Regional economic policy instruments towards changing the quality of institutions: theoretical approach to analysis and implementation in the Russian Far East

Feoktistova Kseniia Igorevna ORCID: 0000-0003-2470-0020 Senior Lecturer; Department of Socio-Economic Research and Regional Development; Far Eastern Federal University 690042, Russia, Primorsky Krai, Vladivostok, Severomorskaya str., 5, building 1, sq. 88 feoktistova.ki@dvfu.ru

Introduction

The development of peripheral regions is a priority task of the Russian state policy. In particular, special programs are being implemented to stimulate the economic growth of the Far East, new laws and even ministries are being created^[1]. The development Strategy of the Russian Far East (hereinafter referred to as the Far East) assumes the fulfillment of structural, social, infrastructural, as well as institutional tasks. The solution of the latter is aimed at equalizing the conditions of functioning of the economy of the Far Eastern Federal District with the all-Russian values by creating special economic regimes, simplifying international trade procedures to attract investment, and increasing the attractiveness of living in the region ^{[10, pp.526-257]}. These tasks are being implemented, among other things, through socio-economic programs, such as the application of the Free Port of Vladivostok regime, plans for the social development of economic growth centers, the Far Eastern Mortgage program, the Far Eastern Hectare program, etc. However, the results of the implementation of such programs remain ambiguous: it is not possible to change the socio-economic situation of the Russian Far East, and therefore the population continues to decrease. At the same time, the formal indicators for evaluating such programs do not reflect changes in the economic growth of regions due to the application of certain measures. Therefore, an urgent area of research is the development of methodological approaches to the analysis and evaluation of the development programs of the Russian Far East, which make it possible to identify the reasons for the lack of expected effects of socio-economic growth.

Special attention should be paid to the instruments of regional economic policy aimed at changing the quality of institutions, which in recent years have been increasingly used in relation to the Russian Far East as a vast peripheral territory. The best way to explain such changes is neoinstitutional economic theory (hereinafter – NIET). The use of the prerequisites and methodological foundations of the NIET for the analysis and assessment of institutional changes in the periphery allows us to set effective conditions for regional development programs that allow us to direct the incentives of economic agents in a certain way. To do this, the design of the developed tools should take into account institutional barriers (for example, inconsistency of formal and informal rules, distrust of authority, conflicting cultural customs, etc.) that hinder successful implementation. An adequate assessment of institutional programs assumes that the set indicators reflect the actual results, rather than the dynamics of the region's macroeconomic indicators, which change not only under the influence of the tools being evaluated, but also due to many exogenous and endogenous factors.

Thus, the analysis and evaluation of economic policy instruments in relation to peripheral territories aimed at institutional change implies not only the measurement of specified formal indicators, but also the analysis of local institutional features of the regions. Each specific development program is the management of certain institutions, the specifics of which must be taken into account at all stages: from planning to evaluating results. For example, land privatization, which has been widely used in the region since imperial times, is an important tool of the regional economic policy of the Republic of Moldova, which involves the transformation of the institution of ownership. At the same time, the institutional features of land ownership are not taken into account when designing and evaluating such programs, which determines the relevance of this article.

Theoretical concepts of regional growth

The implementation of regional policy is one of the important areas of government activity aimed at creating conditions for improving the quality of life of the population and sustainable and uniform socio-economic development in the regions. Regional policy concerns demographic, social, environmental, innovation and other areas. The economic trend emerged in the 1930s, when the problem of the disproportion of territorial development arose in Europe and the USA, which led to social problems. Regional economic policy in a broad sense is an integral part of the general socio-economic policy of the state, which synthesizes its regional aspects and creates the economic foundations of the integrity of the state^[2]. It is aimed at using favorable and limiting the effects of negative regional factors to achieve common strategic goals and objectives of the country's development; to increase the competitiveness of the regional economy; to support and develop the real sector of the economy; to form regional infrastructure, as well as the effective use of state property ^{[12, pp. 11-12]}.

In the scientific literature, regional economic policy is also understood as a set of managerial influences exerted by executive and legislative authorities on regulated processes using instruments of limitation, stimulation, consulting, as well as means such as legislation, institutional transformations, and reproduction resources to direct the region to achieve existing socio-economic goals ^{[4, 6]}.

The implementation and planning of regional economic policy includes a set of long-term tools aimed at shaping the target image of the territory's future. The formation of measures and instruments of regional economic policy is based on the concepts of regional growth, each of which has its own approach to defining a "region" and ways of its development. The basic concept is the neoclassical theory of regional growth. Within the framework of this approach, regions are considered as units of production, between which interconnection and equilibrium can be established through factor markets. Development is a series of successive equilibrium states. Deviation from equilibrium occurs as a result of exogenous shocks. To return to a state of equilibrium, mechanisms and tools of free competition and interregional mobility of factors of production are used, increasing the production potential of the regional economy. Such factors include: the quantity and quality of natural resources, the total number and qualifications of labor resources, capital reserves and the level of technology ^{[7, pp. 121-126]}.

Within the framework of the Keynesian paradigm of regional growth^[3], a region is represented as a system with a unique set of spatial features. These features are the source of development^[4]. For example, advanced industries, large urban agglomerations, sales markets, etc. Each such "source of growth" has its own life cycle, so development a priori cannot be uniform. Thus, within the framework of this approach, regional development is a succession of disequilibrium states, and the development of the region occurs at the expense of growth centers.

Based on the system-synergetic concept, which highlights the importance of the mechanisms of internal self-organization of complex systems in an unstable environment, new theories of the territorial organization of production have been formed. Representatives of these theories consider equilibrium systems that prevent deviations to be incapable of development^[5]. Scientists compare the region with a corporation developing in a market environment. When developing regional economic policy, this approach does not take into account the uneven development of regions and is not aimed at equalization.

In the 1980s, the institutional approach became widespread in economics, largely due to the work of Douglas North. Although North's works are classified as a neo-institutional economic theory, the concept of regional development theory, which was formed under his influence, is called institutional. From the perspective of neo-institutionalism, a region is the minimum necessary territory that can be given the authority to plan and predict its own development. The formation of effective institutions is a key direction for achieving a sustainable trajectory of socio-economic development in the region. Proponents of this trend include non-economic factors in their analysis^[6], and the unit of consideration is the community, that is, an integrated, space- and time-stable system of interrelated elements of economic behavior. The system of basic development indicators includes the number of elements localized in spatial boundaries, the level of direct connections between agents, the quality of established relationships ^[13] and the institutional structure as a whole. The conditions and costs that arise from the collective coordination of interests and decisions in the territory serve as a reliable indicator of the prospects for institutional development ^[26].

Despite the fact that in many cases this concept is the most suitable for planning and evaluating instruments of regional economic policy in the region, it is practically not used in practice. Most strategic planning documents at different levels (federal, regional, and municipal) pay little attention to the institutional structure, although many programs are aimed specifically at changing institutions. Indicators for evaluating such development programs are macroeconomic indicators (for example, GRP growth indices, population growth, investment growth in fixed assets, etc.) ^[8], which do not reflect the quality of the institutions being reformed. This limits the effectiveness of the implemented institutional development measures and the sustainable economic development of the Territories as a whole. In such conditions, the development of the concept of regional growth based on neo-institutional economic theory is an important direction for the analysis and evaluation of programs for the institutional development of territories ^[5].

Effective institutional instruments of regional economic policy: an example of land privatization

The implementation of regional economic policy is manifested through the use of specific tools. The instruments of regional economic policy are understood as directed measures of influence on the economy of the country's subjects. A large number of scientific papers are devoted to the dilemma of which instruments of regional economic policy really work, which meet resistance or do not affect socio-economic processes at all, and how to adapt the instruments to the institutional characteristics of different regions.

The main directions of regional economic policy instruments include:

1. Planning and forecasting;

2. Budget and tax system;

3. Regulatory instruments (loans, interest subsidies, tax incentives, subsidies for the creation of new jobs, transport benefits and subsidies ^{[3, p. 362]}, non-repayable loans for capital construction, financial coverage of personnel training costs, reduction of tariffs for transport, electricity, etc. ^{[19, p. 517-519]});

4. Institutional changes (changes in formal rules governing a particular area at the regional level, for example, migration ^[15], privatization, etc.).

This article examines the conditions for the effectiveness of the latter. The analysis is based on the neo-institutional theory of regional growth, which assumes that the underdevelopment of institutions is the core of the problems of implementing regional economic policy instruments in underdeveloped regions. According to him, the instruments of regional economic policy are rule–changing mechanisms that, in turn, determine people's incentives for certain patterns of economic behavior. Accordingly, evaluating the effectiveness of such tools involves analyzing not only regional macroeconomic indicators, but also changes in the quality of reformed institutions. In order to identify what barriers stand in the way of the successful implementation of these tools and what are the conditions for their effectiveness, it is necessary to analyze the institution being reformed. For clarity, let us turn to the experience of implementing such an instrument as privatization in different countries and the institution of property, which is transformed during its implementation. Privatization is actively used for the development of territories, especially peripheral ones ^[32]. Economists, in turn, try to evaluate the results of such reforms ^{[1, 29]}. Most often, Russian case studies focus on the privatization of state and municipal enterprises as the basis for the transition to a market and a democratic society. Less attention is paid to the effectiveness of land privatization, which at the same time is actively used throughout the country, and in the most remote peripheral regions a special program "Hectare in the Far East and the Arctic" has been launched^[7].

The initiators of privatization programs expect that the legalization of property, the transfer of land into private hands and the appropriation of title will contribute to an increase in private investment in the development of formalized land, economic growth and poverty reduction. Privatization in various cases is designed, firstly, to legalize the shadow use of land resources, secondly, to guarantee reliability and protection for "setting up" incentives for effective economic behavior of the population, and thirdly, to put unused land into circulation, or all of the above at the same time. Privatization is used as a tool of regional economic policy, creating special rules in peripheral regions.

However, land title programs do not guarantee the economic growth of the territory a priori. Research by economists in this field proves that the success of such reforms will depend not only on the literacy of the policy pursued, but also on the stage of development of the territory ^[25], as well as local institutional features, in this case largely dependent on the initial distribution and effectiveness of property rights ^{[20, 21, 22]}. A large number of empirical studies confirm that the transplantation of the institution of private property into each specific region/country is ineffective without taking into account the local characteristics of the institutional environment^{[8] [30]}. The effects of the implementation of regional economic policy instruments are distorted if the rules are not consistent with other institutional elements ^{[23, 24, 31]}. As a rule, the instruments of regional economic policy set only formal rules (new federal laws are being created, regional development programs, etc.), although some impact on informal rules and culture is also being implemented. This is reflected in social advertising, propaganda and explanation of new rules introduced to improve the lives of the population, broadcasting success stories, etc. Nevertheless, the impact on the incentives of economic agents is not carried out directly, but through the filter of the institutional environment of the region, which, in addition to the above elements, includes the level of trust in government and the level of transaction costs (Figure 1).

The most successful scenario of the indicated scheme occurs if: formal and informal rules support each other, the level of trust in the authorities is high ^[2] (accordingly, the reaction to the new rules is positive), cultural values do not contradict innovations, and transaction costs are low. However, this scenario is rare, especially in Russia, which is an outsider in the ranking of countries in terms of the quality of the institutional environment according to the Global competitiveness reports report^[9]. More often than not, when it comes to institutional changes, regional economic policy instruments encounter inconsistencies or opposition between formal and informal rules, institutional traps, and other difficulties in changing the quality of institutions to produce economic growth effects. In such a situation, regional development programs should differentiate depending on the institutional characteristics of the territory.

Figure 1. The impact of the region's institutional features on the implementation of regional economic policy instruments

Thus, on the basis of the neo-institutional theory, the following conditions for the effectiveness of regional economic policy instruments involving institutional transformations are formulated:

1. Consistency of the created formal rules with informal ones. The reaction of economic agents to changes in formal rules corresponds to the scenarios expected by the initiators if the former have incentives to follow them. For example, new rules on land privatization will be in demand if the costs of obtaining legal private land rights are lower than the benefits received. The latter depend on established land use practices. If de facto property relations are more regulated by informal rules that run counter to or co-exist independently with formal ones, then the privatization program will not affect the incentives of economic agents and, accordingly, will not change their behavior. There are examples in history when the process of transferring land to new owners was regulated by informal intermediaries, since the state did not have the resources to control privatization^[10].

2. Compatibility of the new rules with cultural customs and norms. The influence of the cultural context on the effectiveness of the implementation of regional development programs is not obvious in some cases, in others it determines the outcome of the launched reforms. A vivid example of the failure of the territorial development program in connection with established customs and culture was described by E. Acute ^[28][11]. In land ownership relations, cultural norms can consolidate relations between economic agents more effectively than a title. For example, based on culture and moral principles, historically established land boundaries between neighbors, which contradict cadastral maps, can be respected by land users better than legal ones, which are protected by law ^[14].

3. A sufficient level of public confidence in the region's development programs. The reaction of economic agents to the new rules depends on the general level of trust in the authorities and in the initiators of the implemented regional development programs, in particular, as well as on the stability of the reformed institutions. For example, the incentives to use simplified rules of privatization depend on the risks of expropriation of property by the state, on the stability of taxation, on the effectiveness of the judicial system in protecting property rights, etc. Incentives for economic agents to invest in registered land depend on the reliability of prospects for the development of transport accessibility, infrastructure, and the implementation of other declared programs in the region. It is important to note that in this case we are talking about incentives not only for people involved in development programs, but also for performers (most often the performers are municipal authorities)^[12].

The Far Eastern Hectare Program^[13]

The Far East, as a Russian periphery with vast undeveloped territories, has its own specifics. The implementation of regional economic policy instruments is hampered by a weak and contradictory legal system of land relations, in which the legalization process is associated with high transaction costs. Regional institutional specifics, from the point of view of incentives guiding the behavior of landowners, consist, firstly, in distrust of formal property institutions and title-awarding procedures, and secondly, in the prevailing aggressive mentality of the population ^[18]. Another significant problem for land reforms in the Far Eastern region is the multitude of inaccuracies in the cadastral map^[14]. Such institutional imperfections make it impossible to mechanically use the experience of "civilized countries" to solve local problems in the Russian Far East and become a source of various barriers to the successful implementation of regional economic policy instruments.

Since 2014, the state programs for the development of the Far East have carried a number of institutional innovations ^{[11, p.13]}, namely, the formation and development of territories of advanced socio-economic development with favorable conditions for attracting investments and organizational and legal support for the accelerated development of the Far Eastern Federal District. However, the implementation of real transformations in the socio-economic and institutional spheres of the Far Eastern Federal District is hampered by limited economic resources and the unappreciated reaction of economic regional systems to the postulates of the spatial development strategy of the Russian Federation ^[10]. The State program "Socio-economic Development of the Far Eastern Federal District" was approved by the decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 04/15/2014 until 2030^[15]. The program contains 3 goals:

1. Improving the socio-economic development of the Far Eastern Federal District;

2. Achieving a natural population growth rate of 3.4% by 2030 and a permanent population of 8.4 million people;

3. Implementation of plans for the social development of the centers of economic growth of the subjects of the Russian Federation, which are part of the Far Eastern Federal District, and plans for the socio-economic development of individual cities (Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Svobodny Amur Region, Bolshoy Kamen city District of Primorsky Krai).

To achieve these indicators, the Institute of JSC Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic was established. The Corporation implements business support measures, attracts investors to the region, and participates in the implementation of programs aimed at improving the quality of life of people in the Far East and the Arctic. The latter includes 5 areas: the Far Eastern Hectare program, the Far Eastern Mortgage program, the Far Eastern Quarter program, the formation of a comfortable urban environment, and the development of education^[16]. Three of the five programs are aimed at improving housing conditions and the emergence of ownership rights to real estate of residents of the Far East. The idea of these programs is that housing, land and ample opportunities for its development should become a kind of anchor that will restrain the outflow of population from the region, or even a magnet that can attract people from other regions to the Far Eastern Federal District. In addition, privatization is expected to increase investment attractiveness for new owners who have incentives to farm on their land.

Such hopes are well founded, taking into account the global experience of privatization, which contributes to the economic growth of regions and countries. However, these programs have not been able to fully solve the existing socio-economic and demographic problems of the Russian Far Eastern region. The author suggests that the barriers to the successful implementation of regional economic policy instruments aimed at changing the quality of institutions are the established conditions of effectiveness, which are not fully met. An empirical test of this hypothesis was carried out using the example of the Far Eastern Hectare program.

The program was initiated by the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East in 2015-2016 as a social initiative of the Russian Government^[17]. According to the rules, every citizen of the Russian Federation can receive up to 1 hectare of land in the Far East for use and then ownership. The conditions are set by Federal Law No. 119 of May 1, 2016^[18], the implementation takes place in several stages. Since June 1, 2016, residents of the pilot Far Eastern regions have received the right to take a hectare in their region. Since October 2016, land plots have become available to all Far East residents, and since February 1, 2017, to all Russian citizens. Since March 2019, the program has been extended to participants in the State Program to Facilitate the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad to the Russian Federation. On August 1, 2019, the program was launched in the Republic of Buryatia and the Trans-Baikal Territory in a similar manner: first for local residents of the regions, then (from February 1, 2020) for all other Russian citizens. Then, from August 1, 2020, land in the Republic of Buryatia and the Trans-Baikal Territory became available to participants in the program for the voluntary resettlement of compatriots to the Russian Federation.^[19] Since August 1, 2021, the program has been operating in the Arctic. The new amendments gave residents of the Arctic regions the right to receive land plots of up to 1 hectare for free use, then from February 2022, all other citizens can receive land in the Arctic by analogy.

The goal of the program is to consolidate people in the Far Eastern Federal District, stop the outflow of population, and attract private investment to the region through the redistribution of property rights. According to the program, more than 169 million hectares of land are available for development^[20]. At the same time, in the Far East, only 1% of the entire territory of the region is owned by people (Table 1). On average in Russia, this figure is 7.8% (of which 6.6% are households, 1.2% are organizations)^[21].

Table 1. Distribution of lands in the Far Eastern Federal District by type of ownership (as of January 1, 2019, thousand hectares)

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of "Information on the availability and distribution of land in the Russian Federation as of 01.01.2019 (by subjects of the Russian Federation)" https://rosreestr.gov.ru/upload/Doc/06-upr/%D0%A4.%2022%20%D0%B7%D0%B0%202019%20%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%20(%D0%BF%D0%BE%20%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B1%D1%8A%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BC%20%D0%A0%D0%A4).doc

During the implementation of the Far Eastern Hectare program, 85% of land plots available for privatization are owned by municipal authorities, 15% are owned by a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, and less than 1% of land is federally owned (Table 2).

Table 2 – The area of territories in state, regional and municipal ownership in the subjects of the Far Eastern Federal District (as of January 1, 2019, thousand hectares)

Source: ibid.

Thus, in the process of privatization, 84% of the redistributed land is in municipal ownership. Statistics of the initial owners of land plots requested for registration of a "hectare" in the subjects of the Russian Federation are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 – Distribution of land plots requested by people for registration of a "hectare", by type of owner (from the beginning of the program to May 2020).

Source: compiled by the author on the basis of data obtained on the basis of Supplementary Agreement No. 3 dated May 19, 2020 to the strategic partnership agreement between the autonomous non-profit organization Agency for the Development of Human Capital in the Far East and the Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education Far Eastern Federal University in the field of human capital development and human resources dated 09/14/2018, concluded in 2020 for the purpose of researching the implementation of Federal Law No. 119-FZ dated 05/01/2016 "On the Specifics of Providing Citizens with Land Plots in State or Municipal Ownership and Located on the Territories of the Subjects of the Russian Federation that are Part of the Far Eastern Federal District, and on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation".

These statistics indicate that special attention should be paid during the management of the Far Eastern Hectare program not only to the incentives of the program participants, but also to the incentives of the municipal authorities. Local governments are not only the original owners of the land, but also implement the program locally: accept and coordinate applications for participation, prepare contracts for free use of land, accompany and monitor the process of registration of land in private ownership in compliance with all requirements of the participants. In fact, the quality of the program's support by municipal authorities depends not only on the number of "hectares" granted, but also on the level of public confidence in the established procedures for privatization and, as a result, private investment in the development of new lands. In rural areas, the influence of municipal authorities on the effects of the program is particularly strong, as officials are personally familiar with local residents and de facto land ownership rights. The established ownership relations are supported not only by formal, but also by informal rules. Officials, in turn, try to prevent land conflicts among the local population and do not issue disputed plots for registration of "hectares". Municipal authorities are also reluctant to part with land that is owned by them and has the potential, for example, for rental. At the same time, the rules of the Far Eastern Hectare program have been created and are being developed solely in the direction of supporting its participants, without paying attention to the incentives of the performers. It is possible to determine the impact of local government incentives on the effectiveness of the program by analyzing existing assessment indicators^[22] in the context of municipalities. The statistics of the issued "hectares" for the subjects of the Far Eastern Federal District are too general and do not allow us to identify the reasons that slow down the program in each particular municipality. For an adequate assessment of the program, it is also necessary to use performance indicators that reflect not only the number of "hectares" allocated (since de jure a change of ownership is not a sufficient condition for the inflow of private investment and the development of privatized land), but also the actual practices of economic activity.

Conclusion

Despite the economic growth rates exceeding the national average^[23], the population of the Russian Far East is steadily decreasing. Large-scale development programs are being created to solve the demographic problem and create attractive living conditions in the Far East. Since the regional economy of the peripheries is less explained by basic market models, the effects of implementing such programs are not obvious and need to be comprehensively studied. For regions such as the Far Eastern Federal District, there is a need to evaluate development programs in a territorial context, even if we are talking about tools that have been used for decades throughout the country and even the world. The application of a neo-institutional approach to the analysis of regional economic policy instruments implemented in the Eastern Partnership and aimed at institutional transformation makes it possible to identify patterns of reform implementation that are not available in the standard assessment of results based on formal indicators. In particular, this paper examines the assessment of the effectiveness of land privatization conducted for the purpose of economic development of regions. The article establishes the conditions for the effectiveness of such reforms. For peripheral regions where the institution of property rights is poorly developed, this is, firstly, the consistency of the formal rules being created with informal ones, secondly, the compatibility of the new rules with the cultural customs and norms of the region, and thirdly, a sufficient level of public confidence in the programs being implemented.

Empirical studies of the Far Eastern Hectare program have revealed that local land use practices have institutional features that do not allow the formal rules to be fully implemented. The conditions created for privatization do not take into account the role and interests of municipal authorities, which, on the one hand, are the original owners of the distributed land, on the other hand, implement the program locally, and work directly with the participants. Evaluating the effectiveness of the Far Eastern Hectare program, as well as other development programs, is an urgent and non-linear task for economists, requiring not only an analysis of established official indicators, but also an examination of actual institutional changes.

^[1] For example, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic.

^[2] Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 04/28/1995 N 439 "On the Program of the Government of the Russian Federation "Reforms and development of the Russian Economy in 1995 - 1997" [Electronic resource]: Access mode: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_8539/61a15f3765ef8ff37231e62d5e0bd584f7e371ae/#:~:text=Региональная%20экономическая%20политика%20-%20органическая%20 part,states%2C%20synthetic%20ee%20regional%20 aspects. (accessed 19.01.2024).

^[3] There are many theories of regional development "inside" the Keynesian paradigm. For example, the concept of mutual conditioning by G. Myrdal, the concept of "poles of growth" by F. Perru, J.-R. Budville, P. Pothier and H. R. Lasuena, a model of urban agglomeration. Richardson, J. Friedman's "center-periphery" theory, T. Hegerstrand and P. Huggett's "diffusion of innovations" model, H. Hirsch's "volcano" model, and others.

^[4]The concept of "economic development" expands the concept of "economic growth". It appeared in the scientific literature by the early 70s. This concept is not limited to the economic growth factors traditional for a market economy, but includes the analysis of the social, institutional and political structure of countries ^[16]

^[5] These include, for example, the theory of industrial clusters by M. Porter and the theory of regional clusters by M. Enright.

^[6] The institutional field of regional growth theories includes: the theory of market potential (J. Harris), the model of the basic multiplier of regional income (A. Pred), the synthetic theory of agglomeration (P. Krugman), the core–periphery models (G. Myrdal, A. Hirshman, A. Gilbert and J. Gagler).

^[7] The official website of the Program "Hectare in the Far East and the Arctic" [Electronic resource]: https://освойгектар.рф / (date of access: 07/23/2024).

^[8] "Title" in this article means a legal property right secured by the state.

^[9] Global Competitiveness Report Special Edition 2020. World Economic Forum. [Electronic resource]: https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-global-competitiveness-report-2020 / P. 45 (accessed: 06/02/2024)

^[10] One such example is claim clubs, also called associations of actual settlers or squatters' clubs; these pseudo-governmental entities existed in the 19th century in the American West, acting within limited local jurisdiction, seeking to regulate the sale of land in places where there was practically no legal apparatus for resolving land disputes. disputes ^[27].

^[11] In the mountainous country of Nepal, there is a traditional system of dams and canals that allows water to be delivered to all farmers, including those living in the lower reaches. The modern concrete system proved to be less effective because it violated the existing customs of the local population.

^[12] For details on the impact of municipal incentives on the effects of development programs, see the article ^[17].

^[13] Initially, in 2016, the program was called "Far Eastern Hectare", then in 2022 it was expanded to the Arctic regions, and the name changed to "Hectare in the Far East and the Arctic".

^[14] Inaccuracies in the cadastral map are a source of asymmetric information and, as a result, a deterrent to the development of the institution of property rights, and as a result of the economic activity of the region in the same logic as transaction costs prevent transactions in any other area of economic relations.

^[15] The State Program of the Russian Federation "Socio-economic development of the Far Eastern Federal District" [Electronic resource]:

https://minvr.gov.ru/activity/gosprogrammy/sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe-razvitie-dalnevostochnogo / (date of access: 11/15/2023).

^[16] About JSC Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic [Electronic resource]: https://erdc.ru/about / (date of request: 11.12.2023).

^[17] Far Eastern hectare [Electronic resource]: Government work. – 2022. – Official website of the Russian government – Access mode: http://government.ru/rugovclassifier/728/events / (date of access: 02/15/2022).

^[18] Federal Law "On the specifics of providing citizens with ..." dated 05/01/2016 No. 119-FZ (last edition 2016) [Electronic resource]: Consultant Plus. – Access mode: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_197427 / (date of access: 02.02.2019).

^[19] The Ministry of the Russian Federation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic. URL: https://minvr.gov.ru / (date of access: 02/15/2024).

^[20] FIS "To the Far East". Access mode: https://надальнийвосток .Russian Federation/ (date of access: 08/13/2024).

^[21] State (national) report on the state and use of lands in the Russian Federation in 2021. Federal Service of State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography [Electronic resource]: https://rosreestr.gov.ru/activity/gosudarstvennoe-upravlenie-v-sfere-ispolzovaniya-i-okhrany-zemel/gosudarstvennyy-natsionalnyy-doklad-o-sostoyanii-i-ispolzovanii-zemel-rossiyskoy-federatsii / (date of access: 04/03/2023).

^[22] The indicator of the implementation of the Far Eastern Hectare program is the number of land plots allocated.

^[23] Putin: the economy of the Far East is growing faster than the average Russian economy [Electronic resource]: TASS. 2021. Access mode: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/21770613 (date of request: 12/01/2024).