The attributive meaning of the categories "to be" and "to have" on the example of the practical philosophy of Diogenes of Sinop

Mamarasulov Andrei Ravkhatovich PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor; Department of Philosophy; Far Eastern Federal University 690002, Russia, Primorsky Krai, Vladivostok, Red Banner, 51, sq. 636 mamix@bk.ru Other publications by this author

Erich Fromm has a work "To have or to be?" ^[1] devoted to the central question of philosophical anthropology, "what does it mean to be human?". The very formulation of this question shows that without linking with the category of "to be", it is impossible to identify a common goal for philosophical anthropology. Other formulations of such, for example, "what is a person" or "what is the universal human essence" distort the initial message. Cognition, which considers a person only as an object, is always fragmentary, and the primary instance of cognition of a person as a subject is self–awareness, that is, the experience of direct being - an effective state of "being". Therefore, the question "what does it mean to be human?" should be preceded by the question "what does it mean to be?". For Diogenes, there is just such a sequence. So, when Diogenes was asked "are there many people in the bathhouse?", he replied that there were many people, but few people ^{[2, p. 309]}. Or the textbook example where Diogenes walked among people during the day with a lighted lantern, shouting "I'm looking for a man!" [Ibid.]. Why, in Diogenes' view, do these people not have this very "being"? What did Diogenes mean by pointing out that the objective fact of human existence does not give a person a reason to "be"?

The dichotomy of "being" and "having" as an opposition of self-existence and values

It seems that the human status of "being" sought by Diogenes is associated with a certain value – with a special phenomenal quality, possessing which a person acquires this very "being". To consider this possibility, it is necessary to show Diogenes' attitude to values as such. At the first glance at the very way of his life, his personal home is discarded from a number of values. Diogenes, as is known, lived in a barrel (Pythos), believing "that even Socrates lived in luxury, taking care of his small house ... ^{[3, p. 162]}". Public morality is also discarded, because the very practice of Diogenes' "dog" philosophy represents a sarcastic mockery or, using a neologism, "trolling" of social norms ^[4].

Here is a selective list of what falls under Diogenes' "reassessment of values" (we are forced to limit ourselves here to a statement, since the interpretation of quotations from the main source (Diogenes Laertius) will generally be a repetition of what has been said many times and will take up a significant amount within the framework of this article). Money and things are not valuable. Power, prestige, is not a value. Family is not a value. Love is not a value. Fame is not a value. Physical strength is not a value. Religion, deities are not a value. Science is not a value. Philosophy (all but the cynical one) is not a value. Patriotism is not a value ^{[5, p. 26]}. Friendship is not a value. Humanity is not a value. Common sense is not a value.

In general, Diogenes' philosophy is a denial of all values. Diogenes devalues and ridicules everything that is a priori valuable to an ordinary person, welcoming the attitude of ignoring values: "He praised those who wanted to get married and did not get married, who wanted to travel and did not go, who wanted to go into politics and did not do it, who took up parenting and refused it..." ^{[2, p. 304]}. At the same time, Diogenes' asceticism and his countercultural position cannot be understood as a preference for the culture of everything natural ("canine"). Diogenes is not at all a hermit who fled from civilization, and his philosophy is not an opposition of two entities: civilization and the "natural man". There is a perplexity, so often observed by someone who first encountered the practical philosophy of Diogenes: what did this beggar tramp want in general?

From the formal side, the answer is obvious: the goal of Diogenes' philosophy and life was nothing but freedom. "Austerity liberates a person who has come to know his true natural essence <"to be" - A.M.> and their actual needs" ^{[6, p. 146]}. But on the substantive side, one very significant aspect remains unclear: on what basis is freedom preferable to all the values denied by Diogenes? After all, the price of such freedom is extremely high, which the philosopher demonstrates by his very life full of hardships ^[7]. And although Diogenes said that "he takes an example from singing teachers who deliberately sing in a tone higher than necessary so that students understand in which tone they themselves need to sing ^{[2, p. 306]}," thereby arguing that his practical rejection of values is only an extremely contrasting illustration of the truth being pursued for the sake of greater clarity, it should not be considered as a model in itself. Nevertheless, a person who comes into contact with his philosophy needs an explanation: does such freedom give something that can compensate for the price for it?

To understand this problem, let's consider the relationship between freedom and values based on the concept of human self-existence, which, for ease of understanding, we will express in the following question: do I belong to myself or to external forces? Note that this question is not related to the philosophical problem of free will. When self-existence is exchanged for values, it does not matter whether it is forced or not. We are talking, so to speak, about a "controlling stake": do I ultimately belong to myself (self-existence) or already to these values? If the exchange of a person's self-existence for values is performed uncritically, then a person must pay for the acquired values with his freedom. As a result, an individual becomes indebted to family, work, social norms, the state, friends, everyday life, well-being, etc., in short, to all those values for which he exchanged his freedom as a resource. Now, like a fly in a spider's web, the more a person flounders in a network of values, the more he gets involved in it and bleeds out, losing his self-existence, and therefore freedom.

If a person's self-existence is reduced to the position A = A (I belong to myself), then in the position A = B (I belong to another) freedom is automatically lost. The loss of self-existence is equated with the loss of freedom as a mode of the first. Accordingly, we have the right to consider Diogenes' freedom precisely as a mode of human self-existence. This message of freedom - "I belong to myself", being a universal principle, extends to culture as a whole. "Being free," Hegel writes about the Greeks of the period of the highest rise of their culture, "they obeyed the laws that they gave themselves, to people whom they themselves chose as their superiors, they waged wars conceived by themselves, sacrificed their property, their feelings, gave thousands of lives to one goal, which was their goal ^{[8, p. 25]}".

But one can reasonably object: is the exchange of a certain abstraction – self–existence - for the real benefits provided by values inadequate? If a person's freedom is a value in the form of a resource of his strength and capabilities, then is not the exchange of this value, like working capital, for other values a fair and only logical solution? Why, in spite of everything, stubbornly hold a "controlling stake" over yourself, if you can give it up with greater benefit for yourself and for others? These are serious objections that we have the right to address to the philosophy of cynics, who treat the exchange of self-existence for values as a sale for a spoiled coin.

As an illustration of the emerging dichotomy of "to be" and "to have", it is appropriate to cite the famous meeting of Alexander the Great and Diogenes ^{[9, p. 823]}, in which this very exchange of self-existence and freedom for values is modeled. Moreover, it is modeled to the utmost extent, where the maximum of freedom (its "holder" is Diogenes) is offered to be exchanged for the maximum of values (the benefits that Alexander had are unlimited). The scale of the temptation proposed by Alexander is such that any ordinary person, if he refused to receive valuable benefits for free for some subjective reason, would at least be understood as a complete fool. And as a maximum, doomed to return to this situation all his life, he would lose his mind because of the constant comparison of his real state with the possible and the painful realization of what a fateful chance he had missed on his own, unjustifiable whim. What allowed Diogenes to blithely reply to Alexander, "step back, don't block the sun for me," of course, is not a whim or freedom as such, but some kind of foundation behind this freedom.

Alexander aspired to own everything, Diogenes aspired to own nothing. The aspirations are diametrically opposed! However, the tsar's conclusion after the failed exchange, "if I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes," indicates that he had reason to put the personality of Diogenes and the truth of his philosophy on a par with himself and his grandiose deeds. What are both of these great men aware of in this story, as it were, by default? That freedom is not a value among other values that exist in order to exchange one for another, freedom is something inadequate to exchange for any values.

It automatically follows from this provision that freedom cannot be the highest value, because in this case it still remains in the format of value, which is unacceptable within the boundaries of this logic. Freedom does not exist for its own sake, it is not valuable in itself. Note that freedom in Kinism is not a metaphysical idea and not existential freedom as the causelessness of human existence ("abandonment"). In Cynicism, there is no appeal to freedom in the meaning of super-value, as is the case, for example, with the Stoics in relation to harmony, with the Epicureans in relation to happiness, or with Christian ascetics to God. If, for example, Christian asceticism is a rejection of some values ("untrue") in favor of other values ("true"), then Cynicism simply denies the importance of the value format itself, and, accordingly, some values should not be overcome by others. On this basis, freedom cannot act as a moral category. After all, if freedom is not a value, then it cannot come into conflict with other values. And such a confrontation is a condition of a moral attitude in which good is opposed to evil.

Although Diogenes' understanding of the problem of freedom is fraught with too free interpretation of the few fragments of his philosophy that have come down to us, nevertheless, the logic of his teaching can be traced quite clearly:

1) Values gain power over a person, depriving him of freedom;

2) Without freedom, a person ceases to belong to himself, loses his self-existence, that is, he ceases to "be";

3) Values should not prevail over "being".

Based on these provisions, the interpretative moment of our research should not go aside. In addition, the philosophy of Diogenes (which has come down to us) does not have a theoretical side, which is completely replaced by practice. The task of the latter is precisely to encourage a person to comprehend the essence of this practice. Therefore, an attempt to comprehend it should carry an interpretative moment, which is precisely the intention of Diogenes himself. This intention, like a compressed spring, literally shows through in his actions: "Think about why I'm acting like this! I won't tell you anything, because it will be coercion and unfreedom. But if at least a spark of understanding is born in you, then the understanding will be genuine."

The attributive meaning of the categories "to be" and "to have"

So, the teaching of Diogenes poses the following questions to us: on what basis should values not prevail over the "being" of a person, and what is this "being"? To answer them, it is necessary to separate what a person is and what a person has. That is, it is necessary to separate two essential meanings – "to be" and "to have", namely: nature, in which there are no values, and culture, as an environment for the existence of values. The category of "being", taken in the most general definition, reflects nature, that which "arose by itself, was born by itself and left to its own growth" ^{[10, p. 69]}. "To have" is what a person, "acting in accordance with the goals he evaluates" [Ibid.], creates in the form of cultural objects. And although the moments of "to be" and "to have" are in dialectical unity, penetrating each other, it is not this connection that is important for us now, but a simple attributive difference between one and the other, for which the most direct experience is enough to identify.

For example, there is an insurmountable difference between my hand, as an inseparable part of me, and the thing that is in my possession, no matter what value this thing may have. Losing a thing won't break my integrity. The loss of my arm will cause irreparable damage to my integrity. When transferring a thing to another individual, its value and functionality are preserved, but it is completely absurd to transfer ownership of a hand separately from the integrity of a person. The concept of a thing can be non-objective, like, for example, a "table". The hand is thought of as a part of the subject and in all cases cannot be represented otherwise than as "someone's hand". Guided by the hand, an individual can apply it actually or potentially, directly or indirectly, to any of his activities. The thing is suitable for a limited number of applications. That is, the actions of the hand are extremely universal, things are exclusively functional, because it is not the hand that has a function, but the existence of the hand gives a function to a thing, for example, "take a stone for protection", "take a chord on the guitar".

From this it can be seen that "being" is characterized by two attributes – integrity and universality. "Have" – value and functionality. For example, the expression "to be a person" reflects a person as something integral and universal. The expression "to have a book" speaks about the value of a book and its functionality (since it has one), but integrity and universality are not shown in any way in it. When the concept of "to have" is applied to objects related to "to be" ("to have a hand", "to have a thought"), then this applies only to states alienated from the integrity of the individual. For example, we say "I have my hand" in situations where the hand has recovered and gained functionality, or the hand is "learning" something, overcoming disobedience, alienation from the individual's intentions. We also say "I have a thought", meaning that the thought has been formed and can now be alienated from the individual, that is, it can be transferred to another and be understood by him (become valuable and functional). The examples given show that the concept of "having" indicates not only alienation from integrity, but at the same time gives the object attributes of value and functionality.

Let's compare expressions where the concept of "having" is used, for example, "I have feelings", "I have the right", with similar expressions "my feelings", "my right". In the first, alienation from oneself is expressed – the incompleteness of the value and functionality of the individual, therefore, feelings are directed outward to something valuable, and the right is directed outward to something functional. In the second variant, the integrity of the "be" is stipulated: I am indivisible with my feelings and period, I am inseparable from my actions and I fix it as a right.

Universality as an attribute of the category "to be" indicates the universality of the object of being, as if adding to the latter the concept of "in general". So, when we say "to be human" or "to be alive", we mean a person in general or life in general – in a universal sense. When we affirm "this object is" (a synonymous expression for the word "is" is "has a place to be"), we are talking about the involvement of the object in being in general. The attributes "value" and "functionality" that characterize the category of "have" are devoid of this universality. Value is relative (hierarchical), and functionality is conditional. Therefore, for example, the expression "to be free" shows the universal, that is, the universal status of freedom, whereas the expression "to have freedom" speaks of freedom as a private and situational state.

Since "to be" and "to have" are verbs, what expresses action, let us define the difference in the direction of their action (Fromm designates the inherent "to be" and "to have" an intentional character with the terms "mode of being" and "mode of possession" ^[11]). The meaning of the concept of "being" is directed only at oneself and is not directly related to the concept of "having". This orientation of "being" towards oneself (self-reference) is expressed in the concept of "self-affirmation", similar to how equality to oneself is expressed by the concept of "self-identity". The concept of "being" in a statement about something is determined by two conditions: 1) establishing the universality of the object, 2) preserving the integrity of the object. The first condition determines what it is. The second is that it is (has a place to be). So, for the statement "the law of universal gravitation is", the scientific certainty of this law (the establishment of universality, that is, universality) and the fact of its consistency and inviolability as a law (integrity, that is, necessity) is sufficient. Or the statement "I am" is determined by the establishment of the universal "I" and the preservation of the subjective indivisibility, the integrity of the "I". In the first example, there is a self-affirmation of the law through cognition. In the second, the self-affirmation of the "I" in the act of self-awareness.

In relation to a thing divided into parts, "to be" does not assert itself, but regresses, losing the condition of integrity, since there are only parts of a thing, not its integrity, and "to be" agrees with these parts as with a thing only in a conceivable establishment about it. Anyone knows perfectly well what it means to "be" in such a moment of regression of physical or mental integrity caused by illness or injury. "Being" seeks to overcome regression and return to wholeness. "Being" taken in development is overcoming the moment of regression.

Let the symbolic illustration of this statement be a literary work that has become a classic of the twentieth century, the novel by Ch. Palahniuk's "Fight Club" ^[12]. In order to overcome regression, the "being" of the main character, acting as some kind of independent force, goes to a split personality and leads to a lifestyle that in many ways resembles the life of Diogenes. Then, on the way to the integrity of "being", and this reborn state of the hero becomes regressive and must also undergo self-overcoming. The "being" of the main character is self-affirming regardless of himself, which, although it leads to external hardships, but one spark of "being" is enough to fully justify them. Diogenes is a philosophical practice, Palahniuk is a literary symbolism, but in both cases we have the same idea – "to be" is something self–asserting, self–overcoming and in this sense the beginning is blind to the sacrifices of "to have".

Unlike "to be", the meaning of the concept of "to have" is not directed at oneself, but expresses a connection with another. Thus, the statements "the law has force", "man has knowledge" express the connection of an object with something else. For "to be" a connection with the other is not necessary, it is self-directed, self-referential and not directly related to "to have".

So, the categories of "to be" and "to have" are attributionarily unrelated, each of them reflects a special side of human existence. "To be" is wholeness in oneself, "to have" is value in relation to something. "To be" is universality as an opportunity in itself, "to have" is functionality in relation to something. "To be" is self–affirmation, "to have" is affirmation of connection with another. "To be" is self–overcoming, "to have" is overcoming alienation from another. At the attribute level, there is no conflict between "to be" and "to have". You can't choose one over the other, and it's impossible. The attributive difference existing between these categories does not provide a basis for their moral measurement and assessment of the relative greater importance for a person of one of them.

However, if in an imaginary borderline situation we are faced with the dilemma of "to be or to have" – why would we definitely prefer "to be"? Why do we understand Diogenes denying values equal status with "being"? Why do we consider Akaky Akakievich, who identified "to be" and "to have" from Gogol's "Overcoat", a tragicomic character? Obviously, because the categories of "to be" and "to have" are not in opposition, but "to be" and "not to be".

The scope of "to have", based on the difference in attributes shown, does not concern the scope of "to be". Therefore, "to be" is equally blind to the cult of "to have" and to the victims of "to have". Such situations are the most contrasting example of the fact that "to have" does not represent any content for "to be". By analogy with the fact that excessive food consumption does not add anything to health, but can worsen it, so the possession of an abundance of benefits does not give a person absolutely nothing in relation to "being", but can regressingly affect "being", leading to "not being". Conversely, when, as a result of the loss of some benefits, a person involuntarily asks "and what should I do now?", nevertheless, other content is demonstrated besides the attribution inherent in "being". This very question comes from the possibility of "not being" and is directed towards "being" in the form of increasing the level of actualization of the latter in its attributes, in particular, as strengthening integrity through self-overcoming.

The attributive difference between "to be" and "to have" is also present at the moment of their dialectical connection. Cultural values help and contribute to "being" in every possible way, but they are different than being. Values are not the real "being", values are artificial. Therefore, the priority of "to have" over "to be" is equal to the fake "to be", and the fake "to be" is equal to "not to be". And in the most literal sense, because if we choose the latter in the dilemma of "to be or to have", then this will mean the choice of "not to be". Betting on "having" leads to non-existence.

"Being" as a correlate of regression of human nature and culture

When Freud begins his work "Dissatisfaction with culture" with words: "It is difficult to get rid of the impression that people usually use false standards: they strive for power, success and wealth and admire those who possess these benefits, but underestimate the true benefits of life ^{[13, p. 909]}," he states that people make and tend to make this false bet on "having". Fromm speaks of the emptiness of a person's "being" as the reason for the formation of "negative worldview orientations" ^{[14, p. 61]} based on the prevalence of the "mode of possession" ^{[1, p. 116]}. Evola reflects on "being and inauthentic existence" ^{[15, p. 107]}. The question is "is it natural for a person to give preference to "have" over "be" and for what reasons does this happen?" It is sufficiently developed in philosophy, and we will not touch on it. It is only important for us to fix the fact that the problem of the dichotomy of "to be" and "to have" posed by Diogenes is anthropological in its very essence, and it is about nothing else than the way of regression of the essence of man.

The moral bet on "having" expresses precisely the state of human regression. "To have" as different from "to be" is "not to be". Accordingly, the focus of morality on values leads to a decrease, collapse of being. It is no longer the logic of the formation of being that dominates (in the Leibnizian sense, where "the series of things that contains a broader realization, i.e. the greatest number of possibilities, is carried out ^{[16, p. 235]}"), but the process of regression is launched. Which, potentially, leads a person to a loss of integrity and universality, and as a result to a state of decomposition and mediocrity. As soon as the moral advantage is given to the regressive movement, then all self-overcoming is excluded. After all, if regression is accepted as a moral norm, then there is no reason for any self-overcoming. Without self-overcoming, there is no self-affirmation. Regression is the only thing that can assert itself in such a situation. After all, if a person's "being" is not asserted, then in any case his "not being" is asserted.

"To have" acquires the quality of regression only when it is elevated to morality, that is, it acquires the status of "good", everything else of which acquires the meaning of "evil". The desire to possess values becomes a value, that is, values become self-worth, displacing the self-affirmation of "being", and this leads to "not being". Such a regression and decline of the human essence, as it was apparently realized by Diogenes, is beautifully described by Rousseau. "The reason," he writes, "why Diogenes could not find a man in any way is that he was looking for a man of bygone times among his contemporaries. <...> the human soul and passions, imperceptibly being corrupted, change their nature, so to speak <...> that is why the original in man gradually disappears, and society then reveals to the eyes of the sage only a collection of artificial people and feigned passions, which are the product of these new relationships and have no real basis in nature ^{[17, p. 96]}."

All this regression of "being" leads to a state of subjectivity and unfreedom. Freedom is a mode of human self-existence, but if a person, in the resulting sense, does not belong to himself, then he loses both freedom and subjectivity. "There are a lot of people, but few people." The expansion of morality, which relies on values, to the scale of culture threatens to regress "being" no longer to the individual, but to culture as a whole. Understanding the symptoms of a culture-encompassing disease, radical hygiene against pathogens, a passionate desire to heal the regressiveness of such a being, sliding into "not being", all these seem to be the motives of Diogenes' practical philosophy.

Diogenes lived in the midst of a world built by the "real" Hellenes, whose self-affirmation of "being" defined the great cultural and historical identity of Greece. He had something to compare it with. The human regression observed by Diogenes is not a subjective assessment, but a phenomenon that subsequently became an object of understanding for many researchers. In particular, Hegel identifies the regression of ancient Greek civilization with the regression of freedom, the very freedom that is the mode of self-existence of the individual and the identity of culture ^{[8, p. 26]}. So, the practical philosophy of Diogenes is the rejection of the regression of human essence resulting from the moral predominance of "to have" over "to be."

In this case, the question arises by itself: is the opposite possible – some kind of "true" state of things when the "being" of a person prevails? The answer will be no. "To be" is nature and cannot be used in the meaning of a moral category. By talking about superiority, about dominance, we open the way for a moral judgment that opposes some good and evil. However, moral judgment is, so to speak, the generic prerogative of the category "to have", because the values that the latter expresses are always hierarchical and are built into a system of superiority and dominance. The "ability" to morally prevail is inherent only in "to have", by virtue of which "to have" immediately bypasses "to be" and becomes a moral principle, which, in turn, strives to complete its logic in the position "the highest value consists in the very desire to possess values". But "to have", as mentioned earlier, is something other than "to be", it's just not "to be". Accordingly, the bet on "not being" is a regression and collapse of everything – both the individual and the culture.

As soon as the categories of "to be" and "to have" begin to be considered from a moral position, through the prevalence of one of them, the result will be unchanged – regression. In order to avoid regression, it seems that one should act like Diogenes – abandon the manifestation of any value at all. And this brings us back to the question: does freedom from values provide something that can compensate for the high price for it? The answer to it will be negative. In Christianity, for comparison, austerity in relation to worldly values is a promise of "true being" – eternal life, which serves as excessive compensation for hardships, and hardships themselves are defined as trials on the way to this "compensation". There is nothing like that in Cynicism. Everything is laconic here, as in Hamlet's question "to be or not to be?". This antithesis does not promise anything compensating, but it is an insight into the essence of the question "what does it mean to be?". That is, it tracks the state of regression, forcing us to look for an answer to the control question: what essential should remain on the side of "being" so that human nature does not fall into regression and cease to "be"?

Thus, here we return to the refrain question: "what does it mean to be human?". First of all, the category of "being" is expressed in the attribute of self-affirmation. Thus, the kinical freedom from values is the self–affirmation of freedom in spite of everything that, in the case of an "ordinary" person, could easily eliminate freedom. Freedom overcomes the removal of its values and asserts itself "on top" of them as an attribute of human "being". The only thing that can remove freedom is "to have", elevated to a moral principle, because "to have" means "not to be". That is, freedom is removed only when it is not human existence that is self-affirming, but its regression. But such a principle, which Diogenes struggles with, is unacceptable as a regression of the very human essence.

The second attribute of a person's "being" is subjective integrity or self–existence: "I ultimately and against all odds belong to myself." The opposite of this position is the moral principle of the installation "I should not belong to myself, I should be governed by values." This attitude, which blocks the self-affirmation of "being" and decomposes the integrity of the personality, is regressive in its essence. The argument for this can be both direct experience – a person (in general) very passionately experiences a state of subjectivity, and significant experience of philosophical reflection, using Nietzsche's expression, "the descending line of man."

The third attribute of a person's "being" is expressed in the universal character of human nature. Defining from the opposite, this attribute can be designated in the following position: "a person is not a thing that should be in order to perform a certain function." The moral dominance of "to have" over "to be" contradicts this position, reducing a person to a function, and then, logically, to the state of "having a person", that is, to slavery, the regressive essence of which does not need to be argued. On the contrary, universality as an attribute of "being" sets the order of a person's potential transition from the mediocrity of a simple function to the heights of universality ^[18]. As Fromm writes: "To be means to give expression to all the inclinations, talents and talents that (to a greater or lesser extent) each of us is endowed with" ^{[1, p. 138]}.

How Diogenes saw the state of regression arising from the rejection of these attributes, intuitively or categorically, is a rhetorical question. We dare to assume that, first of all, he could see regression in a way that is inaccessible to us – that is, empirically. When Sulla besieged Athens and was asked not to treat the Greeks cruelly, he replied in the spirit: "These are not the same Greeks anymore" ^{[8, p. 574]}. What not so long ago, in the time of Titus Flamininus, the Romans admired in the Greeks and their culture as an ideal of self-affirmation, integrity and universality, regressed. Diogenes, on the other hand, was apparently an eyewitness to the primary crack between the "being" of man and his regression into "not being". Empirically comparing the world around him, created by those who were human, with the attitudes of modern people, he stopped "seeing" the latter.

The practical philosophy of Diogenes as an example of the embodiment of the attributes of "being"

The question "what does it mean to be human?" actualized by Diogenes does not boil down to the premise "how to resist among the "not to be"?", that is, it does not boil down to the search for salvation from the "not to be" (namely, this attitude, as the ancient civilization regresses, begins to dominate in Marcus Aurelius and then clearly dominates in Augustine and Boethius). By analogy, just as any biological body is, without exaggeration, the visual embodiment of the struggle for "to be", so the very essence of man as a result of anthropogenesis and cultural genesis is the embodiment of self-affirmation in the midst of "not to be" and permanent self-overcoming of "not to be". "Being" is not directed at possessing external means of salvation, it is directed only at oneself – to self-affirmation and self-overcoming. The correlate of regression and the possibility of overcoming the latter is already embedded in "to be" simply because it is logically opposed to "not to be". "Being" is itself a correlate of regression, not only logically, but also empirically. After all, the "being" of an individual, representing the basis of all empiricism ^{[19, pp. 237-238]}, is an empirical state par excellence (self-perception of the body, reflection, a trembling experience of life, in the end, an individual "being", taken simply as a fact).

And what did Diogenes mean in this sense: that a person, by elevating "to have" into a moral principle, betrays his essence and nature? It is hardly necessary to interpret it this way, because there is no "true being" that opposes "false being", "being" is not a moral category. The answer here seems to be that Diogenes' philosophy is so consistent in rejecting "to have" that it has no purpose. We dare to assert that Diogenes' way of life and philosophy carry the meaning of the literal embodiment of "being" a human being. What does it mean? First of all, "being" a human being is a high–flown verbal phrase that does not appeal to some ideal (as a variation of "superman"), because "being" cannot have a value dimension, and therefore moral superiority. There is also no moral and normative superiority in Diogenes' intention, since it is impossible to consider Diogenes' lifestyle as a model for an ordinary person and, according to Diogenes himself, unnecessary.

When everything connected with the moral dimension and value superiority is removed from the field of view, then only the embodiment of the self–identical and self-sufficient essence - "to be" a person - should remain. After all, if you ask the question "for what purpose to be a human being?", then the answer to it will repeat the question itself – "to be a human being." "To be" is directed only at oneself and therefore has no external purpose. The advantage of the state of "being" over the state of "not being" also cannot be considered as a goal, since this advantage is embedded in the concept of "being" as its condition. This provision (we will explain it below) is essential.

It is indisputable that nature, through instincts, obliges all living things to "consider" that "being is better than not being", and man, from the side of common sense, also shares this position about the initial advantage of "being", which seems self-evident. Accordingly, an assumption may arise (and it can be traced in many studies) that the immoral aimlessness of Diogenes's "dog" philosophy boils down to the named priority of the natural principle, and is not a human embodiment of the essential meaning of "being". Therefore, it is necessary to determine: which principle pursues the practical philosophy of Diogenes, natural or reflecting the essence – idea?

The condition for interpreting Diogenes as an adept of the priority of the natural principle is a preliminary agreement with the position that nature, by virtue of some kind of value superiority of "to be" over "not to be", has the original purpose of "to be". Here we are forced to resort to a simplifying analogy, through which we will return to this provision. One (the presence of quantity) is no better than zero (the absence of quantity). The advantage of a unit is that in its case, the quantity has a place to be, but zero does not. And although the advantage of a unit in quantity is obvious, it is clear that there is neither an axiological nor a teleological context in this superiority. One is something, zero is nothing. In what way does something have an advantage over nothing? In everything, since everything that is different from nothing will be something. And what is different from nothing? All. Therefore, there is an advantage of "being" over "not being", but it is purely quantitative, because something is everything, and nothing is nothing. And since everything takes place, it is embedded as a quantitative advantage in the concept of "being" in the form of its condition. Thus, the advantage of the state of "being" over the state of "not being" is not axiological, and therefore cannot be presented as a goal.

Although, of course, the amount of everything in the world in the form of infinite diversity and diversity cannot but be considered by reason outside the axiological background, and a biological being is not free not to prefer life to death, because being itself, that is, everything of which a living being is an inseparable part, makes him wish so. Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to assert a certain natural value of "being" that determines the initial advantage of "being" over "not being". Therefore, in our opinion, it cannot be argued that the philosophy of Diogenes, which devalued all values, makes an exception for the value of the natural principle and is thus vital in purpose.

Even if we ask a purely metaphysical question about the fundamental principle of being in general – "why is there something in the world and not nothing? ^{[16, p. 234]}", the meaning of which boils down to the premise of some kind of external superiority that guarantees the advantage of "being" over "not being", then this macroscopic advantage can hardly be directly correlated with a private human "being", which is fragile, vulnerable and not guaranteed by anything external.

When the advantages of "being" over "not being" lose their value dimension, the difference between "being" and "not being" is reduced not to the advantage of one over the other, but simply to a number of attributes of "being" – that without which "being" turns into "not being". These attributes, in our opinion, are self-affirmation and, as its special part, self-overcoming, integrity and universality. And if Diogenes' philosophy has no purpose, but is the embodiment of the essence of "being human", taken, again, not in a moral, moral or idealized-sublime sense, then it should reflect these attributes.

The word "incarnation" means the realization of the intention to "be" (let it be!) in the form of visible "in the flesh" attributes. The first attribute of "being" is the process and experience of self-affirmation, permanent self-fulfillment. Can the life and philosophy of Diogenes be considered the embodiment of this attribute? Absolutely yes. It is unlikely to be possible to name a philosopher who would make Diogenes a direct competitor in this. And there is no exaggeration here. Being the embodiment of the attribute of self–affirmation and self-overcoming, Diogenes' practical life became a rejection of everything, and his philosophy became a denial of all values, that is, there is no reserve left for competition with Diogenes.

The second attribute of "being" is integrity, which, in relation to Diogenes, means the consistency of his life and teachings, based on consistency in Diogenes' attitude both to himself and to reality. Let's ask ourselves the question – what qualities should a person possess in order not to lose integrity and crack despite the comprehensive pressure of the world of values, starting to contradict himself and the observed reality? Of course, the first thing that comes to mind are the Platonic virtues: patience, courage and wisdom. But this is hardly the case: these qualities relate to self-overcoming as a means in the struggle for integrity, and not to the most urgent state of integrity.

The desired "quality", or rather the primary basis, should be the very integrity of a person. What has been said should not be perceived as tautology, hyperbole or abstraction, but, in the very first approximation, as a complex state opposite to the empirically well-known state of spiritual discord and emptiness of "being". Not having the opportunity to reveal what has been said categorically within the framework of the article, we will limit ourselves to a symbolic illustration. In our opinion, such a role can be played by a literary work that has also become a classic of the twentieth century – the novel by K. Kesey "Flying over the Cuckoo's Nest" ^[20]. The personality of the protagonist of this novel clearly resembles the archetype of Diogenes. The semantic outline of the work reveals the relationship between "not to be" and "to be" in the form of opposition. One side of this opposition is represented by a regressive state of integrity (personified in the images of the mentally ill and their ultimately devastating treatment system), and the other side is an integral human "being" (the main character), where the second, even without the intention of doing so, has a healing effect on the first.

In any case, the ability that allowed Diogenes to dismiss values, Alexander, and what is called "common sense" without internal conflict must have a basis, and we associate this with the state of human integrity, with the resulting inverting emptiness of "being" a state of fullness of the individual's self-existence. Naturally, in order for the vessel to remain filled, it must be intact, without cracks. This surprising contrast to the integrity of man is, apparently, the attribute of "being" that allowed the "mad Socrates" ^{[2, 314]} to resist the power of all of the above, not only without visible tension, but with humor and marked irony.

Finally, the attribute of universality lies both in the universal significance of Diogenes' philosophy ^[21] and in the special method of his practical philosophy, which addresses the universality of the effective state of "being". Diogenes implements his theory-free philosophy in the innermost space of the "being" of everyone in whom he generated a spark of at least unconscious consent. A particular precedent for this is this study, which represents the author's attempt to translate his own intuitive understanding of Diogenes into the form of categorical comprehension. And although there is a significant interpretative moment in the above study (to which, again, Diogenes himself motivates a person) going beyond the limits of historical and philosophical factology, but the fact that the personality, life and philosophy of Diogenes represent an example of the embodiment of self-affirmation, self–overcoming, integrity and universality is not just the facts preserved by history and the position achieved in this study, but the very basis for the existence of such facts and positions.

However, it is necessary to go beyond this statement, raising questions: why did Diogenes need the very act of embodying the attributes of "being"? What is the logic of this incarnation? Wasn't it possible to come to an understanding of these attributes in a theoretical way? The basis for answering them lies in the different nature of the manifestations of "to be" and "to have" in their relationship to a person. If the category of "to have" is embodied visually – in the phenomena of values, then the category of "to be" is deprived of such an embodiment. The essential manifestations of a person's "being" are not obvious and require reflection, as V. S. Solovyov says: "Philosophy has made a person completely human ^{[22, p. 124]}."

In answering the question "what do I have?" we cannot do without the moment of the embodiment of the meaning of "have" in the image of specific values to which this or that functional role is intended. Having asked this question, we immediately imagine both what we have and what it means to "have". Here there is an essence – the very category of "to have", expressing the mode of connection of a person with another person, the attributes of "to have" are quite clearly present - value and functionality, showing this connection as hierarchically structured and conditioned, finally, in visual images of objects of possession, the accidents of "to have" are also given. In relation to "have," cognition has no gaps. This is because rationality completely permeates the meaning of "to have." In "having" we are exceptionally rational: not at all striving to have everything indiscriminately, on the contrary, we are extremely selective in relation to objects of possession. And in the case when the object of possession is characterized by a certain uncertainty (family, private property, education), we strive to strictly rationalize the latter through legal formalization.

In relation to the question "what does it mean to be human?" the picture will be radically different. There is no essence here, since the universal "being" has a mode of orientation towards itself and "does not notice" a person. There are no attributes here, because self-affirmation, self-overcoming, integrity and universality relate to the "being" of life in general and do not distinguish a person as something fundamentally different. There is also no certainty about the specific human accidents of "being": the human "being" either merges almost indistinguishably with the "being" of nature (example: Schopenhauer's "will to live"), or seeks the basis of its distinctiveness in the idea of God (example: the foundation of Descartes' cogito). In any case, there is no doubt that the answer to the question "what does it mean to be human?" is incomparably more irrational than the answer to the question "what does a person have?".

Therefore, the hidden negative answer - "I do not know what it means to be human" is quite natural for ordinary consciousness. The universal essence of "being" is asserting itself without needing the support of reason in the least. But if you ask the question "what does it mean not to be human?", then the mind immediately begins to act, because this is already a matter of individual self-affirmation. The mind of an individual analyzes a specific individual "being" for a contradiction with the universal "being". In this way, human existence is added to the universal "being".

How can the mind answer the question "what does it mean not to be human?" if "being human" is irrational? To do this, the mind needs something different in relation to being – not "to be", which is what "to have" is, which, as mentioned above, is completely rational. And when a person realizes that the moral stake on "having" is equal to "not being", then he easily answers the question "what does it mean not to be human?".

Now there is one step left to answer the question "what does it mean to be human?", but this step is the most difficult. Here we need someone who could become the embodiment of "being" a person, someone who could completely overcome "having", and therefore "not being". From a purely formal point of view (and speaking without any comparison), it does not matter whether they are Christ, Lao Tzu or Diogenes. But it is essential that such a concrete act of embodying the human "being" gives us the primary rational basis for the irrational question "what does it mean to be human?". Based on this foundation and comprehending the life and teachings of the one who sought to embody in them the essence of not the universal "to be", but already "to be human", we deduce the attributes of this essence – self-affirmation, self-overcoming, integrity and universality and begin to rationally apply them to ourselves.

But is it possible to do without an external example of the embodiment of these attributes? Yes, because anyone who embodies them on their own will be "Diogenes". The only thing that cannot be bypassed is the act of incarnation itself. After all, the theoretical "being human" is understood only through the practical "being human". As Fromm says: "In the mode of possession, the dead word dominates, in the mode of authentic being – a living experience for which there are no words or expressions (it goes without saying that living productive thinking also refers to the mode of authentic being) ^{[1, p. 139]}".

Thus, the embodiment of the attributes of "being" in a person is logical and necessary, in this way the mind receives the only empirical basis for understanding the question "what does it mean to be human?". Accordingly, if the life and teachings of Diogenes are the embodiment of the attributes of "being", then this act of embodiment removes the dominant irrationality from the question of human self-knowledge, which is at the same time the question of the essential basis of human existence.

So, what is the general conclusion that can be drawn based on the research done? Here I would like to abandon the formalization of what has been said, since the whole work is already nothing more than an attempt to formalize the philosophy of Diogenes completely free from it. The general conclusion is that the practical philosophy of Diogenes of Sinope is an exceptionally informative material for identifying the attributive meaning of the categories "to be" and "to have". The analysis of these categories reveals many relationships with the concepts of freedom, self-existence, human regression, the essence of human existence and its embodiment.

The most significant thing should be recognized that the practical philosophy of Diogenes, being, from our point of view, an example of the embodiment of the human "being", provides support for understanding and comprehending the attributes of this "being". Such attributes, the conceptual expression of which is found in the categories of "self-affirmation", "self-overcoming", "integrity" and "universality", constitute the essential basis of human existence. This conclusion is the result of a philosophical interpretation of Diogenes' practical philosophy and, in our opinion, shows the depth and consistency of Diogenes' position when correlated with the central question for philosophical anthropology, "what does it mean to be human?".