Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 1991-2022

Kerchelaev Yurii Vladimirovich Postgraduate student; Faculty of History; Lomonosov Moscow State University Leading expert; HSE 119234, Russia, Moscow, Lomonosovsky ave., 27k4, office E-611 krchlv.link@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Chedia Anri Robertovich ORCID: 0000-0003-0742-735X PhD in History Researcher; Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs; HSE University 119017, Russia, Moscow, Malaya Ordynka str., 17, room 225 chedia@inbox.ru

In the 21st century, Azerbaijan actively cooperated with all the states of post-Soviet Central Asia. However, with the exception of Kazakhstan, interstate relations were primarily strategic rather than practical ^[3].

Since the restoration of Azerbaijan's independence, its bilateral relations with the Central Asian states, with the exception of the Republic of Kazakhstan, have not reached a level of strategic partnership comparable to that which Baku has built with key partners in Eurasia. The main factors limiting the development of closer cooperation are geographical remoteness, lack of a common border, and complex logistics. Additionally, the dynamics of interaction is influenced by internal and foreign policy differences between the countries of Central Asia, which complicates the formation of a unified approach to cooperation with Azerbaijan ^[4].

In the direction of Central Asia, Azerbaijan paid special attention to building relations with Turkmenistan, which was mainly due to the issues of defining maritime borders and the legal status of the Caspian Sea. These aspects were the basis of bilateral contacts between Baku and Ashgabat. Interaction with other Central Asian States, with the exception of Kazakhstan, remained at a lower level, which was reflected in a limited number of contacts and less active cooperation compared to other regions.

The activities of the foreign ministries of the two countries.

Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were officially established on June 9, 1992. In 1998, Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Ashgabat, which contributed to the development of bilateral contacts. Turkmenistan, in turn, opened its embassy in Baku in 1993, but its activities were suspended in 1994. The official explanation provided by Ashgabat referred to the financial difficulties faced by the embassy, which caused its closure ^{[1, 739]}. Subsequently, the intensification of diplomatic efforts allowed the parties to achieve significant progress, including the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1996.

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan made a key contribution to the development and signing of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 2018. This document, developed within the framework of multilateral cooperation, has removed important obstacles to the implementation of transport and energy projects such as the trans-Caspian transport corridor. One of the important achievements was the conclusion of agreements during the visits of Ilham Aliyev to Ashgabat in 2018 and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov to Baku in 2017, organized with the active assistance of the foreign ministries.

Cooperation between the two countries covered not only the economic, but also the humanitarian sphere. The organization of cultural exchanges, such as the publication of the Makhtumkuli Faragi manuscript in Azerbaijan, and the active participation of the Turkmen delegation in the Islamic Solidarity Games in Baku in 2017, were the result of the efforts of the diplomatic departments of both countries ^[6].

The foreign ministries have played a special role in the integration of the two countries into regional and international structures. The participation of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the framework of the TURKSOY and the TURKIC COUNCIL has become a platform for strengthening cultural and political ties, while coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations has strengthened their positions on the world stage.

The effective work of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan has contributed to the development of bilateral relations, including through overcoming controversial issues, supporting strategic initiatives and promoting joint interests in the international arena. The signed agreements, well-established logistics and the expansion of cultural cooperation laid the foundation for further strengthening ties between the two Turkic republics.

Turkmenistan as a strategic partner.

Azerbaijan is a strategic direction in Turkmen politics. This became especially evident after Baku managed to link the main logistics routes in the Caspian region to itself. Of course, this was partly facilitated by the position of the international community towards Iran and the subsequent sanctions imposed on Tehran. However, at the same time, the transportation of energy resources and cargo from Turkmenbashi to Baku looked no less attractive than their transportation overland via Iran to Turkey.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of meetings took place between Heydar Aliyev and Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov. Azerbaijani researcher A. Hasanov: "Among these visits, President Heydar Aliyev's participation in the summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization held in Ashgabat in May 1994, the events on the occasion of Turkmenistan's Independence Day held on October 26-27, 1994, and the Second Summit of the Heads of the Caspian Littoral states in April 2002 should be particularly noted" ^{[1, 739]}.

In addition, A. Hasanov notes the importance of the treaty of Friendship and cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan concluded during the official visit of G. Aliyev in 1996 ^{[1, 739]}. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 89 documents have been signed between the countries for 2020 ^[6].

However, the cooperation between the two countries at the beginning of the presidency of Ilham Aliyev was not in the simplest phase. The main differences between the countries existed on the issues of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, namely on the ownership of the Caspian offshore hydrocarbon deposits. Disputes developed around the Osman (Chirag), Khazar (Azeri) and Altyn Asyr (Sharg) fields.

At the same time, the most "painful" issue for Ashgabat has always been the delivery of its energy resources to customers. Almost all Turkmen exports were delivered to China via the Turkmenistan–China pipeline through the territory of Kazakhstan (39 billion m3 per year) ^[7]. A small part of the gas was also bought by Russian Gazprom and delivered via the Central Asia –Center pipeline (CAC), which passes through the territories of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Gazprom planned to increase the volume of supplies from 10 to 80 billion m3 by 2029 ^[7]. However, significant disagreements between the parties, the explosion on the pipeline and the global financial crisis first reduced the planned supply volumes tenfold, and then completely curtailed cooperation between the parties from 2016 to 2018 ^[7].

Until 2017, a relatively small amount of gas (8 billion m3) was exported to the northeastern provinces of Iran via the Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline, until the countries disagreed on pricing ^[7]. For a country with the fourth largest natural gas potential in the world (9.5–9.9% of global reserves), supplies to China alone were clearly insufficient ^{[2, 89]}.

It is the organization of exports and the construction of new pipelines that has always been a key problem for Turkmenistan. Ashgabat has always understood the need to diversify its customer base. New projects were considered as alternative options: the frozen Caspian gas pipeline, as well as the Turkmenistan–Iran–Turkey pipeline, which was postponed indefinitely due to the sanctions imposed on Iran. The frozen TAPI pipeline project (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan – Pakistan – India) remained another risky project ^{[2, 89]}.

The trans—Caspian pipeline was supposed to connect Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan to deliver gas via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (under construction at that time) to Turkey and further resale to the EU countries. This idea originated back in the 1990s and later, after the appearance of a number of joint gas projects between Russia and Turkey, it became a tool in competition "for the Turkish market and Turkey's transit potential" ^{[2, 89]}.

Back in 1998, a joint Turkish-Turkmen working group was established to develop the project. It is noteworthy that it included the "president of an Israeli company" and "former senior Israeli intelligence officer" Yosef Maiman, who was close to S. Niyazov, as well as Turkish businessman Ahmet Chalik ^{[2, 90]}.

Researcher A. A. Kuznetsov suggests that Turkey and the United States were the main stakeholders in the project: in April 1998, S. Niyazov discussed a gas pipeline project in the United States, where an agreement was signed to provide a grant "in the amount of 750 thousand dollars for the preparation of a feasibility study" of the pipeline ^{[2, 90]}.

In 1999, negotiations reached an impasse when President Clinton's special envoy for Energy, Richard Morningaster, proposed that not only the Government of Turkmenistan and international companies, but also Azerbaijan, be included in the list of pipeline owners ^{[2, 90]}.

The idea of the country began to return already during the presidency of I. Aliyev, when the Turkmen side could clearly see the dividends that Baku was able to extract from the launch of all transport projects. Moreover, according to the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, adopted at the Fifth Summit of the Heads of the Caspian Littoral States in Aktau, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan no longer needed the consent of all the Caspian littoral states to build the pipeline. Prior to this, it was also planned to compensate for the lack of "agreement" by tanker shipments of liquefied natural gas from Turkmenbashi to Baku ^[2,91].

Meanwhile, Baku has always been cautious about the idea of laying a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline: firstly, it could complicate relations with Russia, and secondly, when Turkmenistan increased gas supplies to the EU, Azerbaijan had a competitor in its own pipeline system. In addition, by the end of the 2010s, almost all Turkmen gas was contracted by China ^[8]. In 2013, the European Commissioner for Energy, Gunther Oettinger, proposed to re-examine the pipeline project, but Azerbaijan's emphasized neutrality in the feuds between Russia and the EU prevented this project from accelerating only because of the whim of Brussels ^{[2, 90-92]}.

By 2018, the project remained unrealized, but the improvement of relations between the countries in the 21st century, especially during the presidency of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, brought a number of other dividends. From 2006 to 2018, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I. Aliyev visited Turkmenistan twice: on November 28-29, 2008 and November 21-22, 2018. The Turkmen president visited Azerbaijan three times: in 2008, 2015 and 2017. During the official visit of the President of Turkmenistan to the Republic of Azerbaijan in 2017, the heads of state signed the "Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan" ^[6]. In addition, the countries cooperated within the framework of various international organizations ^[6].

At a meeting in Baku in 2018, the leaders of the two countries noted that one of the most important areas of cooperation is transport and the organization of transport corridors within the framework of the TRACECA project. Apparently, Berdimuhamedov's visit turned out to be the most productive in the entire history of Azerbaijani-Turkmen relations, as more than 15 documents were signed within the framework of it, most of which related to simplification of procedures in the field of logistics ^[6].

It is cooperation in the field of transport that has become the main one in the economic relations between Baku and Ashgabat. In 2016, railway ferries and wheeled cargo vessels began to cross from the Baku International Trade Port to Turkmenbashi as part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor project ^[9]. Unfortunately, the websites of the official departments of both countries do not provide open economic statistics.

According to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, the two countries cooperate in the fields of transport and logistics, agriculture, energy, pharmaceuticals and tourism. The Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Humanitarian Cooperation has been operating since 2008. In 2017, an agreement on transport and Transit cooperation (Agreement on the Lapis Lazuli Route) was signed between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Georgia and Turkey ^[6]. In 2018, the trade turnover between the two countries amounted to $133 million ^[10].

Cooperation in the humanitarian field is also an integral component of Azerbaijani-Turkmen relations. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan closely cooperate in the fields of culture, science, education and sports between government agencies, academies of sciences and universities.^[6]

At the Fourth Islamic Solidarity Games, held in Baku in 2017, Turkmenistan was represented by 160 athletes led by the Chairman of the Sports Committee of Turkmenistan ^[6].

The State Statistics Committee of Turkmenistan does not publish open data from the population censuses in Turkmenistan in 1995 and 2012. According to the website "Azerbaijans.com "About 33,000 Azerbaijanis live in Turkmenistan {11}. In 1989, according to the All-Union Census, 33,365 Azerbaijanis lived in the Turkmen SSR ^[12].

Thus, during the reign of Ilham Aliyev, negotiations between the leaders of the two countries became more productive. With the assumption of the post of President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, contacts have become more frequent and have reached a qualitatively new level. Of course, the current situation in world politics contributed to this, but it is impossible to detract from the diplomatic will of the two Turkic republics. The signed Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, as well as a number of agreements concluded in Baku in 2018, signaled absolute progress in bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, as well as the beginning of a new page in regional Caspian policy.

Russia's view on Azerbaijani-Turkmen cooperation

The Russian media and official structures generally express a positive assessment of the dynamics of the development of the bilateral dialogue between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, emphasizing the importance of their strategic partnership and interstate cooperation in various fields. Both countries occupy an important place among the foreign policy partners of the Russian Federation in the region, and the strengthening of their mutual relations contributes to the deepening of economic and political integration in the Eurasian space.

The analytical materials emphasize the importance of cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the energy sector, as well as in the field of transport and logistics. This is due to the presence of significant reserves of natural resources in both countries, which makes them key actors in ensuring the energy security of the region. In addition, the active development of transport infrastructure in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan contributes to the strengthening of trade and economic ties and stimulates economic growth, playing an important role in the integration processes in the Eurasian space.

The Russian authorities also supported the development of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, seeing this as an opportunity to strengthen their influence in the region. There was a desire to create favorable conditions for cooperation and exchange of experience between countries, which could lead to more efficient use of resources and the development of international relations.

Nevertheless, information materials and articles are often found in the Russian information field, in which concerns were openly expressed about the return of the issue of supplies of Turkmen gas through Azerbaijan and Turkey to the European Union. At the end of 2022, the thesis was increasingly being followed that Russia was interested in maintaining its control over gas flows to Europe, despite the problems associated with the shutdown of the Nord Streams, and would probably consider an increase in Turkmen gas supplies as a threat to its economic interests and geopolitical influence ^[13].

The Russian Federation demonstrates a cautiously positive attitude towards the development of dialogue between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, while taking into account the priorities of its own national interests. Direct statements expressing unequivocal support or complete indifference to these processes are rare, reflecting the nature of Russian policy in the Caspian region. Russia's strategy is aimed at maintaining a balance of interests, as well as at preventing the formation of situations that could weaken its influence in this geopolitical space.

The Russian Federation is probably focused on ensuring that the development of the Azerbaijani-Turkmen dialogue takes place within the framework consistent with its strategic interests, excluding scenarios that could undermine its position in the region. This implies careful support for the processes of cooperation between the two countries, while monitoring their dynamics and taking measures aimed at minimizing potential risks to Russian interests. In the context of the discussion of the construction of a gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Moscow, together with Tehran, focuses on environmental risks, putting forward this argument as a key objection to the project.

Russian media often express concern that the implementation of the gas pipeline construction project in the Caspian Sea could lead to increased influence of Turkey in the region. Such a scenario is seen as a potential threat to the balance of power between key actors, which, in turn, could jeopardize Russia's strategic interests, including issues of security and control over key transport and energy routes. A similar position is taken by Iran, which also perceives these processes as a challenge to its own interests in the region and supports similar arguments in the discussion about the possible consequences of the project ^[14].

A number of Russian analytical publications suggest that individual NATO countries are purposefully contributing to the intensification of the dialogue between Baku and Ashgabat on the construction of a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea. This is seen as part of a strategy aimed at weakening Russia's geopolitical position in the region. This hypothesis has become particularly relevant in the context of the resumption of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent shutdown of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines. Such actions are interpreted as an element of broad energy and political competition, in which Russia is facing increased external pressure ^[15].

The position of Russian officials, in particular Alexander Bashkin, Senator of the Russian Federation from the Astrakhan region, highlighted on the regional information portal, highlights the legal and economic aspects of the discussed gas pipeline construction project across the Caspian Sea. The senator pointed to the provisions of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (the so-called "Caspian Constitution"), according to which the implementation of any infrastructure project in the sea area requires the consent of all five coastal states. In addition, Bashkin noted that Turkmenistan's economic interests would not be harmed if the project was not implemented, since the natural gas it produces can be fully redistributed to the markets of China, India and Russia, which corresponds to mutually beneficial relations between Turkmenistan and its partners, including the Russian Federation ^[16].

In early 2023, Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee, paid an official visit to Ashgabat, during which the Russian delegation held talks with the current President of Turkmenistan, Serdar Berdimuhamedov, and former head of state Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. During the meetings, issues of strengthening cooperation in the gas industry were discussed, including increasing the volume of purchases of Turkmen gas by the Russian Federation. In addition, the parties expressed their readiness to develop multilateral cooperation in the oil and gas sector in the Eurasian space, which underlines the strategic nature of the partnership and the focus on expanding energy cooperation in the region ^[17].

The analysis shows that Russia is striving to maintain a balance in the Caspian region by supporting cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan within limits that do not threaten its strategic interests, especially in the energy sector. It is predicted that Moscow will continue to carefully influence the development of projects related to gas transportation, focusing on environmental and legal aspects in order to minimize the risks to its geopolitical influence and economic positions.

Conclusion

Summing up, it should be noted that Central Asia was an important area in the foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, while the Caspian region can be considered one of the key areas.

The last years of Heydar Aliyev's rule have demonstrated Azerbaijan's desire to build a constructive dialogue with all Central Asian countries. He managed to restart relations with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the strong Aliev–Nazarbayev alliance was one of the guarantors of stability in the Caspian region.

Ilham Aliyev, who succeeded his father as president, managed to maintain the set vector. A distinctive feature of Azerbaijan's foreign policy in the period from 2003 to 2018 is a professional diplomatic approach to all issues that have arisen. The ability to negotiate allowed Baku to launch promising energy and transport projects in the region, which almost immediately integrated Kazakhstan, and then Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Multilateral contacts with most of the Central Asian countries within the framework of various international and regional organizations have reached a qualitatively new level. It is especially worth noting the emergence of new military-political, cultural and humanitarian organizations, the most famous of which are the Turkic Council and TURKSOY.

The strengthening of the international status of the Republic of Azerbaijan allowed the country to defend its position on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh with greater force, which resulted in Resolution 62/243 adopted at the UN General Assembly.

The established military contacts with the countries of the region, especially after the joint assistance to the NATO bloc in the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, have greatly increased the authority of the countries in world politics. This authority was multiplied by the friendly or partnership relations of all countries with Russia, China and Iran, as well as by the huge amount of hydrocarbon reserves in the region, which in the late 20th and early 21st centuries turned into a special geostrategic hub of Eurasia.