The Regional Dimension of “The Great Game”: Formation and Development (Late 18th – Mid 19th Centuries)

Kryzhko Evgeniy Vladimirovich ORCID: 0000-0001-9943-819X PhD in History Associate Professor; Department of Archeology and General History; Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education 'V. I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University' 4 Akademika Vernadskogo Ave., Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, 295007, Russia jeyson1030@gmail.com

Pashkovsky Petr Igorevich ORCID: 0000-0001-5403-3797 Doctor of Politics Professor; Department of Political Sciences and International Relations; Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education 'V. I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University' 4 Akademika Vernadskogo Ave., Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, 295007, Russia petr.pash@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

The current escalation of international tension, associated with a significant increase in Russia's confrontation with the states of the collective West, has led to a general revival of interest in historical analogues of similar situations. This has led to a multiple increase in the frequency of use of the term "Big Game" in scientific, popular science and journalistic discourses.: both on the pages of domestic and foreign specialized publications and monographs, as well as in the formats of various newspapers, magazines, books, Internet sites, radio and television programs. A distinctive feature of this trend is widespread inaccuracies and distortions – from deliberate and purposeful ones resulting from information campaigns to derivative incompetence and misunderstanding of the essence of the problems – not only the definition and interpretation of this concept, but also the territorial boundaries of the Russian-British geopolitical rivalry implied by it. At the same time, the issue of the regional dimension of the "Big Game" seems to be the most controversial.

In particular, among other contexts and definitions, this concept characterizes another party of the geopolitical confrontation between the two main world civilizations, which has been going on for more than 220 years: the continental one in the form of the Eurasian superpower (the Russian Empire, the USSR, the Russian Federation) and the maritime one in the person of the "Anglo–Saxon world" (Great Britain, and then the USA). The territorial boundaries of this rivalry have changed at different historical stages, one way or another, affecting the Eurasian continent ^[1].

The interpretation of the "Big Game" as the "cold war of the 19th century", which continued in the 20th century, between the powers of the Anglo-Saxons, on the one hand, and the Russian Empire and the USSR, on the other, can be considered similar in meaning. In this context, the issue of geographical localization was determined by the global scale of the geopolitical confrontation, specific to a particular historical period ^[2].

The indicated diversity of opinions regarding the regional dimension of the geopolitical rivalry under consideration introduces an imbalance in the study of this problem, leading to uncertainty and distortion of its understanding. The purpose of the article is to clarify, based on the conducted research, the historically reliable geographical boundaries of the "Big Game" during its origin and classical manifestation.

The presented research is based on materials from the following groups of sources: the work of Russian and British travelers, officers, residents ^{[3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15]}; interstate contractual legal acts ^{[16; 17]}.

The research methodology is based on the provisions of neorealism in the context of a systematic analysis of international relations, in which the interaction of disparate elements acquires a new quality. In this regard, the following research methods were used. The historical and genetic method (retrospective analysis) led to the identification of the features of the genesis and trends in the evolution of the territorial boundaries of the "Big Game", as well as the establishment of cause-and-effect relationships between its stages. The value of retrospective analysis in the theory and practice of international relations is determined by the fact that history "teaches by the example of analogies, and not on the basis of principles. It can highlight the consequences of actions in comparative situations, and, nevertheless, each generation should find for itself which specific situations can actually be compared" ^{[18, pp. 69-70]}. The characteristics of the political elites and individuals who influenced the mentioned Russian-British competition, including its regional dimension, are considered using the activity method. The use of the comparative method helped to determine the general and special, repetitions and changes in the interpretations of the geographical localization of the "Big Game". The analysis of the indicated materials (sources) and scientific publications assisted in the formation of a theoretical and empirical research base, on the basis of which conclusions were drawn regarding the regional dimension of the Russian-British geopolitical rivalry in its traditional sense.

The analyzed problem field is characterized by trends in terminological and geographical "chaos" regarding the use of the term "Big Game" in its classical interpretation. In domestic and foreign international political studies, the geographical boundaries of this confrontation are also designated as the Central (Middle) Asia ^{[19; 20]}, and the Asian region as a whole ^[21], and the Caucasus separately ^[22]. Russian russians believe that there were "three rounds" of the classic version of the "Big Game", each of which was distinguished by regional features: the Persian round (during the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813); the Central Asian round (the Russian-English rivalry in the region in the 19th century); the Far Eastern Balkan round (the competition of two empires from Albania to It is noteworthy that the global rivalry between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War is sometimes attributed to the manifestation of the "Big Game" ^[23].

In some works – mainly by foreign authors ^{[24; 25; 26; 27; 28]} – A parallel is drawn between the rivalry between the Russian and British empires and modern events in the Central Asian region, with the expansion of the membership in China, India, the United States, and the EU, and the use of analytical analogies in comparing the mechanisms of interaction between the actors in question, The conceptual designation of these processes is also given. The ideological problem of the confrontation of empires ^[29] and the involvement of a broad coalition of states in the regional dimension ^{[30; 31]} are separately noted.

It is worth noting a number of works ^{[32; 33]} dealing with the issues of ethnographic study of the area of the "Big Game", as well as the formation of the characteristics of local elites under the influence of the struggle of empires for their sympathies. There are studies that segmentalize the geography of the "Big Game" ^{[34; 35]}, characterizing the strategic position of Afghanistan and Turkestan in the confrontation of empires ^{[36; 37]}.

The works of M. Vasiliev ^[38], V. Degoev ^[30], M. Leontiev ^[2], M. Niyazmatov ^[39], and P. Hopkirk ^[20] are quite informative in the context of the "Big Game" theme, but they do not raise the issue of defining clear geographical boundaries of the conflict under consideration. The exception is the work of E. Sergeev ^[40], who attempts to identify the area of confrontation between empires, but does not take into account the transformation of rivalry in the chronological dimension.

At the same time, the research community overwhelmingly reduces the geographical scope of the "Big Game" to the confrontation between Russia and Great Britain in Central (Central) and South Asia, without giving due importance to its classical chronology. The problems of forming the territorial core of the confrontation of empires, as well as the process of permanent transformation of the borders of this geopolitical phenomenon, depending on its stage, with clear time frame parameters, have not been adequately reflected in the domestic and foreign scientific literature, which increases the importance of studying these aspects.

The "Big Game" in the classical interpretation is defined as the rivalry between Great Britain and the Russian Empire in Central and South Asia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This confrontation was characterized by the desire of each side to realize its interests, avoiding a direct Russian-British military clash that threatened to escalate into a full-fledged war. The mechanism of competition between St. Petersburg and London was based on diplomatic, residency, and economic means of influencing and manipulating local elites and the population of the "gray zone" that divided the territories controlled by the empires. During the 18th and early 20th centuries, depending on short– and long-term Russian and British interests, the geographical focus of the "Big Game" changed and peripheral points of confrontation appeared in order to exhaust the enemy.

Since the middle of the 18th century, the territorial core of this rivalry has been the Indian Subcontinent, where Great Britain, represented by the East India Company, pursued a colonial policy, seeking to make local provinces and principalities dependent on London, competing with France and Holland ^[41]. Decisive actions to shape the future of British India can be traced back to 1757, when British control over Bengal was established. At this time, Great Britain is winning the regional confrontation with its European neighbors in the struggle for Indian resources and is reorienting its policy towards building a long-term control system over this territory ^{[24, pp. 72-73]}. At the same time, the Russian Empire is intensifying its activities in the southern direction, characterized by attempts to discover new resources and trade routes, as well as direct access to the non-freezing waters of the ocean. This was due to the fact that the traditional routes for St. Petersburg were hampered by a series of military conflicts with the Turkish side ^{[35, p. 853]}.

At the same time, the periodic Russo-Persian wars of 1722-1723 and 1796, aimed at annexing Transcaucasia, caused concern in London due to the fact that Russia demonstrated a systematic approach of its borders to India, and France welcomed the Russian initiative. "In the second half of the 18th century," wrote Russian researchers, "Russia entered a new phase of historical development, characterized by the fact that, along with state transformations, Catherine II purposefully resolved issues of foreign and maritime policy, increasing the prestige of the empire in the East and West. In this, she followed the geopolitical projects of Peter the Great. The foreign policy pursued by the St. Petersburg Cabinet has become more active and purposeful every year. The sphere of Russia's interests has spread to such strategically important regions as the basins of the Azov, Black, Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, encompassing the Balkans, Kuban, Transcaucasia and Persia" ^{[42, p. 209]}.

In turn, Great Britain suffered a geopolitical defeat on the American continent in 1783, losing thirty colonies, with the direct participation of the French side as a diplomatic and military rival. As a result, London's revanchist sentiments were reoriented towards the traditional sphere of influence in the East in an effort to establish full control over India, which was realized to a greater extent by 1832 ^{[43, p. 99]}. At the same time, the British, remembering the fiasco with the colonies in America, were jealous of the slightest threats to their colonial power and perceived Afghanistan and Persia as an exclusively neutral buffer zone in the context of ensuring their security.

In December 1800 (according to British data, in January 1801), the Anglo-Persian military and commercial treaty was signed, which was based on allied relations between the countries against the French in order to protect India from external forces. Given the allied relations between Paris and St. Petersburg, the agreement indirectly affected Russia ^{[44, p. 169]}. Subsequently, in 1801, Emperor Paul I openly declared the Indian ambitions of the empire, beginning preparations for a campaign, but he was killed and Russian aspirations were reoriented ^{[24, p. 73]}. This led to the beginning of the "Big Game" in Russian-British relations, initially aimed at mutual deterrence in the issue of expanding their borders at the expense of Persian territories ^{[25, p. 126-127]}. With the formation of the confrontation between Russia and Great Britain, its geographical borders, until the end of the Russian-Persian War of 1804-1813 and the signing of the Gulistan Peace Treaty on October 12, 1813 ^[16], shifted to the west and united the territory of the Hindustan peninsula, Afghanistan and Persia.

The turning point in the Persian theater of rivalry was the Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828, which ended with the victory of the Russian Empire, consolidated by the Treaty of Turkmanchay in 1828 ^[17]. After that, stable Russian-Iranian relations were established until 1917, which the British failed to destroy even after the massacre at the Russian embassy in 1829 and the death of A. Griboyedov ^{[31, p. 435]}, who "replaced the twenty-thousandth army there with a single person" ^{[45, p. 4]}.

The British political elite was shocked by the Russian military successes in the Persian theater of the "Big Game", which was reflected in the work of J. Evans' "On Russia's Intentions" ^[10], in which the author emphasized and integrated Russophobia and the methods of Britain's struggle with Russia by unleashing a series of local border conflicts without the direct involvement of the British side in them ^{[46, p. 22]}. Arguing for the British foreign policy thinking of this time, American researchers emphasized that in the period after 1815, "the Russian army did not stop actively conducting military campaigns in the Caucasus and Turkestan, which began to seriously worry the British in India. As a result, Anglo-Russian relations in the 19th century became even more tense than in the previous century" ^{[36, p. 268]}.

In general, it can be stated that in the first third of the 19th century, Anglo-Saxon Russophobia took shape as an ideology. This was due to the fact that after the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Empire began to be perceived by the British elites as a real geopolitical threat and the main rival in Eurasia. Lacking sufficient military capabilities to neutralize the "Russian threat," London is launching a large–scale anti–Russian information campaign, which, given the increasing influence of public opinion on the policies of Western states, has been a tool for constructing a negative image of Russia in the minds of different segments of society in Britain and Europe. A derivative of this is the tendency for outbursts of Anglo-Saxon Russophobia to predominantly coincide with the need to form public opinion in order to achieve support for the geopolitical initiatives of the British elites directed against the Russian Empire ^{[29, pp. 37-40]}.

The failure of British policy in Persia shifted the geographical focus of the "Big Game" to the Caucasus. Extremely negative sentiments towards St. Petersburg were growing in London, but the British were afraid to speak out on their own, taking a course towards forming an anti-Russian coalition. Since the beginning of the 1830s, British residents appeared on the territory of the Caucasus, who were engaged in organizing local tribes for a centralized struggle against Russia, involving Turkey in this ^{[30, p. 54; 31, p. 436]}. One of the most influential British emissaries to the Ottoman Empire was D. Urquhart, who held extreme Russophobic views and sincerely believed in the "total Russian threat" against India. In 1835, his book "Britain and Russia" ^[14] was published, which, taking into account the lobby of the officer's friends in political circles, caused a surge of anti-Russian sentiment in the UK. This trend was facilitated by the resident's forecast that in the near future, St. Petersburg's expansionist aspirations would be aimed at the disintegration and subjugation of Turkey, its subjugation and withdrawal from London's foreign policy, as well as the arming and reorientation of Persia towards an aggressive policy towards India. D. Urquhart, with the support of King William IV, received unlimited financial opportunities, aimed at helping Circassians in the Caucasus in the struggle against Russia ^{[20, pp. 179-182]}. But the war between the empires was avoided diplomatically, given that Great Britain at that time could not find strong continental allies against Russia.

The gradually developing events of the Eastern question (the struggle of European states and Russia for the territories of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire) led to the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which ended with the defeat of the Russian Empire, which retained its position in the Caucasus. This situation did not suit Great Britain, which demanded that its allies continue the campaign in 1857 in the Caucasian theater of military operations. However, left alone with Russia, it reduces its militaristic ambitions to flirting with the mountain tribes, which results in the ousting of the British from the territory of the Caucasus and the end of the Caucasian War of 1817-1864 ^{[30, p. 54]}. After the end of the Caucasian War and the defeat of the mountain movement led by Shamil, the process of rapid integration of the Caucasus into the Russian Empire was underway. London, which had been competing with St. Petersburg for a long time in the struggle for the Caucasus and part of Central Asia (which also became part of the Russian Empire), took a break from the "game", concentrating its efforts on the Middle East and India ^{[22, pp. 18-19]}.

In December 1864, Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gorchakov sent a memorandum to European states on the reorientation of Russia's policy to the East, raising the issue of the absence of geographical boundaries between the spheres of influence of the countries, which was considered as opportunities for future territorial acquisitions ^{[24, p. 76]}. This shifts the geographical scope of the "Big Game" from the Caucasus towards Turkestan and Afghanistan.

Back in the first quarter of the 19th century, the actions of the empires in Central Asia intensified: The specified territories are entered in the "Big Game" field. Knowledge about the Central Asian states in St. Petersburg and London was limited by the information of merchants, which stimulated the empire to study and further develop the "middle spaces", in the process gaining the sympathy of the local population and determining the aspirations of national elites ^{[33, p. 1499-1501]}. Central Asian territories have become a place of regular visits by Russian ^{[3; 4; 5; 6; 7]} and British ^{[8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15]} residents in the first quarter of the 19th century . The official British presence in the Central Asian region has been recorded since January 12, 1830, and is associated with the order of E. President of the Control Council of India to Governor-General Lord W. Bentinck on the organization of the trade route to Bukhara. London sought to create a "gray zone" between the empires, which would include the Emirate of Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara ^{[28, p. 127]}. However, St. Petersburg had other plans in this regard. The opposing empires tried to win over the local elites to their side. The economic component of this rivalry was won by London. At the same time, diplomatic success was on the side of the Russian Empire, but it was achieved at an extremely slow pace due to the opposition of Great Britain.

Vitkevich's mission to Afghanistan in 1837 gained the emir's favor, which caused concern among the British, becoming the main reason for the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-1842) and the establishment of control over the country only by 1855. The fragility of Kabul's governance stimulated the British to create a strategic depth effect for Indian possessions at the expense of neighboring territories, as well as to finally consolidate Indian lands under their control with the prospect of further economic development of continental Asia. India and Afghanistan served as a springboard in this "game" with Russia for influence in the region ^{[47, pp. 70-71]}. In this vein, two Anglo-Sikh wars took place (in 1845-1846 and 1848-1849), the conquest of the Principality of Nagpur (1853) and Auda (1856), and the defeat of the Sepoy rebellion (1857-1859) ^{[38, pp. 41-42]}, which was instigated by attempts to find a Russian trace, but without success. Russian residents appeared in India by the mid-1870s ^{[40, p. 71]}. By the second half of the 19th century . Great Britain, having strengthened its rear, was ready to realize its Turkestan ambitions, as well as to expand the geography of the "Big Game" to the east.

Thus, there is currently an actualization of the discourse regarding the "Big Game", the regional dimension of which is characterized by the vagueness of many sometimes mutually exclusive interpretations of the geographical boundaries of this phenomenon. This leads to an aberration of ideas about its essence, which is reflected at the level of theoretical generalizations and practical actions of States in the international political sphere derived from them. Turning to the analysis of the experience of the classical version of the Russian-British geopolitical rivalry helps to identify historically justified examples of the transformation of the problem of the geographical framework of the "Big Game" and, consequently, to build objective analogies applicable in the context of modern realities.

A retrospective analysis has shown that within the framework of the geopolitical competition between London and St. Petersburg for diplomatic, residency, and economic means in Central and South Asia in the late 18th and mid–19th centuries, the core (main space) and the periphery (periodically activated "pockets" operating alternately, simultaneously, or partially overlapping in time, depending on the situation) are conventionally distinguished. The territories of India and Afghanistan permanently served as the core. Peripheral points of rivalry "flared up" and "faded out" at certain stages in neighboring regions around the perimeter of the core of the "Big Game", being somehow connected with it. In turn, there is a pattern in the relationship between the phases of activation of the "Big Game" and the intensification of manifestations of British Russophobia, which has been acquiring the characteristics of ideology since the first third of the 19th century.

Initially, from 1757 to 1796, the confrontation was concentrated on the Hindustan peninsula in relation to the Indian territories with some advantage from the British side. From 1800 to 1829, the "hotbed" of rivalry in Persia intensified, which became the "starting point" in the chronology of the classic version of the "Big Game". The success of Russian policy at this stage contributed, from the early 1830s to 1864, to a shift in the focus of imperial competition to the Caucasus. At the same time, from the first quarter of the 19th century to 1837, British and Russian intelligence missions were carried out within Turkestan in order to gain the sympathy of local elites. Russia succeeded in the diplomatic part of this "game", and Great Britain succeeded in the economic part. In 1837-1859, the boundaries of active rivalry covered the territories of Afghanistan, the possessions of the Sikhs and India. London has strengthened its position in the region, nurturing Turkestan ambitions. A new stage of the "Big Game" was beginning.