Attempts to build a consonational democracy as an ethnopolitical problem in modern Macedonia

Tyurin Evgenii Anatol'evich ORCID: 0009-0003-7963-5876 PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Central Russian Institute of Management, a branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 12 Oktyabrskaya str., Orel, Russia, 302028 Turin.of.Foveran@yandex.ru Savinova Elena Nikolaevna ORCID: 0009-0009-0177-9603 PhD in Politics Associate Professor; Central Russian Institute of Management, a branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 12 Oktyabrskaya str., Orel, Russia, 302028 savinovae.n@yandex.ru

Golishevskiy Maksim Borisovich Senior Lecturer; Kaluga Branch; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Postgraduate student; Central Russian Institute of Management-branch; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration 248021, Russia, Kaluga region, Okruzhnaya str., 4 golishevsky@klg.ranepa.ru

Introduction

The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2024 in the Republic of North Macedonia (hereinafter referred to as the Republic of North Macedonia), which have changed the political accents within the country, have once again raised the issue of the directions and strategies of national state building in this young republic. The liberal agenda was replaced by the ideological attitudes of the right-wing conservatives, which could not but affect some aspects of the national state building being implemented in the republic, one of the basic problems of which remains the achievement of harmonization of relations between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians (as the most numerous peoples living in Macedonia)^[1].

The decisions taken today by the leaders of the republic (and this is indeed a fairly large range of actors) in the field of regulating interethnic relations are of considerable research interest to ethnopolitologists, especially in the light of the obvious changes taking place in the internal and external agendas of the EU and NATO.

In our opinion, in the context of the issue under consideration, the events of 2001 became a milestone for Macedonia, when the republic's authorities, with the active political participation of the European Union, agreed to sign the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the LFS), which promised to institutionalize the rights of the ethnic Albanian minority living in the republic in the state system. In this agreement, the State recognized the official status of the Albanian language, and also guaranteed Albanian representation in all branches of government. At the same time, while the practice of promoting the interests of ethnic groups at the level of representative government is long-standing (although not so widespread), in the executive and judicial branches of government (where professional qualifications have always been of paramount importance) various forms of quotas for the representation of specific ethnic groups are a very rare and archaic construct.

In order to justify the ethnopolitical archaisms introduced in Macedonia within the framework of the LFS, some experts appeal to the ideas of consociational democracy, which are noticeably widespread in Western political science discourse. These ideas, among other things, propose proportional ethnic representation as one of the main solutions to the settlement of interethnic contradictions arising within a single civil nation. Since the ideas of consociational democracy must take into account a specific national-state context formed by a variety of factors (civilizational-historical, socio-cultural, confessional, etc.), we propose to consider the practice of applying these ideas using the example of the Republic of North Macedonia. At the same time, we will try to keep in focus the issue of national-state building related to the topic of ethnic representation in Macedonian public administration bodies.

Consociational democracy as a way to overcome ethnopolitical confrontation

Today, researchers identify several strategies for resolving interethnic contradictions in the course of nation-building within the framework of a single multiethnic civil nation. However, not all strategies are aimed at taking into account the interests of each ethnic group living in a common territory. For example, taking into account the interests of relatively self-sufficient ethno-cultural communities is only one of three strategic approaches, while the other two involve ignoring the interests of certain ethnic groups for various reasons [5.P.124]. In the other two strategic approaches, the ethnic component does not become decisive in building a unified management system, although it is perceived differently. Nevertheless, in both cases, it is possible for representatives of a particular ethnic community to interact to resolve issues of a non-ethnic nature and without focusing on ethnic identity.

While maintaining opportunities for interaction with each other, communities separated by different identification features retain the possibility of using various "soft power" tools aimed at harmonizing relations. Although the concept of "soft power" is more often used in the field of international politics, there are examples of the use of "soft power" tools in the intra-national interaction of divided communities. Similarly, for example, in the UK, ethnopolitical communities that focus on different national and state agendas in London and Edinburgh use "soft power" tools [8.P. 127-128], and in Spain, through the same mechanisms, they try to reduce the tension of the ethnopolitical confrontation between the central authorities in Madrid and the population of Catalonia [9.P. 122-126].

On the other hand, the use of a model for regulating interethnic confrontation using the tools of consociational democracy is rather related to the mechanism by which the parties to the conflict are rigidly "separated into different sides of the sandbox," and their further rights and obligations, as well as interaction algorithms, are strictly justified by the actors' belonging to one of the ethnopolitical communities.

The ideas of consociational democracy originate from Arendt Leiphart's work "Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration" ^[3].

In formulating his ideas, Leiphart justified the democratic design of managing the multidimensional nature of society. Such a design, in his opinion, would make it possible to implement democratic governance without violating multicomponence, and without striving to form forced homogeneity. In his interpretation of a multicomponent society, Leiphart based himself on Eckstein's definition ^[11], according to which groups of society are delimited according to segments of social contradictions of a religious, ideological, linguistic, and cultural nature. Moreover, such boundaries coincide with political boundaries, according to which, in turn, social and political institutions (schools, political parties, public associations, etc.) are organized. The essence of Leiphart's consociational idea can be formulated as follows: in a multi-component (divided) community, sovereign power can be fragmented between groups (more precisely, between representatives of the elite who express the interests of their groups), taking into account an algorithm that includes a set of elements such as: consociationality of management, the right of mutual veto, proportionality (standard of representation), a high degree of autonomy in managing their affairs. It is obvious that in the implementation of such a strategy, elites who seek to preserve their opportunities and, therefore, desire a compromise coexistence, acquire special importance.

Today, Western political scientists still recognize the dominant influence of the ideas of consociationalism not only among theoretical experts, but also among practitioners of political activity [18.P.138]. Alison McCulloch explicitly states that when it is necessary to stop an armed civil confrontation, the international community prefers to use consociationalism as an institutional tool [15.P.502].

The consociational approach has been repeatedly used in different parts of the world to reach agreement in multi-component/divided communities, although the results of its use have not always been subjected to proper scientific understanding. In the 21st century, consociational methods were used in the course of nation-state building in Iraq in 2003-2020 ^[4], Lebanon ^{[7; 1]}, Bosnia and Herzegovina ^[10]. The possibilities of using consociational practices are being explored in Estonia ^[2], the South Caucasus ^[19], and Pakistan ^[17].

However, there are also criticisms about the use of consociational practices. McGarry and O'Leary, analyzing the application of the consociational approach in the divided community of Northern Ireland, although they claim that the task of achieving peace has been solved, nevertheless note some shortcomings of the traditional consociational theory, which considers states and regions as stable entities immune to external influence [16.P.46]. In addition, it is noted that during the unification of consociational approaches in national state building, researchers began to ignore the socio-cultural component due to the difficulties of empirical optimization ^[21]. Moreover, Horowitz explicitly points out that building a consociational democracy is impossible in conditions when the contradictions between groups are too serious, and consociationalism itself is preferable not so much for the majority as for certain minorities [14.pp.71-72].

One way or another, consociational practices, as noted above, are actively used in those strategies of nation-state building where the ethnopolitical interests of competing communities are taken into account, and the tools and methods used in the framework of regulation strive to preserve these interests. As a result, the factor of ethnic identity becomes more acute, which becomes crucial for the realization of the rights of community members, so even those problems that are not initially ethnic acquire an appropriate coloring due to the expectation of possible benefits from belonging to a particular ethnic group.

Using a consociational approach in public administration in Macedonia

Returning to the ethnopolitical case of Macedonia, we note that not all analysts associate the LFS with the ideas of consociational democracy in their purest form. According to some experts, the LFS reflects both consociational and centralist ideas, resulting in the formation of a mechanism for complex power-sharing ^{[13, p.83]}. At the same time, centralist ideas were originally intended to compensate for the above-mentioned disadvantages of the consociational approach. However, the application of this approach fits well into the tasks of analyzing the ethnopolitical realities of Macedonia (when considering the mechanisms for forming a ruling coalition on the basis of a parliamentary body, the Assembly of the Republic of Moldova, decentralization in local government and in solving language problems, as well as on foreign policy tracks). The Macedonian case shows that the measures taken in the republic only contributed to the deepening of ethnic differences in these areas ^{[13, p.93]}.

In the Russian ethnopolitological discourse, the scientific understanding of consociational practices in relation to national state building in the RSM is still episodic.

Thus, some studies have considered the possibility of shifting the emphasis in the ethnopolitical space of Macedonia from ethnicity towards civic identity (through the use of consociational mechanisms in the party system) ^{[6, p.112]}. At the same time, the use of consociational mechanisms is indicated as the political consequences of the LFS, among which the right of mutual veto and proportional representation are noted, which led in 2002 to the transformation of the electoral system and its transition from a mixed model to a proportional one. The conclusion is that the use of consociational mechanisms in the Macedonian party landscape has not only led to a decrease in ethnic tension in this country, but has also exacerbated a number of contradictions, as well as increased the influence of the EU and NATO on the political process in the Republic of Macedonia, which has become only one of the platforms for the West to assert its own geopolitical hegemony.

As noted above, the ruling coalition in Macedonia (due to the peculiarities of the state system) is indeed formed on the basis of a representative authority, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, but at the same time, the practice of consociational representation has been extended to the system of executive bodies. The basis for this is contained in paragraph 4.1 of the OPC. This paragraph establishes the extension of the principle of proportional employment to civil servants, and, in addition, it concerns state institutions of the public sector (institutions engaged in activities in the field of education, science, health, culture, labor, social protection and child protection, sports, as well as other structures representing the interests of society in the form of agencies and foundations) ^[22].

For a long time, the implementation of the provisions of the specified paragraph of the LFS took place, one might say, in a mild form. In 2007, a Strategy for the Fair Representation of minorities belonging to non-majority communities in Macedonia was adopted ^{[23, p.10]}. In accordance with common European practice, the position of Commissioner for the Protection of the Principle of Non-Discrimination and Fair Representation (Ombudsman) was introduced. The tools used by the Commissioner remained quite traditional for this position: monitoring the situation with minority representation, submitting reports, initiating inspections, and contacting the Prosecutor's office.

In addition, until 2018^[2], there was a rather specific solution to the problem of proportional employment. There was a K5 program in the republic, under which (to equalize representation) community representatives were hired by the LFS Secretariat, after which they were distributed to public sector institutions (some kind of "borrowed labor" in the public sector). Since it is difficult to keep track of the professional profile of employees in such a situation, there have been situations when employees hired by the Secretariat received salaries, but did not actually perform their work in any institution.

Given the current state of affairs, the Law on Public Sector Employees (maced. The law was developed in the Jewish sector)^[3], which, among other things, initiated the use of a new mechanism for proportional representation of ethnic groups, and also led to the creation of an equally interesting software product called Balancer (mac. Balancerote).

In accordance with article 5 of the aforementioned law, the procedure for planning the recruitment of employees was introduced using the annual plans of each institution. According to the developers, such an annual plan made it possible to analyze the existing representation of ethnic groups in the organization and plan indicators of ethnic representation for the next year. The Ministry of Information Society and Public Administration, together with a member of the Government of the Republic responsible for the implementation of the LFS, developed a "Methodology for planning employment in the public sector in accordance with the principle of appropriate and fair representation" ^{[21, p.109]}.

The mechanism looked like this. Institutions interested in hiring employees draw up Annual Employment Plans for the coming year. When drawing up such a plan, an institution's specialist, using the Balancer software product posted on the website of the Ministry of Information Society and Public Administration^[4], calculates the number of people from the relevant ethnic group that institutions can hire. At the same time, the Balancer takes into account current data from the national census and the ethnicity of government employees and employees already employed. The resulting calculation in the form of an Annual Employment Plan is coordinated by the institution with the Ministry of Information Society and Public Administration, which has the right to propose an adjustment to the plan. After agreeing on the plan, the institution has the right to recruit employees, strictly observing the ethnic proportion. Control was assigned to the Management Agency [20.pp.109-110].

Taking into account the provisions of Article 3 of the Administrative Service Act adopted in 2014^[5], such an employment scheme applied to both Macedonian civil servants and public sector employees.

Active supporters of such measures were representatives of the Albanian minority and, above all, the DSI (Democratic Union for Integration, DUI) party^[6]. Moreover, in 2022, the Minister of Information Society and Public Administration of the Republic of Moldova at that time, Admirim Aliti (an ethnic Albanian), referring to the results of the last population census, tried to include not only residents, but also non-residents, citizens of the Republic of Moldova, in the data used by Balancer during calculations. Such a measure would increase the number of ethnic Albanians included in the calculation by 1/3^[7].

To a certain extent, Macedonia has managed to achieve the desired result. According to the Register of Employees in the Public Sector for 2023 (at the time of writing, data for 2024 were not provided), ethnic representation in government agencies was as follows^[8]:

The data presented in the table mostly correspond proportionally to the ethnic identification in the Republic of Moldova according to the results of the population census of 2021.

Thus, pursuing the quite consonational goal of creating proportional representation at all levels of government, Macedonia institutionalized a system in which ethnicity became the primary condition for employment in the public sector. This situation could not but raise numerous questions both domestically and internationally, including from the European Union itself, which pretended to make maximum efforts to resolve ethnopolitical problems in Macedonia based on the ideas of consociational democracy.

As a result, as early as 2021, the chairman of the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, Bilyana Ivanovska, criticized the use of a Balancer, citing as an example numerous cases when a candidate registered with an Employment Agency with one ethnicity, but changed his ethnic identification at the stage of employment in order to get into the stated quota^[9].

In 2022, the chairman of the VMRO-DPMNE party, Christian Mitskovsky, criticized the use of a Balancer, since professional qualities, rather than ethnicity, should be the basis for professional realization^[10].

The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities^[11], operating under the auspices of the Council of Europe, also criticized the practice of such harsh ethnic stratification. In its Fifth Review of Northern Macedonia, published on May 18, 2022, it pointed out (in addition to those mentioned above) a number of other shortcomings of the mechanism under consideration [12.pp.25-26].

At the same time, the DSI actively defended the need to preserve the Balancer^[12]. The BESA movement (also Albanian) treated the problem more constructively, expressing its willingness to improve the mechanisms of proportional representation^[13].

Although, in 2023, the ruling SDSM party, together with the DSI, came to a decision on the need to abolish the Balancer^[14], real changes occurred only after the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2024 (when the leadership of the republic was completely replaced).

On October 9, 2024, the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR recognized that the provisions of the law that institutionalized the Balancer did not comply with the Constitution of the RSFSR regarding the obligation of candidates for administrative positions to indicate or declare their affiliation to a particular community in a job application^[15]. At the same time, two judges of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus of Albanian origin published a dissenting opinion, considering the abolition of the Balancer unconstitutional.

Some of the Albanian parties strongly criticized this decision. The pro-Albanian Alliance for Albanians (AA) party called this decision a confirmation of anti-Albanian policy^[16], the leader of this movement, Ziaedin Sela, accused the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Constitutional Court of depriving Albanians of their right to ethnic identity ^[17], and the DSI led their supporters to a rally in front of the building of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova^[18]. The more moderate VLEN party, which is in the ruling coalition, generally supported the abolition of the Balancer, while expecting a new alternative solution to maintain proportional ethnic representation in the government system. At the moment, a parliamentary commission on fair representation has been established, which is working on a new draft decision.

Conclusion

Thus, based on the ideas voiced by various political parties of the Republic of Moldova, it can be unequivocally concluded that the ethnic agenda has not been canceled when applying to public bodies of the Republic of Moldova, but the leadership of the Republic will look for a more "elegant" solution, in their opinion.

We see that the use of a consociationalist approach in building a management system in the Republic of Moldova in conditions of acute ethnopolitical confrontation led to additional polarization of the political interests of public groups and did not create conditions for interaction between these groups (as, for example, in the framework of the mutual use of "soft power" tools), which could mitigate the ethnopolitical confrontation.

^[1] Of course, it should be borne in mind that, in addition to Macedonians and Albanians, many other ethnic groups live in the republic, which is small in area and population.

^[2] Interview with Damjan Manczewski: Nema let go of the politics of revenge 18/04/2018 https://nezavisen.mk / intervju-so-damjan-manczewski-nema-otp/

^[3] The law was introduced in the January sector, Spring 27/14, 199/14, 27/16, 35/18 and 198/18. Prechistena verzija. Available on: https://www.mioa.gov.mk/sites/default/files/pbl_files/documents/legislation/zakon_za_vrabotenite_vo_javniot_sektor_-_konsolidiran_tekst.pdf

^[4] Remains available at the end of February 2025 at https://balancer.mioa.gov.mk/

^[5] The Law for Administrative Services, Spring Service 27/14, 199/14, 48/15, 154/15, 5/16, 142/16 and 11/18 and the spring service was held on 275/2019, 14/20 and 215/21. Available on: https://www.mioa.gov.mk/sites/default/files/pbl_files/documents/legislation/zakon_za_administrativni_sluzhbenici_2021.pdf

^[6] Non-residents are welcome to pay for majorization in a small number of countries. Sasho Tanevsky 04/09/2022 https://novamakedonija.com.mk/makedonija/politika/nerezidentite-ja-otvoraat-vratata-za-majorizacija-na-malcinstvoto-vrz-mnozinstvoto/

^[7] The new "balancer" for its work in the administration of the Senate and in Albanian in the dijfsporate. September 18, 2022. https://emagazin.mk/nov-balanser-za-vrabotuva-e-vo-administraci-ata-i-na-albancite-vo-di-asporata/

^[8] Extract one register for the work in this sector in 2023. https://www.mioa.gov.mk/mk-MK/news/izvestaj-od-registarot-na-vrabotenite-vo-javniot-sektor-za-2023-godina.nspx

^[9] DKSK preporachuva yes se isfrli balancerot od Legislate for administrative services, luѓeto mess up for yes se work https://mia.mk/story / дкск-препорачува-да-се-исфрли-балансерот-од-законот-за-административни-службеници-луѓето-лажат-за-да-се-вработат

^[10] https://emagazin.mk/mickoski-podgotven-sum-da-razgovaram-za-brishe-e-na-procentite-za-edna-izborna-edinica-za-brishe-e-na-badenter/

^[11] The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on November 10, 1994 and entered into force on February 1, 1998, sets out the principles to be followed, as well as the goals that States must achieve in order to ensure the protection of national minorities

^[12] And on Arbr Ademi mu preci "20 sucks"25/10/2022 https://nezavisen.mk/i-na-arbr-ademi-mu-prechi-20-otsto/

^[13] Besa bi got into a lot of trouble for attacking Badenter's principle. 27/10/2022 https://nezavisen.mk/besa-bi-razgovarala-za-ukinuvanje-na-badenteroviot-pricip/

^[14] Pavlovska-Daneva: Sit down parties need to agree to the deck "Balancerot" and apply it. 10.10.2024. https://mia.mk/story / pavlovskadaneva-sit-parties-are-different-se-consonant-deck-balancerot-e-iscrpen-in-use

^[15] The court is chartered for the Republic of Northern Macedonia.br.90/2024. Skopje, 09.10.2024 https://ustavensud.mk/archives/30840

^[16] The reaction of AA to AA was due to the "balancer". Sasho Arsowski, October 9th, 2024 https://mia.mk/story / reaction of aa-to-aa-for-a-drop-on-balance

^[17] Villages: The court of the village of ukina balancerot tuku "pravoto na etnica pripadnoste", Elizabeta Veljanovska-Ndeska, October 10, 2024. https://mia.mk/story / villages-are-chartered-by-the-court-of-ne-go-ukina-balancerot-tuku-pravoto-na-etnichka-pripadnost

^[18] Representatives and sympathizers on DUI se soba are charged with a fine for attacking Balanceroth. Andrej Risteski, October 9th, 2024. https://mia.mk/story / претставници-и-симпатизери-на-дуи-се-собраа-пред-уставен-по-денешната-одлука-за-укинување-на-балансерот