Intentional Analysis of Social Acts in Adolf Reinach’s "The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law"

Lyu I ORCID: 0009-0009-1431-0775 Postgraduate student; Department of Theory and History of State and Law; St. Petersburg State University 199034, Russia, St. Petersburg, nab. University, 7-9 liuyi_1996@outlook.com Other publications by this author

Introduction

In the "A Priori Foundations of Civil Law" (1913)^{[18, 27]} ( Adolf Reinach's AOGP presents the first project of the phenomenology of law in the history of legal thought. Despite the fact that Reinach's idea of an a priori doctrine of law is not limited to the doctrine of social acts, almost all of the philosopher's mentioned work is devoted to them. The concept of a social act, on the one hand, was developed by a jurist under the influence of E. Husserl's phenomenology, on the other hand, it is a "bridge" between phenomenological methodology and the theory of (civil) law insofar as it identifies elementary units of legal communication: message, request, order, inquiry, promise, etc. For Reinakhovsky's reconstruction^[9] It is not enough to define the concepts of phenomenological philosophy used by scientists, such as "act", "intentionality", "object relation", "experience", etc.^{[10, p. 470]}. It is also important to show the process of phenomenological analysis of social acts. In this article, taking into account A. Reinach's participation in the republication of E. Husserl's "Logical Studies" (hereinafter – "LI") of 1911-1913 ^{[31, p. 621]}, we focus on the Russian translation of the first part of the second volume of E. Husserl's "Logical Studies" in their second edition^{[4, p. 565]}.

The question of the relation of the so-called inner experience to the social act is one of the essential provisions of the AOGP, which reveals the essence of phenomenological analysis, as it was demonstrated in LEE. Reinach briefly but explicitly describes this relationship through a number of peculiar (types of) social acts ^{[18, p. 179]}. Of course, the relationship between inner experience and social act concerns the key points of understanding the "act" and the method of intentional (essential) discretion in Reinach's phenomenological philosophizing, which makes it necessary to take into account also the work of the scientist on phenomenological philosophy before 1913^{[5, 33]}, in particular "The Essence and systematics of Judgments" (1908)^[29] and "Non-social and Social Acts" (1911)^[28].

1. The problem of interpreting the methodology of the a priori doctrine of law: two approaches

In the research literature devoted to the a priori doctrine of law by A. Reinach, two main approaches to the interpretation of the "A Priori foundations of civil law" are distinguished: linguistic and "Husserl" approaches. The latter considers this book to be one of the examples of the implementation of Husserl's phenomenology^{[16, 19]}, while the former pays special attention to the connection between the doctrine of social acts and the theory of speech acts (J. Austin, J. Searle)^{[21, 30]}. The problem of the linguistic approach, in our opinion, lies in inconsistency (circulus vitiosus): the subsequent rejection of phenomenological reduction (epoch) by supporters of realistic phenomenology does not prove Reinach's rejection of the phenomenological attitude and intentional analysis, as they were described in Husserl's "LIE". If the "Husserl" interpretation sees in the "AOGP" primarily the application of the ideas of early phenomenology, then from the point of view of the linguistic approach, the phenomenology of E. Husserl, up to his transcendental turn, is considered not so much as a method underlying the a priori doctrine of law by A. Reinach, but as the historical context of his work, indicating institutional affiliation. A. Reinach's approach to the phenomenological movement. The focus of the linguistic interpretation is, in addition to the links between "AOGP" and works on the theory of speech acts (in particular, the book by J. Austin's "How to do things with words"), the ontological position of A. Reinach, including Reinach's concept of "state of affairs" ("Sachverhalt"), and the doctrine of material a priori (i.e., "necessary being") are found^{[23, 26]} A. V. Koltsov rightly concluded that, in contrast to E. Husserl's skepticism in Logical Studies, A. Reinach is "obviously more "realistic" in his formulations"^{[5, p. 54]}. It is also worth noting that, according to N. V. Motroshilova, "it has not yet been possible to satisfactorily find a Russian equivalent" for the word "Sachverhalt" ^{[14, p. 442]}.

At the same time, E. Husserl considered Reinach's project "an attempt to realize the long-rejected idea of a priori doctrine of law on the basis of pure phenomenology (emphasis added. – And L.)"^{[25, p. 302]}. As was rightly noted by V. I. Molchanov, from a terminological point of view, the first book of "Ideas towards Pure Phenomenology" (hereinafter – "Ideas I") differs from "LEE" in a radical way: in "Logical Research", apart from the concepts of "ideation" and "intentionality", there are no other specifically phenomenological concepts introduced by Husserl, and In Ideas I, the main concepts are "epoch", "phenomenological reduction", "natural attitude", "noesis" and "noema"^{[12, pp. 24-25]}. Nevertheless, the absence of relevant concepts in the AOGP does not indicate Reinach's rejection of E. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, despite the fact that the second volume of the LIE describes the method of phenomenological reduction in terms of its two stages – empirical reduction and phenomenological reduction proper^{[13, p. 64]}. N. Kadena concluded It is noted that Reinach's project of the a priori doctrine of law is one of the most vivid examples of the implementation of E. Husserl's method, as it is presented in "Ideas I"^[22]. Unlike J. Dubois, who does not see any differences between Reinach's methodology and that of classical philosophy ^{[23, pp. 149-151]}, Cadena discovers a methodological connection between the "A Priori foundations of civil law" and "Ideas I", and Cadena in this article asked precisely how to apply the phenomenological method (essential description) to legal subjects, including social acts ^{[22, p. 96]}. In addition, historical and philosophical studies show that A. Reinach was probably not familiar with the works of proponents of the theory of speech acts^{[6, 31]}.

The question we are interested in is, what are the methodological grounds that allow us to attribute the project of A. Reinach's a priori doctrine of law to the phenomenological philosophy of law? On the one hand, of course, the a priori doctrine of law is broader than the doctrine of social acts, on the other hand, Reinach's concept of a social act is based on the same principles of phenomenological philosophy. In other words, what were the grounds for Husserl to see in A. Reinach's a priori doctrine of law the realization of the ideas of pure phenomenology ^{[25, pp. 302-303]} in relation to the study of law?

It is difficult to disagree with the fact that "although phenomenology as a separate field of philosophy is not reduced to a method, the definition of phenomenological philosophy based on the phenomenological method," writes A.V. Yampolskaya, "is quite generally accepted" ^{[20, pp. 27-28]}. Despite the fact that from the point of view of Heidegger, M. Merleau-Ponty and a number of representatives of realistic phenomenology, "Ideas I" are perceived as a departure from the principles proclaimed in "LEE", "pure, transcendental phenomenology, the project of which is outlined in "Ideas I", is, – emphasizes A.V. Mikhailov, – not by a different type of phenomenology, but only by a different level of consideration, consistently following from the principles of the phenomenological method laid down in "Logical Research" (in particular, by consistently conducting the method of intentional analysis)"^{[8, pp. 9-10]}. Taking into account the fact that Reinach's project of the phenomenology of law can be considered as an intermediate version between Husserl's and realistic phenomenology^[15], we do not interfere in the "struggle" of the two phenomenologies^{[5, pp. 190-191]} and refrain from discussing the problem of "heretics from phenomenology"^[17], we set the task to analyze the concept of intentional discretion in "AOGP", taking into account the conceptual apparatus of phenomenological analysis in "LI", in particular, in the V Study "Intentional experiences and their contents" (hereinafter – the V Study).

2. The vs event. Experiences: the transition to Reality (reell) discretion

According to Husserl, phenomenological analysis requires a transition from an empirical attitude (empirical psychology) to a phenomenological one, or, in LEE's terminology, to the real one (reell) discretion. In the literature, the term "reell" is also translated into "real" ("real content", etc.)^[2], but in this article we are guided by V. I. Molchanov's translation: for example, real (reell) content, real-phenomenological (reell-phenomenologische) unity of experiences, real (reell) In his Fifth Study, Husserl uses the word "reel" in order to distinguish between experiencing the content of consciousness and a fleeting act of consciousness as a real event ^{[4, pp. 318-319]}. The relationship between the concepts of reell and real is explained by M. A. Belousov: "Reell is a neologism that characterizes the components of the stream of consciousness in their difference from the material properties and parts (which can be called "real" – real). Reel means "experienced", "real content" is the content of consciousness in the proper sense of the word, i.e. an integral part of the stream of consciousness as a whole" ^{[2, p. 63]}. What is given (in contemplation) through a subjective act of experiencing (for example, the act of visual perception of a box) is, on the one hand, the experienced content of this subjective act, and on the other, the phenomenon of the implied (assumed) the act of the object ^{[4, pp. 351-352]}. It goes without saying that the experienced content (i.e., experiencing a thing^{[4, p. 322]}) is not what is considered an act of experiencing: "For real (real) phenomenological consideration, subjectivity itself is nothing; it is, generally speaking, transcendent to the act. It does not matter in what sense and to what extent it is justified to talk about her "being", it does not matter whether she is real or ideal, whether she is true, possible or impossible, the act is "directed at her"^{[4, p. 376]}. Accordingly, according to LEE, the phenomenological transition consists in maintaining this fundamental difference between the subjective act of experiencing (as an event, process) and experiencing (phenomenon) the object that is represented in the act. N. V. Motroshilova quite rightly believes that this transition "becomes unexpectedly simple" ^{[13, p. 60]}.

It is important to understand the course of intentional analysis in Reinach's project of the phenomenology of law, since it is precisely in the application of the phenomenological method that the point of interest lies. Let's try to reconstruct the course of the lawyer's phenomenological analysis as much as possible based on the content of "AOGP" and "LI".

Let's start with the thesis about the equivalence between the statement about the effectiveness of a social act and the existential judgment about the unity of legal education. On the one hand, the "endpoint" of intentional analysis is a single-individual education, which has a sign of temporality. On the other hand, the "starting point" of the phenomenological perception of a social act is not a social act corresponding to any temporal formation in the sense defined by Reinach: "Spontaneous and in need of being heeded, we will call acts social acts" ^{[18, p. 176]}. In our opinion, the "equivalent" of the existence (Existenz) of a single legal entity is the effectiveness (Wirksamkeit) of the corresponding social act. The social act that the addressee heeded is considered effective. Of course, the effectiveness of any social act is understood in the sense of attribution, which a priori allows predication ^{[4, p. 428]} in the form of "(this) social act acts." Moreover, the effectiveness of a single individual social act "refers" to the corresponding event unity of the fact that one social act was expressed by the addressee outside of the other (addressee), and the fact that the addressee of the act did not just perceive (i.e., "neutrally took note"^{[4, pp. 441-443]}) this act But he heeded him. This unity, therefore, encompasses not only the social act itself, but also other components related to this event, including the addressee and addressee, as well as the physical phenomenon of manifestation outside of this act. The effectiveness of a single social act is inconceivable without the addressee and addressee of the act, just as the possession of a right is without the bearer of the right. Thus, the unity of an effective social act in a psychologically real discretion is an empirically observed, fleeting interpersonal event, a fact.

Moving on to the real (reell) At our discretion, we distinguish from the unity of an "effective social act" as a fleeting event its real-phenomenological (real-phenomenological) content ^{[4, pp. 44-45]}, i.e. the experience of an effective social act. The correlate of an effective (single) social act in the world of legal entities is the corresponding legal entity: effective (single) the act of requesting correlates with the corresponding request. In other words, the intention of an effective social act is "directed" at a corresponding change in the world of legal entities, which is predetermined by the content of this event. Accordingly, modification of any part of this unity (for example, replacement of the addressee of the act) entails a corresponding change in the correlative (temporal) legal formation, i.e., in the words of practicing lawyers, entails a different legal consequence. Taking into account the above, this cumulative experience is characterized by the fact that in addition to its own social act, its addressee and addressee also take place, as well as peculiar connections between these components. An effective social act is like a composite machine, "which itself consists of machines, and moreover it is a compound of such a kind that the work of the aggregate machine is precisely the aggregate work into which the work of the machine parts flows"^{[4, p. 368]}. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between the experiences of an effective social act (as an event unity) and one's own social act (as part of this event) precisely for the reason that their intentional correlates do not coincide. Of course, intentional analysis is also applicable to the addressee and addressee of the act. Moreover, it is quite possible that other immanent components are allowed, depending on the descriptive originality (essence) of a particular type of social act.

Thus, in the real (reell) The event unity of an "effective social act" is a cumulative experience, and its components – its own social act, the addressee of the act, the addressee of the act – are partial experiences of an "effective social act" as a whole. Thus, we cannot agree with A. V. Koltsov that "a social act cannot be fully attributed to the class of experiences, since ... experience is only an integral part of this kind of intentional act" ^{[5, pp. 40-41]}. Accordingly, we are no longer talking about the real subjects of law and the event between them, but in the strict sense about their experiences. The interrelationships between these experiences-parts are the connections of experiences that are essentially different from the connections of things (Sachen), to which "the experiences of thinking are intentionally related"^{[3, p. 199]}, and the connections of truths (i.e. logical connections) in which "the unity of things attains objective significance as what it is there is"^{[3, p. 199]}. V. I. Molchanov accurately pointed out that this is a fundamental difference that "constitutes phenomenology itself": "The irreducibility of these three types of connections forms not only the initial problematic situation, but also the framework of phenomenology as a whole"^{[11, p. 6]}. Of course, in the a priori doctrine of law, a situation is allowed when the effectiveness of a social act encompasses not one, but several social acts. Reinach also writes about more complex experiences (compositions) of a social act, including the modification of one of the (independent) parts of this experience with the help of another social act ("a representative (alternative) social act"^{[18, p. 183]}).

It is also worth noting that Reinach thus drew special attention to the legal problem of effectiveness, thereby showing the applicability of phenomenology not only to the theory of law, but also to the study of legal practices. According to Theodor Elsenhans, the phenomenological method, as applied in the "AOGP", cannot exclude empirical elements ^{[24, 32]}.

3. The intentional subject of a social act

So, we begin to analyze our own social act. The analysis of social acts requires paying attention to the act itself, and not to other parts of the event unity of the "effective social act" – the addressee and the addressee. One's own social act is understood as that which the addressee heeded, and that through which the event unity of an "effective social act" can be discovered externally (empirically); for example, a written agreement between persons.

Next, the transition to the real (reell) discretion requires a distinction between the real-phenomenological content of the social act itself and its outward manifestation. This distinction takes place in the AOGP, and it goes back to the LI. The phenomenological "isolation" of phenomenal unity reveals something new in Reinach's project: while Husserl formulated the task of pure logic at the beginning of "WHETHER" – "to extract meaning from the psychological and grammatical shell"^{[10, p. 522]}, Reinach understood the external side (i.e., "body", "plane") A social act is broader than a textual and grammatical shell: "Social acts ... have an external and an internal side, just as there is a soul and a body. The body of social acts can vary widely, although their soul remains the same. The order can manifest itself in facial expressions, gestures, and words" ^{[18, pp. 176-177]}. Thus, Reinach distinguishes the external side of his own social act in the same way as Husserl – the physical phenomenon of expression (as a physical phenomenon) from the phenomenological unity of expression, enlivened by meaning.

In this sense, both the expression and the social act itself should be considered as a fused unity ^{[18, pp. 176-177]}. Considering the external manifestation of a social act as a consequence of the impossibility of direct access to other people's experiences^{[5, p. 41]}, Reinach emphasizes that essential for any social act is the need to be heeded ^{[18, p. 177-178]}. If one person turned to another and expressed his opinion about the current weather in a language that the latter does not speak, then in this case we are talking about an expression, and not about a message as a social act (for example, warning the competent authority about adverse weather conditions). What remains after the "purification" of the external manifestation of the social act as a phenomenal unity is the real-phenomenological content of the social act itself, or, in other words, the experience of the social act. Of course, there is no need to talk about the transition to a phenomenological attitude, since this transition is the foundation of our analysis. Accordingly, we further understand the experience in the Husserl sense ^{[2, pp. 61-72]}.

Any social act, according to Reinach, is intentional^{[18, 28, 31]}. More precisely, social acts (as experiences) belong to a special class of intentional experiences – spontaneous experiences: "Spontaneous acts are experiences that belong not only to the Ego, but in which the Ego is revealed as active" ^{[18, 5, 30]}. As for intentionality, this concept is understood using the so–called object relation, in which the correlate of experience is an object in the broadest sense ^{[4, p. 41]}: an intentional object is what this experience is "directed" at ^{[4, 12, 13]}. For example, the intentional subject of the communication act may be, for example, the state of affairs regarding adverse weather conditions (what is being reported); the intentional subject of the transfer act may be movable property, real estate, property rights, etc. One social act (of a certain type) may be the intentional subject of another social act and, thus Thus, a "chain" of social acts is formed, for example: Anton promised Roman that he would request the competent authority to inform the company owned by Roman about adverse weather conditions (to confirm the presence of force majeure). For experiencing, its objective correlate is a transcendental subject (for example, the state of affairs about adverse weather conditions, a house, the god Jupiter ^{[4, p. 343]}, etc.). At the same time, it is obvious that intentionally different social acts (as experiences) can be directed at the same subjectivity. Reinach gives an example of the fact that one and the same conceivable content (for example, the commission of a certain action by one person in relation to another: the provision of services, medical care, etc.) can have both a message and a request, an order and a promise ^{[18, p. 164]}. It is not difficult to distinguish from the specific features of such social acts the same orientation of the subject indication to the same state of affairs (Sachverhalt); we will say: for such acts, the same intentional object is significant. In the words of Husserl, we can "grasp something in one ray of thought (Meinungsstrahl), in one technique (in einem Griff)" so that it (as something transcendent in relation to the act of experiencing) becomes the intentional subjectivity of our experience^{[4, p. 418]}; accordingly, from the point of view of grammar, the content of the message (requests, orders, promises, etc.) can be represented using a subordinate clause ^{[7, pp. 443-444]}, for example, in the phrase "that ..." ("that Anton will perform repair work for Roman", "that Anton will provide medical assistance to Roman").

However, we are not interested in the variety of intentional subjects of social acts, but in the objective relation of social acts or, in other words, the intention of experiencing the social act itself (a synonymous expression for "social act as experience"). As noted above, the object that is implied (assumed) in the act is transcendent in relation to the act and, thus, is nothing for the real discretion of experience ^{[4, p. 376]}. N. V. Motroshilova emphasized that according to "WHETHER" the nature of the subjectivity itself is indifferent to intentional experience (intentional attitude): "In the theory of intentionality, only the moment of the "attribution" of consciousness to an object is characterized, and nothing more" ^{[13, pp. 67-68]}. Therefore, attention should also be paid to the fact that the well-known Husserl slogan "Back to the things themselves!" should be interpreted taking into account his theory of intentionality. "'Things themselves' are what is given in contemplation with evidence," writes M. A. Belousov, "and not something real in the ordinary sense of the word" ^{[1, p. 68]}. The same house can be an intentional subject of, say, civil transactions of different categories, and it is not what this house is (year of construction, cost, location, etc.) that determines the qualification of one document as a purchase and sale agreement or a donation agreement. The fact that this house acts as an intentional subject of a particular civil transaction is determined by the content of the transaction, i.e., an immanent part of the corresponding experience of such social acts in the real world discretion.

We have established that for different types of social acts, the same (same) general moment may be significant, positing the same (same) intentional subject of acts: in this case, social acts are seen as having an identical part of their (real-phenomenological) content, defining the intentional subject of the act. Now we will pay attention to what distinguishes social acts with identical intentional subjectivity in appearance (Spezies).

In "LI", in order to more strictly teach about the whole and the part, the terms "fragment" ("Stück") are distinguished in the sense of an independent part and "moment" ("Moment") in the sense of an independent part; Husserl emphasizes that independence or lack of independence is understood relative to a certain whole, therefore one unity can be independent a fragment of one whole and an independent moment of another whole ^{[4, p. 235]}. Accordingly, this assumption, which makes a specific transcendent something the intentional subjectivity of a particular social act, is a non–independent moment of experiencing the act; according to the terminology of the Fifth Study, this is the matter through which the experience "grasps" the corresponding (transcendent) subjectivity ^{[4, pp. 378-379]}. Further, social acts as experiences of different kinds (for example, one is an act of request, and the other is an act of order), "having" the same matter and the same intentional object (for example, "that Anton will provide medical assistance to Roman"), differ in quality^{[4, p. 375]}. Consequently, a variation in the matter of a social act is a variation in which object the act belongs to, and a variation in quality is a variation in the mode in which this object is intentional^{[4, pp. 376-377]}. The manifestations of different types of social acts with identical substance may not differ grammatically from each other (for example, in the case of a request and an order with the content "Anton will provide medical assistance to Roman"), but in one case there is a requesting intention, and in the other – an ordering intention. Of course, we initially distinguish intention in the usual sense as the focus of attention and intention in the phenomenological sense ^{[4, p. 343]}.

Reinach uses the word "Moment" to denote the quality of an experience of one kind or another, for example, "the moment of affirmation" (Behauptungsmoment)^{[29, pp. 341-342]}. Therefore, we can call the general quality of social acts (as a special class of experiences, which includes the act of communication, the act of asking, etc.) a social moment. Thus, Reinach sees the need for a social act to be heeded as a distinguishing feature of social acts from other spontaneous experiences that require Another (fremdpersonale) ^{[18, 28, 30]}; this feature is called the social moment (soziales Moment). As stated at the beginning of the article, this general point of social acts is related to the effectiveness of the social act.

From the point of view of terminology, it is necessary to make one remark: we observe certain features in the works of A. Reinach in comparison with the terminological apparatus of E. Husserl in "LEE". In addition to the fact that the terms "matter" and "quality" are not used in the AOGP, while the term "act" ("Akt") in Reinach's works is primarily used to denote a (subjective) act (Tun)^{[28, p. 356]}, Husserl in uses the word "act" as an abbreviation of "intentional experience," that is, an act of consciousness in the real (reell) discretion ^{[4, p. 348]}. Accordingly, according to Husserl, in the (descriptive) content of any intentional experience, two presupposing (abstract) moments are distinguished – matter (Aktmaterie) and quality (Aktqualität). A.V. Koltsov rightly points out that the terminological parallelism of "matter" – "content" is established based on Reinach's "Introduction to Philosophy"^{[5, pp. 49-50]}; of course, such parallelism can also be traced in the "AOGP", since it is of no small importance for understanding the structure of a social act.

Obviously, the social moment (soziales Moment) is not what determines whether social acts belong to one type or another. We are talking about that non-independent part of a social act that is identical in social acts of the same type; for example, all acts of request have an identical moment of request (the requesting moment) ^{[29, p. 341]}. Distinguishing social acts of one kind from another is thus a distinction in quality.

The study of the matter of a social act concerns precisely the objective relation of a social act – the intentional relation of a social act as an experience and its objective correlate. It goes without saying that "simple" objective comprehension does not exhaust the essence of any social act; turning to phenomenological terminology, we believe that the intention of any kind of social act is not objectifying insofar as, in addition to how a social act has the function of making a certain subjectivity representable, there is also a feature of the corresponding type intertwined with this function. For example, the act of asking (for example, a request from Ivan to Anton) not only makes something representable (for example, "Anton will provide medical assistance to Roman"), but makes it exactly what the addressee of the act is asking for; the addressee not only has this definite something in mind through the act of asking, but also understands In this case, there is one social act and one (relevant) intentional object, rather than two acts – one act of "simply presenting/pointing out something" and one act of "recognizing it as such." The point is that a social act (as an experience) can be multilayered intentional. "This multilayered structure (Mehrfältigkeit) of an intentional relationship is carried out ... not in a combination of side–by-side or consecutive acts - then the object would be present anew with each act intentionally, i.e. as repeated, but strictly in one act, in which the object appears only once, but in this uniqueness of its presence is achieved. the purpose of a complex intention"^{[4, pp. 390-391]}.

Reinach writes: "... All social acts presuppose... inner experiences. Each social act, in accordance with the essential law, has its basis in a certain type of inner experience, the intentional content of which is identical to the intentional content of the social act or is connected with it in a certain way" ^{[18, p. 179]}. Taking into account the fact that, according to Husserl, the quality of the act (i.e., the quality of intentional experience) is grounded in the matter of the act ^{[4, pp. 378-379]}, we believe that the philosophers had in mind the same attitude of foundation. Now we will look at this in more detail.

4. The "inner experience" of a social act

K. Schumann defines the inner experience of a social act as the mental experience of the addressee of the act: "Social acts are based on mental states or actions that are immanent to the potential performer of the social act. So, a message presupposes confidence in what has been communicated, asking questions implies uncertainty, commanding implies a desire for something to be done, etc."^{[30, p. 160]}. K. Mulligan similarly asserts that the inner experience of a social act is its mental prerequisite ^{[26, p. 38]}. These interpretations are indisputable. The doubt is caused by the fact that, firstly, the AOGP does not use the term "innerpsychisch" to characterize the inner experience of a social act ^{[28, p. 357]} in the way that K. Schumann consistently did when interpreting this book ^{[30, p. 156-157]}; Secondly, the relationship of foundation between (one) social act and its inner experience would become, according to Schumann's approach, the relationship between a social act and another independent phenomenal unity – a mental experience (i.e., an act of experiencing in the ordinary sense). Reinach clearly defined that, for example, persuasion is not an act^{[28, p. 355]}; of course, based on the consistency and rigor of the philosopher's terminology, persuasion as an inner experience that bases a message (as a social act) ^{[27, p. 162]}, cannot be identified with the mental act of persuasion without a separate justification. Distracting from the problem of opposition to realistic and transcendental phenomenology – in particular, from the thesis of rejection of Husserl's reduction (epoch) among the "Munchens" – we try to reveal the essence of this foundation and thus the structure of the social act itself with the help of "LEE".

Above, we established that a social act (as an experience) is an integral part of experiencing the event unity of an effective social act (along with the addressee and addressee of the act). This is what is sent to the addressee, what the addressee of the act heeded, in real (reell) discretion; it is intentional, i.e., "directed" at something as a subject correlate. It is important to distinguish from a social act (as an experience) the content through which the act is carried out. This difference becomes clear when Reinach states that the modification of a social act is not a modification of the content ^{[18, p. 181]}. We will not discuss in detail the modifications of social acts and their contents here; suffice it to note that the real (real) content of a social act and its content in the usual sense are not the same thing.

Further, according to Reinach, belief in the content of the message grounds the message as a social act; for example, belief in the content of the message "there are adverse weather conditions" serves as the basis for the act of communication. In the absence of this belief, the message is carried out, but "this is only an imaginary realization" ^{[18, pp. 179-180]}. The jurist specifically emphasized: "A social act that is somehow carried out among people, on the contrary, is not divided into an independent act and an accidental statement, but forms an internal unity of arbitrary implementation and arbitrary expression (emphasis added. – And L.)"^{[18, p. 177]}. In other words, belief in the content of a message, for example, refers to the "implementation" of a social act as an internal part (non-independent moment) of the latter, which cannot be considered as a separate (integral) act. In our opinion, by using the adjective "internal", the jurist means that belief in the content of a message is not a mental experience of the addressee of a social act, but an internal (immanent) component of experiencing one's own act of communication and, thus, a relatively mediated part of the event unity of an "effective social act"^{[4, pp. 244-245]}.

Based on Reinach's definition, however, there is a common point between the "implementing" content and the social act – a common intentional subject (for example, the same state of affairs about the presence of adverse weather conditions). Thus, inner experience is, firstly, intentional ^{[29, pp. 341-342]}, and secondly, it is an independent part of the corresponding social act. Consequently, we again distinguish "inside" an inner experience - for example, beliefs in the content of a message – the corresponding quality and matter – a convincing moment (Behauptungsmoment) and a comprehension that presupposes subjectivity.

Further, in order to reveal the essence of the relationship between belief in the content of the message (as an internal experience) and the corresponding social act of the message (as a partial experience of the cumulative experience of an "effective social act"), it is necessary to pay attention to the concept of foundation in Husserl's understanding of "WHETHER": "The content of the type α is based in the content of the type β if α is based on by its very nature (i.e., according to a certain pattern, based on its species identity), β cannot exist without simultaneous existence; however, the question remains whether this requires the coexistence of some γ, δ, etc. or not"^{[4, p. 250]}. Accordingly, the foundation of the inner experience of a social act cannot be interpreted as a causal connection between two fleeting subjective acts, two empirical facts; it is not a connection between mental experiences. In our opinion, the foundation of a social act by its inner experience, according to Reinach, is nothing more than the foundation of the quality of the act by its matter in "LI" ^{[4, pp. 378-379]}. In other words, in this case we find an iteration ^{[4, pp. 441-443]} of matter within a social act as an experience, and the intentional object remains the same, on the one hand; on the other hand, with the identity of the object grasp, the quality of the inner experience (for example, the convincing moment of the inner experience of the act of communication) "turns" into the quality of the corresponding social act (for example, the communicating moment of the act of communication) by "multiplying" by the overall quality of social acts – the social moment (soziales Moment). That is, in the case of the act of communication, there is a "social modification" of the convincing moment, the act of questioning – the moment of uncertainty (die Ungewißheit), the act of asking – the desiring moment (der Wunsch), the act of ordering – the volitional moment (der Will), etc. the will to make judgments ^{[4, p. 441]} on the part of Alexander Pfender, Johannes Daubert and, perhaps, Adolf Reinach^{[30, p. 140-141]}.

Consequently, the "imaginary implementation" of a social act – as already noted above – entails a special modification regarding the effectiveness of the act (i.e., the question "what are the legal consequences of this effective act"): for example, the competent authority provided deliberately false information about the presence of adverse weather conditions – this is not an act of communication; accordingly, duringFirstly, we cannot assert the existence of force majeure insofar as there are no sufficient grounds for this, and secondly, a new (adequate) qualification of this act by the competent authority is required. Thus, it is primarily a question of "is" or "is not," i.e., truth and falsity. Therefore, we cannot agree with A.V. Koltsov that the problematic nature of the alleged implementation of a social act is exclusively ethical (moral) in nature ^{[5, p. 166]}; moreover, it is not always necessary and possible to establish an ethical moment in the act of a competent authority in order to invalidate its act. In relation to legal practice of this kind, "social hypocrisy"^{[18, pp. 179-180]} concerns the problem of legal qualification, for example, the problem of the validity of a particular type of civil contract.

Conclusion

The method of intentional analysis demonstrated above, using the example of AOGP, shows the methodological value of phenomenology (as outlined in LEE) for the theoretical science of law as interpreted by Reinach.

Summing up, we have come to the following conclusions.

1. Any (own) social act is an intentional experience that is part of the experience of the event unity of the "effective social act". The connection between a social act, the addressee and the addressee of the act is a connection of experiences.

2. The inner experience of a social act is not a mental experience, it is an immanent, non-independent part of a social act, which, firstly, is an intentional experience by its nature, and, secondly, determines the validity of the social act a priori. Accordingly, the connection between a social act and its inner experience also refers to the connections of experiences.

Thus, the phenomenology of law by A. Reinach studies legal experiences and their connections in the way it was outlined in "LEE". It is shown that it is precisely the "Husserl" interpretation of Reinach's project of the phenomenology of law that makes it possible to identify the method of a priori teaching about law, in particular, when moving to a phenomenological approach in relation to the analysis of problems of civil law. The consistent application of the phenomenological method is clearly evident in the AOGP, despite the fact that there is no corresponding section on methodology in the work. It is the establishment of a connection between Husserl's phenomenology, as it is presented in his "LI", and the doctrine of social acts in the "AOGP" that makes it possible to restore (reconstruct) Reinach's project of phenomenology of law in its authentic phenomenological content – to show how the jurist expanded the field of theory of (civil) law using the methodology of intentional analysis.