Russia's turn to the East: achievements, problems and prospects

El'nikova Yuliya Vasil'evna ORCID: 0000-0002-8478-4716 Doctor of Economics Professor; Department of Regional and Sectoral Policy; Kursk State Agrarian University named after I.I.Ivanov Karl Marx str., 70, office 357, Kursk region, 305021, Russia gniiivm.h@ya.ru

Introduction.

Due to its geographical location, the question of its identity (Asian or European) has always been relevant for Russia. Disputes of this kind were reflected at different historical stages in the formation of various political and philosophical paradigms and Russian intellectual traditions underlying Russian foreign policy, etc. ^[1]. Russia has always referred to the need to use multi-vector diplomacy and the diverse nature of economic cooperation with its international partners. In order to implement the principles of multipolarity, which Russia promotes in its foreign policy, and transform itself as one of the global centers of influence, it became quite logical to "turn to the East" to expand and deepen international cooperation. The choice of the eastern direction was not accidental, taking into account the significant economic and cultural growth of Asia over the past two decades.

The policy of "turning to the East" includes three main components: the socio-economic development of the Russian Far East, the integration of the Russian economy into the Asia-Pacific region, and the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the countries of the region. The intensification of Russia's ties with East Asia pursues a dualistic goal: to integrate into regional markets and secure the role of one of the leading actors in this subregion ^[1].

The shift of priorities in Russia's foreign policy towards the East became relevant after the Asian financial crisis of 2007-2008 ^[2], when there was a reorientation of emphasis in the energy sector towards East Asian markets with their growing demand for hydrocarbons. During this period, energy cooperation intensified with China, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries. Russia has become a member of a number of important Asian multilateral organizations for economic and political integration, in particular the SCO and BRICS. In 2012, the APEC Forum was held in Vladivostok, where for the first time Russia was able to clearly demonstrate its role as an Asia-Pacific power ^[3].

After the coup d'etat in Ukraine in 2014, amid heightened tensions with the West, turning to the East became a key strategic step to hedge external risks. Special attention was paid to the development of cooperation with China in the fields of energy, finance, infrastructure and trade at the bilateral level. Mutual understanding was also strengthened on a number of pressing international issues, such as the Ukrainian crisis, the conflict in Syria, the problems of the South China Sea, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the US missile program in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia ^{[4, 5]}. Important achievements were also noted in the field of military-technical cooperation, including areas requiring special sensitivity, such as early warning systems for missile launches.

In 2016, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation aimed at reducing the opportunities of the historical West to dominate the world stage, as well as shifting the potential of global development to the Asia-Pacific region ^[6]. Moscow has actively begun to establish cooperation with Tokyo and Seoul: an agreement was signed on the participation of Japanese firms in the Arctic LNG-2 project (2019), several major agreements were concluded with South Korea related to the construction of vessels for the transportation of reduced natural gas and the construction of large transport hubs serving energy projects in the Russian Arctic ^[1]. Despite all these positive developments, partnership with East Asian countries has not become an adequate alternative for Russia to its relations with Europe, especially in the field of energy ^[7].

The beginning of a special military operation (hereinafter referred to as the SVO) radically changed the situation. Firstly, in the light of the actual rupture of not only political, but also economic ties with the collective West, this was the only possible option for the further development of Russia's foreign policy. If at the beginning of 2022 the share of Russian gas in European imports was 41%, by October it had fallen to 7.5% ^[5]. Secondly, the countries of this region as a whole have taken a neutral position in relation to their own ^[8].

Thus, the "turn to the East" is not a temporary measure designed to overcome confrontation with the West, but a long overdue and balanced decision. In the light of the events of recent years, it is relevant to analyze the prospects and achievements of Russia's international cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region with the disclosure of the main problems and threats for their expansion and deepening. The sub-region of East Asia was chosen as the main object of research, where the Russian Federation has significant interests in the fields of economics, politics and security.

The purpose of the study was to study the fundamental dynamics of relations between Russia and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region after the start of the CSO and to reveal the main prospects and threats of such cooperation for the Russian Federation.

Results and discussion.

It is no secret to anyone that modern international relations around the world are characterized by a certain instability and unpredictability. In this regard, states have to look for optimal ways to develop political and economic spheres, as well as ways to respond to global challenges and threats, as well as to the demands of the world community. Against the background of deteriorating international relations with the West and an increase in the number of sanctions, the Russian Government has intensified the search for political and economic allies in the East ^[9]. The main advantage of Russia's turn to the East in 2022 is that the vast majority of Russia's Asian partners turned out to be immune to external pressure from the West ^[10].

Despite its ambition, the East is quite a dangerous region. This is primarily due to nationalism in Northeast Asia, which is a strong political force and is supported by local governments. Since there is a possibility of a military conflict, China, India, Japan and South Korea are constantly modernizing their armed forces. In this regard, Yale University professor Thomas Graham argues that Russia needs to be careful when using the advantages of the East, minimizing the risks of major conflicts ^[11].

A significant aspect against the background of the reorientation to the East was the increasing influence and importance of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the PRC) in Russia's foreign policy. The parties officially define the current Russian-Chinese relations as partnership and strategic cooperation, moving to a new stage ^[12]. Thanks to the huge number of signed bilateral agreements, extensive economic ties have been established in the fields of energy, finance, infrastructure and trade, which contributes to improving mutual understanding on pressing issues of international politics and security, such as the Ukrainian crisis, the Syrian conflict, the problems of the South China Sea, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the US missile program in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia ^[13]. The fundamental component of the relationship between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China is trade and economic cooperation: according to official statistics, the trade turnover between China and Russia in 2023 reached $ 227.8 billion. Over the past 13 years, China has been Russia's main trading partner, while Russia rose to fourth place in the list of China's commercial partners in 2023. The governments of the two countries have set themselves the task of doubling the volume of trade turnover between them from $ 100 billion per year to $200 billion. until the end of 2024 ^[12]. Also, significant progress has been made in the field of military-technical cooperation, including the field of early warning of missile launches. Joint exercises of various types, including command and staff, naval, air force and anti-terrorist ones, are regularly held. Joint air and sea patrols in the Asia-Pacific basin and the Indian Ocean are an important part. In addition, agreements have been signed on major Chinese investments in the Russian infrastructure and energy sector. Cooperation with Beijing is successfully developing on multilateral platforms. Among the most successful cooperation institutions are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund, the BRICS Development Bank and the SCO Development Bank. Thus, the institutional framework of the new management system is beginning to form both at the regional and global levels ^{[13, 14]}.

At the same time, we should not forget that the Sino-Russian relations, although not unilateral, have become very asymmetric. This concerns, first of all, the established structure of trade and economic relations, which does not fully reflect the potential inherent in them. So, in addition to exporting hydrocarbons, the Russian Federation does not have another noticeable niche in the Chinese market. In fact, Moscow needs oil and gas exports to China more than Beijing ^[15]. The situation in the service sector and high technology is also disappointing. Even the launch of the Eastern Opening Strategy in 2022 could not compensate for the loss of Russia's access to Western technologies and capital markets. Due to the lack of economic levers of influence on Pyongyang, Moscow's position as an actor in resolving the situation on the Korean Peninsula has significantly weakened ^[13]. There are problems in other areas as well. For example, the investment sector also faces difficulties: the share of foreign direct investment from China in Russia has not increased since 2014 ^[16]. This is primarily due to the fact that the structural features of the Russian economy do not provide a sufficient basis for the implementation of a key role in the region as a whole. And Beijing will not just invest, especially in the face of global competition for Chinese investments. Therefore, one of the strategically important tasks remains the search for promising projects that could attract Chinese investors. From 2009 to 2018, the goals of the Cooperation Program between Northeast China, the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia were also not achieved ^[17]. In connection with the above, domestic experts are concerned that Russia may become heavily dependent on the Chinese market in the future. This makes Russia vulnerable to fluctuations in demand from Chinese enterprises and affects the volume and structure of Russian exports, where China already occupies a dominant position.

It should also be borne in mind that respect for each other's national interests does not always coincide in the context of pressing international policy issues. For example, Beijing has tools that would mitigate the impact of anti-Russian sanctions. However, the Chinese government does not intend to provoke the United States and the EU. Against the background of increasing American pressure on China due to cooperation with Moscow, Russian companies continue to face difficulties in business relations with Chinese counterparties ^[18]. In addition, Beijing refused to participate in a joint project to create a wide-body CR929 airliner ^[3]. At the same time, given the widening gap in the economic power of the two countries, Russia needs to be careful not to fall into the trap of bilateral relations in which China can become the dominant power. In this regard, Moscow needs to develop and deepen strong partnerships with all countries of the Asia-Pacific region, providing them with equal access to large domestic markets of the Russian Federation and natural resource wealth. From this point of view, India, which has already been included in many multilateral formats with the participation of Russia and China (SCO, RIC, BRICS), should remain an additional geopolitical pillar of Russia in Asia.

India is striving to develop strong relations with both Russia and the West so as not to become too dependent on one country. This is especially evident in her position on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Despite its desire to strengthen its ties with the United States, India refrains from voting in the UN condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine, despite pressure from Western allies ^[19].

Modern Russian-Indian relations are in the process of development. An important feature of these relations is the high intensity of political contacts. The last personal communication between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Russia took place at the SCO summit in Samarkand in 2022. The next meeting is scheduled for July 8-9, 2024. One of the key mechanisms for deepening cooperation between Russia and India is the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation ^[20]. In the 2023-2024 fiscal year, the trade turnover between India and Russia reached $65.7 billion, which is 33% more than in the previous fiscal year ^[21]. Russia ranks fourth among India's largest trading partners (after the United States, China and the United Arab Emirates), and second in terms of goods supplies, second only to China. Also, energy plays an important role in the Russian-Indian economic partnership: the first and second units of the Kudankulam NPP are successfully operating in the state of Tamil Nadu. In addition, industrial cooperation is an important incentive for the development of trade and economic ties. For example, chemical industry products account for 28% of Russian imports to India, half of which is accounted for by the pharmaceutical industry. Cooperation between Russian and Indian IT companies is also actively developing, including in the fields of telecommunications, cybersecurity, smart city technologies and artificial intelligence ^[21]. Recently, such areas as shipbuilding and space have been added to the sphere of cooperation. Of particular interest is the joint project between the Zvezda shipbuilding complex and the Indian company Mazagaon Dock Limited for the construction of new vessels for the Northern Sea Route ^[22].

Traditionally, military-technical cooperation remains a significant area of Russian-Indian cooperation. Up to and including 2020, India accounted for 23% of the total volume of Russian arms exports, while Russia provided 49% of Indian arms imports ^{[23, 24]}. Taking into account the events of recent years, India has diversified its defense purchases by increasing imports from the United States. At the same time, Moscow and Delhi continue to cooperate in projects such as BrahMos Aerospace, which operates on the basis of Russian equipment. The Indian government continues to maintain close ties with the Russian Federation against the background of the growing onslaught from China. In this regard, New Delhi implements a policy of "delicate balancing", seeking to maintain historically close relations with Russia and strengthening ties with Western powers as a counterweight to China to ensure its security ^[19].

As problems hindering the development of Russian-Indian relations, it should be noted that there is a disparity in trade between the countries in favor of Russia. India is striving to reduce the negative balance in trade with the Russian Federation through expanding the range of goods, which may lead to a reduction in the cost of contracts and a decrease in bilateral trade. Also, the unresolved problems of mutual settlement in the format of national currencies are a deterrent lever in increasing trade turnover. Since the transition of the calculation to the rupee-ruble format leads to a significant complication of ensuring trade relations. Logistics is also a serious problem: there are no land borders between the countries, and the regions lying between them are characterized by increased conflict. At the same time, the current international transport corridor "North-South" cannot cope with the volume of traffic, and the Vladivostok-Chennai sea line has not started working. Air traffic between the countries is also poorly developed ^[22].

One of the promising areas that unites the potential for the development of both bilateral and multilateral relations is Russia's cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter - ASEAN), which in 2018 reached the level of strategic partnership. ASEAN, as a collective partner, provides Russia with the opportunity to participate on equal terms in all key multilateral formats in which the Association has become a central link (the ASEAN Regional Security Forum, the East Asian Summit and the Meeting of ASEAN Defense Ministers with the main dialogue partners) ^[13]. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have become quite powerful regional actors. In this regard, Moscow is interested in developing and deepening economic relations with them and their neighbors as a counterweight to an increase in China's share in the Russian economy and trade balance.

Six years ago, the Russian Federation and the Association brought their relations to the level of strategic partnership, which reflects the desire of both countries to expand cooperation in various fields. Starting in 2021, a new stage of trade began between Moscow and the ASEAN countries, when the turnover reached $19 billion. Although this figure decreased in 2022, by the end of 2023, the parties reached the $20 billion mark ^[25]. In 2022, Russian exports to ASEAN countries reached the highest level in four years, and the volume of mutual investments between the countries has tripled over the past five years ^[26]. According to the Minister of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations of Myanmar, foreign direct investment from the Russian Federation to the Association countries amounted to $159 billion ^[27].

At the same time, against the background of the growing block confrontation between China and the United States, there is an aggravation of disagreements between the ASEAN countries. One of such pressing issues is the pro-Chinese position of Myanmar, which has come under pressure from the United States and its allies in the region ^[28]. Since 2022, the foreign policy of the Philippines has changed dramatically. Initially, the Philippine government announced its intention to establish relations with China. Further, the process of rapid restoration of US-Philippine relations took place. And on July 8, 2024, the Philippines and Japan signed a defense pact that will allow the countries to deploy troops on each other's territory for joint military exercises and humanitarian operations. Manila and Tokyo are long-time allies of the United States, strengthening their alliance with the forces of the countries of the region to counter the growing military power and influence of China in the region ^[29]. Of particular interest is the position of Vietnam, which has established strategic partnerships with both China and Japan and the United States, while maintaining complex Sino-Vietnamese relations ^[28].

The Ukrainian crisis has influenced the position of some ASEAN states towards Russia. The countries of the Association have polar different points of view of policy towards the Russian Federation. For example, Singapore has imposed restrictions on the Russian economy. In response to the refusal of Singapore logistics companies to work with Russian cargoes, Russia suspended fertilizer exports to ASEAN countries in 2022. On February 28, 2022, Philippine representatives expressed support for Singapore's position at a special session of the UN General Assembly. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei adhere to a more moderate and balanced position, without aggressive statements against Russia. Myanmar's military leadership openly supported Russia's actions, pointing out the importance of protecting security and sovereignty on Russia's western borders and preventing NATO's expansion to the East. Laos and Vietnam abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine ^[30]. In turn, Moscow continues to adhere to the point of view of the need to ensure the unity of ASEAN as an economic union and opposes any attempts to divide it.

The development of the economic integration of the Russian Federation with the countries of East Asia takes place against the background of "closed regionalism", the main criterion of which is geographical belonging to the region. This policy is most common in Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar and Singapore. The key concept in the policy of "closed regionalism" is the concept of "Asian values", which were opposed to Western liberal values. At the same time, economic modernization and socio-political development of Eastern societies can take place outside the Western path ^[31]. From this point of view, the Russian Federation, whose demography, economy and politics largely follow European models, has always been perceived by East Asian countries as a state whose key interests are concentrated in the West and did not fully correspond to the Asian powers ^[13]. In this regard, "from a historical and cultural point of view, it will always be difficult for Russia to build an interaction in Asia that is close in scale and spirit to that which exists in the South and West" ^[32].

Another problem for the development of close cooperation between the Russian Federation and the countries of this region are historical grievances. In some East Asian countries, there is a stereotype that Russia is to blame for their current problems. For example, in the South of Korea, Russia is blamed as the successor of the USSR for the tragedy of the Korean War and the split of the country, in the North – for refusing to provide unconditional support in the confrontation with the South ^[13]. We should also not overlook the fact that the Russian Federation does not have a solid niche in Asian markets, as well as insufficient experience in participating in great achievements in Asian economic integration structures. Given the current level of development of the Russian eastern regions, they are perceived as the periphery of East Asia, and Russia itself as a marginal regional player ^[33].

Thus, the Government of the Russian Federation, in the context of the "turn to the East" strategy, needs to pursue a meaningful and well-coordinated strategy based on the most effective use of available resources. In the meantime, despite the vast experience gained in the process of cooperation within regional organizations, as well as having positive results of cooperation with East Asian actors, the Russian side still does not have a full-fledged organizational, managerial, ideological and political base for its implementation.

Conclusion.

In the context of the difficult geopolitical situation of the Russian Federation, it is extremely important to analyze the political and economic risks associated with the Russian strategy of "turning to the East". The main goal of the course change is not only to increase the volume of trade and economic cooperation, but also to expand Russia's political and financial presence in the Greater Asia region. Currently, Russia's task is to attract foreign direct investment from this region and use the territories of advanced development to create new high-tech industries.

Although positive trends have been observed in recent years in changing relations between the Russian Federation and ASEAN, most members of the Association, in the context of strengthening cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, consider Russia not as an independent actor in the region, but as an ally of China. In order to get out of China's shadow and take an active position in the economic and political processes in this strategically important region, Russia needs to deepen and expand international relations with all Asian countries. In this context, it is important for the Russian Federation to diversify its economic partners and diversify its participation in multilateral projects within the framework of the Asia-Pacific region, ensuring mutual benefit. In this regard, the Government of the Russian Federation needs to develop long-term strategies for developing relations with major Asian partners on a bilateral basis. It is important for the Russian government to strengthen and expand existing ties with India, the DPRK, as well as the countries of Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.). The approach to them should be based on a clear understanding of the importance of each of these states for Russia's national interests.