I. Kant: metaphysical justification of aesthetics

Kormin Nikolai Aleksandrovich Doctor of Philosophy Leading Scientific Associate, Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences 109240, Moscow, Goncharnaya str. 12, p. 1, room 507 n.kormin@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

I. Kant implements the turn of philosophy, as well as its core - metaphysics, to a critical understanding of aesthetics, to the identification of relevant grounds for it. Today, a whole range of metaphysical concepts can be defined: along with classical metaphysics, these are concrete metaphysics, reflexive metaphysics, speculative metaphysics of possible worlds, naturalized metaphysics, metaphysics of modal realism, metaphysics of science, metaphysics of art, a whole trend of metaphysical painting, and even judgments about the primordial metaphoricity of metaphysics itself. In addition, metaphysical aesthetics also exists in modern Western aesthetics, although discussions are still underway around it: some authors talk about its collapse, but others emphasize the need to develop metaphysical principles in aesthetics. In this case, we will be interested in the question of how Kant's interpretation of aesthetics is metaphysically loaded, how aesthetics and metaphysics relate. "If we consider that Kant also includes aesthetics in metaphysics, then it becomes clear that Kant considers the whole philosophy to be metaphysics, and not some special privileged part of it, which Aristotle's commentators called the first, i.e. the most important, philosophy" ^{[37, p. 335]}. This inclusion allows us to talk about the aesthetics of aesthetics, exploring the nature of aesthetic knowledge.

Both versions of the introduction (earlier, more detailed, and abridged) to Kant's "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" are determined by broader criteria showing to what extent the metaphysical horizon of aesthetic perception of reality is expanding, presenting it sometimes from the most unexpected angles, how to explore the depth of the concept of "aesthetic". The modern German researcher Gottfried Gabriel rightly emphasizes in his textual and problem-oriented brief introduction to the complete works of Kant that academic literature about him "usually presupposes an understanding of his philosophy without any effort to explain it" ^{[15, S. 10]}. The question is whether the grounds for such an explanation are provable or unprovable. Gabriel's characterization can be fully attributed to the studies of Kantian aesthetics, with the significant addition that among them there are not many works on its justification (one of the rare exceptions ^{[25, S. 4-71]}). Kant's aesthetics itself is a spiritual urge to transform human nature, that is, it is something inextricably linked with the manifestation of the metaphysical in us, with a conceptual analysis of paradoxical thinking, revealing the possibilities of the impossible, the expression of the inexpressible. Defining the parameters of the task set by Kant for the global transformation of metaphysics, associated with the identification of the conditions for the validity of its postulates, primarily the conditions of a priori synthetic judgments, V. V. Vasiliev shows what prospects critical philosophy has opened for philosophical psychology and transcendentalism. "The transcendental approach to epistemological problems and problems of the philosophy of consciousness has turned out to be an extremely promising philosophical methodology. Kant himself, however, limited the scope of transcendental research to the question of the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge. But after some time it turned out that similar questions about the possibility of certain givens of consciousness can be no less or even more interesting than the question of a priori cognition. An example of such transcendental research in a broad sense can be the study of the conditions of various kinds of ontological attitudes of everyday consciousness, from belief in causality to belief in the existence of the external world and other selves" ^{[3, p. 249]}. Equally important is the study of transcendental intentions to explore the prerequisites for the diverse trends in the development of modern aesthetic consciousness and art.

In general, aesthetic concepts are inextricably linked with philosophical attitudes. R. Rorty, discussing the question of what philosophy is, turns to the interpretation of the opposition of the beautiful and the sublime as a version of the opposition of the absolute and the relative. "Striving for the beautiful is an attempt to arrange familiar things into patterns of greater harmony and density. Elegant mathematical proofs, brilliant scientific explanations, clear conceptual analysis, beautiful patterns of lines and colors and unique melodies are all examples of such ordering. On the contrary, striving for the sublime is an attempt to come into contact with something incomprehensible, because inexpressible is something that cannot be reinterpreted and recontextualized. The boundary between the beautiful and the sublime roughly coincides with the boundary between the reasoned and the inspiring" ^{[34, S. 41]}. At the same time, such a tense confrontation is thought of by Rorty as a way to transform civilization.

The leitmotif of both editions is the need for new correlations and interactions of structures of aesthetic space related to semantic forms of questions: are the powers and abilities of the mind infinite, how does it produce knowledge, what are the rules of its relationship to the world (both are in harmony or are they completely different?), what are the forms of relationship, about which can be launched into the realm of fantasy, imagination, fiction, how to study unconscious states, as well as categorical analysis of the mostly beautiful and sublime and a whole system of new ideals of art. These are questions about how cognition is possible, whether it is possible to create a holistic picture of cognition of the world, to comprehend the innermost idea of the soul, what are the properties of the transcendental subject and the possibilities of substantiating the unity of consciousness. In the search for answers to these fundamental questions, in the search for meaning, in revealing what in the tragedy of Euripides' Medea is characterized as a gift of meaning – in this case, the meaning of works of thought, Kant creates his vision of subtle matter described by aesthetic representations. An analogue of working with such matter can be, if we follow Aristotle, working with marble – this material is only still being created by the sculptor of the statue, but at the same time it is also the material of an already completed statue, that is, something that is the subject of activity taken in the aspect of its temporal possibilities. This activity turns on different sides, and a theoretical understanding of its changes is extremely important in building the metaphysics of creativity.

The opposition between the rational and the aesthetic is not given in advance in a ready-made form. As for reason itself, the philosopher in the first "Critique" recognizes the fallacy of the desire to bring a critical assessment of the beautiful under its principles. But this point of view began to transform somewhat already in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, and to an even greater extent when he begins to consider the entire system of the soul's abilities in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, to identify the value meaning of the judgment itself, "the organic connection of cognitive abilities under the supreme control of reason" (AA XX, S. 345), the harmony of which, ""explosions of"concordance" (Husserl), philosophy gives aesthetics, giving it special importance. And it is precisely this question of the relationship between the aesthetic and the rational that creates special difficulties. After all, aesthetic relations are inexpressible through rational structures alone, and it is not by chance that E. Husserl will use the expression: believe aesthetically. Therefore, even for the schemes of describing the aesthetic sphere, such formations as metaphors, symbols, analogies are so important, conveying the development of aesthetic possibilities and laying lines of complication of aesthetic systems with each new epoch. Stefan Majechak rightly emphasizes that aesthetics "has its own type of regularity similar to reason, associated with conceptually and logically formulated laws of reason and reason, [although they] cannot be equated with discursive rationality" ^{[28, S. 7]}. The structural analogies themselves can be objectively projected onto aesthetic reality, the idea of which can be characterized as an inconspicuous being associated with what Kant will define as a mystical corpus of rationality, which later, in M. Heidegger's existential analytics, will be defined as an ecstatic vibration of the primordial matrix of existentiality, opening an epistemological space, such a way of being-in-a mood that mysteriously gives its shades bright colors, while creating a temporal sketch of being, "ecstatically extended temporality". All this suggests that aesthetics acts as a discipline immanent to philosophical reflection.

Both of these editions are so important to us because in them Kant reveals for the first time why metaphysics, epistemology and ethics need aesthetics as a way to solve the problems that arose in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and in the "Critique of Practical Reason". But does aesthetics bring something new to metaphysics? The problems raised here by Kant and the ways he found to solve them are still the subject of philosophical debate. Some researchers generally bring metaphysical statements almost to the point of absurdity. "Kant demonstrated," writes Ken Wilber, "that-as Wittgenstein would later formulate-most metaphysical problems are not false, they are meaningless. The point is not that the answer is bad, but that the question is stupid in itself... it is based on a categorical error: the eye of pure reason is trying to see Paradise. Note that I do not mean that Kant was enlightened (that is, that his eye of contemplation was completely open). It wasn't like that. A wonderful way to understand Kant's position is to study the position of [...] the Buddhist genius, Nagarjuna, because Nagarjuna applies the same critical philosophy to the mind, but not only to show the limitations of the mind, but also to move further and help open the eye of contemplation (prajna), which knows the Highest directly, unconceptually and indirectly. Kant does not really know about prajna, or contemplation, but since he knows that God is beyond the sensual and the rational, he therefore believes that God is forever hidden from direct consciousness. Soon Schopenhauer will note precisely this flaw in Kant's view" ^{[42, pp. 61-62.]} As for this long passage, here, for lack of space, only one thing should be noted: Wilber's own categorical error is different – pure reason has no eye. So if we talk about Kant's characterization of metaphysics as an imaginary untenable science, then we must bear in mind that he criticizes the old rationalistic metaphysics with its disgusting fecundity.

In fact, in both editions of the Introduction, we are talking about the metaphysical prolegomena of aesthetics as a kind of exegesis of the entire transcendental philosophy of Kant, which is more clearly and vividly expressed in the original edition, which opens with the chapter "On Philosophy as a system" and reaches the penultimate chapter entitled "An encyclopedic introduction of criticism of the faculty of judgment into the system of criticism of pure reason." Aesthetics receives critical coverage as a science, understood as a justification for why it should have such and not another systematic form (different from both the system of theoretical knowledge and the moral system, but at the same time internally related to them). That is, to paraphrase Boris Pasternak, from which family of foundations does it originate, in other words, which community or community of foundations generates the aesthetic spirit? If we consider aesthetics as a form of scientific thinking, then the question immediately arises: after all, it is always objective, while aesthetic reality is inconspicuous or has a specific objectivity, it, from Kant's point of view, is not a kind of being. And in this sense, one cannot talk about aesthetic value, although it may imply the presence of aesthetic effectiveness. But is it possible to single it out speculatively? Perhaps a way out of this difficulty should be sought by synthesizing such non-objectivity with the idea of reason and reason. But how justified is it to deduce the existence of aesthetic things from the procedure of marking up higher cognitive abilities? What exactly does the interdependence of aesthetic interpretation and cognitive structure mean? In transcendentalism, aesthetics is considered as an epistemology and methodology of interpretation of the system of criticism, in which this system interprets itself. The difference between system structures should be determined by comparing them, and aesthetics should also be considered as a form of comparative philosophy. Of course, we are not talking here about transcendental aesthetics and aesthetics of pure practical reason.

Kant's Critique of the Faculty of Judgment is the first work in the history of thought in which aesthetics is a system-forming element of the construction of metaphysics. And often, when talking about the aesthetic, Kantologists fix first of all the meaning of this concept, revealed in the context of the inclusion of aesthetic knowledge in already existing transcendental knowledge, that is, knowledge that sees the place that, according to Kant, we either give to sensuality or pure reason to the concept. Upon closer examination, it turns out that aesthetic structures are involved in the very process of erecting the building of knowledge, the formation of patterns of activity, therefore, drawing a dividing line between these types of knowledge was quite problematic for Kant. From this it becomes clear why it is so important to clarify Kant's approach to the substantiation of aesthetics in the light of the interpretation of transcendental metaphysics. Metaphysics itself is philosophical truths born of a system of pure reason, while Kant sometimes gives philosophy as such a peculiar aesthetic meaning – because he thinks of it as a brilliant undertaking of one of the highest cognitive abilities, likening it to "the genius of reason (gleich als Vernunftgenius)" (AA XX, S. 343). Philosophizing, considered in the general context of the intellectual thought movement, is for him an "omnipotent development of the human mind" (AA XX, S. 337), in which he sees the original germ of nature, something wisely arranged for great purposes, this germ gives us reliably apodictic knowledge. Kant seeks to find a criterion for identifying the possibilities of transferring the old metaphysics to the right path of science, having determined in advance the conditions without which it cannot be considered as such. And this involves converting it into a format of criticism. This new state of metaphysics, Kant will say, will "determine our course of action in the future," which in itself enhances its appeal. At the same time, he saw in metaphysics the completion of the entire culture of the human mind, which became possible thanks to the courage to use one's own mind. To have the courage to exert the forces of one's own mind is, according to Kant, the motto of Enlightenment. And it is quite understandable why, in modern conditions, the famous Kantian question: What is Enlightenment? The attention of domestic and Western researchers is riveted. K. Delijorgi, for example, considers Kant's philosophy as an interpretation of a specific Enlightenment project. Kant's philosophy belongs to an "intellectual context in which meaning, direction and possible limits"The Enlightenment” has been the subject of intense debate. Kant sought to answer all the most pressing questions concerning the theoretical foundations and practical consequences of philosophical criticism, considering rational research itself as a form of self-criticism. Consequently, he defines enlightenment not in terms of rational certainty, but rather in terms of freedom to engage in public debate." And further: the Kantian question "remains relevant for us today. By asking it, we are not just trying to satisfy our curiosity about the period of European intellectual history. Rather, we are trying to figure out “what is still at stake when we argue about the Enlightenment,“ or perhaps, [somewhat] hesitantly, ”what is left of the Enlightenment?”» ^{[6, p. 14]}. The answer to this question, awareness of the incompleteness of the educational project is extremely important for us, because Kant thinks of his aesthetics as building a common perspective for the transfer and dissemination of knowledge and culture, a person's exit from the state of his minority, a perspective for the realization of which it is necessary to take difficult steps for personal self-improvement, to gain "human self-standing", which is "the pledge of his greatness" (Pushkin), to implement decisive steps towards freedom, including such creation through freedom as art. Consequently, Kant's aesthetics can be considered as a certain quintessence of the German Enlightenment, as a meta-theory of artistic experience. However, some aesthetic positions are not so easy to relate to the understanding of the Enlightenment. Let's take the purely aesthetic problem of mimesis, imitation. From Kant's point of view, "imitation itself is most repugnant to the free use of our reason, because here we deliberately train ourselves to use others' judgments instead of our own... The use of reason consists in self-activity, but human laziness leads to the fact that they [people] would rather behave passively than raise their cognitive ability so much that to use their own powers" ^{[11, pp. 278-279]}.

In both editions, Kant explains the meaning of the "Critique of the faculty of judgment" for his philosophical system as a whole (the comparison of the two editions was carried out by D. N. Razeev and V. Euler [see: 38; 9]), which allows us to outline the semantic separation of theoretical and ethical approaches and create the contours of the image of his metaphysical system. One of the famous questions of metaphysics posed by Kant is a new question that defines the entire field of aesthetics: what is art? This question does not lose its relevance when we analyze contemporary art. This question becomes particularly acute when we try to determine to what extent contemporary art directs intellectual development, and not just passively follows some of its schemes. In a hidden form, the question of what art is is already touched upon by the "Critique of Pure Reason", but we find a comprehensive discussion of this issue only in the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment". Aesthetics and art theory have traditionally been viewed as something far from the core of Kant's philosophical ideas. The situation began to change only in recent decades. The philosopher approaches the aesthetic problems of art from afar: before expanding his understanding of the essence of art, he turns to the analysis of the concept of "judgment ability". It should only be emphasized here that Kant's metaphysics of the faculty of judgment is structured in such a way that a kind of aesthetic transformation of the judgment itself is carried out. Here is a rather long fragment of the text from The Critique of Pure Reason. "The world, available at any given moment, opens up to us such an immeasurable field of diversity, order, expediency and beauty, regardless of whether we trace them in the infinity of space or in its boundless division, that even with all the knowledge that our weak mind could acquire about them, every speech is in front of so many and immeasurably great miracles become powerless, all numbers lose their ability to measure, and even our thought loses all certainty, so that our judgment of the whole inevitably turns into silent, but all the more eloquent amazement" ^{[16, pp. 799, 801 (In 650)]}. We reflect on the ability of judgment, which was not created by us, but aesthetically acquired. Our very thinking is possible precisely because of our ability to judge.

At the same time, aesthetics structurally enters into the analysis of the faculty of judgment – not the one that, according to the "Critique of Pure Reason", applies rational concepts to phenomena, their prerequisites are in sensuality, which is not thought of as "an entanglement of representations, but [as] a subjective condition of consciousness" (AA XXIII, S. 21), from which implies the necessity present in sensuality. Without sensuality, we would have no idea of the object, although nothing is thought through sensual contemplation alone. It is only in connection with each other that reason and sensuality can determine an aesthetic object, but if such a connection is ignored, then we will have concepts without contemplation or contemplation without concepts. For example, without sensuality, aesthetics has turned into an imaginary system of intellectual cognition, striving to define its objects without the help of contemplation. That is why the conceptualization of the faculty of judgment is so important for aesthetics. Kant's theory of judgment itself, as R. Hanna shows in the preface to his article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ^[11], sharply differs from many other theories of judgment, both traditional and modern, in special qualities: "(1) taking the innate ability to judge for the central cognitive ability of the rational human mind, (2) insisting on the semantic, logical, psychological, epistemological and practical priority of the propositional content of the judgment, and (3) systematically embedding the judgment in the metaphysics of transcendental idealism." In fact, the ability of judgment is identical to the ability of thinking, which, by its intuitive-mental facet, by its unprecedented spontaneity, approaches the creative ability of the artist, in this sense, the latter can be attributed to the "structural creativity of the mind" (R. Hanna).

The critical analysis of the faculty of judgment presupposes its isolation as a separate cognitive ability, containing its a priori, subjectively interpreted principle, the ability to critically evaluate one's activities, the ideals and norms of which regulate the formation of a peculiar image of what is and what should be created in art. After all, thinking and thinking, judging are not the same thing. As we read in a poem by M. Y. Lermontov:

... it's better to say everything without thinking,

The stupider it is to think and the stupider it is to judge.

And Kant characterizes the lack of judgment as stupidity, which nothing can cure. Therefore, you need to follow the advice of Mr. Flaubert and "blush if you are told that you do not have the ability to judge." But what motivates the emergence of the concept of judgment ability? What tasks set before transcendental philosophy turn this concept into an important theoretical experiment for Kant?

If we insist on discussing these issues, then they should be supplemented with another, no less important one. How does Kant understand reason itself? It is legitimate to assert that Kant opens his aesthetic reflections with the characteristic of pure reason, which is characterized by the following features: reason as a pure a priori cognitive ability, as an intelligible or theoretical form. It would seem, why go to such a decent distance to start moving towards aesthetic thought and intuition? But the problem is that the aesthetic itself is precisely connected with the very beginning of the movement, with the Aristotelian interpretation, which we meet in Metaphysics, of the ability as the beginning of movement (so Kant's critical analysis of the ability to judge has deep metaphysical roots), with the New Testament beginning of creation, movement to the fact that Kant's contemporary – E. T. A. Hoffman called the harmony of the beginnings, with the paradoxical nature of this movement, as evidenced by the famous aporia Achilles and the turtle, and even with an artistic interpretation of the prerequisites of the very beginning – referring to the work of Francis Bacon, Gilles Deleuze emphasized that the painter "must enter the picture himself before starting it." To use Kant's expression, we can say that aesthetics is the beginning, or at least there are glimpses of a close transformation and clarification of the sciences associated with aesthetics, after these sciences have become dark, confusing and unusable due to ill-applied efforts.

But whether art itself, to paraphrase Aristotle, has an ability that is not in what is being created is a difficult question. The aesthetic originates, it happens, "comes from the feeling and from the state of our subject, namely, how we are affected by the object" ^{[11, p. 216]}, art itself, according to Aristotle, is not in itself, but in something else an abiding principle, but after all, all knowledge from the senses is According to Kant, there is only one appearance. Doesn't this mean that aesthetics deals only with mirages? To some extent, this is so (which is worth one problem of artistic fiction as a fruit of creative imagination)! But at the same time, participating in the creation of new artistic spaces, fiction depends to some extent on the requirements of authenticity, on fixing connections and relationships between objects. But even if the subject is objectively clear to us as a result of the interaction of man and the world, still "we often need to affect our state through representation and use the driving forces of the soul. This subjective greater clarity is called liveliness. The vividness of cognition, therefore, refers to aesthetic cognition and to sensuality" ^{[11, p. 252]}. But this does not mean that the aesthetic is reduced to the sensual. Kant even compares the relation of feeling to the essentially beautiful with the relation of a golden frame to a beautiful painting. So, in fact, at the center of aesthetics is the question in one form or another: how to start the movement itself, at least some special case of movement, an active form of existence or life (and aesthetic, according to Kant, "must be very alive")? Aesthetics will always write a treatise similar to Cartesian work "Principia philosophiae". Therefore, it is extremely important for aesthetics to delve into the disputes between Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno of Elea over the interpretation of the movement itself, highlighting in it a peculiar aspect of the analysis of the problem, especially since the aesthetic idea of movement entails an unattainable depth. After all, it is perhaps more difficult to pass the gap between reason and the aesthetic than in the case of Zeno's aporia, since here we are dealing with a distance generated, firstly, by art, and secondly, by an effort to find something universal for this particular, to detect the movement of creative thought from multiplicity to its unity, that is, movement towards structural harmony, to find aesthetic perfection, which, according to the "Viennese logic", rests on the agreement of cognition with the subject and the special laws of human sensuality. "Although the basis of sensual benevolence is subjective, it is subjective in relation to all mankind" ^{[11, p. 214]}, a characteristic expression of which, according to Kant, is music. In transcendental philosophy, this distance becomes the subject of critical reflection exploring the limits of a priori cognition. Placing Kant's aesthetics within the framework of his larger-scale study of the fundamental role of judgment in the life of reason, begun in the first "Critique", K. McKie takes a peculiar position in interpreting the relationship between the aesthetic and epistemological in the third "Critique": instead of exalting the idea that aesthetic judgment is somehow assumed by cognition, she suggests to see them as parallel structures, since both have a basis in reflexive judgment (see: 29, pp. 137-167).

Moving along the boundary outlined in the first "Criticism" and reaching the boundary outlined in the third "Criticism", we must distinguish them, observing both the principle of heterogeneity in the origin of knowledge and the principle of subordination of the particular to the general. In the structure of the metaphysics of nature, Kant identifies the physiology of pure reason, which explores the thinking nature, that is, the existence of the soul, which "we are not allowed to observe with the help of any other contemplations, except those that are delivered to us by our inner sense, and yet here lies the mystery of the origin of our sensuality" ^{[16, p. 437 (334)]}. And it is this metaphysical direction that is of decisive importance for aesthetics. In fact, it is embedded in rational psychology in its Kantian understanding, which presupposes the study of a priori principles of the soul's activity, its moral eidos. As Werner Oyler emphasizes, the function of the "Critique of the faculty of judgment" is "a methodical mediation between the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morality, the relations between which Kant considers as relations of opposites. This function, which "Criticism of the faculty of judgment" can perform because it itself is not part of philosophy, is central only from the point of view of the systemic aspect of philosophy; from the point of view of other aspects, it does not have a key function" ^{[10, p. 281]}. With this approach, we begin to consider the space between these forms of critical analysis as if with the help of modern devices that allow us to see the entire gap between them through a cloud of fundamental concepts, correlating the designation of structures of aesthetic perception of the world and artistic types of cognition (an interesting monograph by Rainer Wil is devoted to the problem of the correlation of Kant's theory of perception and theory of art [see: 43]) which lead to this perception by searching for a specific methodology capable of enriching aesthetics with ideas about the evolution of scientific discourse – however, such a methodology in transcendentalism is quite problematic, since Kant sometimes does not see any relationship between aesthetic judgment and true meaning. But his interpretation of this problem changes when he analyzes the antinomy of taste, whose judgment is not based on a definite concept and at the same time is still based on an indefinite concept of the supersensible. This concept is sometimes attributed by Kantologists to the dogmatic prejudices of critical philosophy, associated primarily with the concept of the soul as a thing in itself. After all, "this postulate is intended to play the role of a "supersensible substrate" or "carrier" of all a priori abilities and forms (sensuality, reason, imagination, dialectical reason, moral law, judgment, etc.), to act as the basis for all ways of applying reason: theoretical and cognitive, practical or moral, aesthetic or teleological etc." ^{[9, p. 235]}.

It is important for aesthetics that it was in the doctrine of sensuality and the faculty of judgment that Kant allowed the concept of the soul as a thing in itself. The judgment as such is an image of epistemological unity, which makes it possible to identify the structures of the concept's relationship to consciousness. But what, in fact, is aesthetic in judgment? Is this a practical or theoretical judgment? At the heart of this very opposition "lies the correct concept of taste, namely as a purely reflective aesthetic faculty of judgment; and then both apparently contradictory principles are compatible: both can be true" ^{[14, p. 491]}. This methodology can lead to the identification of levels of artistic rationing, to the comprehension of the spirit of the work, to the definition of the place of aesthetics in the world of the abilities of the soul. Take, for example, the problem of the relationship between the aesthetic, sensuality and reason. "Judgments about the beautiful," Kant writes, "should be made rather on the basis of an impact on sensuality, rather than on the mind, because beauty is a coincidence with sensuality, and the mind itself is the ability to rule. Taste, therefore, cannot be applied to laws. The rules of taste are empirical, but they do not make our judgment true – they only serve to bring our judgment under certain concepts if it is cultivated through a variety of exercises. Thus, taste can in no way be interpreted as a science" ^{[11, p. 219]}. But the closer the outlines of the field of transcendental concepts become, the clearer the connections of reason and creativity become, the intention of reflection of the aesthetic ability of judgment in order to rise, as Kant emphasizes, to proportionality to reason, the connection of the foundations of art and its symbolic ideas, the transition from aesthetic experience and judgment to the art of genius. Aesthetic knowledge itself is the result of our ability to understand beauty, the sublime and the heroic, the tragic and the comic, the identification of the initial conditions of the artist's awareness of himself in internal perception, his attitude to the artistic tradition and his position in interaction with representatives of the creative environment, their mutual understanding, which makes possible the experience of art itself, including the ability to collectively an action characteristic of an artistic subject; such an action presupposes the achievement of a paradigm of harmony, implicit agreement in the context of a common goal of art, as, for example, in an orchestra. That is, we are talking mainly about a kind of invisible transcendental apperception of art (reformulating Kant's understanding of apperception, we can say that the artist cannot imagine anything connected in the subject of the image that he would not have connected himself in his consciousness before, and this connection is the only thing that can only be created by the artist himself in the act of his it is only through consciousness that something is given to its representation as a coherent, creatively fulfilled requirement of unity, so that a picture, for example, can be considered as a synthetic unity of a phenomenon diverse in the formation of an artistic image, even an image as such: if we consider it, according to P. Riker, in the Kantian spirit as a scheme, then it "acquires a verbal dimension: before becoming a field of fading percepts, it is a womb of nascent meanings" ^{[41, p. 444]}), internally connecting spiritual and creative forces through reason and the structures of the art of communication.

The birth of the philosophical power of surprise to the world allowed us to deepen intellectual developments in the field of creative thinking, productive imagination, and the spiritual power of talent. These forces are "creative insofar as their application is not drawn from experience, but is derived a priori from principles" ^{[15, p. 165]}. But this orientation reveals an obvious contradiction characteristic of aesthetic science, a contradiction between the structures of its impractical and practical, utilitarian meaning (that is, in this case we do not associate this meaning with Kant's distinction between technically practical and morally practical), this orientation expresses the process of goal-setting, while the very ability to use means to achieve all goals, which are befitting humanity, Kant characterizes as a manifestation, cultivation of mastery. Such a creative application forms, one might say, a kind of aesthetic metaphysics, or rather, a paradoxical expression of the metaphysical a posteriori with its own understanding of art is carried out here. That is, aesthetics is constructed as a form of "metaphysics regarding objects, since they are given to our senses" ^{[16, p. 1061 (In 875)]}. Such metaphysics forms the core of experimental philosophy, the methodological principles of which are different from skepticism, aimed at identifying reliability, when its adherents try to find the causes of misunderstandings, resolve disputes that arise. But in experimental philosophy there are no "misunderstandings that cannot be easily eliminated, and the last means of resolving the dispute should eventually be experience, no matter how long it takes to find this remedy" ^{[16, p. 571 (In 452-453)]}. Aesthetic research is at the intersection of empirical and a priori, pure knowledge, and "the difference between empiricus and purus depends on the source of the concept, and this, therefore, is already a metaphysical study" ^{[11, p. 321]}. Of course, the concept of art cannot be deduced from experience, and aesthetics goes beyond the boundaries of where the experience of art leads it, and inevitably finds itself in a world of ideas that complete all our knowledge, while understanding the ideas themselves is purely metaphysical. The source of ideas is in the mind, and they affect the experience of art, acting, for example, as rules according to which various experiments in art can be carried out. But these are special rules. After all, "fine arts are arts that are created not in accordance with logical rules, but through empirical experiments. For it is only the effect that distinguishes the rules of sensuality, which does not know the rules of art, which is why there cannot also be rules of taste. Aesthetics, accordingly, cannot be a canon, but [N.K.] is always preceded by experiments in fine arts, and then rules follow, which, however, serve only to criticize art. It is necessary, therefore, to get acquainted with the samples of beauty in order to gain taste. Indeed, in terms of taste, a person is dependent on fashion and tends to society. A person has taste if everyone likes what he likes. And so the social inclination of all has given rise to taste and modifies it. The ancients have withstood the criticism of many centuries and still remain in high esteem, and whoever reads them, and whom they impress, gets a taste - only he should not imitate them. Taste is the effect of the faculty of judgment" ^{[11, pp. 219-220]}. Consequently, aesthetics itself cannot be represented as a set of norms and rules in art, because it is a non–canonical discipline, and the judgment of taste is associated with the free play of cognitive abilities; if Plato posed the question of what is beautiful in itself, then for Kant such a question is meaningless, because, as he emphasized in According to the "Viennese logic", the aesthetic cannot exist by itself, knowledge about it requires a combination of thorough knowledge and lightness of feeling as a form of knowledge, therefore it is quite possible to say that aesthetic knowledge "must contain both. It takes great genius to bring this to fruition" ^{[11, p. 216]}. Aesthetics can be fully associated with the subtlety in the use of concepts, which Kant refers to the immanent reflection on our epistemological treasury: "If we knew all the time what we know, namely when using certain words and concepts, we would be amazed at the treasures of our knowledge" ^{[11, p. 254]}. But it's not just about epistemological amazement. Aesthetics takes us into an open space where the usually separated moments of human knowledge intersect, represented by various forms of discourse; in this discipline they reach the depth of the semantic markup of possible worlds. The clarity of these intersections is ensured by the identity of apperception. But the interpretation of the aesthetic as metaphysical a posteriori poses many difficult problems for aesthetics, initially associated with the construction of its conceptual apparatus. They can be felt to some extent already in the "Critique of Pure Reason", comparing the vision of aesthetic concepts with the analysis, for example, of the concept of substance. After all, if we wanted to create completely new aesthetic concepts from the material provided to us by perception, then, as Kant writes in the course of considering the question of transcendental truth, "without borrowing from experience even an example of their binding, then we would find ourselves in a world of the purest fantasies, the possibility of which would not be attested by anything. For indulging in fantasy, we were not guided by experience, and these concepts were not borrowed from it. Such fictional concepts can acquire the character of their possibility not a priori as a category, as a condition on which all experience depends, but only a posteriori as given by experience itself; therefore, their possibility either must be known a posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be known at all" ^{[16, p. 363 (269-270)]}. Therefore, the consideration of aesthetics as part of the metaphysical a posteriori reaches the boundary of knowledge, so that for its images both infinite spaces of consciousness lying on both sides of the border are made visible.

We can think of aesthetic phenomena only on the condition that sensual contemplations are connected in one consciousness. Modern researchers sometimes show how difficult Kant's analysis of the transcendental unity of apperception is. Let us turn to the authoritative representatives of the interdisciplinary movement, called cognitive science, who analyze the Kantian tradition. "We are told that the self," F. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Roche write in their book The Repressed Mind, "really exists, but we will never be able to know it. Moreover, this “I” hardly corresponds to our emotional beliefs: this is not me and not my “I”; this is the idea of the “I” in general, the idea of some impersonal agent or mover behind the experience. He is pure, primordial and unchangeable; I am impure and ephemeral. How can such a different self relate to my experience? How can it be the condition or the basis of all my experiences without being influenced by those experiences? If such an "I" really exists, it can relate to experience only by being part of the global fabric of dependence, but this will clearly violate its primordial absolute state" ^{[2, p. 183]}. And although some authors of cognitive research consider Kant to be their godfather, but as we can see from the above fragment, everything is mixed up in the house of cognitive science. After all, Kant means by transcendental that which deals with the types of our knowledge of objects, and the proponents of the cognitive hypothesis still insist on knowing the objects themselves - my “I”, my experiences, world dependence, and so on. Kant, on the other hand, will be interested in everything that relates to "the knowledge of reason based on concepts alone," that is, metaphysics.

Long before the creation of the Critique of Pure Reason, the philosopher raised the question of the distinction between metaphysics and aesthetics. Back in the mid-1760s, the notification of the lecture plan provides an exposition of metaphysics with its characteristic scientific method. At the same time, he portrays critical philosophy as complete logic, emphasizing the very great similarity of the two types of logic itself as criticism, corresponding to the prescriptions of common sense and the prescriptions of scholarship, which "at the same time gives reason, in connection with the criticism of reason, to pay attention also to the criticism of taste, i.e. aesthetics, since the rules of the former always serve to explanations of the rules of the second and their differentiation are a means to a better understanding of both of them" ^{[21, p. 286]}. The further development of Kant's aesthetics took place only after he began to regard the reflexive ability of judgment from the side of the ability to judge expediency. And it is quite understandable why, because since the time of Aristotle it has been known that it is "for the sake of a goal that an ability is acquired" ("Metaphysics" IX 8, 1050a 5 (per. A.V. Kubitsky)). But the appeal to reflection (reflection) generates a number of difficulties associated primarily with the interpretation of an aesthetic object. Reflection as such "does not deal with objects themselves in order to get concepts directly from them [we cannot get aesthetic concepts directly from works of art as aesthetic objects – N. K.]; reflection is a state of mind in which we first of all try to find subjective conditions under which we can get to concepts. Reflection is the awareness of the relationship of these representations to our various sources of knowledge, and only thanks to it can their relationship to each other be correctly determined" ^{[16, p. 417 (316)]}.That is why it is epistemologically important for aesthetics to begin its constructions, starting initially from a transcendental reflexive position aimed at the objects themselves. Moreover, reflection is the duty of everyone who seeks, as Kant would say, to judge art a priori. But the indication of this position in aesthetic work is quite natural for another reason, namely, because the idea of reflection is internally connected with the idea of creative activity of the subject. As will be shown in the phenomenological analysis of reflection on non–reflexive attitude, it cannot doubt its event status, it appears as real creativity - it is a transformation of the structure of consciousness.

"Critique of judgment" it is deserves to be metaphysically told in different ways-and as part of a critical analysis of the spotless mind (otherwise it would be impossible to reach the fullness of a priori principles; the famous letter of K. L. Reinhold (December 1787), Kant explicitly recognizes that revealed three non-matching parts of philosophy, one of which contains a priori principles of teleology, consistent with the aesthetic ability of the soul), as an important perspective of the critical philosophy, as a view on knowledge itself with a broad, intermediate point, not just based on the principles of interaction between theoretical and practical philosophy, and some dynamic principles in order to explore the aesthetics as a discipline left in a fluctuating condition (but does that mean she rushes from one extreme to the other?), the reasons for the change of movement from one section of philosophy to another, or causes of structural stresses, vibrations between them: a very subjective fluctuation in knowledge, according to Kant, it is always worrying, it causes mental anxiety, which is understandable, because "in the beginning, all our knowledge of the dark" – hence the doubts, contradictions, objections, alternating with clarifying themselves fluctuations; and it is of great importance the culture of communication, forms of discussion of issues in the scientific community, mutual understanding between supporters of different points of view, and "great talent is manifested in the fact, what [standing on one point of view – N. K.] can clearly represent [their] fluctuations others" ^{[11, p. 295]}. Such a study of aesthetics is extremely important to identify the foundations of the dynamics of the construction of a metaphysical building, the metaphysical system itself. And it is quite understandable why some writers believe that the mind itself tries to resemble the movement of a ship rocked by waves. That is why the following Kantian characterization of the metaphysical style of thinking is so important. "Indeed, if such a system is ever destined to be realized under the general name of metaphysics (and it is possible to develop it in its entirety and in all respects extremely important for the use of reason), then criticism must in advance explore the ground for this building to the depth at which the first foundation of the ability [to give] independent the principles depend on experience, so that any part of the building does not settle, which would inevitably lead to the collapse of the entire building" ^{[14, pp. 71, 73]}. Consequently, aesthetics as critical thinking is intrinsically linked to the study of the deep composition underlying the project of metaphysics – both as a natural ability and as a priori synthetic knowledge. But what, in fact, does this composition imply – a structural and semantic similarity of the theoretical and moral parts of metaphysics, their connection by analogy or something else? This should be clarified in this article.

1. The transcendental aspect of the study of aesthetic judgment.

It is impossible to identify the metaphysical foundations of aesthetics without clarifying the inner connectedness of all aspects of Kantian criticism. And here, first of all, the question arises of how it is possible to synthesize aesthetics with such intellectual directions that, it would seem, are quite problematic for it: for example, with the same a priori principles and concepts that make up the subject of metaphysics or first philosophy. After all, its principles, according to which objects can be given in artistic experience, the principles of the ability of narrowing, cannot be considered within the framework of a modified method of thinking, from which arguments were based regarding the statement about the impossibility of deducing them from a priori concepts. Aesthetic concepts, which are thought of by the mind, can be given only in the experience of their application, creative embodiment. Therefore, the ability of judgment, refined by experience, cannot be considered as a special part in the system of pure philosophy (metaphysics) As a skill, it is a specific psychological phenomenon described as a special cognitive ability. This is how the most difficult question gradually arises about the relationship of the metaphysical, cognitive and psychological in models of aesthetic development, which will later be supplemented by the dilemma of the unknowable supersensible, its mental image as an imaginary, but really unrealizable aesthetic principle of moral activity, expressed by the category of harmony of the moral sphere – according to Kant, "harmony itself is possible due to the fact that God is the reason for morality" (AA XX, S. 336). That is, the supersensible actually substantiates the unity of the ethical and aesthetic, beauty and goodness, and such justification develops into the aesthetic symbolism of the spiritual world, which has both semantic and sensual meaning hidden in its mysterious images. The invisible supersensible, with which aesthetic taste correlates, is a kind of transcendent state, thanks to which a synthesis of a symbolic understanding of beauty and moral ideas is possible. At the same time, it is precisely with the supersensible that the diversity of higher cognitive abilities is combined, without this combination it would be impossible to reconcile them with the claims of taste. Such a combination is a conditional probability of events in the subjective and natural world, although such a probability does not coincide with either. This combination is a kind of peculiar phenomenon that borders on the supersensible as the basis of freedom. At this incomprehensible boundary, a universal synthesis of theoretical ability with practical ability takes place. The intelligible world itself can also be conceived in the concept of freedom through formal legislation. Here it is important to understand what Kant understands by the form itself, for him it is a way, as it becomes clear from the Critique of Pure Reason, of ordering the manifold in a phenomenon, he is "ready in the soul a priori" and should be treated as something isolated from sensuality. As we can see, Kant builds an aesthetic building on the deep foundation of transcendental philosophy, which is filled not only with our perceptual abilities, but also with spiritual structures.

Solving the question of the synthesis of aesthetics with the above-mentioned intellectual directions also involves understanding how the two parts of the "Criticism of the faculty of Judgment" itself - aesthetics and teleology - are combined, the attention of some modern Western researchers is drawn to the problem of such a combination. At the same time, the emphasis here shifts from aesthetics to the field of cultural studies, which is presented as almost a new way of understanding this relationship. In support of their position, proponents of this point of view sometimes refer to Kant's judgment of culture as the "last goal". The question is, what is the last purpose of what we are talking about? In the aesthetic part of the Critique, Kant speaks primarily about the culture of mental strength and moral feeling, but it is unlikely that such an interpretation can claim to express the aesthetic meaning of the treatise. The author's claim that in the introduction to the Critique Kant puts forward interdependent arguments in favor of how culture demonstrates the subordination of nature to its supersensible basis looks obviously far-fetched: this, they say, is the central question that he seeks to answer in his work. But Kant's introduction is not about culture, but about proving the unity of the supersensible as a principle of nature with the concept of freedom, which has a philosophical meaning. According to S. Bremne, "understanding the criticism of judgment from the point of view of culture allows us to see that the two parts of the work not only have similarities or common themes, but also assume each other, which [allows] us to find out how nature obeys freedom" ^{[3, S. 367]}. But the common theme of these parts, which also do not imply each other, is not culture, but expediency as an aesthetic principle.

But what is the difference between cultural and teleological approaches? S. Bremne's work also argues that the Kantian concept of culture provides a new way of understanding the above combination. Indeed, Kant argues that culture is at the same time the "ultimate goal" of nature and should be defined in terms of "art as a whole" (of which visual art is a type). Therefore, based on our own cultural background, we find ourselves in purely aesthetic territory. In the critique of teleological judgment, culture, as the last empirically cognizable body of nature, serves as a link between nature and freedom, while in the critique of aesthetic judgment, it is through culture that the connection between art and morality passes. As for moral culture, it "will lead a person to the concept of God, to which no speculative reason will lead him. However, evidence of reason is possible to the extent that reason is so cultivated as to have in its possession all the arguments that put beyond doubt all the foundations of speculative reason" ^{[16, pp. 200-201]}. But what degree of cultivation of reason leads to theology? In any case, Kant offers various but interdependent arguments in favor of how culture demonstrates the subordination of nature to its supersensible basis: This is the central question that Kant asks and seeks to answer in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment. Thus, he not only develops a concept essential to both parts of "Criticism"; he also demonstrates how these two parts can be perceived as complementary, each complementing the other in order to solve the most important metaphysical question. Thus, understanding the critique of judgment, which presupposes the expansion of the cultural horizon, allows us to find not only the similarity of the two parts of the work, but also to find a place of action for metaphysical research.

Is it possible to consider the late edition of Kant's introduction as a new program of aesthetic research, or is it just a refinement and development of developments that were carried out in the first edition? If the early edition of the introduction began with the consideration of philosophy as a system, then the second edition first raises the question of the branching of philosophy itself, the conceptual apparatus of which correlates the principles of rational cognition with the object. Raising the question of the constitutivity of aesthetic judgment, Ulrich Seeberg emphasizes that "the unity of rationality, since it is connected with the idea of the unity of all reality, based on which a rational subject can understand only himself, turns out to be a fruitful basis for explaining ... the specifics of aesthetic experience, as it appears precisely in the differentiation of rational human abilities in the modern era" ^{[37, S. 963]}. There are two levels of the apparatus of this explanation, assuming the concept of nature and the concept of freedom (causality, necessity and freedom, chance, expediency), they give different principles of the possibility of their objects. The first level, described in the Critique of Pure Reason, devoted to metaphysics and epistemology, creates conditions for theoretical knowledge as a philosophy of nature, the legislation of which applies only to phenomena; the principles of this knowledge cannot be extracted from the always sensually limited concept of nature. It should be noted that modern Western analytical epistemology, which declared semantics prima philosophia, disputes the fundamental principles of transcendental philosophy, its theoretical core: true, a number of its representatives pay considerable attention to "the construction of Kantian semantics of singular cognitive reference" ^{[44, p. 117]}, but many of them believe that Kant's system was built all the time the same is based on other principles. Some aspects of opposing transcendental concepts also affect the attitudes of today's analytical aesthetics. The second level creates prerequisites for practical knowledge as a philosophy of morality with its own legislation, these prerequisites just precede teleological attitudes. Legislation of both the first and second levels is relevant only to the totality of subjects of all possible experience, considered as phenomena. Theoretical legislation is carried out by reason, practical legislation by reason, and the fact that both, "incessantly limiting themselves – true, not in their legislation, but in their actions in the sensually perceived world – do not constitute something unified, is explained by the fact that the concept of nature can, however, present its objects in contemplation, but not as things in themselves, but only as phenomena, the concept of freedom can in its object represent a certain thing in itself, but not in contemplation; therefore, none of these concepts can give theoretical knowledge of its object (and even the thinking subject) as a thing in itself, which it would be supersensible itself; the idea of it, although it should be put as the basis for the possibility of all these objects of experience, but it itself can never be raised and expanded to knowledge" ^{[14, p. 89]}. Since reason and reason, the expression of the conceptual sphere of which are the various categorical structures of aesthetic knowledge, limit themselves in their disparate actions in the sensory world, and, consequently, in the aesthetic field, such a restriction also affects the idea of the form of the object, with which Kant precisely connects the beautiful in nature. But such an object cannot be a thing in itself, its image is conveyed by special phenomena that Kant calls either the art of sensual truth or the art of sensual visibility (painting). Unlike the concept of nature, the concept of freedom can represent the idea of a thing in itself or the supersensible, in aesthetics such a representation is carried out indirectly – through artistic creation. An artist can embody the idea of the supersensible in his work, but no matter how much we look at it, we will not see it there.

Looking into the endless horizon that we strive to cross in order to get closer to the thing itself, we feel our own baselessness, from which neither the concepts of reason nor the concepts of reason can save. But there is also a horizon closer to us, which is "the coincidence of the boundaries of our knowledge with the goals of humanity" ^{[11, p. 222]}, the concentration of our adequate knowledge. In contrast to this logical horizon, an aesthetic horizon can be called one that is quite specific: it indicates the location of abilities relative to taste, the relationship between the finite and the infinite, and the beauty of the relationship between them. Here we pin our hope on the action of ideas, giving them only a practical orientation in accordance with the laws of the concept of freedom, without resorting to theoretical constructions that are not able to expand our knowledge to the supersensible. It follows that between nature as a sensually perceived world and freedom as a supersensible one there lies an "unbridgeable gap", so that the transition from the first to the second is impossible. But the passage across the vast abyss, impossible for one ability, can be built through the formation of another ability – the aesthetic one, which always builds a magnificent hermeneutic bridge. After all, art itself performs a kind of act of transcendence, due to its ontological rootedness in freedom: although the sensual cannot affect the supersensible, nevertheless the concept of freedom must realize its own goal-setting in the sensory world in accordance with its laws, and this provision contains all the prerequisites for revealing the capacious concept of art as creation through freedom, which Kant will build it later. Free art itself seems to Kant to be an ennobling of man, a Humaniora. However, "what relates to fine art ... is not yet completely free, because artists, etc., are still mechanistic. Poetry and eloquence are already freer. A humanist is one who interprets beauty and cultivates his spirit by studying the ancients in order to expel savagery from him. This implies the secularism [Urbanitaet] that we notice among the ancients, and historical knowledge is important in the sense that it expels uncouth" ^{[11, p. 227]}. In other words, freedom as the supersensible fulfills in the sensually perceived world the artistic goal indicated by its prescriptions. Generally speaking, nature should be thought in such a way that logic – this, according to G. Shpet, the "abc of sciences" – containing a description of natural forms coincides, at least, with the possibility of teleology, realized in it according to the concepts of freedom. Therefore, despite the heterogeneity of the concepts of nature and freedom, Kant nevertheless finds the "basis of the unity of the supersensible", which makes possible both the formation of the philosophy of nature and the formation of the philosophy of freedom, that is, the transition from a mindset that sees the principle of nature to a mindset that asserts the principle of freedom. The search for such a basis is carried out not with the help of theoretical structures, but on the path of aesthetic consideration as clarification of the peculiar meaning of judgment, which is the most important task of the "Critique of the faculty of judgment". Such an image of aesthetics as a system-forming component of the Kantian system should neither be understated nor exaggerated. E. Kassirer, revealing the historical and spiritual significance of the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment", which marked the "beginning of a new general movement of thought", believed that the understanding of the origin of aesthetics as a structure that arises only from the desire to divide a metaphysical system, characteristic of the modern Kantian studies, is rather doubtful, because if we allow such an interpretation of aesthetics, "then its historical impact should seem almost miraculous" ^{[4, S. 291]}, which explains little: for example, why it had such a significant impact on artistic life and subsequent philosophical development. Nevertheless, a miracle remains a miracle – this "sudden surprise of the soul" (Descartes), and it is to him, as a supernatural, supersensible phenomenon, that Kantian aesthetics draws attention. After all, it is said: if everything happened according to the natural laws of our soul, then genuine miracles would happen. Perhaps that is why the self-determination of aesthetics within a metaphysical system is so important for Kant. And a critical analysis of the faculty of judgment should contribute to the development of aesthetic topology, that is, contribute to understanding the nature of aesthetic spaces, which are defined by various dimensions in the system of transcendental philosophy.

When developing such a topology, modern aesthetics reveals fundamental changes in the understanding of artistic action, since the object of art cannot be abstracted from the subject, his freedom and creative euphoria (although some installations assume just such an abstraction, or even the construction of a non-subjective aesthetics); despite its vagueness, this object is thought of as a creative result of contact the world and man, in a sense, creating his own world and projecting his individuality onto the structures of experience. From this point of view, Kant's understanding of aesthetic action as expanded, that is, relying on the entire repertoire of consciousness for staging on the world stage, is extremely important. In Kant's view, the structures of aesthetic perception of the world appear as activity-oriented, creatively oriented, even as if transcending them, since the aesthetic concepts themselves describe the sensory world not by themselves, but as a symbolization of the supersensible world. In the process of thinking about ways to connect the separate parts of theoretical and practical philosophy, epistemology and morality in the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment", Kant finds both the immanent properties and principles of aesthetics and philosophy of art itself, basing his constructions on a deep study of the aesthetic works of his predecessors. As V. F. Asmus emphasized, Kantian aesthetics arises as a result of the construction of philosophy as a system.

Kant puts his reflections on such a transformation into the form of understanding the limits of the faculty of judgment. Sometimes, speaking about the criticism of pure reason (this purity is ensured by the accuracy of tuning to the implementation of a priori legislation) or about the criticism of pure cognitive ability as such, it is during this critical analysis that he undertakes, for the sake of the possibility of building his system, a new structuring of the entire mental tissue, in which it is necessary to single out as one of the essential parts of such criticism the ability to judge, which turns out to be "like an average member, with the help of which disparate moments are connected. It is precisely because of their fragmentation that they need something third, which would perform the function of connection, since none of the opposite moments - neither the rational concept nor the sensory diversity – has its own definition through which it could connect with its opposite. When we have an empirical concept, its connection with sensory diversity is already embedded in it precisely because its origin is secondary, arises in us by identifying and abstracting the general properties of objects of experience; but when we have before us a pure concept of the understanding, a category that has no sign by which we could apply it to one or the other If there is a different sensory material, then an intermediary is needed who can provide the possibility of this application. Such an intermediary, according to Kant, is the ability of judgment" ^{[5, pp. 84-85]}. With the advent of such an intermediary, the transcendental structure encompasses the critique of pure reason, the critique of pure judgment, and the critique of pure reason. And the development of the ideas of aesthetics in critical philosophy is precisely carried out on the way of conceptualizing the specific ability of judgment. Having divided philosophy into two main parts – theoretical and practical, Kant approaches aesthetics through the concept of the faculty of judgment as a structural and semantic similarity of epistemology and morality, as a metaphysical singularity. Already in the first "Critique" he introduces in a very peculiar way the concept of the ability to judge and imagine, the canon of which creates a mental landscape that directs it to schematization and application of discursive concepts to phenomena and the ability to bring under the rules adopted in this discursive field. For the application of concepts, "a function of the faculty of judgment is needed, on the basis of which the object is brought under the concept, therefore, it is still necessary to have at least a formal condition under which something can be given in contemplation. If this condition – the ability to judge (scheme) – is missing, then such a summation cannot take place, since we are not given anything that could be determined only by the shape of the object" ^{[16, p. 403 (304)]}. Kant inscribes this ability into the structure of higher cognitive abilities, considering it as setting the logical analysis of concepts, judgments and conclusions. This analysis abstracts from the meaningful moments of cognition, and without them in the aesthetic field everything becomes problematic – after all, according to Kant's famous position, thoughts without content are empty, and contemplation without concepts are blind (although some representatives of modern aesthetics question precisely the meaningful aspect of aesthetic knowledge, fixing its meaningful blurriness), because here it is impossible to circumvent the question of what, in fact, is set forth, depicted in a work of art, or what is the peculiarity of beauty.

But is there a prohibition on this abstraction in transcendental logic? He is not here, which is why Kant speaks of the transcendental ability of judgment as almost an aesthetic phenomenon, that is, the expression of outstanding human abilities, a high degree of giftedness, his special talent, while the conceptual design of these abilities largely coincides with the philosophy of artistic thinking, mastering another ability – the ability to judge about expediency. For Kant, the faculty of judgment is a unique talent, "a special talent that requires exercise, but which cannot be learned. That is why the ability to judge is a distinctive feature of the so-called natural mind and its absence cannot be filled up by any school, since a school can give a limited mind and, as it were, hammer into it any number of rules borrowed from others, but the ability to use them correctly should be inherent even to a schoolboy, and if this natural gift is not present, then no rules that would be prescribed to him for this purpose guarantee him from their erroneous application" ^{[16, p. 251 (172)]}. A similar path can be followed in aesthetics: the artist's natural gift is his exceptional abilities, innate talent, he, of course, may need a school whose professional program promotes the development of teaching methods, for example, drawing, comprehension of the rules of art, it encourages the practice of spontaneity, focusing on the main components of a work of art, but this does not mean that the artistic disciplines themselves will teach the talent of a painter or musician: you can study solfeggio, which develops a musical ear, but not become a composer.

Transcendental logic normatively corrects the activity of the faculty of judgment in the process of applying pure reason, but will this normativity (disputed, by the way, by a certain part of the modern aesthetic community) lead to the substitution of the actually given, cognizable by reason, due, proclaimed by reason? Is it possible to avoid such a substitution? This is too complicated a question to be considered in the context of this article. We will only point out how this question is connected with the topic of arbitrariness, spontaneity, which is so important for aesthetics, which are always sensual: the laws of duty as expressions of necessity and connection with grounds should not be deduced from what is given to us in experience; it determines arbitrariness, and in relation to possible moral actions, The intention of which is precisely due, empiricism is nothing more than the "mother of appearance" (Kant) contained in phenomena. The mind does not follow their order, but acts purely aesthetically – "quite spontaneously creates its own order based on ideas" ^{[16, p. 715 (In 576)]}.

The history of the mind, however, looks more like a theatrical play than an orderly sequence of events. Kant believes that understanding the prospects for the development of philosophy does not come from recognizing the possibility of improving the discursive sphere of a priori knowledge; the philosopher associates these perspectives with critical thinking, which avoid errors of judgment, and they can affect aesthetic thinking, which in itself is not just a product of feelings. The specificity of transcendental philosophy itself lies in the fact that its constructions are based on concepts that relate to their subjects a priori, and therefore it "must also indicate, with the help of general but sufficient signs, the conditions under which objects can be given in accordance with these concepts, since otherwise these concepts would not have there would be no content, i.e. they would be only logical forms, and not pure concepts of the mind" [16 p. 253 (175)]. That is why the transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment is so important for us, which forms not only a system of these correspondences, the expression of which is schematism and the principles of pure reason, but also is a condition for substantiating aesthetics itself in the process of conceptualizing the reflexive faculty of judgment.

The fundamental innovation of the Kantian approach is that it reveals our ability to perceive aesthetic action as a reflection, even as a flicker of the integral structure of consciousness. Criticism of cognitive abilities as conditions for obtaining a priori knowledge reveals their strong boundaries. But the boundaries of reason and reason do not directly touch each other, there are vast spaces between them, all the diversity of which Kant precisely designates by the term "the faculty of judgment". Like other cognitive abilities, it must contain its own a priori principle. But besides the criticism of cognitive abilities, Kant discovers another critical region similar to cognitive abilities – the criticism of the ability to create a visual image or representation. Both cognitive abilities can be considered as the realization of the abilities of the soul, each of which is so specific that it is impossible to find their common root. This "ensemble of abilities" (S. L. Rubinstein) of the soul is formed, in Kant's view, primarily by the cognitive ability and the ability of desire, the dialogue of which is extremely important for the advancement of consciousness along a certain middle path described by the ability of pleasure or displeasure (sometimes he calls it "a morally intellectual feeling" (AA XX, S. 345)) and finding a lot of specific parameters. Aesthetics is directly related not only to the latter ability, but also to the ability of desire, because without it we are unable to explain our creative possibilities, to make sure that our internal resources are sufficient to create an object. Desire itself is considered as an affect, lust or an uncontrollable longing that encourages us to strain our forces, testifying to a kind of dialectic of the soul, in the depths of which aesthetic sprouts from the germs of creativity are just sprouting. A person has special desires, "when he is prompted to create an object only through his representation, from which he cannot expect any result, because he is aware that his mechanical forces (if non-psychic forces should be called so), which must be determined by this representation in order to create an object (became maybe indirectly), are either insufficient, or are generally aimed at something impossible..." ^{[14, p. 95]}. Thus, the considered ensemble of creative abilities will relate not just to the field of psychology, but to the field of critical philosophy only if it is possible to find its a priori principles for the ability of pleasure. In general, we have knowledge about our abilities only after we have established the procedure for testing them. The result of such a test of the soul is the manifestation of creativity. All of them are just a consequence of what Kant calls the beneficial structure of our nature.

If we are going to explore aesthetic experience using techniques that are rigorous enough to make it relevant to metaphysics as a science, then we will need the concept of a specific faculty of judgment. For each of the above–mentioned abilities, its own a priori legislation is established: for cognitive ability – by reason, its peculiarity lies in theoretical knowledge, since it correlates with the phenomenon; for the ability of desire - by reason in accordance with the concept of freedom. Just as between reason and reason, considered in their logical application, is the faculty of judgment, so between the cognitive faculty and the faculty of desire is the feeling of pleasure, dependent on the latter faculty. As for the faculty of judgment, the question immediately arises regarding it in this scheme: since it is impossible to rely on a logical law in the search for the principle of the faculty of judgment, then how can it realize its cognitive ability, focusing on concepts when solving problems? "The faculty of judgment in general is the ability to think of the special as subordinate to the universal. If the universal is given (rule, principle, law), then the faculty of judgment, which brings the special under it (and if, as a transcendental faculty of judgment, it indicates a priori the conditions according to which it is only possible to bring this general under it), is the determining faculty. But if only the special is given, for which it is necessary to find the universal, then the ability of judgment is a purely reflective ability" ^{[14, p. 99]}. For aesthetics, the latter ability is of fundamental importance, which, however, does not have autonomous legislation, and therefore cannot create a new world different from the world of nature and the world of freedom; reflexive activity is focused on inventing or composing a law for the diverse forms of nature or for modifications of its transcendental concepts. In fact, we face an extremely difficult task, how to create the universal. Even reason is unable to solve it, since its legislation is written in order to explain the possibility of nature, and these modifications involve the identification of special points on a blurred empirical image. Legislation for the diverse forms of nature may seem accidental to the mind, but still, if we start from some mysterious principle of the unity of the manifold, without which a metaphysical system cannot be built, it is necessary. It follows from this that the reflective ability of judgment requires its own principle, which cannot be discovered empirically, since it is intended to argue for what purpose a variety of particular principles of experience should be conceptualized, to arrange them in the form of a system of empirical knowledge. The search for this principle of the faculty of judgment convinces us that it is characterized by a wide range of equivalence. Its interpretation is carried out on the basis of its own autonomy (isolation; reflecting on the laws of nature, the ability of judgment nevertheless prescribes a law not to nature, but only to itself, forms its own conceptual apparatus). This interpretation of the basis directly affects the understanding of aesthetic experience, which, from the point of view of A. Kern, "is autonomous not because it has nothing to do with cognition, but because it turns our cognition into a moment of play" ^{[23, S. 10]}. And this changes a lot in the intellectual environment, since it requires a new a priori principle in the Kantian system: "since the concept of an object, since it also contains the basis of the reality of this object, is called a goal, and the correspondence of a thing with that property of things that is possible only according to goals, is called the expediency of its form, then the principle of ability judgments about the form of things in nature under empirical laws are the expediency of nature in its diversity. That is, nature is represented by this concept as if a certain understanding contained the basis of unity [in] the diversity of its empirical laws" (AA V, S. 180-181). The concept of expediency is defined through properties realized in the faculty of judgment; it is thanks to the discovery of the teleological principle that aesthetics is brought into the system of transcendental philosophy, and its norms are codified in it. It is also important for aesthetics that the properties of expediency itself are directly related to creativity. "The goal is the object of arbitrariness (of a reasonable being), through the representation of which arbitrariness is determined to act for the production of this object" ^{[19, p. 27 (381)]}. The concept of expediency does not relate in any way to the integrity of the boundaries of nature and is not subject to any objectification, it can only be a way of reflecting on it as an object of experience. It cannot be reduced to moral concepts – these versions of practical expediency. The only thing that betrays the aesthetic meaning of this concept is that it is thought metaphorically, by analogy with art. A special area of meaning is also associated with the reflective ability of judgment, which, if viewed epistemologically, will acquire only a regulating principle here. Pointing to the meaning itself, it would be interesting to trace how its conceptualization developed in modern semantic philosophy and what role it played in semantic aesthetics. The leading members of this philosophical tradition doubt the semantic construction (developing a theory of meanings, comprehending concepts, judgments and propositions) of the Kantian system. The very birth of semantics took place in conditions when, as Alberto Coffa emphasized in his analysis of the semantic tradition from Kant to Carnap, efforts were made to "avoid Kantian theory a priori." But how successful these efforts have been, including in aesthetics, is the subject of a special study. This means that no cognitive model is built with the help of a conceptual apparatus for understanding the ability of judgment, the concept itself has only a normative style here. Does this mean that the faculty of judgment has no other support than the history of its own autonomy? What kind of story is this? And has the history of at least one faculty been written, for example, such an ability as taste, which for Kant is precisely the aesthetic faculty of judgment? The philosopher sometimes calls it benevolence – contemplative, inactive.

2. Metaphysical a posteriori and synergy of harmony

In the future, aesthetic structures are considered by Kant in the context of the metaphysical justification of scientific knowledge, the methodology of the analysis of empirical and theoretical knowledge. We do not even suspect what treasures we possess in the field of knowledge. "If we knew what we know, ... then we would be amazed at what treasures are hidden in our knowledge" ^{[21, S. 843]}. But what treasures are hidden in aesthetic knowledge? In order to discover these treasures, it is extremely important to understand the relationship between the transcendental principle and one feature of the metaphysical principle in the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment." In general, in order for a thing to become an object of knowledge, it is necessary to identify a priori a universal condition for considering it as such, in this case it will be thought of through an ontological predicate, for example, as a changeable substance, or something that exists by itself. By this condition Kant understands the transcendental principle. In contrast, the metaphysical principle has one specific facet, it assumes the same condition – only for empirically defined objects, which can subsequently receive a priori characteristics; the originality of their predicative feature will be transmitted through the concept of an object moving in space, through the idea of something changeable, having an external cause, that is, accidents. The Kantian concept of causality has undergone significant changes towards a mechanical description of nature in the context of the theory of living beings, and such a shift helps us, as A. Breitenbach rightly emphasizes, "to better understand the multi-layered Kantian understanding of causal knowledge" ^{[2, p. 219]}.

Before the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment was created, modern aesthetic science had not yet been recognized as a serious scientific discipline. Then (and sometimes even now) it was not a unanimously accepted judgment on the direction of research. It was seen more as a free association of various aspects of certain disciplines (epistemology, psychology, art history, art history, and so on), a project to bring them closer by analogy, rather than a single discipline. For the first time it finds such unity in Kantian metaphysics. After all, as it is clear from the previous presentation, since we are dealing with objects of aesthetic experience, it is clear that we can bring them only under the metaphysical principle. In a certain sense, the aesthetic principle is a kind of the principle of practical expediency as a definition of free will, and it can be considered as a "metaphysical principle, since the concept of the ability of desire as will must be given empirically (it does not belong to transcendental predicates). Both principles [transcendental and metaphysical – N.K.], however, are still not empirical principles, but principles a priori, because no further experience is required to connect the predicate with the empirical concept of the subject of their judgments; this connection can be seen completely a priori" ^{[14, p. 105]}. Therefore, the aesthetic as a form of metaphysical a posteriori cannot be given the meaning of a transcendental predicate, since it is inextricably linked to the fabric of experience, although in aesthetic judgment the connection of the predicate itself with the subject is intuitively seen a priori.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the further justification of the aesthetic allows for a fairly wide variation. The indicator of its degree is primarily expediency. The principle of expediency, which needs transcendental deduction, is indicated by a priori statements of the reflexive faculty of judgment, they refer to the structures of empirical research of nature, considered in the diversity of its particular laws, as well as to the identification of conditions for bringing its universal laws under this a priori concept of reason. Kant calls transcendental principles the maxims of metaphysical wisdom, these are generally valid sayings in the form of rules that often catch the eye of the researcher, such as: nature chooses the shortest path. They cannot be justified purely psychologically, because these norms affirm the order, as it should be judged. The subjects of empirical research are set in various ways, each of these specifications cannot be known a priori and therefore seems random to our judgment. The system of empirical laws presupposes the unity of experience itself, otherwise we could not link empirical knowledge into one whole – a kind of aesthetically significant harmony of experience, including artistic experience. "An artist must know how to group diversity in such a way that unity is manifested if his painting is to be liked. Truth is the most preferable foundation of unity… In aesthetic perfection, it is a condition sine qua non and the most sublime negative condition" ^{[11, p. 218]}.

But conformity only to the conditions of experience in aesthetic science seems less and less consistent both from a logical and empirical point of view. The universal laws of nature hint at a connection between things according to their kind, although they say nothing about a specific connection between them. However, the unfolding of a specific connection of natural phenomena expresses more vividly than others the ways of moving towards that direction, which will soon become the main intention of aesthetics, influencing epistemological and social connections. In Kant, this specificity is precisely revealed by the ability of judgment as a means of achieving something that is considered an a priori approach: "for human discretion, the accidental in the special (empirical) laws of nature still contains, although incomprehensible to us, but nevertheless conceivable natural unity when linking its diverse [content] into itself a possible experience in itself" ^{[14, p. 109]}. This incomprehensible natural unity (created by the mind at the junction of particular laws in order to establish the a priori principle of cognizability of the order of nature) is nevertheless accidental, and Kant thinks of such an accident of the natural as the expediency of nature. The principle of expediency a priori presupposes the disclosure of knowledge about the subordination of genera and species in nature, the transition from one genus to another and allows for various types of causality.

But how to find an elegant solution that will become an intermediate link between the principle of expediency and the evolution of aesthetic discourse. The ability of judgment recognizes the correspondence of nature with our cognitive ability, which allows us to weave a "guiding thread for experience" from such a confusing for us, incommensurable with our ability to understand many threads, for empirical research, to solve the creative task of creating a coherent experience, to reveal how the connection "multiplied" (Anna Akhmatova). The subject solves this problem reflexively, when the ability of judgment imposes on itself an obligation (a kind of self-law), implemented in the form of a law of specification of nature in relation to the diversity of its empirical laws. "Therefore, when it is said: nature specifies, in accordance with the principle of expediency, its universal laws for our ability to know, i.e., to match them with the human mind in its necessary business – for the special, which gives it perception, to find the universal, and for the various (for each species, it is true, universal) in turn to find a connection in the unity of a principle – this does not prescribe a law to nature and does not learn such a law from it by observation (although this principle can be confirmed by observation). Indeed, this is not a principle of determining, but only of reflecting judgment; it only requires that the empirical laws of nature, no matter how nature is arranged according to its universal laws, must necessarily be investigated according to this principle and the maxims based on it, since with the use of our reason in experience we can succeed and acquire knowledge only to the extent that this principle is valid" ^{[14, p. 115]}. This correspondence of nature with our cognitive ability, which receives a priori justification in the reflective ability to judge nature by its empirical laws, is what Kant calls transcendental expediency. It is relevant to the cognitive ability of the subject and represents the fundamental concept of reflexive judgment, which is designed to epistemologically think an infinite variety of empirical laws according to such a concept. The principle of expediency does not define either nature or freedom, but is only a maxim of the ability of judgment aimed at creating a way of reflecting on a coherent experience, which causes us a feeling of joy – in fact, the aesthetic state of the researcher from the fact that he had to face the phenomenon of systematic unity under empirical laws, which we are not given to substantiate.

Kant finds this elegant solution in a kind of lax theory, set by very peculiar metaphysical attitudes. There is a whole horizon of many mechanisms of correspondence between nature and empirical laws, among them is its correspondence to an epistemically directed intention or plan of action carried out on the basis of the principle of expediency. From the spontaneity of the laws of nature and the universal laws of reason, no intention of cognitive activity can arise, meditation of intention is contained only as the goal of the faculty of judgment, designed to bring unity of principles into the order of nature according to empirical laws and attribute this goal to nature itself. The processes of mental activity that make up intention as a significant part of our experience cannot be understood unless they are considered aesthetically, namely as an expression of a sense of pleasure, as a manifestation of the reflective ability to judge the principle of subjectively expedient specification of nature by its genera and species. Comprehension of the experimental grounds of intention also sets an a priori analysis of the feeling of pleasure, which is significant for everyone, this analysis shows how interconnected cognitive ability and the world are generated, what cognitive flexibility aesthetic affect shows here. If the coincidence of perceptions with categories is an aesthetically neutral process, since it is generated in a purely discursive way, then "the detectable compatibility of two or more empirically heterogeneous laws of nature under one principle encompassing them is the basis for a very noticeable pleasure, often admiration, even one that does not cease, although we are already sufficiently familiar with its subject… Therefore, something is required that, when considering nature, draws attention to its expediency for our understanding–an effort to bring, where possible, its heterogeneous laws under higher, although still empirical, laws, so that, if possible, we may experience pleasure from such consistency of them for our cognitive ability; ^[2] we consider consistency as purely accidental" (AA V, S. 187-188; cf. with another version of the Russian translation: ^{[14, p. 119]}). If ancient and medieval aesthetics up to Modern Times (Kepler's "Harmony of the World") were set by the doctrine of the harmony of the cosmos, the music of the spheres, then Kant's aesthetics reproduces this idea with one significant change: for a German philosopher, talking about the harmony of the world is like talking about the harmony of a thing in itself, unknown to us, therefore The discussion of this topic is transferred to another plane: to the plane of the metaphysical a posteriori.

It is important to describe the mental basis that is assumed under the harmony, coherence and compactness of these ideas and the pleasure they generate in the subjective world. Connected with the sphere of concepts given through experience, the metaphysical a posteriori is related to such an event of consciousness and cognition, which are aimed at reproducing the drawing of the world together with the person drawing, and such a combination of them is a kind of primary synthesis, the a priori structure of which participates in the synthesis of perception and in intentional acts intended for the action of representations performed in language. T. Teufel He examines the problem of synthesis itself in the "Critique of the faculty of Judgment" in the context of the concept of peculiarity (in this regard, it is important to find out what the aesthetic piquancy of a peculiarity consists of), showing how "unsynthesized, non-referential sensory states (what Kant calls "private as such") become amenable to synthesis for the first time" ^{[39, p. 54]}. At the same time, Kant directly connects the metaphysical a priori with the prerequisites of the faculty of judgment, which, despite the uncertainty about the horizons of the ideal expediency of nature, contribute to understanding how the world is aesthetically revealed to us not only in various spatial and temporal scales, but also in the conceptual representation of its internal structure and harmony. After all, we prefer to hear "those who give us hope: the more we know nature in its internal structure or compare it with external links unknown to us now, the simpler we recognize its principles and, the further our experience progresses, the more harmonious we will consider nature with the apparent heterogeneity of its empirical laws" ^{[14, p. 121]}. In essence, we are talking about an increasing movement towards synergy of harmony. Indeed, the most important aspiration of the reflexive faculty of judgment to achieve symmetry between nature and our cognitive ability is aimed at eliminating any restrictions for the implementation of the principle of symmetry in the empirical sphere.

Another aspect of the understanding of pleasure suggests its connection with the interpretation of creativity. "Pleasure is the idea of the correspondence of an object or action with the subjective conditions of life, i.e. with the ability of causality possessed by the representation in relation to the reality of its object (or the determination of the forces of the subject to activity in order to create it)" ^{[20, p. 297]}. It is pleasure that gives meaning to the intimate circle of agreement between objectivity and subjectivity, determining the correlation between them and giving impetus to the creative action of consciousness in reality itself.

The question is how to create this circle, how to extract the aesthetic content of the Divine book of nature – a kind of natural revelation. Galileo also tried to read this book. For Kant, it is deployed in an infinite variety of natural things. It is equally important to find out from what, in fact, to create an understandable order of nature. Kant believes that it is created from a confused state, disproportionate to our ability to comprehend. And when we embark on a transcendental study of the very ability of judgment and taste, we are faced not only with difficulties, but also with the most complex problems, "so confusing by nature itself." The above is also characteristic of the principle of the faculty of judgment itself, which "occurs mainly in those judgments that are called aesthetic and relate to the beautiful or sublime in nature or in art. Nevertheless, the critical examination of the principle of the faculty of judgment in them forms the most important part of the criticism of this faculty. Indeed, even if they do not contribute in any way to the knowledge of things by themselves, they still belong only to the faculty of cognition and indicate the direct relationship of this faculty to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure" ^{[14, p. 73]}. Aesthetics is directly related to diving into the mysterious depths of epistemological theory, to what, in fact, the cognitive string implies.

The structures of metaphysical a posteriori and metaphysics of the faculty of judgment open up a wide field of interpretations used to endlessly unravel formulations and rethink mysterious expressions concerning the Kantian epistemological model. Some aesthetic concepts that are thought of by the mind include the nature of the ability to feel, but this area of concepts is quite limited, since through them the ability of judgment cannot draw from itself the a priori principle of the relationship of the phenomenal world to the supersensible, but in order not to distance itself from it at all, it is necessary to outline the place where the attitude to it will be moved in one epistemically important direction – for the knowledge of nature exclusively for their own purposes, the ability to judge. It is this a priori principle that is focused on the knowledge of organic systems, on understanding the flow of the river of life. Philosophers say that it is impossible to enter the river itself twice, while poets raise the question of its properties or nature:

The river is like that, what are its meanings in you…

(R. M. Rilke. From the poetry cycle for Madeleine

de Broglie. III. Care (translated from German by N. Boldyrev).

And although apriorism in the faculty of judgment is not directly related to the feeling of pleasure, but if we assume such a connection, then it is in it that Kant will see something "mysterious in the principle of the faculty of judgment", in the aesthetic application of this ability.

But how can we, despite this mystery, still understand the images of the dispensation of the aesthetic faculty of judgment as a kind of introduction to philosophy? The attention of representatives of cognitive science is often drawn to this arrangement. Modern research is significantly changing the premises from which thinking should proceed when interpreting the relationship between aesthetic and cognitive. Seeing Kant's innovation in understanding emotion as a special structure of consciousness (although there is no innovation in this understanding, in this sense, almost Aristotle can be considered an innovator), I. V. Kirsberg insists on interpreting Kant's understanding of beauty as an extra-cognitive emotional experience, noting, however, that "traces of a cognitive understanding of the aesthetic are preserved in Kant not only because of the pressure of the prevailing New European tradition, which represents both thought and all consciousness as understanding, but also, mainly, because of the mystery of the underlying aesthetic sense of (non) pleasure: due to its ambiguity, everything seems indefinite and the boundary of the cognitive is not visible. With exceptional foresight – contrary to all New European conceptuality – Kant saw feeling beyond cognition and thought, but never created a concept leading to an expanded understanding of consciousness – showing its own quality of its extracognitive structures (emotions and will)" [Kirgberg, 2023, p. 176]. As for the invisible boundary of the cognitive, Kant argues just the opposite, insisting that with respect to the abilities of cognition, considered from the point of view of the application of reason, we can set boundaries. In addition, several other questions immediately arise here. After all, not all the New European tradition considered consciousness as understanding (if one sees in the understanding itself not only cognitive ability): There was also an idea of the inexpressibility of the essence of consciousness, of self-awareness, of the reflexive status of consciousness. Kant emphasized the fundamental impossibility of knowing anything about the transcendental subject residing inside our consciousness (from the very division into possible and impossible in his view, transcendental philosophy begins). Will as a natural ability influenced by the mind is not just a quality of the extracognitive structures of consciousness, but also one of the spaces of consciousness endowed with the ability to create. "Will is the ability either to create objects corresponding to representations, or at least to determine oneself for their creation" ^{[20, p. 313]}, that is, one's causality. Another question is whether such an extra–cognitive structure as, for example, perception can be considered knowledge? Further, what is considered cognitive and what is non–cognitive (the author interprets aesthetic thought itself as completely separate from cognition, in this sense it is non-cognitive). It is equally important to understand where sensory cognition belongs, and to find out whether Kant finds a transcendental solution to the question of the relationship between the cognitive and the sensual or not. How can the speculative mind clearly feel its power in other areas? Do emotions themselves have an ideatory character: after all, an idea is still something insensitive, and, as Kant emphasized, poetic language is surprisingly rich in ideas themselves. Do some abstract structures contain affective shades? Finally, why does the author think that Kant's understanding of consciousness does not show such a quality as will? After all, the consciousness of the ability to perform actions is, according to Kant, arbitrariness, which, although affected by motives, can still be determined to act only on the basis of pure will. I. V. Kirsberg connects the possibility of seeing the prospects of critical analysis of the ability of judgment with his judgments about the conceived and imperfect Kant. But whether there are any prospects for understanding it in the case of such an interpretation is a big question.

3. The subtle beauty of metaphysics

Metaphysics sees in the ability of judgment a changeable ability of any type, but the definition and measurement of this ability is quite problematic. Let us turn first to the "Critique of Pure Reason", here the philosopher reflects only on one source of the formation of knowledge – the mind, which knows itself as an event of the construction of constitutive a priori principles, bypassing, with some exceptions, such important theoretical abilities as reason and the ability to judge. Kant sees in the latter ability nothing more than a "gift of the spirit", it is precisely this ability that, one might say, opens up the space of aesthetic relations between the "I" and the world. To some extent, the will as the ability of desire is related to such a discovery, since it is also the ability to create objects, that is, the will, as the philosopher emphasizes, is something that defines itself for their creation. Why exactly are these theoretical constructions – reason, which, according to Kant, is always with us, and the faculty of judgment, in which Kant sees the essence of experience in its relation to reason – necessary in order to understand the explosion of complexity of aesthetic structures over the past millennia? Even in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that May Appear as a Science, Kant argued about the human mind in relation to its works of art (menschliche Vernunft in Ansehung ihrer Kunstwerke (AA IV, S. 360)), that is, in relation to one of its aesthetic states. What is this aesthetic dissolution of the problems that will arise in the future when explaining the activity of the mind in the "Critique of the faculty of judgment"? Some modern studies that analyze the aesthetic origins of transcendental a prioriism bring us closer to the answer to this question. Kant, as T. B. Dlugach emphasized, "speaks of aesthetics as a sphere where, strangely enough, the very a priori nature of reason arises, although for philosophy the possibility of this remains mysterious and only assumed" ^{[8, 284]}. Unfortunately, mystique has a downside – uncertainty, which allows for an imperfectly distinct expression of philosophical thought and a cascade of interpretations. Another point of view, different from Dlugach, is held by a French researcher. Considering the relationship between reason and art, Jean-Luc Nancy starts from the Kantian formulation of the question at the very beginning of the "Critique of the faculty of judgment", which takes shape in the form of an analysis of ways of understanding the expediency of nature by analogy with art, in other words, by analogy with technology. But, as we can see, the problem of this relationship is already raised in the "Prolegomena", and in the first "Criticism" this scheme has acquired a wider scale, becoming an integral part of the problem of the relationship between reason and culture. Recently, Western researchers have been paying attention to the development of an interdisciplinary genealogy of the theory of schematism itself in Kant's philosophy. The scheme of sensory concepts, resembling the monogram of the pure faculty of imagination a priori, participates in the formation of the prerequisites for the aesthetic concept of the image, including the artistic image. Today, some authors trace the origin of transcendental schematism from the literary and artistic practices of that time. For aesthetics, S. Morrow's research of systematic correspondences between Kant's theory and three ways of rethinking the status of movement and form in literature, art and aesthetics at the end of the XVIII century is of particular importance: in the transformation of ballet into pantomime by J.G. Noverre, conducted in his theoretical work "Lettres sur la danse et les ballets" (1760), the expressive function of meter in Klopstock (1764-1779) and the reassessment of aesthetic perception in Lessing's Laocoon (1766). Such an approach, according to the author himself, "reveals the unexpected origin of Kant's theory" ^{[32, S. 10]}. Nevertheless, Kant's aesthetic thought is built primarily as coming from purely philosophical approaches, and not from a theoretical understanding of artistic experience.

Reflecting on the development of the Kantian theme of mind-art, mind-artist in Nietzsche and the Romantics, Nancy believes that all issues related to art are concentrated here. "But the question of the mind-artist, first posed by Kant, means art as such, and this has nothing to do with art as beauty" ^{[35, p. 21]}. But what is this dual structure of art? And it is hardly possible to agree that Kant for the first time poses the problem of the mind-artist, because it has already become, in fact, before Aristotle in the form of a far from difficult task to describe the activity of the architect-mind. Kant himself has a more complex relationship between reason, beauty and art. For example, to what conception of art can the transcendentally critical question about the possibility of art, which stands in the "Critique of Pure Reason", be attributed? And is it possible to divide aesthetic a prioriism into parts? If we talk only about art itself in a broader context, then, one must think, we are talking about such an aspect of its understanding, which is indicated in the first "Criticism", when the question is raised about how not only art is possible, but also reason itself. In fact, mutually reinforcing aspects arise between these provisions, which will be discussed in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment.

Metaphysically, the question of what boundaries determine the transfer of Kant's reasoning about the human mind to the understanding of works of art. Can't these works seduce the mind itself? Finally, does not this transfer mean that aesthetic feeling as such is the basis of reason? The projective connection of cognitive abilities, fixed on these boundaries, even reveals another theoretical construction that does not coincide with reason; it is this that Kant calls the ability of judgment and evaluation in its theoretical and practical expression, "the aesthetics of pure practical reason." A particularly sad fate overtakes naive aesthetics, professing the attitudes of the ordinary human mind (and to some extent the mind with its happy simplicity), not trained in something new, but having its own axiological criteria in the field of theoretical evaluation ability, when it dares to move away from sensual thinking, as a result of which itself "he comes to the incomprehensible, falls into direct contradictions with himself, at least to the chaos of unreliability, vagueness and impermanence. In the practical field, however, the power of evaluation only begins to show itself from a very advantageous side when ordinary reason excludes all sensual motives from practical laws. Then he becomes even very refined; it does not matter whether he wants to be picky about his conscience or the claims of others regarding what should be considered fair..." ^{[20, pp. 91, 93]}. But if such a mind excludes sensual impulses from the practical field, then how can it, despite its delicate strings, relate to the aesthetic faculty of judgment. This question also concerns whether the culture of the ordinary mind is theoretically capable of directing science to a new – aesthetic – path of research. The answer to these questions is precisely given by the third "Critique", in which the gallery of special abilities forms a transition between such parts of the building of knowledge as reason and reason. The construction of this gallery of cognitive images is intended to determine its a priori architecture, to identify which kind of principles structures this transitional form – constitutive or regulatory. The possible meaning of the text about the transitional form between these parts of such an impressive building is the idea of it not as a special part of pure philosophy, which is a two-part composition (theoretical and moral philosophy). This non-part is sometimes interpreted as a communication segment: but what exactly is meant here – because the segments themselves are different (link segment and mixing segment)? The transitional segment, which has the form of the ability to judge, is thought of as a segment of unity (in Russian philosophy and art, the concept of unity will be developed and supplemented with the concepts of all-humanity and all-art) and a way to create a whole. But what type of connection is assumed here – the one that implies a connection in the idea or a connection in reality? As for the first, each link of this connection should appear not only in the situation described by the concepts of means and ends, it should equally "be defined by the idea of a whole with its place and its function"

^{[14, p. 657cn.At the same time, Kant retains a broader meaning for these links: a descending series of causes and actions passes into an ascending one, and such a transition dominates the aesthetic sphere, since a work of art, thought of as an action, is awarded the characteristics of the cause of the work when constructing an ascending line, as a result of which it appears as a property of action. Critical reason, through its a priori judgments, theoretically reveals the laws of nature, and practical reason reveals the law of freedom. But does the a priori principle relate to that which only mediates the connection, which transforms διὰ πασῶν χορδῶν, passes through all the strings of theoretical and practical philosophy, that is, to the faculty of judgment; can this lay the foundation for a third, indirect structure that has an indirect influence on other parts of the building of philosophy? Kant presents it as a two-part system. Although even in the first introduction to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, he assumed that the faculty of judgment could justify precisely a special part of philosophy. Moreover, despite the fact that the transitional form between the parts of this building is not a special part of pure philosophy, this form still claims to be the formation of a critique of pure reason. A critical examination of the faculty of judgment, which has its aesthetic implications, should be the first step in substantiating metaphysics. The very construction of an art gallery, the development of a new scientific direction related to aesthetic research, presupposes the substantiation of metaphysics as a science, a critical analysis of its a priori principles. At the same time, Kant undertakes the substantiation of aesthetics as an introduction to personal metaphysics, a systematic presentation of it in a concise form. Great difficulties arise on this path, since the propositions of the faculty of judgment, deployed in the aesthetic faculty, are not subject to transcendental deduction from a priori concepts of reason. M. Heidegger emphasized the specific characteristics of Kant's understanding of deduction itself, bringing its meaning closer not to philosophical, but to legal connotations. "In a legal dispute, the "powers" are confirmed, or the "claims" are denied. Two things are necessary for this: first, the establishment of the circumstances of the case and the object of the dispute (quid facti), then the presentation of what is recognized by law as justified by law (quid juris). Lawyers call the demonstration of the validity of a claim "deduction" [43, p. 48]}. Explaining why Kant identifies the problem of the possibility of metaphysics in the form of such a legal deduction, Heidegger also notes here that it requires "showing the possibility of a priori connectability of pure concepts with objects. Since the authority to use these concepts, which do not originate from experience, cannot be verified through an appeal to their actual use, pure concepts"presuppose a process of deduction, and aesthetic judgments always need it, only in the latter case it occurs due to the ability of judgment. But does this legal dispute have anything to do with the dispute about a psychic force capable of deploying aesthetic action, which is, as it were, a middle ground between rational intelligibility and moral space, as it were, a metaphysical part of sensuality? It is they who are able to generate a state in which activitas instantanea creationem, the activity of the moment, is a creation, that is, the action of not only the architect of the world, but also its creator. We are talking about a dispute between the intelligible and the sensual, ending with a verdict regarding the detachment of the mind from the activity of the senses, which, however, do not judge by themselves at all, but nevertheless are thought of as modes of implication of the mind. The Cartesian Epistemon character even compares our feelings, inclinations, and judgment (entendement) with various painters who have the ability to participate in primary cognition. And, of course, the best of painters is our mind. What talent, then, should an artist have for judgment?

As for the jurisdiction of the judgment itself, Kant thinks of it as a representation relative to the objective representation we have. The judgment is based on "the unity of activity that brings different ideas under one general idea" ^{[16, p. 157 (93)]}. It is a specific form of thinking that performs the synthesis of ideas in consciousness, with which the scientific empiricism of nature research is in harmony. I. V. Kirsberg reproaches Kant for allegedly mixing thoughts and judgment, "not noticing, therefore, the difference between utterance and expression" ^{[29, p. 176]}, which sounds rather strange. But what exactly is the confusion, for example, of the ability of judgment and the ability to think expediency, is completely unclear. Isn't the judgment itself related to the utterance of a thought? As E. Husserl said, the one who expresses the principle is judged, and in the expression itself the philosopher saw a spiritual formation. At the same time, he criticized species relativism: according to his installations, the judgment is true, since it has its origin in the species nature of man. Kant raises the topic of expression more than once – for example, when he talks about the expression of the claims of the judgment of taste, about the expression itself as containing a symbol for reflection, about the expression for concepts by analogy with contemplation, etc. So there is no confusion here. And in modern logical research, judgments are also seen as a mental action that reveals a structural relationship to the composition of the expressed thought. As for the detailed presentation of the problem of the difference between a statement and an expression, it is more appropriate to talk about it as a phenomenon of a later period, when logicians, as M. M. Novoselov emphasized, began to portray judgment as an invariant in the class of possible linguistic representations. An even more difficult question arises if we take into account the Kantian theme of teleology – Vladimir Solovyov will even talk about organic logic. But the idea of the organics of logic, put forward by Andrei Tarkovsky, brings a new level of complexity. And how to interpret the ability of judgment in this regard?

Before we go any further, it is worth emphasizing that Kant addresses the problem of the aesthetic from the very center of philosophical knowledge, adhering to the growing belief that the aesthetic approach is based on the ability of judgment. Already in the Middle Ages and at the beginning of Modern Times, judgment itself was analyzed as the result of the interaction of understanding and will, while both these abilities were considered as reinforcing each other. P. Riker diagnosed their action as a manifestation of a "pre-dialectical movement translated into the language of the psychology of abilities, which, in turn, depends on the cosmological concept of causality. This dialectical situation [however] did not disappear with the advent of either the psychology of abilities or the cosmology supporting it. Kant's distinction between theoretical reason and practical reason only gave a new expression to this old problem, and the enormous difficulties faced by this dichotomy at the beginning of the third "Critique" are known" ^{[39, p. 88]}. These difficulties are to a certain extent related to the need to determine, first of all, the properties of the ability to contemplate itself, the sensory ability, without which it is impossible to find out the epistemic reality of what we have introduced into things themselves, it is precisely this that is associated with aesthetic expansion, which simultaneously increases the possibilities of creative action, opens up new regions and reduces the saturation of metaphysical colors. Remembering the metaphor of the island used in the Critique of Pure Reason, we can say that aesthetics is also surrounded by an ocean of passions, mirages, and creative impulses. And the picture of the action of the aesthetic mind itself can in some sense be attributed to Kant's characterization of the mode of action of the mind, given at the beginning of the third chapter, which contains the transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment. "Now," Kant writes here, "we have not only gone through the whole country of pure reason and carefully examined every part of it, but also measured it and determined the place of each thing in it. But this country turned out to be an island, enclosed by nature itself in unchangeable borders. It is the land of truth (an intriguing name), surrounded by a vast and raging ocean, this location of illusions, where mists and ice, ready to melt, seem like new countries and, constantly deceiving the empty hopes of a navigator eager for discoveries, draw him into adventures that he can never give up, but which he nevertheless, he cannot bring it to the end in any way." The analogy with this fragment can also be used to describe the island called the "aesthetic faculty of judgment", Kant will try to measure it and determine its boundaries in the last "Critique", thirsting for discoveries of aesthetic treasures on this island, striving to carry out an exciting journey of thought into the world of experiences, values and works of the soul; from this walking through torments She cannot give up on creativity, but she is also unable to complete it. However, the most important thing here is something else. The fact is that this fragment opens Kant's analysis of the grounds for distinguishing all objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena, and the aesthetic itself just endlessly oscillates between them in search of its own support in the structures of the metaphysical a posteriori, that is, the aesthetic vibrates like a string – not only entirely, but also in parts, when it is set in motion by the creative The tension at the metaphysical crossroads between the phenomenal and the noumenal is in a state of almost transcendental amphiboly. But this is precisely where certain difficulties arise for aesthetics, since the criticism of pure reason already imposes a ban on ontological creativity. This criticism "does not allow us to create a new field of objects [but such a new field is precisely the objects of art - N. K.], in addition to those that can appear to him as phenomena, and forbids us to be carried away into intelligible [intelligible] worlds, even if only in the concept of them. An error leads us to this in the most obvious way, which can be excused, although not justified; it consists in the fact that the use of the understanding, contrary to its purpose, is given a transcendental character, and objects, i.e. possible intuitions, have to conform to concepts, and not concepts – to possible intuitions (on which alone rests the objective significance of concepts)" ^{[16, pp. 449, 451 (345)]}. In the "beyond" indicated here, there is an outlet for aesthetics, and it is quite understandable why E. Husserl will talk about the mode of the phenomenon precisely as an aesthetic mode, while emphasizing in a letter to Hugo von Hofmannsthal (12.1.1907) that the artist assimilates the completeness of images intended "for creative aesthetic solutions", unlike a philosopher who grasps the semantic fabric of the world in terms.

The creative tension itself can tell us a lot about ourselves. In essence, we are talking about a specific creation of reality as an aesthetic work of our soul – and it does not coincide with the affixation of sensuality with something beyond it - a thing in itself or a thing in itself. Moreover, Kant uses the very "theme of affecting sensuality rather as a springboard to move into the sphere of active cognitive activity of a person, which is his main theme" [34 p. 385]. This main theme is vividly revealed in Kant's metaphysics of creativity. What is the specificity of creation or creation? It is extremely difficult to determine how a multifaceted subject participates in this act of endless penetration into the world and the elevation of freedom, only turning things in itself into things for us. But it is much more important to determine how theoretically to combine different aesthetic profiles, bearing in mind the discrepancy of some constructions and problematizations, for example, the metaphysics of creation, which is different from creativity, creation or from what Kant calls our own creation, and from the work, in general from any activity, from the "art of doing" (Prem. 7, 16). In an aesthetic sense, the biblical personification of wisdom is significant as an artist who was born before the beginning of the world and had her hand in its creation. The idea of creation is the focus of pure transcendental consciousness, which is precisely focused on the "epiphany of the immeasurability of creation" (Kant), in which divine freedom becomes apparent. Western and Russian aesthetics, in fact, are born from the initial contemplation of the wisdom of divine creation, this contemplation manifests itself as reverence for the soulful beauty - such a soul-uplifting force. Aesthetics appears as the consciousness of the work, or, according to Kant, the "identity of the great creation" - Identität der einen Größenerzeugung, referring to this sacred primordial work; the aesthetic substance itself – creativity – is the latest list of creation, which is directed intuitus derivativus (derivative contemplation, devoid of the creative power of the Absolute). It is fair to emphasize that the question of creation is this Judeo–Christian concept, which cannot be reduced to the image of either creation or action, J.L. Nancy believes that in nature itself "there is no place for creation as such" ^{[35, pp. 22-23]}, and since there is no conceptual design, we do not have an established concept of nature. For Kant, everything is much more complicated, firstly, it is only for nature that one can think of a higher essence, which should be the creator of things; everything is subordinated to the idea of an omnipotent creator, as the philosopher emphasized, although the creator of the world does not form a whole with the world itself. By the term creation, the objective goal of which is the perfection of the world, and the ultimate goal is man, the philosopher means the free reason for the existence of the world. Creation is the property of freedom (sometimes, instead of creation, Kant uses the expressions transformation into reality from nothing or creation of substance from nothing). The idea of creation is conceived by him in the context of the metaphysics of unity, according to which all substances do not follow each other (otherwise we would close access to the explanation of phenomena and the very use of reason would be suspended, "harmony of the use of our mind" (Kant), which is nothing but the purpose of creation); the very act of creation means its own a kind of substantial explosion. Although "we can never comprehend either the beginning of the world or the possibility of this beginning, in the end we still comprehend that the concept of causing the world by God remains, or that the world has a creator" ^{[13, p. 212]}, the concept of which is sometimes denied for the reason that in Kantian aesthetics nature itself is considered only only as a technique, the idea of which negates the concept of the creator himself (according to Nancy, the problem of creation is rewritten as a priori a posteriori, the technique or art of nature replaces creation, its other substitute is reason, reflective judgment and the ability to judge). Nancy's point of view echoes that of J. Deleuze's understanding of the meaning of the Copernican Revolution in Kant's philosophy. "Dogmatism asserts harmony between subject and object and appeals to God (who has infinite abilities) to guarantee such harmony. The first two critics replace this with the idea of the necessary subordination of the object to the "finite" subject: subordination to us – the legislators – in our finiteness as such (even the moral law is a fact of finite reason). This is the essence of the Copernican Revolution" ^{[7, p. 218]}. But there is no such substitution in Kant's philosophy. According to Kant, the idea of a system of creation leads us to the idea of an architect (creator of forms, or in another interpretation, a non-creative God), and not a creator (creator of substance), although the concepts of architecture and creation coincide in some ways. Criticizing the physicotheological proof, Kant distinguishes between the concepts of the architect of the world (Weltbaumeister), whose activity is limited by the use of specific materials, and the unconditioned creator of the world (Weltschöpfer), who is subject to everything and who resides in a space invisible to us: Already in biblical times, it was recognized that the wise creator of the world "is pleased to dwell in darkness" (3 Kings 8:12).

Nancy, in his interpretation of the idea of creation, is far from what should be understood by creation itself, although he wonders what it actually means to "think creation." In Kant's view, it means the act of arising as an action of an alien cause, an extraterrestrial essence. Indeed, it makes no sense to talk about it as a concept describing the phenomenal world, although Kant uses the term visible creation. However, the situation changes, if we are not talking about phenomena, but about things in themselves and objects of discursive knowledge, "then even if they were substances, we can consider their existence as dependent on a cause alien to them" ^{[16, p. 343 (In 252)]}. And therefore we should think of the transcendent foundation of the world, which is contained in a being different from it, containing the principle of the systematic unity of the world and its expediency – this visible "signature of God" (Nancy) under all things. Because of this, we must inevitably admit the creator of the world, and, consequently, his creation. "From such an idea of the idea of the supreme creator, it is clear that I do not base the existence of such a creator and knowledge about him on the basis, but only from the idea, i.e. from the nature of things in the world according to such an idea" ^{[16, p. 343 (In 252)]}, from the idea of the moral creator of the world. According to the principles of practical reason, there is a clear harmony between the creator and his creation.

Therefore, the idea of creation is connected with the question of the possibility of the very emergence – that which arises, arising from itself, possessing what the philosopher calls the ability to begin by itself, that is, what arises from nothing. From Kant's point of view, nature reveals itself as a canvas of a mind with artistic talent. On this canvas there is both the Judeo-Christian concept of the creaturity of man, and doubt about his created substance, and the noumenal characteristics of creativity itself. As P. P. Gaidenko emphasized, "for the salvation of human freedom, it is not enough to point out that a person belongs not only to the sensory world (as having a body), but also to the supersensible world (as having a rational soul), – it must also be assumed that as a supersensible being he is also supermodern and as such it is not a created substance. This is where the center of gravity of Kant's doctrine of time as an a priori form of sensuality lies; although it plays a primary role in Kant's theoretical philosophy, its role in practical philosophy, in substantiating the possibility of freedom, is even more fundamental" ^{[4, p. 180]}. However, how well-founded is Piama Pavlovna's hypothesis that the idea of man as an uncreated substance follows from the doctrine of time as an a priori form of sensuality? In support of her hypothesis, she refers to that fragment of the text of the Critique of Practical Reason, which precedes Kant's famous judgment on the aesthetic aspects of artificial intelligence, or, according to his terminology, a thinking automaton. Kant himself pointed out significant difficulties in considering the question of created and uncreated substance. And P. P. Gaidenko wonders whether the Kantian doctrine of the timelessness of man as a thing in itself really rejects the Christian dogma of the creaturity of man. To answer this question, it is necessary to take into account the Kantian principle of dual consideration: indeed, what kind of person is being talked about – man as an empirical being – this, according to Herder, "compendium of the world", or man as a noumenon. Even in the "Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Morals", reflecting on the fallacy of the judgment that man creates himself, Kant emphasizes that the Ego as such, regarding what can be pure activity in it, should be attributed only to the intellectual world unknown to us, the noumenal world, to the idea of the subject of universal legislation as the only one the moral creator of the world. And the very concept of transformation into reality from nothing, "the concept of creation does not belong to the way of sensory representation of existence and not to causality, but can only relate to noumena. Therefore, if I say about beings in the sensually perceived world: they are created, then I consider them in this regard as noumens" ^{[20, p. 559]}. The concepts of creation, creation as the reason for the existence of the world and the concept of creativity, the whole region of which is comprehended by the incomprehensibility of the aesthetic, are different concepts, and aesthetics as such, in some part, is built metaphysically as a feeling of a supersensible essence (noumenon), the very connection between God and man has the structure of creation; this connection can be compared with the relationship the monastery and the temple. "We will come to him and make our abode with him" (John 14:23). Commenting on this fragment from the Holy Scriptures, Elder Joseph Hesychast in his "Letters" emphasized: The Lord "promised [to create] a monastery, and you will become [His] temple" (I, 64).

The ideas of creation, the creation of man in the image of the God of heaven, his godlike appearance, the incessant movement towards the new within the created world, the idea of created and uncreated light, supersensible beauty are key to Christian aesthetics. From Kant's point of view, creation affects the intelligible, and not the sensually perceived existence of created beings in visible creation, "but all this would be completely different if beings in the world existed in time as things in themselves, since then the creator of substance would at the same time be the initiator of all mechanics in this substances" ^{[20, p. 559]}. After all, supersensibility and supermodernity are, in fact, the same thing, since time is one of their original forms of sensuality, it is a subjective condition for contemplating ourselves, an a priori condition of the inner phenomena of the human soul, a way of representing the subject as an object. But is such a transcendental interpretation of time an argument in favor of the fact that man is not a created substance, that he was not created by God? There is only one God beyond time, or "before the age" (Ser. 42, 21), and in Kant's view God and eternity exist in their formidable majesty. In essence, a person understood in his inner connection with God, taken with all his causality in the phenomenon, is in principle different from his hypostasis as a subject of the noumenal world - a world inaccessible to the structures of sensory thinking. Biblical thinking likens the act of creation to the action of a potter with clay. The active essence of the noumenal subject is paradoxical, since it "spontaneously (von selbst) begins its actions in the sensually perceived world, but action [as such] does not begin in itself" (AA III, S. 368). In order to produce an action as an act in time, it makes no sense to turn to the intelligible ability of pure reason, since it is not subordinated to the very form of time. Speaking about pure contemplation, Heidegger emphasized that it "can form a pure sequence of sequences "now" as such only when it has in itself an ot-, pro-, and then a generative faculty of judgment" ^{[43, p.144]}. From this point on the border of sensuality, from the concept of a sensory condition and the idea of a special gift of the faculty of judgment and the way in which imagination delivers an image to the concept, as well as images drawn in space by productive imagination and imaginative synthesis, through which an object is built in the imagination and, finally, from what Kant calls hidden in the depths of human souls are created by the art of schematism and the creation of time in the act of explicitly grasping contemplation, and a metaphysical path is paved into the aesthetic field in the Critique of Pure Reason. Also, according to her initial draft, this work was to be called "Die Grentzen der Sinnlichkeit und der Vernunft", and the methodological apparatus for developing ways to limit sensuality and reason refers to what constitutes "the nature of the doctrine of taste, metaphysics and morality" ("was die Natur der Geschmackslehre, Metaphysick und Moral ausmacht" (AA X, S. 123). So the roots of Kant's aesthetic judgment go back to the deep structures of the philosopher's speculative reflections.

Metaphysical arbitrariness

The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment is one of Kant's most difficult works. Speaking about the meaning of this work, F. Schelling wrote: "only by the purity of a truly independent soul and the great gifts of a clear spirit can it be explained that in an era of the deepest humiliation of art, when empty sentimentality reigned, and art was expected either to gross material enjoyment, then to improve morals, or in any case, to teach or some other benefit when all the beautiful things said by Winkelmann and Goethe were completely forgotten or misunderstood, Kant rises to the idea of art in its independence from any other purpose than that contained in himself, asserts the unconditionality of beauty and postulates naivety as the essence of genius in art" ^{[44, p. 31]}. Despite such a high assessment, this work is stylistically, according to even authoritative commentators, the most imperfect of all Kant's works. But philological and philosophical disciplines are still different disciplines, and if we keep in mind the semantic dignity of this work of Kant, then it is impossible not to admit that before us, despite the stylistic archaism, is the pinnacle of European aesthetic thought. Since, as we have seen, in the works of reason, more relevant indicators are located closer to artistic values, it follows that it is possible to formulate some assumptions that give a certain unity to the aesthetic way of questioning about the very cognition carried out by reason.

In the preface to the first edition of the third Critique, Kant takes a reflective look at the attitudes of the critical analysis of pure reason, seeing in it the exploration of the possibilities and boundaries of knowledge through a priori concepts – these building stones of metaphysics, while striving to develop this knowledge from its original germs. The philosopher abstracts from the ontological view of the aesthetic understanding of reality, shifting the center of gravity of his aesthetic theory to purely philosophical reflection. P. Riker will even compare the structures of metaphysical and aesthetic-metaphorical transfer: in the first case, we are talking about transferring the sensual to the non-sensual, in the second – about transferring one's own to the figurative. But if the study of the possibility of cognition and understanding of the world itself contains a metaphysical meaning, then the study of its boundaries has rather an empirical meaning: after all, the image of the border is a sensual image. Although it must be admitted that the observer of the boundary of meaning is not located on the territory of meaning itself. However, being such, can the observer himself say something about the observed phenomena? In addition, the boundary as such is something amazing, since it "belongs both to what lies within it and to the space lying outside this totality," therefore, the mind, Kant continues here, "not closing itself in the sensually perceived world, but also not fantasizing beyond it, is limited in such a way that as is typical of the concept of a border, namely, it is limited by the ratio of what lies outside the border to what is contained inside it" ^{[24, pp. 126-127]}. If we proceed from the totality of the above considerations, then shouldn't we admit that we are in a situation of metaphysical arbitrariness, especially considering how much attention Kant pays to the topic of arbitrariness (Willkür) as such. Therefore, it is quite acceptable to interpret an aesthetic idea in the aspect of a peculiar principle: it has to do with the sensually perceived world as what Kant designates as the corpus mysticum of intelligent beings in it, possessing free will.

Stepping over the sensuous, the mind strives to comprehend the supersensible, which leads us to determine the inner possibility of metaphysics. In accordance with this, aesthetic thinking should be considered as combining, on the one hand, metaphysical concepts as concepts characterizing the natural inclination of the mind, but not related to the analysis of the model of reduction of rationalistic activity to naturalistic attitudes, on the other hand, conclusions by analogy, although such a combination does not prevent the mind from reaching the objective boundary of experience. Therefore, aesthetics is directly related to a specific kind of creativity – to the creation of metaphysics as a science. And it is quite understandable why. After all, it was precisely a certain part of the scientific community – the researchers of nature - who "discovered the light. They realized that the mind penetrates only into what it creates according to its own sketch, it must hand over the principles of its judgments according to the unchangeable laws of nature and force her to answer his questions, and not drag after her as if on a sling" (AA III, S. 10). Aesthetics is precisely built on the level of metaphysics with its two-layered language for describing a pulsating field illuminated by the light of reason, lumen cognitionem, that is, light, meaning, in fact, thinking itself; this language is directly related to the transmission of the integrity of a certain radiant objectivity, which sets a certain optics for exploring the continuum of singularities in art, individualized artistic consciousnesses Such objectivity is extremely important in interpreting the discreteness of the world of works of human imagination, inspiration and mind, irrational ways of embodying talent – this "syllable of creation" (V. A. Zhukovsky). But how to aesthetically capture what can only be perceived by the artist himself, what is this pronouncing unit of art?

Aesthetics can be likened to the window spoken of by the thirteenth-century Islamic mystic Aziz Nasari, who compared the spirit to a source of light, as if standing behind the physical world, and when a person is born, this source shines through it, as through a window. Aesthetics, in fact, is such a spiritual window, illuminating with transcendent light the temple of the human soul, immersed in magnanimity (French), in what are called paradoxes of creative nature. The aesthetic expression of metaphysics also explains the possibility of a priori contemplation through the senses. Kant is trying to find an answer to the question of the conditions of aesthetic benevolence and reason, interconnected by a mosaic of relationships, but this answer is unlikely to be adequate to the question asked. After all, for metaphysics as a science, it is still necessary to find an appropriate measure so that it does not turn into entertainment capable of drowning out the "burdensome call of reason", therefore "because false feathers will be removed from metaphysics, it will not become a meager and small figure at all, but will show itself in another respect rich and decently decorated" ^{[24, p. 151]}. But should aesthetics be reduced to the adornment of metaphysics? Transcendental metaphysics, as it is understood in the first Critique, is generally abstracted from sensory representation, from feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Not to mention metaphysics in general, even its analytical part seemed to Kant to be one that "would not only be useful for its certainty and integrity, but which, moreover, due to its systematicity, would also contain an elusive beauty (vermöge des Systematischen in ihm noch überdem eine gewisse Schönheit enthalten würde)" (AA IV, S. 325). From the very beginning, the foundations of aesthetics are limited in the sense that they extend only to the conceptualization of the activity of the senses, which provide a scheme for the application of rational concepts, it remains in a complex relationship with the metaphysical predicate, which Hegel will call the insensitive sensual. At the same time, the kind of pleasure described by Kant in the third Critique, with a given tension of contradictions, differs from the tension that Plato highlighted – pleasure and suffering. Already in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant poses the question of pleasure in the following way: "All practical concepts relate to objects of benevolence or lack of it, i.e. pleasure or displeasure, therefore, at least indirectly they relate to objects of our feelings. But since feeling is not the ability to imagine things, but is outside the entire faculty of cognition, the elements of our judgments, insofar as they relate to pleasure or displeasure, therefore belong to the practical elements of our judgments, and not to the whole transcendental philosophy, which deals exclusively with pure knowledge a priori."^{[16, p. 1007 (In 829)]}. What are we talking about here? It is mainly about creating prerequisites for discussing the place of aesthetics in the system of transcendental philosophy. Truth. it is difficult to agree that feeling is taken out of the brackets of the entire faculty of cognition. But is aesthetic benevolence an understanding anticipation of the practical, an act of generating a sense of "metaphysical calmness" (G. Simmel)? Another problem of abstracting from sensuality is related to the fact that J. Derrida will consider as a way of distinguishing and at the same time connecting abstract and sensual structures: after all, abstract concepts themselves mask a sensual figure. How, then, can one express one's own status of aesthetic phenomena?

The metaphysical similarity of aesthetic ideas

Where is the resolving sign of the movement of thought, in which the judgment is fulfilled about the unfolding infinity of aesthetic impression and work, about their infinitely clarified meaning? How fundamental is the ability of judgment, and what place does it occupy among other abilities? Abilities as such are intuitively perceived by us, in their structure we can distinguish, say, "music as an "ability" with a canon [in each note there is a transformation hidden that is not audible to a Martian and is obscured by the language of "abilities"; but it is necessary to equalize the readings of instruments with the readings of feelings, considering the latter also as artificial, generated (from its own "understanding materiality"), which exists only together with interpretation, that is, to arrange thorough "settlements" of observation on all these things]" ^{[32, pp. 198-199]}. Another question is how legitimate in aesthetics is a judgment based on the division into the observer and the observed. In the world of special abilities, which include music and art in general (later Kant will complement them with a sign of giftedness, talent and genius), a rather dramatic situation is developing. In the diversity of the abilities themselves, the ability of judgment occupies a unique place as an independent ability – this mysterious ability of the mind, which was thought of in the sacred texts as the eye of the soul, which, one might say, looks into the meaning. In some modern studies, the ability to judge appears even as an operation to replace creation. For Kant, the faculty of judgment and the faculty of reason are similar in that they represent different ways of normative activity of thinking: if the mind asserts the rules, then the faculty of judgment has a distinctive ability – not only to bring under the rules, but also as a specific ability of judgment to delve into the essence of reflection itself as a state of the soul with its peculiar gift of finding, to discover, to grope for certain subjective conditions. The faculty of judgment, as we have seen, is not only the ability to apply the special, the sensual and the particular, the transition beyond which, according to Heidegger, metaphysics makes, not only the ability to bring the special under the universal transcendental law written by reason and a priori ordained by it, but also, conversely, the ability to find the universal for the special in nature. In addition, it indicates the authorship of the very connection of cognitive abilities. In a certain sense, the ability of judgment is characterized by the very mastery of their distinction, turning to the origins of the legal capacity of their application.

This mastery manifests itself not so much in the first "Criticism" as in the field of statements in the entire corpus of other Kantian texts regarding the structural features of the beautiful, sublime, heroic, tragic, comic, experience of art, since we all experience them. The evaluation of these statements forms the protocol of the very criticism of the faculty of judgment. This protocol has no cognitive significance, but it is still important to check the connection with cognitive ability, its a priori connection with the feeling of pleasure. Moreover, "the faculty of judgment can derive from itself the principle of the relation of one thing to the unknowable supersensible and must apply it only for its own purposes for the knowledge of nature" ^{[14, p. 75]}, and its a priori principle is for the knowledge of ways to adequately express the human position. And although this principle cannot be directly attributed to the feeling of pleasure, it seems that some kind of indirect relation to it is possible, and such mediation constitutes a mysterious embodiment of the principle of aesthetic judgment, taken in a transcendental aspect. Mystery as such appears in the case of an appeal to the foundations of sensory intuition, which is precisely everything that is covered by the transcendental concept of the supersensible, that is, such a concept that, according to Kant, can be "in itself indefinite and at the same time indefinable", a certain x, which today in quantum mechanics would be interpreted as a kind of "quasi-coordinate" (L. I. Mandelstam). At the same time, this mystery may be a consequence of the complexity of the problem of nature's relationship to the unknowable supersensible, favoring it, posed by natural systems themselves, their, in modern terms, strange attractor.

So, the concepts that define their object to the principles of cognition must have specifications that include various principles for substantiating the possibility of their objects; these specifications are compiled by Kant in the form of concepts of nature and freedom. They characterize the unique landscapes of philosophical knowledge: the theoretical landscape described by natural philosophy with its empirical and at the same time technically practical principles, and the practical landscape described by the philosophy of morals with its moral and practical principles, which can only be a priori, since freedom has no empirical content. At the same time, Kant seeks to completely abolish all objections to morality, to abolish, according to O. Heffe, in a "socratic way" ^{[14, S. 351]}. No less difficult is the question of distinguishing the theoretical and practical provisions themselves, as well as the question of the art of the most subtle distinction in the aesthetic field, for example, in handicraft: after all, "where there is no such distinction and division of work, where everyone is a jack of all trades, there crafts are in a state of the greatest barbarism" [24. P. 155]. As for the metaphysical distinction between theoretical and practical positions, there is no meaningful difference between them. Theoretical propositions are characterized as a way of anthropological work in accordance with certain principles that allow for the possibility of their natural conditioning through arbitrary action, which is well explained by the example of geometry (this, according to Kant, sublime science), which can also be understood as a practical part of the philosophy of nature. But already here we enter the aesthetic field, if we understand by it reflection on creative action. No matter how you say it, but "practical provisions ... relate only to the creation of objects" ^{[14, p. 839]}. But doesn't aesthetic creation seem quite self-sufficient to explain the practical? Despite the above judgment, this is hardly acceptable. And the solution of the above difficulties is possible on the basis of a kind of principle of complementarity of the theory of the object and what Kant calls the theory of our own nature, as well as through attitudes that relate to the inner states of creative consciousness. The problem is how they arise. According to Kant, "the principles of the possibility of the human condition through art should be borrowed from the principles of the possibility of our definitions arising from the properties of our nature" ^{[14, p. 843]}. Therefore, when justifying the possibility of implementing an art project, we must go beyond aesthetics and turn to what Kant calls transcendental anthropology. Art as such has its roots in the depths of human nature, the only question is what kind of roots they are. What range of possibilities does it suggest? The relationship between human nature and art, the natural and the aesthetic, has long occupied a significant place in the artistic consciousness itself. As Shakespeare wrote,

Nature does not give, but lends beauty to us.

("Sonnets", translated by V. Likhachev).

But what kind of debt obligation is this and how is it concluded? When researchers begin to explain the phenomenon of art, they, as a rule, fit it into the well-established multi-valued concept of techne in antiquity. Kant himself is interested in a special sphere of practical attitudes that describe an action by depicting its form, regardless of whether the question of the possibility of an object is solved through our will or whether there are tools necessary to make this object. Only these specifications contain the idea of freedom. But it cannot be justified theoretically, its necessity arises only in the practical field, including the region of technical provisions, certain prescriptions of skill and the consequences of theoretical knowledge about nature. This region is closer to aesthetic reality, since ἡ τέχνη means skillful making, craftsmanship, creation, art. And the initial dimensions of the aesthetic mainly take into account the ancient variables of the interpretation of techne, primarily in the context of the Aristotelian understanding of the virtues of the intellect. In fact, it lays the foundation for an understanding of aesthetics as a concept of creativity, as the wisdom of creativity, complementing its ancient interpretation as sensuality. One can, of course, abstract oneself from sensuality, and, like Plato, leave it, since it limits the mind, and "go beyond it on the wings of ideas into the empty space of pure reason" ^{[16, p. 59 (9)]}. But such abstraction calls into question the very possibility of creativity, since nothing will remain in the ideal void, even from the artist's brushstroke. Therefore, the basis for the application of aesthetic forces can only be the condition of the initially synthetic unity of creativity and sensuality, switching to what are considered deeper expressions of consciousness. Among the noted technical provisions, Kant refers to the dispositional structure that defines the art of performing what is to be implemented. As a result, we have what the ancient Greek called a techneme, τό τέχνημα – a work, a product, an invention, an art. "In a complete theory," Kant writes, "this art is always only a consequence, and not an existing part of itself" of a certain teaching. And further: "we will also use the word technique when natural objects are considered only as if their possibility were based on art" ^{[14, p. 845]}. That is, in understanding technology, Kant proceeds from a conditional understanding of art, their mutual influence on each other. This convention means that the judgment of technical solutions cannot be attributed to either theoretical or practical provisions, since they do not rely on certain features of the object or the order of its creation, they only judge it by analogy with art, but in a very remarkable way, correlating technical characteristics not with the judgment itself but only with what is connected with the map of consciousness, with the drawing of the faculty of judgment.

The relationship of various abilities in general, rather, resembles an adversarial trial, assuming the presence as one of the parties, first of all, the ability to bind, conscious of the intelligible subject, subjecting the connection as such to the process of conceptualization and visualization (today this problem is considered from the point of view of analytical philosophy and psychology, J. Tudory, for example, reveals the difficulties of the conceptualization of the emergence of human abilities [see: 41, p. 260]). Kant thinks of the connection itself as underlying philosophy – it is a kind of programmatic thinking complex that creates an environment for diverse work with the concepts of the singular, special and universal: if the mind learns the universal, distracting from everything singular and special, but making possible the coexistence of rules and laws, and the mind defines the special through the universal, extracting principles, then the faculty of judgment, mediating the connection between these two abilities, presupposes Subsumtion des Besonderen unter das Allgemeine – the attribution of the special to the universal (Russian translators, as a rule, translate: "summing up the special under the universal", which is not entirely clear: in the first introduction, Kant uses the term Subsumtion, which in German has the meaning – subordination, attribution, attachment; the Latin verb subsum has a wider range of meanings – to be under, inside, to be near, to underlie, to be contained, to hide, to hide; in the introduction to the second edition, Kant applies enthalten unter (to subordinate)). For aesthetics, not only this mediating connection is important, but also the target connection, it is important how the connection is created in general. For example, she is interested in how the mind creates a connection of the manifold in the inner sense, thereby influencing it, how the empirical contemplation of an object turns into perceptions based on the necessary unity of space and contemplation ("I sort of draw the outlines of a house in accordance with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space" ^{[16, p. 239 (162)]}), how is the ability of the mind realized, with which the laws of nature are consistent, the ability to connect the manifold in general a priori. Academician V. A. Smirnov, in his lecture "Big Cultures" (October 12, 2023) at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, examines the ability of judgment in the context of analyzing the key question – is another type of connectedness possible (and thinking itself is its unfolding). Kant would have raised the question of a concept of connection other than connectedness, a connected one (Zussamenhange) – about another kind of connection. So, speaking about coordination, he emphasizes that this is "a completely different kind of connection than that found in the simple relation of cause to action (foundation to effect), when the effect, for its part, does not determine the foundation and therefore does not form a whole with it (as the creator of the world with the world)" ^{[16, p. 181 (112)]}. Hence the problem of the relationship between creation and the created, which is so important for metaphysical aesthetics. If we talk about aesthetic things, then they are characterized by a kind of causal relationship according to the concept of expediency or regularity of the accidental, the very principle of art is based on causality according to ideas. Of particular importance is the analysis of this principle in the context of understanding reason as the ability to set goals and categorical structures of aesthetics itself, for example, the concept of mathematically and dynamically sublime. P. M. E. Azua, revealing the meaning of the teleological elevation of reason in Kant's philosophy, builds a paradoxical proof of the unity of reason precisely from the duality of the category of the sublime, while showing how "with with the help of the resonance of the teleological interpretation of reason, not only the internal systematics of the third "Criticism" is revealed, but also the internal systematics of the entire critical philosophy" ^{[33, 2023, S. 7]}. As for art itself, showing the impossibility of a physicotheological proof of the supreme essence, Kant emphasizes that it is nature acting freely according to its goals that only "makes all art possible", as, indeed, reason itself.

All the previous points are directly related to the metaphysics of the faculty of judgment in Kant's understanding. And here it is important to take into account modern interpretations of this ability. According to A. V. Smirnov, if there is another type of connectedness indicated above, then it is possible to talk about the variability of reason, and from this type of connectedness the same Kantian ability of judgment grows; the presence of another type of connectedness means that the ability of judgment is not invariant, as Kant believed, it does not give a priori laws. But this is a difficult question – according to the first "Criticism", the ability to judge is not a legislative ability at all, however, according to the third "Criticism", it should contain, if not its own legislation, then at least "its own principle of detecting laws". Moreover, the pure faculty of judgment is thought of as a priori legislating, possessing a certain autonomy. Its principle is an a priori principle. The faculty of judgment is just the summation of the subject under the predicate, but what does the metaphor of summation mean? By the way, in modern Western literature there is no unified point of view on the meaning of the metaphor itself in Kantian terms. Thus, pointing to the phenomenon of Kant's widespread fame as the creator of metaphors, M. Raffing emphasizes that "symbols, analogies and aesthetic ideas are undoubtedly metaphorical procedures that perform both a fundamental and systematic function in Kant's philosophical language" ^{[35, p. 9]}. S. Forrester fixes certain limitations in interpretation Kantian metaphors. According to his point of view, "the symbolist view of Kantian metaphors is implausible, [so] that instead we should take an aesthetic view of the idea" ^{[10, p. 107]}. What influence does metaphor have on Kant's interpretation of the faculty of judgment? Is metaphorical judgment possible?

The logic of judgment is the logic of predication. But by virtue of what do we bring the subject under the predicate and what does this summation mean? The very act of summing up is, by the way, an important aesthetic theme, it is often touched upon even in works of art. So, in I. S. Turgenev's "Niece" we read: "it would be ridiculous to sum up an infinite variety of artistic personalities under some fixed graphs." Kant's interpretation of the summation procedure means that, according to A. V. Smirnov, we use spatial metaphor. Identifying various types of predication as a means of establishing connectedness, he emphasizes that the ability to establish it, "when two are one and vice versa, is based on the ability of judgment, which Kant considered invariant, and logic, which would be impossible without the operation of attribution to a set or the statement "A is B", and our speech: we speak in sentences, not in words" ^{[40, pp. 51-52]}. Pointing out that in Semitic languages, unlike European ones, such connectedness is replaced by a simple sequence, the author here insists on the study of reason through the study of language. Given this difference, one can ask a reasonable question: "what about the ability of judgment, what about logic and coherent speech? Such startling statements mean that the work has simply not begun, that the archive of the great Arab-Muslim culture has not been read in terms of the Arabic linguistic tradition and the Arabic literary language. The reason for this neglect is not inattention, but the dogmatic idea of the one–dimensional nature of the mind, of its representation exclusively by the option that is deployed by a large European culture. This blocks access to the own thesaurus of the Arabic linguistic tradition as a high theory describing the Arabic literary language as a product of the collective mind, arranged differently from the usual European scientist from the experience of his great culture, including his science and philosophy. The comparative study of the mind, presented in different versions in large cultures of mankind, will give philosophy no less than the comparative study of languages gave to European linguistics after its centuries-old isolation within the framework of one language or one language family." But do these options give the work of reason as a whole a significantly different meaning, or do they not? Do they relate to what Husserl calls the essential events of the mind? They can be considered as an aesthetic eidetics of reason, since the philosopher seeks to reveal the perfect character of reason with its correlate – truth. What is the relationship between mind variability and mind colligation? There is also a question about the unity of reason, Husserl, analyzing the characteristics of reason belonging to doxic modalities, even pointed to the "unified character of the primordial mind." Since the concept of reason refers to the comparison of its different variants, it should first of all be noted that the comparison itself is largely an aesthetic phenomenon (as the most important means of artistic expression; in this regard, we can recall, say, the problem of similarity in the interpretation of the verse organization of Ibn Sina) – suggests their assimilation according to some common the sign. But what is this general sign, when interpreting which it should be taken into account that omnis comparatio claudicat, any comparison is lame, that is, it does not quite fit? Another question is whether the conceptualization of reason is possible through the cognizability of language, and here one cannot do without Kant's critical–reflective understanding of the foundations of rationality; it is not at all accidental that today some researchers approach the question of the metaphysical theory of rationality. And when we talk about the ability of judgment itself, we should not only talk about comparisons, metaphors, although the latter also exist, according to M. Heidegger, "only within the limits of metaphysics." Speaking about the aesthetic ability of judgment in general, one can agree with M.K. Mamardashvili, who, analyzing Kant's understanding of the aesthetic, placed it in the very core of the definition of form and at the same time emphasized that "the so–called concepts of space, time, and other concepts are not concepts, but ideas of reason similar to aesthetic ideas"^{[31, 127-128]}. And this alone brings aesthetics to a purely metaphysical level of reflection, albeit not directly, but in a roundabout way, introducing the relation of similarity in a variety of forms.

How, then, is the aesthetic included in the project of conceptual design of the faculty of judgment? Reflecting on the meaning of bringing the subject under the predicate, it is necessary to ask the question, in the structures of which logic we talk about the ability of judgment – formal or transcendental. If the former is distracted from considering the landscape of applied knowledge, then the latter in the analysis of concepts and principles prescribes "not only the clarification of a pure concept as an element of pure knowledge, but also the definition and justification of the essential unity of pure knowledge. Thus, logic gets an absolute advantage over aesthetics, although, on the other hand, it is contemplation that is the primary whole of cognition" ^{[43, p. 56]}. The rules that correct the ability of judgment contain not only the rules of judgment, but also the canon of their application or giving them reality. Kant sees in this ability a natural talent, a manifestation of wit, a property of the natural mind (Mutterwitz), which finds out whether the general concept describes a specific case. However, Nancy expresses doubts about the effectiveness of transcendental logic in constructing the third "Criticism", since it is precisely unable to identify specific cases. But such a judgment looks rather strange. Heidegger also noted that "since aesthetics and logic are oriented from the very beginning towards transcendence, which is not just the sum of pure contemplation and pure thinking, but their truly original unity, in which they function only as elements, their mutual result should lead to something more than themselves"^{[43, p. 112]}. Moreover, since in the first "Critique" the very ability of judgment is a rubric of transcendental logic, the doctrine of which opens a new book of this logic dedicated to the analysis of the fundamentals, in the third "Critique" this rubric, despite the modal-axiological shift of semantic emphasis in its interpretation, still retains its cognitive intention and gives a transcendental an exposition of aesthetic judgments. If we talk about logic itself, then it should be borne in mind that the aesthetic judgment of reflection, in which chance is considered as the determining basis in the goal, opposes logical judgment, although it often loses in this confrontation, since due to aesthetic impressionability one can lose logical vigilance [see: 11, p.358]. As for the concepts of chance, chance, it should be noted that the application of the faculty of judgment is a necessary application, moreover, ordered by the a priori principle: therefore, "for human discretion, the accidental in the special (empirical) laws of nature still contains, although incomprehensible to us, but nevertheless conceivable natural unity when linking its diverse [content] in itself a possible experience" ^{[14, p. 109]}.

Given all these difficulties and entanglements, it becomes clear how difficult it is to find the a priori principle of the faculty of judgment, to deduce it from the incomprehensible, but conceivable for us; such a conclusion should be carried out at the level of studying the issues of philosophical propaedeutics as the field of application of the a priori principles themselves. The faculty of judgment undertakes a discursive analysis of its own normative activity, devoid, however, of an objective assessment, otherwise it would be necessary to take a recursive step to determine whether this incident depends on the corresponding normative event. Kant plays the aporia associated with the principle of the faculty of judgment on the example of aesthetic judgments, which constitutes an important part of the third "Criticism". And although the research undertaken in it does not contribute to cognition, they are still confined to cognitive ability, being a sign of its connections with the feeling of pleasure. And this sets us the task of revealing the meaning not only of an aesthetic event, but also of cognition itself. "What is knowledge for? This is a dramatic question. Maybe the question is unacceptable. We find that our minds are spontaneously designed to make a priori synthetic judgments. But the primary pleasure of learning has been lost – we do not know what we are learning for. At the same time, the question arises about our purpose, because our cognition presupposes the unity of nature... The technique of the faculty of judgment will already become an open art of receptivity, assumed as such and put to the test as such. Well, this is an aesthetic pleasure" ^{[35, pp. 165-166]}. And when we talk about the aesthetic faculty of judgment, we are talking, using the expression highlighted by the author, about the open art of the receptivity of organic beings in the world, their comprehension; as for the feeling of pleasure, then with regard to it, aesthetic judgment itself establishes a constitutive principle.

But aesthetic judgment itself has its limits, defined by the structures of metaphysical experience. And mixing the boundaries of different principles – aesthetic, moral and logical judgment – can give rise to a kind of sfumato in the intellectual sphere (a kind of chaotic knowledge). And if we talk, for example, about logical judgment relating to the natural sciences, then the specificity of the faculty of judgment lies in the fact that it allows us to draw from itself a position about the involvement of natural phenomena in the unknowable supersensible, about which Kant has certain doubts. But the supersensible itself is the starting point of Kant's entire metaphysics. And this doubt is evidence of his "amazing sincerity and modesty, which is in principle alien to great philosophers. And in this doubt is also his enduring greatness" ^{[36, p. 190]}. At the same time, aesthetics uses this position not for objective cognition, but for subjective cognition, considering nature itself only for its own purposes, so that the initial postulates of aesthetic science relate to the concept of expediency, to the knowledge of the life world, organic laws. Showing how the transition from causality to the doctrine of purpose is methodically leveled in Kant's teaching, in which systematic creative power is acquired, G. Cohen emphasized that the idea of purpose has its roots in the logic of the original. "The concept of purpose in the ethical problem of man becomes the concept of the original. With the concept of the original, we can try to bring freedom and autonomy to exact purity as well.… In the end, the principle of aesthetics, beauty as a systematic thought of the origin, can also be justified" ^{[30, p. 613]}. In this sense, the aesthetic is almost a kind of intellectual substance, its metaphysical language describes only not something that exists in itself, but something that gives law to itself as an expression of the universal dignity of the individual. Therefore, the purely metaphysical question of the original origin of organization as such, and the possibility of a teleological explanation of the nature of aesthetic action, is so important. The solution to this metaphysical question assumes that the goals themselves justify the possibility of an action that is carried out only in ourselves, in our intellectual world, capable of generating phenomena in harmony with the goals in the form of works of art.

Despite the requirement of conformity to the experience of art, Kant increasingly attracts in aesthetics the mental structures that were considered the prerogative of metaphysics (the supersensible, modality, human nature, and so on). The very combination of the principle of judging expediency and the aesthetic principle, the principle of art, acts as a metaphysical concept. Philosophy as such, according to the First Introduction to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, can be represented as a system of cognition by reason, and it is very noteworthy that the question of the system itself is sometimes raised in modern Western Kantology even purely aesthetically – as a question of creation. But for Kant, another important problem is how to distinguish the system of cognition by reason from the critique of pure reason, which, although it does not structure such a system, but justifies its idea. This system has a rather complicated branching. One of its components is defined by the description of forms of thinking in their normative integrity, the other by the analysis of objects of thought accessible to rational cognition through concepts. The last philosophical branch leads us to the basis of the distinction between the principles of science, which appears in the form of theoretical (philosophy of nature with its empirical principles) and practical (philosophy of morals with its a priori principles) philosophy. Here, the greatest difficulties are caused by issues related to practical provisions that relate to the arbitrary creation of a mental state in us, the creation of the possibility of objects through this arbitrariness. Kant doubts the possibilities of practical psychology, conceivable as part of anthropological philosophy, and such doubts are extremely important to take into account when explaining aesthetic things. "The fact is that the principles of the possibility of the human condition through art should be borrowed from the principles of the possibility of our definitions arising from the properties of our nature, and although they consist in practical provisions" ^{[14, p. 843]}, nevertheless, the provisions themselves cannot be attributed to the formations of experimental psychology, since they do not have a fundamental diagrams, but they only make up a commentary on psychological texts.

Since the structure of practical propositions in philosophy contains both empirical and a priori statements about the world, the former as such can be attributed to its theoretical part. The actual practical statements should include those that convey the idea of freedom and justify moral precepts. It is precisely such statements that Kant refers to practical philosophy as a special part of the system of cognition by reason. He calls all other statements not practical, but technical provisions. At the same time, we are not talking about technology in the modern sense, for Kant this term goes back to the ancient Greek ἡ τέχνη - art, craft, skill, skill, method, work, product. This application of the term technique draws us to the essence of the aesthetic imperative. After all, the technical provisions "relate to the art of doing what they want it to properly take place" ^{[14, p. 845]}, turning what they want into reality. Kant analyzes the natural technique or symbolic consideration of the aesthetic foundations of the world in the same way as in the first "Critique" he judged the perception of the world as if (als ob) it were the creation of a higher being. At the same time, we are not talking about the substitution of creation with the technique of nature, which was mentioned above, because this substitution is sometimes considered as an introduction to the subject of universal equivalents, as an opportunity to be a distinguishing element of the creative force of the architect who creates form and the creator himself who creates matter; such a field of equivalents sets the structure of transfer, the structure of similarity (metaphor, analogy, symbol, image, sign, etc.), bringing under the idea of the same (creation) as another (technique), transcending epistemic thinking about creation itself and affirming the possibility of the original. But such interpretations are hardly worth taking seriously. After all, Kant initially introduces the concept of technology not as a structure of substitution, but as an idea of using whatever it is. The very beginning, according to Kant, is incomprehensible to us; technical judgment goes beyond both theoretical and practical judgment, here the activity of judgment is not limited either to the properties of the object or to the method of its creation, sometimes it is called, paradoxically, that which becomes a work, then a surrogate of creative performance. The conceptual justification of this activity is precisely given by the principle of the faculty of judgment.

Modern Western researchers are trying to explain what lies behind the ability to judge, without plunging into thoughtful metaphysics. Analyzing Kant's critical philosophy, J. Deleuze uses different semantic accents in his interpretation of the concept of ability: it depends on the type of connection, referring to a special source of ideas. At the same time, describing the relationship of the abilities themselves, for some reason he excludes the ability of judgment from their structure: "three active abilities (imagination, reason, reason) enter into a certain connection, which is a function of speculative interest. It is the mind that legislates, and it is it that judges; but below the mind, imagination synthesizes and schematizes, reason concludes and symbolizes so that knowledge has the maximum of synthetic unity" ^{[7, p. 166]}. He addresses the analysis of the faculty of judgment only in the second part of the section devoted to the relationship of abilities in the third "Criticism".

So far, we have been talking mainly about Kant's understanding of the structure of philosophy, now we have to consider the way to build a system of thinking abilities, as it is performed in the First Introduction to the "Critique of the Faculty of Judgment". Here it is presented in the form of a matrix of abilities, which shows how much thinking is able to perform a certain action, allowing you to operate with the concepts of the general (rule, principle, law) and the special: to know the general, to bring the special under it and, finally, to determine the latter through the general (having received a conclusion about the principles). This matrix (although not yet fully represented, it still lacks a pure way of contemplation, sensuality, imagination, the transcendental synthesis of which "underlies all ... our ideas about reason" (AA XX, S. 345)) sets the a priori metric, respectively, of reason, which brings with it the law of nature, and reason, which gives the law of freedom, and, finally, the ability of judgment with its own rhythm of linking these two abilities, that is, builds a system of all abilities. And it is quite understandable why F. Schelling saw in the system itself a harmonic sequence similar to the rhythm of tones in music. It is the apriorism of the faculty of judgment, Kant suggests, that "will lay the foundation for a special part of philosophy." But such a philosophical step would lead to the fact that one would have to admit, as already noted, a three-part structure of philosophy; the most important thing is that it does not reflect its integrity, which has a two-part composition.

The faculty of judgment is conceived by Kant as a kind of cognitive ability, possessing far from dispositive characteristics that do not allow any projection of rational concepts or ideas of reason. The processing of the sculptural casting of the faculty of judgment involves only summing up concepts that are not filled in by it. But the faculty of judgment can also carve out "its" mental form, which acquires a conceptual relationship to nature with a range of such qualities that are consistent with this ability. It allows for the first time to build bridges between private and general laws of nature that have yet to be discovered. This ability has conceptual thinking, structuring the legislative field through the generalization of "the expediency of nature according to our ability to know it, since this requires that we can judge the special as contained in the universal and have the opportunity to bring it under the concept of nature" ^{[14, p. 849]}. Judgment receives its final embodiment by virtue of some incomprehensible universal aesthetic flash, with which nature itself is illuminated as if it were born in the bosom of harmony with the very faculty of judgment. All statements about nature as an organic whole are made as a result of their reducibility to a certain semantic center formed by the principle of expediency (random regularity), which the faculty of judgment provides in nature, or the principle of correspondence of nature to our faculty of judgment.

This and other metaphysical difficulties arise when trying to adapt the interpretation of the faculty of judgment to aesthetics. The ability to judge is such a form of conceptual thinking that it has never become an idea, although it has ceased to be a category – from here one can see its obvious intermediateness. This is a subtle shade of its activity, which exists at the very moment when it was revealed as a system according to empirical laws. All this makes us turn to the search for additional concepts that could define the boundaries of the diversity of empirical laws and the heterogeneity of natural forms, the mastery of which allows us to build a private experience. Although the complementarity of this project problematizes the concept of an empirical system of cognition, nevertheless, it is the private experience itself that functions as a mirror reflecting the systematic connection of the laws of nature. This system opens up for the ability of judgment the prospect of bringing the special under the general, building an empirical unity. Hegel rightly pointed out that in the third "Critique" there appears a requirement of concreteness, according to which the idea of "unity was posited not as something otherworldly, but as present" ^{[6, p. 504]}, making possible, according to Kant, an all-encompassing natural connection. Kant calls a random pattern the formal expediency of nature, the presence of which is assumed in it. It is not just about the deep analogy between nature and cognition, but about how subtly the shades of theoretical images of cognition of nature and practical maxims of freedom are reflected in thinking; rather, it refers to heuristic methods used to solve the problem of building a model of the desired systematic connection that will lead to a priori cognition a coherent experience. The faculty of judgment is that aesthetic place in the structure of the intellect where the concept first arises – the concept of nature as art, a kind of artistic appellation of the world concept. If we keep in mind the ancient tradition of using the concept of art, then it can also be interpreted as the concept of the technique of nature with respect to its special laws. Such a conceptual framework does not provide any theoretical knowledge about nature as a system according to transcendental laws, but only creates an understanding structure for it to be observed in accordance with objective laws of nature, with which natural forms would be compared. We are talking about the conceptualization of the subjective study of nature, which makes it possible to introduce a systemic connection into the diversity of its empirical laws. And Kant presents such a study as part of a system of criticism of pure reason, which studies the relationship between two intermediate abilities – the sense of pleasure and the ability to judge, the latter containing an a priori principle for the former. Since the a priori principle for the phenomena that make up the fabric of experience gives reason, the question arises – what role can the a priori principle of judgment play in relation to a single empirical field, divided into general and particular laws. Their diversity and heterogeneity are so great that it is not possible to bring empirical laws to generic unity under some general principle, to systematize them according to the laws that the understanding gives a priori for phenomena (modes of representation). Despite this fiasco, we still have to rely on transcendental expressions of the faculty of judgment, well-known formulas can be considered as the basis of their typology (nature takes the shortest path, it does nothing in vain, does not make a leap in a variety of forms), and they point to the principle for experience as a system and contribute to the ascent from empirically special to the more general, although also empirical. Indeed, unity in the sense of transcendental aesthetics coincides with the unity of possible experience, in the structures of which nature itself appears to us as an objective reality.

In the structure of the faculty of judgment, aesthetics is primarily interested in the reflective faculty of judgment, when we analyze our thoughts about specific representations or phenomena in order to internally focus on the concept possible through the comparison and synthesis of these representations. It also needs the transcendental principle of its activity. "The reflective faculty of judgment, in order to bring these phenomena under empirical concepts of certain natural things, treats them not schematically, but technically, not purely mechanically, like an instrument controlled by reason and feelings, but artistically, according to the universal, but at the same time indefinite principle of the expedient arrangement of nature in a certain system, as if in the interests of our ability to judge in accordance with the special laws of nature (about which the mind says nothing) and the possibility of experience as a system" (AA XX, S. 214). The reflexive faculty of judgment correlates sensory contemplation with concepts, and analyzing how Kant interprets feeling itself, domestic researchers sometimes present it as an education filled with the principle of uncertainty (although Kant himself compares it almost to a mechanical tool). But is metaphysics deducted from the analysis of this vague feeling, and what metaphysical questions arise when trying to correlate this analysis with an understanding of the aesthetic? The problem, first of all, is that Kant's aesthetic system is set not just by a sensually indefinite, but by an even more complex principle of the universally indefinite, in fact, the principle of art, expressing the expedient arrangement of the world in the idea of its system, as if in the interests of the faculty of judgment descending to the special and diverse from the heights of a general concept. So, as proponents of a narrow interpretation of sensuality believe, Kant does not pick up aesthetic thought as a kind of analogue of feeling. That is, we can judge nature as art if we recognize that it specifies its transcendental laws according to the principle of the very faculty of judgment, as if creating them and allowing us to find in the infinite variety of its phenomena their affinity according to possible empirical laws. Of course, there is a logical expediency, but from its installations it is impossible to understand how the forms of the system are revealed in natural things, as well as how the ability to produce these forms themselves is realized in them. Considering expediency as a "regularity of the accidental", which is perceived in the act of reflection on a given object, Kant shows how it arises from the subjective relationship of phenomena to one of the abilities of our soul, the ability of judgment, the idea of which justifies the possibility of formation itself. This idea generates the absolute expediency of natural forms, but only in relation to phenomena as systems, nature acts as an artist, and the expedient forms themselves can be given to both him and the scientist, only empirically. At the same time, expediency as such, which opens access to systematic unity in the division and specification of special forms of nature, can be built on a supersensible basis, transcending ideological structures. Hence, the way of approaching the aesthetic judgment of reflection is clear. This is how Kant describes it. If "the form of a given object in empirical contemplation is such that the grasp of the diverse [content] of this object in the imagination is consistent with the representation of the concept of reason (it is unclear which concept), then in simple reflection, reason and imagination agree with each other, contributing to their work, and the object is perceived as appropriate only for the ability of judgment, therefore, Expediency itself is considered only as subjective. After all, this does not require and does not generate any definite concept of the object, and the judgment itself is not a cognitive judgment. – Such a judgment is called an aesthetic judgment of reflection" ^{[14, pp. 885, 887]}. Reflecting on the problem of finding the boundaries of aesthetics, Kant highlights the most important perspective of its consideration not only from the point of view of reflection, but also from the point of view of image theory. Modern Western researchers are also trying to answer the question of the nature of the image, trying to build a unified theory of image types, combining the ideas of philosophy of science, cognitive science and cognitive psychology. At the same time, it is emphasized: "we can understand what images are only if we truly understand the role they play in our thought procedures, challenging the popular belief that the usefulness of images is only instrumental and cognitively inferior" ^{[24, p. 10]}. Kant explicitly recognizes that the discovery of the reflective faculty of judgment presupposes what today we would call a project of art, an artistic image, which includes not only our attitude to the device of the imperative of expedient connections, but also a methodological meaning referring to the foundations of theories that are based on an understanding of experimental data (the law of specification, the principle of affinity of phenomena according to possible empirical laws). And this completely changes the methodology of scientific research itself and largely explains the phenomenon of the methodological attractiveness of Kantian criticism for modern philosophy and science, for understanding the meaning of aesthetic debates about the nature of image and visual perception (E. Gombrich, N. Goodman).

As we can see, Kant approaches aesthetic science, the nature of aesthetic judgment very specifically, clearly realizing that no other kind of cognition can achieve its completeness, except metaphysics, when the mind, entering its territory, is in a rather dramatic situation - it is unable either to hold on to the conditioned or to comprehend absolutely. In this sense, the mind remains in the same intermediate position, enters the same bridge of explication, in which the aesthetic theory built by Kant will remain, only this time on the territory of the metaphysics of the abilities of the soul. In aesthetics, this metaphysical drama is precisely played out when reason (and the aesthetic idea is in reverse accordance with the idea of reason: after all, the aesthetic faculty of judgment and reason operate with the same concepts of "special" and "general", only aesthetics brings the first under the second, and reason defines the first through the second) instead of the border The world seeks to delineate the boundary of its own ability, to reveal its characteristic antinomy in the aesthetic application of the faculty of judgment. Unlike empirical contemplation, which, when applying the manifold, binds imagination and discursive representation with immanent harmony, complements this harmony in pure reflection so that diversity itself is perceived as subjective expediency.

Kant admits ambiguity in the expression of the aesthetic way of representation. This expression can also characterize the cognitive attitude of representation, that is, our receptivity, to the phenomenon, and then the aesthetic itself can refer to the form of sensuality, which is why a transcendental aesthetics was built, referring not to the reflexive ability of judgment, but to the ability to cognize an object through representations or the so-called spontaneity of concepts about it. Pointing out that the theme of spontaneity, understood as the action of reason and will, resonates throughout Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy, K. A. Moran emphasizes that, "since spontaneity and the accompanying concept of freedom underlie many of Kant's most important theses and arguments concerning cognition, judgment and moral actions, then both by themselves often remain shrouded in mystery or accessible only through transcendental arguments" ^{[31, p.10]}. From an aesthetic point of view, the interpretation of spontaneity of thinking is important as the ability to begin a state and a number of phenomena, as the ability to connect the diverse content of contemplation through the self-activity of the subject. Concepts are based on it, and it requires viewing the diverse content of representations and linking it to obtain new knowledge. We are talking about the ability to independently create concepts with the help of reason, as well as the ability of the mind to act spontaneously, while creating its own "own order". And here a fundamental antithesis breaks out between two levels of understanding of the aesthetic: at the first level, Kant, abstracting from sensuality, justifies only its a priori principles that give us the form of phenomena, and metaphysically interprets the concepts of space and time as transcendental structures. He associates this level with cognitive ability. This is the so-called transcendental aesthetics of the first "Criticism". But there is another level, to some extent in contact with the psychological part of the first, when the aesthetic means the sensual, in this case we are talking about the relationship of representation to Gefühl der Lust, to the feeling of pleasure (and its denial), understood as a modification of our internal state, the basis of which is the consistency of cognitive abilities. In this sense, the aesthetic is devoid of any cognitive properties, which, by virtue of its subjective meaning, undermines the status of aesthetics as an objective science, and this is despite the fact that the aesthetic subject is somehow included in the world he is aware of. And the ambiguity of the expression "aesthetic way of representation" stems from the area of distinguishing a priori contemplation (the original forms of sensuality) and the experience of affective states. The conceptual foundations of aesthetic developments are clarified when the term "aesthetic" does not relate to contemplation and discursive representation, but only to acts of the faculty of judgment in its reflexive variation, when we make a judgment only about the subjective expediency of the subject, we reflect on the holistic perception of the harmony of cognitive abilities, as well as on art and its foundations, we ask The goal is to create a mosaic of relations between philosophy and art, in which the most complex mental transitions are developed, semitones are softened, and unusual compositional techniques are used. Let us recall in this connection Stendhal, who in his "Letter on Mozart" (Monticello, August 29, 1814) emphasized that "from a philosophical point of view, Mozart seems to be an even more amazing phenomenon than he appears to us as the author of magnificent musical works."

Aesthetics as a propaedeutics of philosophy

There is no such text among Kant's aesthetic texts,

Where is the evidence of dry thoughts

They would not show intelligence.

(Boris Pasternak "God's Peace")

A great mind, we add. And that is why it is so important to understand how the Kantian mind will build the metaphysical language of aesthetics, the language produced by Kantian transcendentalism. After all, Kant's pathos "boils down to re-enacting metaphysics based on sensuality" ^{[35, p. 158]}. No less difficult is the question of how to reproduce metaphysics, based on the fact that there is such a special sphere of sensuality, which is often reduced to pleasure and displeasure. And why is the feeling of pleasure itself correlated with an aesthetic representation? Indeed, in the world tradition, the aesthetic is associated with positive feelings of joy, surprise, delight, delight, charm, catharsis. For example, the same surprise, according to modern concepts, "responds to our fundamental need to understand ourselves and everything around us, allowing us to interact with the world as if we were seeing it for the first time" ^{[5, p. 232]}. Therefore, when Kant speaks about the feeling of joy, pleasure, enjoyment (das Gefühl der Lust), it is more appropriate to keep in mind a wider range of feelings and experiences, not to mention the fact that in the Georgian and Russian translation tradition (A. Bochorishvili, E. Feinberg, A. Guliga) the term benevolence (das Wohlgefallen) is used, having also the meanings: satisfaction, pleasure, sympathy, sympathy (recall the biblical: Friede auf Erden und den Menschen ein Wohlgefallen – peace on earth and good will in man). And Kant himself will often turn to the specified spectrum when considering the aesthetic. It is also important for aesthetics that Kant's interpretation of pleasure itself is connected with the problems of creativity and objectivity – the concept of pleasure is defined by him as "the power of the subject to activity" in order to produce, create an object ("der Kräfte des Subjekts zur Handlung, es hervorzubringen" (AA V, S. 9)).

Our aesthetic representations model the world, and these representations differ from logical and rational ones in that they absorb only the subjective side of the representation itself, which is in no way related to the reproduced image of the object, with its definition in the order of logical, cognitive operations. Kant will characterize this side as an aesthetic property of this representation associated with a sense of pleasure. In this sense, it is identical with what appears in perception and is an expediency, which is also not a quality of the object, although it can be deduced epistemologically. "Expediency, which precedes the cognition of an object and which, moreover, even if there is no desire to use this representation for cognition, is nevertheless directly connected with the representation of the object, [such expediency] is that subjective in the representation that cannot become the moment of cognition. Consequently, the object in this case is called expedient only because the idea of it is directly related to the feeling of pleasure; and this very idea is an aesthetic idea of expediency" ^{[14, p. 123]}. Pleasure is not a formalized representation of the world, and although it is associated with an apportionment of the form of the object of contemplation, but its reproduction corresponds only to the subject, so that pleasure itself speaks not only of its proportionality with cognitive abilities, which manifest themselves in the play of the reflective faculty of judgment, in what Goethe called Kant's "apology of the game", but also about the subjective formal expediency of the object. We grasp these forms in the imagination in its freedom, but this is possible if the reflective faculty of judgment is aimed at strengthening its tendency to measure contemplations and concepts. If this comparison reveals the harmony of imagination and reason, then much in its tone contributes to the awakening of a sense of pleasure, and our contacts with objects are projected onto patterns of activity associated with incomparable pleasure from contemplating objects as data in reflective perception and appropriate for the reflective ability of judgment. We judge such objects as aesthetically expedient, abstracting from the idea of them as having a concept as their premise. And if the statement about the pleasure of presenting such an object is characteristic of everyone who makes such judgments, then Kant calls the object itself beautiful, and the event of such a judgment, which claims to be universally valid, despite its internal randomness, is a manifestation of taste. "Receptivity to pleasure from reflection on the forms of things (both nature and art) denotes not only the expediency of objects in relation to the reflective ability of judgment in accordance with the concept of nature in the subject, but also, conversely, the expediency of the subject in relation to objects, if we keep in mind their form and even formlessness, by virtue of the concept of freedom that is why aesthetic judgment, on the one hand, as a judgment of taste correlates with the beautiful, and on the other – as arising from a certain spiritual feeling – and with the sublime" ^{[14, p. 129]}.

Depending on which basis – subjective or objective – we represent expediency in the subject of experience, there will be a further distinction in the "Critique of the faculty of judgment." If we are talking about a subjective basis, then we mean the harmony of the form of an empirical object and cognitive ability associated with a sense of pleasure, this harmony arises in the process of grasping the form itself and is set at a pre–predicative level through the synthesis of contemplation and concept, a synthesis taken in its activity and considered taking into account its epistemic features. If we are talking about an objective basis, then we mean the correspondence found by the mind of the form of an object with its very possibility, given in proportion to the concept of it and stemming from the principle of substantiation of this form. In order to understand how much experience has become aesthetically relevant, it is necessary to consider in more detail the background of the synthesis of contemplation and the concept that exercises the ability of judgment. She epistemologically applies the concept in the form of its image, that is, brings the concept and the contemplation corresponding to it closer, "it doesn't matter whether it happens through our own imaginative ability, as in art, when we realize a preconceived concept of an object that is a goal for us, or through nature, in its technique (as in organic bodies), when we bring our concept of purpose into it to judge its product" ^{[14, p. 131]}. Based on this, Kant distinguishes in the critical analysis of the faculty of judgment between criticism of the aesthetic and criticism of the teleological faculty of judgment, considering the former as the ability to judge formal or subjective expediency through a sense of pleasure. The aesthetic faculty of judgment is of fundamental importance for the entire structure of the third "Criticism", since it contains an a priori principle for a reflexive approach to the natural world and the human world – the principle of the formal expediency of nature in a subjective relation to our cognitive ability, considered according to its particular laws; without this, the picture of cognition would be quite vague to the mind. Pavel Florensky, who saw in the contemplation of objective expediency a source of surprise, believed that Kant himself was here moving away from the spirit of Kantianism and, as it were, turning to the attitudes of "concrete metaphysics."

At the same time, as a special ability, it brings under sensory judgment the harmony of the form of the object of nature and our cognitive ability, observing nature from the point of view of certain normative, and not only conceptual structures. But it is worth noting here that the very problem of the relationship between judgment and sensuality is quite complex. Even the medieval commentator on Virgil's Aeneid believed that Virgil was sometimes unfairly reproached for destroying his own judgments with some kind of counter-empathy. Today, there are various interpretations of this concept. But we will give here only the one given by S. S. Averintsev, characterizing the Vergielian counter-feeling, especially since this interpretation also has in mind the structure of judgment to some extent. Counter-empathy means that "the complexity of the world enters into the consciousness of an individual, not facilitating, but aggravating the demands of his conscience. You have to pay not just the bill, but all the bills, and you will hardly be able to pay until the end. Instead of an external "agon" played out with a partner, there is an internal dispute, an argument with oneself, going on in depth, sometimes soundlessly; the noise of arguments and counterarguments is replaced by a responsible and quiet realization of the difficult truth that for a person of civilization who has emerged from identity into history, mediated by history, moral conflict is no longer an emergency an incident, not a special case, but an element in which one must learn to live. The further you go, the deeper you plunge into this element. Our acquaintance with her has lost the sharpness of the first experience, which it had in the time of Virgil, but has become incomparably comprehensive: two millennia have not passed in vain. Self–willed, irresponsible attempts to make life easier for oneself lead into emptiness, in whichever of two possible directions – in the direction of a false imitation of wholeness or in the direction from a relativistic rejection of the need for wholeness - they are not undertaken. You can seek to forcibly simplify problems, throw out of memory that you have already seen another side of the truth that is not facing you, like the other side of the moon, drown out this knowledge with an aggressive and straightforward statement of truths accepted in your circle; but this is against the conscience of the mind. One can calm down on the fact that everything is relative, the moral norm is an illusion, the subject of moral responsibility is a phantom, because an intermittent sequence of random reactions to random influences cannot answer for anything and to no one, there is no one to answer....What we said about Virgil is a "saying"; the "fairy tale" concerns ourselves. Thinking about the fate of culture today can only go the way of "counter-feelings". It is important that this does not condemn him to either skepticism or relativism" ^{[1, pp. 331-332]}, but in aesthetics he turns to the conscience of the creator, which is the essence of artistic synergy.

While not contributing to the knowledge of nature, the aesthetic faculty of judgment, which structures the focus of culture, and not pseudo-culture, nevertheless is of crucial importance for understanding the development of the expressive side of cognitive practices; this ability refers "only to the criticism of the expressing judgment of the subject and his cognitive abilities, since they have access to a priori principles, which, however, no matter their use (theoretical or practical), and this criticism constitutes the propaedeutics of any philosophy" ^{[14, p. 137]}.

We will now approach the understanding of the goals and objectives of aesthetic propaedeutics of philosophy not in the context of the first edition of the introduction to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, but in the context of their analysis in the second edition, in the final chapter of which the connection through the faculty of judgment between two forms of legislation carried out by reason and reason is revealed. This is a more concise version of the general argument that this connection cannot be the basis of research in either theoretical or practical philosophy, this basis should be sought in a completely different field. These arguments are already set out in the first edition. Such a search does not concern the specific content of the processes in this area, but the parameters of its nature, which are precisely determined by the ability of judgment. Here is a map of consciousness that is consonant with the higher abilities of the soul and requires philosophical research and justification in the structures of experimental metaphysics. Characterizing the prospects of metaphysics, which has entered the reliable path of science, to which it should be guided by a changed way of thinking, Kant emphasizes that "with the help of the ability to know a priori, we can never go beyond the limits of possible experience, and this is precisely the most essential task of this science" ^{[16, p. 21 (XIX)]}, the task of experimental metaphysics, in the architecture of the future solution of which should be embedded not only theoretical philosophy, but also aesthetics. In addition, the aesthetic is implicated in the experimental structure itself. Drawing a distinction between physical and mental experiment, Ernst Mach emphasized that "... the visionary, the novelist, the poet of social or technical utopias – all experiment in the mind. But so does... a serious inventor or researcher. All of them imagine known conditions and associate with this idea the expectation, the assumption of known consequences: they make a mental experience. However, while the former combine conditions in their imagination that do not really exist, or attribute consequences unrelated to these conditions in their imagination, the latter remain very close to reality in their thinking" ^{[33, p. 190]}. Kant's aesthetics is based on the close proximity of metaphysical thinking to experiment, creating an aesthetic equivalent of metaphysical experience.

According to theoretical philosophy, the understanding, which makes possible nature itself, which appears to our senses, contains a priori constitutive principles of theoretical knowledge, as a result of which it prescribes its legislation to nature a priori; it is the ability to understand what we perceive in the world, the ability to infer, build indirect judgments and give rules. The mind is characterized by a tendency to assume the existence of something else invisible behind the objects of the senses, symbolizing the supersensible substratum of nature in all its uncertainty. Thus, he solves the puzzling task of identifying the laws of their connection. Reason focuses on the activity of the mind and its operations with judgments that directly address the senses and relate to its concepts of objects, to the understanding of perceptions – this instrument of conceptual comprehension, which gives coherence to the mind, establishes a priori legislation for freedom with its peculiar causality, which is expressed through the idea of the supersensible in the subject. Reason builds a never-ending system of knowledge, its a priori concepts bring unity to the diversity of discursive knowledge, create discursive harmony of the projected unity of the diverse, reaching a "harmonic maximum" (Marina Tsvetaeva), bring the rules of reason to possible harmony, looking for the unconditional for the conditioned. Here the foundations of art coincide with the a priori possibilities of the senses. Thanks to the mind, a person distinguishes himself from the world around him, experiencing the effects of objects on his senses. Reason is the creator of concepts, its distinctive ability is the ability to give principles or synthetic knowledge from pure concepts, through which we know the particular in general, Kant calls them ideas that build a transcendental doctrine of the soul and a transcendental science of the world. Through these ideas, the mind reaches the extreme limits of cognition, delivering pragmatic laws of free behavior for the realization of sensually conditioned goals. And it is quite understandable why J. Derrida considers Kant among thinkers such as Marx and Althusser, who "insist on the priority of the practical order. Rather, they are talking about creating strict conditions for practicality in order to avoid possible deviations of the mind from theoretical and speculative mysticism" ^{[8, p. 37]}. Kant points to the ultimate goal, which lies in the whole purpose of man, and he calls the philosophy that justifies such a goal morality. Moral philosophy is part of the structure of pure philosophy, and "all the equipment of the mind in the processing of what can be called pure philosophy is indeed aimed at ... a more distant goal, namely [determining] what should be done if the will is free, if there is a God and if there is an afterlife" ^{[16, p. 1007 (In 828-829)]}. For aesthetics, the question is in what language one can speak about what should be done. After all, reality itself

...little consolation

The one with the smoldering intellect.

The language of the gods has been banished by the earth,

Priyala prose dialect.

(Igor Severyanin "Poetry of mental pain").

The language of aesthetics is the language of freedom - it's like a translation from the language of the gods. The concept of nature and the concept of freedom do not intersect anywhere, according to Kant, there is a deep abyss between them, over which it is impossible to bridge – neither between nature and freedom, nor between the supersensible and the phenomenon. But the impracticability of such a transitional design poses difficult problems for aesthetics. For example, Christian Thies poses the question: "what bridges did Kant build from the aesthetic to the moral – and how strong are they" ^{[40, S. 630]}? This issue is especially acute if we talk about modern bridge construction, which impresses not only with its aesthetic designs, but also with unimaginable rational calculations using high-speed computers, calculations that allow taking into account a huge number of external factors affecting its design. We are talking, therefore, about the complicated relationship between the aesthetic and the rational in the modern era. And it is not by chance that S. L. Frank will emphasize the importance of considering the involvement of artistic knowledge and abstract knowledge. Despite the problematic nature associated with the construction of such a mental bridge, Kant nevertheless admits the possibility of a kind of reverse bridge on the territory of metaphysics, the construction of which assumes that the supersensible affects the sensual through causality through freedom. Action in accordance with the concept of freedom indicates the ultimate goal as a necessary condition for the possibility of free goal-setting, inherent in human nature. The existence of such an a priori premise implies the ability of judgment, providing a transition from the concept of nature to the concept of freedom, this ability contains the regulatory principle of cognitive ability, presupposes the creation of a fabric of experience according to the transcendental principle. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant connects the concept of the faculty of judgment with the idea of a hypothetical application of reason, the regulatory principle of the entire cognitive faculty. Unlike reason, the faculty of judgment gives the supersensible substratum of nature "definiteness through intellectual ability," and reason defines it. "If reason is the ability to deduce the special from the universal, then the universal is either already certain and given in itself, then only the ability of judgment is required to summarize, and the special is necessarily determined by this. Such an application of reason I will call it apodictic. Or the universal is applied only problematically and constitutes only an idea, whereas the special is reliable, but the universality of the rule for this consequence still constitutes a problem" ^{[16, p. 829 (In 674-675)]}. And Kant calls this application of reason hypothetical. In the third "Critique", the emphasis is on such a conceptualization of the faculty of judgment, which introduces the concept of purpose, excluded by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason from among the categories of pure reason (but retaining regulatory significance in transcendental dialectics as a structure of teleological consideration of nature), here an a priori concept of expediency of nature is assumed, justifying the possibility of transition from the concept of nature to the concept of freedom. This, on the one hand. And on the other hand, teleology looks at the world as if reality depended on the actions of some transcendent mind, justifying the expediency and significance of its project. Here there is a noticeable difference between the two interpretations of the faculty of judgment, which lies in the fact that the central image of the faculty of judgment, given in the first case at the pre-reflexive level, is now understood as the actualization of the ability to judge and criticize from the point of view of the purposefulness of aesthetic perception; at the reflexive level, judgment refers to a person, to something metaphysical in us, which for the first time, it makes it possible to achieve aesthetic goals.

Conclusion

Immanuel Kant is the first classic of non–classical aesthetics, who, in his analysis of the faculty of judgment, provides a metaphysical justification for the structures of aesthetic consciousness, the concept of art as a form of experimental metaphysics, which will be developed in the French and Russian intellectual tradition based on the idea of metaphysical a posteriori (M. Proust, M. Mamardashvili). The purpose of this article is to reveal how metaphysically loaded Kant's interpretation of aesthetics is. It is solved within the framework of transcendental anthropology, which includes the integration of sections of the philosophical sciences, forms of unity of cognitive abilities at various stages of their correlation, so that aesthetics itself becomes a link between various philosophical disciplines, without losing its normative character. Within this framework, the interpretation of the relationship of sensuality, spirituality and rationality is carried out, the search for a new system of ideals of the "creative man". Aesthetics is considered by Kant not only as a conceptualization of the cognitive abilities of the soul, but also as a metaphysical expert judgment regarding aesthetic perception, impression, imagination, which presuppose a variety of phenomena such as randomness and uncertainty in acts of creative consciousness, unconsciousness, as well as categorical analysis of the mostly beautiful and sublime and a whole system of new ideals of art. For the first time since Plato and Aristotle, the philosophical horizon opens up again in Kantian aesthetics. The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment is the first work in the history of thought in which aesthetics is a system-forming element of the construction of metaphysics. Kant's aesthetics allows us to look at the current problems of the metaphysics of art again and in a new way, being a spiritual motivation for the transformation of human nature, in other words, it is something inextricably linked with the manifestation of the metaphysical in us, which we came to consider during the analysis of two editions of the introduction to the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment. Both of these editions are so important for aesthetics because in them Kant for the first time reveals why metaphysics, epistemology and ethics need aesthetics itself as a way to solve the problems that arose in the "Critique of Pure Reason" and in the "Critique of Practical Reason". In both versions, Kant explains the significance of the "Critique of the faculty of judgment" for his philosophical system as a whole. In fact, these works deal with the metaphysical prolegomena of aesthetics as a kind of exegesis of the entire transcendental philosophy of Kant, which is more clearly and vividly expressed in the original version. At the same time, aesthetic reflection is embedded in metaphysics as a form of completion of the project of the entire culture of the human mind. Being a discipline immanent to philosophical reflection, aesthetics is considered as an epistemology and methodology of interpretation of the system of criticism, in which this system interprets itself. From this it becomes clear why it is so important to clarify Kant's approach to the substantiation of aesthetics in the light of the interpretation of transcendental metaphysics. The metaphysical direction associated with the study of thinking nature is of decisive importance for aesthetics. In fact, it is embedded in rational psychology in its Kantian understanding, which presupposes the study of a priori principles of the soul's activity. The measurement of the aesthetic a priori leads to ponderous conclusions about the ways of using means to achieve all the goals that befits humanity, these ways are achievable through the manifestation, cultivation of skill, through creativity as the archetype of his, humanity's, salvation. Such a creative application forms, one might say, a kind of aesthetic metaphysics, or rather, a paradoxical expression of metaphysical a posteriori with its own understanding of art is carried out here, and aesthetics as such is at the intersection of empirical and a priori, pure knowledge. Such metaphysics forms the core of experimental philosophy. But the interpretation of the aesthetic as metaphysical a posteriori poses many difficult problems for the science of beauty, initially associated primarily with the construction of its modern conceptual apparatus.