On the issue of the thematic specifics of the channels of the Communist Party deputies in Telegram

Plotnikov Ivan Pavlovich Postgraduate Student; Department of Theory and History of Journalism; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Moscow, 101000, Russia plotnikov.iv2014@gmail.com

Parhit'ko Nikolai Petrovich ORCID: 0000-0002-7678-5735 PhD in History Associate Professor; Department of Theory and History of Journalism; Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University of Russia 6 Miklukho-Maklaya str., Moscow, 101000, Russia scharnchorst@mail.ru

Introduction

Today, social networks are becoming more than just a news platform. They are one of the most important tools in shaping the image of the party, promoting its ideology and winning over a new electorate. In addition, social media has largely changed modern approaches to political communication. Unlike traditional media, social networks allow politicians to address the electorate directly and immediately see the reaction in the form of views, comments, etc. Some researchers believe that with the current level of digital communication, replenishing the party's assets becomes quite a difficult task if the party does not have its own resources in the network space ^{[23, p.127]}. Moreover, obtaining high ratings of support and trust of the electorate is impossible without the effective work of individual deputy channels ^{[21, p.85]}.

In this sense, the functions of social networks and messengers in the political space were most fully formulated by A.V. Anishchenko. In her opinion, these media are used as tools for organizing, mobilizing, and implementing various forms of political participation and civil-political activism ^{[16, p.20]}.

At the same time, it is important to note the crucial role of social networks in creating media images. Thus, certain ideas, statements, and political programs are often associated by the party audience not so much with the party itself as with a specific politician ^{[22, p.218]}. Therefore, it is obvious that social media channels, even for representatives of the same party, can differ significantly both in form and content.

At the same time, the process of media content consumption has also changed: in modern conditions, we see trends of "re-information", when the audience, after receiving information from traditional media, also turns to alternative sources, primarily social networks ^{[20, p.60]}. We should add that social networks are also crucial for voters in the issue of monitoring the activities of a deputy after his election ^{[10, p.754]}.

Turning to the history of the issue, it is worth saying that political parties began to explore the online space back in 2004. This period is characterized by the transition from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 technologies, when it became possible to carry out interactive interaction during communication ^{[26, p.22]}. According to the scientific works of R. Gibson and A. Remmel, there are three media models of the election campaign: pre-modern (using newspapers and direct personal communication), modernist (using television and advertising) and professional-postmodern (using the Internet) ^{[8, p.34]}. Later, researchers M. Vergere, L. Hermans and S. Sams also identified a fourth model – a personal campaign, which is characterized by the use of Web 2.0 technologies (including social networks) and personality-oriented interaction with the audience. Thanks to this approach to communication, the electorate learns more about the politician's personal life, and the politician himself gets a stronger connection with people beyond the professional ^{[12, p.482]}. It was with the advent of the fourth model that parliamentary accounts and social media channels began to be actively used.

The full potential of social networks was first successfully used in 2008 and 2012 during the election campaigns of Barack Obama, and later during the election campaigns of Donald Trump in the United States in 2016 and E. Macron in France in 2017 ^{[11, p.29]}; ^{[13, p.7]};

^{[26, p.22Because of this, a significant part of foreign research focuses on social networks such as Facebook and Twitter (banned in the Russian Federation). A detailed analysis of the messages on the social network Twitter during the US election campaign is presented in the work of F. Barclay and Ch. Pichandi, who compared election results and social media content. It turned out that in terms of the number of mentions and posts among Twitter users, B. Obama was ahead of his opponent M. Romney. The number of followers on Facebook was also higher for Obama. In addition, Obama's advantage was that he registered his social media pages back in the 2008 elections, which ensured his popularity with a certain number of online audiences at the start of the campaign [3, pp.19-20]}.

However, despite the wide functionality and possibilities, the use of social networks still generates discussions in the scientific community. Thus, it is often difficult to verify the content of information posts on social networks. Modern researchers analyzing the impact of social media on election campaigns abroad are increasingly turning to the problem of fake news. For the first time, this was noticed in his scientific work. Allcott and M. Gentskov. The researchers analyzed the content of social networks during the 2016 US election campaign and concluded that Facebook accounted for the largest number of fakes. Moreover, fake news in support of D. Trump had a wider reach and was distributed in greater numbers than similar messages in support of his opponent B. Clinton ^{[1, p.2]}.

It is noteworthy that the 2017 French election campaign was also characterized by fake news on social networks, primarily on Facebook ^{[20, p.60]}. Similar studies have revealed the spread of fake news on Facebook and during the Italian general elections in 2018 ^{[7, p.3]}.

Subsequently, other researchers added that such messages are characterized by sensationalism and emotionality. In addition, social media is part of the post-truth campaigns. According to the authors of such scientific papers, the spread of fakes is facilitated by "filter bubbles", that is, algorithms of social networks that select only the information that users prefer in accordance with their own beliefs. In addition, it is possible to create fake accounts or bots on social networks, which are used to increase the number of subscribers and online attacks on political opponents, as well as for disinformation purposes ^{[9, pp.1431-1437]}. This is confirmed by the data of Indian researchers who studied the influence of bots on the Twitter accounts of Indian politicians ^{[4, pp.6-7]}.

As some researchers have noted, with the beginning of mass use of social networks, the phenomenon of disinformation led "to an increase in political intolerance and discursive violence, undermined trust in state institutions and traditional mass media" ^{[6, p.197]}. Moreover, the dissemination of news messages in the party segment of social networks is faster than in the non-party segment ^{[2, p.14]}.

Let's also pay attention to the fact that the study of the content of social networks, including parliamentary channels, allows us to predict the results of election campaigns. Thus, the work of Indonesian researchers analyzed the presidential elections in Indonesia in 2024. The authors were interested in two factors: the number of messages of each candidate on Twitter, as well as a variety of user reactions to these messages ^{[5, p.523]}.

Turning to the Russian experience of Internet activity, it should be noted that in Russia the first attempts of parties to use social networks in the framework of the election campaign were recorded in 2011. The development of the online presence of parliamentary parties was observed in the period 2011-2016, and it finally took shape by 2018 ^{[27, p.10]}. Moreover, if Facebook and Twitter social networks initially gained the greatest popularity among the audience, now VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Yandex Zen and Telegram services are more often used ^{[15, p.134]}; ^{[25, p.52]}.

Separately, we note that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, along with United Russia, were innovators in the development of the Internet space. Already in 2011, party leader G. Zyuganov began using Twitter and VKontakte accounts. At that time, the party also had its own YouTube channel. However, Internet technologies were not widely used in the party. This was primarily due to the fact that the CPRF electorate consisted of older people ^{[27, p.11]}.

Nevertheless, later in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, a new stage of the development of social networks was recorded, associated with two events. Firstly, with the speech of party leader G. Zyuganov at the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 2013, at which the head of the Communist Party announced the decision to create a group of "red bloggers", they meant, among others, the deputies of the party. At the same time, Zyuganov expressed the opinion that social networks represent "a very cheap and effective way to spread information." Secondly, with the refusal of the candidate for president from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, P. Grudinin, to participate in the TV debates on Channel One due to the scandalous behavior of the other candidates (V. Zhirinovsky and K. Sobchak). It was decided within the party to use other platforms for campaigning, including social networks.

Instagram Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter have been blocked at the request of Roskomnadzor, so the party's efforts are currently focused on Telegram and VKontakte services. At the same time, according to A.V. Makhrin, the content in both social networks of the party is quite similar ^{[23, p.123]}. A similar point of view is shared by V. V. Titov, who noted that channels on social networks serve more as news feeds than as tools for two-way communication ^{[28, p.28]}. E. R. Nikulin also adds that the media management of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation on social networks does not take into account the diversity of the audience, and therefore publications receive a low the level of user response ^{[24, p.44]}.

In any case, at the current stage of political communication, Russian parties can no longer ignore the popularity of social networks, in particular Telegram, which is used by both young people and the older generation. So, according to the latest data from MTS, Telegram's Russian audience numbers 85 million users, and the social network itself has become the fourth most popular Internet resource in the country.

The scientific literature presents a number of studies devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the activity of Russian parties in social networks. In general, many researchers agree that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is experiencing significant difficulties in the development of political communications in Telegram, which do not allow it to increase its audience and use all the opportunities provided by the social network ^{[24, p.44]}. Moreover, one of the main problems of the party in the online sphere is the difficulty in creating major information occasions ^{[18, p.16]}. On the other hand, some authors note that Telegram as a whole has low activity of "systemic", including parliamentary parties ^{[28, p.26]}.

L. V. Smorgunov gave the most complete picture of the use of the opportunities and advantages of social networks: his research covers the spectrum of the majority of Russian parties. However, he considered only data on the social networks VKontakte and Twitter ^{[26, p. 27]}. A similar study was conducted by D. V. Chizhov, who analyzed the activity of Russian parties on the social networks VKontakte, Twitter and Facebook ^{[29, pp. 320-321]}.

In addition, there are separate studies of the Communist Party's social networks at the regional level. For example, D. Y. Chirkin and A. D. Kolmakov, investigating the elections to the Yekaterinburg City Duma, came to the conclusion that representatives of United Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are the most active in social networks ^{[30, p. 94]}. E. V. Yevpak, in his scientific work on online communications of the Communist Party in the Republic of Tuva, found the following features of political communication in the region: the focus on publishing unique content, the desire to reduce the text of messages, the priority of the graphic form of information ^{[19, p. 565]}. At the same time, there is a study by A. A. Beshkarev and O. V. Pystina, which focuses on such a unique problem as the influence of memes on the creation of a positive media image using the example of the leader of the regional branch of the Communist Party of the Komi Republic ^{[17, p. 109]}.

This category also includes research on the activity of the party during major election campaigns. Thus, V. M. Ananishnev notes that during the Moscow mayoral elections in 2023, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation did not use "any remarkable political technologies" to interact with voters ^{[14, p.103]}. E. R. Nikulin, in his work concerning the State Duma elections in 2021, believes that the resources of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in social networks They are not an "effective communication tool" ^{[24, p. 44]}. Such conclusions lead us to believe that the party's social media channels at the regional level show better results in working with the electorate than the main party channels.

However, even now, certain aspects of the content of party social networks, in particular the thematic component of the channels of individual deputies, are still poorly understood. In the framework of this study, we tried to examine the content of the Communist Party's deputy channels in the period between major election campaigns and identify the most popular topics among the party's electorate.

Research methodology and procedure

The first step of the study was the selection of Telegram channels. We have reviewed the published statistics of the Center for Research on Russian Political Culture (CIPCR), which analyzed the activity of deputies of Russian parties in social networks for the period September 2024. CIPCR also compiled a list of political channels with the highest number of messages, views and engagement based on data from the Kribrum social media monitoring and analysis system. About". From this rating, we selected seven of the most media-active communist politicians with Telegram channels: G. Zyuganov, Y. Afonin, D. Parfenov, N. Ostanina, S. Obukhov, M. Matveev, I. Filatova.

We should also note that the monthly period of all publications on party online resources was chosen specifically to ensure that there is no link to significant socio-political events such as election campaigns, when the number and quality of posts may change as well as the subject of the channel.

The study was further divided into two stages. The first is an analysis of the overall channel statistics, including channel registration time, number of subscribers, number of publications, citation index, and percentage of audience engagement. To obtain the data, we used the TGsat service. The second stage included a content analysis of publications for October 2024 and the identification of key tokens specific to each channel. For this stage, the built-in functions of the Telegram messenger and the ability to upload publications for the period under review in HTML format were used. It is important to note that the total volume of all publications included both original posts and reposts from other channels. The data obtained was analyzed using the SANSTV service.RU and Text Statistics Analyzer programs. Additionally, the information was processed manually. Prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, and service words were not included in the sample. The second stage also included highlighting the three most widely read publications on each channel.

As a result, a comparative analysis of the data obtained allowed us to identify the thematic area of each of the channels, as well as to consider the relationship between their topics and general statistics, that is, to determine which socio-political issues are popular with the audience of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Let's add that based on the first stage of the study, a table with general statistics of parliamentary channels was made, and based on the second, a word cloud with the most common lexemes was created.

Results

In the table below, we have provided the overall channel statistics for the end of October 2024.

Table 1. Statistical data of Telegram channels

As can be seen from this table, most of the channels were created after 2018, which confirms our thesis above about the beginning of active use of social networks by communists in connection with scandalous TV debates during the election campaign.

Despite the many years since the channels were registered, the data obtained indicates that the Communist Party has not mastered Telegram. Only two channels were able to overcome the threshold of 10,000 subscribers, and the resource of Communist Party leader G. Zyuganov is not among them. Moreover, the number of "live" subscribers on the channel "News from the Rest" is quite difficult to determine, since the channel's statistics show a sharp increase and loss of audience, which may indicate an increase in subscribers. However, it should be noted that the channels "News from the Rest" and "Mikhail Matveev Comment" have the highest figures in terms of the citation index and the number of publications per month.

Nevertheless, the overall level of engagement of subscribers of parliamentary channels is quite low. This indicator measures the ratio of the audience activity of an online resource (reposts, comments, reactions) to the number of views. From our point of view, this parameter should optimally be 10-20%. Only the channels of M. Matveev and D. Parfenov correspond to this range. Moreover, the channel "News from the Rest", despite the highest number of subscribers, has the lowest rate of 2.5%, which once again leads us to the assumption of audience fraud.

Next, for each channel, we calculated the most commonly used tokens, arranging them in descending order. Opposite each token is a number indicating the frequency of its use in October. In addition, in our study, we measured the volume of posts published, and also highlighted the most widely read publications for the month.

The official resource of the party leader Gennady Zyuganov is dominated by publications from 1 to 1.5 thousand characters. We can identify the following keywords and the frequency of their use: Communist Party – 149 times, Russia – 102, country – 77, Soviet – 58, victory – 53, front – 37, war – 35, development – 33, party – 32, news – 28, USSR – 26, Komsomol – 26, budget – 25, frontline – 22. During the October period, the most widely read publications were: a post with the headline "The demographic crisis requires not punitive measures, but social transformations" (10 thousand views), a post congratulating a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation P. Grudinin (8 thousand views), a post with a summary of the report "The historical contribution of Socialism to the defeat of Hitler's fascism and Japanese militarism and the tasks of the Communists at the present stage" (5 thousand views).

The channel of deputy Sergei Obukhov "Obukhov. PRO" is mostly devoted to the analysis of the political situation in Russia and abroad. The online resource hosts publications-reposts of scientific research, analyses of interviews and statements of politicians, assessments of the political prospects of Russian political parties (primarily the Communist Party), etc. Mostly voluminous posts from 1.5 to 3.5 thousand characters are published. We can identify the following keywords and the frequency of their use: Communist Party – 86 times, Russia – 52, deputy – 53, country – 36, party – 35, budget – 29, development – 27, faction – 26, political – 26, power – 23, inquiry – 23, SVO (special military operation) – 19, communist – 17, leader – 15, United Russia – 12. During the October period, the most widely read publications were posts with the following headlines: "PRO Magic Pendel for officials as a way to get rid of a million illegal migrants" (43 thousand views), "PRO corridor of opposition from the Communist Party and the two-part electorate of the Communist Party" (28 thousand views), "the CASE of one ex-prime minister, 11 former deputy prime ministers, two permanent representatives who fled with money to the West and the blocked anti-corruption initiative of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation" (21 thousand views).

The channel of deputy Mikhail Matveev "Mikhail Matveev comment" publishes materials about the activities of the politician and his comments in the field of migration. Moreover, the deputy himself takes a clear anti-migrant position. Short publications (300-800 characters) predominate, but voluminous materials (1.5-3 thousand characters) are periodically published. The channel has the following statistics on key tokens: migrants – 70 times, Russian – 65, Russia – 65, migration – 29, the State Duma – 29, migration – 28, crimes – 26, Russian – 24, Tajikistan – 16, foreign – 14, foreigner – 12, citizenship – 12. For the October period The most widely read publications were: "Since 2018, the regions of Russia have spent more than 60.7 billion rubles from their budgets on providing medical care to migrants who do not have health insurance policies" (104 thousand views), "The State Duma adopted today a package of laws toughening the fight against illegal migration" (68 thousand views), "In connection with a high-profile interview with a fighter from the UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) crew that was released yesterday on the Goblin channel Goodwin and Ernst "Hedgehog" repeatedly sent inquiries about the circumstances of their deaths to the Minister of Defense and the chief military Prosecutor" (66 thousand views).

The channel of deputy Nina Ostanina "News from Ostanina" specializes in publishing materials about demography. The posted content is closely related to the position of a politician who is chairman of the State Duma Committee on Family Protection, Fatherhood, Motherhood and Childhood. Both short (500-1500 characters) and voluminous (2-3 thousand characters) publications prevail. The channel has the following statistics on key tokens: children – 206 times, family – 156, State Duma – 91, tax – 71, parents – 66, childhood – 51, child – 51, childlessness – 47, rest – 50, bill – 49, law – 46, motherhood – 44, fatherhood – 44, the state – 35, education – 30, life – 28. At the same time, the token "KPRF" is mentioned only 25 times. During the October period, the most widely read publications were: a post about awarding the winners of the First National Award "Father's Recognition" (31 thousand views), a reaction to the ban on religious clothing in schools in the Vladimir region (23 thousand views) and a post with the headline "Opinions are divided in the State Duma on the introduction of a ban on walking quadrobers" (12 thousand views).

The channel of deputy Irina Filatova "Red Fury" publishes information about the politician's activities. Both short (300-400 characters) and voluminous (1.5-3 thousand characters) publications prevail. It is worth noting that not many tokens are allocated on the channel in terms of frequency of use: country – 30 times, Russia – 18, people – 17, ban – 16, Russian – 13, family – 12. Such data suggests that the channel's subject matter is quite vague: from healthcare to migration and housing and communal services. During the October period, the most widely read publications were posts with the following headlines: "The bill banning childfree propaganda was unanimously adopted in the first reading" (32 thousand views), a post responding to criticism of the bill banning propaganda of the ideology of non-procreation (32 thousand views), a post with the headline "Chairman of the State Duma chastised "New people" for opposing the bill banning the ideology of childlessness" (16 thousand views).

On the Yuri Afonin channel, voluminous posts from 1.5 to 3 thousand characters are common. A total of 52 publications were published in October. The online resource has the following statistics on key tokens: Communist Party – 79 times, country – 66, Soviet – 64, Russia – 55, budget – 41, state – 38, growth – 38, price – 35, Russian – 34, development – 28, Komsomol – 25, economy – 25, party – 23, Zyuganov – 21, leader – 21, socialism – 16, Communist Party – 11. During the October period, the most widely read publications were posts with the following headlines: "Korkino as a portrait of Russian capitalism" (21 thousand views), "The proposal of the Ministry of Finance to reduce the state's share in state-owned companies may have simply catastrophic consequences for Russia" (17,000 views), "Alexander Lukashenko advises students to study Marxism in order to know life" (13,000 views).

The content of Deputy Denis Parfenov's channel is "Red. Parfenov" is a voluminous publication from 1.5 to 3 thousand characters. The online resource has the following statistics on key tokens:KPRF – 46 times, country – 33, budget – 29, Russia – 27, Russian – 24, communist – 19, development – 19, economic – 17, Moscow – 15, Central Committee (Central Committee) – 14, economy – 14, victory – 12, growth – 11, USSR – 10, faction – 10, war – 9. During the October period, the most widely read publications were posts with the following headlines: "The Communist Party faction in the State Duma did not support the draft federal budget" (2.6 thousand views), "In the same pocket" (2.5 thousand views), "A funeral action was held in Moscow on October 4, 2024 dedicated to "Black October 1993" (2 thousand views).

As a result, we can get the following general data on the frequency of use of words on the channels: Communist Party – 236, Russia – 217, children – 206, family – 168, country – 165, State Duma – 120, budget – 99, Russian – 95, development – 74, state – 73, tax – 71, migrants – 70, parents – 66, Russian – 65, Soviet – 64, party – 58, deputy – 53, childhood – 51, child – 51, rest – 50, growth – 49, bill – 49, childlessness – 47, law – 46, motherhood – 44, fatherhood – 44, economy – 39, faction – 36, leader – 36, communist – 36, price – 35, education – 30, migration – 29, life – 28, migration – 28, political – 26, crimes – 26, Komsomol – 25, power – 23, inquiry – 23, Zyuganov – 21, ITS – 19, people – 17, economic – 17, Tajikistan – 16, socialism – 16, prohibition – 16, Moscow – 15, foreign – 14, CC – 14, United Russia – 12, foreigner – 12, citizenship – 12, victory – 12, Communist Party – 11, USSR – 10, War – 9.

Based on the statistics obtained, we have formed a word cloud reflecting the most popular lexemes among political channels.

The above data proves that channels can be divided into two types: specialized and general-purpose. The first type includes the channels: "Mikhail Matveev comment", "News from the Rest" and "Obukhov. PRO». To the second - "Red Fury", "Yuri Afonin", "Red. Parfenov" and "Zyuganov". Voluminous publications of up to 3.5 thousand characters are common on all resources, short posts of up to 1 thousand are found only on the specialized channels Mikhail Matveev Comment and News from the Rest. It is due to this that specialized channels manage to publish more posts than other deputy channels, and therefore be more operational.

It is worth noting that specialized channels practically do not mention the lexemes characteristic of common channels associated with the communist ideology: the Communist Party, Soviet, USSR, communist, Komsomol. Whereas on resources with a common theme, the key tokens are quite similar. This fact can be explained by the orientation to the channel of the party leader G. Zyuganov and the main party news. The exception is S. Obukhov's channel, whose subject matter partially coincides with general thematic resources: the difference lies in the fact that the author focuses on policy analysis, and not only on news about the party and the activities of its deputies.

After analyzing the most popular publications on all seven channels, we can conclude that the most relevant topics for the audience are problems with migrants and demographic issues. This is also evidenced by general statistics, which show that the interest in the channels of deputies (the number of subscribers, the maximum number of views to posts, the citation index) specializing in these topics is significantly higher than that of channels that seek to cover the maximum number of topics. Moreover, even on general thematic channels, these topics dominate in terms of the number of views. If we focus only on general thematic channels, then the country's economic problems (rising prices and the issue of the federal budget) will dominate there, where, in addition to lexemes related to party ideology, lexical units dominate: budget, price, growth.

On the other hand, the engagement of channels with a common theme is somewhat higher than that of specialized ones. Nevertheless, these figures cannot be unambiguously attributed only to the subject parameter, these statistics are also influenced by a number of other factors: the possibility of leaving comments, conducting audience surveys, visual features of materials, etc.

Conclusion

Summing up the results of the study, we come to the conclusion that the deputy channels of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation represent a well-formed system. The analysis of key lexemes reveals the division of party channels into two main types: specialized and general online resources. Nevertheless, the general statistics of parliamentary resources show that the party's presence on Telegram is still quite weak.

Specialized channels focus on a specific topic, often related either to a position (for example, N. Ostanina is chairman of the State Duma Committee on Family Protection, Fatherhood, Motherhood and Childhood), or to the interests of the politician himself. Moreover, at the moment it is specialized channels that are more attractive to the audience of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation: we see the largest number of subscribers on resources with one main topic.

General-purpose channels, in turn, cover a wide range of issues. At the same time, the central place is occupied by the Zyuganov canal, which most deputies are guided by. Also, the authors of general thematic channels are more inclined to use ideological lexemes characteristic of the party: Soviet, Komsomol, USSR, communist, etc.

Separately, we note that the most popular topics, given the content of all types of deputy channels, for the audience of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation are problems of demography and migration, as well as internal economic problems. It is these publications that receive the largest number of views, which means they are in the range of interests of the party's media-active electorate.

As a result, a new direction in the development of parliamentary channels has emerged in recent years. Now their function is not just to report on the activities of a politician or a party. In fact, the deputies themselves act as analysts and experts.

The theoretical results of our research can be used in the study of the modern media system in Russia, especially the party media. In addition, the results are of practical importance and may be in demand when developing the party agenda of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or another political organization.