The Hamas movement: origins, activities and development in 1990-2010.

Fetisov Andrei Vladimirovich Student; Faculty of International Relations; St. Petersburg State University 1/3 street Smolnogo, Saint Petersburg, Russia, 191124. andrey.fetisov.2909@gmail.com

Introduction. In the theory and history of international relations, the focus has traditionally been on State actors, while various non-state actors are on the periphery of these sciences. It is only in cases where actors outside sovereignty pose a significant challenge to sovereign actors that international theorists and practitioners pay significant attention to them, mostly temporarily. Examples of such challenges by non-state power actors to modern (Western-type) states in the 21st century were: Al-Qaeda (after the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001), ISIS (after its challenge to the international community in Syria and Iraq) and now Hamas (after the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 2023), which called into question the hegemony of this regional nuclear state, the professional abilities of its army and special services, and initiated the next stage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and, more broadly, the Middle East crisis, with the participation of other powerful non-state military actors (Hezbollah and Ansar Allah – the Houthis) with unforeseen consequences for global politics. Which makes it necessary to investigate this problem.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the emergence and evolution of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).

A historiographical analysis of the genesis of Hamas. Domestic authors pay great attention to the study of the problems of the Hamas movement.

According to the Russian researcher G. G. Kosach, Islamic rhetoric and religious dogma became the foundation of the activities of the Hamas organization, which largely determined its further development. Kosach's research focuses on identifying the prerequisites that led the Palestinian movement to turn to radical Islamic ideology, rather than analyzing its methods of struggle. The hostile attitude towards Israel and the use of violent actions against its population, based on religious tenets, makes it possible to characterize Hamas as a terrorist organization. The work traces the process of formation of this movement and the transformation of its ideological attitudes. According to the author, the Hamas movement has demonstrated the ability to transform itself politically and develop its own nationally oriented program. Several key factors contributed to this: gaining control of Gaza, a change of leaders in the upper echelons of the organization, and changes in the regional political landscape. An important incentive for this evolution was the confrontation with their main political opponent, the Fatah movement, which runs the Palestinian National Authority. As a result of this confrontation, Hamas was forced to look for new ways to develop and strengthen its political positions ^[1].

The study by A. A. Kerimov and R. F. M. Ahmad analyzes how the internal contradictions of the Palestinian elite and the terrorist status of Hamas hinder the creation of an independent Palestine. The split among the political leaders significantly hinders the process of gaining sovereignty by the Palestinian people. A study of the ideological principles and practical methods of Hamas's work shows that without removing the movement's status as a terrorist organization, it is impossible to achieve political unity in Palestine. Moreover, a constructive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires the inclusion of Hamas in the negotiation process. After analyzing the political strategy and ideological base of the movement, the researchers emphasize the critical importance of reviewing the international status of Hamas for the successful establishment of Palestinian statehood ^[2].

The article by Y. N. Zinin examines the attitude of the Arab world - from government structures to the media and public opinion - to the ideology and activities of Hamas. Special attention is paid to the current stage of the confrontation, where the strategy and tactics of the current leadership of the organization are considered in detail. The fundamental principles of Hamas, which have been formed since its foundation in 1987, are based on the Islamic ideology and the concept of total jihad, the goal of which is the complete denial of Israeli statehood and the "liberation of the Palestinian territories." The study includes a detailed analysis of the fundamental documents of the organization and the origins of its formation ^[3].

N. I. Shlykov conducted a study on the assessment of the Hamas movement in modern Russian historiography. The author believes that since its creation in 1987, Hamas has become a key participant in the confrontation between Israel and the Arab world. An analysis of scientific papers has shown ambivalence in assessing the success factors of this organization. Some experts emphasize the importance of the religious component in the activities of Hamas, while others point to the effectiveness of their social initiatives as a basis for public support. At the same time, Russian historians demonstrate amazing unanimity in their assessments of this period, without showing significant differences in views ^[4].

Hamas, due to its involvement in the Middle East conflict since the 1980s, as an Arab "terrorist" organization, has traditionally been actively covered by foreign authors. So, D. Maggs in his work explores the issues of the history, politics and ideology of Hamas. The author divided the evolution of Hamas into four stages: formation (1940s — 1987), consolidation (1987-1993), active resistance (1993 — 2006) and governance (from 2006 to the present). According to D. Maggs, Hamas seeks to lead the resistance movement against Israel without provoking a backlash that could deal it a fatal blow. In order to maintain unity and its position at the head of the Palestinian movement, Hamas is forced to meet all these various demands. As a result, Hamas' desire for unity sometimes seems to be an ideological contradiction ^[5].

D. Levin studies the history of relations between Iran, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. According to the author, Iran supports groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PID).* For both geostrategic and ideological reasons. From a geostrategic point of view, Tehran helps, arms and finances these two groups in order to expand its regional influence. From an ideological point of view, Iran considers Israel to be a usurper of Muslim lands and a threat to Islam ^[6].

J. Macaron believes that while the Palestinian Authority, based on Fatah, is trying to rethink its legitimacy and mandate, Hamas has become a key player in the aftermath of the Gaza war, strengthening a strong and often contradictory network of alliances that make the Islamist group an indispensable player in the coastal strip. For a long time, the Hamas structure allowed the organization to pursue a complex foreign policy, which combined a confrontational military wing and a diplomatic political bureau in the conflict with Israel. His ultimate goal remains to hold positions in Gaza ^[7].

Results. Since the late 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood* has been active in the territories of Palestine occupied by Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War (in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank [of the Jordan River]), establishing a network of charitable organizations, clinics and schools. At the same time, it operated at mosques in Gaza, and at universities in the West Bank. The activities of the Muslim Brotherhood* in these areas were nonviolent, but a number of small groups associated with them called for gazawat ("small" jihad, "holy war") against Israel in the territories it occupied. In the end, the Muslim Brotherhood's emphasis on creating an Islamic Arab society rather than a secular one led them into conflict with secular Arab states such as Egypt, which controlled the Gaza Strip and Jordan, which controlled the West Bank ^{[8, pp. 65-66]}.

However, subsequently, changes in the foreign policy context of Palestine and the situation inside it changed the functioning of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestinian society. Thus, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, all of Palestine within its internationally recognized borders (according to the Oslo Agreement, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) came under Israeli occupation. On the one hand, this eliminated the causes of the conflict between the Palestinians and neighboring Arab States, which no longer claimed their lands. And, on the contrary, it gave the Palestinians the support of these states against Israel (moral, diplomatic, financial, etc.). On the other hand, it turned the Arab-Israeli conflict into a battle between two nations - Jewish and Palestinian.

In the face of massive poverty in Palestine and its occupation, the political situation in the country only worsened. In such a situation, a long-term mass Palestinian resistance to Israel began as part of the 1st intifada, led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO/Fatah). This action has shaped the mass consciousness of modern Palestinians. However, this intifada took place outside the Islamic framework. Moreover, during the first intifada, part of the Palestinian society accused the Muslim Brotherhood* of receiving Israeli funds to undermine the PLO's influence in the country. These accusations threatened the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideas among the masses and needed a response from this organization. Accordingly, its attempts to adapt to the demands of the Palestinian society and the radicals within its own ranks, appease their demands and reject accusations of inaction, gave rise to two disparate reactions of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Israeli occupation.: 1) their creation as part of the Islamic Jihad* and, 2) their creation in December 1987. The Islamic Resistance Movement is Hamas ^{[5, p. 3-4]}.

This military nationalist movement differs from the similar Palestinian movement, the PLO, in its Islamism and uncompromising attitude towards Israel, against the background of secularism and servility of the latter. In particular, it is focused on the creation of an independent Arab-Palestinian state, which should cover the entire territory of the British mandated territory of Palestine within the borders of 1947 "from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea" and therefore rejects any attempts to cede part of Palestine to Israel (Hamas: Definition, History, Ideology. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2024, November 20. URL: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hamas ) and create a Palestinian state exclusively in the territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as proposed by the PLO, which is inclined to compromise with the Israelis.

Like its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas seeks to create an Arab Islamic State based on the principles of Islamic law (Sharia). The corresponding Hamas slogan, set out in Article 8 of the Organization's 1988 Charter, systematizes the beliefs of its members: "Allah is his goal, the Prophet is his model, the Koran is his constitution: Jihad is his path, and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of his desires" ^{[9, p. 12]}.

The Palestinian aspect of these views is specified by Hamas in its 1988 Charter based on Islamic jurisprudence: the religious duty of Palestinian Muslims is a Holy War against Israel in order to wrest control of Palestine from it. Since it is an Islamic Homeland, it can never be handed over to non-Muslims. All of Palestine is an Islamic country usurped and occupied by the Israelis, an Arab country by birthright, which must be returned to its owners through the destruction of Israel. Because of this, Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to exist, devotes itself to the search for violent means of its destruction (HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement). Federation of American Scientists. 2023, December 14. URL: https://irp.fas.org/world/para/hamas.htm ), rejects negotiations with him on the cession of any Land. This position of Hamas led it into conflict with the PLO, which in the same year 1988 recognized Israel's right to exist (Hamas: Definition, History, Ideology. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2024, November 20. URL: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hamas). This, in turn, allowed Iran (IRI), which focused on the "export" of the "Islamic revolution", to interpret the Sunni terrorist organizations - Hamas and the genetically related "Islamic Jihad"* as "national liberation" structures of the Islamic trend, with which it can cooperate in the framework of Iran's popularization of its own version. anti–Israeli and anti-Western resistance among the population of Arab and more broadly Muslim countries ^{[1, pp. 179-202]}.

From a pragmatic point of view, Hamas leaders understand that for more than 50 years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the topic of Palestine has acquired great religious and political significance and weight in Islamist, fundamentalist discourse, and therefore any concessions or even negotiations with Israel on the part of individuals and (or) organizations claiming to be Islamic are difficult, if not impossible ^{[10, pp. 79-92]}. Unless they take place with the support of Islamic theologians and lawyers of the highest authority and qualifications in the Islamic world (dar al-Islam), and the fact that they take place will have ambiguous consequences for the latter. Therefore, Hamas, as an Islamist, Sunni movement, cannot enter into real negotiations with Israel, and even more so, to recognize its existence ^{[9, pp. 20-21]} without the approval and support of religious leaders of Islam who are located outside Palestine (primarily in Mecca and Medina), and who, at the same time time, they do not provide such support to the leaders of Hamas.

Thanks to the above, the emergence of Hamas allowed the Palestinian offshoot of the Brothers* By the mid-1980s, to monopolize the mass consciousness of the Sunni Islamists of Palestine and to begin competition between the Palestinian political movements (PLO and Hamas). Moreover, Hamas did not just act independently of other Palestinian organizations, especially secular and nationalist ones, but was at enmity with them, as they were inclined to compromise with Israel. In contrast, Hamas militants attacked Israeli civilian and military targets under any conditions. This prompted the latter to arrest a number of leaders of the organization in 1989, including the founder of the movement, Sheikh Ahmed Yasin. After this event, the leader of the organization in 1991-1995, Abu Marzouk, formulated its "survival strategy", necessary in case Hamas again faced a challenge to its existence from its opponents from outside. The embodiment of this strategy was the reorganization of its command structure. This is, in particular, the division of the organization's leaders into "key" and others. The first (members of the Politburo) were stationed outside of Palestine (first in Amman until 1993, then in Damascus and since 2012 in Qatar) - beyond the physical reach of Israel (Hamas: Definition, History, Ideology. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2024, November 20. URL: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hamas). The remaining part of the leadership in Gaza in Palestine was divided into a political and a military one, which controls the eponymous divisions ("wings") of the organization. The first is that Hamas performs administrative and public functions and, until October 7, 2023, controlled the entire Gaza Strip, providing social services to its population. Its last leaders in the Gaza Strip before the Al-Aqsa Storm were Mahmoud al-Zahar and Ismail Haniyeh. The second is in charge of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades (al-Qassam Brigades, Brigades, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, since 1992 ^{[6, p. 28]}).

Against the background of the end of the 1st Intifada and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) in 1994 as part of the PLO's conciliatory policy towards Israel in the 1990s, Hamas' popularity among the Palestinian masses grew. Hamas condemned the 1993 Oslo Peace Agreement between Israel and the PLO, along with the genetically related Islamic Jihad group. For years after that, Hamas challenged the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (Hamas. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. URL: https://www.terrorism-info.org il/en/c/hamas/) in general, trying to prevent their appeasement with Israel. In response, the authorities of both Palestine and Israel responded with harsh punitive measures against the leaders of Hamas. These repressions only strengthened the organization's status among the Palestinian masses, providing its "Brigades" with a constant stream of volunteers, and vice versa, its determination to lead their resistance ^{[7, p. 4]} to the Israelis. In these circumstances, in 1996, the organization elected Khaled Meshal as chairman, the next composition of its politburo was formed in Amman, responsible for the organization's international relations and fundraising for its activities abroad, and the armed wing of the group, the al-Qassam Brigades, was restored ^[11].

The role of Hamas as the leader of the massive nonconformist resistance against Israel in the 1990s illustrated its commitment to revenge for the actions of Israelis against Palestinians ^{[7, p. 5]}, which only unwound the spiral of violence. Because of this, the United States, EU members, Japan, and Australia, focused on supporting the peace process between Palestine and Israel, recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization ^{[12, p. 159]} and condemned Iran for providing it with external military and financial support.

In the end, given the growing role and influence of Hamas in Palestine, the head of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority at the same time, Yasser Arafat, tried to include this organization in the legal Palestinian political process by appointing its members to senior positions in the Palestinian National Authority in the early 2000s. However, the breakdown of the next Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in September 2000 G. increased the level of violence between the parties, triggering the 2nd intifada (Al-Aqsa). The scale of violence during this conflict exceeded its figures during the 1st intifada. In particular, because Hamas activists carried out a number of terrorist attacks in Israel itself ^[11], and not in the occupied territories, including the murder of 21 Israelis at a disco in Tel Aviv in June 2001 and 30 Jews during the Passover seder in Netanya in March 2002. In response, four months later, an Israeli airstrike killed Hamas military commander Salah Shehadeh. Moreover, after this incident, Israel launched a siege on Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and the PA in general, at their residence in the West Bank city of Ramallah, for their inability to deal with the terror of Hamas. In 2004, Israeli aircraft in the Gaza Strip killed the co-founders of the movement, the spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and the political leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi. In August 2005, Israel, despite the unresolved problem of Hamas, withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip, leaving the settlement in this Arab exclave under the formal control of the Palestinian Authority ^[11]. However, after the 2nd intifada and more than a decade of non-recognition of the fundamental principles of the existence of the Palestinian Authority, the Hamas leaders, in words, softened their views on the peace process, opportunistically indicating that they would accept the agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Such statements were made in order to participate in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. Since then, senior Hamas leaders have repeatedly verbally stated their willingness to support the two-state solution based on Israel's pre-1967 borders ^{[2, pp. 95-101]}.

In the 2006 elections to the Palestinian Parliament, Hamas won the majority of votes and headed the Palestinian authority in both regions - the West Bank and Gaza. However, a year after the election, the strained relationship between Hamas and Fatah, the country's two largest parties, led them into open conflict. So, in mid-2007, the new President of the Palestinian Authority, M. Abbas, representing Fatah, dismissed Prime Minister I. Haniyeh, representing Hamas, for the fact that the latter forcibly assumed full control over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, seizing Fatah and Palestinian Authority facilities in it and suppressing their secular cadres ^{[13, pp. 33-46]}. This reaction of the Palestinian President to the actions of Hamas fixed the gap between the country's two largest parties, which led to the dissolution of the unity Government of the Palestinian Authority and its division through dual power into the government of the Gaza Strip, which was led by Hamas in 2007-2024, and the West Bank, which has been led by Fatah representatives since 2007. It was during this period that Iran's relations with Hamas deepened ^[6].

Hamas returned to its position of non-recognition of Israel and in early 2008 carried out a terrorist attack, killing an Israeli civilian and firing rockets and mortars at his territory. It was only in June 2008 that Hamas concluded a truce agreement with Israel, which significantly reduced the number of rocket attacks on the latter from Gaza. After 6 months, Hamas broke off this deal by resuming rocket attacks on Israel, which led to a large–scale military operation of the latter in late December 2008 - "cast lead". Declaring the destruction of a "significant part" of the Hamas infrastructure in the region after 15 days of operation, Israel announced a "unilateral" "cease-fire" in the Gaza Strip on January 18, 2009 ^{[11, pp. 152-153]}. A similar operation, the "protective frontier," was carried out by the Israel Defense Forces in 2014, during each of which Hamas enjoyed Iran's support in its confrontation with Israel. However, during and after the events of the Arab Spring, relations between Hamas and Iran temporarily deteriorated due to the Syrian Civil War, in which Hamas, as a Sunni party, supported Sunni co-Religionists who rebelled against the government of Bashar al-Assad, while the latter was supported internally by Shiites, Ismailis and Christians, and outside is Iran ^{[14, pp. 175-182]}.

The Arab world shows an ambiguous attitude towards the methods of Hamas, despite the general support for the Palestinian resistance. A significant number of Arab citizens, especially on social media and in public discussions, openly express solidarity with the actions of Hamas and share their position. There is a broad consensus on the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people against the occupation, including the residents of the Gaza Strip, but views on the ideological platform and tactical decisions of Hamas cause different reactions in the Arab States.

Despite Israel's numerous military campaigns against Hamas, including operations in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021, the movement has demonstrated remarkable resilience. Using the tactics of asymmetric confrontation, the Palestinian resistance forces managed to maintain their presence and influence, even in the face of large-scale Israeli attacks on their infrastructure. Israel's attempts to eliminate key figures of Hamas and undermine its military potential did not lead to the desired result ^{[15, pp. 76-84]}. Although the Gaza Strip suffered serious damage and human casualties were significant, the organization continues to be an important political player in the region, successfully resisting the superior military might of the enemy.

The surprise attack on October 7, 2023, demonstrated serious vulnerabilities in Israel's defense system. Many Arab media and commentators are encouraged by the growing military potential of the Palestinian side. In their opinion, this operation dealt a significant blow to the reputation of the Israeli armed forces, calling into question the effectiveness of their intelligence and technological equipment, of which the country was so proud ^{[3, p. 55]}.

After the events of the Arab Spring and the withdrawal of Islamist forces from the political arena, the Palestinian problem lost its former importance in the Arab world. However, the recent escalation in the Gaza Strip has brought the Palestinian conflict back into the international spotlight, both within the region and beyond its borders. It is worth recalling that since the middle of the last century, the Palestinian issue has been the cornerstone of the idea of pan-Arabism and has significantly influenced the foreign policy of Middle Eastern states ^{[16, pp. 30-35]}.

In an atmosphere inflamed by reports of the massacre in Gaza, there is a debate about the forms of resistance, interaction between different parts of the Palestinian movement, its ties with the countries of the region, the background and role of pan-Arab actions, etc. ^{[17, p. 19]}.

Reacting to the statement by the Hamas leadership that Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was caused by a reaction to the desecration of the mosque, terrorism by settlers and aimed at liberating the mosque and ending the Israeli occupation, observers called them a theoretically legitimate goal, but hardly feasible ^{[18, p. 11]}.

The radical positions of both sides - the Netanyahu government and the Hamas movement - have led to an unprecedented escalation of violence, which significantly distorts the perception of the conflict ^{[19, p. 1514]}. Hamas, contradicting the fundamental principles of the Palestinian national movement and the position of the PLO, especially in matters of interaction with Israel, opposes the most right-wing government in Israeli history. Both sides, the Israelis and the Palestinians, are doomed to seek compromise and mutual recognition, since neither side can completely destroy the other. Palestinian militant organizations, including Hamas, will continue to exist, as well as the State of Israel itself will remain on the political map of the region ^{[4, p. 254]}. The realization of the impossibility of an absolute triumph of one of the parties becomes critically important, since each participant in the conflict is now focused on total superiority and the defeat of the enemy ^{[20, pp. 18-20]}.

Conclusions. So, Hamas, as a Palestinian offshoot of the Islamist, Sunni Muslim Brotherhood movement*, under the influence of its environment, evolved from an apolitical socially oriented clerical structure into the most radical Palestinian organization that torpedoed any attempts at Palestinian-Israeli understanding and in these efforts transformed into a quasi-state militarized structure that relies on financial support. The enemy of the Sunnis is Iran. However, the dominant processes for this organization in the Arab Sunni environment (the prospects for Arab-Israeli and Sunni-Israeli mutual understanding in the modern historical window of opportunity) pushed it to an open full-scale, all-out war with Israel for the liberation of Palestine.

*The organization is recognized as a terrorist organization and is banned in the territory of the Russian Federation