The main provisions of the "essential" model of mind

Mamarasulov Andrei Ravkhatovich PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor; Department of Philosophy; Far Eastern Federal University 690002, Russia, Primorsky Krai, Vladivostok, Red Banner, 51, sq. 636 mamix@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

The business of the mind is to know everything. No matter how illusory knowledge may be, a person nevertheless strives to know everything. The syncretic worldview typical of early cultures is far from plausible, but people are already confident that they know or can know everything from the origin of the world to the structure of the afterlife. Despite the fact that in pre-scientific knowledge the connection between things is explained extremely arbitrarily, nevertheless, the fact that knowledge is comprehensive is a sufficient reason to recognize the activity of reason in it. The question arises, is it not in this comprehensive nature of cognition that the natural essence of the mind consists?

The current cognitive and utilitarian advantage of science is so great that it is difficult to see the natural essence of intelligent knowledge behind its "cultural layers". Just as intelligent life has gained some autonomy from nature in the course of evolution, so in the process of cultural development, science, armed with these advantages, looks down on the natural essence of reason ^{[1, p. 69]}. And when, for example, it comes to the possibility of genetic transformation of humans as a species, this no longer seems like an exaggeration. The general ambiguity of the situation leads to the fact that in the 21st century, attitudes towards human nature are polarized in two directions. On the one hand, an understanding of human existence and reason based on the primacy of structural criteria allows for the possibility of eugenic modification of the latter, as well as their substitution by artificial intelligence. On the other hand, it is becoming relevant to search for the essential criteria of human existence and his mind — that which cannot be artificially changed and replaced.

Indeed, the essence is that to which the phenomenon belongs as its manifestation. This philosophical axiom means that a person cannot break away from nature as his essence, and science (and philosophy oriented towards it) is not free to break the connection with the natural essence of the mind. In order for the thesis of the primacy of essence to be justified, two obvious conditions must be fulfilled. First, to assume that the mind has a natural essence. Secondly, to identify and comprehend the main provisions of the philosophical model of the natural essence of the mind, comparing it with the structural and instrumental model of the mind. This work is dedicated to the question of the feasibility of these conditions.

General characteristics of the "essential" and "procedural" models of reason

The concept of "the natural essence of reason" presupposes that in nature, along with the fact of knowing the unreasonable, there is the fact of knowing the rational. Taken in this elementary sense, rational cognition is one of these two modifications of cognition as such. The cognitive ability of an unintelligent life effectively orients a being within its local environment, but does not extend to everything in general. Homo sapiens, on the other hand, is a being that is not limited to the limits of the local environment due to the fact that its cognition is directed at everything. Understanding this essential difference between rational cognition and irrational cognitive activity does not require delving into the field of epistemology. It is enough just to add the meaning of "everything" to cognition, as a phenomenon observed in nature. Thus, the essence of the mind can be defined as comprehensive knowledge or knowledge directed at everything.

In this context, the word "everything" indicates the unlimited scope of knowledge. Such knowledge is omnidirectional both from the quantitative side — it extends to everything, and from the qualitative side — it is directed both outward and inward. "Everything" does not oppose this kind of cognition in the role of an object, but is pre—established to cognition as its omnidirectional form. Being unlimited in direction and object, comprehensive cognition is always equal to itself — it is self—identical, since "everything" here is not the result of the cumulative process of cognition. Regardless of the productivity of such knowledge, it remains the same knowledge of everything. That is, intelligent cognition, defined in the form of an entity, automatically expresses an inherent attribute of the latter — self-identity ^{[2, p. 60]}.

If comprehensive knowledge is self—identical - always equal to itself, then its form is unchangeable. It follows that such cognition does not have any purpose, since its presence presupposes a change. The very act of "knowing everything" cannot be the goal, since it is the essence of this kind of knowledge, the possibility of its existence. "Learning everything" is not a process of becoming, but only the fact of existence in nature, which has no purpose, meaning "to learn everything." That is, "knowledge directed at everything" is one of the possibilities that have come true in reality. After all, if limited knowledge (irrational life) is present in nature, then there is no reason why, along with limited knowledge, there should not be a universal form of knowledge — reason.

Let us denote the stated understanding of the nature of mind by the term "essential" model of mind. This position has its antithesis in a model that we will designate as the "procedural" model of reason. The terms used go back to Plato's distinction between essence and phenomenon: "One must distinguish between what always becomes and never exists, and what exists but never becomes" ^{[3, p. 131]}. The terminology of both approaches directly reflects their essence. The "essential" model defines reason as a meaning existing in nature that is identical to itself, or, in the classical Platonic sense [ibid., p. 133], as an "idea" of reason. The "procedural" model considers the mind as a process of becoming cognition or "self-unfolding of the spirit" ^{[4, p. 322]}, which acquires its own meaning relative to the purpose of this process.

The substantive difference between these models boils down to two defining criteria. The "essential" model defines reason as essentially simple: reason is a fact of cognition, to which "everything" is added as unlimited in the direction of cognition. In the "procedural" model, on the contrary, the mind, taken in all its manifestations, is a complex process that represents a continuum of different structures.

In addition to the difference between the criterion of simple and complex, both models represent polar positions in relation to the question of the mind's own purpose. The "essential" model does not imply that intelligent cognition has such a higher purpose. The all—encompassing nature of the mind is a natural possibility that has aimlessly (so evolutionarily happened) "found" its reality in a person. A simple involvement in such an entity is sufficient to justify all manifestations of reason through it ^{[5, p. 64]}.

The opposite position automatically follows from the logic of the "procedural" model. Intelligent cognition is a process of becoming, aiming at the full self—disclosure of the mind. An illustrative example of this understanding is the philosophy of Hegel ^[6]. The mind has its own goal, let's call it the "highest goal" for short, is a key feature by which one or another philosophical concept can be attributed to the "procedural" model of the mind. Without a higher goal, the entire complex process of reason turns out to be meaningless, that is, unreasonable, which means that reason turns out to be something that "always becomes, but never exists." It is the presence of a "higher purpose" that gives reason a connection with existence, so that reason can be accepted as an independent being, and not as a faceless accident of natural processes.

So, philosophical concepts that contain what can be described as the "highest goal" of reason belong to the type of "procedural" model. These, in turn, can be divided (using Aristotle's terminology) into "dianoetic" and "ethical." The first type includes concepts in which the "highest goal" of the mind is connected with cognition. The most illustrative example here, as mentioned, is the Hegel system. The second type includes concepts in which the "highest goal" of reason is associated with the formation of a moral principle. As examples of such, let us single out Kant's philosophy, where the moral aspect of reason gives meaning to the entire processuality of reason ^{[7, p. 11]}, V. S. Solovyov's philosophy, where reason is procedurally revealed in relation to the "highest goal" — the idea of unity ^{[8, p. 745]}, concepts of existential philosophy, adhering to the formula "existence precedes essence" ^[9].

The most illustrative example of the "essential" model of reason, in our opinion, is Plato's philosophy, where everything is thought of through the category of essence ("idea"), with the form of which reason is initially associated. "If consciousness in the beginning is a purely spiritual potency, or spiritually potential energy, then it is, first of all, there is a certain set of potential ideas, potencies of spirit and thought that are awakened, and not newly created by experience and the process of thinking. It was on this point of view that the great Plato stood..." ^{[5, p. 105]}.

It is also necessary to include Schopenhauer's philosophy, in which reason is only partially opposed to will and is defined as an entity that does not have its own "higher purpose." "Only when the intellect exceeds the measure of what is necessary, does cognition more or less become an end in itself. That's why this is a completely unusual event.… Intelligence is a factory worker who is doomed to hard work from the very beginning, and his demanding master, volya, forces him to work from morning to night" ^{[10, vol. 5, p. 55]}.

It should be emphasized that this work does not aim to classify philosophical concepts according to the above-mentioned typology. We are forced to limit ourselves to the most explicit historical and philosophical examples, using them mainly in an illustrative role. The main fundamental works on which the research is based directly or in the context of their historical and philosophical analysis are: Plato's "Timaeus", "Phaedo", "Feast" ^[2], G. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" ^[11], I. Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" ^[12], "Foundations of Metaphysics morality" ^[13], A. Schopenhauer "The World as will and representation" ^{[10, vol. 1, 2]}, V. S. Solovyov "Justification of goodness" ^[8], "Criticism of abstract principles" [Ibid.]. The modern research literature devoted to the problem of the nature of the mind is represented by the works of M. Hockheimer "The Eclipse of the Mind. Towards a critique of instrumental reason" ^[1], D. K. Dennett "Reason from beginning to end" ^[14] The conceptual framework of the research claims to be new and is primarily author's (to the extent academically acceptable for philosophical research).

The purpose of the work is to identify the common grounds and logic of two different approaches to understanding reason, compare them with each other, and thus try to answer the question: are there common grounds for considering the "essential" model of understanding reason as a full—fledged alternative and antithesis to the "procedural" model?

The structure of the work is subordinated to this goal and is built in accordance with the main objectives of the study (disclosed in their logical sequence in separate sub-paragraphs), namely:

1) Typologically define the models of mind under consideration, revealing their conceptual difference according to the criterion of simple-complex and according to the criterion of having a "higher goal";

2) To reveal and substantiate the first criterion of the "essential" model, which is that the mind is something simple in its essence;

3) Anticipating the transition to the second criterion of the "essential" model, which consists in the thesis that reason has no "higher purpose", consider the question of the existence of an attributive connection between the essence of reason and its teleological character;

4) To reveal the second criterion of the "essential" model, substantiating the thesis that the essential understanding of the mind does not imply the existence of a "higher purpose" in the mind;

5) Having considered the "procedural" model of mind as the antithesis of the "essential" model, identify the moment of conceptual priority of the latter.

Research methods. A typological method was applied to classify the theoretical models under consideration. The method of system analysis was applied to identify the basic provisions of each model.

Let's explain the key concepts of the study: "complex", "simple", "structure", "essence", "purpose".

"Complex", as the language suggests, means "composed of many". A complex object is a unity made up of many things. Such unity is denoted by the concept of "structure". "Structure" is the unity of many things, built on the basis of universal and necessary connections. The amount of many things included in the structure and the number of connections uniting it into a unity gives the concept of "complex" a criterion of comparative degree — "A is more complicated than B". All objects with a structure are "complex", although they vary in degree of complexity.

An object called "simple" either has no structure, or must represent a qualitatively different and indivisible whole. "Simple" objects include: "nothing" — as something that has no structure, but only the form of a negative whole, and "essence" — as a structureless natural self-identical form of the whole or "idea" in the Platonic sense.

"Purpose" is the meaning that is given to an object in order to organize a reasonable structure. In the expression "the object is assumed to be the goal," the language itself suggests that the object is delegated the meaning of the goal from what the goal actually is. Such a valid goal is an organized, reasonable structure. The role of the object to which the goal value is delegated is an element that is missing for the organization of a reasonable structure. In this case, the value of the missing object is equal to the value of the organized intelligent structure and all its significance, embodied in the image of the goal, is delegated to it. Natural human needs are not associated with the concept of "purpose", as they are predetermined by nature, but the way to satisfy them is related to the structure-forming activity of the mind and therefore is goal-setting. Thus, a goal is a reasonable structure incomplete in an organization, because a reasonable structure completed in an organization ceases to be the goal of reason.

So, the basic provisions of the "essential" and "procedural" models of mind come down to the following. In the "essential" model, reason is, firstly, essentially simple, and secondly, it is a self-identical form that has no purpose of its own. In the "procedural" model, on the contrary, the mind is continuumarily complex and is a projective process conditioned by the mind's own purpose.

The first position of the "essential" model of mind is "the mind is essentially simple"

Let us correlate the first position of the "essential" model – "mind is essentially simple" – with the specifics of rational cognition, posing the question: how can reason, taken in all its manifestations, be thought of as essentially simple?

The task of the cognitive ability of an irrational life is expressed in one word — survival. The discrete simplicity of the biological survival process can be reduced to the "to be or not to be" position. Accordingly, the task of cognition has a functionally simple meaning here — whether cognition orients a living being or not. The theoretical questions that reveal the structural complexity of irrational cognition, "what is cognition?" and "how does it work?" are secondary to the vital effectiveness of cognition and make sense only after the fact. If cognition were not effective, there would be no point in analyzing its structural complexity. That is, irrational cognition is simple in its functional sense, representing an effective means of survival, but not an end in itself.

Turning to the specifics of intelligent cognition, let's take its epistemological organization as a well-established evolution of a ready-made system that has fully formed and absolutely does not need any morphological changes. Indeed, the immanent interpenetration of the sensual, logical, symbolic, and speculative structures the mind as a harmoniously tuned and extremely effective cognitive whole, in which, apparently, there is no particular point in singling out one thing as the "most reasonable" and defining intelligence. Based on this premise, the specifics of rational cognition, in comparison with unreasonable cognition, will be determined not by structural, but by external differences (by "external" differences we mean all those features whose explanation does not need an analysis of the structure). Let's define these external differences.

Firstly, the mind, taken in the observed manifestations of its organization and activity, is a comparatively more complex structure than the cognitive abilities and active acts of an unintelligent life.

Secondly, the activity of reason has a teleological character, which fundamentally distinguishes it from the activities of irrational beings: nature cannot have goals, but reason, on the contrary, is goal-setting.

Thirdly, intelligent cognition is characterized by progressive movement, which is expressed by the process of accumulation and optimization of rational experience.

The first external difference between the mind and the knowledge of the unintelligent is the comparative structural complexity of the mind. The mind is complex — and this is self-evident. But let's ask the question: what is the degree of this complexity? Is the mind complex to a comparative extent relative to cognition, which does not possess intelligence, or is the mind characterized by some incomparable supercomplexity that fundamentally distinguishes its very nature? Despite the fact that intelligent life has a number of well-known advantages, the answer is that the mind is only comparatively complex. The reasons for this response are as follows.

Firstly, we do not have a standard for determining the degree of complexity of cognition, at which the comparison of types of cognition becomes impossible. Even if we assume that the difference in complexity is not comparable, then this difference cannot be confirmed by comparison, because the degree of complexity of these objects is not comparable according to the assumption made. Therefore, when raising the question of the difference between rational and unreasonable cognition, one should proceed from the comparative complexity of the former and generally not raise the question of an incomparable degree of complexity as incorrect.

Secondly, only the structural complexity of the mind is obvious, that is, what can be compared with the structures of an unintelligent life. The attempt to give the manifestations of reason a special qualitative status, let's say, of a certain godlike nature, is speculative and not related to evidence.

Thirdly, if we abandon the position that the mind is complex only to a comparative extent, then it is necessary to contrast intelligent life with the rest of life. This would mean that all our activities are alienated from vital necessity and turn out to be a non-vital consequence of the complexity of the mind. On the contrary, it is obvious that the mind and its activities represent a highly organized life, that is, a comparative degree of organization of life, and are not opposed to the latter.

So, the first external difference of rational cognition is precisely the comparative complexity of the mind in all its manifestations. The basis for this conclusion is rooted not in an analysis of the structural manifestations of reason, but in particular of the latter as knowledge aimed at everything, simply because the cognitive abilities of an unintelligent life, aimed only at some things, are comparatively more limited.

But if reason is characterized by comparative complexity, then it can equally be characterized by comparative simplicity, since comparative characteristics are relative and depend on the point of view. In order to characterize reason as something comparatively complex, we need a criterion — absolutely complex, but it is obviously so complex that it cannot be given to reason, in any case, we do not have a criterion of absolutely complex. Accordingly, reason should be considered as comparatively simple, because the absolute criterion of simple is known — it is the essence.

The transition from the comparative degree of the simple to the essentially simple is as follows. The most abstract idea of the mind is based on the distinctive feature of the latter — to know everything. In this particular, the concept of "everything" is thought of as unlimited in nothing and having no comparative degree, because the proposition "relative knowledge of everything" implies a contradiction. The meaning of "knowing everything", therefore, cannot have a relative form and is unconditional, and the attribute of the unconditional can only have an essence. This means that the sense of "knowing everything" that characterizes the mind is not only a feature, but also the essence of the mind. The essence is simple by definition. Thus, the mind is simple in its essence — "to know everything."

So, the understanding of reason as knowledge directed at everything is characterized by the fact that:

First, it does not require an appeal to the analysis of the structural complexity of both the mind itself and its manifestations.;

Secondly, it proceeds from the combination of two simple meanings - the functional meaning of "cognition" and the non—relational meaning of "everything":

Thirdly, it correlates the mind with the essence — that is, with a simple structureless form.

It follows from this that the mind can be thought of as something simple in its self-identity, as it is represented in its "essential" model. Reason is the self—same meaning of "knowing everything."

This understanding separates reason from the cognitive activity of irrational life, no longer comparatively in phenomena, but in essence, that is, in the original sense, revealing the essence of comprehensive knowledge in the simple proposition "to know everything." The simplicity of this position consists, in addition to what has been said, in its discreteness, since one can know either everything or not everything (but only some). If there were not this essential, rather than structural, "watershed" between rational and irrational cognition, then, at least, it would be impossible to talk about two other external differences of reason — the teleological and translational nature of rational cognition, which will be shown in the analysis of these differences.

The transition from the essential simplicity of reason to its teleological character

Before considering the second difference between the "essential" and "procedural" models, which is the problem of the mind having a "higher purpose," it is necessary to identify the connection between two external differences of the mind: comparative complexity and the goal-setting process. This is necessary in order to answer the question: is it possible to define the goal-setting process as an attribute of the essence of reason?

A person, existing as a complex structure within a complex structure, which is nature and culture, must be extremely selective. The possibility of a mistake that threatens to destroy the complex, and therefore very vulnerable, structural organization of human life lurks in everything. To avoid mistakes, it is necessary to carry out artificial selection. In order to carry out artificial selection, it is necessary to set goals. Selectivity itself, as it is present in animals, presupposes the form of the goal — "this is not necessary, but this is necessary." Artificial selection, which characterizes intelligent life, is carried out not from many things, but from everything in general, which means that the causal relationships between various elements of activity can be organized extremely non-linearly. Such causal nonlinearity requires a goal as a separate representation that connects everything into one, which allows us to model the goal — "what exactly is needed." In addition, each element in the complex structure of actions created by the mind is not accidental. The certainty of each element requires extreme selectivity in the selection of everything, which is impossible without a clear understanding of the goal as a model relative to which the selection is carried out. Thus, reason logically cannot but be teleological, and this goal-seeking nature of reason seems to stem from the complexity of reason itself, dealing with everything, not just some.

So, we have a general basis for theoretically accepting the position that the teleological character of reason stems from the fact that reason is complex. We formalize this conclusion in the statement "complex defines the goal", where the concept of "complex" (according to the definition given above) is synonymous with the concept of "structure".

The statement "since the mind is a structurally complex object, it must have a purpose" seems logical. Let's further explain this by referring to an analogy. The complexity of the watch device is necessary for the organization of human life, which is the purpose of its creation. Based on the structural complexity of both the clock and human activity, a conclusion is drawn about the need for a complex purpose. According to this analogy, if the mind is complex, then its activity should be expedient.

However, such a transition from complexity to purpose is not entirely correct, since the purpose by which the complex is created precedes and determines the complexity of the subject. In addition, it can be argued that nature is full of complexly structured objects, but they, like nature itself, have no goals.

The question of the transition from complexity to purpose turns us to Thomas Aquinas' "proof through expediency", which states: if an object is given as structurally complex, then there must be a goal that allows us to organize many things into one ^{[15, p. 69]}. And since the goal is something conceivable, there must be someone who thinks it. "Nature is complex, therefore there must be a God." The expediency here, as it seems, is based on the concept of structurally complex. However, in "proof through expediency," the world is a complex structure because it was preceded by a purpose given by God. Before divine goal-setting, the world had no structure and was just nothing. This means that having a goal defines the structure (complex). For a believer, the goal is embedded in nature from the beginning, and the position that the goal determines the structure of nature should not cause him questions, because there is someone who sets goals — God ^[16]. However, can the statement "the goal determines the structure" be considered correct if it is not accompanied by faith in God as the target cause?

For science, the answer is no. From a scientific point of view, there are no goals in nature, and science itself deals only with what has a structure, structure for it is the only given, so science does not deal with the problem of the root causes of structure as such ^[17]. Philosophy, on the other hand, deals with the category of purpose and the goal-setting principle, the substratum of which is the human mind. Along with complex (structured) objects ^[18], philosophy also considers simple objects (entities), and the problem of the existence of root causes is the domain of philosophical knowledge. Therefore, we address the question exclusively to philosophy: can the statement "the goal determines the structure (complex)" be considered correct?

Indeed, without knowledge of the purpose of a thing, one cannot conclude about the existence of the mind that created this thing. Such a thing, taken without knowledge of its rational purpose, cannot be recognized as a part of reason. With regard to the activity of the mind, the goal is the criterion of the latter's existence, which is explained by the teleological nature of the mind itself: if something is created by the mind, then it was created for some purpose, that is, to organize some kind of intelligent structure.

This provision is consistent with the definition of "goal" used, where "goal" is the meaning given to an object for the organization of a reasonable structure. The mind organizes the structure by acting purposefully, because organizing the structure is its real goal. A separate action of the mind ceases to be relevant goal-setting when the goal is achieved, that is, when the created structure is fully organized. The statement "the goal determines the structure" will be correct only if the structure is not definitively defined and needs to continue the activity of the mind. Thus, the statement "the goal determines the structure" is correct, but only in relation to the actual unfinished activity of the mind.

So, in the question of the causal relationship between the complexity of the mind and its teleological character, there are grounds for two, firstly, opposite, and, secondly, non-universal statements: "the complexity of the mind determines the existence of a goal for it" and "the existence of a goal for the mind determines its complexity." The direct combination of both positions leads to a consistent conclusion: the phenomenon of purpose is inconceivable without the complexity of reason, and the complexity of reason is inconceivable without the phenomenon of purpose. This means that neither the complexity of the mind nor the goal is a defining element. Both should be determined by the fact that it is neither a complex structure nor a goal, but something structureless and without purpose, and that can only be a simple form — essence.

The essence of the mind, according to the "essential" model, is comprehensive cognition. Let's check whether the goal-setting process will be possible if we proceed not from comprehensive knowledge (essence), but from limited knowledge?

Let's limit cognition to the maximum extent, namely to two positions: 1 and 0. In this case, none of these elements can become a target, because there is no information for this. Now we will endow this discrete relation with meaningful information, for example, "to be or not to be." This position also cannot generate a goal shape for the same reason. But this position is vitally significant and does not imply the situation of Buridan's donkey. In order for "being" to take the form of a goal, a comprehensive structure is needed that forcibly delegates the goal of "being" to cognition. Such a structure is nature, that is, "everything", and biological life, without exaggeration, is nothing more than a consequence of everything ^[19]. Therefore, the reason for even the simplest teleological form, which is even called a "goal" only conditionally, is the connection with everything.

Indeed, what makes any structure "be" or "preserve itself" as some kind of permanent organization? What formed this structure is everything, nature itself. If nature were not an all-encompassing principle, showing only some fragments of it, as in the case of 1 and 0, then there would not even be a conditional goal—setting "to be" in nature, which we unwittingly admit, saying, for example, "the goal of an animal is to survive (to be)." However, there are no goals in nature as such, they come only from the mind. For a goal to arise, reason, like nature, must represent "everything," but not structurally, but in itself — through the essence of reason as knowledge directed at everything.

So, the condition for the emergence of the "goal" form is the comprehensive structure of nature, which determines the direction of change. By direct analogy, the condition for creating a goal as such (in humans) is comprehensive cognition, since otherwise there would not be enough information to create a form of goal, and the action would be spontaneous rather than goal-setting.

It follows that the essence of reason and its teleological character form a relation of identity. "Knowing everything" and "creating a goal" are the same thing: a goal is unthinkable without reason, and reason is unthinkable without a goal. The limited scope of the article does not allow us to explain this position in more detail and in more detail, at the moment we are forced to leave it open for additional argumentation — now it is important for us to draw a dotted line through the logic of the "essential" model of reason in this matter.

And this logic is as follows: the connection between the essential simplicity of reason and its teleological character is defined as extremely simple, since it is given in the simple form of identity. In general, this relationship is as follows. The essence of reason is "the knowledge of everything." "Knowing everything" is a necessary condition for the emergence of a goal as a form. Any goal of the mind is the organization of intelligent structures. And if the mind has the essential ability to model structures from everything, and not from some, then the purpose of the mind can be everything. If everything can be the goal of reason, then reason cannot but be the "knowledge of everything," which is the essence of reason. A = A. The essence of reason and its teleological character are identical. Therefore, the teleological character of reason can be considered as a necessary attribute of the essence of reason.

The second position of the "essential" model of mind is "mind has no "higher purpose""

It is obvious that intelligent cognition is a progressive process of accumulation and optimization of rational experience, developing both in the individual sphere (personality formation) and in the social sphere (culture). The divergence of positions on what causes this process is the second main difference between the "procedural" and "essential" models of reason. Or, according to the logic of the "procedural" model, the reason for the progressive movement of the mind is the "highest goal" of the mind. Or, from the point of view of the "essential" model, the mind does not have its own "higher purpose", and the named progressive movement stems from the very essence of the mind and is its attribute. A comparison of both approaches, which would exclude an appeal to structural analysis, can only appeal to the superficially obvious. Therefore, let us ask the question: which of the two indicated positions seems more "obvious" ^{[20, p. 42]}? And here the logic of the "procedural" model immediately faces the following difficulties.

First, it does not automatically follow from the evidence of the development of rational cognition that it is the "highest goal" of reason that acts as an independent cause, and not something else. So, by analogy, the obvious fact that a living person strives to continue life does not automatically lead to a certain "higher goal", for example, gaining immortality. And although a person can justify his desire for life in a similar way (religious philosophy), it is clear that the acquisition of immortality as a cause does not automatically follow from the will to live, since there are other reasons here.

Secondly, from the fact of the progressive movement of reason, it cannot be concluded that reason imposes on a person the need to act according to some "higher purpose." Otherwise, this kind of goal must be a special necessity, different from the necessity that already exists in nature, that is, the "highest goal" of reason must be super-natural. And since the goals that reason sets for itself are consistent with it only with natural necessity, we have no experience with setting some super-natural goals (even the religious goal of gaining "eternal life" is vital, because the goal here is still "life"). Consequently, the "highest goal" is either assigned by a non-human mind (for example, by God or by Hegel's "absolute idea"), or it cannot have the form of a goal, since the human mind forms all its goals based on a necessity known to it. This condition makes the goals reasonable. After all, if a person sets goals in accordance with some unknown necessity, then his actions will be characterized as insane.

Thirdly, the fact of the development of rational cognition objectifies only causality in the actions of reason, but not the goal. It is wise to accumulate and optimize experience. However, the reasonableness of the "higher goal" due to the fact that it has never been achieved is not obvious. Accordingly, such a goal has no reason to be considered the goal of reason, and its manifestation in the status of a "higher goal" is given as an approximation "from the future" and is completely speculative.

These arguments show that the connection between the progressive movement of reason and the "higher goal", which expresses the position of the "procedural" model, is at least not obvious. This conclusion contrasts with the fact that it is possible to rely on indisputable grounds, such as the comparative complexity of reason and its teleology, and thus arrive at more obvious positions that reflect the position of the "essential" model.

Indeed, we see that the diverse activities of the mind are determined by goals, but – and this is not an exaggeration – we do not know anything specific about the "higher purpose" of the mind carrying out this activity. Can we then say that if the mind does not have its own "higher purpose", then its existence and activity become questionable? Of course not. Only the mind sets goals, and nothing can set goals for it. There are no goals in natural nature, only the mind has them. The mind simply sets goals for everything, including itself, or, in other words, sets goals for itself. The question about the "higher goal" is precisely "for what purpose does the mind set itself?".

But there is no definite reason to answer this question. The existence of a "higher purpose" cannot be deduced from the teleological character of reason, from which all goals originate. The mind simply sets goals for itself in its activities, in the same way, for example, as life "sets goals" for itself through instincts. If a living being stops fighting for life, it will die. It's the same with the mind. The purpose of reason is to set goals for itself, on the basis that if a rational being stops acting intelligently, it will cease to be intelligent.

"Setting goals for oneself" means that the mind must set goals for itself — act based on existing knowledge and develop it. Therefore, the reason for the movement from "less" intelligence to "more" is the usual goal-setting by the mind of oneself or, more simply, the appointment of reasonable goals by the mind. From the formal side, such self-determination is identical to the self-determination of biological life (which is the spring of its evolution), with the only difference that the mind is teleological, and its self-determination has the quality of setting goals for itself.

Naturally, this immediately runs into an objection: it is easy to say "reason should set goals for itself intelligently," but what does "reasonable" mean, what are the criteria for "reasonableness"? This question itself implies an answer based on an appeal to the epistemological structure of reason. But such an appeal is impossible in the "essential" model. The answer to the objection must be based on the premise that the essence of reason, "to know everything," and its teleological character are one and the same thing.

Therefore, let us ask the question: is reason possible if it does not set goals? The answer is no. It is even unnecessary to argue that without a form of purpose, any structurative activity of the mind automatically stops. Undoubtedly, the mind cannot fail to set goals. But why? Because it's reasonable, because without goals, reason ceases to be itself. But can the mind set goals for itself unreasonably? It can, although it shouldn't, because it is obvious that this creates a threat of insanity, that is, that the mind will be lost, ceasing to be itself.

"Will cease to be oneself" means "will not be identical to oneself", "will lose self-identity", and the essence is self-identical by definition. Therefore, the statement "the mind must set goals for itself intelligently" does not need to appeal to structural criteria. The essence is self-identical and protects itself by doing so. Structural criteria, such as "universality" and "necessity", do not have such a support, but require, as in Descartes, the existence of God ^{[14, p. 438]} or, as is the case in the "procedural" model, the presence of a "higher purpose" of reason, which is what we are talking about. it will be lower.

Thus, the progressive movement of the mind follows only from its teleological character and is not determined by some "higher purpose." And since the theological character of reason and its essence are identical, the phenomenon of accumulation and optimization of rational experience is a direct consequence of the essence of reason as knowledge directed at everything. Thus, the progressive nature of the mind can be defined as an attribute of the essence of the mind "to know everything."

The priority of the "essential" model of reason over the "procedural" one

Of course, from the theoretical side, nothing forbids linking the progressive movement of reason with a "higher goal", but such a thing, whether it be Hegel's "absolute spirit" ^{[21, p. 136]}, "victory over nature" in the religious-positivist doctrine of N. Fedorov ^{[22, p. 160]}, "God-manhood" by V. S. Solovyova ^{[23, p. 22]}, the essence of approximating the logical, rational or moral sides of the existence of reason.

What is the basis for this kind of approximation of the "highest goal", if the latter cannot be correlated with evidence? The reason is that the mind is viewed structurally. In the "procedural" model, the status of the principle determining reason is given to one structure, such as logic (Hegel), experience (positivism), morality (Kant, philosophy of unity). And once a mind-defining structure is established, it means nothing more than that the structure defines the mind. And if "structure determines the mind," then it literally means that the mind itself is a structure and nothing more. What is the meaning of the statement that an object is only a structure? The fact that an object is a process of interaction of various structures, from microstructures to a speculative superstructure, is only a matter of scale. How to characterize such an object? How continually complex. Accordingly, the mind is a continuum complex object, as it is represented in the "procedural" model.

And if, as mentioned above, power is given to a separate structure, then how can the latter determine the complexity of the mind — all other structures? Only through the formation of a superstructure, namely, a "higher goal" as a single structure of all structural manifestations of the mind. Indeed, based on the definition of the concept of "purpose", the concept of the "highest goal" of reason should be defined as the meaning that is given to a certain meaning for the structural organization of all manifestations of reason. The "highest goal" of the mind, therefore, should be thought of as a superstructure — something that unites all the structural manifestations of the mind.

The existence of a "higher purpose" and the complexity of reason in the logic of the "procedural" model are not conceivable without each other. If there is structural complexity, then there must be a superstructure ("higher purpose"), and if there is a superstructure ("higher purpose"), then there must be structural complexity. For example, Kant's philosophy, revealing the structural complexity of reason, arrives at the superstructure ("highest goal") of reason in the form of moral absolutes ^{[24, p. 16]}. And vice versa: the preconceived idea of the "highest goal" of reason (superstructure) in the form of moral absolutes automatically defines reason as a structurally complex phenomenon. After all, the "big" structure is the unity of the "small" ones.

Here, it would seem, one could object that Kant's moral absolute, for example, "freedom" is a noumenon, not a structure ^{[12, pp. 304-305]}. However, freedom as a noumenon is the "highest goal." The existence of a "higher goal" or, in Kant's terminology, noumenon, is not obvious, cannot be deduced from experience, and is intelligible ^{[13, p. 93]}. Noumenon is therefore an approximation of one particular structure (the autonomy of the will) into a superstructure (the transcendental idea of freedom), which, as the "highest goal," defines the moral "ideal of the kingdom of goals."

This is not a criticism of the "procedural" model, but only of its logic and specifics. At the same time, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the very existence of reason escapes from the connection between the nature of mind and the form of structure.

From the structural understanding of the mind, one can only get a process—"that which always becomes and never exists." What is it becoming? "The ultimate goal." Why does it never exist? Because the existence of what, it would seem, should have given this process meaning, namely, the "higher goal" does not exist as a fact and, most importantly, does not pass into another quality, another structure, but remains only a structure. Despite the fact that in the "procedural" model, the content of the "highest goal" is verbally given not a structural meaning, but the status of an indivisible whole, for example, "noumenon", "absolute spirit", "all-unity", but in reality the transition from structure to essence is not accomplished. The "higher goal" remains only the power over the mind of one of its structures, brought to the maximum.

However, what is especially important is that the very demonstrated desire of the "procedural" model to present the superstructure of the "highest goal— as a simple entity speaks volumes. What makes us attribute the nature of an entity to a superstructure?

The structural understanding of the mind is reduced to the process of interaction of structures. But reason as a process must make sense, otherwise the process ceases to be reasonable. And if the process is meaningless and unreasonable, then the very existence of reason escapes understanding. For a process to be reasonable, it must make reasonable sense. For this, the "higher goal" should not be a structure, but a meaning. What is the "meaning"? Meaning is not the connection of elements within a structure, but the way out of it as the connection of everything with everything.

Nature is not the connection of everything with everything, nature is "everything". Cognition is the connection between mind and nature. Cognizing everything, the mind carries out the connection of everything (inclusiveness) with everything (nature). Being the connection of everything with everything, the mind obtains the desired essential meaning, defined as "to know everything." And since nature exists only as "everything", and not some, then through the cognitive involvement of the whole of nature, the mind acquires not only meaning, but also an original existence (self-existence). That is, the mind has meaning and exists on the condition that it is not a structure, but something else — an essence. Otherwise, having neither a reasonable meaning nor an original existence, reason turns out to be an unreasonable process, "something that always becomes, but never exists."

This is the logic that, in our opinion, explains why the superstructures of the "procedural" model, such as the "noumenon", "absolute spirit", and "all-unity" manifest themselves as an entity without being one. But maybe these superstructures are not only manifested, but actually rely on as an entity? It is not difficult to answer why this is not the case. An entity has no purpose. The fact that the "highest goal" is the immediate motive and conceptual center of their philosophy for the relevant thinkers does not require explanation.

The fact that the "highest goal" of reason in the "procedural" model should be an entity, not a structure, is also confirmed by the fact that upon achieving the "highest goal" the structure should be transformed into an entity. So, for example, in Hegel, the finite spirit undergoes the process of transformation "into an absolute spirit", into a "self—aware absolute idea" ^{[21, p. 135]}, in V. S. Solovyov, upon reaching "true unity", a person is reborn into an essence - a "god-man" ^{[8, p. 271-273]}. Whether the structure is capable of being transformed into an entity at all, and whether it is legitimate to approximate such a possibility "from the future" are questions for a separate study.

Now it is important for us to fix the position that the "procedural" model, despite its conceptual difference, boils down to the logic of the "essential" model in that the mind must be an entity. Without this condition, the mind, firstly, being only a continuous stream of complex things, loses its meaning and existence. Secondly, in the "procedural" model, the "highest goal" must be achieved and eliminated by rebirth into an entity, which confirms the priority of the "essential" model, where the existence of reason has no purpose.

Thus, in its projective premises, the "procedural" model comes to the logic of the "essential" model, namely: "reason must be understood as an entity, and it cannot have a purpose." In this sense, the "procedural" model is a modification of the "essential" model, which in itself indicates the conceptual priority of the latter.

Conclusion

The study reveals and substantiates the thesis of the "essential" model of mind that the mind can be thought of as an original natural entity, defined as "cognition of everything." In the course of the research, an attempt was made to substantiate the position that the external differences of the mind — self—identity, teleology, translativeness - logically follow from the existence of the natural essence of the mind as its attributes and are inconceivable without it. Through the connection of the essence of reason with its attributes, it is shown that the definition of reason as essentially simple and without a "higher purpose" is a perfectly acceptable position, and the model of reason based on the primacy of essence is a completely constructive concept. On the contrary, the "procedural" model of reason, which defines the latter as a continuum of complex structure and the process of achieving a "higher goal," is based, in our opinion, on a number of non-obvious provisions that are absent from the "essential" model. Moreover, since the process of self-disclosure of the mind appears in the "procedural" model as projectively finite, in its final premises the "procedural" model coincides with the initial provisions of the "essential" model, which allows us to speak about the conceptual priority of the latter.

A separate structure, being the product and outcome of the modification process, is always open to modification. In this sense, structure is a process based on variability and presupposes variability. In this context, reason can only differ in that this variability must be subordinated to some "higher purpose." Accordingly, the "procedural" model of mind, based on the assumption of the primacy of structure, unwittingly opens the way, firstly, for eugenic modifications of man and his mind, and, secondly, for approximating the "higher purpose", which should determine human existence. Both of these positions cannot but face serious philosophical criticism. The former has its own opposition in modern bioethics. The second, through Nietzsche's philosophy, is actively opposed in postmodern philosophy, whose criticism can often be reduced to the statement that the assumption of reason's "higher purpose" is, so to speak, an "archaic" concept. Sharing this critical attitude as a whole, we tried to justify it in a slightly different way, contrasting the "procedural" concept of reason with the "essential" one, based primarily on rethinking in a new context the ideas about the nature of reason that are embedded in the philosophy of Plato and Schopenhauer.

Naturally, conclusions related to such a fundamental issue as the understanding of the mind in its essence cannot claim to be unambiguous. Although the work is entirely devoted to this issue, nevertheless its motive lies in the sphere of problematics, which can be conditionally called "bioethical" – shifting the understanding of the nature of the mind from a structural and instrumental "paradigm" to an essential one. The research results are intended not so much to provide answers, but rather to return to the very polemical question of the essence of intelligent cognition in a new context: is there something natural and essential at the heart of reason - something that should not and cannot be transformed by science, and something that is fundamentally genuine for artificial intelligence? This problem, being philosophical, requires, first of all, a rethinking of the existing philosophical models of reason, which this work is a particular attempt at. The main message of the research is the primacy of the essence of man and his mind over ideas, in which such a thing is not assumed, which automatically allows for the possibility of a structural transformation of human nature. In this sense, the conclusion drawn from the results of the study is as follows: if the nature of the mind in its essence is something simple and has no purpose, then there is nothing and no need to modify it.