Henry Wilson’s Memorandum “Our Present and Future Military Policy in Russia” (November 13, 1918) as a Factor of the British Intervention Policy in Russia in November – December 1918

Mironiuk Sergei Alekseevich ORCID: 0000-0002-6874-7595 PhD in History Senior lecturer; Department of History of the Institute of Economics and Management in Agribusiness; Russian Timiryazev State Agrarian University 49 Timiryazevskaya str., Moscow, 127550, Russia privetsergey95@mail.ru Other publications by this author

The British policy of intervention in Russia (November 1917 – December 1919) is an important research area in the historiography of the Russian Civil War. It is interesting from the point of view of its influence on the emergence, development and completion of the internal Russian confrontation and the dynamics of Russia's relations with the leading states of Europe, Asia and America. This influence was due to the UK's status as one of the leading countries of the time. Its power was based on commercial and industrial leadership based on the colonial nature of the economy, a strong navy and a policy of balance of power in Europe. Because of this, she had diverse global interests in the world and opportunities to promote them.

British interference in the internal affairs of Russia, which was going through a special, crucial and significant historical stage — the Civil War, has become the subject of scientific discussions among domestic and foreign historians. In historiography, there are different assessments of the degree of influence of the policy of British intervention on the course of this war, as well as its motivation and goal-setting.

According to Soviet historians E. E. Yakushkin, I. I. Mints, G. E. Mymrin, O. F. Solovyov, S. G. Livshits, F. D. Volkov, and M. I. Svetachev, the policy of British intervention was to destroy the proletarian state, restore capitalism in Russia, establish control over Russian territory, and dismember the country ^[1-7]. Her influence on the Civil War was considered very significant due to her significant assistance to the White Movement as an opponent of Soviet Russia.

In post-Soviet, Russian historiography, the problem of the British policy of intervention was touched upon in the context of other, broader research areas ^[8-11]. Researchers such as V. P. Fedyuk, R. G. Gagkuev, and V. I. Goldin were interested in some topics related to this policy, in particular the role of the British military in the development of the anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia, Southern and Northern Russia ^[12-15]. In general, from the point of view of Russian historiography, this policy of intervention was mainly aimed at preventing the strengthening of German influence in Russia, especially after the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, as well as at realizing the possibilities of consolidating and strengthening Britain's position in the former Russian Empire. The scale and directions of the intervention were determined mainly by the dynamics of the First World War and the results of the fighting between the Red Army and the White Armies. In the end, the British policy of intervention was a notable but not decisive factor in this confrontation.

Regarding foreign historiography, historians U. and Z. Coates, J. White, R. Ullman, J. Bradley, R. Jackson, K. Keeble, M. Hudson, and J. Moffat considered the problem of British intervention policy to a greater extent within the framework of major research topics ^[16-24]. Many of them understood the intervention as a forced preventive military measure against Germany. Its purpose was to prevent the enemy from profiting from using the territory of the former Russian Empire to achieve victory in the First World War and consolidate its dominant position in this territory. This policy had little effect on the development of the Russian Civil War due to the lack of military forces and limited opportunities to assist the anti-Bolshevik forces. It was mainly the Russian front-line dynamics that determined the course of the Civil War. Depending on it, the priorities, directions and volumes of British aid to the opponents of the RSFSR changed.

Currently, the British policy of intervention remains a significant scientific topic for the historiography of the Russian Civil War. Her research requires active work on the introduction into scientific circulation of official documents of that time, including documents from the British War Cabinet, since they reflect the processes that influenced the emergence of the idea, preparation, implementation and completion of the intervention policy from November 1917 to December 1922. Of greatest interest are those documents that were written and prepared by high-ranking officials persons during or after important events that influenced the policy of intervention. These include documents from the Imperial General Staff, which had a significant impact on the formation, development and completion of this policy.

During the years of the British intervention, the heads of this institution were Generals William Robertson (December 1915 – February 1918) and Henry Wilson (February 1918 – February 1922). G. Wilson gained fame due to his professional experience, high authority and participation in the preparation and implementation of the intervention in Russia. His distinctive features as a high-ranking military man were broad erudition, the ability to think globally, careful analysis and non-standard judgments. These features manifested themselves in the documents he prepared for the British War Cabinet.

Among the documents of the Imperial General Staff of that time, the memorandum "Our current and future military policy in Russia" dated November 13, 1918 is of great importance ^[25]. This document is of interest because of the analysis it contains and the reasoned practical proposals for solving the problems of further implementation of the policy of intervention of the United Kingdom in Russia.

The object of research in this work is the memorandum of the head of the Imperial General Staff, G. Wilson, "Our current and future military policy in Russia" dated November 13, 1918, the subject is its content as a factor of British interference in domestic Russian affairs in November–December 1918.

The purpose of this article is to reveal the impact of the Wilson Memorandum on the British policy of intervention in Russia during this period, the task is to examine in detail the contents of this document. The involvement of this document in the study of British intervention policy makes it possible to expand and deepen it, as it demonstrates the complex process of shaping this policy in detail by various departments, which from this point of view gives the work a scientific novelty. Given that the content of this historical source has not been fully described and researched in Russian historiography, the scientific significance of the work will be presented in the form of valuable information contained in the Wilson memorandum.

The main research methods used are retrospective, systemic and narrative. The first method allowed us to show the British policy of intervention in the process of its development in November–December 1918. The second one shows the relationship between the content of the document and the military-political situation in November–December 1918, as well as their mutual influence. Since the Wilson memorandum had not previously been fully described in Russian historiography, the work reflects its content and nature in sufficient detail. At the same time, the emphasis is placed on those parts of it that are most significant for the study of the British policy of intervention.

Prior to the appearance of the Wilson document, the British policy of intervention developed in a generally consistent and dynamic manner. From July to August 1918, a significant contingent of British military forces entered the borders of Northern Russia with active military and political cooperation with the United States, as well as Siberia and the Far East with Japan and the United States. At the same time, the British successfully invaded Turkestan in August 1918 and attempted to gain a foothold in the Caucasus through the capture of Baku, which ended in failure in September 1918. The reason for the intervention was to help the rebellious Czechoslovak corps in the Urals, the Far East and Siberia, the main reasons being the re—establishment of the Eastern Front in one way or another so that Germany would suspend the transfer of troops from the eliminated Eastern Front to the Western, where the German offensive was underway, as well as preventing Russia from falling into the German sphere of influence. The British policy of intervention included, in addition to the introduction of a limited military contingent, active assistance to anti-Soviet forces as supporters of the continuation of the war with Germany. It was the continuation of the military confrontation with the Germans that forced the British population to agree to a policy of intervention in Russia.

However, the situation began to change dramatically with the signing of the Armistice of Compiegne on November 11, 1918. With this event, the First World War ended. Such a situation forced the War Cabinet to urgently review and make important decisions on the British policy of intervention in Russia: either to continue it in its current form, or modernize it taking into account the new, post-war realities, or stop it. In this regard, the Imperial General Staff presented the memorandum of its head, H. Wilson, "Our current and future military policy in Russia" dated November 13, 1918.

Russian Russian policy The document began by listing three objectives of the British government's policy of intervention: to prevent Germany from receiving aid from Russia and Siberia in the form of labor and supplies; to keep the enemy's human and material resources on the Russian front so that they would not be used on other fronts; to prevent Germany from gaining predominant influence in Russian affairs after the war. As Mr. Wilson noted, "The first two goals disappeared with the signing of the armistice. Only the third one remains, which, however, can be described almost as "the war after the war" ^{[25, p. 22; 26, p. 84]}. The British intervention did not have precise geographical military objectives, but to a large extent the results were achieved. This was evidenced by the encouragement of the Czechs to hold the front line in order to deprive the enemy of the vast resources of Western Siberia, and passive resistance to the Germans throughout Russia and Ukraine, as a result of which supplies were often burned rather than delivered to the enemy, as well as the retention of significant enemy military forces in Russia, that is, they managed to avoid sending them to other theaters of war, which was critically important for the Entente. For example, in September 1918, there were 34 German infantry divisions in Russia, compared with 36 in April 1918. In this regard, Mr. Wilson concluded that the decision of the British and Allied governments to interfere in Russia's internal affairs was justified.

In his opinion, now, under the conditions of the Compiegne Truce, when considering any actions in Russia, it is necessary to keep in mind the possible time constraints, as well as the fact that any initiated action may not be carried out if it is not continued after the signing of the peace terms. In this regard, Mr. Wilson considered: "Therefore, we must be careful not to start anything that we are not ready to continue after the declaration of peace" ^{[25, p. 22]}.

The memorandum went on to cite the arguments of supporters of continued intervention: Bolshevism was a danger to the whole world, including the Central Powers, and therefore it should be suppressed; if the British did not do this, the Germans would eventually crack down on Bolshevism and gain dominant influence in Russia; those who helped the British should not be abandoned at the mercy of the Bolsheviks, and "without We may not be able to withdraw a certain part of our troops after further intervention" ^{[25, p. 22; 26, p. 84]}.

From Mr. Wilson's point of view, Bolshevism was a cult, if not a religion. In this regard, in one case, he would not be able to survive the restoration of normal conditions in the rest of the world for a long time, in another, more favorable for him, he would gradually turn into "a more highly developed organism," and it seemed wrong to constantly suppress it by military methods.

Wilson considered the second argument to be true in terms of the real purpose of the British policy of intervention. A successful German struggle against Bolshevism would lead to the practical absorption of the border states that the Germans created and strengthened during the First World War. However, such a takeover "would have continued only until Russia became strong enough to challenge it, in which case these states would have become a "Russian irredentist" ^{[25, p. 22]}.

It was contrary to British principles to "abandon our friends," but efforts must be made to ensure that they are capable of self-defense. If the Bolsheviks turn out to be the best at what they do, then the British will not be able to defend others indefinitely. As for the withdrawal of British troops, some difficulties might have arisen in Arkhangelsk, but Mr. Wilson did not doubt the help of the Bolsheviks in their withdrawal by land, if it had been desirable while Arkhangelsk was frozen.

If it is decided to continue the intervention or even make it more effective, there will be two main alternatives. The first was to create a ring of states around Bolshevik Russia to prevent the spread of Bolshevism; to deprive it of supplies and expansion opportunities, in order to lead to the absolute exhaustion of Bolshevism. "This will entail, in this case, starvation for a large number of people and will require the occupation of the border states by the allied forces for an indefinite period until Bolshevik Russia disappears and non—Bolshevik Russia is clearly strengthened," noted G. Wilson ^{[25, p. 22; 26, p. 84]}.

He focused on the reasonable likelihood of the consequences of the withdrawal of German troops from the Western Front of the Bolsheviks. In this case, some border states would fall under Bolshevik control, and the Germans would return there if Allied troops did not take their place in the meantime. As for the formation of a group of States and the deployment of garrisons in them, "the period of occupation under such a scheme would be of unknown duration. From a purely military point of view, such a plan is not justified, since it presupposes passive resistance and the complete transfer of the initiative to the Bolsheviks" ^{[25, p. 22]}. In this case, there would be a dispersion of forces in small groups over a vast territory, none of which would be strong enough to do anything, and the Bolsheviks, based on their central position, could concentrate against anyone. Then each group would become a source of concern. G. Wilson concluded that such a policy may eventually lead to larger-scale operations "at a time when we may be less prepared to carry them out than at present" ^{[25, p. 22]}.

The second option was to take active military measures to finally crush Bolshevism as soon as possible. He was a faster and more reliable plan to contain the possible expansion of Germany, "since the border states would again fall into the orbit of a united Russia, the only power that can constantly restrain Germany's expansion to the east; but there are great difficulties in the way of such actions" ^{[25, p. 22]}.

At the same time, there was another option: to force Germany to transfer weapons and equipment to the border countries, repatriate troops that British-friendly countries might have, and generally provide them with the kind of support that is practically possible with a shortage of troops, and then let them do their best.

These three choices were analyzed in detail by the Imperial General Staff. If we take a course to occupy the ring of border states, Britain should have a definite plan to provide the necessary garrisons after the signing of the peace and strengthen them as needed. However, there were problems with the implementation of this course. The British army was staffed mainly on the principle of "for the duration of the war." This circumstance could not be the basis for an indefinite campaign in Eastern Europe and Asia against an enemy to whom the public of the United Kingdom had no particular complaints. For such a purpose, maintaining the current recruitment system would not be approved in Britain. "It is very doubtful that the French and Americans are in a better position in terms of troops, and it seems unlikely that the latter country would be willing to help us; although if this were the case, the problem would be greatly simplified," said G. Wilson ^{[25, p. 23]}.

Taking vigorous, military measures against the Bolsheviks had clear advantages, provided there were sufficient forces and direction of attack against large cities as centers of Bolshevism. In this case, British forces would have been withdrawn from Arkhangelsk, and commitments in the Transcaspian region, Siberia, and the Kola Peninsula would have been fulfilled. According to G. Wilson, "this plan represents the only reliable method of delivering a fatal blow to Bolshevism for a certain time" ^{[25, p. 23]}. But there are problems with the implementation of this plan. First of all, it was necessary to have the support of the British public. The climate and the vast territory of Russia also posed great difficulties, especially in winter conditions. "Due to these difficulties, we could not expect to complete the campaign before the summer of 1919 and, therefore, could face difficulties maintaining an army fighting in Russia after the declaration of peace," concluded the Chief of the Imperial General Staff ^{[25, p. 23]}.

Consequently, the third option remained — "to do everything in our power from a material point of view to give our friends a decent start, and then leave" ^{[25, p. 23]}. G. Wilson proposed taking the following measures on the Western, Northern and Eastern fronts in Russia, as well as in the Caucasus and in the Transcaspian region.

A corps of 30,000 troops was to be sent from France to the Western Front. Haller's trip to Poland, which "will be the most important state and the only one that is likely to be able to oppose Bolshevism without outside help" ^{[25, p. 23]}. There were also changes to be made in Yu's army. Dovbor-Musnitsky numbering 70 thousand. All these military forces had to be supplied in sufficient quantities with weapons and ammunition either from the Germans or from the Allies. Along with this, the Polish contingents being formed must be repatriated. After the withdrawal of German troops, Ukraine would become an object of Bolshevik attention. G. Wilson suggested: "Our policy should be to support stable elements with money, supplies and ammunition as soon as the Black Sea is opened, while Romania should occupy Bessarabia and thus create a barrier in the west" ^{[25, p. 23]}. With regard to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, it was necessary to limit the supply of weapons and moral support to national governments.

With regard to the Northern Front, Britain's goal was to settle Karelo-Finnish relations so that Karelia would no longer depend on the bayonets of British troops along the Murmansk Railway, although it is not yet possible to say about the possibility of their withdrawal from there. It was necessary to hold Arkhangelsk in winter, but in no way to take on new obligations. Efforts should also be made to enable the Russians to stand on their own in the event of a decision to withdraw British troops in the spring.

On the Eastern Front, under the terms of the armistice with Germany, the Czechs' willingness to continue fighting seemed unlikely, and in the event of peace, it would have been even less. In view of the successful mobilization in Siberia by the Russian government in Omsk, "in cooperation with the French, we must provide all possible material assistance in the formation and training of Russian armies in Siberia. The sooner these armies can hold Siberia and the Eastern Front from the Bolsheviks without outside help, the sooner we will be freed from our obligations in this region" ^{[25, p. 23]}. According to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, it would also be necessary to consider recognizing the Omsk government in order to strengthen its position in mobilizing forces in Siberia and other places.

With regard to the Caucasus and the Transcaspian region, the forces of A. I. Denikin and P. N. Krasnov, thanks to the opening of access to the Black Sea, should be assisted in the form of weapons in order to launch an offensive against the Bolsheviks. In this case, the British military forces would have been withdrawn to the east of the Caspian Sea. According to Wilson, there were doubts about the possibility of maintaining the North Persian lines of communication with the Caspian Sea as soon as the Black Sea was opened. Since Turkey, as a friendly country of Great Britain, would have become an effective barrier to the expansion of the Central Powers to the east, the goal of the British advance towards the Caspian Sea — protecting the routes to India — would have been achieved without additional efforts.

The memorandum concluded with the following conclusions. It is necessary to finally fulfill internal obligations to the British army, with the aim of a complete withdrawal of troops from European Russia by the time a peace treaty is signed and a strong Russian government is formed in Siberia. It was also expressed the intention to take advantage of the opening of the Baltic Sea to provide "our friends" with military supplies and the Black Sea, "... to occupy such ports on the east coast as may be necessary to lend a helping hand to those who gravitate towards the creation of a stable Russian government" ^{[25, p. 23; 26, p. 85]}.

The contents of the document were discussed at a meeting at the Foreign Office on November 13, 1918. As a result, important decisions were made: to continue the occupation of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; to recognize the Omsk Directory as the de facto government; to support the Siberian expedition that had already begun and urge the Canadians to adhere to the agreements stipulated before the armistice; to encourage the Czechs to remain in Western Siberia and send some of their staff there; to approve the regulation on the relationship between the French General M. Janin and the British General To begin the occupation of the Baku-Batum railway; to establish contact with A. I. Denikin in Novorossiysk and provide all possible assistance with military materials; to provide the Baltic states with military materials if and when they have governments ready to receive and use such materials; to allow General W. Marshall to take control of Krasnovodsk (modern Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan); adhere to the Convention of December 23, 1917, expanding the British sphere of influence as much as possible to include the territory between the Don and the Volga ^{[27, p. 78-79; 28, p. 355]}. Consequently, Mr. Wilson's proposals were generally approved by the Foreign Office with some additions.

A day later, on November 14, 1918, at a meeting of the British War Cabinet, the decisions of the meeting at the Foreign Office were approved, and with this in mind, a new, modernized British policy of intervention in Russia was adopted. However, the point about allowing W. Marshall to take over Krasnovodsk was left to the joint discretion of the Secretary of State for Military Affairs and the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs ^{[27, p. 77; 28, p. 355]}.

By December 1918, as part of the implementation of the decisions of the War Cabinet, the British armed forces had significantly increased their influence on the territory of the former Russian Empire. On November 16, 1918, the British squadron entered the Black Sea. A day later, a five thousand strong contingent led by W. Thomson arrived in Baku from Persia. The Baku-Batumi railway was taken under control. In December 1918, British ships entered the harbors of the Baltic states: Memel (modern Klaipeda, Lithuania), Libava (modern Liepaja, Latvia), Riga and Revel (modern Tallinn, Estonia). Significant financial and military-material assistance was provided to the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces, primarily to the forces of A. V. Kolchak and A. I. Denikin, who, according to the British, were able to restrain Bolshevism and change the dynamics of the Civil War. Subsequently, equipment worth 14.6 million pounds was delivered to the troops of A.V. Kolchak in Siberia. Materials worth 26 million pounds were provided to A. I. Denikin in the South of Russia ^{[29, p. 442]}.

Thus, the memorandum of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, G. Wilson, "Our current and future military policy in Russia" dated November 13, 1918, appears to be a significant document for the history of the British policy of intervention in Russia in November–December 1918. Its author listed the goals of Britain's interference in Russia's internal affairs. This intervention was explained by the fact that Germany could have won the First World War and further strengthened its position in the world by using the resources of the former Russian Empire and the liberated military forces from the liquidated Eastern Front to send them to other theaters of military operations, primarily the Western one. These circumstances convinced British subjects to support the War Cabinet and continue to fight against the Germans. During the war, the policy of British intervention was justified from the point of view of the country's population.

However, an important event occurred that forced a rethink of this policy. On November 11, 1918, the Armistice of Compiegne was signed between the Entente countries and Germany. In this regard, the problem arose of the expediency of continuing the British intervention in Russia, when for the British residents and soldiers there was no longer a convincing argument for its continuation. Along with this, the War Cabinet needed to address pressing issues related to the weakening of German influence in Russia and the containment of Bolshevism within the borders of the state it controlled.

Mr. Wilson analyzed the problems that had arisen and the various options for further implementation of the intervention. He suggested an option that offered two advantages: He did not provoke strong protest from the public and soldiers, and also ensured national interests in Europe and Russia. The essence of his proposals was to provide comprehensive support to the newly formed states on the territory of the former Russian Empire and the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces.

These proposals were received with approval by a meeting in the Foreign Office and the Military Cabinet. However, they were detailed and somewhat reworked in terms of solving such tasks that would strengthen British influence in Russia. For example, to adhere to the Convention of December 23, 1917, expanding the British sphere of influence as much as possible to include the territory between the Don and the Volga. As subsequent events have shown, the British policy of intervention in its improved form began to be implemented immediately. It became a significant factor in the intensification of the Civil War in Russia, when the White Movement received significant support.