Handmade methods of countering kamikaze FPV drones (based on the experience of the Special Military Operation)

Gonta Semen Nikolaevich Student; Department of Theory of Law and State, History and Philosophy; Sochi State University 354000, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Sochi, ul. Plastunskaya, 94 rudolf.diesel.bmw@gmail.com Other publications by this author     Ivanov Nikolai Aleksandrovich Lecturer, Department of Physical Culture and Sports, Sochi State University 354000, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Sochi, ul. Plastunskaya, 94 ivanovnik45@yandex.ru Other publications by this author

Malkova Yuliya Aleksandrovna PhD in History Associate Professor; Department of Theory of Law and State, History and Philosophy; Sochi State University 354000, Russia, Krasnodar Territory, Sochi, ul. Plastunskaya, 94 malkov01@rambler.ru Other publications by this author

Introduction

Modern military conflicts around the world show that non-systemic improvised (artisanal) weapons that are used by various forces around the world should not be underestimated. Starting from entire regions (the Khyber Passage in Pakistan), where so-called artisanal (atypical) firearms are produced, and up to the first experience of using modified civilian attack drones by terrorists in the Middle East, it can be noted that where there is a shortage of technical or financial resources, improvised weapons always appear, which, by their effectiveness, can not inferior to conventional weapons.

In this article, it is proposed to consider the issue of artisanal methods of protection against the types of improvised barrage ammunition that have already become familiar to us – kamikaze FPV drones. As mentioned above, the first attempts to use civilian quadrocopters (drones) were made by the terrorists of ISIS* (* a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) in the Middle East, however, it is today that we can observe the real flourishing of the scope of civilian quadrocopters in military operations, which began after the start of a Special Military Operation (SVO) in In 2022.

Based on this, the relevance of the study lies in the fact that currently the increasing influence of kamikaze FPV drones and the availability of protection from them in the army on the defense capability of troops directly on the battlefield is becoming apparent. Therefore, it is interesting to consider ways to protect against FPV drones, which are already used in military conflicts and, above all, in the fields of their own.

The purpose of the study is to consider and analyze artisanal methods of countering kamikaze FPV drones in modern military conflicts.

This article is an attempt by the authors to analyze the experience and process of evolution of artisanal methods of countering kamikaze FPV drones, which has occurred over the past few years of ITS implementation.

Materials and research methods

The materials for this study were numerous photographs and videos from military journalists, bloggers, official representatives of the Ministries of Defense, the media, etc., which were analyzed by the authors. All images used in this article are photographic citations, and under each illustration there is a link to the original source (if it was possible to reliably establish one).

The methodology of the work is determined directly by the research topic and includes general scientific research methods: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, content analysis method. The authors also use other methods in their work, namely historical-genetic and narrative research methods.

The bibliographic database of this work consists of current research by domestic and foreign authors related to the topic of drones, quadrocopters and their use in the military sphere.

Discussion

In the modern Russian scientific environment, publications on the topic of various UAVs and FPV drones are just beginning to appear. Among these, we will single out the works of some authors: articles by I. A. Solovatov ^[1] and S. N. Gont ^[2], the work of the team of authors of the Ryazan Guards Military Technical University ^[3], articles by A. A. Mataras, I. Y. Gulyaev ^[4] and K. E. Leskov, I. Y. Sharapov ^[5].

Among the foreign studies, we will single out the works of the authors: an article by Anna Kornet and Tomas Balzezak ^[6], a work by Brazilian military Gilberto Frison ^[7], an article by Cornell University scientists Sarah Kreps and Paul Lushchenko ^[8], an article by journalist Jason Sherman ^[9], as well as a study by an international group of authors ^[10].

The results of the study

This article is a logical continuation of the research on the use of civilian quadrocopters and FPV drones in the military sphere, which was started in an article by the author S. N. Gont ^[2], where the role of civilian quadrocopters (drones) in the military sphere is traced using the example of recent military conflicts. However, this study analyzes precisely the combat use of drones, without covering in detail the topic of countering such weapons.

Based on this, in this article it is proposed to consider the opposite side of the scope of application of quadrocopters in combat operations, namely methods of countering such drones. It is worth noting here that various types of technical counteraction to the drones in question are currently being actively developed and tested (primarily in the field of electronic warfare), but so far such systems are either imperfect in the fight against kamikaze FPV drones, or are limited in nature and are not widely found on the battlefield.

Therefore, in this article, artisanal methods of countering drones were chosen for consideration, since they are, by far, the most common and accessible means of countering kamikaze drones for military personnel on both sides.

Anti-drone safety nets.

First, let's look at the easiest and least reliable way to protect against kamikaze FPV drones - various types of networks.

Camouflage nets have long been used in almost all armies of the world, but with the beginning of its military operations and the widespread use of kamikaze drones, it became clear that such networks can also be to some extent "traps" for drones. Here are just a few examples of such protection.

Even at the first stages of its military operation, the State Border Service of Ukraine reported a case when a Russian kamikaze FPV drone got entangled in a camouflage net installed in the location and did not detonate (Figure 1).

Figure 1. A Russian FPV drone stuck in a camouflage net.

Source: State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.

It is worth noting here that usually such kamikaze drones carry PG-7VR cumulative grenades from the Soviet RPG-7 (the so-called "shot" RPG) as a warhead, and can also be additionally equipped with plastid. Based on this, the explosion of such a drone occurs after direct physical contact with the target. Therefore, if such a drone does not come into contact with an object for some reason, the detonation of the warhead does not occur.

Another example of such protection, already from the Russian side, is from 2024, when a Ukrainian kamikaze FPV drone flew to the calculation position of the Russian D-30 howitzer and also got stuck in the camouflage network (Figure 2).

Figure 2. A Ukrainian FPV drone stuck in a camouflage net.

Source: YouTube channel of the TV channel Transbaikalia ^[11].

As noted directly by the military personnel in the interview, this drone was neutralized by controlled detonation, shooting it with a machine gun. Later, when it became clear that such a form of protection against kamikaze drones was also possible, the military personnel in the field went further and began to develop the use of such networks.

So, in 2022, Western and Russian journalists reported that the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to use heavier, already metal nets to protect their positions with artillery installations, stretching them over American M777 howitzers (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Mounting of metal protective nets over M777 howitzers by the Ukrainian military.

Source: ANNA NEWS ^[12].

It should be noted that such metal nets can be quite effective against light kamikaze FPV drones, however, their effectiveness is sharply reduced against heavier versions of barrage ammunition, such as Russian Lancets, etc.

Also, in 2023, it became known that the Russian military uses artisanal mesh frames to strengthen their trenches and protect them from being hit by kamikaze FPV drones ^[13], aerial photographs of these trenches were distributed on the Internet.

However, there is currently no information available on the effectiveness of such methods of protection against kamikaze FPV drones. However, it is noted that the main purpose of such protective frames is, first of all, to hinder the aerial reconnaissance of the enemy using quadrocopters.

Thus, at the end of this section, we can conclude that the considered protective nets are the "first line of defense" against kamikaze FPV drones and are, in many ways, intended to make aerial reconnaissance difficult for the enemy. And the function of protecting such networks from the direct detonation of kamikaze drones is random, as the examples described above show.

Anti-drone metal protective visors (so-called "Braziers").

The following method of countering kamikaze FPV drones is perhaps the most widespread and effective found in both the Russian and Ukrainian armies. Some time after the start of the military operation, when it became clear that civilian quadrocopters and kamikaze FPV drones pose a significant danger to armored vehicles on the battlefield, the soldiers themselves found a simple, cheap and, as it turned out, effective way out.

Self-made power structures with visors began to be welded on all types of armored vehicles, which prevent the effects of dropping shells from quadrocopters or reduce damage from hitting kamikaze FPV drones.

Such artisanal protection showed quite successful protection of light equipment from kamikaze FPV drones and drop drones, and therefore soon began to be massively used by both sides. The range of equipment that is equipped with such protection includes almost all wheeled and tracked vehicles that participate in combat operations (Figure 4).

Figure 4. A Russian tank with a factory visor and additional makeshift chain-link protection.

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

These "technical innovations" were quickly picked up by the direct manufacturers of armored vehicles. As an example, let's take the Russian Uralvagonzavod, which at the end of 2023 began equipping its tanks with factory visors from kamikaze FPV drones ^[14].

It is also worth noting here that in addition to factory protection, military personnel are actively refining anti-drone protection at their own discretion, as can be seen in Figure 4, where, in addition to the standard visor, an additional protection bar is installed at the back. In this regard, we will pay attention to the materials from which such an artisanal anti-drone protection is made.

As another example, we will cite here the footage of the State border Service of Ukraine, distributed in 2024. They showed the process of refining the Canadian light armored vehicle "Roshel", which has been actively used by various units of Ukraine since the beginning of its military operation.

The "naked" cars that arrived from Canada are already in place, directly in the unit itself, being modified by welding protective anti-drone visors made of chain link mesh and reinforcement bars to the most vulnerable places (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Canadian armored car "Roshel" GPSU with artisanal anti-drone protection made of chain link mesh.

Source: State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.

Note that the experience of such improvements has not gone unnoticed in the world. After the Hamas militants invaded Israel on October 7, 2023, a new round of Arab-Israeli conflict took place in the Middle East. After the October events, Israel announced a military operation "iron swords" against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Almost immediately after the start of active hostilities, it became clear that the Israeli Merkava tanks were practically defenseless against attacks by Hamas militants using quadcopter dropships ^{[2, pp. 84-85]}.

It is obvious that in their military training, the Hamas militants used precisely the experience of their own military, where such means had long been used at that time. However, the Israeli army very quickly corrected its mistake and after some time, footage of the work of the IDF units appeared on the network, where it was seen that the Merkava tanks also began to be equipped with homemade anti-drone visors (Figure 6).

Figure 6. The Israeli Merkava tank with the initial version of the anti-drone visor, the beginning of the operation in Rafah.

Source: Israel Defense Forces.

Later, information and footage began to appear about new andronov protection options for Israeli tanks ^[15]. So, at the end of January 2024, footage of Merkava tanks appeared on the network, where you can see improved versions of anti-drone visors installed in the factory (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Israeli Merkava tank with an improved anti-drone visor, January 21, 2024.

Source: The Warzone ^[15].

Thus, Israel became one of the first countries in the world to quickly adopt the experience of a Special Military Operation. However, other countries have gradually begun to use this experience. So, at the end of March 2024, it became known that the army of the People's Republic of China began to equip its wheeled armored vehicles with anti-drone visors (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Chinese armored personnel carrier ZBD-09 in competition with a welded anti-drone visor.

Source: Defense Blog ^[16].

The footage of the above Chinese armored personnel carrier was taken at a military competition involving the ground forces of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA).

Let us note here another country that has adopted the experience of its military operations – India. In October 2023, anti-drone visors were also seen on the tanks, protecting the weak point of the tank's turret (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Indian T-90 tank with anti-drone visor.

Source: StratNews Global.

This anti-drone protection was seen on the tanks of the Western Command, which is responsible for the Indian-Pakistani border. This step seems quite logical, since currently most of the aforementioned terrorist and other groups (Hamas, Houthis ^[17], etc.) use light civilian drones, and, as you know, there are certain contradictions in Indian-Pakistani relations, not counting the direct threat from various Islamist terrorist organizations based in Pakistan.

Thus, at the end of this section, we can conclude that the artisanal anti-drone visors discussed above have become a mandatory and necessary element of protecting any military equipment on the battlefield. And the experience of such anti-drone protection, gained during the SVO, is being actively analyzed and is beginning to be successfully applied in the armies of various countries.

Anti-drone metal and other heavy protective structures (so-called "Assault sheds" or "Turtle tanks").

This method of protection against kamikaze FPV drones is a logical continuation and improvement of previous forms. So, at the end of April 2024, a number of Ukrainian media began to report that the Russian military began to use unusual types of reinforcement of their armored vehicles in the zone of their own.

Later, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Zvezda TV channel showed the operation of one of these machines in the south Donetsk direction ^[18]. Here it is interesting to consider the anti-drone protection of this howitzer, which is not only a classic anti-drone visor, but also additional heavy protection in the form of logs from a log cabin, which were installed inside the protective visor around the perimeter of the tower (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Russian self-propelled howitzer Msta-S "Kosandra".

Source: Zvezda shopping mall^[19].

As noted in an interview with Zvezda shopping mall, the commander of this self-propelled gun: "the metal lattice roof on the Msta-S self-propelled gun protects the howitzer from dropping ammunition from quadrocopters of the Baba-Yaga type, the grid in the frontal part protects from enemy FPV drones, and the log cabin around the tower also protects from multicopters and artillery fragments in counter-battery duels" ^[18].

It is worth noting here that the Ukrainian Baba-Yaga attack quadrocopters, which are actively used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, pose a serious threat to armored vehicles, since they can carry up to 4 cumulative grenades for dropping, and their control is carried out via the Starlink satellite network.

Next, let's look at another artisanal method of protecting armored vehicles from kamikaze FPV drones. So, in April 2024, it also became known that Russian troops began to use T-72 tanks with sheet anti-drone protection welded on top in the SVO zone. Apparently, such weighted anti-drone structures were originally anti-drone visors, which were later welded with metal sheets for greater protection from kamikaze drones.

Later, footage appeared on the network with an even more improved design of the turtle tank ^[20], the protection of which, in addition to metal sheets, was covered with additional metal grilles on top (Figure 11).

Figure 11. A Russian tank with super-heavy anti-drone handicraft welded protection.

Source: Military Review ^[20].

Such reinforced tanks were immediately dubbed "assault sheds" by the Ukrainian and Western media, as they were seen in the offensive actions of Russian troops. It should be noted that such anti-drone protection is significantly more effective than conventional protective visors, this was also confirmed by subsequent videos, where it is clear that this "porcupine" (as it was dubbed by the Russian media) withstood the hit of about 40 kamikaze drones without any damage to itself.

At the end of this section, we can conclude that protective anti-drone visors are currently evolving into more powerful power structures, which are currently used only in the hottest areas of the free zone, during assault operations.

Conclusion

Currently, it is becoming obvious that with the beginning of the use of quadrocopters and kamikaze FPV drones in combat, the context of military conflicts themselves has changed. The massive use of these cheap and, at the same time, effective methods of destroying armored vehicles creates an unequal situation in which a cheap drone priced at 300-400 dollars can effectively destroy and disable expensive armored vehicles worth millions of dollars. Therefore, this situation required an immediate solution to the problem of kamikaze FPV drones on the battlefield. And while standard technical means of countering drones (laser weapons, electronic warfare systems, etc.) are currently still being tested or are not so common in the military, the solution to the problem came from below, namely from military personnel in the field, who began to develop and apply various types of anti-drone protection on their own.

In this article, we have reviewed the main methods of artisanal protection against kamikaze FPV drones, among which, of course, homemade power structures and anti-drone mesh visors stand out. It should be noted that if at the very beginning many Western journalists and military observers openly ridiculed the armed forces of the Russian Federation for using artistically welded anti-drone "grills" and "barbecues", now their sufficient effectiveness in protecting against FPV drones has become obvious to absolutely everyone. And the experience of such protection began to spread in other countries of the world, as can be seen from the analysis of the examples of Israel, China and India in this work.