus on alternative Western international political, economic and integration institutions.

Based on what has been said and having reached the present day chronologically in the study, it should be said that the current format of military-political cooperation between the countries indicates that the problematic period in relations with Cuba has passed. The Russian-Cuban Military-Industrial Complex, having rebounded from its lowest point at the beginning of the 21st century (the closure of the REC), steadily developed over the subsequent period, practically restoring the level of trust of Soviet times. The two countries have achieved almost complete political support in the international arena, accompanied by constant bilateral visits and other government activities towards each other. This is also supported by the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation dated March 31, 2023, where the development of "friendship, mutual understanding" and "multifaceted mutually beneficial partnership" with Cuba, along with Brazil, Venezuela and Nicaragua, is singled out among all Latin American states separately. Thus, the Russian Federation identifies for itself the key countries in LA with which it aims to develop relations in the context of the formation of a new world order, and among these States the Republic of Cuba occupies its rightful place.

However, despite the agreements reached, there are a number of factors hindering the development of military-political cooperation, for example, weak economic cooperation: in recent years, the trade turnover between the countries has been estimated at between 200 ^[25] and 450 million dollars ^[26] (for comparison, Cuba, Spain and China over the past two years it has been fluctuating around 1 billion years)^[8]. This is a consequence of the termination of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic in the 1990s. The USSR's place in the economy was taken by China, which for some years had a trade turnover with the island of about 2 billion dollars and maintained good prospects for an increase in military-industrial cooperation with Cuba ^[27]. Although the issues of economic presence are not a priority for the Russian Federation in Cuba, they are still important for full-fledged military-political cooperation, as they establish a sense of mutual responsibility and stimulate the process of political rapprochement, which increases military contacts. Other factors complicating the UPU may be the traditional political turbulence in Latin America, as well as Russia's focus on more important tasks, given that Russia has already left the island once, curtailing almost all military-political cooperation.

With regard to the military component of the interaction itself, it should be said that it is in a secondary position, although Russian specialists continue to regularly travel to Cuba and assist in supporting the Soviet military-industrial complex. In addition, a representative office of the Rostec State Corporation operates on the island, fulfilling the obligations of the Russian Federation in the framework of military-technical cooperation. At the same time, according to separate official documents announced earlier, Russia is involved in the modernization of the Cuban Armed Forces, although there has been no real confirmation of this from military experts and, so far, the Revolutionary Armed Forces continue to "age."

At the same time, on the part of the Republic of Cuba, it should be noted that even despite the precipitation after the withdrawal of the Russian military from the island, the Cubans, in their always difficult geopolitical situation in the region, have never turned away from cooperation with the Russian Federation ^{[12, Ch. 3]}. In addition, of course, in relations with Cuba, Russia is connected not only by modern contacts, but also by an established attitude towards the USSR (and therefore to Russia, the successor state) as a defender of the sovereignty of states opposed to the United States. The older and middle generation of Cubans still look at Russia as a brotherly country. Thus, the restoration of friendly relations with the Republic and financial support can directly affect the restoration of Russian military facilities in the region. In addition to ideological issues, the island's difficult economic situation remains an important factor for Cubans, which forces the government to look for any opportunities to interact with its allies. In this regard, it can be assumed that the issues of the hypothetical military presence of the Russian Federation in Cuba and the expansion of cooperation with the Revolutionary Army in need of renewal lie primarily in financial matters, therefore, as mentioned earlier, economic cooperation between the countries is extremely important for military-political cooperation.

Thus, after the closure of the REC in Cuba and the logical decline in the bilateral military-industrial complex, Russian-Cuban relations, gradually developing, returned to the strategic level. Of course, statistically, it is impossible to talk about the return of cooperation to the Soviet-Cuban level – the Russian Federation, by virtue of its capabilities, cannot provide support to the Republic of Cuba in the form in which the Soviet Union provided it. However, despite weak economic cooperation, the two countries have become close again in their political attitudes and visions of international relations, which in many ways is the basis for strategic military-political cooperation. However, without financial injections (and from both sides), issues of direct military cooperation are unlikely to go beyond the boundaries of today's contacts, therefore, the problem of developing military-political cooperation between the countries lies in the economic plane and its solution may directly affect the restoration of Russian military facilities in the region, and not only on the Island of Freedom.