The USSR policy on information and propaganda coverage of the military presence of a Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Kokorev Maksim Andreevich ORCID: 0000-0002-2334-0732 Postgraduate student; Department of Russian History of the XX-XXI centuries; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University 119234, Russia, Moscow, Leninskie gory, 1B, room 955 kokorevma@my.msu.ru

Problem statement

The military conflict in Afghanistan has become the longest and bloodiest local war in the history of the Soviet Union. The military presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan lasted from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 – 9 years and almost 2 months (3,341 days).

The military and political intervention of the USSR represents one of the stages of the still unfinished military conflict in Afghanistan. The scale of the military-political involvement of the USSR requires a deep understanding (the price of war: political consequences, economic costs, human losses), which determines the scientific significance and relevance of the research problem.

The relevance of research. Information and psychological weapons were of particular importance in the military confrontation in Afghanistan. The mass media have become an instrument of informational and psychological influence. In the modern geopolitical confrontation, when information and psychological operations have become the basis for a new generation of hybrid wars, the importance of propaganda tools is increasing.

In the Soviet Union, the mass media (print, radio, television) played an important role in spreading propaganda and conducting agitation in accordance with the general line of the Communist Party, expressing state-party interests. In the USSR in 1980, more than 5.2 thousand periodicals and continuing publications and 8.1 thousand newspapers from All-Union to grassroots were published, with a total one-time circulation of 377.8 million copies; all of them were subordinate to Goskomizdat^[1]. The nature of the information and propaganda coverage of the military conflict in Afghanistan in the Soviet press is shown by a study of the publications of the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (the Central press organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense). Publications of the USSR mass media are supplemented by both published sources and new archival materials, primarily from the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as from the Russian Academy of Sciences and the GARF (in particular, little–studied letters and appeals from Soviet and foreign citizens to the Central Committee of the CPSU - RGAN. F. 100. Op. 5. D 840, 841, 853 – 865, 1392.; Op 7. D. 94, 439). A scientific study of personal sources, including those introduced into scientific circulation for the first time (interviews with internationalist soldiers, the author's personal archive), allows us to give a unique characterization of the socio-psychological factors of the Afghan war. Thus, a fairly wide range of sources involved allows us to consider the highlighted aspect of the problem from a new angle and allows us to determine the nature of the information and propaganda state policy of the USSR, which is the novelty of this study.

The scientific article is devoted to the study of the USSR's policy of information and propaganda coverage of the military presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1979 - 1989). The objective of the scientific article is to determine the content and results of the work of state censorship and propaganda agencies of the USSR covering the military conflict in Afghanistan (1979 – 1989).

The chronological framework of the study is determined by the military presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: December 25, 1979 – February 15, 1989.

In modern scientific works (the 2020s), the following leading areas of research on the history of the military conflict in Afghanistan are highlighted: the political history of the development of Afghanistan^[2]; the specifics of planning and conducting military operations in Afghanistan^[3]; the impact of the military conflict in Afghanistan on the development of local wars in the post-Soviet space^[4]; the analysis of the influence of clan-tribal and ethnic factors on the course of the armed conflict in Afghanistan^[5]; socio-psychological analysis of public attitudes towards the war in Afghanistan, research on the activities of public associations "Shuravi"^[6]; study of regional security problems caused by the continuation of the long-term military conflict in Afghanistan involving numerous radical extremist and terrorist groups^[7].

The scientific article contributes to the topical issue of information and propaganda coverage of the military conflict in Afghanistan in the context of information and psychological impact.

Information and propaganda coverage of the Soviet Union's military intervention in the civil war in Afghanistan: events of December 25-27, 1979

On December 12, 1979, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted Resolution No. 176/125 "On the situation in Afghanistan" – the decision on the military intervention of the Soviet Union in the civil war in Afghanistan. The decision was provisionally approved by the Politburo on December 8, 1979 and confirmed at a meeting with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev on December 26, 1979.^[8]

On December 25, 1979, according to the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov No. 312/1/030, the deployment of a contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan began.

On December 27, 1979, Soviet special forces conducted a special operation Baikal-79 in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, to seize strategic facilities and intercept control in the country. The special operation Storm-333 aimed at the physical elimination of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, H. Amin, became an integral part of Baikal-79. A coup d'etat was carried out by the Soviet military in Afghanistan, and B. Karmal was brought to power in the country^[9].

The events of December 25-27, 1979 – the armed intervention of Soviet troops in the civil war in Afghanistan – marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Soviet-Afghan relations and a new milestone in the military conflict.

The truth about the events of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was hidden by the propaganda of an ideologically correct view until the early 1990s, and many documents of military operations are still classified.

The deployment of a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan was supposed to be and was completely unexpected not only for Soviet citizens, but for the whole world. The logic of the actions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the "Afghan issue" shows continuity with the experience of military support of the states of the socialist camp (Hungary – 1956, Czechoslovakia – 1968) and a unified strategy of decisive foreign policy actions of the USSR (the dogma of "socialist internationalism", the "Brezhnev doctrine")^[10].

Based on oral instructions from the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the USSR D. F. Ustinov, about 100 military formations were deployed in the Central Asian and Turkestan military districts in December 1979. The real purpose of the combat deployment and mobilization of reservists from the reserve was carefully hidden, and instead the illusion of an inspection check and military exercises was created. "At the end of 1979, in a roundabout way, through friends and acquaintances, rumors began to reach, that's right – not information, but rumors that large-scale exercises with the mobilization of several divisions and military units were allegedly taking place in the TurkVO. There was some kind of unexplained anxiety in these conversations," recalls Colonel-General B. V. Gromov^[11].

At the same time, the propaganda of an ideologically correct view of events in Afghanistan was being prepared. In the Soviet Union, mass media (print, radio, television) performed an important function of agitation and propaganda. They were directly subordinate to the general line of the Communist Party and expressed state-party interests. Ideologically correct information and propaganda coverage of events was the most important task of their activities.

On December 23, 1979, the central newspaper of the USSR Pravda published the message "Futile attempts: behind the scenes of events," which categorically denied "rumors" about the impending entry of Soviet troops into the country: "Recently, Western, especially American, mass media have been spreading deliberately inspired rumors about some kind of "interference" by the Soviet Union. Interference of the Union in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It comes to claims that Soviet "combat units" have allegedly been introduced into Afghan territory. All this, of course, is pure fiction"^[12].

Soviet citizens first learned about the events in Afghanistan from the USSR propaganda organs on December 28-29, 1979. The information in Pravda was contained among other international news, not highlighting the importance of the entry of 50,000 Soviet troops into the country outside the USSR and hiding the role of Soviet special forces in the events of the military coup on December 27, 1979. Kabul.

On December 28, 1979, the "Address to the People" of the new leader of Afghanistan, B. Karmal, announced a new stage of the "great April revolution", the "day of freedom and rebirth of all fraternal peoples of Afghanistan", which came "with the help of the victorious uprising of the revolutionary army of Afghanistan"^[13].

On December 29, 1979, the "Appeal of the Government of Afghanistan" stated: "The Government of the Soviet Union granted the request of the Afghan side for urgent political, moral, and economic assistance, including military assistance, which the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had repeatedly requested from the Government of the Soviet Union"^[14]. Later in Pravda, it was stated in "Messages from Kabul" that on December 28, 1979, "Karmal Babrak was unanimously elected General Secretary of the Central Committee... the revolutionary court sentenced X. for crimes against the noble people of Afghanistan. Amina is facing the death penalty. The sentence has been carried out"^[15].

As Mikhail Gorbachev recalled (from November 27, 1979 to October 21, 1980, he was a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU), the news of the Soviet troops entering Afghanistan was unexpected and shocking.: "It was not the Politburo that made the decision, but the group within the Politburo, the senior comrades. My friend E. A. Shevardnadze and I learned about this. I came to Pitsunda for a vacation. He came to visit me there. We talked a lot. We wake up in the morning, in fact, and the rise was premature. They tell us this: the deployment of a limited contingent to Afghanistan has been announced. Before that, neither he nor I knew anything. He is a candidate for the Politburo, and I am a candidate for the Politburo. And we didn't know. This is generally out of the ordinary"^[16].

Soviet politicians and diplomats needed to legitimize the military action of December 25-27, 1979, especially the events of the military coup of December 27, 1979 in Kabul.

The official Soviet position was announced in the response of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, to a statement by the President of the United States, J. P. Blavatsky. December 29, 1979: "The statement contained in your message that the Soviet Union did something to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan is completely unacceptable and untrue. I must emphasize with all certainty that the changes in the Afghan leadership were made by the Afghans themselves, and only by them. Ask the Afghan government about this."^[17]

The general line of the Communist Party on the events of December 25-27, 1979, was outlined in the Central Committee's report to the XXVI Congress of the CPSU on February 23, 1981 by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev: "Imperialism has unleashed a real undeclared war against the Afghan revolution. This has created a direct threat to the security of our southern border. This situation forced us to provide military assistance, which was requested by a friendly country. The plans of the enemies of Afghanistan have failed"^[18].

In turn, it was announced that "X Amin and his henchmen were direct mercenaries of imperialist forces hostile to Afghanistan, CIA agents who aimed to discredit and undermine the April Revolution... acting on the orders of the CIA, Amin colluded with the counterrevolutionary scum entrenched in Pakistan"^[19].

The ideologically correct view concealed an insoluble contradiction, which was created by the combination of both the fact of repeated requests from the head of Afghanistan, H. Amin (since September 16, 1979, following the results of the military party coup against N. M. Taraki), and the decisive role of Soviet troops in the coup on December 27, 1979 against the regime of H. Amin. Therefore, the USSR purposefully concealed the real picture of the events in Afghanistan that took place on December 25-27, 1979.

On December 27, 1979, Protocol No. 177 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On propaganda support for our action against Afghanistan" stated: "To emphasize that the USSR had nothing and has nothing to do with changes in the leadership of Afghanistan"^[20]. The resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was supplemented by internal official instructions for the CPSU, the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the USSR State Publishing House. The diplomatic work of the USSR was also carried out in this direction, in particular at the UN^[21].

The guide was the "List of information prohibited for publication in the open press, broadcasts on radio and television": "Prohibit showing the participation of any military units of the USSR Armed Forces in combat operations to protect the USSR and other states after 1945, as well as providing assistance to foreign states"^[22]. "Until 1983, it was officially believed that the 40th Army was on exercises," recalled V. N. Sevruk, deputy head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the 1980s^[23].

Thus, the nature of information and propaganda coverage of the Soviet Union's military intervention in the civil war in Afghanistan was laid down in December 1979. State censorship was established immediately upon the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and always controlled coverage of the fighting of a limited contingent, purposefully hiding the real picture of the events of the undeclared war "across the river."

The nature of information and propaganda coverage of the military presence of a Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979 – 1985.

In the early 1980s, soldiers and officers of a Limited contingent found themselves in a completely unfamiliar world, in a feudal Islamic country. Neither the complexity of the situation nor the tasks were fully clear, perhaps even to the leadership of the USSR. "What did we understand then? We had no idea how serious this was. You know what kind of messages there were, it's impossible to understand anything: what kind of limited contingent, what tasks it has … The regimental commander announced the order: "We are moving to cover the southern borders of our Homeland." I still think that that first order was the most correct and clear. … And international assistance. To whom? What for? You wouldn't understand," recalled the internationalist soldier S. V. Loktionov^[24].

The information and propaganda state policy of the Soviet Union purposefully concealed the participation of Soviet troops in military operations in Afghanistan. And although the Soviet press mentioned the presence of a Limited contingent in Afghanistan, the ideological attitudes of state propaganda defined it as exclusively peaceful international assistance to the Afghan people from the "Shuravi".

The nature of the information and propaganda coverage of the military conflict in Afghanistan in the Soviet press is shown by a study of the publications of the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (the Central press organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense).

In the Red Star, under the special heading "On the ground of Afghanistan," it was reported that Soviet troops were allegedly conducting exercises to combat a simulated "enemy."^[25], provide peaceful assistance to Afghan workers in building a new life ^[26], improve political awareness ^[27], receive letters from home ^[28], rest ^[29] – and not a single word about the fighting of Soviet troops with the Mujahideen in the undeclared war "across the river".

A striking example of propaganda is the "Letter from Afghanistan", which described the correspondence of the internationalist soldiers with the girls from the brigade of sewing workers at the Stavropol folk crafts factory Voskhod: "We became friends with the Afghan peasants. We help them cultivate their crops, invite them to visit, tell them about life in our country, share soldiers' food ... to mark the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, an exhibition dedicated to friendship and unity of the Soviet peoples has been opened in the Lenin marching room"^[30]. Probably, only naive girls, scribblers, could believe this. The girls were not informed about the daily fights and the friends who did not return from them.

It should be recalled that for Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, fighting did not stop for a single day, and on average, on each of the 3341 days of the undeclared war "across the river", up to 5 Soviet soldiers were killed and at least 16 wounded in combat operations, ambushes, raids, and clashes with the Dushmans^[31]. However, the military exploits of the Soviet internationalist soldiers in the Soviet press could only be learned between the lines, unlike the "heroic deeds" of the Afghan army.

In particular, in 1980: "The soldiers of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan are vigilantly guarding the gains of the April revolution"^[32], "The soldiers of the Revolution are on the alert"^[33], "The strength of the Afghan border guards lies in their revolutionary conviction, in the rightness of the just cause of the April revolution, dedication and loyalty to military duty"^[34], "The People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan, with the support of the population, captured 30 bandits in Chardara county"^[35]. The publications were published in the series "On Guard of the Revolution"^[36], "Afghanistan in the lens"^[37] and "Correspondence from Afghanistan"^[38].

It should be noted that already on February 29, 1980, a battle took place near the village of Shigal, which brought the first major combat losses of Soviet troops in the Afghan war – 36 paratroopers (317th guards pdp of the 103rd Guards Airborne Forces) were killed in one battle, among them the first Heroes of the Soviet Union (posthumously) in the OKW N. P. Chepik and A. G. Mironenko. In total, in 1980, the losses of the Limited Contingent amounted to more than 1.5 thousand killed and at least 5.2 thousand wounded ^[39].

However, Soviet citizens were offered a completely different picture of events.: "The soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are firmly guarding the gains of the April revolution, resisting the attacks of its enemies. In the pictures: Afghan soldiers improve their combat skills; political activities in the Afghan-Soviet friendship room"^[40], "Units of the Afghan army together with self–defense units defeated several large gangs in January: 2223 bandits were killed, 1117 captured, about 2 thousand weapons were shown to journalists"^[41]. Focusing on such publications, the war "beyond the river" became completely distant, unknown to many Soviet citizens.

The false ideological picture led to a distorted perception of the war by Soviet society. The internationalist soldier S. Mironov recalls this: "It was very difficult. No one knew where we were or what we were doing. The only one who probably believed my stories was my father. And friends, even close ones, said: come on, don't talk, the Afghans are fighting there, and you are planting trees. It was very hard to listen to it"^[42].

Many citizens of the USSR were naively convinced of the absolute reliability of the official information provided by newspapers, radio and television. This was one of the reasons why the society did not understand the "Shuravi" who returned to the Soviet Union from the undeclared war – this was the reverse side of propaganda.

The only exceptions were those for whom the undeclared war "across the river" became a pain of memory and heart, leaving unhealed mental wounds, and sometimes their whole lives were divided into "before and after" receiving a telegram, as happened to the parents of O. V. Gorbunov, who died in Afghanistan on December 2, 1983 when an armored vehicle was blown up: "It is with deep sorrow in our hearts that we inform you that your son and our comrade in arms ... while performing a combat mission, died faithful to the military oath ... honestly and conscientiously fulfilled the military duty of an internationalist soldier, while showing courage and heroism"^[43].

A study of letters and appeals from Soviet citizens to the Central Committee of the CPSU from the archival materials of the Russian Academy of Sciences (first of all, F. 100. Op. 5. D. 853-858) shows that since August 1981, anonymous letters and appeals have been sent to the top state party leadership of the USSR on behalf of mothers of soldiers drafted into the Red Army.

An example of such letters from the early 1980s is an appeal to the Central Committee of the CPSU on behalf of mothers of soldiers in December 1984: "Do not consider our letter a complaint, but a request from parents for their sons to return to their homeland and live, love and give offspring to our Homeland. It is important that parents understand their anxiety"^[44].

A mother who lost her eldest son in Afghanistan in March 1982 addressed the Central Committee of the CPSU in February 1985 from Frunze: "Our country seems to be powerful and just around the Kremlin, but in life some people live happy, others cry all their lives. When we have honest and fair people in our posts, when our children stop dying. Look at the Frunze cemetery – there are so many of them from Afghanistan. And not only the eternal flame, there is not even water to water the flowers. And most importantly, don't let my [second] son die."^[45]

The first rare reports about the military exploits of Soviet internationalist soldiers in Afghanistan began to appear only 1.5 years after the start of hostilities, at the end of 1982. On October 24, 1982, the message "The Tale of a Son" ^[46] was published in the Red Star – about the feat of A. I. Stovba, who on March 29, 1980, at the cost of his life. He covered the withdrawal of his comrades in Kunar province. Meanwhile, in 1979 – 1982, more than 4.8 thousand soldiers and officers of a Limited contingent died, at least 17 thousand people were wounded, concussed, and injured^[47].

An illustrative example: Hero of the Soviet Union N. M. Akramov recalls the presentation of the highest military award: "The award was sudden and secret, my dad was the first to tell me about it in Tajik over a closed line, he served in the KGB. I was called to Kiev in September 1982 and awarded the order at the district Officers' house"^[48]. The title Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal was awarded to N. M. Akramov by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 5, 1982 "For courage and heroism shown in fulfilling international duty in the Republic of Afghanistan": on March 16, 1982, N. M. Akramov led the unit (12 people). Near the village of Shafiheil in Baghlan province, he destroyed a numerically superior gang of Dushmans (47 people) and its leader Khandar.

It should be noted that in the message of the Red Star "On the land of Afghanistan" for July 10, 1982, a photograph of N. M. Akramov was placed along with the motorized infantry of his unit (6th motorized rifle Company of the 149th guards of the 201st msd): "The unit commander is a knight of the Order of the Red Star, a Communist of the Guard, Senior Lieutenant Nabi Akramov. The motorized rifle units make efficient use of every minute of the training time, and the socialist competition is well organized here. … During tactical exercises and field exercises, the motorized rifle guards raised the unit's combat readiness to a high level"^[49]. And such "tactical exercises", "field exercises" and "socialist competitions" with daily risk to life and health were the daily combat routines of Soviet soldiers and officers in Afghanistan.

Therefore, the harsh truth of the undeclared war "across the river" inevitably put everything in its place, destroying illusions.: "The trip to Afghanistan shook me up a lot. I was struck by the huge gap between what I saw and heard on the spot and what I read in official telegrams and reports on the situation in this country. All illusions finally left me," recalled Lieutenant General of the KGB of the USSR N. S. Leonov^[50].

The problems of unsatisfactory state social protection for veterans of the Afghan war were first publicly reported only in February 1984, the fifth year of the undeclared war. In the publication "Duty" by Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist I. P. Rudenko, it was reported about the seriously wounded internationalist soldier Alexander Nemtsov, who in his homeland faced a wall of alienation built by the callousness and bureaucracy of officials in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk region of the Ukrainian SSR^[51]. After the publication, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided "On shortcomings in work" and conducted an audit of the social work of local authorities in relation to internationalist soldiers in all republics of the Soviet Union^[52].

Thus, the presence of a Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979 – 1985 was ideologically defined by the USSR state propaganda as exclusively peaceful international assistance to the Afghan people from the "Shuravi". The information and propaganda state policy of the Soviet Union purposefully concealed the participation of Soviet troops in military operations in Afghanistan. This was largely determined by the need to eliminate the theme of war from the memory and life of Soviet society, due to the inevitability of answering the question of the goals and cost of military action in a country outside the territory of the USSR.

The impact of the Glasnost policy of perestroika and renewal of Soviet society on the information and propaganda coverage of the military presence of a Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: 1985-1989.

By 1985, the fighting of a Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had become a serious political problem (the price of war: political consequences, economic costs, human losses): in 1979 – 1984, more than 9 thousand soldiers and officers of a Limited contingent died, at least 30 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured; the greatest losses of the Limited The casualties were associated with the expansion of hostilities in 1984: more than 2.4 thousand soldiers and officers were killed, at least 8.5 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, and injured^[53].

And if in the early years of the undeclared war "across the river" it was possible to hide the reality of daily fighting under the term "international aid", then gradually the living truth about the unknown war and the daily fighting of 100 thousand. The limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan inevitably broke through censorship barriers^[54].

An example is an anonymous letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU addressed to Mikhail Gorbachev, July 1987: "When will this massacre finally end? Why are you mutilating people's destinies? Why aren't your children in Afghanistan? Name the son or daughter of at least one member of the Central Committee who served there or died. Think about what you're doing. Naturally, this letter will not reach you, despite the hype in the newspapers about perestroika and democracy. But never mind, at least someone will read it. … And I dream even less of finding answers in the newspaper Pravda. Where is this truth? I will not subscribe − perestroika has not won yet. I'm afraid"^[55].

This was also stated, but more emphatically, in a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU from a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, February 1988: "I am more than sure that none of the sons of our top leaders have visited Afghanistan, not one of them has laid down his head in the fields of their steppes and mountains. The high ranks of popes and relatives saved them from this. And simple Vanya from Ryazan has always been and remains a scapegoat. I know that my letter will displease you, but I'm not afraid of that. I have nothing to lose, my life is almost over, one war is enough for me, and I don't want young men who have never seen anything in life to die in this massacre."^[56]

Only on August 2, 1985, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU made a decision according to which it was allowed to "publish individual isolated facts (no more than one per month) of injuries or deaths of Soviet servicemen in the performance of military duty." At the same time, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed the ban on publishing "information in open publications revealing the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and above", and also confirms the ban on "publishing materials on perpetuating the memory of the dead"^[57].

Since 1986, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in the concept of "new political thinking", has adopted a foreign policy course towards an international settlement of the military conflict and a reduction in the military presence of the USSR in Afghanistan^[58]. On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an agreement on the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops with guarantees from the USSR and the United States^[59].

Despite the changes associated with the "glasnost" policy of perestroika and the renewal of Soviet society, state censorship persisted. Pravda's special correspondent in Afghanistan, V. S. Okulov, recalls the role of censorship restrictions in 1988, when the Soviet intelligence raid near Bagram was replaced by the actions of the Afghan army: "Censorship corrected the report on the night raid: Instead of the Soviet army, there are units of the Afghan People's Army, and instead of Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail, there is Ahmad. The reason: "Censorship forced: it is not necessary, they say, now, on the eve of the Geneva talks, to show that the OKW is conducting active hostilities ..."^[60].

The withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was established by February 15, 1989 and began on May 15, 1988.^[61]

An important aspect of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was its information and propaganda coverage, which convincingly confirmed the Soviet Union's implementation of the Geneva Agreements on April 14, 1988.^[62] For ideological reasons, UN representatives and numerous foreign journalists were allowed to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan^[63].

Starting in January 1989, Krasnaya Zvezda reported almost daily on the progress of the withdrawal of units of a Limited contingent: "There, on Salang. Our paratroopers celebrated the last New Year on Afghan soil"^[64], "Sapper soldiers will go ahead of the columns returning to their homeland, ensuring the safety of their movement"^[65], "Meeting at Home. This year, the first group of retired internationalist soldiers arrived from Afghanistan at Tashkent-Vostochny airport"^[66], "We are leaving, friendship remains"^[67], "Afghan reportage. The hour of return"^[68], "The columns are heading north. Report from the headquarters of a Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan"^[69], "On the roads of Afghanistan. They are getting shorter for soldiers and officers from a limited contingent of our troops. And their end ends at the border, beyond which lies the Motherland. Soon she will meet them"^[70], "Hello, native land! The first column of combat units from the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan arrived in Termez yesterday."^[71] "There, ahead, is the land of the Motherland. Columns are moving north"^[72], "130 kilometers to the border"^[73], "The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is being completed strictly on schedule"^[74], "Hello, Motherland!"^[75], "The fatherland meets the sons"^[76].

The final day of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, February 15, 1989, became a landmark. Colonel-General B. V. Gromov, who led the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the last commander of the 40th Army, recalls that none of the leadership of the Soviet Union considered it necessary to meet a limited contingent at Home: "There was no one from Moscow at the withdrawal of troops. … At that time, I was ready to openly say on the bridge, but I could barely resist: "why is there no one from Moscow?!". The state sent us there to fight. Well, you don't want to meet the commander of the army, then the troops had been leaving for almost a year before that. It was possible to determine which day to arrive. But someone from the Politburo had to come. There was no one there. It's like we made it up ourselves..."^[77].

It should be noted that the end of the "Afghan war" for the USSR raised questions for the state authorities about the search for Soviet soldiers and officers who went missing during the war (417 people); about the adaptation to civilian life of more than 620 thousand "Shuravi" – Soviet soldiers and officers, civilian specialists who served on the orders of the Soviet state in the undeclared war "across the river"; about the social security of more than 53.7 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured in the war; preserving the memory of 15130 people who died in the war. The fate of the 273 Soviet soldiers who went missing in Afghanistan is still unknown^[78].

However, it was not until June 2, 1988, that Resolution No. 217 of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR granted the right to "the Councils of Ministers of the autonomous Republics, regional executive committees, regional executive committees, Moscow and Leningrad City executive committees to make decisions on the construction of memorial complexes, monuments and tombstones to defenders of the Motherland and internationalist soldiers"^[79].

"Our state has been fighting a war in Afghanistan for seven years. Why does the government keep the losses in manpower and equipment a secret from the Soviet people?" a member of the CPSU, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, asked in an address to the Central Committee of the CPSU in January 1988^[80]. It was only on May 26, 1988, after a long silence at a press conference, that the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, A.D. Lizichev, reported the first official information about Soviet losses in Afghanistan (as of May 1, 1988): 13,310 Soviet soldiers were killed, 35,478 wounded, and 311 missing.. "We are aware of our losses, and these losses were quite heavy," said Army General A.D. Lizichev^[81]. The first full official data of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense on the irretrievable losses of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan were published on August 17, 1989 in the newspaper Pravda^[82].

The study of letters and appeals to the Central Committee of the CPSU testifies to the contradictory position of the state and society in relation to the internationalist soldiers, who often faced indifference at home.: "They were often greeted not with warmth and love, but with indifference and disregard" (March 1988)^[83], "Everywhere they write about the sensitive attitude towards the families of the victims, but I only felt indifference" (May 1988)^[84].

A letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU from the mother of a deceased Soviet soldier in Afghanistan, May 1988, is indicative: "It's a shame that our sons are being forgotten. My son died in 1983. It's been five years now, and I'm still crying. Many people are surprised that it's time to stop crying, it's gone by the way for them, it's a peaceful, happy time for them, but I don't see this peaceful time. I see thousands dead and maimed.… There's a lot of formalism around. But they are generally silent and hiding about this terrible war. Perhaps it is possible to make a monument to those who died in Afghanistan"^[85].

The government, which initially sought to conceal the daily combat operations of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, then chose to "turn the page" and assign full responsibility to its predecessors, the "Brezhnev" Politburo, and declare this war a "mistake," which was enshrined in Resolution No. 982-1 of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR dated December 24, 1989 "On Political Assessment." decisions on the deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in December 1979"^[86]. B. V. Gromov recalls: "The deputies actually defamed everything that we, the participants in the Afghan war, did there. The boys carried the honor of the state on their shoulders, which did not even say "thank you" loudly and clearly."^[87]

The internationalist soldier P. V. Shetko spoke about state hypocrisy at the Congress on December 24, 1989: "Real communists carry a party card next to their hearts, that the party has one privilege - to be ahead. Communist comrades, tell us the names of those who protested against that war and sought the truth. Those who surrendered their party card in protest or shot themselves... the war is not over yet. And not only there, in Afghanistan. It's not over for us here yet. It will not end until at least one unreleased Soviet prisoner of war remains, until at least one grave is cared for, the memory of the dead is immortalized, until at least one disabled person or war participant finds his place in society or lives on the verge of poverty, until those responsible for the deaths of our people are brought to justice. in a foreign land until everyone finds out the truth about the Afghan war"^[88].

The apotheosis of such a hypocritical state policy was the phrase "We did not send you there"^[89]. From a letter from an internationalist soldier to the Central Committee of the CPSU, September 1988: "From the stands and in the press, there is a lot of talk about attention to the "Afghans", about benefits for them (according to the resolution of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers)... We were given a certificate of benefits. But what does it do? Only the right to pass through the store without queuing. Where is the social justice that our leaders talk so much about? Moreover, some smart guys say, "I didn't send you there (to Afghanistan)."^[90]

Thus, the increase in the price of the USSR's military and political participation in the military conflict in Afghanistan (political consequences, economic costs, human losses) led to the impossibility of further eliminating the theme of war from the memory and life of Soviet society: in 1979 - 1984, more than 9 thousand soldiers and officers of a limited contingent died, at least 30 thousand people were killed. wounded, contused, traumatized^[91]. Daily combat operations of 100-thousand. The limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan could no longer be concealed, which raised the issue of the goals and cost of military operations in the country outside the territory of the USSR. However, despite the changes associated with the "glasnost" policy of perestroika and the renewal of Soviet society, state censorship persisted.

Conclusions of the study

Since the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, the USSR has developed a special state policy in the field of information and propaganda coverage of the events of the military and political involvement of the Soviet Union in the military conflict in Afghanistan.

State censorship has always strictly controlled information about the fighting of a Limited contingent, trying to prevent the dissemination of information about the real participation of Soviet troops in the daily fighting of the Afghan war and distort the true picture of the events of this undeclared war "across the river."

The USSR's policy of information and propaganda coverage of the military presence of a Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was conditioned by the need to eliminate the theme of war from the memory and life of Soviet society, due to the inevitability of answering the question of the goals and cost of military operations in the country outside the territory of the USSR.

However, the increase in the price of the USSR's military and political participation in the military conflict in Afghanistan (political consequences, economic costs, human losses) made it impossible to hide the reality of the Afghan war any longer, which raised the question of the goals and cost of military action.

Nevertheless, despite the changes associated with the "glasnost" policy of perestroika and the renewal of Soviet society, state censorship persisted. The issues of adaptation to peaceful life of more than 620 thousand "Shuravi", social security of more than 53.7 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, and injured in the war, preservation of the memory of 15130 people who died in the war, and the search for Soviet soldiers and officers missing during the war (417 people) were almost not raised.

A study of the USSR's policy of information and propaganda coverage of the military presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan convincingly proves the perniciousness of creating a false ideological picture of events. The propaganda picture of events. The information generated by the mass media of the USSR (especially in 1979 – 1985) led to a distorted perception of the military conflict in Afghanistan and the military-political participation of the Soviet Union in it, to the suppression of the feat of the Soviet internationalist soldier on the soil of Afghanistan.

It should be noted that in the context of the collapse of the united Union state at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the ideological vacuum created by state–party propaganda was filled by a critical rethinking of the events of the Afghan War, the heroism and courage of the Shuravi.

In the modern geopolitical confrontation, when information and psychological operations have become the basis for a new generation of hybrid wars, the importance of propaganda tools is increasing. A similar instrument of information and psychological warfare is the mass media. However, their use should be conscious and competent, taking into account ideological goals and historical experience.