Conceptualization of everyday life in philosophy of M. Heidegger and R. Barthes

Samoylova Yana Vladimirovna ORCID: 0009-0007-4996-4571 Postgraduate student; Department of the History of Anthropological Doctrines; Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Russia, Moscow, Goncharnaya str., 12x1 y.v.samoylova13@gmail.com

Introduction

During the twentieth century, social and humanitarian thought suddenly turns from the study of key historical events such as revolutions and wars to the study of "everyday life". Until the beginning of the twentieth century, such a subject as "everyday life" was considered unworthy for serious scientific research, therefore philosophy became the theoretical justification for changing the field of research. E. Husserl made the concept of "life world" one of the central ones in his later works "Cartesian Meditations" ^[9] and "The Crisis of European Sciences and transcendental phenomenology" ^[10]. Later, phenomenological sociology, mainly in the person of A. Schutz, will create its own concept of everyday life ^{[25, 26]}, based on Husserl's "life world". Influenced by Schutz, Berger and Lukman will write one of their most significant works, "The Social Construction of Reality" ^[5], in which they assert everyday life as a reality of the highest order in human consciousness ^[27].

Everyday life has become for the most part a sociological tool, nevertheless, there is a feeling that sociological concepts of everyday life are trying to assess everyday life itself ^[7]. Although history, sociology and cultural studies have appropriated "everyday life" for themselves, this does not mean that "everyday life" has never been the interest of philosophers.

The purpose of this work is to establish the influence of the philosophical understanding of "everyday life" on European sociological and cultural thought in the twentieth century.

One of Husserl's students, Martin Heidegger, dealt with the issue of everyday life in his main work "Being and Time". It is believed that Heidegger had a negative attitude towards everyday life, associating it with an inauthentic existence and das Man ^{[13, 20]}. This conclusion is based on the first part of "Being and Time", which is devoted to the inauthentic existence of Dasein. And in the lecture "What is metaphysics?" Heidegger contrasts scientific knowledge with everyday perception of the world. But in this text, the concept of "everyday life" has a different meaning than in "Being and Time". In the context of "What is metaphysics?" everyday life, rather, acquires the meaning of everyday life ^{[24, pp. 16-17]}. Heidegger nowhere calls everyday life itself bad, destructive, worthless, etc., moreover, he does not give any value judgment of everyday life as such. Of course, "Being and Time" is not an easy job and sometimes ambiguous, it contains not just "everyday life", but also "average everyday life", "everyday life", "everyday life", "everyday life to death".

Therefore, the first part of this article will focus on the analysis of "everyday life" in the work "Being and Time" in order to clarify why the author believes that everyday life is Dasein's being and refute the opinion about Heidegger's negative attitude to everyday life.

The second part of the article will focus on an equally important figure of twentieth—century philosophy, Roland Barthes. At first glance, it cannot be said that everyday life was among the interests of French structuralism, and even more so was a problem or a question for them. But the situation in France in the 1950s and 1960s haunted Bart, and in this regard, for the first time, everyday life begins to bother him as a matter of course, which acquires the meaning of a myth dictated by bourgeois ideology, mass culture and consumer society. French structuralism, represented by Barthes' philosophy, is driven by the idea of separating everyday life from itself, or at least from what it tries to pretend to be ^{[29, p. 293]}. Since Barth's reflections on everyday life are embedded in the corpus of his main philosophical ideas and are not explicitly overlooked, we will try to detect and trace them more clearly.

The views and reflections on everyday life of Heidegger and Barth sometimes overlap and complement each other. Perhaps there is much more in common between these two philosophers than it might seem.

Heidegger's Apology for Everyday Life

The question of everyday life for Heidegger is ontological and existential in the sense in which he understands phenomenology and hermeneutics ^{[16, pp. 221-222]}. In Heidegger's philosophy, and more specifically in his early work "Being and Time", everyday life is no less important than Dasein, and to some extent they are inseparable from each other. Therefore, further consideration and analysis of Heidegger's understanding of everyday life will be built around Dasein. In this article, concepts such as Dasein and das Man will not be translated ^{[17, pp. 244-246]}, except for their references in quotations as "presence" and "people", using Bibikhin's translation of "Being and Time" ^[23].

In general, everyday life can be understood as "average ways of existence" ^{[23, p. 370]}, that is, this is the way and kind of being Dasein, in which it persists and exists every day. This is an a priori ontological condition for the existence of Dasein, so not everything is so clear in understanding everyday life.

To begin with, let's clarify a few important conditions regarding the existence of Dasein. Firstly, in addition to the fact that Dasein is somehow immersed in everyday life, he is always in the "world" and in relation to him as being-in-the-world, that is, this is a kind of relationship and interaction of Dasein with the world, his attitude, openness and disposition to it. In this way, as being-in-the-world, the things that touch and care about Dasein appear to him. He uses them as handymen, which are just for him out of all other things. Secondly, Dasein exists and is in the world not alone, but with other Dasein of the same kind. Heidegger calls this mode being-with-others. And thirdly, this is the existential das Man. Bibikhin translates this concept as "people", but these are not any specific people, but someone impersonal and anonymous.

This brings us to a conversation about two ways of Dasein's existence or existence — authentic and inauthentic, or one's own and improper. Das Man refers to an inauthentic way of existence, which is characterized by the loss of a person's self. Russian Russian It is important to note that the linguistic construct of combining a certain neuter article "das" with the indefinite pronoun "Man" in Russian rather corresponds to the meaning of the Russian word "all" in sentences of an exculpatory nature: "everyone ran", "everyone jumped". Thus, Heidegger emphasizes the improper existence of Dasein, through immersion and dissolution in das Man, and the removal of responsibility for his behavior and making any decisions that occur in an inauthentic existence "with a fundamental regard for certain "Other" people" ^{[17, p. 248]}.

Here it is necessary to make a remark about the fundamental difference between the Russian and German mentality in relation to the statement "to do like everyone else". In German, this is a recommendation in an ethical and practical sense, which has a positive connotation, and it is ultimately associated with the validity of the categorical imperative and the famous "Order" (das Ordnung). In Russian, the main emphasis has always been on the recommendation to "live with your mind."

For Heidegger, the question of authentic and inauthentic existence is also related to the question of time. When Dasein is in the mode of inauthentic existence, time is in some sense infinite for him, "because it is based on something other than the Self (Selbst) of a person" ^{[15, p. 279]}, in contrast to genuine existence, when Dasein is aware of his own mortality and is limited by it, therefore "authentic" time is finite, but a person's life is within the time limits of birth and death.

Interestingly, Heidegger uses everyday life or even average daily life to describe das Man and such an average everyday inauthentic way of Dasein's existence. Then the question arises about the meaning of such an everyday life in which Dasein dissolves into das Man, exists in a mode of inauthenticity, having lost himself? Although it sounds very tempting to draw a conclusion about everyday life as something that hinders and leads Dasein away from genuine existence, as some researchers do, but first let's consider the phenomenon of falling as "the basic image of everyday life" ^{[23, p. 175]}.

Heidegger concludes that falling as a phenomenon does not carry any negative connotation, it is to some extent natural and inevitable for Dasein, especially when it comes to being-with-others and being-in-the-world. Russian Russian might be more accurate to use the word "hit" instead of "fall", because "fall" in Russian has a negative connotation in both religious and practical senses). Firstly, the fall is not a "fall from grace", that is, not the state into which Dasein falls and overcomes it. Secondly, where Dasein falls is the "world" itself, which "implies dissolution into being-with-each other" ^{[23, p. 175]}. Moreover, it is an indicator of the ability to be in the world, albeit in the mode of an inauthentic existence of Dasein ^{[23, p. 179]}. That is, on the one hand, the fall refers to an inauthentic existence (and with the help of it Heidegger reveals an inauthentic existence in a new light) and thereby takes Dasein away from himself. It always tempts Dasein to hide from himself in das Man. But, on the other hand, the fall is not overcome, even being in the mode of the true existence of Dasein, it remains as a fact of the already fallen Dasein. For greater clarity, we can consider the fall as a metaphor, then the fall symbolizes the birth and formation of a person in a society in which self-loss occurs, while a person will remain in the structure throughout his life. It is the fall of man that "exposes the essential ontological structure" ^{[23, p. 179]}, in which a person feels himself in everyday life together with others.

The "others" with whom daily interaction takes place also differ in Russian and German reality. Russian Russian Bibikhin, translating the word Dasein, used the Russian concept of "presence", which correlates with the bureaucratic place of interaction of citizens among themselves in the XIX century, thereby emphasizing the unavoidability of the state principle from the "everyday life" of Russian life. While in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century, the communal traditions of self-government are still strong, of what was once designated by Fichte as the "Gemeinschaft".

Thus, we have established that, staying in everyday life, Dasein "falls" or falls into the "world" of das Man. And then everyday life acquires the status of an average daily life for Dasein, in which he exists inauthentically and hides himself from himself. But the main task of Dasein is the transition to the mode of authentic existence or the disclosure of one's self. Nevertheless, das Man is such an everyday way of Dasein's existence that it takes his inauthentic existence to some extreme, and Dasein has the opportunity to open up in a genuine existence and find himself. But what can Dasein do to find a genuine existence — to escape from everyday life, to separate himself from das Man? Authentic existence is not going beyond reality or any kind of enlightenment, but a modified way of Dasein's existence, in which everyday life and das Man are preserved, only Dasein begins to interact with them in a different way.

That is, "Dasein does not have any hidden essence, located as if on the other side" ^{[4, p. 188]}, but there is an inner unique potential and self that were hidden by the fall, but not destroyed. And the disclosure of one's true existence then "is not the elimination, but only the modification of the improper" ^{[4, p. 190]}. With this, Heidegger is trying to point out that changes are taking place in consciousness.

Misunderstandings about Heidegger's "everyday life" arise from the different contexts in which it is used: everyday life as the average daily routine of inauthentic existence in das Man or everyday life is an a priori condition of Dasein's existence. This is all true of everyday life. The author believes that Heidegger's everyday life comes in three meanings. Firstly, it is indeed an a priori condition for the existence of Dasein, that is, it is everyday life as such, the existence of which we accept virtually and unconditionally. At the same time, everyday life as such is a kind of horizon of possibilities for different modes of Dasein existence. "The monotony of everyday life takes for a change what the day presents every time. Everyday life determines the presence even when it has not chosen people as its "heroes" ^{[23, p. 371]}. Secondly, everyday life as such acquires the meaning of "average everyday life" in an inauthentic existence and averages Dasein as referring to das Man. Thirdly, everyday life as such acquires the meaning of everyday life to death in a genuine existence and continues to preserve Dasein in itself. In this regard, Heidegger specifically points out that "existence itself is not something that soars above the falling routine, but existentially it is only a modified mastery of the latter" ^{[23, p. 179]}.

And as for das Man, he also does not disappear anywhere with genuine existence, but again acquires a different meaning for Dasein. "The self's own being does not rest on the exclusive status of the subject separated from people, but there is an existential modification of people as an essential existential" ^{[23, p. 130]}. That is, Dasein's authentic existence inevitably collides with das Man, because this is an a priori category of his existence, which reveals Dasein's authentic existence, awareness of his finiteness in being-in-the-world, which exists as an inauthentic "I" with them. Thus, genuine existence is the mode of existence that comes after an average daily existence.

This brings us to the most important conversation for Heidegger about authentic existence, which is characterized by being-to-death. The problem of human death is such that a person can never face his own death, or rather, we cannot realize and experience it when it has already happened. Therefore, death as a semi—mythical being - everyone had heard about it, in a distant way it could touch like the death of another, but no one "saw" it as their own. Death is a distant fact, but never accomplished for Dasein. Das Man imposes on Dasein that death will not overtake him, at least for now. It is a constant reassurance that death is far away, although we all live with death breathing down our backs. "People give the right, and strengthen the temptation, to hide from themselves their very being towards death. The hiding avoidance of death dominates everyday life so stubbornly that in being-with-each-other "neighbors" it is often explained to the "dying" that he will escape death and then immediately return to the calmed daily routine of his preoccupied world" ^{[23, p. 253]}. That is, even on his deathbed, the thought of death is not acceptable. This naive utopia about immortality and the meaninglessness of life lies at the heart of inauthentic existence and characterizes das Man. But the path to true existence lies precisely through the awareness of one's own mortality, finiteness, freeing oneself from the mind-numbing das Man. Only death can motivate a person to live through the disclosure of his self and potential, and not just exist in the routine routine of das Man and vegetate everyday life. For a genuine Dasein, the future is always more important, because this is the "possibility" of fulfillment, being-to, this is being to the possibilities of a person and a kind of anticipation, "stepping forward". And when a person decides to take this step forward, he realizes his finiteness. "Whenever we decide on something, we realize our finiteness (Endlichkeit). Determination shows us our finiteness as "temporality" ^{[15, p. 279]}.

Russian Russians also need to pay attention to the different attitudes towards death in the Russian and German public consciousness, which has found expression in the well-known position that fatalism is characteristic of Russians. Neither a Russian nor a German lives for death. In this case, we are talking about the difference in answering the question "why live?". In the German public consciousness, the answer to it is the position, "you need to live like everyone else." From the point of view of Protestantism, "God as judge" will make a true decision about the righteousness or unrighteousness of a life lived. In Russian religious consciousness, the divine nature of the human soul itself, its personal origin, has always been emphasized, therefore the very fact of realizing mortality did not play the role that was attributed to it in Western Christianity. For the Russian consciousness, the meaning of life is to "live in a divine way, for love, and we will all be in heaven, by virtue of divine love and mercy." Essentially, by the fact of realizing his mortality, Heidegger urges the German reader to turn to the personal principles of his soul, combining philosophical discourse with theological.

In relation to this, L. Tolstoy had the opposite position, believing that awareness of death is the opposite of genuine life. "By According to Tolstoy, the ability of a living being to accept death and come to terms with it is in inverse proportion to his awareness of his uniqueness and uniqueness" ^{[12, p. 12]}.

H. Arendt also critically disagrees with Heidegger regarding the view of death as a path to the true state of Dasein and, conversely, argues that anticipating death only connects Dasein more strongly with das Man ^{[22, p. 157]}. After all, Heidegger did not realize how close he himself had come to Plato, who showed that "this teaching actually stems ... from the opinion of the majority" [Cit. according to: 22, p. 157].

We started with the fact that everyday life is "average ways of existence" ^{[23, p. 370]} and at some point it seemed that this average everyday life was read in a negative light by Heidegger, as a space of inauthentic human existence. But upon closer reading, it becomes clear that the "average" does not refer to everyday life itself, but to the way of existence in it. And everyday life itself, in the meaning of the average, rather indicates a certain horizon of possibilities for human existence. So Heidegger's everyday life, to some extent, on the contrary, acquires the status of being, or, more precisely, everyday life is the being of Dasein, and not an insignificant routine. Heidegger writes: "Everyday life is, after all, precisely being "between "birth and death" ^{[23, p. 233]}, which again indicates ontological belonging to Dasein. Everyday life itself is the same, in the sense of its permanence and factuality, but it can be revealed and grasped by a person in different ways, depending on which way of existence he has chosen, that is, changes occur in human consciousness in relation to constant daily life.

Interestingly, when reading Bibikhin's translation, we encounter not only everyday life, but also everyday life, the latter just refers to an inauthentic mode of existence, while everyday life refers to a genuine mode of existence, although, in my opinion, in some places there is confusion and ambiguous reading, especially when "average" is added or "average existence".

Heidegger conceived "Being and Time" as a fundamental ontological work that aims to identify Being, at least that's what he means at the beginning of the work. But it is impossible to get rid of the feeling that ideological and political overtones are present. In principle, it is clear why such a feeling is created, given the historical context in which "Being and Time" was written. Because das Man is not just "people", it is an unsuccessful translation of the faceless mass. The masses, in the sense of the crowd, which later structuralists would call mass culture. In many ways, we can consider the average existence and das Man as Heidegger's criticism and contempt for some forms of modern civilization ^{[30, p. 755]}.

In the middle of the twentieth century, first history (M. Blok ^[6], L. Fevre ^[21], E. L. R. Laduri ^[14]) and anthropology (Boas school ^{[11, p. 16]}), and then cultural studies (K. Geertz) turned to the topics outlined by Heidegger. Very characteristic in this regard was the work of K. Girtz, describing the disruption of the traditional funeral rite in the small town of Mojokuto on the island of Java, which led to public unrest on this Indonesian island, as a result of the state's misunderstanding of the practice of ritual communication between the Muslim and Buddhist communities ^{[8, pp. 168-200]}.

In this regard, French structuralism takes the conversation about everyday life to a new level, no longer hiding that everyday life has become an instrument of political and ideological control. Roland Barthes, as one of the most prominent representatives of French structuralism, to some extent takes the next step and takes the discourse about everyday life to a new level in his work "How to live together: Romantic simulations of some spaces of everyday life." If this work is considered a kind of continuation of Heidegger, then Barth moves on to the question of how to live together with a truly and inauthentically existing Dasein as being-together-with-others, when the cloud of ideological and political das Man continues to control everyday life. After all, Bartowski Dasein is a subject who also feels a sense of loneliness, has certain needs and desires, and most importantly, to find a sense of place.

Bart: A different everyday life

Everyday life began to attract Roland Barthes when he realized that the reality in which everyone lives is actually not the one that the press and art give it to us for. Everyday life has become a new object of political and ideological control. Thus, in the preface to the "Mythologies", Barth sets himself the goal of "revealing the ideological deception" that lurks in the self-evident [everyday life] ^{[2, p. 47]}. Barth's cultural and ideological criticism was aimed at understanding everyday life in France and mass culture. But, after revealing the mythologized modernity, Bart does not stop in his reflections and develops his criticism in order to change the daily life of a person. Now, for Bart, everyday life is interesting to the extent that it can be changed. He "never stopped hypothesizing and fantasizing about how things could have been different —different than in his alienated and class-torn society" ^{[31, p. 2]}. This is how Bart comes to utopia, as an opportunity to bring changes to everyday life. He finds this in the analysis of the utopias of Sade, Fourier, and Loyola: "the distinguishing feature of utopia is the everyday; or else, everything everyday is utopian: schedules, food programs, clothing designs, furniture arrangement, instructions regarding conversations or communication" ^{[3, p. 27]}.

Barth's analysis of everyday life begins as a critique of the mythologies of everyday life and continues in a utopian restoration of the random texture of "life". For Bart, it is important not only to show the contrast between an idealized reality and an unsatisfactory reality, but to reveal an abnormal, absurdly driven human desire to conform to everyday life and its microtextures. The apogee of the disclosure of the structures of everyday life occurs in the work "How to live together: Romantic simulations of some spaces of everyday life" ^[1], which is a collection of his lectures delivered at the College de France.

Bart has built his lecture course in the form of rows of "traits", this helps not only to focus on a specific topic, but also to establish connections between different topics. Therefore, in this article we do not follow any clear sequence of "traits", but consider how it seems appropriate for the author to arrange and link them in this case. Bart gives his listeners and readers the opportunity to reflect on certain topics themselves and build their own meanings on this framework, so we will try to do this.

At the very beginning of the course, Bart makes a certain installation, where he explains the method and concepts that he will use to analyze "life together". One of such important concepts is "idiorrhythmie". It means its own unique rhythm, its own speed and at the same time utopian space, something that maintains a distance that allows the unique rhythms of different lives to exist next to each other. Rhythm in itself, of course, implies individuality, but this is not enough for Bart, therefore, to emphasize the individual characteristics of refined forms of life, such as "moods, unstable configurations, swings from depression to exaltation; in a word, it is the very opposite of a sharp cadence, merciless in its regularity" ^{[1, p. 52]} he adds "idios" ("idios" from ancient Greek — private, own).

The title "How to live together" is rather a question for Bart. That is, how to live together when everyone has a different life and the rhythm of its living? Therefore, Barth's fantasy is the idea of a kind of ideal balance of living alone and together. In this regard, the continuation of the title "Romantic simulations of some spaces of everyday life" indicates Barth's reflections on the spaces of everyday life that are suitable for living alone and together with another/others.

Barth's concern for the issue of everyday life, lifestyle and idiorrhythmies permeates through all the work. Already in the first section of "Akedia" he describes the state of dissatisfaction with his own daily routine. Even, perhaps, it would be more accurate to say, dissatisfaction with a routine lifestyle that makes everyday life unbearable ^{[1, pp. 72-73]} (the description of this condition is similar to Heidegger's inauthentic existence of Dasein). But unlike the state of Xeniteia, which indicates the loss of its place in everyday life as a whole, this is a feeling when you want to walk away, pull away, because there is nothing to do here ^{[1, p. 234]}, Akedia is still not such a categorical state. Despite the fact that this daily routine is nasty and routine, a person still continues to arrive in it.

Reflecting on the possibilities of living together, everyday life is crucial for Bart. Because for a person, everyday life is not just a living environment in the sense of space, but also interaction with others in this space, that is, a person as an everyday subject. Let's reflect on the interaction in everyday life, idiorrhythmia, subjectivity and individuals. What I think will be an interesting and logical addition to the "idiorrhythmic interaction" is the influence or adjustment to the rhythm, adopting the rhythm of another. What makes the idiorrhythm of a particular person really unique is identity — the interests, desires, values of an individual, and in this case, adopting, adjusting to the rhythm of another is revealed in the light of mass culture and consumer society (the author writes about this in more detail in his article ^[18]). Idiorrhythmia in the Bartovian sense can be compared with a lifestyle (see the author's article: The concept of "lifestyle" in the social sciences and humanities // Ideas and Ideals. No. 1. 2025). After all, there is a certain rhythm in the style (it can be artistic rhythmicity, manifested in shape, color, size, dynamics), but also style is consistency and elements that combine well with each other, rhythm (whatever rhythm we are talking about — musical or vital) also has a certain sequence of bars.

Now let's try to combine the idea of adopting the rhythm of another with two images of Bart's society — a flock and an anthill. He writes: "The image of a flock is a common image of an anthill society. In the anthill: universal, all-encompassing bureaucratic training (no matter what kind of system: mass culture in capitalist societies = a sketch of the same anthill society; television is our ant appendix), ≠ Flock: collective transmission to each other, synchronously and instantly, tastes, pleasures, fashion and fear. Flock: the image is more terrible than an anthill. Anthill: equalization of individuals, mechanization of social functions. The pack: the elimination of subjectivity, the training of affects that are completely balanced" ^{[1, p. 96]}. That is, in the anthill there is a process of gradual tuning of rhythms or the initial creation of harmonious idiorrhythms. In the pack, it is a complete "demolition" of the existing idiorrythm and the imposition of a new one. If idiorrhythmia is related to a person's identity, then, in the case of a pack, it will be a complete "undermining" and "demolition" of identity.

Barth believes that group idiorrhythmia can exist only if there is a common goal for this group, there must be an experience of group life, the consolidation of individual idiorrhythms into one group. But for such cohesion, there must be some patterns, so Bart comes to the rules and says that "the favorite space of the rule = idiorrhythmia" ^{[1, p. 221]}. There are good and bad rules. That is, the rule, as he writes, can be ethical, as a kind of prescription and recommendation, the purpose of which is to "make life and everyday life transparent" ^{[1, p. 220]}. Thus, one of the important conditions for different people with different idiorrhythms to live together in common everyday life is the rules, since they regulate the interaction of different subjects and their rhythms. But there is always an irresistible desire to turn rules into regulations, because "the attraction to the law remains in a person," then the regulations become an ideological tool and there is an "imposition of sociality as power" ^{[1, p. 221]}, thereby slamming everyday life as an idiorrhythmic space of interaction between subjects.

To feel this difference between a rule and a regulation, Bart gives an example from the utopia of the Garden. The rule is based on some kind of mutual agreement, when one is ready to fulfill it, knowing that someday the same thing will be done for him in return (therefore, the rule is ethical). While the regulation is more of an imposed law, there is no mutual agreement in it, it works for the masters as such a one-sided rule. Perhaps, by this distinction between rules and regulations, Barth is once again trying to point out and criticize the modern political and ideological structure of everyday life that bothers him.

There is some parallel between the rule and the regulation, and the genuine and inauthentic existence of Dasein. That is, when Dasein exists inauthentically, it is as if he lives according to the regulations imposed on him by the set of prescriptions of das Man. In inauthentic existence, the rules work for das Man, unlike genuine existence, when Dasein is aware of his self, others and his finiteness, then the rules that he observes also become conscious, as part of his own attitudes, values and desires. Also, with genuine existence, everyday life also acquires the meaning of meaning for Dasein, as for Barth — the meaning of the rules is to make everyday life transparent ^{[1, p. 220]}.

This is how Bart connects idiorrhythmia, everyday life and rules. But it is also important for us that he connects the rules with the territory, saying that any system of rules is a territory ^{[1, p. 218]}. That is, everyday life is divided into territories or independent subspaces by rules where the subject observes a certain rhythm. Each subspace, endowed with special rules, has its own time, schedule and a certain code of conduct, which are determined by the identity of its inhabitant.

This brings us to the conversation about the relationship between space and the person in it. Space obeys and at the same time reflects the rhythm of its inhabitant, thus, the subject subordinates space to himself and makes it his own kind of habitat. Moreover, Barth insists that one's own space is a prerequisite for idiorrhythmia ^{[1, p. 113]}. That is, space has several meanings for the subject — it is a special place of its own, which obeys the idiorrhythm of the subject, reflects his identity, and also allows him to protect himself from others and be at one with himself. Usually, such a space that becomes a habitat is a house or a room. This is a space that is not only subject to the rules of the inhabitant, but moreover is a representation of his inner world ^{[1, p. 117]}. Your own space as a habitat, being a fence, allows you to keep your distance from others, you can "get away" from this world without really going beyond it — this is its value. The room is a place of fantasy, writes Barth, pointing out that we are not only physically free in this space, but also intellectually, mentally, we are free to think anything and this is our freedom. "The struggle for a room = the struggle for freedom" ^{[1, p. 117]}. Bart draws an interesting comparison between transparency and freedom, not hiding his dissatisfaction with modern "mythical" everyday life. That is, transparency does not give us freedom, since we are under supervision, this is the principle of American offices — open space, transparent offices — transparency is the supervisory principle of power ^{[1, p. 117]}.

What Bart finds interesting, and for us relevant in connection with Heidegger, is the structure of the room. Each room is an enclosed space, or rather, even a closed structure. It is not walls or fences that make a space enclosed and separate, but its fullness or content, ranging from colors and textures, ending with objects and their arrangement in space. But what really assigns space to a certain subject is "not concentration, but dispersion, stretching" ^{[1, p. 124]}. That is, it is not the fact that the objects are simply collected in one place (in this case, the folding space can be a habitat) that is important, but how they are arranged, namely conveniently. What Heidegger calls being-in-the-world is a Proxemia for Barth, by which he means improvised access to objects that can be reached even in the dark, "with eyes closed", clearly knowing their location ^{[1, p. 208]}.

Barth's structural analysis of the spaces of everyday life is caused not only by his desire to "dive in" and reveal the ideological background of modern everyday life, but also to show how it changes with cultural and historical development, and at the same time the lives of subjects and their idiorrhythmies change. As Barth said at the beginning of his lecture course, which tries to create a framework for future reflections of listeners, gives us the opportunity to reflect more deeply on the modern structure of everyday life, our place in it with others, to trace how in reality our daily life and being-in-the-world have changed in recent decades, in Heidegger's words. Reflections on modern everyday life are still at the embryonic stage, but the beginning has been made, and the modern reading of Barth provides a good basis for future studies of everyday life.

As in the case of Heidegger, R. Barth's philosophical works had a significant impact on the further development of humanitarian knowledge. "The structural and anthropological concept of K. Levi-Strauss marked the beginning of the application of structuralist methodology to analyze the culture of primitive communities. However, structuralism has received wider application in the analysis of socio-cultural phenomena of modern society, and the specifics of this application turned out to be the close intertwining of structuralism with semiotics. Gradually, the theme of everyday life, which was formed in the human sciences since the first half of the twentieth century, began to enter the circle of interests of representatives of the French trend of structuralism, who dealt with the problems of modern culture, including in those subject areas that can be attributed to the sphere of everyday life" ^{[19, p. 52]}.

Conclusion

Heidegger's analysis of the concept of everyday life made it possible to identify three meanings that everyday life acquires in "Being and Time". The first meaning and most important is the a priori structure of existentiality or Dasein existence. Further, everyday life is revealed in two other meanings through modes of existence, that is, authentic or inauthentic. At the same time, Heidegger points out that everyday life in the modes of existence does not change everyday life itself as an a priori structure of Dasein's existentiality, but is a modified way of mastering the latter. That is, it indicates that everyday life does not change for Dasein, but the way of grasping or consciousness changes in relation to everyday life. It also makes sense in connection with a person's self and self-awareness, which can dissolve into das Man or gain independence, separate the "I" from the "they".

The ambiguity in relation to different terms such as "ordinariness", "everyday life", "average ordinariness" suggests a possible differentiation of the "modus" meanings of everyday life in Heidegger, at least at the level of translation, by distinguishing between everyday life and ordinariness, where the latter precisely refers to an inauthentic mode of existence.

Barth's dissatisfaction with everyday reality or "self-evident", pushes him in a sense to continue the work of Heidegger, who gave grounds for everyday life as an unchangeable "space" of existence outside human consciousness. Barth, on the other hand, tries to establish and reveal the cultural and ideological influence on the perception of everyday life by a person.

How to live together is a work that analyzes the grasp of everyday life by consciousness, but not like Heidegger's when it comes to individual consciousness, but already like the life of the "I" with others. Everyday life is an everyday space of idiorrhythms that can exist harmoniously, but rather like a utopia.

"Everyday life" undergoes various semantic changes, because it can never be taken by itself as an isolated object. The main thing is that everyday life exists for and thanks to man. All changes in everyday life occur in relation to its significance for anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, history and other socio-humanitarian disciplines.

Our interpretation of Heidegger and Barth's research allows us to establish the following: it seems unchanged to human consciousness, therefore we can consider only those changes in the perception of everyday life by a person when it becomes the goal of political and ideological control. The perception of everyday life as a socio-cultural world or a space in which people coexist, is shared by them and at the same time unites them.