Problems of formation of the Kostroma militia during the Patriotic War of 1812

Kondrat'ev Nikolai Vladimirovich Chief Librarian; Information Center “K. D. Ushinsky Library” Russian Academy of Education 127550, Russia, Moscow region, Moscow, Dmitrovskoe shosse, 37 building 1, block 134 nickolay.kondratjev@yandex.ru

Introduction. One of the important issues of the history of the Kostroma militia in 1812-1814. The task is to clarify the numerical composition of the people's military force, the stages of its formation and the tasks associated with this process - equipping, food supply, forage, as well as financing. These topics are covered in varying degrees of detail in the writings of K.A. Voensky ^[6], V.R. Apukhtin^[2], A.K. Kabanov^[8], N.N. Vinogradov^[3], S.G. Vinogradova^[4;5] and need to be commented and verified.

The source base is documents published in 1962 in a collection edited by L.G. Beskrovny and R.E. Altshuller^[10], as well as previously unpublished documents from the funds of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (hereinafter - RGVIA), the Russian State Historical Archive (hereinafter – RGIA), and the State Archive of the Kostroma Region (hereinafter – GAKO).

The course and results of the study. The starting point in the formation of the militia was the manifesto of July 6, 1812. "On the gathering of the zemstvo militia within the state." As head of state, the emperor appealed to all estates "with all the firm hope for our brave army ... to gather new forces within the state, which, inflicting new terror on the enemy, would form a second fence to reinforce the first, and to protect the homes, wives and children of everyone and everyone" ^[9].

The initial orders for the convocation of the militia were reduced to the establishment: "For the initial compilation of the intended forces, it is provided in all provinces to the nobility to bring the people they supply to protect the fatherland, choosing from among themselves the chief over them, and letting them know about their number to Moscow, where the chief leader will be elected over all" ^[9]. In the first manifesto, the main function of the militias was defined – to protect the population from enemy troops. Since the emperor's proclamation was generalized in nature, the specification of tasks was carried out in subsequent manifestos, personal decrees, resolutions of the Senate, proclamations and circulars of the Synod.

The organizational center for the formation of militias became The Special Committee for Internal Militia Affairs under the Emperor, as well as provincial militia committees.^[7]

The Imperial manifesto of July 18, 1812 contained an indication of territorial stratification (division into districts), quantitative proportions, the timing of the collection and the purpose of military force. The militia of the 3rd district, which included the Kostroma province, was initially supposed to only "prepare to calculate and appoint people," but not to collect them until a special order, so as not to interrupt agricultural work. ^[7] The plan for the order and quantity of the collection of warriors is detailed in Alexander I's rescript to the commander of the 3rd district, P.A. Tolstoy, on the procedure for collecting militias: "to produce this set, arranged in parts, without burdening the villagers and considering, at your discretion, both with the course of field work and with the local circumstances of the inhabitants" ^[11]. It was proposed (in the same document) to limit the number of militias to several regiments at first, and to have them as a model for possible subsequent formations.

State legislative and administrative acts made it possible to identify the control figures for the recruitment of militias. Plans for the militia of the 3rd district, including Kostroma, are indicated in the report of P.A. Tolstoy to Emperor Alexander I: the proportion is 4 soldiers from 100 audit souls, in Kostroma province it is supposed to gather 11,000 people and divide into 4 infantry regiments plus 1 battalion, as well as form a cavalry regiment of 500 people^{[15, ll.40-41ob.]}.

Let's consider how the number of the Kostroma militia is shown in historiography.

K.A. Voensky writes that the nobility assembly of the province decided "from 291357 landowner peasants to collect an average of 4 souls from 100 and only 11,000 (under the command of Lieutenant General Bardakov), plus an additional set of 5,500 (reserve under Major General Bulygin), that is, only 16,500" ^{[6, p.9-10]}.

A.K. Kabanov^[8] states that the proportion of donations by soldiers in different provinces was very different (from 10 from 100 souls to 1 person from the same 100 souls), and the number of Kostroma militia indicates 9976 people.

V.R. Apukhtin writes that the nobility decided "to give 11,000 soldiers from all the audit souls registered in the Kostroma province. At first it was assumed that this would be an exclusively foot militia, but, at the suggestion of the commander of the third district, Count Tolstoy, who arrived in Kostroma on August 7, it was decided to allocate 660 people from them and organize a mounted hundred. For this purpose, 660 horses with harness were donated, and in addition, 220 horses and 110 carts for the militia's wagon train" ^{[2, p.45]}. In addition, the researcher reported disputes regarding the number of sacrificed warriors^[2]. It is also noted that "landlords who had less than 6 souls did not participate in the recruitment of the militia at all and no monetary fee was due from them," unless the owners themselves... out of their zeal, they will wish to make a donation possible, according to their condition, with money“ From 6 and 7 souls they took 4 rubles each, and from 8 and more – 5 rubles each. Reliable commissioners were chosen to collect this money, equipped with catalogs of such souls and parish books" ^[2].

N.N. Vinogradov^[3,p.84] presented the details of the militia recruitment plan for the Kostroma province. According to his version, firstly, the collection was carried out in counties with a different number of souls, from a minimum of 16, from a maximum of 25, owners of less than 16 souls were exempt from the supply of warriors. Secondly, as the researcher recorded, the following control figures were proposed: Kostroma county – 6148, Nerekhtsky – 1968, Kineshemsky -1278, Galichsky - 1201, Kologrivsky – 889, Yurievetsky -810, Chukhlomsky -723, Varnavinsky – 702, Buevsky- 679, Soligalichsky – 568, Vetluzhsky-581, Makaryevsky – 435.

According to N.N. Vinogradov, 1,500 people went on a campaign with a shortage. ^[3,p.86]

In Soviet and post–Soviet historiography, statistics on the collection of national militias in 1812 in Kostroma province were given only once on the basis of data from the regional archive (currently, most of them lost as a result of a fire) - in articles by S.G.Vinogradova. ^[4;5]

S.G. Vinogradova indicates the same planned figure for the number of warriors – 11,000 people: "On the basis of the royal manifestos of June 6 and 18, 1812, the nobility of the Kostroma province, meeting in Kostroma on July 29, 1812, determined: 1. to sacrifice 11 thousand foot soldiers" with all clothes and provisions for three months; 2. to collect 291 thousand rubles for the uniforms of the Kostroma Infantry regiment. ^[5]

According to her, "unlike the Nizhny Novgorod militia, the collection of which was mostly completed at the end of September 1812, in Kostroma on November 8, there were 2 thousand soldiers in short supply" ^[5]. Based on the reports of the commander of the Kostroma militia P.G. Bardakov (unresolved cases in the GAKO), the researcher provides the following data: on December 15, 1812, 10,800 people, 529 combat horses, 141 lifting horses, 70 wagons were gathered in the militia. Arrears amounted to 200 people, 131 combat horses, 79 lifting horses and 40 wagons^[5]. Shortages of soldiers, horses and wagons were noted in all counties except Nerekhtsky. Calculations based on the materials of S.G.Vinogradova give 1200 people a shortage.

It deserves attention the fact that on the memorial plaques in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the number of the Kostroma militia is indicated at 10519 warriors, grouped into 1 mounted, 4 infantry regiments and a battery of rangers.

The documents of the archives make it possible to clarify and detail the data of historiographical research, as well as to identify unused or uninterpreted facts.

In Kostroma province, as elsewhere, the calculation of the number of militias was carried out only from the number of landowner serfs. This was the establishment of the imperial manifesto of July 18, 1812: "State and economic and specific peasants in those provinces from which a temporary internal militia is formed do not participate in it, but are provided for the usual recruitment of recruits according to established rules" ^[9].

At the same time, there is no complete coverage of the issue of the social composition of the people's military force, although it is known about the participation of various segments of the population in the militia. For example, N.O. Andronikov, back in 1874, in a book on the history of the Kostroma Theological Seminary ^[1], based on the documents of the consistory, gave a list of seminarians who joined the militia, told about the moods among students: "Many had to keep the jealousy of abuse in themselves because they did not have the opportunity to ask for it The matter of parents' blessing…There were also such cases that some pupils ... voluntarily fled to the active army." ^{[1, p.40]} The author also reported on monetary donations from seminarians, teachers and clergy.

According to the statement on the number of peasants in the provinces belonging to the militia districts, submitted by the Minister of Finance D.A. Guryev to the governor of the War Ministry, Lieutenant General A.I. Gorchakov, on August 14, 1812, there were 289,435 owner peasants. The calculation did not include free farmers (226), state-owned (62,138) and assigned to special departments (58.039) ^{[12,ll43-43ob]}.

Documents on the Kostroma province show that the objections of local landowners were expressed in the unwillingness to supply 4 warriors from a hundred audit souls, as the Kostroma civil governor N.F. Pasinkov wrote in a report to the Minister of Police in 1812. According to him, two counter-proposals were put forward. The court counselor of the Mild suggested collecting 9 people from 865 souls. The second offer is 1 person from 50 souls. This proportion was proposed by the vice-governor, the actual state councilor Vaskov, the actual chamberlain Tatishchev, the major General Prince Meshchersky, the actual state councilor Alexei Koptev, the adviser to the provincial government, the state councilor Golokhvatov, the provincial prosecutor Efremov and the collegiate adviser Alexander Protasyev^{[15, l.14-14ob.]}.

The same fact is recorded in the materials sent from Kostroma on request^[14,l.107] in 1836, and in the draft notes of A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky:"As a result of the decree of the Kostroma nobility of 1812, on June 29, 11,000 soldiers were received from the noble estates to the Kostroma militia, to whom, in pursuance of the rescript of October 21, 1812. in addition, according to the decree of October 15, 5,500 soldiers were appointed and collected (left in reserve, were not on the campaign), that is, 16,500 soldiers from 291,357 souls". ^{[13,ll.402-402ob]}

The reason, it seems, is obvious: all these persons are the largest and richest owners^[19], who clearly do not benefit from losing workers in the midst of agricultural work, especially since the next recruitment took place in the spring.Conscription was determined by 3 people with 500 souls ^[16], therefore, the very fact of collecting peasants in the ratio of 4 to 100, and of the most able-bodied age, could not but cause some social tension.

In the presentation of the Kostroma civil governor to the Minister of Police in 1812, the planned figures were recorded: "to collect 11,000 soldiers and make up of them as a result of the proposal <...> Count Tolstoy mounted 600 men with 600 horses and harness, and for the baggage train on foot to prepare 110 pairs of lifting horses with harness and 110 carts." ^{[15, l.2]} In the same place, the governor writes ^{[15, l.8]} that it was decided to supply soldiers with a maximum of 25 souls, with a minimum of 16, and represents the layout of the planned 11,000 warriors by county:

This information about the proportion of militia gathering and distribution by counties coincides with the data of N.N. Vinogradov.

Official data on the provinces of the 3rd district of the militia, summarized in the vedomosti in October 1812 and signed by Lieutenant General Count P.A.Tolstoy, show that in terms of the number and equipment of infantry battalions, the Kostroma militia was second only to the Nizhny Novgorod, surpassing the Penza and Simbirsk by a third, and the combined Kazan and Vyatka almost three times. It should be noted that the target figure is 11,000 people. The same consolidated statements indicate that the shortage in Kostroma amounted to 2,000 people^[10].

In the commentary to the vedomosti, P.A. Tolstoy explains the shortage of militias not only by slowness on the ground, but also by accounting methods – counting exclusively those who arrived at the assembly points^[10]. Consequently, the results of the formation of the militias of the 3rd district, including Kostroma, were summed up by the numbers of the order, and not the actual number.

The true reasons for the shortage remain unclear. But it can be assumed that there is indeed an erroneous interpretation of the data, and the plan for the supply of warriors should be considered actually fulfilled. Our reasons are as follows:

1. The RGIA foundation keeps a list from the report of the Kostroma civil governor to the commander-in-chief in St. Petersburg dated December 23, 1813, where it says that "when the first militia marched, 668 soldiers were left here, who were assigned to the additional militia. These people are supposed to make up a special battalion under the command of a staff officer." In addition, the staff was supposed to have 44 constables and proviantmasters, 8 drummers and 600 privates, divided into 4 companies ^{[15, L.34]}.

2. Out of the total number of 11,000 warriors, 600 people were selected for the cavalry regiment, which was noted in the correspondence of the Kostroma civil governor with the Ministry of Police ^{[15, L.2]}.

In total, we get almost the same facts of inconsistency between the plan and the real number of militias as when calculating S.G. Vinogradova – about 1200 people.

Conclusion. According to the results of the study, the following conclusions were drawn: firstly, the quantitative composition of the militias, including the Kostroma one, was determined by law, calculated according to specified proportions and control figures, regardless of recruitment; secondly, the problems that arose during the recruitment of militias were related to the property status and profitability of the landlords of the province; inThirdly, an important component of the information sources, which has not been updated to date in historiography, are the mechanisms for recruiting, manning, calculating financing and providing forage, as well as instructions on accepting money and military equipment, accepting donations, resolutions on uniforms and equipment of warriors, issues of armament and training of recruits, as well as supplies The Kostroma militia; fourthly, the documents allow us to establish the course of the discussion about the figures of giving warriors from noble estates and mechanisms for overcoming contradictions. In addition, the archives contain information about the social and everyday problems of the inhabitants of the province in connection with the events of 1812-1814 and ways to solve them. And finally: in historiography, the planned figures for the recruitment of militias served as a guideline, while the details and fluctuations in statistical data were not covered, which allows us to declare the novelty of this study.

The results obtained make it possible to clarify the chronology of the formation of the Kostroma province militia, and to detail statistics. Further verification of historiographical materials and analysis of documents from the central and regional archives will make it possible to clarify the economic and financial indicators of the Kostroma militia, such as: the size of donations, the burden on various estates when donating money and in kind, the size of salaries and one-time allowances for militia members. Based on a comprehensive study of the problems of the formation of the Kostroma militia during the Patriotic War of 1812, a comprehensive comparison with other militias of the III district will be possible.