Serbian-Montenegrin relations and the prospect of the creation of the Balkan Union in 1904-1905

Bogomolova Dar'ya Konstantinovna Postgraduate student; Faculty of History; Moscow State University 115409, Russia, Moscow, Koshkina str., 13k1 bogomolova.dasha@gmail.com

The failed Balkan and, as its component part, the Serbian-Montenegrin Union of 1904-1905 became the first attempts in the 20th century by the Slavic countries of the peninsula to overcome mutual contradictions and coordinate joint foreign policy goals. It was first based on the principle of "The Balkans to the Balkan peoples", which then became a full–fledged idea, the motto of the First Balkan War. Under the influence of new contradictions in European politics, Serbia and Bulgaria on the one hand, Serbia and Montenegro on the other, decide to join forces to fight for their interests in the European regions of Turkey inhabited by Slavs, and to protect against attempts by Austria-Hungary to strengthen expansion in the Balkan Peninsula. The initial stage of this association was to be secret bilateral agreements. For a number of reasons, only Serbia and Bulgaria managed to reach an agreement. The protracted negotiations between the Serbian king and the Montenegrin prince did not yield results. Thus, during this period, the creation of the Balkan union was not crowned with success. The specifics of negotiations between Serbia and Montenegro are considered in detail in the works of such researchers as L. Alexic-Pejkovic, N. Rakocevich and N. I. Khitrova ^{[1, pp. 327-357; 2, pp. 18-38; 3, p. 185]}. However, in the mentioned studies, historians focused mainly on internal factors that influenced the unsuccessful outcome of the negotiation process.

It seems interesting to supplement this story with an analysis of how the idea of rapprochement among Serbian and Montenegrin politicians was perceived and transformed during this period, and how this was influenced by the change in the political situation on the Balkan Peninsula and in Europe as a whole.

By the beginning of the XX century. The Ottoman Empire is rapidly losing influence in its European territories, which have become an arena of economic and geopolitical rivalry between the great powers, actively forming military and political alliances. The Balkan factor is also significantly increasing – the young states that have emerged from Ottoman rule are striving with all their might to implement their national programs and become equal subjects of international relations in Europe, which would be impossible without the liberation of that part of the Christian population that has hitherto lived under the yoke of the Ottomans.

In the second half of the 90s of the XIX century. against the background of unrest on the island of Crete and the subsequent Greco-Turkish war in the spring of 1897, the so-called Eastern question and the problem of Straits again became acute on the European political agenda. During this period, the Russian Empire significantly intensified its policy in the Far East, giving priority to this particular direction, as a result of which its course was being adjusted in relation to the Balkans, where it became increasingly difficult to compete economically with European powers. Thus, the most acceptable policy for the Russian Foreign Ministry and Minister A. B. Lobanov-Rostovsky was the policy of balance, a balance between France and the Triple Alliance. Therefore, in order to protect itself from the need, in case of an escalation, to act "on two fronts", but maintain its influence in the region, Russia in April of the same year, in violation of historical tradition, went to conclude an agreement with Austria-Hungary on maintaining the status quo on the Balkan peninsula. "We had to put the Balkans under a glass dome until we dealt with other, more urgent matters," the Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote on this occasion ^{[4, p. 288]}. The agreement was very controversial – the main contradictions were the desire of Austria-Hungary to secure the right to annex the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been under Austrian occupation since 1878, and the seizure of the Novopazar Sanjak. A separate point was the plan to create an independent Albanian state. In response to these unacceptable points for Russia, the Foreign Ministry put forward reciprocal wishes, as a result of which the agreement was reduced to guarantees of maintaining the current situation in the region.

At the same time, Russia did not seek to abandon its historical mission to protect the Christian population of the European territories of Turkey, and as much as possible tried to diplomatically assist the South Slavic states, primarily Bulgaria and Serbia, in the implementation of their national tasks. This goal was served by the successful operation of a network of Russian consulates in Macedonia (in Skopje and Bitola) and Old Serbia (Prizren). The Murzsteg Agreement, concluded in the autumn of 1903, after the Ilinden uprising in Macedonia was suppressed by the Turkish authorities, became a kind of continuation of Russian-Austrian cooperation in the region. The brutal punitive measures of the Ottoman administration led to the direct intervention of European diplomacy, as a result of which Russia and Austria demanded an immediate series of administrative, political and judicial reforms under the supervision of European representatives.

The aggravated situation in the region worried the governments of the Balkan states, who regarded the events as a new round of crisis and the struggle of the great powers for influence in the Balkans.  Fears were justified that Slavic countries could also be involved in this struggle. At the height of the uprising in Macedonia, the Serbian ambassador to Russia, M. Spalaikovich, telegraphed to the leadership that the program of Russian foreign policy on the eastern issue was entering a new phase and did not even rule out a war between Russia and Turkey in the near future ^{[5, p. 302]}. "Russia's conservative and patient policy, its experience and consequences in domestic life due to the last war with Turkey, political chaos and variability in the views and actions of individual Balkan states - all this has so far forced Russia to first exhaust all measures of peaceful policy towards Turkey before deciding to proceed with the final defeat The Ottoman Empire in Europe," wrote Spalaikovich ^{[5, pp. 303-304]}. Among the reasons for such changes, the ambassador highlighted in a special way the murder in August 1903 by a Turkish gendarme of Albanian origin of the Russian consul in Bitoli, A. A. Rostkovsky. This murder put an end to Petersburg's patience. All the ostentatious attempts of the Porte to apologize were unsuccessful: Russia was no longer ready to forgive the murder of a diplomat and easily hush up the crisis, as in March 1903, when the Russian consul in Kosovo Mitrovica, G. S. Shcherbina, was mortally wounded during the Albanian uprising.

The vigorous measures taken by the Russian Foreign Ministry in an attempt to hold the Turkish authorities accountable, and a number of ultimatum demands, showed that Russia is ready, as before, to defend its interests harshly. To confirm their intentions, a squadron of four ships of the Black Sea Fleet was sent to Turkish waters on August 11 ^{[6, p. 147]}. Nevertheless, all these actions did not mean a willingness to provide carte blanche to the Balkan states to support separatism in the European regions of the Ottoman Empire. Russian Foreign Minister V. N. Lamsdorff, as before, insisted on the strict preservation of the status quo and called on the Slavs (primarily Bulgarians) not to interfere with the adopted political program to force Turkey to strictly carry out reforms in the vilayets ^{[6, p. 148]}. The appearance of Russian battleships off the Turkish coast worried diplomats and created a dangerous precedent that could seriously complicate all further negotiations. Serbian Ambassador to Constantinople J. Hristich believed that this would further spur the rioters to unrest and convince them of the inevitability of war, and wrote that "Russia should not delay the withdrawal of its fleet if it does not want the uprising to cover the whole of Turkey" ^{[5, pp. 331, 357]}. On August 23, after the investigation of the murder of A. A. Rostkovsky and the public execution of those responsible for this crime, the Russian ships were indeed hastily recalled ^{[6, p. 148]}.

The Ilinden uprising had a very significant impact on the relations between the Slavic countries of the Balkan Peninsula. Its scope and pace came as a surprise to Balkan diplomacy in many ways, but soon began to receive more and more responses. Bulgaria was the first to respond, where they immediately supported the actions of the Macedonian rebels by sending volunteers and weapons to them, providing them with material assistance. Then the Serbs and Montenegrins began to provide secret support. Thanks to the agitation organized in Serbia among local Macedonians, which the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs could not extinguish, numerous couples regularly went to Macedonia from the territory of the kingdom ^{[5, pp. 443-444]}. The Serbian ambassador to Bulgaria reported on the arrival of a Montenegrin officer in the country, who was supposed, allegedly on direct instructions from the Montenegrin government, to establish contact with the Macedonian rebels, as well as on negotiations between one of the Bulgarian officers and the Serbian government ^{[5, p. 363]}. According to the Ambassador's report, the Bulgarian Ambassador to Montenegro, D. Rizov, took an active part in the Montenegrin-Bulgarian negotiations.

The attitude towards Bulgaria in these conditions on the part of the great powers and Russia is rapidly deteriorating, it is increasingly being assessed as an instigator, since due to its support for the Ilinden uprising, the threat of a Bulgarian-Turkish war became quite real. This could destroy the status quo overnight, which was being fought over so much in St. Petersburg and Vienna. At the same time, it should be noted that the opinions of Russian diplomats on this issue differed to the contrary, as mentioned in his memoirs by the famous British diplomat J. Buchanan. Thus, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople insisted on the immediate suppression of the Macedonian movement, and the ambassador in Sofia urged the leadership to help him as soon as possible ^{[7, p. 58]}. Unwilling to lose the sympathy of the Russian Empire, official Serbia and Montenegro sought to distance themselves from Macedonian problems.  At this time, the Russian Foreign Ministry began to consider Serbia as its mainstay in the Balkans. In early September 1903, in a conversation with the outstanding Serbian politician S. Novakovich, who arrived in St. Petersburg, Foreign Minister V. N. Lamzdorff especially emphasized the correct position of Serbia and stated that "everyone pays tribute to the maturity and moderation of the Serbian people and Serbia, and that today, more than ever, in conversations between the great powers consider their rights" ^{[5, p. 413]}. In Bulgaria, they realized that none of the Balkan powers would officially support it, and the country was completely unprepared to fight Turkey alone.

At the same time, a new round of contradictions between the great powers and the Port could not but cause concern in the Balkans, where they were increasingly thinking about their role in this confrontation. Despite the briefly established equilibrium after the conclusion of the Murzsteg Agreement, the events of August-September 1903 pushed the Balkan neighbors to establish ties and cooperation in the face of a crisis that seemed inevitable to them, and for the first time there was a tendency to coordinate actions between the Slavs in the fight against external expansion. Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro had no illusions about what the new Austro-Russian agreement might threaten, which was perceived, firstly, as a blow to Slavic interests, and secondly, as a kind of "half-measure" that could only complicate both the very essence of the Macedonian problem and the real situation of the Christian population ^{[8, pp. 72, 86]}. The Serbian Envoy to Turkey, J. P., wrote about this in great detail. Hristich: "Without any doubt, in such a way that she (Austria – D.B.) will not so easily abandon this treaty, which gives her, in a sense, the right to interfere in the affairs of the region; a right that Russia has so stubbornly disputed, and now clearly recognizes and shares with her in front of the whole of Europe. <...> We must pay special attention to this fact and be guided by it. To act differently, especially today, at such a serious and perhaps fateful moment for us, is to go against Serbia's interests. <...> Russia, first of all, cares about its own exclusively Russian interests, and it will never prefer any Slavic interests to them" ^{[5, pp. 320-330]}. J. Buchanan, a witness to the mood in Bulgarian society, also agrees with these provisions: "Although some of these measures were taken by the Bulgarian government with satisfaction, the whole plan was spoiled in his eyes by the fact that it was entrusted to Austria and Russia, the two most reactionary and selfish members of the European concert of powers. <...> at the same time, apart from the fear of self-isolation in case of defeat, the Bulgarian government was concerned about the idea that, taking advantage of the Russian devastation, Austria would occupy the northern districts of Macedonia" ^{[7, p. 59]}. Montenegro also held a similar opinion about the danger of the adopted program and the consequences of Russian-Austrian cooperation in the form of strengthening Vienna's expansionist policy.

Against this background, in September 1903, the first attempts were made by Serbian and Montenegrin politicians to establish a dialogue after a long confrontation between the Obrenovici and Negoshi Petrovici. It should be noted that in July of the same year Serbia temporarily recalled its ambassador from Cetinje and did not return him for the next four years ^{[2, p. 21]}. Montenegro did not have a representative in Belgrade until 1913. For this reason, diplomatic contacts between the countries were greatly complicated and took place either on the basis of direct correspondence between the foreign ministers, or through meetings of Serbian and Montenegrin diplomats in other foreign missions.

One of these meetings took place in September 1903 in Constantinople between the head of the Montenegrin Foreign Ministry, G. Vukovich, and the Serbian Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, S. Grujic. The diplomats exchanged opinions on the political situation against the background of the Macedonian uprising and the new reform plan and concluded that "it is disastrous both for our people in Turkey and for the two Serbian states" ^{[5, p. 805]}. Both diplomats initiated the improvement of Serbian-Montenegrin relations and agreed on the need to conclude a military-political agreement between the countries. At the same time, negotiations on a possible alliance also began between Bulgaria and Serbia. However, at this time, the idea of an agreement between Serbia and Montenegro was not further developed. Returning to Belgrade at the end of September, S. Grujic took over the post of Prime Minister and faced a number of internal political difficulties requiring immediate solution ^{[5, p. 805]}. The establishment of relations with Cetinje faded into the background until the end of 1903 – early 1904 and resumed when it was feared in the Balkans that, busy preparing for war with Japan, Russia would hardly be able to protect the interests of the Slavs.

At the end of December 1903, G. Vukovich sent a letter to S. Grujic with a reminder of the agreements reached and a proposal to proceed to concrete actions to conclude an agreement. "Don't be surprised at our impatience. The uncertainty in our relations in such conditions becomes not only unbearable, but also extremely dangerous for both countries," the minister wrote ^{[5, p. 805]}. The content of the letter is also very remarkable in that it reflects the personal political beliefs of G. Vukovich, one of the most prominent political figures in Montenegro, the closest assistant and close friend of Prince Nikola. Vukovich was a sincere supporter of the idea of South Slavic unification, and never separated the Montenegrins from the Serbs, while recognizing the dominant role of Serbia in gathering Slavs under the auspices of a single state ^{[8, p. 145]}. In this letter, he once again confirms this point of view, regarding the upcoming union as extremely important and even fateful for all Slavs. "Let's get ready for all the sacrifices that the whole Serbian people rightfully expect from us. <...> If we do not arrange all this as soon as possible, imagine what terrible responsibility we will assume for the future of the Serbian people," concludes G. Vukovich ^{[5, pp. 805-806]}.

The Serbs responded to Montenegro's call and in January sent the royal adjutant, Lieutenant Colonel Dragashevich, to the country to express the readiness of the Serbian government to negotiate an alliance ^{[5, p. 921]}. On February 10, G. Vukovich conveyed Prince Nikola's consent to all points of the preliminary agreement ^{[5, pp. 921-922]}, and the development of the text of the main agreement began which it was decided to keep secret. And although an understanding was reached between the parties at this stage, later the situation showed how differently the union was treated in Serbia and Montenegro, and why in the end the agreement remained on paper.

It is worth saying that at first a possible alliance was not considered seriously by Serbian politicians and was seen only as one of the possible tactical steps in the struggle for the liberation of European territories of Turkey and as protection against possible attempts by Austria to annex the Novopazar Sanjak at a time when Russia is distracted by the war. At the same time, the Serbian government strictly adhered to Russian recommendations and shared the need to maintain the status quo, which was repeatedly emphasized by N. Pasic, who took over the post of Foreign Minister in early February 1904. On February 1, in a letter to his friend, the Serbian Ambassador in Vienna M. Vujic, he stressed that the basis of Serbian foreign policy is "maintaining peace" and "assistance in the reforms proposed by Russia and Austria" and wrote that he would continue to develop friendly relations with the countries in this spirit ^{[5, p. 943]}.

In Montenegro, the opposite opinion was held during this period, but there were reasons for that. In conversations with the Russian military agent in Cetinje, N. M. Potapov, Prince Nikola during this period spoke extremely negatively about the Murzsteg reforms and Russian-Austrian cooperation: "I tremble <...> at the thought that Russia, embroiled in a war with Japan, can leave the pacification of Macedonia to Austria-Hungary alone. It would be better to give the Balkan Slavs themselves the opportunity to settle scores with their ancestral enemy, the Turks, than to hand it over to the Austrians, infinitely more hateful to them than even the Turks!" ^{[9, p. 97]}. The ruler also assessed the prospects of Serbo-Montenegrin and generally Slavic cooperation in a very peculiar way, not missing an opportunity to draw Russia's attention to himself. "Report, Colonel, to your superiors," Prince Nicholas continued, "that Montenegro with its prince is currently the only stronghold of the South Balkan Slavs. Neither King Peter of Serbia nor Ferdinand of Bulgaria enjoy such prestige among the local Slavs as I do. Let the governments of Serbia and Bulgaria be set against our great patroness by the intrigues of Russia's enemies. But believe me, Colonel, my word alone will be enough for not only the Serbs of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia and the current kingdom to rise up against their governments and join us for a common struggle for the Slavic cause, but even the majority of Bulgarians would join us for this purpose..."– quoted the ruler in one of his reports of January 1904, a military agent ^{[9, pp. 97-98]}.

Such extremely harsh rhetoric of the Montenegrin ruler was explained, first of all, by justified fears that Austria-Hungary was preparing to annex the territories of the Novopazar Sanjak, the buffer zone separating Montenegro from Serbia, and was also a kind of attempt by Prince Nikola to remind Russia of his loyalty. Russian Ambassador A. N. Shcheglov informed the leadership: "He is extremely burdened by the complete uncertainty in which he finds himself in these difficult times regarding the future of his principality. From all sides, news reaches him about Austria's preparations for an active policy in the Balkans and rumors of bloody riots in the neighborhood of Montenegro in the spring. Meanwhile, Russia does not tell him definitely whether he should prepare for war or sit still, no matter what happens in Europe" ^{[9, p. 112]}. The Foreign Ministry, however, was laconic and calm on this point, conveying that Montenegro "has nothing to worry about at all" ^{[9, p. 114]}.

But unsatisfactory news continued to be received in the principality, indicating an increase in the number of Austrian troops along the Montenegrin borders in Sanjak and Bosnia and Herzegovina, regular supplies of weapons and food supplies. Military agent N. M. Potapov reported to the General Staff that the Austrians were supporting local Albanian tribes, as well as conducting secret propaganda work, pasting various proclamations within the Novopazar Sanjak ^{[9, p. 121]}.

Concern was gradually transmitted to Serbian diplomats, whose reports during this period were almost entirely limited to attempts to draw the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to what was happening. From the information received in February-March from the Serbian consulates in Macedonia, it followed that the reforms had no success; at the same time, the influence of Austria steadily increased, and the Russian influence fell ^{[5, p. 954]}. In addition, there were attempts by Austria-Hungary to take advantage of Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty, according to which it actually secured the right to occupy the Novopazar Sanjak, so important for the national Serbo-Montenegrin interests. The first step in this direction was Vienna's attempts to withdraw these territories from the Murzstag reform program.

Serbian Ambassador to Vienna M. Vujic wrote to N. Pasic that "the local military and public circles not only do not believe in the possibility of successful implementation of the reform program, moreover, they hope for complications that would lead them to the desired annexation – and further, to occupation outside Mitrovica" ^{[5, p. 911]}. In addition, he noted the difference in the assessment of the situation among Russian diplomats. In particular, the secretary of the Russian embassy in Belgrade (who temporarily replaced the functions of ambassador due to the departure of N. V. Charykov), V. V. Muravyov-Apostol-Korobyin, holds "exactly the same opinion" about the plans of the Dual Monarchy, but the permanent ambassador of Russia to Austria since 1895, P. A. Kapnist, "wants to believe in the complete sincerity of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan agreement, and immediately perceives any negative news as speculation by the Balkan peoples on Austro-Russian differences" ^{[5, p. 912]}. The diplomat A. N. Shcheglov also wrote about this: "Passing through Vienna, I saw our ambassador to Austria, and Count Kapnist told me that, according to his conviction, the Habsburg Empire would now do nothing to violate the status quo in the Balkans, unless it was forced to do so by the machinations of the Serbs, Montenegrins and Bulgarians in the occupied provinces or in Old Serbia" ^{[9, p. 113]}.

It should be noted that P. A. Kapnist, back in the 90s of the XIX century. acted as one of the ardent supporters of the rapprochement of the two empires, but at the same time believed that simply maintaining the status quo did not meet Russian interests in the Balkans, and, in this regard, put forward a plan for a joint partition of the European territories of Turkey with Austria between the Balkan states. Foreign Minister V. N. Lamsdorff criticized Kapnist's proposals, saying that it was diametrically at odds with the peace-loving policy that Russia had chosen. Therefore, one of the important tasks of the diplomat at the post in Vienna was to keep the young Balkan countries from reckless policies that could drag the country into a major military conflict.

Along with M. Vujic, another prominent Serbian politician, M. Milovanovic, paid great attention to this problem, who in different years held the positions of Minister of Justice, Minister of Finance and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Serbia. In 1904, he represented the country in Italy and worked to gain Italy's favor in the context of the Balkan issue and the formation of military and political alliances^{[1][2, p. 27]}. Milovanovic was of the opinion that the Balkan countries should work together to stop the further development of the Macedonian movement, as this could prevent all other peoples in the Balkans from solving their national tasks, since they are not ready for this yet. This is exactly what the diplomat saw as the main goal of the nascent Balkan alliance. "My opinion, which I see as my duty to inform you, is that now that Japan has already thrown down the gauntlet to Russia, and when Russia is forced to gather all its forces in the Far East, the first, most necessary task is to do everything so that an agreement is reached between Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria not for the sake of solutions to the Macedonian issue, but exclusively in the practical field of protecting joint interests against outsiders," he wrote to N. Pashich ^{[5, p. 925]}. At the same time, however, Milovanovich noted with displeasure that each of the Balkan countries "pulls the blanket over itself", and also stressed the danger of the fact that Austria has a strong influence among the Albanian population ^{[5, p. 944]}.  

N. Pasic paid great attention to M. Milovanovich's assessments and his impressions of communication with the Italian ruling circles. In addition, at the end of February, the Minister of Foreign Affairs received information that, thanks to the intrigues of Vienna, in Skopje, Kumanovo and a number of other areas of the Kosovo Vilayet, not Russian gendarmes were put under surveillance, as was assumed by the initial reform plan, but Austrian ones ^{[5, p. 967]}.

This fact convinced the Serbian leadership to hurry up with the development of the text of the union treaty, which was sent to Montenegro on April 27, 1904. It was based on the principle of "The Balkans to the Balkan peoples", and also defined the main range of territorial claims of both states. Thus, the sphere of Serbia's interests included: Senica, Novi Pazar, Mitrovica, Skopje to Vardar, Bitol and Ohrid, and Montenegro: Pljevlja, Berane, Pec, Prizren, Skadar and Drac ^{[10, p. 276]}. In addition, the parties agreed to jointly prevent any intervention in the solution of the Albanian issue in relation to the Skadar region, and to use force of arms for this, if necessary. It is interesting to emphasize the fact that by this point Serbia had decided to recognize Montenegro's claims to Pec and Prizren, which had previously been the subject of serious disputes between Prince Nikola and King Alexander.

Despite the fact that this draft was generally accepted by the Montenegrin ruler, he considered it necessary to make a number of changes to it. In particular, he considered it mandatory to introduce a clause on the role of Russia as a kind of initiator and observer at the conclusion of the treaty, and also proposed to emphasize the special role of Skadar as a native Serbian territory. It is quite true in this case that N. Rakocevich's statement that this was done by the prince in an effort to protect the interests of his dynasty from the possible intentions of Italy and Austria-Hungary to include these territories into independent Albania ^{[2, p. 29]}. The attempt to include Russia in the text of the agreement was hardly necessary (since the agreement already included a clause stating that it would act as an arbitrator in possible Serbian-Montenegrin disputes), but rather a political trick peculiar to Prince Nicholas. With such a step, he seemed to show loyalty and loyalty to the Russian emperor. At the same time, this is what has apparently become a stumbling block between Montenegro and Serbia.

These amendments were also reviewed by the Russian representative in Cetinje, A. N. Shcheglov, and then a copy of the draft was sent to the Foreign Ministry and Emperor Nicholas II, who fully approved it, since the Serbian-Montenegrin union under the auspices of Russia would further emphasize the degree of its presence and influence in the Balkans ^{[11, p. 455]}.

In Serbia, the amendments were considered unnecessary and did not change the essence of the treaty, and the inclusion of a clause concerning Russia in it was generally impossible. As N. Pasic wrote in a reply letter to the Montenegrin Foreign Ministry on June 3, 1904, this does not matter in maintaining the status quo, but at the same time imposes unnecessary responsibility on St. Petersburg for all that the Balkan countries will undertake in the future. Well understanding the policy of Prince Nicholas, he rather pointedly remarked: "Russians are pleased to see how we work in accordance with the course of their policy, but not when they are told that all this is done only out of an effort to please them, since they see in this the cunning of their younger brothers, who act out of self-interest to to bind the duty of the elder brother" ^{[10, p. 374]}.

Nevertheless, Prince Nikola preferred to remain firmly on the principles expressed by him and did not accept the clarification of the Serbian side. Subsequently, a number of attempts were made to still achieve the signing of the union treaty, to which Montenegro later proposed to add a trade treaty ^{[10, p. 727]}. Without much success, the negotiations continued for about a year, while not moving at all from the dead end. The situation was not improved by the presence of the Montenegrin delegation at the coronation of Peter Karageorgievich in Belgrade in the autumn of 1904.

In turn, Russia, preoccupied with the war with Japan, stopped interfering in the Balkan problems for a while, and the Foreign Ministry did not give any recommendations to its staff on whether to promote the establishment of relations between the Balkan countries.

Russian diplomats themselves on the ground held different opinions about both the need and the possibility of concluding a Serbo-Montenegrin alliance, and later, probably fearing unnecessary complications in the Balkans, they stopped supporting it altogether. As noted in the monograph by N. I. Khitrova, A. N. Shcheglov and P. A. Kapnist took the position of Montenegro on this issue and fully approved the amendments made by Montenegro to the text of the agreement ^{[3, p. 204]}. In the spring of 1905, Shcheglov had to leave Cetinje, and his place was briefly taken by the diplomat Yu. Ya. Solovyov, who openly told Foreign Minister G. Vukovich that apart from the patronage of Russia, the country did not need any other unions at all^{[2] [2, p. 36]}. At the same time, it is likely that this was a private opinion of Solovyov, a rather harsh person in his statements, as evidenced by the diplomatic scandal after which he was recalled from Montenegro^{[3][12, p. 162]}.

N. Rakocevich, relying in his work on the memoirs of G. Vukovich, writes that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prince Nikolai perceived this position as a demarche of the Russian government, and sees this as the main reason why the treaty was never signed ^{[2, p. 37]}. N. I. Khitrova, based on In Russian diplomatic documents, she did not confirm this version and expressed the opinion that the unsolvable territorial disputes between the neighbors were to blame ^{[3, p. 205]}. At the same time, this statement does not fully correspond to reality, since a comparison of all the draft agreements shows that the parties, in general, outlined the range of desired territories and at that time came to an understanding, and possible disputes over the delimitation should have been resolved after their acquisition.

Summing up, it can be noted once again that the hopes for rapprochement between Serbia and Montenegro, which were born under the influence of the Macedonian national liberation movement, did not materialize. Due to the complicated communication between the countries, due to the lack of diplomatic representatives in both Serbia and Montenegro, and as a result, limited sources, today it seems difficult to fully characterize all the reasons why the union between Serbia and Montenegro, which was supposed to be one of the steps towards the Balkan union, was never concluded. Undoubtedly, the tough positions and even the stubbornness of politicians on both sides played a big role. "The failure of the negotiations showed that expectations were unrealistic that relations between the two countries would improve with changes in Serbia," R. Raspopovich writes in his monograph on Montenegrin diplomacy ^{[11, p. 456]}. He concludes that Serbian-Montenegrin relations during this period became even worse than during the reign of Alexander Obrenovich, which is confirmed by the absence of the Serbian ambassador in Cetinje. R. Lusic also held a similar opinion based on the analysis of G. Vukovich's memoirs, where there is a lot of evidence of bad personal relations between the two rulers – Peter Karageorgievich and Nikola Petrovich-Negosh ^{[8, pp. 148-149]}. Without a doubt, the researchers are right about this issue. Until the events of the Bosnian crisis of 1908, relations between the two countries would only worsen, culminating in the so-called "bomb trial", when the Montenegrin ruler accused official Belgrade of preparing an assassination attempt on him.

Nevertheless, there was a place for constructive cooperation in official relations between the countries. Since 1903, Serbian-Montenegrin negotiations on common current issues have been held on a regular basis through personal correspondence between Foreign Ministers N. Pasic and G. Vukovich. During them, Serbia and Montenegro managed to resolve the brewing migration crisis associated with a large number of Montenegrins wishing to resettle in Serbia, agree on new customs tariffs and sign a trade convention ^{[10, p. 535]}. Despite the fact that a military alliance was not concluded, the countries officially coordinated the main direction of policy towards Austria-Hungary and Turkey, expressed their desire to promote the principle of "The Balkans to the Balkan peoples", which Russia would later officially support. In addition, for the first time, the importance and danger of the Albanian issue in relation to the national Serbo-Montenegrin interests were emphasized.

At the same time, the main reason for the unsuccessful outcome of the negotiations, it seems to us, was that the foreign policy of both states was undergoing a period of transformation, and by that time its course towards the Balkan problem had been worked out only in the most general sense, without taking into account all significant factors, solely under the influence of rumors about possible attempts Austria will seize Serbian territories. Thus, the idea of an alliance was dictated by an urgent political need. And if Prince Nikola's rhetoric in conversations with diplomats was often belligerent towards his ancestral enemies, then in Serbia, on the contrary, they sought to maintain the status quo as long as possible, and having received reassuring guarantees that Vienna was not seeking to annex the Novopazar Sanjak ^{[13, p. 700]}, they stopped considering a military alliance with Montenegro is necessary. This is evidenced by the reports of the Russian Ambassador to Serbia, K. A. Gubastov. "<...> The King said that he most of all wishes that there would be no serious confusion on the Balkan Peninsula this year, which is completely untimely for Serbia," he informed the Russian Foreign Ministry in April 1905 ^{[14, p. 396]}.

It would take a long time for both countries to be ready, together with other forces on the Balkan Peninsula, to start fighting for their national aspirations.