Turkey's mediation as an attempt to integrate into the emerging multipolarity on the example of the Syrian, Libyan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukrainian conflicts

Mishin Lev ORCID: 0009-0003-5460-3931 Junior Researcher; Department of the Middle and Post-Soviet East; INION RAS 117418, Russia, Moscow, Nakhimovsky ave., 51/21 lev.darsik@mail.ru

The origins of Ankara's mediation efforts

In recent years, mediation has become one of Ankara's "business cards". In a more global sense, this became possible due to Turkey's limited resources, under which Ankara was forced to look for alternative ways to increase its own authority on the world stage ^[1]. This is especially important, given not only Ankara's supra-regional, but also global ambitions, which can be traced in R.T. Erdogan's famous book "A More Just World is Possible" ^[2], in which he put forward the concept of "A world greater than five", which meant a world greater than five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

In this concept, he formulated proposals for the reform of the UN Security Council, an important place among which was occupied by the expansion of the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. Of course, Turkey's desire to become a permanent member of the Security Council also occupies a special place in this. Such an initiative is only a denominator in the equation of emerging multipolarity. Ankara understands that without expanding diplomatic capabilities, it is not possible to realize not only supra-regional ambitions, but even global ones, which R.T. Erdogan dreams of.

Ankara's recent successes on the diplomatic track did not appear overnight, but were the result of Ankara's active activities in many regions of the world, primarily in Transcaucasia, the Middle East and Africa. In general, Turkey's need for active diplomatic actions, and, in particular, mediation, can also be traced in the book once by R.T. Erdogan's ally, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister A. Davutoglu "Strategic Depth"^[3], which laid down the principles of "initiative" and "humanitarian" (tour Girişimci ve insani) of the country's foreign policy, which was already mentioned by former Turkish Foreign Minister M. Cavusoglu^[4]. However, it is important to note that historically Turkey, like its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, is not able to be content with "second places", but claims key positions in the world, which deciphers the two principles of Turkish foreign policy listed above: all initiatives should be aimed at increasing the country's foreign policy weight.

Nevertheless, each of the cases discussed in the article presupposes an important condition – in each of these conflicts, Ankara supported one side or another in one way or another. In some cases, as in the examples of the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, the Turkish armed forces were directly involved – in fact, interventions were carried out on the territory of these states. In others, as was demonstrated during the Karabakh conflict, significant military and economic assistance was provided to one of the parties, as well as the provision of military advisers. Understanding these details will allow us to comprehensively understand the causes of failures and successes, as well as the impact on Ankara's foreign policy image.

Mediation in Syria

The Syrian case was one of the first examples of the dualism of Turkish mediation. So, despite the fact that at the very beginning of the events of the "Arab Spring" Ankara showed restrained rhetoric, by the end of 2011, beginning of 2012, R.T. Erdogan initiated active anti-Assad rhetoric, which was a response to the operation by the Syrian armed forces in the city of Hama, which the Turkish head of state called unacceptable and that Turkish patience has come to an end ^[5]. At this stage, Ankara generally shared NATO's point of view, which was to support the Syrian anti-government forces. Nevertheless, an important detail in this case is Ankara's resolute rejection of American support for Kurdish and pro-Kurdish formations, which forced it to further make adjustments to the general course of NATO in the Syrian conflict.

Speaking about Turkey's mediating role in the Syrian conflict, it is impossible to ignore the multiple military operations on the sovereign territory of Syria. Thus, the first of them was Operation Euphrates Shield, conducted in 2016, which was followed by a series of military operations, which resulted in the creation of a buffer zone in a large area of Northern Syria ^[6]. At the same time, in the territories occupied by Turkey, Ankara began the process of granting citizenship to the Turkish minority, which in Turkey was traditionally considered part of the united Turkish people, divided following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire ^[7]. In addition, these territories are used as a distribution point for Syrian refugees, of whom there are more than 3 million in Turkey ^[8], and whose presence in Turkey has been causing public discontent for several years.

Nevertheless, despite its active involvement in the fighting in Syria, Ankara co-founded the Astana Format, within the framework of which, together with Iran and Russia, noticeable prerequisites were created for the normalization of the situation in the region, as well as the potential normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations. It is important to note that official Damascus recognizes the Syrian regions controlled by Turkey as occupied ^[9] and demands a complete withdrawal of troops, which further complicates any mediation efforts, although it does not cancel them.

The creation of the Astana format became a kind of breakthrough in the issue of non-Western negotiation platforms, since by 2017 it became obvious that the West, led by the United States, was unable to make constructive proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict due to its own geopolitical interests in the region ^[10], whereas Russia, Iran and, to a certain extent, Turkey (recall that Ankara accepted the largest number of Syrian refugees) it was beneficial to establish stability in Syria. Ankara's participation in the Astana format has led not only to the fact that Turkey has become one of the mediators in the conflict, but also one of its active participants, capable of influencing the military-political balance of power in the region. One of Ankara's most striking successes in Astana was the establishment of joint patrols with Russia, as well as security control in one of the most hot spots in Syria – the Idlib enclave. Nevertheless, one of the key features of Turkish mediation manifested itself here – the search for opportunities to strengthen its own military and political positions in the region, which consisted in more flexible control of the Kurdish forces in Syria, which Turkey considers terrorist.

In addition, the benefit of the Astana process for Ankara was to formalize it as one of the guarantors of resolving the crisis and, at the same time, legalizing the location of its armed forces (although this did not concern the occupied territories in Northern Syria). In the modern history of Turkey, this was the first case of Ankara's participation in the peacekeeping process with the official status of one of the mediators in the conflict. In general, the Syrian case demonstrated to Ankara the possibility of resolving issues of national interests by force, especially when it comes to the Kurdish problem, which has historically been a key one for the Turkish state. In addition, it became obvious that even direct participation in the conflict does not prevent further mediation and participation in peace processes, which in a certain sense freed the hands of the Turkish leadership in subsequent cases. All this became a prologue for Ankara's full-scale actions to integrate into the emerging multipolar world.

The Libyan case

The Libyan case, in general, is in tune with what could be seen in Syria a few years earlier. Nevertheless, the example of Libya has further exposed the contradictions in the context of Ankara's mediation capabilities. First of all, this is due to direct intervention in the conflict and the support of one of the parties (Ankara supports the Government of National Accord), moreover, starting in January 2020, Ankara introduced a limited contingent of its fleet into the waters of Libya, provided military advisers to the NTC, and also, according to some media reports, employees of the NTC fought on the side of the NTC a large Turkish PMCs Sadat ^[11], which is associated personally with R.T. Erdogan. The argument to justify the support of the Government of National Accord in Tripoli was the recognition of this government by the UN, even though it controlled only a small part of the territory of the once unified Libya.

Separately, it should be noted that Ankara not only supported one of the parties to the conflict, but also went against a number of NATO allies: France and the United States, which at certain stages provided indirect support to the actions of the main opponent of the NTC, Khalifa Haftar, who is the head of the Libyan National Army ^[12]. At the same time, according to various media reports, as well as according to the report of the UN Group of Experts, the Turkish flotilla located off the coast of Libya shot down several reconnaissance drones of countries that supported Khalifa Haftar ^[13].

In addition, the roots of such an active position in support of the NTC can be traced in the memorandum signed shortly before these events in 2019 with the NTC on the delimitation of maritime spaces. The ambiguity of this agreement was that in this agreement Turkey and Libya (represented by the NTC) recognized each other as countries with opposite coasts. In addition to the unusual nature of such an agreement, concluded at the height of the civil war, the memorandum contradicted geography – for Libya, Greece is the country with the opposite coast according to the international classification. In addition, according to the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, the Greek islands of Crete and Rhodes were deprived of the right to form maritime zones around themselves ^[14].

Against this background, Ankara's mediation initiatives did not meet with much support on the world stage, nevertheless, during the Astana process, a potential settlement was discussed between representatives of Russia and Turkey, but no significant results were achieved ^[15]. In this context, it is important to note that Russia and Turkey support opposing sides in the Libyan conflict, which, although the Libyan case is related to the Syrian one, it is important to note a different degree of tension within the framework of the two conflicts.

Summing up the consideration of the Libyan case, it can be stated that this conflict is the least representative as an example of Ankara's mediation efforts. First of all, this was made possible thanks to Turkey's most active participation in the conflict on one of its sides. At the same time, Ankara supports a less popular side in the international arena, which limits its already weak mediation potential in this conflict, taking into account all the introductory ones. This was demonstrated during the negotiations on the sidelines of the Astana process, during which no common ground was found with another player claiming to mediate in the Libyan conflict – Russia.

The Karabakh case

The Karabakh case is unique in its essence. The allied relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, framed in the unofficial motto "One people – two states", add to its uniqueness, which, until 2020 and the Second Karabakh War, manifested itself only in cultural, economic and administrative initiatives, but with the outbreak of the conflict, the interaction of the two states acquired an open military connotation ^[16]. Thus, among the most striking examples, one can note the supply of Turkish weapons to the Azerbaijani army, among which the Bayraktar-TB2 UAV was particularly famous ^[17], which managed to be decisive in the battles against the armed forces of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, as well as the armed forces of Armenia in conditions of air defense shortage ^[18].

Given these facts, the mediation case in this particular conflict, as mentioned above, is unique. By the time of the end of the Second Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani side had indicated its own preferences in mediators: Russia and Turkey ^[19]. Nevertheless, special preference was given to Russia, where the heads of Armenia and Azerbaijan met for the first time and were able to come to an agreement on a truce with the direct participation of the President of Russia ^[20].

This development has caused misunderstanding in the Turkish media. Particular indignation could be traced in the pro-government media Hürriyet and Yeni Şafak ^[21], which often broadcast the position of the Turkish leadership from the ruling Justice and Development Party. Many experts explained this step by Baku as an attempt to balance the increased influence of Ankara, which it received due to the unprecedented support of Azerbaijan during the war, as well as its actual penetration into almost all spheres of life in Azerbaijan, and, first of all, into the military sphere, in which, according to the assurances of a number of media outlets, there was a galaxy of regular Turkish officers who advised the Azerbaijani army during the Second Karabakh War.

The Karabakh case was the first example of the limited success of Ankara's mediation, if not its failure. The cornerstone of this was Turkey's excessive involvement in the conflict. In fact, it was demonstrated for the first time that Ankara can be "pushed" into the background of the mediation process if the object of these efforts considers Ankara's influence excessive. In this particular case, we can confidently state one of the first full-scale clashes between Turkey and the emerging polycentricity, in which even small actors are able to balance between regional and supra-regional powers.

The Ukrainian case

The Ukrainian case of Turkish mediation can be called the culmination of all Ankara's initiatives tested in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, the key difference from previous attempts at Turkish mediation was the proposal of peacekeeping initiatives, as well as negotiation platforms almost immediately after the outbreak of the conflict ^[22]. It is important to take into account that in this particular case, for the first time, Ankara was not and at the time of the fall of 2024 was not involved as a party to the conflict (even taking into account the open support of Ukraine, as well as the provision of limited assistance to it).

It is worth noting that Ankara in this case made active attempts to act as a mediator even before the outbreak of hostilities. So, on February 23, 2022, during a telephone conversation with V. Putin, the President of Turkey stressed that the complication of the current situation "is not beneficial to anyone" ^[23]. Eventually, an agreement was reached to hold talks during the Diplomatic Forum in Antalya (March 11-13), as well as in Istanbul (March 29).

Nevertheless, the most significant event in these events was the so-called Istanbul negotiations ^[24], during which viable prerequisites for concluding a peace treaty were worked out between the delegations of Russia and Ukraine, but the intervention of the United Kingdom and the United States put an end to these initiatives and prolonged the fighting. Over the next two years, Turkish politicians noted in a number of interviews that it was the intervention of third countries that not only crossed out the almost completed agreement, but also shook Ankara's mediation efforts, which resulted in a further decline in Turkey's role ^[25].

Despite these facts, Russia and Ukraine have once again chosen Turkey as an intermediary to solve the food crisis that broke out in the world due to the cessation of supplies of Ukrainian and Russian grain. Given Russia's desire to establish food supplies to the poorest countries of the world, Ankara's offer to become an intermediary was met positively by both the Ukrainian and Russian sides. The failure of the Istanbul talks in the spring of 2022 did not cause disappointment in the eyes of the conflicting parties, as Ankara has established itself as the most restrained member of NATO and occupies a neutral (with reservations) position towards the conflict.

The initial success of the deal helped Ankara to receive additional political dividends, as well as to fuel the election campaign of R.T. Erdogan. Nevertheless, due to the fault of the Ukrainian side, the grain deal was curtailed, which to a certain extent undermined Turkey's mediation authority. In addition, a certain degree of responsibility for the failure of the grain deal was assigned to Ankara. According to Russian media reports, it was not uncommon for military vessels and the military contingent of Ukraine to pass under the guise of food tankers, which predetermined Russia's non-extension of the grain deal ^[26].

The failure of the grain deal launched the process of Moscow's gradual abandonment of intermediary services. The point of no return in this matter was the release in July 2023 of the militants of the national battalion "Azov" (recognized as an extremist organization in the Russian Federation), bypassing the agreements reached with Russia on their stay in Turkey until the end of the conflict. Despite this, President R.T. Erdogan decided to transfer them to the Ukrainian side, which, in fact, led to the justified skepticism of the Russian side towards any mediation initiatives of Ankara ^[27].

From that moment on, any statements by the president, as well as top officials of Turkey, were met with restrained skepticism from Moscow, although the subsequent reaction to a direct violation of the agreement did not lead to a crisis in Russian-Turkish relations, it undermined confidence in Ankara.

Conclusion

To summarize, the following should be highlighted. First, the Turkish peacekeeping initiatives were the development of ideas developed by A. Davutoglu and R.T. Erdogan, formulated in two key principles of Turkey's foreign policy: initiative and humanity. Special attention is drawn to the humanitarian nature of Turkey's foreign policy, the generally accepted definition of which contrasts with Ankara's actions in the international arena. First of all, we are talking about the direct intervention or support of one of the parties associated with peacekeeping initiatives, which cannot but enter into a semantic contradiction. This contradiction is clearly demonstrated by the lack of significant results in conflict resolution. On the contrary, it can be stated that Ankara's peacekeeping efforts not only do not bring significant constructive results, but also in some cases provoke further deterioration of the situation, which can be traced to the example of the Ukrainian and Libyan cases: if in the first, due to the violation of its own agreements with one of the parties to the conflict, the credit of trust was de facto lost, issued by Moscow to Ankara for conducting peacekeeping and mediation initiatives, which could not but add tension around the crisis. The Libyan case showed that Ankara is ready to put its own regional interests above the need for peace.

The Syrian and Nagorno-Karabakh cases have demonstrated that Ankara is capable of resorting to direct deployment of troops into the territory of a sovereign state, and, moreover, being able to occupy the territory. As for the Karabakh case, it demonstrated Turkey's willingness not only to provide wide-scale support to its allies, but also to claim a mediating role in this conflict.

Formulating the term "Turkish mediation", it can be stated that the Turkish version of peacekeeping initiatives always involves the choice of one of the parties. All the examples given in the work clearly show the dualism of the emerging multipolar world and the place of the Turkish Republic in it. Turkey continues to pursue a "two-track" policy, trying to get dividends from all sources, even if it is necessary to take contradictory steps to get them. Nevertheless, the 4 cases reviewed show that at the present stage Ankara is not able to achieve all the benefits in the peacekeeping and mediation field. Thus, the set goal and tasks of the work can be considered completed.